REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
COMMERCIAL AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION
INSOLVENCY NO. E035 OF 2020
AGNES WANJIKU MUKIRI …………………..……………………..
…... DEBTOR/ APPLICANT
-VERSUS-
AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION…………………………...
………. CREDITOR/ RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The subject of this Ruling is an application to set aside
statutory demand brought vide a notice of motion dated 19 th
December 2020 under sections 17(1)(d) and 17(3) of the
Insolvency Act 2015 and regulation 17 Insolvency
Regulations, 2016.
2. The said statutory demand is dated 30th November 2020 and
was issued and together with the Husband Peter Mukiri
Gateri acting as directors of their three companies. The
alleged debt sum is Kenya Shillings One Hundred and
Thirty-Three Million, Eight Hundred and Eighty-One
thousand, one hundred and forty-one and eighty-five cents.
(133,881,141.85/=)
3. The Debtor through her application dated 19th December
2020 now prays for orders to set aside the said Statutory
Demand issued on 27th November 2020 together with costs
of the Application.
4. The Application is supported by various grounds
propounded through Affidavit evidence of the Debtor and
written submissions dated 30th August 2022. The
Respondent opposed the Application vide the Replying
affidavit of Louis Omukhulu sworn on 3 rd May 2022 and
their written submissions dated 4th November 2022.
Summary of the Applicant’s Case
5. The Statutory demand subject to this application is based on
a bank guarantee given by the Applicant herein and her
husband who are the sole shareholders and directors of
three private family companies. The Applicant claims that
the Respondent lured them into a scheme whereby they
signed letters of offer and borrowing resolutions purporting
to have taken legal advice whilst they had not. Notably, the
debtors had previously dealt with other bankers from KCB,
Equity and HCFK. However, with the Respondent herein its
two agents would bring draft facility letters to the office and
would not give them time to acquire independent legal
advice before signing the same. As such the Applicant raises
issue that they were dealing with experienced banking
officers who knew the legal significance of the of the
documents having prepared them therefore there was an
inequality in the bargaining process.
6. On 13th August 2015, the creditor granted to Pemuga
Autospares the sum of Kshs. 20 million which was working
capital and a letter of credit of 25 million that went into
importation of spare parts. Additionally, the sum of Kshs.
43,560,00.00/= extended to Vision 2030 Homes went into
purchase of land at Thika which was charged to the bank,
namely Thika Municipality Block 13/523, 13/525, 14/981
and 14/973. The two latter plots are the subject of a suit in
the nature of disputed ownership at the Thika ELC Court
whereby the Respondent/Creditor herein has filed a Defence
to defends their right in the securities.
7. On 15th June 2017 the Creditor issued upon the debtors a
Statutory Notice but thereafter decided to restructure the
loans into one. The final document for the restructuring was
also issued to the debtors for their signature without the
benefit of independent legal advice which the applicant
holds to be unfair and in fraudulent procedure as
previously resorted to by the bank in the former facilities
obtained.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the Applicant urges this Court to
find that the Respondent acted unconscionably by
knowingly taking advantage of the debtors due to the
inequality of the bargaining powers between the parties.
9. The second arm of the Applicant’s argument is that the debt
herein is disputed. As such, it cannot be the foundation of
the statutory demand herein or the insolvency proceedings.
This position is supported by several cases including
Cruisar Ltd v CMC Aviation Limited (No. 2) [1978]
KLR 131. In sum, she alleges that there is a genuine
dispute on the alleged amounts claimed which are also the
subject of pending litigation in COMM E509 of 2020.
Therefore, the process initiated by the creditor via the
statutory demand herein is an abuse of court process as it
runs parallel to the said pending suit.
Summary of the Respondent’s case
10. As per the Respondent, the facts are that the Applicant with
her husband run family businesses of which they act as
directors. Their three companies include; Pemuga
Autospares Limited, Vision Twenty Thirty Dream Homes
Limited and and Rajaa Stones Limited. On diverse dates
from the year 2014 to 2017, various credit facilities were
advanced by the Respondent in respect to two of the three
family businesses and the Applicant, her husband and their
third company gave bank guarantees for the loan facilities.
