Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs.

Court of Appeals

Facts:
The case involves Boston Equity Resources, Inc. (petitioner) against the Court of Appeals and
Lolita G. Toledo (respondents). The events leading to this case began on December 24, 1997,
when the petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24. Respondent Lolita Toledo filed
an Answer on March 19, 1998, but later, on May 7, 1998, she submitted a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Answer, indicating that her husband, Manuel Toledo, had already passed away
on July 13, 1995. Following this, the petitioner filed a motion on August 5, 1999, requesting the
disclosure of Manuel's heirs. Respondent complied with the court's order to provide the names
and addresses of the heirs. Subsequently, on January 18, 2000, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Substitution, seeking to replace Manuel with his children as party-defendants, which the trial
court granted on October 9, 2000.

The trial proceeded, and on July 18, 2001, the RTC issued a pre-trial order. However, on October
7, 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing several grounds, including
the failure to implead an indispensable party and lack of jurisdiction over Manuel. The RTC
denied this motion on November 8, 2004, stating it was filed out of time and that the issue of
jurisdiction was barred by estoppel by laches. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, which found that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's orders, leading to the
present petition for review on certiorari by the petitioner.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of the respondent?*
2. Is the respondent estopped from questioning the trial court's jurisdiction?
3. Did the petitioner fail to implead an indispensable party?**
4. Is the inclusion of Manuel Toledo as a party-defendant a misjoinder of parties?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found merit in the petition and ruled in favor of the petitioner. It reversed the
Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the RTC's orders denying the motion to dismiss. The
Court held that the special civil action for certiorari was not the proper remedy for the denial of a
motion to dismiss, as such an order is interlocutory. The Court also ruled that the respondent was
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court, but the trial court had not
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the estate of
Manuel Toledo was not an indispensable party, and the inclusion of Manuel as a party-defendant
was not a misjoinder.

Ratio:

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The Supreme Court emphasized that the special civil action for certiorari is not intended to
correct every interlocutory ruling but is limited to correcting grave abuse of discretion. The
Court noted that the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was justified, as it was filed
significantly after the respondent's amended answer and after the petitioner had presented its
evidence. The Court clarified that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo was
not barred by laches, as jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, the
trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over Manuel since he was deceased at the time the
complaint was filed, making the estate of Manuel an indispensable party unnecessary for the case
to proceed against Lolita Toledo. The Court concluded that the petitioner could pursue the claim
against the surviving solidary debtor, Lolita, without needing to implead the estate of the
deceased.

Note:

*As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the
defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a
motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which
can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."
**Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple
reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.

Roldan vs. Spouses Barrios

Facts:
The case involves Alona G. Roldan as the petitioner and the spouses Clarence I.
Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios, along with Rommel Matorres and Hon. Jemena
Abellar Arbis, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aklan, as respondents. The events leading to this case began on February
3, 2014, when Roldan filed a foreclosure action against the Barrios spouses and
Matorres, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 9811. Roldan alleged that on
October 13, 2008, the Barrios spouses borrowed PHP 250,000.00 from her, with a
repayment period of one year and an interest rate of 5% per month. To secure this
loan, they executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a parcel of land in Baybay,
Makato, Aklan, which was assessed at PHP 13,380.00. Roldan claimed that the
Barrios spouses defaulted on their payments starting February 2011 and that they
had subsequently mortgaged the same property to Matorres without her consent.
The Barrios spouses filed an answer with special defenses, arguing that the loan
computation was inaccurate and that they had filed for rehabilitation under Special
Proceeding No. 9845, necessitating a suspension of the foreclosure proceedings.
Matorres also filed an answer, admitting to the mortgage but asserting that Roldan
had no cause of action against him. On July 22, 2014, the RTC dismissed both
foreclosure cases for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the assessed value of the
property was below PHP 20,000.00, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the first-

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 level court. Roldan's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 18, 2014,
leading her to file a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the
RTC.

Issue:
1. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases
for lack of jurisdiction?
2. Is the action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage incapable of pecuniary
estimation, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the RTC?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in dismissing the foreclosure case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Ratio:
The Court explained that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law
and cannot be waived by the parties involved. The RTC dismissed the foreclosure
cases on the basis that the assessed value of the mortgaged property was only PHP
13,380.00, which is below the PHP 20,000.00 threshold for RTC jurisdiction as
stipulated in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The
Court clarified that while foreclosure actions are generally considered incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the jurisdiction is still determined by the assessed value of
the property involved. Since the assessed value was below the threshold, the RTC
correctly concluded that the first-level court had jurisdiction over the case. The
Court also noted that the essence of a mortgage is to secure a debt with a specific
property, and foreclosure is a necessary consequence of non-payment. Therefore,
the RTC's dismissal was justified, and the petitioner's reliance on previous
jurisprudence was misplaced, as the cited cases did not alter the jurisdictional
requirements established by law.

Iniego vs. Purga

Facts:
The case involves Artemio Iniego as the petitioner and Fokker C. Santos as the
private respondent, with the Honorable Judge Guillermo G. Purganan serving as
the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, City of Manila.
The events leading to this case began on December 11, 1999, when a vehicular
accident occurred involving a freight truck driven by Jimmy T. Pinion, an employee
of Iniego, and a jitney driven by Santos. On March 1, 2002, Santos filed a
complaint for quasi-delict and damages against both Pinion and Iniego, claiming

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 actual damages of P40,000, moral damages of P300,000, and exemplary damages
of P150,000, totaling P490,000.

On August 24, 2002, Santos filed a Motion to Declare Iniego in Default, alleging
that Iniego failed to file an answer within the final extended period. In response,
Iniego filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the
case. On October 21, 2002, Judge Purganan issued an Omnibus Order denying
Iniego's Motion to Dismiss and Santos's Motion to Declare Iniego in Default. In the
order, the judge stated that the main cause of action was not the claim for
damages but the quasi-delict itself, which could not be subject to pecuniary
estimation, thus affirming the RTC's jurisdiction.

Iniego filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 7, 2002, which was denied
on January 21, 2003. Subsequently, Iniego elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which was dismissed for lack of
merit on October 28, 2004. A motion for reconsideration was also denied on
January 26, 2005, prompting Iniego to file the present petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
1. Are actions for damages based on quasi-delict capable of pecuniary estimation,
thus falling under the jurisdiction of municipal courts if the claim does not exceed
P400,000?
2. Should the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the private respondent be
excluded from the computation of the jurisdictional amount since they arose from a
cause of action other than the negligent act of the defendant?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, and thus fall under the jurisdiction of
either the RTC or municipal courts, depending on the total amount claimed. The
Court also held that the total amount of damages claimed, including moral and
exemplary damages, exceeded the jurisdictional limit of P400,000, thereby
affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio:
The Court's reasoning centered on the interpretation of jurisdictional limits as
defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. It
clarified that the subject matter of the action, rather than the cause of action,
determines whether it is capable of pecuniary estimation. The Court emphasized
that actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are fundamentally about
recovering monetary compensation for injuries caused by the defendant's tortious
acts, making them inherently capable of pecuniary estimation.

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 Furthermore, the Court rejected Iniego's argument that moral and exemplary
damages should be excluded from the jurisdictional computation. It stated that all
claims for damages, regardless of their origin, should be aggregated to determine
jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the total claim of P490,000, which included
all types of damages, fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, thus affirming the
lower court's decisions.

Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Standard Insurance Co. Inc.

Facts:
The case involves Pantranco North Express, Inc. and its driver Alexander Buncan
as petitioners, and Standard Insurance Company, Inc. and Martina Gicale as
respondents. The incident occurred on October 28, 1984, in Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
when Crispin Gicale was driving a passenger jeepney owned by his mother,
Martina Gicale. During a rainy afternoon, a passenger bus owned by Pantranco
and driven by Buncan overtook the jeepney, colliding with its left rear side before
speeding away. Following the accident, Crispin reported the incident to the local
police and to Standard Insurance, the insurer of the jeepney. The total repair cost
was P21,415.00, but Standard only covered P8,000.00, leaving Martina to pay the
remaining P13,415.00. Subsequently, Standard and Martina sought reimbursement
from Pantranco and Buncan, who refused to pay. This led to the filing of a
complaint for a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Manila. The petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that the Metropolitan
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case. On June 5, 1992, the RTC ruled in favor
of the respondents, ordering the petitioners to pay the amounts due along with
interest and attorney's fees. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the RTC's decision on July 23, 1999. A motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied on November 4, 1999, prompting the petitioners to file a
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the action considering that the
respondents' respective causes of action did not arise out of the same transaction
nor were there common questions of law and fact?
2. Are the petitioners liable to the respondents based on the evidence and applicable
law?
3. Were the petitioners deprived of their right to due process?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
2. The petitioners were found liable to the respondents for the damages incurred.
3. The petitioners were not deprived of their right to due process.

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Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the
Totality Rule, which states that the aggregate amount of claims determines
jurisdiction. Since the combined claims of P21,415.00 exceeded the P20,000.00
threshold for RTC jurisdiction, the trial court was correct in asserting its authority.
The Court also noted that the claims arose from a single transaction—the vehicular
accident—thus establishing a common question of fact regarding negligence. The
factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
were binding and indicated that the petitioners were negligent under Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the petitioners' claim
of being denied due process, as they had been given ample opportunity to present
their case but failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The essence of due
process was satisfied as the petitioners were afforded the chance to be heard.

1st Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of

Communications

Facts:
The case involves First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. (petitioner) and the
Philippine Bank of Communications (respondent). On June 19, 2002, First
Sarmiento secured a loan of ₱40,000,000.00 from PBCOM, which was backed by a
real estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. The loan agreement was amended
multiple times, increasing the loan amount to ₱100,000,000.00 by September 15,
2003. By January 2, 2006, PBCOM initiated a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of Real Estate Mortgage, claiming that First Sarmiento had failed to pay the
principal and accrued interest despite several demand letters. On December 27,
2011, First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of the real
estate mortgage, but the Clerk of Court refused to accept it due to the absence of
tax declarations for the mortgaged properties, which were necessary for assessing
docket fees. On December 29, 2011, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted First
Sarmiento's motion to consider the value of the subject matter as not capable of
pecuniary estimation, ruling that the action for annulment was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. However, on the same day, the mortgaged properties were
auctioned and sold to PBCOM. First Sarmiento filed a new Complaint for
annulment of the mortgage on January 2, 2012, claiming it never received the loan
proceeds and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the foreclosure. The
RTC issued a temporary restraining order for 72 hours but later dismissed the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the action was a real action
requiring appropriate filing fees based on the value of the mortgaged properties.
First Sarmiento's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 25, 2012, leading
to a Petition for Review filed with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

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1. Did the Regional Trial Court acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint
for annulment of real estate mortgage?
2. Was the action for annulment of real estate mortgage capable of pecuniary
estimation?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court did acquire jurisdiction
over First Sarmiento's Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.
2. The Court held that the action for annulment of real estate mortgage was
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction is defined as the power of a court
to hear and decide a case, which is determined by the nature of the principal
action or relief sought. In this case, the Court found that First Sarmiento's
Complaint primarily sought the annulment of the real estate mortgage, not the
recovery of ownership or possession of the mortgaged properties. The Court
reiterated that if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of a sum of
money or real property, the action is deemed incapable of pecuniary estimation,
even if a monetary claim arises as a consequence. The Court also noted that the
RTC's dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous, as First
Sarmiento had paid the assessed docket fees, and any deficiency should not have
led to dismissal but rather to a lien on the judgment award. The ruling clarified
that the nature of the action should be assessed based on the principal relief
sought, and the Court reaffirmed that actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage are typically incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Note:

Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides Regional Trial
Courts with exclusive, original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

Facts:
On July 19, 1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog initiated Civil
Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, seeking to recover the sum of
P1,908.00, along with legal interest from the date of the complaint's filing until full
payment, plus costs. The court issued a writ of attachment against the defendants'
properties, which was later dissolved when the defendants posted a counter-bond
through the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (the Surety) on July 31, 1948.
After the defendants filed their answer, which included admissions, denials, and a

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 counterclaim, the trial proceeded. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, and the judgment became final and executory. When the writ of
execution against the defendants was returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs sought to
execute against the Surety's bond. The Surety opposed this motion, arguing two
points: (1) failure to prosecute and (2) absence of a demand for payment. The court
denied the Surety's motion, stating that no prior demand had been made. After the
plaintiffs made the necessary demand and the Surety failed to comply, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution. The Surety's request for additional
time to respond was granted, but it failed to file an answer. Consequently, the
court issued the writ of execution against the Surety. The Surety then moved to
quash the writ, claiming it was issued without the required summary hearing. The
court denied this motion, leading the Surety to appeal to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the lower court's orders. The Surety subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction over the case
due to the amount involved being within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
under the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals required the plaintiffs to
respond to this motion, but they did not. Eventually, the Court of Appeals set aside
its previous decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction over the case given the amount
involved?
2. Was the Surety barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction at such a late stage in
the proceedings?
3. Was the issuance of the writ of execution against the Surety valid despite the claim
of lack of a summary hearing?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance did not have jurisdiction
over the case due to the amount involved being within the exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts.
2. The Court held that the Surety was barred by laches from raising the issue of
jurisdiction at such a late stage in the proceedings.
3. The Court affirmed the validity of the writ of execution against the Surety, stating
that the Surety had been given adequate opportunity to respond.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred exclusively by law, and the lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. However, in this case, the Surety's failure to raise the
jurisdictional issue for nearly fifteen years constituted laches, which is a legal
doctrine that prevents a party from asserting a claim due to a long delay in doing
so. The Court noted that the Surety had actively participated in the proceedings
and had invoked the jurisdiction of the court to seek affirmative relief, thus

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 estopping it from later questioning that same jurisdiction after receiving an
adverse decision. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the issuance of the writ of
execution against the Surety was valid, as the Surety had been properly notified of
the proceedings and had failed to respond within the given timeframe. The Court
reiterated that the bond filed by the Surety was intended to secure the payment of
any judgment the plaintiffs might recover, and once the judgment became
executory and the execution was returned unsatisfied, the Surety became liable
under the bond. The Court's decision was grounded in the principles of public
policy, which discourage the raising of stale claims and the inequity of allowing a
party to benefit from a favorable judgment while later contesting the court's
jurisdiction when the outcome is unfavorable.

Note:

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted.

Figueroa y Cervantes vs. People

Facts:
The case involves Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes (petitioner) against the People of
the Philippines (respondent). On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18, under Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. The
incident occurred on January 16, 1994, in Bocaue, Bulacan, where the petitioner,
as the driver of a bus, allegedly caused the death of Rodolfo Lopez y Amparado due
to negligent driving. The trial commenced, and on August 19, 1998, the RTC
convicted the petitioner, sentencing him to imprisonment and ordering him to pay
damages to the victim's heirs.

