Status of Children 1
Status of Children 1
(a) If the parents are of the same nationality, their common personal
law, whether their national law or the law of their domicile, will be
applied.
(b) In the Philippines, since we follow the nationality theory (Art. 15,
NCC), the common national law of the parents applies, and, if they
have different nationalities, the national law of the father governs.
2. Who are legitimate and illegitimate children under Philippine internal law?
Remember that under RA 9225, illegitimate children may now use the
surname of the father “if their affiliation has been expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father” during the latter’s lifetime.
5. What law governs the rights and duties between parent and child?
(a) if the child is legitimate as determined by the above rules, either the
common personal law of the parents, or the personal law of the father
if the parents are of different nationalities, governs;
(c) In the Philippines, again since we follow the nationality theory, the
law of the mother governs if the child is illegitimate, unless the child is
again recognized by the father, in which case the personal law of the
father (whether it is the same as the mother) applies.
B. Legitimation
Under Art. 177, the following requisites must concur in order that a child
may be legitimated:
(a) the child was conceived and born outside lawful wedlock;
(b) the parents, at the time of the child’s conception, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.
The immutability of the status of a legitimated child is very clear under Art.
180, FC which provides that “the effects of legitimation shall retroact
to the time of the child’s birth.” Also, Art. 178 provides that “the
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.”
C. Adoption
(b) PD 603 was later amended by EO 91, series 1986 regarding non-
resident aliens who were allowed to adopt under PD 603.
Under the FC, aliens were not allowed to adopt in the Philippines anymore
except those referred to in Art. 184(3) thereof, and non-resident aliens were
allowed to adopt Filipino children only under the law on Inter-Country
Adoption (RA 8043) which was signed on June 7, 1995. Under this law, the
adoption proceedings are to be held in the home country of the adopters.
(d) Still lawter, on February 25, 1998, RA 8552 was signed (“Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998), amending many provisions of the FC on domestic
adoption.
(a) The old definition of adoption in the Partidas is that it is ‘the act
whereby one person is received as the offspring of another although
he is not such by nature.’
This definition was based on the theory that adoption is mainly for the
benefit of the adopter, so that those who have no children or have lost
them, may have the solace and joys of parenthood, and that the void which
exists in childless homes may be filled (Ynigo v. Republic, 95 Phil. 244).
“Adoption is thus given a social and moral purpose; that is, to extend to the
orphan or to the child of the indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the
protection of society in the person of the adopter” (Dr. Tolentino).
The legal effects of the adoption are determined by the same law that
created the relationship of adoption. The legal effects that flow from
the adoption are:
(a) As discussed in Question No. 1 hereof, while the NCC did not allow non-
resident aliens to adopt, PD 603 liberalized the NCC provisions on adoption
and allowed even non-resident aliens to come to the Philippines and
adopt our children here.
(b) The FC, however, became strict in adoption of aliens in the Philippines
because of reports received by the Committee that drafted the Code x x x
that some Filipino children adopted by aliens and brought by the latter to
their home countries suffered cultural and psychological shock and could not
adjust to their new lives in the foreign countries of their foreign adopters.
Also, information was received that old alien pedophiles, after having been
allowed to adopt Filipino children in the Philippines, would, after bringing said
children to their home countries, simply abandon these children after they
had satisfied their sexual desires on them. There were even alleged cases of
Filipino children who, after having been adopted by foreigners, were killed
for organ transplant in the foreign homes of their adopters. Hence, the
Committee believed that by limiting adoption of Filipino children by aliens to
former Filipino citizens (and/or their spouse) related by blood to the adopted
children, the latter would be given some measure of protection by the
adopters who are their relatives by consanguinity.
(c) RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) again allows aliens (who are
not former Filipino citizens) to adopt in our country, provided –
(1) they have the same qualifications as those required of Filipino
citizens;
(2) their countries have diplomatic relations with our country;
(3) they have been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to
the filing of the petition for adoption, and maintain such residence until
the adoption decree is entered;
(4) they have been certified by their diplomatic or consular offices or
by any appropriate government agency that they have the legal
capacity to adopt in their own countries; and
(5) their government allows the adopted child to enter their country as
their adopted child.
6. The cases of Republic v. CA and Hughs, 227 SCRA 401 , and Republic v.
Judge Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 6, 1994 , decided by the SC, denied the
joint petitions for adoption filed under the FC by former Filipino wives, now
American citizens, and their American husband, because what the FC only
allowed was joint adoption by Filipino citizens and their aliens
spouses. Are these decisions still good under RA 8552?
No more if the aliens husbands of former Filipino wives can comply with the
requirements for alien adopters under Sec. 7(b), RA 8552.
But, RA 8552 still requires that husband and wife must jointly adopt,
which joint adoption was also required by the FC, except when one spouse
seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate child, or when one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the other spouse (Art. 185, FC). RA 8552
adds that in cases where the spouses are legally separated x x x the
husband or the wife can adopt alone, and the consent of the other spouse
to an adoption filed by one spouse is no longer necessary.
(1) All legal ties between the biological parent/s and the adopted child
are severed and the same shall be vested in the adopter/s, except in
cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter. In other
words, parental authority over the adopted child is transferred to the
adopter;
(2) The adopted child shall be considered for all intents and purposes to
be the legitimate child of the adopter/s, and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate children;
(3) In legal and intestate succession, the adopter/s and the adopted child
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. Testamentary succession will, however, apply if the
adopted child and the adopter/s had left a will.
8. There are still other important points to remember regarding the nature
of adoption in the Philippines; namely:
(1) Adoption proceedings in our country are always judicial and in rem,
i.e. publication is required as constructive notice of the petition for
adoption to the whole world, since adoption creates status;
(2) Since there can be no valid adoption without a court decree granting the
same, a mere agreement of adoption between the adoptions and the
[biological] parents of the child is not a valid adoption (Santos-Ynigo v.