11. Sometimes in the year 2017, the two companies defaulted
and consequently the bank issued a Demand. However, the
bank resulted to restructuring all the loans in order to have
a single facility which was accepted by the debtors. As a
result, on 28th September 2017 the applicant and her
husband executed Personal deeds of guarantee/indemnity in
favour of Pemuga Auto Spares Limited with a term loan
limit of Kshs. 79,970,304 at an interest rate of 14% p.a, with
a default rate interest at 2% per month.
12. By 21st May 2018, the default by the debtors had continued
and the outstanding loan amount was at Kshs.
85,404,690.73/= The creditor requested for additional
security to no avail and on 7th February 2020 it conducted
valuations on the securities it held. Subsequently, it could
not find any successful potential buyers for two of the
properties. The other two of the four secured properties
were the subject of a suit whereby ownership was being
disputed in Thika Environment and Land Court Case
Number No. 216 of 2018. The result was that security
could not be realized and the debt amount had now
skyrocketed to Kshs. 126,369,610.73/= as of 30 th June 2020.
In that light, the bank served a demand letter on 9 th October
2020 in the said sum.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION:
13. The court has perused the arguments by both parties and
has come to various conclusions. The main issue is whether
the Statutory Demand issued upon the Applicant should be
set aside.
14. The law on setting aside is found in the Insolvency
Regulations 2016 regulation 17 which provides:
a. If the Debtor appears to have a counterclaim, set-
off, or cross-demand which equals or exceeds the
amount of debt or debts specified in the statutory
demand;
b. The debt is disputed on grounds that appear to be
substantial;
c. It appears that the creditor holds some security I
respect of the debt claimed by the demand, and
either paragraph (6) is not complied with in
respect of the demand, or the court is satisfied
that the value of the security equals or exceeds
the full amount of the debt; or
d. The court is satisfied, on other grounds that the
demand ought to be set aside
15. The Applicant’s case seems to hinge mainly on Regulation
17(b) that the debt is disputed and as such raises various
substantial grounds which can be summarized as follows;
a. That the personal guarantees given by the debtors
herein are unenforceable as the Creditor obtained
them under undue influence and fraudulent
misrepresentation by not advising the debtors to
obtain independent legal advice before executing
them.
b. That the Insolvency Proceedings by the Creditor herein
are an abuse of the Court Process as there is another
suit HCCC E509 of 2020 African Banking Corporation
Limited v Pemuga Autospares and Others whereby the
Creditor seeks similar reliefs.
16. On the first ground, the Court notes that the debtors were
directors of the companies and had previously dealt with
banks. The Court is also alive to the fact that it is seldom in
any negotiation that the bargaining power of the parties are
absolutely equal and therefore it is not enough to say that
such inequality exists but a party must show that the
unconscionable use such power by the stronger party. In
the case of Kisii Safari Inns Limited and 2 others v
Deutsche Investitions-Und Enwicklungsgelischaft
(‘Deg’) & others [2011] eKLR it was held:
The doctrine of unconscionable bargains is also
an equitable doctrine. There are at least three
prerequisites to the application of the doctrine,
firstly, that the bargain must be oppressive to the
extent that the very terms of the bargain reveal
conduct which shocks the conscience of the
court. Secondly, that the victim must have been
suffering from certain types of bargaining
processes, and, thirdly, the stronger party must
have acted unconscionably in the sense of having
knowingly taken advantage of the victim to the
extent that behavior of the stronger party is
morally reprehensible.
17. The Applicant alleges that the unconscionable bargain was
as a result of failure of the Creditor to advise the debtors to
obtain independent legal advice. The case of Barclays
Bank Plc v O’ Brien and Another [1993] All ER 417 is
relied on to allege fraudulent misrepresentation by the
Creditor. The facts of the said case are that the wife had
agreed to stand as surety to the husband. The wife went
ahead to sign the security documents at the risk that the
matrimonial home and herself were potentially liable for the
debts of the company. Accordingly, the bank had
constructive notice of the wrongful representation by the
husband to the wife and despite the fact failed to
recommend to the wife that she gets independent legal
advice.
18. It is clear from the facts that both debtors were acting in
the capacity of directors and shareholders of their
companies and had dealt with various creditors such as the
Respondent herein. The Applicants therefore had previous
knowledge having engaged in borrowing transactions such
as this. Further, through their affidavit evidence, the debtor
stated that “where it was necessary for an advocate to
witness a document we arrange the witnessing after
which we informed Mr. Muiru that they were ready for
collection.” The Court therefore agrees with the
Respondent that indeed there was an allowance for the
Applicants to obtain legal advice accordingly. In the
circumstances, the facts herein do not paint a picture of
wrongful misrepresentation as alleged by the Applicant. The
Court therefore finds that the allegation that the two agents
of the Creditor had conducted themselves in a morally
unconscionably manner towards the borrowers has not been
proven on a balance of probabilities.
19. On the second ground, the Applicant invites this
Honourable Court to find that the proceedings herein are an
abuse of court process as there is another suit COMM
E509 of 2020 whereby the Respondent has sought similar
reliefs. This Court choses to proceed with caution by stating
that the threshold for a counterclaim as required in
Regulation 17 (supra) is that such counterclaim, set off or
cross-demand must be be equal or exceeding the sum of
money in the statutory demand. The Counterclaim and
Defence therein does regard ground one above as there is
no mention of any amount of money counterclaimed or to
set off the demanded amount.
20. Notably, these are bankruptcy proceedings against natural
persons which have been instituted simultaneously with
COMM E507 of 2022 where similar reliefs have been
sought. The preference of use of multiple processes by the
creditor as in this case will be juxtaposed with where a
company is involved. The Court of Appeal in Pride Inn
Hotels & Investments Limited -vs- Tropicana Hotels
Limited (2018) eKLR held that:
“There is no requirement under the Insolvency
Act or the Companies Act which stipulates that
liquidation of a company should be as a last
result. Liquidation is one of the options under the
Insolvency Act which a creditor such as the
Respondent in the case, could pursue to secure
payment of a debt, especially a debt that remains
unpaid for several years and in respect of which
the appellant has been given adequate time,
opportunity and indulgence.”
21. Similarly, the Respondent is not limited in option by
Insolvency Act when it comes to bankruptcy proceedings
against natural persons. The court will be guided by the
case of Ecobank Kenya Limited vs Francis Tole
Mwakideli [2018] eKLR cited with the approval in
Rufus Ragui & Anor v Vivo Energy Kenya Limited
[2020] eKLR whereby it was stated:
“A creditor is free to choose from which debtor
and what method to use to recover debt. The
debtor has no luxury or right of choosing for the
creditor who amongst the debtors to pursue and
failure to pursue all the debtors at once is not
fatal to the creditor’s petition. In view of the
above, I find no merit in ground number (b) of
the objection. I find that the petition is not
premature, not an abuse of the court process as
the creditor is not obliged to exhaust other
recovery mechanism available to it before
bringing up an application for bankruptcy..”
22. Further, the Creditor by participating in Thika
Environment and Land Court ELC 216 of 2018 which
consists of two consolidated suits is acting in rightly to
defend its rights in the securities given by the applicants. In
the foregoing the Court finds that the proceedings herein
are not an abuse of court process. The grounds advanced by
the Applicant do not warrant the setting aside of the
Statutory Demand and as such the debt is not disputed on
substantial grounds.
pto
CONCLUSION
23. The Court therefore orders that:
a. The Applicated dated 19th December 2020 seeking to
set aside the Statutory Demand is hereby dismissed.
b. The Court hereby authorizes the Respondent/Creditor
to present the bankruptcy petition (immediately)
c. Similar Orders to apply in Insolvency Petition
E034/2020
Dated, Signed and Delivered Virtually at Nairobi this …….…
day of ……….…… 2023
D.O CHEPKWONY
JUDGE