Dissatisfied with the conviction, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), where he raised, for the first time, the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the
case. The CA, in its decision dated February 28, 2001, ruled that the petitioner was
estopped by laches from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction due to his active
participation in the trial without raising the issue earlier. The CA affirmed the
conviction but modified the penalty and damages awarded. The petitioner
subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari, questioning the applicability
of laches and the validity of the conviction based on several legal grounds.

Issue:
1. Does the failure of the petitioner to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial
constitute laches, barring him from raising it on appeal?

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2. Does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial amount to estoppel
regarding the jurisdiction of the RTC?
3. Is the admission by the petitioner regarding the difficulty of stopping a bus at high
speed sufficient incriminating evidence for his conviction?
4. Did the CA err in determining the speed limit applicable to the accident site
without evidence?
5. Is the conviction for homicide through reckless imprudence justified when the
prosecution did not prove the necessary elements during the trial?
6. Is the testimony of the defense witness sufficient to acquit the petitioner of the
charges?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition for review, ruling that Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94 is dismissed without prejudice. The Court found that the petitioner was
not estopped by laches in questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, as he raised the issue
in his appeal without significant delay. The Court also noted that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case, which could be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction is a matter of law and cannot be
conferred by the parties' consent or through estoppel. The Court reiterated that a
lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, as it
affects the authority of the court to render judgment. The principle of estoppel by
laches applies only in exceptional circumstances, such as when a party has actively
participated in the proceedings for an unreasonable length of time without
asserting their rights, leading to inequity. In this case, the petitioner raised the
issue of jurisdiction in a timely manner during his appeal, and thus, laches did not
apply. The Court also highlighted that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is
void and can be attacked directly or collaterally. Therefore, the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the case warranted the dismissal of the charges against the
petitioner.

Note:

The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

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 A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction

Calimlim vs. Ramirez

Facts:
The case involves Modesta Calimlim and Lamberto Magali, acting as the
administrator of the estate of Domingo Magali, as petitioners against Hon. Pedro
A. Ramirez, the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch I, and Francisco Ramos, the private respondent. The events leading to this
case began in 1961 when the Municipal Court of Manila rendered a judgment in
favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against Manuel Magali in Civil Case
No. 85136. Following the finalization of this judgment, a writ of execution was
issued on July 31, 1961. A Notice of Levy was made on September 21, 1961, on a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9138, registered in
the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim." The levy specified
that it was against the rights and interests of Manuel Magali only.

On October 17, 1961, a Certificate of Sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation, again indicating that
the sale pertained only to the rights of Manuel Magali. However, a final Deed of
Sale issued on January 25, 1963, erroneously stated that the sale was for the entire
parcel of land, not just Manuel Magali's rights. This deed was annotated on the
title.

In 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition to compel Manuel

Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138, which he failed to do.
Subsequently, the corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138
cancelled, which was granted by the court, leading to the issuance of a new title,
TCT No. 68568, in the corporation's name.

Upon learning of the cancellation, Modesta Calimlim filed a petition on November

21, 1967, to cancel TCT No. 68568, which was dismissed by the court on July 3,
1968. The petitioners did not appeal this dismissal. Instead, on January 11, 1971,
they filed Civil Case No. SCC-180 against Francisco Ramos, who claimed to have
purchased the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Ramos moved
to dismiss the case, arguing it was barred by prior judgment or statute of
limitations. The court dismissed the case on April 21, 1971, citing estoppel by prior
judgment. The petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied, prompting
them to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
1. Is the dismissal of the petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 a
valid bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180?

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2. Did the respondent court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition
filed in LRC Record No. 39492?
3. Can the petitioners be considered to have been estopped from asserting their
rights due to laches?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the petition in LRC Record No.
39492 does not bar the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180.
2. The Court found that the respondent court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition in LRC Record No. 39492.
3. The Court held that the petitioners were not estopped from asserting their rights
due to laches.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court reasoned that for the defense of res judicata to apply, the prior
judgment must have been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction. In this
case, the petitioners' earlier petition in LRC Record No. 39492 was filed in a land
registration court, which has limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate ownership
issues. The dismissal of that petition could not serve as a bar to the subsequent
civil case, as the issues raised pertained to ownership, which the land registration
court could not resolve.

The Court emphasized that the lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, including on appeal, and cannot be waived by the parties. The
petitioners acted promptly after learning of the erroneous cancellation of their
title, and their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 was within a reasonable time
frame. The Court also noted that the doctrine of estoppel by laches requires
knowledge of the facts, which was not present in this case, as the petitioners were
unaware of the adverse title until it was too late. Thus, the Court reversed the
lower court's orders, allowing the petitioners to pursue their claim in Civil Case
No. SCC-180.

Note:

It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As
such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an
ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real
property.
Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such
judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule

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 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3,
Civil Code.)

Mangaliag vs. Catubig-Pastoral

Facts:
The case involves petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano against Hon.
Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. The
events leading to the case began on January 21, 1999, when Serquina, along with
three companions, was riding a tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte in Pagal, San
Carlos City. During this time, a dump truck owned by Mangaliag and driven by
Solano attempted to overtake another vehicle, resulting in a sideswipe collision
with the tricycle. Serquina and his companions sustained serious injuries due to
the alleged gross negligence of Solano. Following the incident, Serquina incurred
medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00 and suffered a permanent facial
deformity, leading to a claim for P500,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00 for
lost income.

On May 10, 1999, Serquina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners in
the RTC. The petitioners denied the allegations and attributed fault to the tricycle
driver, Laforte, who they claimed was unlicensed. After a pre-trial conference and
trial on the merits, the petitioners, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss on March 8, 2000, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case
since the principal amount claimed was below the jurisdictional threshold for the
RTC. The RTC denied this motion on April 17, 2000, citing Administrative Circular
No. 09-94, which states that the total amount of damages claimed should be
considered in determining jurisdiction. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was also denied on June 13, 2000. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

Issue:

1. In an action for recovery of damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed
for in the complaint provide the sole test for determining the court's jurisdiction,
or should the total amount of all damages claimed, including moral and exemplary
damages, be computed collectively to determine the appropriate court's
jurisdiction?
2. Are the petitioners estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC due to
their active participation in the trial proceedings?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, affirming
the RTC's orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration.
The Court ruled that the total amount of damages claimed, including moral

13 | P a g e
damages, should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioners were not estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction.

Ratio:
The Court's decision emphasized that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter is determined by the material allegations in the complaint and the
applicable law, irrespective of the merits of the claims. The Court interpreted
Administrative Circular No. 09-94, which clarifies that in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, the total amount of such claims must be
included in determining jurisdiction. In this case, Serquina's claim for moral
damages was not merely incidental but a separate cause of action arising from the
injuries sustained, thus necessitating its inclusion in the jurisdictional amount.

The Court also addressed the issue of estoppel, clarifying that while active
participation in trial proceedings can lead to estoppel, it is not an absolute rule.
The petitioners raised the jurisdictional issue promptly after realizing the defect,
and no judgment had been rendered at that point, which meant they were not
barred from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the RTC
had properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case, and the petitioners' reliance
on previous cases was misplaced as those cases involved different legal contexts.

Note:

The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Frianela vs. Banayad, Jr.

Facts:
The case involves Apolonia Banayad Frianela as the petitioner and Servillano
Banayad, Jr. as the respondent. The events leading to this case began with the
death of Moises F. Banayad, the uncle of the petitioner, who passed away on
March 27, 1991, in Pasay City. Following his death, the petitioner filed a petition
on June 3, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City for the
allowance of Moises's holographic will dated November 18, 1985, in Special
Proceedings No. 3664-P. In her petition, she claimed that Moises died without
issue and bequeathed to her a parcel of land in Pasay City, certain religious
images, and all his personal belongings. The respondent, a cousin of the petitioner,
opposed the petition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other

14 | P a g e
 holographic wills dated September 27, 1989, and September 28, 1989. After a
trial, the RTC ruled on September 29, 1995, that the September 27, 1989, will
revoked the November 18, 1985, will and appointed the respondent as the
administrator of Moises's estate. The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA), which, in its June 17, 2005, decision, modified the RTC's ruling,
stating that the September 27, 1989, will only revoked the earlier will concerning
the disposition of real property. The petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration
was denied on August 17, 2005, prompting her to elevate the case to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
1. Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in Special Proceedings
No. 3664-P?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in its interpretation of the validity of the September
27, 1989, will and its effect on the November 18, 1985, will?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC of Pasay City had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in Special Proceedings No. 3664-P, leading to the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised in the petition.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court's decision was grounded in the principle that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and must be established at the time of the filing of the action. The
Court noted that the original petition filed by the petitioner did not specify the
gross value of Moises's estate, which is a requirement under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. The law stipulates that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over
probate matters where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). Since the petition lacked this essential information, the RTC
improperly assumed jurisdiction, which constituted a gross error. The Court
emphasized that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, including on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or estoppel. The Court
also distinguished this case from previous rulings where the issue of jurisdiction
was raised at a later stage, asserting that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction rendered
all proceedings, including the decision rendered, null and void. Thus, the Supreme
Court dismissed the case, reinforcing the importance of jurisdiction in probate
proceedings.

Duero vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

15 | P a g e
 The case involves Gabriel L. Duero as the petitioner and Bernardo A. Eradel as the
respondent. The events leading to the case began in 1988 when Eradel allegedly
entered and occupied a parcel of land owned by Duero, which was covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. The
land had an assessed value of P5,240. Duero made several attempts to inform
Eradel of his ownership and requested him to vacate the property, but Eradel
refused and even threatened Duero with bodily harm. Consequently, on June 16,
1995, Duero filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages and Attorney's Fees against Eradel and two others, Apolinario and
Inocencio Ruena, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The
Ruena siblings requested an extension to file their answer, which was granted until
July 18, 1995. During this time, Duero and the Ruenas reached a compromise
agreement, which was later used by the trial court to render a partial judgment on
January 12, 1996, recognizing Duero's ownership and possession of the land.
Eradel was declared in default for failing to file an answer to the complaint. Duero
presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996, and on May 8, 1996, the
RTC ruled in his favor, ordering Eradel to vacate the land and pay damages. Eradel
received the decision on May 25, 1996, and subsequently filed a Motion for New
Trial on June 10, 1996, claiming he was a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr. The RTC
denied this motion. On July 24, 1996, Eradel filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, asserting that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case due to the low
assessed value of the land. The RTC denied this petition, and Eradel continued to
challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC through various motions. Eventually, the
Court of Appeals granted Eradel's petition for certiorari, declaring all proceedings
in the RTC case null and void, which prompted Duero to seek relief from the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the municipal
trial court had jurisdiction over the case?
2. Was private respondent Eradel estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC after filing several motions before it?
3. Was the failure of private respondent to file an answer to the complaint justified?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by Duero and affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The Court upheld the ruling that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case and that Eradel was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Furthermore, the Court found that Eradel's failure to file
an answer was justified given the circumstances.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case.
The Court emphasized that jurisdiction is a matter of law and cannot be waived by

16 | P a g e
the parties involved. The Court noted that Eradel, who was an unschooled farmer,
mistakenly believed that his landlord, Artemio Laurente, Sr., should handle the
legal proceedings. This misunderstanding, combined with the fact that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case due to the low assessed value of the land, justified
Eradel's failure to file an answer. The Court reiterated that a party may question
the jurisdiction of a court at any stage of the proceedings, and estoppel should only
be applied in exceptional cases to prevent injustice. The Court concluded that the
RTC's failure to recognize its lack of jurisdiction rendered its decisions null and
void, thus validating the Court of Appeals' ruling to set aside the RTC's orders and
judgments.

Note:

Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically
never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would
be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals was in order.

Velasquez, Jr. vs. Lisondra Land, Inc.

Facts:
The case involves Perfecto Velasquez, Jr. as the petitioner and Lisondra Land
Incorporated, represented by Edwin L. Lisondra, as the respondent. The events
leading to this case began in 1998 when Perfecto and Lisondra Land entered into a
joint venture agreement to develop a 7,200-square meter parcel of land into a
memorial park. However, Lisondra Land failed to secure the necessary permit from
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a timely manner, which
delayed the construction of the project. Additionally, Lisondra Land neglected to
provide the required insurance coverage and did not pay its share of the realty
taxes. Perfecto later discovered that Lisondra Land was involved in unethical
practices, such as collecting kickbacks from agents and giving away lots in
exchange for services from engineers, architects, and suppliers, contrary to their
agreement to finance the project with its own funds. Consequently, Perfecto filed a
complaint for breach of contract against Lisondra Land before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), which was docketed as Civil Case No. 18146.

Lisondra Land sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction since the issues involved real estate trade and business practices,
which fell under the exclusive authority of the HLURB. The RTC ruled that it had
the competence to decide the case. Dissatisfied, Lisondra Land elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a special civil action for certiorari, which
resulted in a decision on November 25, 2003, granting Lisondra Land's petition
and dismissing Civil Case No. 18146. The CA held that the RTC had committed
grave abuse of discretion by taking cognizance of the complaint, as the alleged
acts constituted unsound real estate business practices under the jurisdiction of
the HLURB. This ruling became final.

17 | P a g e
 Subsequently, Perfecto filed a complaint with the HLURB, alleging that Lisondra
Land had committed unsound real estate business practices, including
unauthorized sales and failure to develop the project according to the approved
plan. On July 20, 2007, the HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of Perfecto, rescinding
the joint venture agreement and ordering Lisondra Land to pay fines, damages,
and attorney's fees. Lisondra Land appealed to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, which initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction but later
reversed its decision upon Perfecto's motion for reconsideration. The HLURB
Board affirmed the Arbiter's findings with modifications regarding the damages
awarded.

Dissatisfied, Lisondra Land brought the case to the Office of the President (OP),
which denied the appeal and affirmed the HLURB Board's resolution. Lisondra
Land then filed a petition for review with the CA, arguing that the HLURB lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter. On December 28, 2016, the CA found merit in
Lisondra Land's petition, setting aside the OP's decision and dismissing Perfecto's
complaint, asserting that the HLURB's authority was limited to cases filed by
buyers or owners of subdivision lots and condominium units. Perfecto sought
reconsideration, which was denied, leading to the current petition.

Issue:
1. Does the HLURB have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Perfecto Velasquez,
Jr. against Lisondra Land Incorporated?
2. Is Lisondra Land estopped from questioning the HLURB's jurisdiction after actively
participating in the proceedings?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Perfecto Velasquez, Jr., granting the petition
and reversing the Court of Appeals' decision dated December 28, 2016. The Court
reinstated and affirmed the Office of the President's decision dated August 1, 2013,
with modifications regarding the award of damages.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction is the power and authority to
hear, try, and decide a case, which is conferred by law and not by the consent of
the parties. The HLURB's jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the cause of
action, the subject matter involved, and the parties. The HLURB has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving unsound real estate business practices, claims
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units, and specific performance
of contractual obligations. In this case, Perfecto, as a business partner and not a
buyer, lacked the standing to sue Lisondra Land for unsound real estate business
practices before the HLURB. However, the Court found that Lisondra Land was
estopped from questioning the HLURB's jurisdiction due to its prior inconsistent
positions in the litigation process. The principle of estoppel applies when a party

18 | P a g e
actively participates in proceedings without raising jurisdictional objections,
thereby waiving the right to contest jurisdiction later.

The Court noted that allowing Lisondra Land to question the HLURB's jurisdiction
after previously asserting it would undermine the integrity of the judicial system
and lead to conflicting appellate court decisions. The Court also addressed the
substantive issues of unsound real estate business practices, finding substantial
evidence of Lisondra Land's violations, including unauthorized sales and failure to
comply with development plans. Consequently, the Court ruled that Lisondra Land
was guilty of unsound real estate business practices and affirmed the HLURB's
findings regarding damages and attorney's fees owed to Perfecto.

Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. vs. Presiding Judge of Regional

Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 52
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness
to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court,
the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester will apply.

Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate
intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should
be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.

People vs. Claravall

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of
clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that
when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court -- because the offended party has
NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or
instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action -- the rule is as follows:

1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"

2) in any other case, however -- i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged
in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need
not be paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an
award for actual damages."

Manuel vs. Alfeche, Jr.

19 | P a g e
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of
clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that
when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court - because the offended party has
NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or
instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action -the rule is as follows:

1) when the 'amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information' filed in court, then 'the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in Court for trial;a

2) in any other case, however - i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged
in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need
not be paid and shall simply 'constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an
award for actual damages.a"We hold that said General ruling, especially the last
subparagraph above-quoted, was actually intended to apply to a situation wherein
either (i) the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or (ii) the
complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperate and/or nominal
damages but has not specified ANY amount at all, leaving the quantification
thereof entirely to the trial court's discretion, 7 and NOT to a situation where the
litigant specifies some amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even
though the different types of damages sought be not separately or individually
quantified. Were we to hold otherwise, the result would be to permit litigants to
continue availing of one more loophole in the rule on payment of filing fees, and
would not serve to attain the purpose of the revised Sec. 1 of Rule 111, which is "to
discourage the 'gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's office to include
in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple
millions of pesos without paying any filing fees.a" 8

Paloma vs. Mora/ Villaflor vs. CA

Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,37 we revisited the import of the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, to wit:
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies
even if the question involved is also judicial in character. . .

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court
cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the primary
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in
an agrarian dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract.
In Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs.
Vasquez [240 SCRA 502], the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the best
position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was

20 | P a g e
compatible with its development plan.

Star Special Corporate Security Management, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit

Verily, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and its corollary, "the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . are not ironclad rules." 86 An exception to
these rules is where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine.87 Respondent Commission on Audit could no longer assail the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, indirectly or collaterally, by way of its Comment here
after respondent Puerto Princesa had effectively lost its right to question the
validity of the November 18, 2003 Decision.

Again, the settled doctrine is that "final judgments may no longer be reviewed or
in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by [this
Court], much less by any other official, branch or department of Government."

Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure
of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to
criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime
is to be punished.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not
ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that aa retroactive law, in a
legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws,
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes
or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or
take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of
a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.a
The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the
application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions a those which
have accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigantsa rights may not preclude their retroactive

21 | P a g e
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that aa person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.a

Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that no
record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal is procedural in nature and
should therefore be applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the question
as to whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure
of appellant to file a record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old
rules, which question is pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang 129 took
effect, became academic upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer
requires the filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed
the legal obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A statute which transfers the
jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a
remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but
formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create new nor take away
vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time it accrued
cannot validly try the claim where at the time the claim is formulated and filed the
jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for
even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and transferred to
another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular
court.

9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings
admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted
from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair
vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive
application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or
would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending
actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts.aWe hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would
result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to
redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this

22 | P a g e
procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
period of redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be
34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, ait is the only property left behind
by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassinas bullet.a 14

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The
manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which
is already vested.

Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Co., Inc.

The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible
application of the Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding
the bench and the bar that zealous compliance with the rules is still the general
course of action. Rules of procedure are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and
speedy dispensation of cases; 21 to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be
weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a
case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the
purpose of justice requires it.

Cabrera vs. Ng
A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and
has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.

Sebastian vs. Morales

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of

23 | P a g e
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain
his failure to abide by the rules.

Spouses Lumanas vs. Sablas

WHERE THERE IS NO DECLARATION OF

DEFAULT, ANSWER MAY BE ADMITTED
EVEN IF FILED OUT OF TIME

It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his
answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing
the answer expires. 15 The Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the
trial court not only to extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an
answer to be filed after the reglementary period.16

Thus, the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse
but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on
or before November 5, 1999.

The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before
a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. 17 Where the
answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is
declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the
case, the answer should be admitted.18

Therefore, the trial court correctly admitted the answer of petitioner spouses even
if it was filed out of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not yet
declared in default nor was a motion to declare them in default ever filed. Neither
was there a showing that petitioner spouses intended to delay the case.

Saint Louis University, Inc. vs. Cobarrubias

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights;
like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized
exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to

24 | P a g e
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by
all the attendant circumstances. 52 Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of
the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute

Suffice it to say that a[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.a42 Those who seek exemption
from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of
exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure.43 Petitionersa failure
to advance any explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or
to complete payment of the same within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal
to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal fee
is unwarranted.

IN RE: Uy vs. Maghari III

The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this
requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Signature and address. a Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a
post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,
or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(Emphasis supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere
means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a
positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has
read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed
for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a
pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken

25 | P a g e
occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of
Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession.
Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 a A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, something the law strongly proscribes. 39 (Citations omitted)
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply
with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of
legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A
deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.

Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated

as part of a counsel's signature:

(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;

In Bar Matter No. 1132, this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
40

(2) Attorneys number;

In Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the "number and date
41

of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of this, a
(3) lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number;

In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code, a lawyer must
42

(4) indicate his professional tax receipt number;

Bar Matter No. 1922 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory

43

Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of

(5) Exemption; and

This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC required the inclusion of a

44

(6) counsel's contact details.

Republic vs. Kenrick Development Corporation

26 | P a g e
The Court emphasized that a signed pleading must be signed by either the party or
their counsel, as stipulated in Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The
signature of counsel is a personal assurance that the pleading has been read and is
supported by a good ground. Atty. Garlitos' failure to authorize anyone to sign the
answer rendered it invalid, as he could not delegate this authority to an unqualified
person. The Court noted that procedural rules are essential for the orderly
administration of justice and should not be disregarded lightly. The respondent
failed to provide compelling reasons to justify a relaxation of these rules.
Consequently, the trial court's declaration of default was upheld, and the Republic
was allowed to present its evidence ex parte. The Court also directed that Atty.
Garlitos be held accountable for his actions, which violated the ethical standards of
the legal profession.

Bacolor vs. VL Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc.

SECTION 3. Contents and Filing of Petition; Effect of Non-Compliance with
Requirements. a The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of
all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved,
the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief
prayed for.

In Altres v. Empleo,34 the Court summarized the basic tenets involving non-
compliance with the requirements on, or filing of defective verification and
certificate against forum shopping, to wit:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not

necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons".

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or

27 | P a g e
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate
officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority
of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping; 9 in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a
verification signed by an aemployment specialista who had not even presented any
proof of her authority to represent the company; 10 in Novelty Philippines, Inc., v.
CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the
authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum
shopping certificate;11 and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC
Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the
Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate
against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the boardas
authorization.12

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories
to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the
sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied
in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being ain a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of
the allegations in the petition.

Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. vs. Tablante

28 | P a g e
 Facts:
The case involves Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (petitioner) and
several respondents, including Mario Tablante, ECRM Enterprises, Rockland
Construction Company, Laurie Litam, and MC Home Depot, Inc. The events
leading to the case began on December 6, 1999, when the petitioner, represented
by its Chairman and President Ronaldo Salonga, entered into a lease agreement
with Mario P. Tablante of ECRM Enterprises for approximately one hectare of land
in Pasig City. This lease was intended for a three-month period to serve as a
staging area for the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. Upon the expiration of the
lease on March 6, 2000, Tablante assigned his rights under the lease to Rockland
Construction Company and Laurie Litam. However, it was later discovered that
Tablante had also executed a separate lease with MC Home Depot, Inc. on
November 26, 1999, for the same parcel of land, leading to the construction of
commercial stalls on the property. Following the expiration of the lease, the
petitioner demanded that the respondents vacate the premises, with a final
demand made on December 20, 2000. In response, Rockland filed a case for
Specific Performance against the petitioner on January 11, 2001, seeking to
compel the petitioner to execute a new lease for three years. The petitioner
subsequently filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents, which was
initially dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) for lack of merit, ruling that
the issue was not about physical possession but rather about the right to renew the
lease. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on July 10,
2003. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was dismissed on technical grounds, leading to the current petition before
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the grounds
of improper verification and lack of necessary documents?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the RTC's decision regarding the
unilateral renewal of the lease agreement and the respondents' right to occupy the
property?
3. Is the petitioner liable for attorney's fees and costs of suit?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari based on technical grounds.
2. The Supreme Court found that the issue of the unilateral renewal of the lease
agreement and the respondents' right to occupy the property had become moot
and academic due to the expiration of the lease.
3. The Supreme Court did not make a pronouncement regarding the petitioner's
liability for attorney's fees and costs of suit, as the main case was considered
closed and terminated.

29 | P a g e
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari by the
Court of Appeals was unwarranted, as the failure to attach a Corporate Secretary's
certificate to the verification and certification against forum shopping was not fatal
to the petition. The Court emphasized that corporate powers are exercised through
the board of directors, but it has recognized the authority of certain corporate
officers, including general managers, to sign such documents. The Court noted
that the petitioner had substantially complied with the rules, and that dismissing
an appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon, especially when it results
in unfairness. The Court also determined that the issue of possession had become
moot and academic, as the lease had expired, and the respondents were no longer
in possession of the property. The Court's decision reflects a commitment to
ensuring that procedural rules serve the ends of justice rather than obstructing it.

Latorre vs. Latorre

SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. -- Actions affecting title to or possession of real

property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.

...

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. -- All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Facts:
The case involves Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) and her son, Luis Esteban
Latorre (respondent). The events leading to the case began in October 2000 when
the petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale with an application for Injunction against the respondent and Ifzal
Ali in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City. The petitioner claimed
that on September 28, 1999, the respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of
Lease concerning a 1,244-square meter property located at No. 1366 Caballero St.,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. The petitioner asserted that the respondent
falsely declared himself as the absolute and registered owner of the property, as
they were co-owners in equal shares.

The petitioner recounted that on March 14, 1989, both she and the respondent
executed Deeds of Donation to transfer ownership of the property to The Porfirio
D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation).
Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, they executed Deeds of Revocation of
Donation and Reconveyance, which were not registered, leaving the property in

30 | P a g e
 the Foundation's name. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was aware of
their co-ownership and that she demanded her share of the rental payments from
Ifzal, which he refused.

On August 16, 2000, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had annotated
an adverse claim on the property’s title, asserting full ownership based on a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, which the petitioner claimed was falsified
and her signature forged. The petitioner sought to enjoin Ifzal from paying rent to
the respondent and requested damages. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,
arguing improper venue, claiming the case should have been filed in Makati City,
where the property is located. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order and
later denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, leading to a trial.

On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the proper venue was indeed the RTC of
Makati City. The petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting
her to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The case
was complicated by the petitioner’s death on November 14, 2009, after which her
counsel sought to continue the proceedings.

Issue:
1. Did the RTC err in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in classifying the
petitioner’s complaint as a real action?
2. Was the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction justified given the
circumstances?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC did not err in treating the venue as
jurisdiction and correctly classified the complaint as a real action.
2. The dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction was justified, as the proper venue
was indeed the RTC of Makati City.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint rather than its title. In this case, the petitioner’s
complaint sought the nullification of a Deed of Absolute Sale and involved claims of
co-ownership over real property, categorizing it as a real action. The Court
reiterated that actions affecting title to or possession of real property must be filed
in the court with territorial jurisdiction over the property, which in this instance
was the RTC of Makati City.

The Court also noted that the RTC's initial denial of the motion to dismiss was a
procedural error, as it should have recognized the improper venue at that stage.
However, the subsequent dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was appropriate, as the
RTC ultimately acknowledged the venue issue. The Court highlighted the

31 | P a g e
importance of adhering to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, stating that direct
appeals to the Supreme Court are only permissible when no adequate remedy
exists in lower courts. The Court found no reversible error in the RTC's decision,
affirming the dismissal of the case.

Jur

Spouses Saraza vs. Francisco

Venue of an Action for
Specific Performance

As to the issue of venue, the petitionersa argument that the action should have
been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is
misplaced. Although the end result of the respondentas claim was the transfer of
the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific
performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernandoas execution of a deed
of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made.

Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development

Corporation31 is instructive. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance
that involved property situated in ParaAaque City was instituted before the RTC of
Pasig City. When the caseas venue was raised as an issue, the Court sided with
therein petitioner who argued that a[t]he fact that ashe ultimately sought the
conveyance of real propertya not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the
action [for specific performance with damages] was instituted.a 32 The Court
explained:

[I]n La TondeAa Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action

for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The
defendants allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land
located in Bago City a a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while
the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim
ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized
defendantsa ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been
laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific

performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it
accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land
located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial courtas order
allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with
damages. Contrary to petitionersa position that the RTC of Quezon City had no
jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the

32 | P a g e
said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the
rule that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which
may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside. 33 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation
v. Court of Appeals34 where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution
of a deed of sale over a parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for
specific performance, because the primary objective is to regain ownership and
possession of the property. 35 It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was
not in any way connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party
against whom the complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had
earlier executed an Undertaking for the propertyas transfer, correctly giving rise
to a cause of action either for specific performance or for rescission, as in this
case.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the
respondentas action. It provides that personal actions amay be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.a
Considering the respondentas statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite,36 the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

Gochan vs. Gochan

`This contention has no merit. Although appellant's complaint is entitled to be one
for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of a parcel
of land situated in Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate
of title covering said parcel of land be issued to him shows that the primary
objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to
execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a
finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself
into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action must be commenced in the province
where the property is situated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies." 15

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall
be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by
the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC,

33 | P a g e
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Spouses Yujuico
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal
action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature
have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real
action.20 The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. 21 Such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property.22 The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff, 23 for which reason the action is considered a
transitory one.
Briones vs. Court of Appeals
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which
has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.33 instructs
that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue
where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of
said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:

The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive
venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue
may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the
place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement,
what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be

shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as aexclusively,a awaiving for this purpose any other venue,a ashall
onlya preceding the designation of venue, ato the exclusion of the other courts,a or
words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. 34 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint

34 | P a g e
assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not
its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding
on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of
improper venue. 35 Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity
of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general
rules on venue.To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this
nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely
assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized
that Brionesas complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts,
claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to
the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in
the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
San Miguel Corporation vs. Monasterio
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties
thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the
exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even
those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the
exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly
confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles
of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor
who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more

convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their
agreements.23 Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as relating solely to
the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding
the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted
restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and
oppressive.

Moreover, since convenience is the raison daetre of the rules on venue, 24 venue
stipulation should be deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be
adopted which most serves the partiesa convenience. 25 Contrawise, the rules
mandated by the Rules of Court should govern. 26 Accordingly, since the present
case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal
action,27 we find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of
Naga City, the place where plaintiff resides.

35 | P a g e
Spouses Ochoa vs. China Banking Corp.
The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the
Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real-Estate
Mortgages." Sections 1 and 2 thereof clearly state:

Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to

any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or
the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall
govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected,
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.

Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the
property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the
sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said
place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part
thereof is situated.5

The case at bar involves petitioners' mortgaged real property located in ParaAaque
City over which respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose extra-
judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in
ParaAaque City.

The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties 6 and sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, 7 cannot be made to apply to the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule
4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.

The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an
indispensable party. 17 An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit
or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.18

In this case, DMI is not an indispensable party because petitioner can claim
indemnity directly from respondent, having made itself jointly and severally liable
with DMI for the obligation under the bonds. Therefore, the failure to implead DMI
is not a ground to dismiss the case, even if the same was without prejudice.

36 | P a g e
Divinagracia vs. Parilla
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courtas action
in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The partyas interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other partiesa that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. 30 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants, viz.:

SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. a A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties. 32

In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs,
legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject
land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both
Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the
rules on representation under the Civil Code, 33 their respective interests shall be
represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela,
Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel.34

The aforementioned heirs a whether in their own capacity or in representation of

their direct ascendant a have vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof.
However, a reading of Santiagoas complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.as
interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.as interest over the subject
land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 35 of
the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his
children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagoas omission of the aforesaid
heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.

37 | P a g e
Santiagoas contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of
the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties
deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court
cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle
the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for
partition.36 Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
disputed properties.37

In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of
the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he
merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject
land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be
determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who
have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in
Santiagoas complaint.

In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant

complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present.38 Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the November 29, 2002
Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.

Ada vs. Baylon

Misjoinder of Causes of Action

The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct
and independent actions a partition and rescission. First, the petitioners raised the
refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties
which they inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading,
the petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.

The actions of partition and rescission

cannot be joined in a single action.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the

uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the
same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in
one declaration, complaint or petition. 29

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The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the
same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the
parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at
minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity,
where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. 30

Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the

alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an
opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter
alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special
rules.31

Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by
the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for
partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an
action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of
civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of
partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one
complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in
determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in
the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of
action.32

A misjoined cause of action, if not severed

upon motion of a party or by the court sua
sponte, may be adjudicated by the court
together with the other causes of action.

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed,

the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua
sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded
with separately. 33 However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the
court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the
simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction
of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted
grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of
causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courtas
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a
party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of
action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).35 (Citations omitted)

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It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the
case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a
misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed
from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered
by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.

Marcos-Araneta vs. Court of Appeals

We agree with petitioners and turn to the governing Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. -- A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or in the
case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
As the aforequoted provision makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff may
amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e., without leave of court, before
any responsive pleading is filed or served. Responsive pleadings are those which
seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses, 32 like an answer. A motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10. 33 Assayed against the
foregoing perspective, the RTC did not err in admitting petitioners' amended
complaint, Julita and Francisca not having yet answered the original complaints
when the amended complaint was filed. At that precise moment, Irene, by force of
said Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending her
underlying reconveyance complaints. As aptly observed by the RTC, Irene's motion
to admit amended complaint was not even necessary. The Court notes though that
the RTC has not offered an explanation why it saw fit to grant the motion to admit
in the first place.

In Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, the Court, expounding on the propriety

of admitting an amended complaint before a responsive pleading is filed, wrote:
[W]hat petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss,
not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been
filed, respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter
of right. Following this Court's ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co.
considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the
correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint;
otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial court's duty to
admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should
not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint. 34
It may be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed through the June
29, 2000 RTC order. It should be pointed out, however, that the finality of such
dismissal order had not set in when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17,
2000, she having meanwhile seasonably sought reconsideration thereof. Irene's
motion for reconsideration was only resolved on August 25, 2000. Thus, when
Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, the order of dismissal was not

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yet final, implying that there was strictly no legal impediment to her amending her
original complaints.

Philippine National Bank vs. Spouses Manalo

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. a
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to
be made

Young vs. Spouses Sy

SECTION 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The
adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A
supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements.16 Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original
pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained
an issue to be tried in the action. 17 It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its
usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief
with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the
original complaint.18

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts
which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled;
hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or
extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even
though they themselves constitute a right of action. 19

In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court ruled that when the cause of action
stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action
mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental

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complaint; the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies
in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of
action. However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development
Co.,21 the Court held that a broad definition of causes of action should be applied:
while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the
cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental
pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its
allowance but only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of its
discretion; and of course, a broad definition of "cause of action" should be applied
here as elsewhere. 22

In this case, the consolidation of title over the subject property in the name of
respondent Manuel Sy and the issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as
alleged co-owner from exercising the right of legal redemption, are new matters
that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. The relief prayed for in the
Supplemental Complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal redemption
accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and intertwined with the cause of
action in the Complaint for the nullification of the "Second Supplemental to the
Extrajudicial Partition" on the ground that it lacked the approval of a guardianship
court.

Ada vs. Baylon

Asserting a New Cause of Action
in a Supplemental Pleading

In its Decision dated October 26, 2007, the CA pointed out that the said action for
rescission should have been filed by the petitioners independently of the
proceedings in the action for partition. It opined that the action for rescission
could not be lumped up with the action for partition through a mere supplemental
pleading.

We do not agree.

A supplemental pleading may raise a new

cause of action as long as it has some
relation to the original cause of action set
forth in the original complaint.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. a Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The

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adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.
In Young v. Spouses Sy,36 this Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the
purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus:

As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add
something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental
pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined
with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts
which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled;
hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or
extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even
though they themselves constitute a right of action. 37 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or

events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be
supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of
action.

Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co., Inc.

The appellant also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the
writs of execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez, without requiring said
official's appearance in court, it was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
said sheriff. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public" official in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official
records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section
11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff making the return need
not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. In the case of Antillon vs.
Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151, citing Wigmore on Evidence, this court said:

"To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents
an exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents
executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials.
The courts and the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an
exception. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily
needed, the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary
duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose
daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official

43 | P a g e
sources. Were there no exception to official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering their depositions before an officer. The work of Administration of
government and the interest of the public having business with officials would
alike suffer in consequence."

And this Court added:

"The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that ' it presumes they
will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore,
whatever acts they do In discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence
and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require,"

Vlason Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

Summons to a domestic or resident corporation should be served on officers,
agents or employees, who are responsible enough to warrant the presumption that
they will transmit to the corporation notice of the filing of the action against it.
Rules on the service of motions should be liberally construed in order to promote
the ends of substantial justice. A rigid application that will result in the manifest
injustice should be avoided.
The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the
trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a
notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements
renders their motions fatally defective. 69 However, there are exceptions to the
strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows: 70
"... Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1)
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice;71 especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be
served;72 (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound
and judicious discretion of the court; 73 and (4) where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed." 74The present case falls under the first exception.
Petitioner was not informed of any cause of action or claim against it. All of a
sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its salvaging business were levied
upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this
to happen simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement - which, as
already said, was satisfactorily explained - would be a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice.

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Spouses Manuel vs. Ong
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. a Whenever practicable, the summons

shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule

14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished
from its alternative :a substituted service a as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. a If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales
endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the
Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the
first occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel's
mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and
copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.

The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the
sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They
claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where
the service of summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra
Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was someone other
than petitioner Sandra Manuel.

The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address.

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons
is served. A defendant's address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the
summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse
to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-
CV-2582 a the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel a was validly acquired. This is
so because personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel,
was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.

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Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

Acquisition of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons
or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not
voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void." 18 In an action strictly in personam, personal service
on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot
be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service
can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of
service."19 Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with
the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of
due process as of jurisdiction." 20

Requirements for Substituted Service

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case
provides:
SEC. 8.21 Substituted service. a If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid
substituted service:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. 22 Section 8,
Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to
serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is
mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently,
what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 23 Under the Rules, the
service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or
the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter
submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The

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plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has
failed.24 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable
time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to
30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of
court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the
sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which
the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus,
one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time"
with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand,
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the
sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in
the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries
made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence
or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons
on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The
form on Sheriff's Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the
Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure.26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which
should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

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If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it
should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
therein."27 A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age
of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment
to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability
to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be
of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand
English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time
for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation
of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least
be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if
the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age,
what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said
receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of

business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;
and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of
the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the
Return.

Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar

Let us examine the full text of the Sheriff's Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve
the summons with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the
above entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA "IMEE" MARCOS-
MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or
Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-
Manila at reasonable hours of the day but to no avail for the reason that said
defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises. That on the
15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in
accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said
summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz,
caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and
Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion,

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living with the said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt
thereof of said processes but he refused to sign (emphases supplied).

WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of origin,

duly served for its record and information.

E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Ltd. vs. Benito

Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired
Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus: 23
"x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to
`be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors.' The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad
and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word `agent' of the
corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who
precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very
appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is
an illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific
terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment
permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect
an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent
practitioner." (underscoring supplied)Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a
consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, stated that "(T)he rule must
be strictly observed. Service must be made to one named in (the) statute x x x". 24

It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta
Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, 25 the Court held:
"A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of
the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one
who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x.

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, `to bring
home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.' x x x.

The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on
a domestic corporation. x x x." (underscoring supplied).Service of summons upon

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persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been
held as improper. 26 Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a
firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been
served at the firm's principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs.
Dizon,27 it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the
insurance firm's Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been
obviated had the summons been served at the firm's principal office.

Green Star Express, Inc. vs. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp.

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. a If the

defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. 8In the past, the Court upheld
service of summons upon a construction project manager, a corporation's assistant
manager, ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of corporate
executives, retained counsel, and officials who had control over the operations of
the corporation like the assistant general manager or the corporation's Chief
Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as
"agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules,
service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. 9 The
rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." 10 It
has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated
in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that
the express mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly
listed in the rules. 11 If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. 12

Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on

January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it was received upon instruction of
Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however,
does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. 13 The Return did not even state whether
Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed
assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the
summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then
allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green Star
never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC's motion to
dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which
appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented as
evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit
first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which
is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although the corporation may
have actually received the summons. 15 To rule otherwise will be an outright

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circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of
justice.16

At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be
heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process. Corporations would be easily deprived of
their right to present their defense in a multi-million peso suit, if the Court would
disregard the mandate of the Rules on the service of summons.

Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. vs. Tansipek

Relief from order of default.--A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order
of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense.
In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as
the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the
Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and meritorious defenses. 7 The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur

Lina vs. Court of Appeals

Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground
that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect,
and that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion
for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of
any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court on
certiorari/prohibition. On this point, respondent appellate court aptly said:
x x x where the judgment rendered by the respondent court is the one sought to be

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 annulled, a petition for relief, under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is
a remedy in the ordinary course of law, could have been just as plain, adequate
and speedy as certiorari. Such a remedy could have been granted by the
respondent court. And if the respondent court still denies the petition, then
petitioner can take an appeal on the order denying the petition, and in the course
of such appeal, petitioner can also assail the judgment on the merits upon the
ground that it is not supported by the evidence, or it is contrary to law."

Domagas vs. Jensen

Facts:
The case involves Filomena Domagas as the petitioner and Vivian Layno Jensen as
the respondent. The events leading to the case began on February 19, 1999, when
Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vivian Jensen in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Domagas claimed to be the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
30980, located in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, with an area of 827 square meters.
She alleged that Jensen unlawfully entered her property on January 9, 1999, by
excavating a portion and constructing a fence, thereby depriving her of a 68-
square meter section of her land. Domagas sought various forms of relief,
including the removal of Jensen from her property, payment of monthly rentals,
actual and moral damages, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages.

The MTC rendered a judgment on May 17, 1999, ordering Jensen to vacate the
encroached area and pay monthly rentals, actual damages, attorney's fees, and
exemplary damages. However, Jensen did not appeal this decision. Subsequently, a
writ of execution was issued on September 27, 1999. On August 16, 2000, Jensen
filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, seeking to
annul the MTC's decision on the grounds that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over her
person due to improper service of summons. Jensen argued that the summons was
served to her brother, Oscar Layno, while she was in Oslo, Norway, and that he
was not authorized to receive it on her behalf. The RTC ruled in favor of Jensen,
declaring the MTC's decision null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed this ruling, leading to the present petition for review on
certiorari by Domagas.

Issue:
1. Was there a valid service of summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on the
respondent, Vivian Layno Jensen?
2. Is the action for forcible entry filed by Filomena Domagas an action in personam or
quasi in rem?

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court ruled that there was no valid service of summons and
complaint on the respondent, Vivian Layno Jensen, in Civil Case No. 879.
Consequently, the MTC lacked jurisdiction over Jensen, rendering its decision null
and void. The Court also clarified that the action for forcible entry is an action in
personam, not quasi in rem.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is essential for a court to validly try and decide a case. In this instance, the service
of summons was deemed invalid because it was not properly executed according to
the requirements of the Rules of Court. The Court noted that the service was made
on Oscar Layno, who was merely visiting the property and was not a resident or
authorized representative of Jensen at the time of service. The Court highlighted
that strict compliance with the rules regarding service of summons is crucial, as
any deviation could result in a lack of jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Court clarified the nature of the action for forcible entry, stating
that it is an action in personam, which seeks to enforce personal rights and
obligations against the defendant. The Court distinguished between actions in
personam and quasi in rem, explaining that the former involves judgments against
the person, while the latter pertains to the status or ownership of property. The
Court concluded that since the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Jensen due to
improper service, its decision was null and void, affirming the lower court's ruling
in favor of Jensen.

Ching vs. Cheng

The Court explained that dismissals under Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
are generally without prejudice unless specified otherwise. The "two-dismissal
rule" applies only when a plaintiff has caused two dismissals of the same action. In
this case, the first dismissal was at the instance of the defendants, and the second
dismissal was requested by the plaintiffs, thus not triggering the rule. The Court
emphasized that the trial court's dismissal of the second case was explicitly stated
to be without prejudice, allowing the respondents to file a third case.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the act of filing the third case while the
motion for reconsideration of the second case was pending constituted forum
shopping. The principle of litis pendentia was applicable, as there was an identity
of parties and causes of action between the second and third cases. The Court
underscored the importance of avoiding multiple actions on the same subject
matter to prevent conflicting judgments and to uphold the orderly administration
of justice.

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