Republic), nor the fact that the child had been adopted de facto (ampon) by
the alleged adopting parents (Lazatin v. Judge Campos);
(3) Neither is the mere registration of the child in the civil registry as the
child of the adopter a valid adoption. This even amounts to the crime of
simulation of birth punishable by prision mayor in the medium period, and a
fine not exceeding P50,000.00;
(4) The capacity and right of the adopter to file a petition for adoption, are
governed by the law in force at the time the petition is filed, and
cannot be impaired by a new law disqualifying him/her for adoption
(Republic v. CA and Bobiles; Republic v. Miller).
This is particularly true if both the adopter and the adopted child are
nationals or domiciliaries of the forum that decreed the adoption.
10. Does adoption confer on the adopted child the citizenship of the
adopter?
No. Adoption does not confer on the adopted child the citizenship of
the adopter. Adoption is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and
the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the
Civil Code (Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen v. Republic; Ching Leng v. Galang).
CASES ON ADOPTION
Thereafter, said escritura was filed by petitioner before the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila for registration. However, the respondent
Leoncio Aglubat, the deputy local civil registrar of Manila refused registration
on the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through
judicial proceeding. Hence, the escritura cannot be registered because a
notarial adoption is not a judicial proceeding.
“We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's theory. We are at a loss
to understand how it could be concluded that the structure of the law did not
authorize registration of foreign adoptions. We perceive that Article 409 and
Section 10 aforesaid were incorporated into the statute books merely to give
effect to our law which required judicial proceedings for adoption. Limitation
of registration of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a
misconception which a broader view allows us now to correct. For, if
registration is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out
a prohibition where the law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no
purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil Code, the disputed
document of adoption is registrable.
No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and adoptee, or
any other person for that matter, would ensue from the adoption here
involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever may
be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other
persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code
which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign
adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign
country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the
Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption
shall be governed by the laws of this country.”
FACTS: On August 3, 1988 the Family Code of the Philippines took effect,
which, among others, under its Art. 184 prohibits aliens to adopt.
However, prior to the Family Code, the law on adoption in force was PD 603
or the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt.
Herein private respondents Claude and Jumrus Miller (Spouses Miller) are
American citizens who have been living in the Philippines since 1985.
Later, in July 29, 1988, the spouses Miller filed with the RTC a verified
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
ISSUE: Whether private respondents spouses Miller, as aliens, have the right
to adopt the minor Michael despite prohibition under the Family Code which
took effect after the petition for adoption was filed.
“The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino
child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3,
1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the
provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt
under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of
the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected
by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court
acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To
repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of
the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said
Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family Code.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of
the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objective of the law.”
Spouses Park v. Hon. Liwanag, G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019
Second Division, Justice Hernando
FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee are American
citizens who have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (for petitioner
Park) and since 2009 (for petitioner Lee).
Later, after more than three years residing in the Philippines, petitioners-
spouses filed a Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor
“Mayca Alegado” aka Inna Alegado before the RTC.
Later, however, the RTC found that since petitioners-spouses are both
foreigners, the petition for adoption presented a proper case of inter-country
adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed
under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Hence, the RTC, directed that
transmittal of the copy of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country
Adoption Board (ICAB) for appropriate action.
Later, petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied. They later filed
a Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which dismissed the
same based on technicalities. Petitioners moved for reconsideration to no
avail. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has properly ruled that the petition for adoption is a
proper case of inter-country adoption.
x x x
Petitioners point out that contrary to the pronouncement of the RTC, the
instant case is not appropriate for inter-country adoption proceedings
because the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 applies to aliens who
permanently reside abroad. However, in the instant case, petitioners do not
permanently reside in the U.S. They have been residing in the Philippines for
more than three continuous years prior to the filing of their Petition for
Adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act. To support their claim
and while the adoption proceeding was pending before the trial court,
petitioners prepared the written deposition of Ms. Tifany Markee, an expert
in U.S. immigration and inter-country adoption laws, who was deposed by the
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. She certified that
petitioners are deemed habitual residents outside the U.S. since they have
resided for more than two years with Innah in the Philippines. This being the
case, under U.S. laws, they are in fact exempted from adopting through
inter-country adoption.
xxx
1) Sec. 4 of RA 8552 (or Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) compared with Sec.
9 of RA 8043 or (Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995);
We note that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing
and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (in
the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee),
and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior
to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic
Adoption Act.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioners' Petition for
Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act in order
for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance thereof.
'The Supreme Court en banc in OCA Circular 213-2017 states that foreigners
who have filed an application for adoption with the assistance and approval
of the DSWD MUST attach the following to their petition to the courts:
This implies that these foreigners should still secure a certification from their
Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies that since they are not
residents in their countries and habitually residing in the Philippines, the said
agencies could not issue the documents required by the domestic courts in
support to their Petitions filed for domestic adoption. If ever their cases will
be endorsed to ICAB by the courts, ICAB will file a manifestation on this
matter so that the domestic adoption could be pursued.'
Thus, even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB,
as what the RTC did, there is still a high probability that the ICAB will file a
manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial court could be
pursued, considering the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the
referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a
matter that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and
the petitioners.
xxx
In view of this, We hold that since the case properly falls under the Domestic
Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that the instant case be
speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the
determination of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child,
instead of inappropriately referring the instant domestic adoption case to the
ICAB where the proceedings may have to start anew and might be referred
back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic adoption
proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of
the child is of paramount interest. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in In
the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is instructive:
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the Ne w Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail."