Visit https://ebookfinal.

com to download the full version and

explore more ebooks

A Theory of Legal Argumentation The Theory of

Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal
Justification Alexy

_____ Click the link below to download _____

https://ebookfinal.com/download/a-theory-of-legal-
argumentation-the-theory-of-rational-discourse-as-
theory-of-legal-justification-alexy/

Explore and download more ebooks at ebookfinal.com

Here are some suggested products you might be interested in.
Click the link to download

The Legal Theory of Carl Schmitt 1st Edition Mariano Croce

https://ebookfinal.com/download/the-legal-theory-of-carl-schmitt-1st-
edition-mariano-croce/

Credit and Creed A Critical Legal Theory of Money 1st

Edition Andreas Rahmatian

https://ebookfinal.com/download/credit-and-creed-a-critical-legal-
theory-of-money-1st-edition-andreas-rahmatian/

Feminist Legal Theory Second Edition A Primer Nancy Levit

https://ebookfinal.com/download/feminist-legal-theory-second-edition-
a-primer-nancy-levit/

Legal Education Simulation in Theory and Practice Caroline

Strevens

https://ebookfinal.com/download/legal-education-simulation-in-theory-
and-practice-caroline-strevens/
Justification and Critique Towards a Critical Theory of
Politics 1st Edition Rainer Forst

https://ebookfinal.com/download/justification-and-critique-towards-a-
critical-theory-of-politics-1st-edition-rainer-forst/

On Rhetoric A Theory of Civic Discourse 2nd Edition

Aristotle

https://ebookfinal.com/download/on-rhetoric-a-theory-of-civic-
discourse-2nd-edition-aristotle/

On Rhetoric A Theory of Civic Discourse 2nd Edition

Aristotle

https://ebookfinal.com/download/on-rhetoric-a-theory-of-civic-
discourse-2nd-edition-aristotle-2/

New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property

1st Edition Stephen R. Munzer

https://ebookfinal.com/download/new-essays-in-the-legal-and-political-
theory-of-property-1st-edition-stephen-r-munzer/

Forgotten Justice The Forms of Justice in the History of

Legal and Political Theory 1st Edition Allan Beever

https://ebookfinal.com/download/forgotten-justice-the-forms-of-
justice-in-the-history-of-legal-and-political-theory-1st-edition-
allan-beever/
A Theory of Legal Argumentation The Theory of Rational
Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification Alexy Digital
Instant Download
Author(s): Alexy, Robert, Adler, Ruth, MacCormick, Neil
ISBN(s): 9780199584222, 0199584222
Edition: Revised ed.
File Details: PDF, 18.61 MB
Year: 2010
Language: english
 A THEORY OF
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
 A Theory of
Legal Argumentation
The Theory of Rational Discourse as
Theory of Legal Justification

ROBERT ALEXY

Translated by

Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

1989
 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan

Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press

© in this English translation, Oxford University Press, 1989

© in the original German edition, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation:
Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begriindung,
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Alexy, Robert
A theory of legal argumentation: the
theory of rational discourse on theory
of legal justification
1. Legal argument
I. Title
340'.11
ISBN o-1rr-82550!)9

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Alexy, Robert.
[ Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. English J
A theory of legal argumentation: the theory of rational discourse
as theory of legal justification / Robert Alexy; translated by Ruth
Adler and Neil MacCormick.
Translation of: Theorie der juristischen Argumentation.
Originally presented as the author's thesis ( doctoral )-Georg
-August University of Giittingen, 1976.
Bibliography Includes indexes.
I. Law-Methodology. 2. Semantics (Law) 3. Judgments.
I. Title.
K213.A4313 1989 34o'.1-dc19 88-21866
ISBN o-1rr-82550!)9

Typeset by Cotswold Typesetting Limited, Gloucester

Printed and bound in

Great Britain by Biddies Ltd.
Guilciford and King's Lynn
For Edith
lt:inn
 Preface
In a leading decision-of 14 February 1973 on decisions contrary
to statute, the first panel of the German Federal Constitutional
Court declared that all judicial rulings must 'be founded on
rational argumentation'. 1 This demand for rationality in
argument can be extended to any situation in which lawyers .
engage in debate. So questions about the nature of rational
argumentation in general and rational legal argumentation in
particular are not only of interest to legal theorists and
philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practising
lawyers and a matter of concern for every citizen active in the
public arena. Not only the standing of academic law as a
scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions
depends on the possibility of rational legal argumentation.
The question of what is to be understood by 'rational legal
argumentation', of whether and to what extent it is possible, is
the subject-matter of this investigation. The subtitle: 'The
Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification'
indicates how these questions are to be tackled. The answer
proceeds in two stages. Parts A and B of the book attempt to
work out a general theory of practical reasoning, whilst Part C
applies this theory to legal argumentation. That the first two
par'ts> occupy considera.bly more space than the third is a
reflection of the present objective to lay a foundation for a theory
oflegal argumentation. A further development of this theory is
not only possible but also desirable. If this investigation succeeds
in its aim, it will have laid the corner-stone for such future work.
The manuscript of this book was presented as a thesis in the
Faculty of Law of the Georg-August University ofGottingen in
1976. The work would not have come to fruition without
support from many quarters. I should particularly like to single
out Professor Ralf Dreier from all those who helped along the
way. It was he who first gave me many of my ideas during the
course of countless discussions. My thanks also to Professor
Malte DieBelhorst whose criticism saved me from several errors.

' BVerfGE (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court) 34,269 (287).

Vlll Preface
I should also like to record particular thanks at this point to my
philosophy teacher Professor Gunther Patzig. It would give me
particular pleasure if his approach to philosophy were recogniz-
able in the method of this investigation. Finally thanks are due
to the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes which gave both
intellectual and financial support throughout many years.
R.A.
Giittingen
January 1978
 Preface To The English Edition
This book was first published in German in 1978. It is a great
source of pleasure to me that it is now appearing in English. I
should like to express special thanks to the translators, Ruth
Adler and Neil MacCormick. They gave me their manuscript to
read before it went to the printers, and I was very gratified to
find that they had captured my meaning entirely, even in those
places where differences in the two languages precluded a literal
translation. I believe that the book has been improved by their
work. I also owe many thanks to William Twining who initially
supported the idea of a revival of translations of contemporary
scholarly work in legal theory. Finally, I must express my
gratitude to the editorial staff of Oxford University Press for the
care they took in seeing the manuscript through the Press, and in
particular for their detailed help with the bibliography.
R.A.
Kiel
September I988
 Contents

List of Logical Symbols used in the Text xv

INTRODUCTION
r. The Problem of the Justification of Legal Decisions
2. The Fundamental Ideas of this Enquiry 14
3. Topic Theory and its Limits 20
4. Towards Assessing whether Contemporary Methodologi-
cal Discussions Reveal a Need for a Theory of Rational
Legal Argumentation 24

A. REFLECTIONS ON SOME THEORIES OF

PRACTICAL DISCOURSE
I. Practical Discourse in Analytic Moral Philosophy 33
r. Naturalism and Intuitionism 34
1. I. Naturalism 34
1.2. Intuitionism 37
2. Emotivism 39
3. Practical Discourse as a Rule-Governed Activity 47
3.1. The Foundations in Linguistic Philosophy: Wittgen-
stein 8nd Austin 47
3.2. Hare's Theory 58
3.3. Toulmin's Theory 79
3-4- Baier's Theory 93
4· Some Interim Results 99

II. Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth IOI

I. Habermas's Critique of the Correspondence Theory of

Truth IOI
2. Combining Speech Act Theory and a Theory of Truth 104
3. Distinguishing between Action and Discourse 105
4. The Justification of Normative Statements 107
5. The Logic of Discourse I I I
6. The Ideal Speech Situation ll9
7. Critical Discussion of Habermas.'s Theory 124
Xll Contents
III. The Theory of Practical Deliberation of the
Erlangen School 1 38

1. The Programme of the Constructive Method 1 38

2. The Presupposed Purpose of Constructivist Ethics 140
3. The Principles of Constructivist Ethics 142
4. The Critical Genesis of Norms 149
5. Points to Remember 153

IV. Chaim Perelman's Theory of Argumentation 155

1. The Theory of Argumentation as a Logical Theory (In the
Wider Sense) · 156
2. Argumentation as a Function of Audience 157
3. Demonstration and Argumentation 158
4. The Concept of the Universal Audience 160
5. Persuading and Convincing 164
6. Perelman's Analysis of the Structure of Argumentation 164
7. The Rationality of Argumentation 169
8. Points to Remember 173

B. OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF GENERAL

RATIONAL PRACTICAL DISCOURSE
I. The Problem ofthejustification ofNormative Statements 177
2. Possible Theories of Discourse 180
3. The justification of Rules of Discourse 180
4. The Rules and Forms of General Practical Discourse 187
4. 1. The Basic Rules 188
4.2. The Rationality Rules 191
4.3. Rules for Allocating the Burden of Argument 195
4,4, The Argument Forms 197
4.5. The Justification Rules 202
4.6. The Transition Rules 206
5. The Limits of General Practical Discourse 206

C. A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTA-

TION
I. Legal Discourse as a Special Case of General
Practical Discourse 211

1. Types of Legal Discussion 2 11

2. The Special Case Thesis 2 12
3. Transition to a Theory of Legal Argumentation 220
.T

Contents Xlll

II. The Outline of a Theory of Legal Argumentation 221

1. Internal Justification 221
2. External Justification 230
2. I. The Six Groups of Rules and Forms of External
Justification 231
2.2. Empirical Reasoning 232
2.3. The Canons of Interpretation 234
2.4. Dogmatic Reasoning . 250
2.5. The Use of Precedent 274
2.6. The Application of Special Legal Argument Forms 279
2. 7. The Role of General Practical Arguments in Legal
Discourse 284

III. Legal and General Practical Discourse 287

I. The Need for Legal Discourse in View of the Nature of
General Practical Discourse 287
2. The Partial Correspondence in the Claim to Correctness 289
3. The Structural Correspondence between the Rules and
Forms of Legal Discourse and those of General Practical
Discourse 289
4. The Need for General Practical Arguments in the
Framework of Legal Reasoning 291
5. The Limits and Necessity of the Theory of Rational Legal
Discourse 292

Appendix 297

Bibliography 303

Index 317
 List of Logical Symbols used
in the Text
7 = not (negation)
I\ = and (conjunction)
v = or (disjunction)
~ = if ... then . . . (conditional)
~=if and only if ... then ... (biconditional)
(x) = for all x (universal quantifier)
O=it is obligatory that ... (deontic operator)
-
i
I
 Introduction

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF LEGAL

DECISIONS

'It can . . . no longer be seriously maintained that the

application oflaws involves no more than a logical subsumption
under abstractly formulated major premises'. 1 This observation
by Karl Larenz marks one of the few points of agreement in
contemporary discussions oflegal methodology. In many cases
the singular normative statement which expresses a judgment
resolving a legal dispute is not a logical conclusion 2 derived from
formulations oflegal norms presupposed valid 3 taken together
with statements of fact which are assumed or proven to be true.
There are at least four reasons for 'this: (I) the vagueness oflegal
language, 4 ( 2) the possibility of conflict between norms, 5 ( 3) the
fact that there are cases requiring a legal statement which do not
fall under any existing valid norm, 6 and finally (4) the
possibility, in special cases, of a decision which is contrary to the
wording of a statute.7

' K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschajt, 3rd edn. (Berlin, Heidel-

berg and New York, 1975), 154.
2
On the concept of logical conclusion cf. A. Tarski, 'On the Concept of
Logical Consequence', in his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford, 1956),
409 ff. On the possibility of relations of inference between normative
propositions cf. below, pp. 188-9.
3 What is to count as 'a legal norm presupposed valid' may remain an open

question here. The claim made in the text also holds good where further
sources oflaw such as precedent are recognized in addition to legislation and
custom.
4 Cf. H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), 121 ff. and id.,

'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', Harvard Law Review, 71
( l 958), 606 ff. .
5 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. M. Knight (Berkeley, Calif. 1967),

205-8.
6
Cf. Larenz, Methodenlehre, pp. 354 ff.
7 It is not only possible that this enumeration may be incomplete; one might

also be of the view that it contains too many reasons. Thus on the one hand (3)
and (4) are missing from the reasons cited by Kelsen for the 'indefiniteness of
2 Introduction
A legal judgment], which follows logically from formulations
of legal norms N N Nn whose validity has to be
1
,
2
•••

presupposed together with empirical statements Ar, A 2 • • • An,

can be described as justifiable in terms ofN 1 , N 2 • • • Nn together
with A A 1
, An. However, if there are judgments which do
2
•••

not follow logically from N 1 , N 2 • • • N n together with A 1 , A2 • • •

An, the question arises of how such judgments can be justified.
This problem is the fundamental problem for legal methodo-
logy.
The theory of legal methodology could solve the problem
of how fully to justify a legal judgment if it were able to
provide rules or procedures according to which it could be
shown either that the transition from N N Nn and Ar, A 1
,
2
• ••
2

. . . An to J is permissible (even where J does not follow

logically from N N Nn and A A
1
,
2
An) or that in
•••
1
,
2
•••

addition to the presupposedly valid norms and the proven

empirical statements, further propositions with a normative
content N:, N: ...
N~ can be adduced such that J follows
logically from N N Nn together with N'r, N: ... N~ and
1
,
2
•••

Ar, A2 ... An.

The most widely discussed candidates for the role of rules or

the law-applying act', while on the other, he cites the discrepancy between the
will and the expression of the norm-stipulating authority as a reason (5) in
addition to (r) and (2) (Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, p. 350 and 'Zur Theorie
der Interpretation', in Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schute . .. , ed. H. Klecatsky,
R. Marcie, and H. Schambeck (Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich, Salzburg, and ·
Munich, 1968), ii. 1365). (5) may be.regarded as a reason for (4) or ( r ). What
is problematic is whether and to what extent decisions classified under (3) and
(4) are constitutionally admissible. In both instances the judge assumes a role
in an area which, according to the principle of the separation of powers, would
seem to be the province of the legislature. However, this problem cannot be
discussed here. It will only be pointed out that there are cases of (3) (indirect
breach of contract) and (4) (compensation for non-physical injury (BGB,
para. 253)) in which the creation of new legal norms through legal judgments
and the non-application oflegal norms, has been generally recognized or held
to be in accordance with the constitution by virtue of a declaration of the
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerJGE 34, 269 (286-7) ). The subject-matter
of this book is not the question of the cons ti tu tionali ty of decisions falling under
(3) and (4), but rather that of whether such decisions in their turn can also be
rationally justified within the framework oflegal methodology. However, an
answer to this question should also be of significance in addressing the problem
of their constitutional admissibility.
 Introduction 3
procedures to take on this task are the so-called 'canons of
interpretation'.
Even the number of these canons remains in dispute. Savigny,
for instance, distinguished the grammatical, the logical, the
historical, and the systematic elements of interpretation. 8
According to Larenz there are five criteria of sound interpreta-
tion: the literal meaning of the :;tatute; its contextual meaning;
the regulatory purposes, aims, and normative intentions of the
historical legislator; objective-teleological criteria; and finally
conformity of interpretation to the constitution. 9 To cite a
further example, Wolff recognizes philological, logical, system-
atic, historical, comparative, genetic, and teleological
interpretations. Io
More significant than the problem of the number of canons is
the question of their rank order. Different canons may lead to
quite different results. In the light of this fact, they would only be
capable of yielding a single correct answer by way of a well-
grounded result if it were possible to articulate strict criteria for
ranking them. No one has as yet succeeded in doing this. r I A
further difficulty is the indeterminacyI 2 of the canons of

8
F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen RiJmischen Rechts, vol. i (Berlin, 1840),
212ff.
9 Larenz, Methodenlehre, pp. 307 ff.
10
H.J. Wolff and 0. Bachof, Verwaltungsrecht, 9th edn. (Munich, 1974), vol.
· i, para. 28. III. c. (The paragraph number refers to Wolffs section of the
textbook.)
11
Cf. M. Kriele, Theorieder Rechtsgewinnung, 2ndedn. (Berlin, 1976), 85 ff.;J.
Esser, Vorverstandnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtifi.ndung, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt-
on-Main, 1972), 124 ff. Larenz, who makes an attempt at a rank ordering, also
observes that 'there exists no definite ranking between them' (lvlethodenlehre,
p. 334). The difficulty of justifying a rank order is closely related to the
difficulties of determining the goal of interpretation. A decision about the goal
of interpretation presupposes a theory regarding the function ofadjudication,
and this in its turn presupposes an answer to the question whether and to what
extent rational legal argumentation is possible. In this regard Engisch is to be
supported in his view that it requires 'a more penetrating perspective to assign
to each method of interpretation its relative validity and its particular logical
setting' (K. Engisch, Einfiihrung in das juristische Denken, 5th edn. (Stuttgart,
Berlin, Cologne, and Mainz, 197 1), 84. The theory oflegal reasoning proposed
here constitutes an attempt to discover such 'more penetrating perspectives'.
12
Cf. Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 86.
 4 Introduction
interpretation. A rule such as: 'Interpret every norm so that it
achieves its purpose' leads to divergent outcomes when each of
two interpreters has a different view as to the purpose of the
norm in question. 1 3
The weakness of the canons ofinterpretation indicated above
does not mean that they should be dismissed out of hand. But it
does exclude the possibility of considering them as sufficient in
themselves as rules for constructing justifications of legal
judgments.
One might give up the search for a system ofjustificatory rules
and try instead to establish a system ofpropositions from which the
missing normative premises necessary for the purposes of
justification could be deduced.Justification in terms of such a
system would be conclusive whenever the system consisted solely
ofpropositions derivable from the set of presupposedly valid
norms. In such a case, however, the system would not contain
any regulations which went beyond the presupposedly valid set
of norms. 14
On the other hand, if, like Canaris for example, one
understands by such a system, a system of the general principles
oflegal order (an 'axiological-teleological' system)1 5 the ques-
tion immediately arises as to how such principles are to be
established. They do not follow logically from the presupposed
norms. The application of such principles for the justification of
legal judgments is also problematic.
11 The principles allow of exceptions and may be mutually inconsistent
and even contradictory; they do not claim to have all-or-nothing
applicability; their real meaning only unfolds through a !~p-_:Yay
process of adjustment and limitation; and for their actual -imple-
mentation, they require concretization via subordinate prin-

13 In light of the uncertainty of the canons, it is open to doubt whether they

are to count as rules at all. Thus Muller sees them as 'short-hand descriptions
for certain ways of proceeding in an investigation' and Rottleuthner as
instructions 'to ask for standards ofrelevance' (F. Muller, Juristische Methodik,
2nd edn. (Berlin, 1976), I 67; H. Rottleuthner, Richterliches Handeln ...
(Frankfurt-on-Main, 1973), 30). The question of the logical status of the
canons is discussed in more detail below. See pp. 244-5.
4 Cf. Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 98.
1

15
C.-W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegrijf in der Jurisprudenz (Berlin,
I 969), 46 ff. .
 Introduction 5
ciples and particular value-judgments with an independent material
content. 16
The axiological-teleological system is not such as to yield any
unique decision about the proper weighing and balancing of
legal principles in a given case or about which particular values
should be given priority in any particular situation. 17
This does not mean to say that it is impossible to base
arguments on a system of values and goals, that is to argue from
an axiological-teleological system, or on some other system.
Arguments from systems, however these systems are character-
ized, play a significant part both in the practice of the courts and
in the field oflegal science. 18 However, it does make it quite clear
that this type of argumentation is never entirely conclusive.

1.1 Suppose that there are situations in which the decision of

an individual case does not follow logically from either empiric·~1
statements taken together with presupposed norms or strictly
grounded propositions of some system however conceived, and
also that such decisions cannot be completely justified by
reference to rules of legal method. In such cases it must follow
that the decision-maker has discretion inasmuch as the case is
not fully governed by legal norms, rules of legal method, and
doctrines oflegal dogmatics. Accordingly there is a choice to be
made between competing solutions.
It is this choice on the part of the decision-maker which

16
Ibid., 52-3 (my italics). Cf. Larenz, who notes that 'at each stage of
concretization, additional value judgm~nts [are] needed, which must be taken
on first by the legislature and only subsequently, within the framework of any
remaining scope for judicial discretion, by the judge' (Larenz, Methodenlehre,
p. 462).
17 In view of this state of affairs, Wieacker considers whether it might not

'perhaps after all be better to abandon any postulated system of (relatively)

closed deductive relations' (F. Wieacker's review of Canaris, Systemdenken und
Systembegrijf, Rechtstheorie, I ( I 970), I I 2). Cf. further Esser, Vorverstiindnis und
Methodenwahl, p. 100, where he writes of the 'multiple valency of the evaluative
content of a principle' and observes: 'It is not the principles which act but
rather the person who has to determine the law. The correct relation cannot be
"extracted from" the system without examining the problems of conflict.'
18
For a number of examples which stress precisely this point cf. U.
Diederichsen, 'Topisches und systematisches Denken in der Jurisprudenz',
NJW 19 (1966), 698 ff.
6 Introduction
determines which singular· normative proposition 1s to be
asserted (as the conclusion of a piece of legal research, for
example) or to be pronounced by way of a judgment in a case.
The content of such a singular normative statement is an
assertion or determination of that which is required of,
forbidden to, or permitted for certain individuals. 19 Hence the
decision, regardless of the question at which level ofjustification
it is reached, is a decision about what ought to or may be done or
not done. In this decision a state of affairs or an action or type of
behaviour on the part of one or more persons is given preference
over other states or actions or kinds of behaviour on the part of
these persons. Giving preference in this way involves a judgment
that the chosen option is in some sense the better one, and to this
extent there is a 'value-judgment' 20 as the basis of2 1 the decision.
Almost all contemporary methodological discussions emphasize
the fact that law cannot dispense with such value-judgments.
19
It is not being asserted here that all legal judgments directly express
commands, prohibitions, or permissions. This is not the case in respect of
judgments altering legal relations, for example. The weaker thesis that all
judgments are reducible to basic forms which contain only those normative
expressions which are basic deontic operators such as 'commanded' 'forbid-
den', and 'permitted', will not be put forward here, although there are
arguments in favour ofit. Here it will suffice to say that legal judgments at least
imply commands, prohibitions, or permissions. Regarding this problem area,
cf. W. N. Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning', in his Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, ed. W.W. Cook (New Haven, Conn., 1923),
23 ff. and, in particular, A. Ross, Directives and Norms (London, l 968), rn6 ff.
20
On the concepts of'giving preference', 'choice', and 'better' cf. G. H. von
Wright, The Logic ofPreference (Edinburgh, 1963), 13 ff. The expression 'value-
judgment' can be used to designate either the actual giving of preference or the
judgment that a particular alternative is the better one, or the rule of
preference underlying this judgment (and thereby the preference). Concern-
ing this last cf. A. Podlech, 'Wertungen und Werte im Recht', AbR 95 ( 1970),
195-6. Many use the expression to mean all these and more at the same time.
Since there is no need for greater precision for present purposes, it will be
omitted.
21
Cf. Wieacker, 'Zur Topikdiskussion in der zeitgenossischen deutschen
Rechtswissenschaft' in Xenion, Festschrift for P. J. Zepos, ed. E. von
Caemmerer, J. H. Kaiser, G. Kegel, W. Miiller-Freienfels, and H.J. Wolff
(Athens, 1973), 407: 'Outwith the core of the law which is amenable to
subsumption and particularly in the realm of making new law ... all problems
concerning the applic.ation oflaw ... can be formulated as decisions between
alternative value-judgements.'
 Introduction 7
Thus Larenz speaks of the 'insight that the application oflaw is
not exhausted by a process ofsubsumption, but rather requires a
wide range of value-judgment~ on the part of those applying the
law.' 22 Muller is of the opinion that 'law devoid of decisions and
value-judgments [would be] neither practical nor
realistic'. 23 Esser observes that 'in all but the least problematic
decisions .I. . value-judgments [are of] central significance'. 24
Kriele comes to the conclusion that one 'cannot by any means
escape from evaluative, normative-teleological, and political
elements inherent in every interpretation', 25 and Engisch is
forced to recognize that
even today, statutes, in all branches of the law, [are] constructed in
such a way that both judges and administrators do not make and
justify their decisions purely by subsumption under fixed legal
concepts whose content will be revealed unambiguously through
interpretation, but are rather called upon to judge independently and
from time to time to decide and decree in the manner oflegislators.2 6
The problem has been identified rather than resolved by the
above observations. The question is where and to what extent
value-judgments are required, how the relationship between
these value-judgments and the methods of legal interpretation
as well as the propositions and concepts oflegal dogmatics are to
·• be determined, and how these value-judgments can be ratio-
nally grounded or justified.
Finding answers to these questions is of great theoretical and
practical significance. At the very least, the scientific status of
jurisprudence is dependent on the answers we give. In
addition, our answers will have considerable bearing on the
problem of the legitimacy of regulating social conflicts by
judicial decisions. For if it is the case that judicial rulings are
based on value-judgments, and if these value-judgments
cannot be rationally grounded, then at least in a large number
of cases it is the de facto, extant, normative convictions or
decisions of a professional body 27 which form the basis for such
22
Larenz, Methodenlehre, p. 150.
2
3 Miiller, Juristische Methodik, p. 134.
24 Esser, Vorverstandnis und Methodenwahl, p. g.
25 Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 96.
26
- Engisch, Einfiihrung in das juristische Denken, p. 107.
27 This holds true at least for courts presided over by professional judges.
 8 Introduction
conflict-resolution, a basis which neither has nor can have any
further justification.
J The questions: (I) where and to what extent value-judgments
are necessary; (2) how these value-judgments relate to argu-
ments designated as 'specifically legal' and to legal dogmatics;
and (3) whether such value-judgments are rationally justifiable,
cannot be answered in advance in the Introduction. They are
rather the subject-matter of this investigation. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid the risk of certain quite probable misunder-
standings, I shall assume a position in respect of some of these
issues.
The thesis that law cannot proceed without value-judgments
does not mean that the outcome of every case is uncertain. Legal
norms or dogmatic doctrines or precedents will often dictate a
unique answer. It can even be assumed that there are
considerably more such cases than there are debatable or 'hard'
cases. 28 Yet it must be said that the clarity of a so-called 'clear
case' is not such a simple matter either. 29 Whoever claims that a
decision is uncontroversial is to be understood as asserting that
there are no arguments which might give rise to serious doubts.
Such arguments are, however, always conceivable. The asser-
tion that every such counter-argument is bad or legally
irrelevant does not follow conclusively from the set of presup-
posed norms. In view of this one might wish to assert that the
categorization of a case as 'clear' constitutes a 'negative
value-judgment' 30 with respect to all potential counter-argu-
ments. But this touches a problem which need not be pursued
any further here.
It is sometimes suggested in the literature that the value-
judgments required for legal decision-making should be under-
stood as moral evaluations. Thus Kriele writes: 'With this, the
last veil has fallen: every exercise of jurisdiction is guided by
28
Cf. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegrijf, p. r 4 7.
29
Cf. Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, pp. 2 r 2 ff.
30
The idea of such a negative value-judgment is alluded to by T. Heller:
'Every legal act of subsumption already involves a value-judgment to the
extent that, in order to be applied at all, the law must have been deemed to be
of value in the form in which it is handed down' (Logik und Axiologie der analog en
Rechtsanwendung (Berlin, rg6r), 59). Cf. Esser, Vorverstandnis und Methodenwahl,
p. r 75: 'Basically, the wording of a legal norm only becomes "clear" if the
outcome with which one is faced does not offend.'
 Introduction 9
31
considerations of social morality'. On the other side, Hart is of
the opinion that the decision-maker may be guided by almost
any social objectives whatever their moral value might be; he is
not confined to moral reasons. 32
In order to solve these problems, one would have to elucidate
concepts such as 'considerations of social morality', 'moral
reason', etc. Such elucidation can, however, be avoided for the
present since the discussion does not depend on the strong thesis
that the prerequisite value-judgements are always to be
conceived as moral judgments, but rather on the much weaker
daim that they are always morally relevant.
1
This at least cannot be denied if it is admitted that (I) every
legal judgment touches on the interests of at least one person and
that (2) the question whether or not some action encroaching on
the interests of an individual is justified can always be treated
also as a moral question.
The observation that the inevitable value-judgments present
in many legal decisions are morally relevant does not in itself say
very much. It is, however, the presupposition of the thesis to be
justified below: the thesis that legal decision-making ought (ought
from a legal point of view) to be guided by morally sound value-
judgments of a legally relevant kind.

1 .2 It would be wrong to conclude from the fact alone that law

cannot proceed without value-judgments, that those applying
the law can give free reign to their own subjective moral
convictions whenever such value-judgments are required. Such

31
Kriele, 'Offene und verdeckte Urteilsgriinde. Zurn Verhaltnis von
Philosophie und Jurisprudenz heu te', in Collegium Philosophicum, F estschrift for
J. Ritter, ed. E.-W. Bockenforde et al. (Basle and Stuttgart, 1965), 112.
32
Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', pp. 608 ff. Cf.
N. Hoerster, 'Grundthesen analytischer Rechtstheorie', Jahrbuchfiir Rechtsso-
ziologie und Rechtstheorie, 2 ( 1972), 123. The question of whether or not the
value-judgments which are necessary in the context oflegal decision-making,
but which cannot be directly extracted from the law itself, are to be regarded as
moral judgments, is quite separate from the question of whether or not legal
decisions can be distinguished from moral decisions at all. The latter would
have to be emphatically answered in the affirmative by referring to the special
character oflegaljustification to be expounded in the theory oflegal discourse.
Cf. W. K. Frankena, 'Decisionism and Separatism in Social Philosophy', in
Rational Decision, ed. C. J. Friedrich, N 0Mos, 7 ( 1964), 18 ff.
IO Introduction
a conclusion would only follow if there were no possibility at all
of objective evaluation. Many suggestions and attempts have
been made to further this end. Three are of particular interest in
relation· to this investigation.
First there is the seemingly plausible suggestion that the
decision-maker should be guided by the 'value-judgments of the
community at large or of a specific group' .33 There are several
objections to this proposal. In many cases it is simply not
possible to establish exactly what are the value-judgments of the
community. Even with the help of social survey methodology, it
is often not possible to capture popular value-judgments in a
form that is sufficiently concrete to serve as the basis for a
decision. In order to overcome this problem, the community
would have to become thoroughly acquainted with each
individual case to be decided. Furthermore such a procedure
would frequently yield divergent value-judgments. Which
should the decision-maker pursue? This question arises even
where the relevant value-judgments are those of a 'specific
group', of which two of the most obvious are lawyers or, from
within this class, judges. Even among these, it is not rare to meet
quite divergent views. Moreover, if one settles for the convic-
tions of a specific group, it is necessary to give reasons for making
the opinions of the members of this group the decisive ones.
Finally it is necessary to question whether a normative
conviction can count as a justifying basis for legal decisions
simply on the ground that it is commonly held. It could perhaps
be argued that certain normative convictions are pervasive only
because they have as yet not been subjected to critical

33 Engisch, Einfuhrung in das juristische Denken, p. 124. Cf. C. Perelman,

Justice (New York, 1967), 67, where he says of judges that they 'ought to
exercise their mandates in conformity with the aspirations of the community
they represent'. Indeed, he says this of 'the legislators, the executives, and
judges who are elected or appointed by those who possess the confidence of the
people'. He wishes to leave the search for rational value-judgments to the
philosophers. Cf. further R. Zippelius, Einfiihrung in diejuristische Methodenlehre,
2nd edn. (Munich, 1974), who recommends first ascertaining 'which
interpretation or supplementation of the law would best correspond to the
ethico-legal ideas prevailing in the community' (p. 76). Should it prove
impossible to arrive at an unambiguous outcome in this way, the judge should
be allowed 'to pursue his or her own sense of rightness, his or her personal
notions of expediency' (p. 85).
 Introduction I I

examination. This point, however, has more limited application

to the convictions held by lawyers. These are, at their best, the
outcome of continuous and institutionalized critical discussion.
<"l On the other hand it must be stated that since the decision-
maker in the role ofjudge pronounces judgment 'in the name of
the people', he or she should not be indifferent to the beliefs of
those in whose name judgment is handed down. 34 Moreover the
results of the deliberations of numerous generations of lawyers
can only be neglected by decision-makers at their peril. It can be
seen from these observations that it cannot be a matter of
straight alternatives; of being guided by one's own convictions
or by those of the people in whose name justice is administered
or those individuals who have long made it their practice to
discuss legal questions. What is required is rather a model which
on the one hand can take into account both commonly held
convictions and the results of prior legal discussions, and on the
other hand leaves room for criteria of correctness. The theory to
be presented here claims, amongst other things, to provide just
such a model.
Almost more attractive than the reference to widely held
beliefs is recourse to the 'inner evalll?,tive coherence of the l~gal
Qt.der' 35 or to the 'legal order's meaning taken in its entirety' .36
This model is correct to a degree but it is also inadequate. It is
inadequate because a concept such as the evaluative coherence
of the legal order has no fixed meaning which would restrict any
decision-maker to a specific value-judgment. The different
norms are crystallizations of wholly different, often diverging
evaluative perspectives. Perhaps no principle is unrestricted in
practical application. In addition it is often quite unclear what
values in particular a given norm is supposed to embody. This

34 Cf. Zippelius, Einfuhrung in die juristische Methodenlehre, p. 21: 'The idea of

democracy already advocates that as many people as possible should

participate in determining the form of the social order, and that as a
representative of this community, the judge should follow the ideas prevailing
in it.'
35 Wieacker, 'Zur. Topikdiskussion', p. 408, and similarly in his 'Uber

strengere und unstrenge Verfahren der Rechtsfindung' in Im Dienst an Recht und

Staal, Festschrift for W. Weber, ed. H. Schneider and V. Gatz (Berlin, 1974),
439.
36
Larenz, Methodenlehre, p. 420.
12 Introduction
means that a further decision has to be made as to the weight to
be assigned to the various evaluative perspectives bearing on the
case.
If it is indeed the case that for the reasons given above, legal
decisions cannot be fully justified in terms of the evaluative
coherence of the legal order, it is nevertheless beyond dispute
that the evaluative perspectives expressed in the constitution as
well as in other laws or embodied in a variety of norms and
decisions are relevant for any potential decision.Just as on the
model which takes into account the convictions of the general
public, here too it is less important to postulate compliance with
these evaluative perspectives than it is to determine more
precisely the forms in which, and the rules according to which,
they can and should enter into the justification of a particular
decision.
A third possibility would be to appeal to some objective order
of values, whether independent of the law or as expressed in the
constitution or in the totality of the legal order, or to a set of
objectively recognizable doctrines of natural law. This is what
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 37 and
the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court)3 8 have done in
Germany. 39 Such a proposal involves what have repeatedly
been shown to be highly questionable philosophical premisses. 40
More will be said about this later, in the discussion of meta-
ethical intuitionism. Equally strong i~ the objection that the
relatively specific propositions necessary for justifying a given
decision can hardly be deduced from an order of values
whatever its ontological status.41
On the other hand it must be admitted that some of the
propositions established in this way, although vague in the
37 Cf.BVerfGE2, 1 (12);6,32 (40-1); 7,198 (205) 27, 1 (6);30, 173 (193).
38 Cf. BGH,?, (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in civil matters) 8,
243 (248); BGHSt (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in criminal
matters) 6, 47 (53).
39 On the subject of the combination of mainly theologically shaded natural

law motives together with elements of the Scheler and Hartmann ethics of
value underlying this approach to legal decision-making cf H. Welzel,
Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, 4th edn. (Gottingen, 196'2), 225.
4° Cf. W. Weischedel, Recht und Ethik (Karlsruhe, 1956); Welzel, Naturrecht,

pp. 226 ff.: Podlech, Wertungen und Werle im Recht, pp. 201 ff.
41
On this cf. Wieacker, Gesetz und Richterkunst (Karlsruhe, 1958), 1o.
 Introduction 13
extreme, are neverthdess entirely acceptable. Consider for
example 'Liberty and equality are constant fundamental values
of state unity.' 42 What is lacking is some more satisfactory
foundation for such principles and some procedure defining
them more _precisely.
The proposals discussed so far for the objectivization of value-
judgments can be divided into three groups:
( r) Proposals using as a starting-point actual extant convic-
tions and points of consensus as well as actually valid or
accepted non-legal norms.
(2) Proposals making a reference to values which can in some
way by extracted from the existing fabric of the law
(including past decisions).
(3) Proposals involving principles which go beyond the
positive law.
A further possibility has not been discussed, namely:
(4) An appeal to empirical findings (over and above those
involved under ( r)).
Such empirical findings are of considerable significance in the
process of legal justification of legal decisions, but normative
premises cannot be deduced from them alone. 43
There is much.to be said in favour of the view that'none of the
procedures listed above, nor indeed any combination of like
procedures, could solve the problem of the justification oflegal
judgments. Certainly, in modern society there are divergent
views on almost every practical problem. Actual consensus, at
least consensus sufficient to deal with concrete practical
questions, is rare. Divergent values are always apparent within
the overall framework of a legal order and these can lead to
divergent outcomes in their application to particular concrete
cases. An appeal to self-evident truths or to pre-ordained laws of

4 BVerfGE 2, 1 (12):
2

43 On the problem touched on here of the derivation of an 'ought' from an

'is' cf. the review of the literature by E. Morscher, 'Das Sein-Sollen-Problem

logisch betrachtet. Eine Ubersicht iiber den gegenwartigen Stand der
Diskussion', conceptus, 8 (1974), 5 ff.; Hoerster, 'Zurn Problem der Ableitung
eines Sollens aus einem Sein in der analytischen Moralphilosophie', ARSP 55
(1969), 11 ff.; F. von Kutschera, Einfiihrung in die Logik der Normen, Werte und
Entscheidungen (Freiburg and Munich, 1973), 66 ff. and below, pp. 34ff., 59.
 Introduction
nature is-at least from the methodological point of view-a
very doubtful way of proceeding. Moreover, any principles
discovered in this way can be applied quite differently. Finally it
is possible to draw sets of mutually opposed normative
consequences from any given judgments of fact.
Should we conclude from this that in the last analysis it is after
all the non-intersubjectively-testable value-judgments of the
decision-maker that are the decisive factor, value-judgments
which can perhaps be explained in sociological or psychological
terms but cannot be justified any further? This is certainly not a
desirable conclusion as far as concerns the legitimacy ofjudicial
decision-making and the scientific character oflegal dogmatics
in its concern with normative questions. This is not in itself an
argument against drawing the conclusion, but it is a good reason
for searching for an alternative solution.

2. THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OF THIS ENQUIRY

Such a search would appear promising in the light of the results

of modern discussions on ethics, of contemporary linguistic
philosophy, and also of current developments in the theory of
argumentation, all of which meet at various points. It is the aim
of this investigation to discuss critically some theories developed
in these different areas and to apply them to the field of
fundamental juristic inquiry. 44
Legal reasoning will be understood here as a linguistic
activity which occurs in many different situations from
courtroom to classroom. This linguistic activity is concerned, in
a sense yet to be more precisely defined, with the correctness of
normative statements. It will be expedient to designate such
activity 'discourse' and, further, since it concerns the correctness

44 In connection with the Swedish legal theorist Ivar Agge, Dreier

characterizes contemporary legal theory as a 'frontier post discipline' with the

task of testing 'the findings, whether empirical or theoretical, of neighbouring
sciences for their relevance to legal science in the narrower sense' ( Was ist und
wozu Allgemeine Rechtstheorie? (Tiibingen, 1975), 2 I). This investigation may be
regarded as an attempt to contribute to the completion of this task.
 Introduction
of normative statements, as 'practical discourse'. (Legal dis-
course is a special case of general practical discourse. 45 )
Legal discourse can be conceived ofin a variety of ways. It can
be looked at from an empirical, an analytical, or a normative
standpoint. It is empirical, for example, where it describes or seeks
to explain the relative frequency of given types of arguments; 46
the correlation between groups of speakers, the speech situations
and the use of certain types of argument or their application; the
force of arguments; the motivation to use certain arguments or
the views prevalent among given groups of people concerning
the validity of arguments. Theoretical work in such subjects
belongs to the behavioural study of legal practices in general
and of judicial activity in particular 47 and has to be pursued by
social scientific methods.
It is analytical where the focus is on the logical structure of
actual or possible arguments. Finally, it is normative where it ·
proposes and justifies criteria for the rationality of legal
discourse.
These three approaches are not sharply distinguished in
traditional German legal methodology. This, however, is not
necessarily a shortcoming, for a whole series of relationships
exists between them. Thus the empirical approach presupposes
at least a rough classification of the different types of argument.
The normative perspective requires insights into the logical
structure of possible arguments. The relationship between the
normative and the empirical approaches is more problematic.
Can it be said, for example, that the majority view in a given
group as to the validity of an argument is a test for its
rationality? Questions such as this can only be raised at this
stage; they are to be discussed more fully during the course of the
present investigation.
Criteria for the rationality of legal discourse will be at the
forefront of the enquiry. Since the elucidation of such criteria
includes an analysis of the logical structure of justifications, the

45 On the justification of this thesis cf. below, pp. 212 ff.

46 On this cf. E. Eichenhofer, 'Frequenzanalytische Untersuchungen
juristischer Argumentation', Rechtstheorie, 5 (1974), 216 ff.
47 Cf. Rottleuthner, Richterliches Handeln, pp. 61 ff.
 Introduction
approach pursued in this book can be termed 'normative-
analytical'. An attempt will be made to develop a theory oflegal
discourse that is both normative and analytical.
The conception of legal discourse as a special case of general
practical discourse will be of central significance. Both legal
discourse and general practical discourse are concerned with the
correctness of normative statements. This is what they have in
common. It will be argued that both in the assertion of a general
practical statement and in the assertion or pronouncement of
legal statements a claim is made to correctness. 48 Legal discourse
is a special case because legal argumentation occurs in the
context of a number of limiting conditions. In particular one
must include here its statute-bound character; its necessary
regard to precedents; its involvement with doctrinal studies as
developed through an institutionally organiied profession of
academic lawyers, as well as-and this of course is not true for
academic legal discourse-its subjection to the requirements of
procedural ordinances and regulations .
.The claim to correctness involved in the assertion of any legal
statement is the claim that, subject to the constraints set by these
limiting conditions, the assertion is rationally justifiable. This
claim matches the precept in Article 20, paragraph 3 of the
Constitution (Grundgesetz) under which every act of adjudica-
tion is subjected to 'legislation and the rule oflaw'. The question
is how we are to understand the formula 'rationally justifiable,
subject to the constraints set by these limiting conditions'.
In order to answer this question it would seem appropriate to
begin by investigating what might be meant by saying that a
normative statement is 'rationally justifiable'. To this end a
number of relevant theories will be discussed in considerable
detail. The theories in question belong partly to the field of
analytical moral philosophy, in particular those of Stevenson,
Hare, Toulmin, and Baier, together with Habermas's consensus
theory of truth, the Erlangen School's theory of practical
deliberation, and finally Perelman's theory of argumentation.
The results of these discussions will be integrated into a general
theory of rational, practical discourse. The core of this theory
8
4 Cf. below, pp. 214 ff.
 Introduction
will consist of five groups contammg a total of twenty-two
explicitly formulated rules and a table of six forms of
argument. 49 The explicit formulation of these rules and forms of
argument may seem pedantic, redundant, or even presump-
tuous. Perhaps its most important function is to reveal their
shortcomings the more plainly. ·These deficiences may relate to
the content of the rules, their incomplete enumeration, the
redundancy of particular rules and forms of argument, as well as
the lack of precision in their formulation. Insofar as short-
comings of this kind do not render the rules and forms of
argument entirely pointless, they present something akin to a
code of practical reason.
The efficacy of these rules and forms of argument should be
neither overestimated nor undervalued. They are not axioms
from which certain normative propositions can be deduced, but
rather a group of rules and forms of various logical rankings
which an argument must satisfy if the conclusion it establishes is
to have the correctness it purports to have. At the same time, the
rules do not by any means completely determine the conclusion
of such an argument in each and every case. But they do exclude
some (as 'discursively impossible' ones) from the class of possible
normative propositions, and thereby establish the validity (as
'discursively necessary' ones) of the contradictories of those
excluded. In the case of a large number of normative
propositions, however, they, together with their contradictions,
are entirely consistent with the rules of discourse ('discursively
possible'). This can be explained by the fact that the rules of
rational practical discourse do not prescribe the premises from
which the parties to any discourse have to set out. The starting-
point ofany discourse consists in the first instance of the initially
given (i.e. actual extant) normative convictions, desires, and
perceived needs of, and empirical information possessed by, the
speakers. The rules of discourse lay down how one may arrive at
well-founded normative statements from this starting-point but
without fully prescribing every step. Since it is possible to start

49 Cf. below, pp. 188 ff. On the concept of an argument form cf. below,

p. 92. On the difference between rules and forms cf. below, p. 188 n. 29.
18 Introduction
from quite different normative convictions, desires, and per-
ceived needs, and since it is not certain how perceptions of need
T
change or how normative convictions are to be modified or
desires subjected to limits, there remains a possibility to quite
diverse outcomes.
It could be said that the rules of discourse define a decision-
making process in which it is uncertain what is to form the basis
of decision and in which not every step is prescribed. This can be
viewed as a shortcoming on the one hand and an advantage on
the other. The shortcoming is obvious. The advantage consists
of the fact that the overall basis of the decision and a series of
individual steps in the decision-making process are not fixed by
any expert in decision theory who in turn would have to begin
from his or her own preconceptions, but are rather left to the
individuals immediately involved. The task of discourse theory
can be seen precisely as that of putting forward rules which on
the one hand are sufficiently weak-that is, of such limited
normative content that individuals of quite different normative
outlook can agree to them-and on the other hand so strong
that any discussion which abides by them can be acknowledged
as 'rational'.
The weakness of the rules of discourse outlined above is made
more pronounced by the fact that some of the rules are
formulated in such a way that they can only be adhered to
approximately. However, this does not make the rules pointless.
They certainly cannot reduce the field of what is discursively
possible to any sort of final certainty. Nevertheless they are of
considerable importance in explaining the claim to correctness,
as a criterion for judging the correctness of normative state-
ments, as a critical device for weeding out whatever is not
rational in a purported justification, and/or for sharpening an
ideal worth striving for.
This vindicates discourse theory as a promising enterprise for
legal theory. A norm or individual directive which satisfies the
criteria determined by the rules of discourse can be deemed
'just'. Hence the theory of discourse is one of what are probably
several possible ways of analysing a central concept of
jurisprudence.
The discussion has already alluded to the fact that legal
discourse can be distinguished from general practical discourse
 Introduction 19
in that the former is, in short, restricted in its scope by statute,
precedent, legal dogmatics, and-in the case of actual judicial
proceedings-by procedural legislation and regulations.
(The wide range of what is merely discursively possible, the
tentative nature of any co_nclusions, and the need to resolve
many practical questions in a limited time-span, constitute three
of the reasons for regarding these constraints as not merely
acceptable but rather both rational and necessary.)lt can be
assumed that any participants in a process of rational deliber-
ation which has as its object the limits of general practical
discourse, would decide· in favour of the introduction of
procedures for creating rules of positive law as well as
procedures for the scientific analysis and for the application of
these rules. That is, they would decide in favour of the
institutionalization of scientific legal studies and of some form
(not necessarily the currently practised form) of judicial
discourse .. The introduction of positive legal rules, their
courtroom application, and their compulsory enforcement have
not least among their functions that of securing the possibility of
general practical discourse.
In saying that legal discourse takes place within a framework
of limiting conditions, nothing has been said as to how this
delimitation is to occur in practice. To this end it will be
necessary to determine in more detail both the rules according
to which the limiting conditions are to be taken into account and
the actual forms ofargument in which reference may be made to
them.
It is possible to make a distinction between those rules and
forms which are valid for all kinds of legal discourse and those
which play a role only in certain forms of discourse. Only some of
the general rules and forms can be discussed in this enquiry.
A particularly important problem to be examined in this
connection is the question of the relationship oflegal argumen-
tation to general practical argumentation. The 'special case'
thesis is open to at least three interpretations.
The first possible meaning is the claim that the actual process
ofjustification or deliberation should proceed (and in ideal cases
does indeed proceed) according to the criteria of general
practical discourse, and that legal justification only serves as a
secondary legitimation ofany conclusions arrived at in this way.
20 Introduction
This thesis can be called the 'Subordination Thesis'. According
to this thesis, whenever cases arise whose solution cannot be
derived conclusively from statute _law, legal discourse is nothing
more than general practical discourse behind a legal fac;ade. 50
If the Subordination Thesis is rejected, two possibilities
remain. It might be claimed that legal argumentation can take
one part of the way, to a point at which specifically legal
arguments are no longer available. It is here that general
practical argumentation must intervene. This thesis can be
designated the 'Supplementation Thesis'. Finally there is the
view that specifically legal arguments and general practical
arguments should be combined at all levels and applied jointly.
This interpretation, which can be labelled the 'Integration
Thesis', is the one adopted here.
Of course, little has been achieved by the mere assertion of the
Integration Thesis. The question remains how the integration
which it demands should be fostered. To put it another way, in
Esser's words, the question is that of how to determine the
relationship of 'tests for correctness' with 'tests for coherence' in
respect of the reconcilability of the solution offered with the
positive law, due account being taken of other legislative
solutions and of'dogmatic elements' .51 Ascertaining this is one of
the aims of the theory of legal reasoning put forward in this
book.

3· TOPIC THEORY AND ITS LIMITS

Anyone putting forward a theory oflegal reasoning, may well be

understood to be proposing some version of the Theory of Legal
Topics, which has played such a significant part in discussions of
methodology during the last twenty years. But this would be a
50 Muller has claimed that Kriele advocates this thesis (Juristische Methodik,

pp. 93 ff., 196-7). Some ofKriele's remarks can be understood in this way (cf.
perhaps his Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 2 18). However, Kriele also speaks of
the 'characteristic value' of legal justifications which have the capacity of
'influencing the outcome, or at least its range of variations' (ibid., 220). Most
recently Kriele has come out expressly against Muller's interpretation (cf.
ibid., epilogue, pp. 319-20).
5 ' Esser, Vorversti.indnis und Methodenwahl, p. 19.
 Introduction 21

case of mistaken identity, and as such would have the

unfortunate consequence that any objections put forward
against topic theory would be automatically transferred,
without further inquiry,. to the theory of legal reasoning in
question. In order to avoid this it would seem appropriate to ask
briefly how the theory developed here relates to Viehweg's
thesis 52 that legal thinking is best understood as a 'topic-
orientated' form of thought.
In order to answer this question it is necessary to know what is
to be understood by 'topic theory' 53 in this context. Adapting
from Otte, with minor modifications, 54 it can signify three
different things: ( 1) a technique of searching for premisses for an
argument; (2) a theory as to the nature of premisses; and (3) a
theory about the application of premisses in justificatory
arguments at law. As a technique of searching for premisses, the
theory of topics advocates the consideration of every possible
point of view with a bearing on the question at issue. It is here
that catalogues of 'topoi' are meant to come in useful. 55 Struck,
presumably with criticism in mind, undertook the work of
putting together such a catalogue of sixty-four topoi. Amongst
these are to be found such disparate items as: 'Lex posterior
derogat legi priori', 56 'Nothing unconscionable may be
demanded', 57 and 'Purpose'. 58 Even the heuristic value of such
compilations must be subject to doubt. 59 In any event, nothing
comparable will be attempted in this investigation.
The theory of topics considered as a theory of the nature of
premisses is of greater interest. According to this theory,
whenever argumentation proceeds with a topos as the starting-
point, the propositions from which one starts are neither proven
52
T. Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, 5th edn. (Munich, 1974).
53 From the extensive literature on topic theory cf. in particular Kriele,
Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, pp. 114-53; G. Otte, 'Zwanzig Jahre Topik-
Diskussion: Ertrag und Aufgaben', Rechtstheorie, 1 ( 1970), 183 ff.; Wieacker,
'Zur Topikdiskussion', pp. 391 ff.; A. Bokeloh, 'Der Beitrag der Topik zur
Rechtsgewinnung', thesis (Gottingen, 1972).
54 Otte, 'Zwanzig Jahre Topik-Diskussion', p. 184.
55 Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, p. 35.
56
G. Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1971), 20.
57 Ibid., 33.
58 Ibid., 34.
59 Cf. Otte, 'Zwanzigjahre Topik-Diskussion', p. 187.
22 Introduction
truths nor mere assertions of arbitrary will but are rather
evbo~cx 60-that is, plausible, reasonable, generally accepted, or
probable propositions. 61 There is a measure of truth in this, but
it is open to misinterpretation and is too general and partly false.
It is too general because it does not differentiate sufficiently
between the various premisses necessary to the process of legal
justification of decisions. Struck's assertion: 'A statute is one
"topos" among others, but an extremely important one', 62 does
not do justice to the role played by valid enacted legal norms in
legal discourse. 63 In addition to this weakness there is also the
inability of topic theory to do justice to the authoritative
character oflegal reasoning both in the context ofinstitutionally
pursued legal dogmatics 64 and in that of case-law. 65 An adequate
theory oflegal reasoning, however, must include a theory both
of the status oflegal dogmatics and of the proper evaluation of
precedents.
Apart from its failure to grasp the significance of statute,

6
° Cf. Aristotle, Topica, 1 oob.
61
Translations of eV<5o~a vary. Rolfes's translation uses the expression
wahrscheinlich 'likely' (Leipzig, 1922), p. I. Viehweg favours instead meinungs-
massig, 'reasonable' ( Topik und Jurisprudenz, p. 2 1). Referring to English
translations, Kriele considers 'generally accepted opinions' as most appro-
priate ( Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 135) and Wieacker views probabel
'probable', as a free but nevertheless suitable suggestion ('Zur praktischen
Leistung der Rechtsdogmatik', in Hermeneutik und Dialektik, Festschrift for H.-
G. Gadamer, vol. ii, ed. R. Bubner, K. Cramer, and R. Wiehl (Tiibingen,
1970), 328 n. 46).
62
Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz, p. 7.
63
On this point of criticism cf. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegrijf,
pp. 142 ff.; Diederichsen, 'Topisches und systematisches Denken', p. 702.
64
Cf. in particular Diederichsen, 'Topisches und systematisches Denken',
pp. 698 ff.
65
Nor is this weakness remedied by the idea of a system of topics considered
by Viehweg. Such a system as understood by Viehweg can be defined by
means of four characteristics: ( 1) orientation to the problem (2) ordering of the
'topics' corresponding to the problems (3) continual movement by means of
(4) rational argumentation ('Some Considerations Concerning Legal Reason-
ing', Law, Reason, and Justice: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. G. Hughes (New
York and London, 1969), 268; similarly in his 'Systemprobleme in
Rechtsdogmatik und Rechtsforschung', System_ und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft
und Dokumentation, ed. A. Diemer (Meisenheim am Glan, 1968), 104). The
introduction of a system of topics defined in this way is little more than the
introduction of a new name for what was previously simply called 'Topics'.
 Introduction
dogmatics, and precedent, the fundamental problem with the
theory of topics is its exclusive orientation to considering the
surface structure of standard arguments. Struck's catalogue of
topoi is illustrative of this. Little can be achieved with formulas
like: 'Purpose' and 'Nothing unconscionable may be
demanded'. What really matters is the logical analysis of such
arguments. It is only in this way that their character as
structures comprising various sentences, some of which have the
all-important feature of being normative, can be grasped. In
any rational discourse, these are the true objects of discussion. 66
However, if one analyses the deep structure of such topoi as:
'Whatever is intolerable is not lawful', 67 which in a general
formulation can plausibly be counted among evbo~cx 'which
appear true to all or to the majority or to the wise and from
among the wise, once again either to all or to the majority or to
the most famous and respected' ,68 one finds more specific
normative sentences to which these criteria do not necessarily
apply. But these are precisely the sentences which matter, for a
phrase like 'Whatever is intolerable is not lawful' becomes quite
useless the moment there is disagreement as to what is
intolerable. To respond to this problem by producing additional
formulations at the same level of generality, is to evade the issue.
Finally, topic theory as a theory about the application of
premisses in the justification of individual decisions, is also
problematic. The relevant rule supported by the theory here is
the requirement of considering all aspects. 69 But this says
nothing at all on the question of which aspect is decisive, nor
does it even lay down what is to count as a point of view in the
first place. In this respect Viehweg's observation that 'discussion
apparently remains the only forum of control'7° is vacuously
true. But what does a 'forum of control' mean? Should every
actually achieved consensus be regarded as a guarantee of the
correctness of what is agreed on? This cannot be the case, if only
because subsequent discussion may reveal defects inherent in a
66
On the requirement 'to give preference to open evaluations over
"topical" justifications' cf. Wieacker, 'Zur Topikdiskussion', p. 409.
67
Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz, p. 33.
68
Aristotle, Topica, r 00 6 .
69
Cf. Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz, p. 7.
70
Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, p. 43.
 Introduction
prior consensus. It would at least be necessary to demand that in
any such discussion certain rules are to be followed which mark
out the discussion as a rational one. Struck alludes to several
such rules.7 1 However, these rules are inadequate from the
outset in that they contain nothing about the role of statute,
dogmatics, and precedent.
Perhaps the picture drawn here of topic theory is too negative.
It can at least be said that there is a sense in which the present
investigation incorporates the intentions of topic theory as it has
been applied to law. 72 However, it is precisely this which makes
it imperative to expose its shortcomings as clearly as possible. A
theory of legal reasoning will be judged by reference to the
extent and degree to which it succeeds in avoiding these
shortcomings. To recapitulate once again, these shortcomings
consist of underestimating the significance of statute, dogmatics,
and precedent, of insufficient analysis of the deep structure of
arguments, and of an insufficiently precise concept of discussion.
It is, however, important to hold on to some aspects of topic
theory-in particular the view that in areas where there are no
conclusive justifying grounds it is not necessary to leave the field
wide open to irrational decision-making, and also the belief that
there is a close conceptual connection between the idea of
rational justification and that of rational discussion.

4. TOWARDS ASSESSING WHETHER CONTEMPORARY

METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS REVEAL A N.EED FOR A
THEORY OF RATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTATION

The theory of legal argumentation put forward here can be

understood as extending and developing many of the points
alluded to in the literature on legal method. It is not only
71
Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz, pp. 99 ff.
72 This applies in particular to the proposal for a formal 'topic' as presented
by Viehweg. The subject-matter of such a formal topic should be the rules of
the pragmatics of the language. By 'pragmatics' Viehweg understands,
following Morris's famous distinction, the theory of the relationship between
signs, speaker, and situation. (Cf. C. W. Morris, 'Foundations of the Theory of
Signs', International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Chicago, 1938), vol. i, no. 2,
pp. r ff.) On this, Viehweg refers to findings in modern logic, linguistic
philosophy, and moral philosophy ( Topik und Jurisprudenz, pp. r r r ff.). This
usage is adopted in the present study.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 »On eräs, minkä voisitte tehdä, mutta se on vaikeata.»

»Vähätpä siitä! Sanokaa, mitä se on.»

»Ajattelin tullessani tänne… mutta ei siitä tule mitään.»

»Sanokaa, minä pyydän!»

Hän koetti katsoa Roman silmiin taas, ja tämä vältti hänen

katsettaan kuten ennen, mutta nyt paljon viehättävämmästä syystä.

»Ajattelin että — että jos tahtoisitte tulla luokseni, kun ystäväni

ovat koolla siellä, niin teidän läsnäolonne minun vieraanani kaikkien
noiden parissa, joiden silmissä olette minua solvaissut, riittäisi jo
puhdistamaan kaiken. Mutta —»

Hän odotti sykkivin sydämin Davido Rossin vastausta, mutta tämä

ei ensin sanonut mitään, ja ollen luopuvinaan koko tuumasta jatkoi
Roma:

»Mutta se on mahdotonta. En voi pyytää sitä. Tiedän mitä se

merkitsisi.
Sellaiset ihmiset ovat säälimättömiä — armottomia.»

»Onko siinä kaikki?» sanoi Davido Rossi.

»Ettekö siis pelkää?»

»Pelkää!»

Hetkisen he katsoivat toisiinsa, ja heidän silmänsä loistivat. Roma

oli ylpeä hänen rohkeudestaan. Tuo ei ollutkaan lapsi, vaan mies,
mies, joka naisen tähden saattaa asettua koko maailmaa vastaan.
 »Olen ajatellut muutakin», virkkoi Roma.

»Sanokaa.»

»Olette ehkä kuullut, että olen kuvanveistäjä. Valmistan

suihkukaivoa kaupungille, ja jos saisin veistää teidän kasvonne —.»

»Se kokoaisi hehkuvia hiiliä pääni päälle.»

»Teidän täytyisi silloin istua mallina luonani.»

»Koska saan alkaa?»

»Huomis-aamuna, ellei se ole liian aikaista.»

»Siihen tuntuu olevan vuosia», vastasi Davido Rossi.

Roma painoi päänsä alas ja punastui. Davido Rossi koetti taas

katsoa hänen loistaviin silmiinsä ja hehkuviin poskiinsa, ja pelkästä
ilosta käänsi tyttö päänsä pois.

»Anteeksi, jos olen viipynyt liian kauan», sanoi hän yrittäen

heikosti avata ovea.

»Olisin valittanut joka hetkeä, jos olisitte mennyt ennen», vastasi

Davido Rossi.

»Tahdoin ainoastaan, ettette ajattelisi minua vihaisin ja katkerin

mielin.»

»Jos minulla on ollut semmoinen tunne, on se nyt täydellisesti

kadonnut.»
 »Minun on myöskin kadonnut», sanoi Roma vienosti ja rupesi taas
tekemään lähtöä.

Hänen viittansa hakanen oli tarttunut olkapään kohdalta

silkkimusliiniin, ja koettaessaan irroittaa sitä hän katsahti Davido
Rossiin ja hänen katseensa näytti sanovan: »Tahdotteko?» ja Davido
Rossin katse vastasi: »Saanko?» ja ruumiillisessa kosketuksessa
omituinen, näkymätön silta yhdisti heidät silmänräpäyksessä.

»Sallikaa minun saattaa teidät ulos», sanoi Davido Rossi, ja tytön

silmät vastasivat avomielisesti:

»Tahdotteko?»

He astuivat alas portaita vieretysten, melkein koskettaen toisiaan.

»Unohdin antaa teille osoitteeni. — Trinità dei Monti», sanoi

Roma.

»Kahdeksantoista Trinità Dei Monti», toisti Davido Rossi.

He olivat saapuneet toisen kerroksen kohdalle. »Koetan muistaa»,

sanoi
Roma. »Luulen nähneeni teidät ennen jossakin.»

»Ehkä unessa», vastasi Davido Rossi.

»Niin», sanoi tyttö, »ehkä siinä unessa, josta puhuin.»

He saapuivat kadulle, ja Roman vaunut, vuokrattu coupé, olivat

odottamassa parin askeleen päässä ovelta.

He puristivat toistensa kättä, ja tuon sähkökosketuksen aikana

Roma kohotti päänsä ja loi pimeässä Davido Rossiin sen katseen,
jota tämä turhaan oli hakenut valossa.

»Huomiseen asti siis», sanoi Roma.

»Huomis-aamuun», vastasi Davido Rossi.

»Huomis-aamuun», toisti tyttö, ja taas hänen silmänsä näyttivät

sanovan: »Tulkaa aikaisin, tulettehan? — On niin paljon vielä
sanottavaa.»

Davido Rossi katsoi Romaan loistavilla silmillään, ja jotain melkein

poikamaista tuli hänen kuluneisiin kasvoihinsa, kun hän sulki
vaunujen oven.

»Hyvästi!»

»Hyvästi!»

Roma avasi vaunujen ikkunan ja kumarsi hymyillen ikkunasta

vaunujen poistuessa.

Davido Rossi seisoi hetkisen paikoillaan paljaspäin piazzalla

tähtien valossa, ja hänestä tuntui kuin aurinko olisi lakannut
paistamasta. Sitten hän palasi sisään. Bruno kahvilassa lauloi
hallitusta vastaan sepitetyn laulun, ja madonnan kuvan alla palavan
öljylampun alla nuori mies ja tyttö lukivat unikirjaansa. Vanha
garibaldilainen kuorsasi sohvalla portinvartijan kojussa, portaissa oli
hiljaista, ruokasali oli tyhjä, ja Elena liikkui yläkerroksessa.

Davido Rossi astui katolle taas. Hänen oli kirjoitettava

kirjoituksensa huomispäivän lehteen, ja hänen täytyi koettaa koota
ajatuksiaan. Kaupunki humisi alhaalla. Sähkövalot ilmaisivat missä
Corso oli ja levittivät kuutamomaista valoa piazzan kumpaankin
päähän, aivan kuin kaupunki olisi valaistu tanssiaisia varten ja sitten
äkkiä jätetty autioksi. Pehmeitä varjoja väikkyi alempana, ja jostakin
näkymättömästä paikasta kuului mandoliinin väriseviä ääniä, ja
tenoriääni lauloi lemmenlaulun värähdellen kuin laulurastaan sävel.

Noiden kirkkaiden, tyynien tähtien alla hän ei voinut ajatella mitään

muuta kuin Roman kirkkaita silmiä ja lumoavaa hymyä. Hän meni
sisään, ja astuessaan sisähuoneeseen hän tunsi hienoa tuoksua.
Ilma oli täynnä tunnelmaa, ja se kertoi jostakin suloisesta olennosta,
joka oli mennyt, mutta kuitenkin oli läsnä.

Jotain valkoista oli lattialla. Se oli pieni pitsinenäliina. Onnensa

huumaamana Davido Rossi nosti sen huulilleen, ja sitten jokin
äkillinen ajatus pani hänet säpsähtämään.

Hän sanoi itselleen: »Hän on minun sisareni. Hän oli kuollut ja on

jälleen elossa, hän oli kadonnut ja on jäilleen löydetty.» Samassa
joku koputti ovelle.

Se oli kirjapainon poika, joka pyysi kirjoitusta huomiseen lehteen.

»Sano faktorille, että tässä on kaikki, mitä minulla on tänä iltana»,

sanoi hän ottaen kirjekotelon, johon hän sulki allekirjoituksilla
varustetun paperin, jonka otsakkeena oli »Uskomme ja
tunnustuksemme».
KOLMAS OSA.
ROMA.
I.

Trinità dei Montin piazza on saanut nimensä Pincion kukkulan

reunalla olevasta kirkosta ja luostarista. Kuljemme sen läpi luostarin
puutarhan pitkän muurin vieritse mennessämme Pincion puistoon,
jossa kaupungin soittokunta soittaa talvisin iltapäivällä. Piazzan
kirkon takana ovat Borghesen laajat puistot marjakuusineen ja
sypresseineen, ja piazzan edessä leviää koko kaupunki Monte
Marion vihreistä rinteistä saakka, jossa pinjat kohoavat taivasta
kohti, tasankojen rajalla olevaan vanhaan Rooman linnoitukseen
asti. Palatseja, majoja, torneja, huippuja ja kirkkoja väikkyi kuin
taulun puitteisiin suljettuna alhaalla Juniculum-vuoren pitkän rinteen
sisäpuolella.

Ihmisiä tulvaili piazzalle illalla kuulemaan, kun pyhän Sydämen

nunnat ja lapset lauloivat rukouksiaan, ja katsomaan auringon
loistavaa laskua suuren Pietarin-kirkon taakse, josta se loi kapeita
punaisia säteitä pitkin kapeita katuja ympäröiden ne taivaallisella
hohteella. Kiviportaat, jotka kulkevat jos jonkinlaisissa mutkissa
peittääkseen jyrkkyyttään, vievät alas kirkolta soikealle Piazza di
Spagnalle, joka on aina koristettu ruusuilla, joita kukkakauppiaat
myyvät kojuissa suihkulähteen ympärillä.
 Näitten portaitten yläpäässä on neliskulmainen talo, josta on
näköala joka taholle Roomaan. Auringon nousu ja auringon lasku
kultaa sen, kukkien tuoksu piazzalta kohoaa sinne, ja Pinciolta
kuuluu sinne soittokunnan soitto. Donna Roman hallussa oli kaksi
kerrosta tuossa talossa. Alempaa kerrosta, joka oli rakennettu
holvikattoiseksi ja jonne päästiin kaupungin puolelta, hän käytti
atelieena, toista kerrosta yksityisasuntona.

Donna Roman kodissa oli kymmenen tai kaksitoista huonetta

toisessa kerroksessa, keskellä punaisella ja keltaisella silkillä
kalustettu sali, jonka seinät olivat verhotut sametilla ja valaistut
ruusun- ja violetinvärisillä, liljanmuotoisilla, venetsialaisesta lasista
tehdyillä lampuilla. Hänen makuuhuoneensa, jonka ikkunat olivat
Kvirinaalille päin, oli kuin linnunpesä vaaleansinisine
huonekaluineen, vuoteen ympärillä sininen silkkiverho ja vuoteella
koruompelulla koristetut tyynyt. Hänen päiväkammionsa, jonka
ikkunat olivat Vatikaanille päin, oli täynnä malakiittivaaseja ja
petoeläinten nahkoja, uunilla pronssinen kello ja Mefistofelesta
esittävä veistokuva. Paitsi Donna Romaa ja hänen palvelijoitaan
tässä huoneistossa asui ainoastaan eräs tytön etäinen sukulainen,
jota hän sanoi tädiksi ja joka tavallisesti tunnettiin nimellä kreivitär
Betsy. Mutta atelieessa alhaalla, jonne kiertoportaat johtivat
asuinhuoneistosta ja jossa riippui seinillä maskeja, veistoksia ja
kallisarvoisia aseita, oli Bruno Rocco, Donna Roman marmorin
veistäjä, Davido Rossin asuintoveri ja ystävä.

Ovenvartija katsoi Donna Romaan tapansa mukaan tämän

saapuessa vuokratuissa vaunuissa Piazza Navonalta, mutta tulija ei
ollut sillä mielellä, että kohtelias huomio olisi häntä huvittanut, ja kun
hänen palvelustyttönsä juostessaan ylös portaita sanoi jotain
emäntänsä tädistä, kreivittärestä, ei Donna Roma kuullut sitä. Hän
meni suoraan makuuhuoneeseensa, lähetti heti pois palvelijansa, ja
kun koira työnsi kylmän kuononsa hänen käteensä, ajoi hän sen pois
hyväilyttä.

Siitä huolimatta hän ei mennyt levolle heti, vaan istui kauan

puettuna, leikkien peilipöydällä olevilla pikkuesineillä. Sitten hän
harjasi hyvälle tuoksuavan tukkansa, kääri kokoon päälaelleen ja
päästi irti taas. Kolme valoa paavin loggialla, jotka sammutetaan
kello kymmenen, olivat aikoja sammuneet, raitiovaunujen lyhdyt
olivat lakanneet tuikkimasta, ja hiljaisuus oli levinnyt kaupungin yli,
kun Roma katsoi pientä kelloaan ja huomasi istuneensa kokonaista
kaksi tuntia ajatuksissaan.

Sisäinen nainen hänessä oli saanut aika kolahduksen sinä iltana.

Hän oli lähtenyt ulos ylpeänä, iloisena, uhkaavana, ja hän oli
palannut kotiin nöyryytettynä, hämillään ja hiukan häpeissään. Mutta
yli kaikkien muiden tunteiden oli omituinen suloinen tunne, hellyys,
lämpimän veren tykintä, vastustamaton viehätys, jota hän turhaan
koetti vastustaa.

Hän nukkui huonosti ja näki kiusallista unta, että hänen isänsä

taivaasta vartioi maan päällä olevaa tytärtään tietäen kaikki hänen
ajatuksensa, kaikki hänen työnsä. Tämä oli peloittavaa, ja hänestä
tuntui aivan kuin hän olisi suuri rikoksellinen ja syntinen. Koko yön
häntä vainosivat nuo suuret syvämietteiset silmät, jotka tuntuivat
olevan hänen isänsä silmät, mutta jotka sitten olivatkin Davido
Rossin silmät. Ne saattoivat hänet tuntemaan aivan kuin jotain
halveksittavaa olisi hänen ympärillään ja aivan kuin hän olisi ollut
alasti. Mutta herätessään aamulla, kun aurinko paistoi huoneeseen
ja ääniä kuului piazzalta, hän saattoi vapautua tuosta
epämiellyttävästä tunnelmasta. Hän hymyili muistellessaan unta
alastomuudestaan ja hän ajatteli eilisen illan tapahtumia aivan kuin
teatterinäytäntöä, joka oli hetkeksi lumonnut hänet.

Kun palvelustyttö toi hänen teensä, oli hän täydellisesti oma

herransa, ja kaikki mitä sen jälkeen tapahtui, auttoi häntä jälleen
muuttumaan samaksi olennoksi kuin eilisaamuna.

»Eteisessä on henkilö, joka toi tämän kirjeen hänen

ylhäisyydeltään», sanoi palvelustyttö.

Se oli kirje paronilta, joka lähetti lupauksensa mukaan Felicen

Donna Roman palvelukseen. »Kuten sanoin, hän on aarre eikä näe
mitään», kirjoitti paroni. »Älä lue sanomalehtiä tänä aamuna, lapseni,
ja jos sinulle lähetetään niitä, älä virka mitään.»

Roma oli tuskin lopettanut aamiaisensa, kun ilmoitettiin, että eräs

sanomalehtinainen tahtoi tavata häntä. Se oli Lena, Olgan kilpailija
sekä kirjallisuudessa että rakkaudessa.

»Minä olen 'Penelope'», sanoi hän, »tiedättehän Aurinko-lehden

'Penelope'. Tulin kysymään, ettekö tahtoisi vastata herra Rossin
eiliseen puheeseen. Toimittajamme suo mielellään teille tilaisuuden
siihen. Ja jos tahtoisitte minun kauttani vastata Olgan häpeällisiin
syytöksiin… Olgako? Hän on 'Fiori', tiedättehän. Ettekö ole lukenut
hänen kirjoitustaan? Tässä se on. Häpeällisiä viittauksia! Ei kukaan
nainen voi jättää niitä vastaamatta.»

»Kaikesta huolimatta aion juuri niin tehdä», sanoi Roma.

»Hyvästi!»

Lena oli tuskin mennyt kynnyksen yli, kun paljon tärkeämpi henkilö
astui Roman luo. Se oli senaattori Palomba, Rooman pormestari,
kohtelias, liukas mies, jolla oli pienet vilkuilevat silmät.

»Otan osaa kärsimäänne ikävään, hyvä neiti! Hävytöntä parjausta!

Semmoista se on se painovapaus! Häpeällistä! Se on kaikki
sanomalehdissä — olen ottanut ne mukaani. Eräässä lehdessä on
suoraan viitattu teihin. Katsokaa — kuvanveistäjätär, joka on
äskettäin saanut tilauksen kaupungilta mahtavan miehen välityksellä
—. Eikös se ole kiusallista? Ja vaalit ovat lähellä! Meidän täytyy
panna julkinen vastalause. Oh, älkää säikähtäkö! Se on vain pakotie
ampiaispesästä. Ei mitään viekkautta, ei. Tietysti kaupunginhallitus
ostaa suihkulähteenne kumminkin, mutta arvelin, että on parasta
tulla tänne neuvottelemaan, ennenkuin julkaisen mitään.»

Roma ei sanonut mitään, ja mahtava mies vetäytyi kauemmas, ja

hänen kasvojensa ilme sanoi, että hän oli osoittanut suurta suosiota,
mutta hänen tuli nyt myöskin saada suosionosoitus palkakseen.

»Huhu kertoo, että hallitus aikoo järjestää uuden

salapoliisilaitoksen — ja siinä se tekee vallan oikein. Muistattehan
sisarenpoikani Charles Minghellin? Minä toin hänet tänne, kun hän
tuli Pariisista. Niin, Charles rupeaisi mielellään tuon poliisilaitoksen
johtajaksi. Ja sopivampaa miestä ei voi löytää! Hän saa selville
kaikki asiat neulan putoamisesta vallankumoushankkeisiin asti. Ja
jos Donna Roma tahtoisi kuiskata sanasen hänen puolestaan…
Lupaatte ajatella sitä? Kiitos!… Mikä ihana veistos! Teidän tietysti?
Mestariteos! Voi kilpailla vanhan Rooman mestariteosten kanssa. —
Istunto tänään, ystäväni — hyvästi!»

Pormestari ei ollut vielä ulkona, kun kolmas vieras tuli eteiseen. Se

oli Madame Sella, kuuluisa muotiompelija, joka katsoi kuuluvansa
tavallaan seuraelämään ja käyttäytyi tuttavallisesti ruhtinaallisia
asiakkaitaan kohtaan.
 »En suinkaan nyt mahtane tulla de trop? Tiesin ettette pahastuisi,
vaikka tulin näin aamusella. Minkä häpeämättömän puheen se
kansankiihoittaja piti eilen! Jokainen puhuu siitä. Ihmiset sanovat,
että te aiotte lähteä pois. Mutta ei suinkaan se liene totta? Eikö?
Sepä hauskaa! Olen niin iloinen!… Ohimennen sanoen, älkää
välittäkö noista minun pikku laskuistani, rakas ystävä, mutta… ensi
viikolla aion pitää pienet kutsut, ja jos paroni suostuisi tulemaan… Te
mainitsette siitä hänelle? Tuhat kiitosta! Hyvästi! Kuinka suloiselta te
näytätte tuossa yksinkertaisessa puvussa! Atelieehame tietysti. Kuka
uskoisi, että yksinkertaisessa alpakkahameessa voi näyttää noin
ihanalta!»

»Kreivi Mario», ilmoitti Felice, ja naisekas vanha keikari tulla

tepsutteli huoneeseen. Hän oli Roman talonisäntä ja Italian lähettiläs
Pietarissa.

»Kuinka ystävällistä, että otitte minut vastaan, Donna Roma. Ja

näin tavattomaan aikaan. Mutta minä toivon vakavasti, että paronin
ei tarvitse luopua toimestaan noiden ilkeiden panettelujen tähden.
Vai ette usko? Sepä hauskaa. Tietysti ministeri on arka, kun hänen
yksityiselämäänsä kosketaan. Anarkistit tietävät sen, ja maassa,
jossa yleinen mielipide on niin oikullinen kuin täällä, se on vanhin
poliittinen temppu. Entäs meidän vapaamieliset laitoksemme! Ne
auttavat aina kiihoittajia, jotka ajavat kansaa hyökkäysasentoon.»

Sitten hän lisäsi astuen ikkunan luo: »Mikä ihana näköala!

Kaunein koko Roomassa, se on koko Euroopassa! Minä sanon aina,
että ellei minulla olisi vuokralaisena Donna Roma, ajaisin hänet pois
ja asettuisin itse tänne asumaan… Tästä johtuu mieleeni eräs
seikka. Olen… hm… olen hyvin kyllästynyt Pietariin, ja olen
kirjoittanut ministerille pyytäen, että hän siirtäisi minut Pariisiin, ja jos
joku kuiskaisi sanan puolestani… Kuinka suloinen te olette!
Hyvästi!»

Roma oli sairaana tuosta valheellisuudesta, ja hän tunsi

katkeruutta sitä henkilöä kohtaan, joka oli sen herättänyt. Samassa
avasi näkymätön käsi oven Pincion puolisessa seinässä, ja hänen
tätinsä ärtyisä ääni kutsui häntä toisesta huoneesta.

Vanha kreivitär, joka juuri oli lopettanut pukeutumisensa ja tuoksui

hyvänhajuiselle saippualle, makasi valkoisessa aamupuvussa
sohvalla, jonka toisella puolella oli kultapuitteinen peili, toisella pieni
pyhimysarkku. Hänen kasvonsa näyttivät tuhatvuotisilta. Ne olivat
kuin valtansa menettäneen roomalaisen keisarin kasvot, ja harmaa
tukka oli vielä keikailevissa kiharoissa hänen hienon päänsä
ympärillä. Hänen luiset sormensa olivat täynnä liian väljiä sormuksia,
ja helminauha riippui hänen ranteessaan. Kissa istui hänen
jaloissaan leikkien kultaristillä, joka oli lähtenyt irti nauhastaan.

»Oh — tuossako sinä viimeinkin olet? Joskus sinä kumminkin tulet

luokseni. Kiitos!» kuiskasi hän vaikeroiden. »Otaksuin sinun
eilisiltana tulevan minua katsomaan ja olin valveilla yli puoliyön.»

»Minun päätäni kivisti, ja siksi menin levolle», sanoi Roma.

»Minulla on aina päänkivistystä, rakkaani, mutta, ei kukaan

ajattele minua», sanoi vanha nainen, ja Roma astui ikkunan luo.

»Nyt sinun pääsi varmaan on yhtä jäykkä kuin ennenkin, ja sinä

yhä vielä aiot kutsua tänne tuon miehen huolimatta minun
kiellostani?»
 »Hän tulee istumaan mallinani tänä aamuna ja on jo ehkä
saapunut», vastasi Roma.

»Juuri niin! Ei maksa vaivaa puhua. En ymmärrä tämän ajan

tyttöjä. Taivas tietää, että maailma ei ole niin hirveän vaativainen. Se
pyytää vain ihmisiä hiukan hallitsemaan itseään ja säilyttämään
hyvän varjon. Minun nuoruudessani ei ikinä olisi sallittu tuollaisen
miehen astua ainoankaan kunniallisen kodin kynnyksen yli
Roomassa. Hänet olisi suljettu vankilaan, sen sijaan että hän nyt
istuu pääministerin hoidokin mallina.»

»Betsy-täti», sanoi Roma, »tahtoisin kysyä sinulta jotain.»

»Joudu sitten. Päänkivistykseni alkaa. Nattalina! Missä on

Nattalina?»

»Oliko riitaa isäni ja hänen omaistensa välillä, ennenkuin hän läksi

kodistaan ja meni maanpakoon?»

»Ei toki! Kuka semmoista kertoi? Vai riitaa! Hänen isänsä sydän oli
murtunut, ja hänen äitinsä sulki linnan portit, eikä niitä avattu
ennenkuin hänen kuolinpäivänään. Paavi koetti rakentaa rauhaa,
mutta isäsi oli samanlainen kuin sinäkin — liian jäykkäniskainen.
Nattalina, anna hajusuolani. Miksi et ole tuonut tyynyä kissalle?»

»Mutta täytyyhän miehen elää omaa elämäänsä, ja jos isäni arveli

oikeaksi — —.»

»Oikeaksi? Sanotko sinä oikeaksi sitä, että hän rikkoi välit

omaistensa kanssa ja ollen ainoa poika antoi arvonimen mennä
hukkaan ja maatilansa joutua koirille?»

»Minä luulin, että ne joutuivat paronille, tätikulta.»

 »Roma! Etkö sinä häpeä pilkata minua tuolla lailla? Sinä pilkkaat
paroniakin huolimatta hänen hyvyydestään! Minä en jaksa kuulla
isästäsi enää. Hän menetti rikkautensa ja nimensä, jätti oman
lihansa ja verensä toisten armoille — ja minkä tähden?»

»Arvattavasti isänmaansa tähden.»

»Tyhjän tähden! Itserakkauden, turhamielisyyden ja valekunnian

tähden. Mene pois! Pääni on haljeta. Nattalina, miksi et ole tuonut
minun hajusuolaani? Ja miksi sinä aina unohdat — —»

Roma läksi huoneesta, mutta hänen tätinsä ääni, kun tämä torui
palvelijaa, seurasi häntä atelieehen asti.

Hänen koiransa oli alhaalla ja tuo musta villakoira vastaanotti

hänet meluavan suosiollisesti, mutta iloista ääntä, joka tavallisesti
huusi hänelle hyvää huomenta, hän ei kuullut. Bruno oli kyllä siellä,
mutta hän oli vaiti ja totinen ja nyrpeän näköisenä työnsä ääreen
kumartunut.

Donna Roma ymmärsi helposti tuon muutoksen katsellessaan

omaa työtään. Se seisoi telineellä siinä osassa atelieeta, jossa hän
itse työskenteli ja joka oli lasiseinällä erotettu toisesta osasta. Se oli
Davido Rossin pää, jonka hän eilen oli karkeasti muovaillut. Hän ei
vielä ollut päättänyt ketä kahdestatoista lähteen ympärillä olevasta
apostolista Rossin tuli esittää, hän päätti tehdä kokeita itse
patsaassa. Tuo oli luonnos vain, mutta siinä oli jälkiä siitä
mielenliikutuksesta, joka oli kiusannut häntä, ja se osoitti, että hän oli
tietämättään jo tehnyt valintansa. Se esitti Juudasta.

Eilisiltana hän oli nauranut katsellessaan sitä, ja hän oli nauranut

ajatellessaan, kuinka koko kaupunki nauraisi, jos tuo mies rupeaisi
istumaan mallina omalle irvikuvalleen. Mutta tänä aamuna hän
huomasi, että tuo kuva oli julma ja mahdoton ja väärä. Se ei
soveltunut Davido Rossin luonteeseen, kuten Roma hänet nyt käsitti,
ja hän antoi anteeksi Brunon pahan tuulen, jos hänen valintansa oli
siihen syynä. Mutta koska Bruno oli vakoillut häntä ja puhunut
hänestä ystävälleen ja koska oli mahdollista, että hän edelleenkin
kertoisi emäntänsä töistä, päätti Roma vastedes lukita oven omaan
atelieehensä ja siten estää häntä kielimästä.

Pari kosketusta saveen poisti synkän ilmeen patsaasta, ja koska

Roma ei kuitenkaan voinut tehdä sen enempää ennen Davido
Rossin tuloa, istui hän kirjoittamaan kirjettä.

»Rakas paroni! — Kiitos kardinaali Felicestä. Hänestä tulee

olemaan suuri apu tässä talossa, jos hän vain voi elää sovussa
Monsignor Brunon kanssa ja ystävyydessä arkkipiispa
portinvartijan kanssa. Senaattori Tyhmelin? on käynyt täällä
puhumassa jotain minun suihkukaivoani koskevista merkillisistä
suunnitelmista. Hän pyysi minua mainitsemaan, kuinka sopiva
hänen sisarenpoikansa Charles Minghelli olisi uuden
salapoliisilaitoksen johtajaksi. Madame de Trop ja kreivi Signorina
ovat myöskin olleet täällä, mutta heidän vaatimattomista
toivomuksistaan kerron toiste.

Mitä D.R:iin tulee, on ilmapuntari korkealla, mutta luultavasti

kumminkin tulee myrskyisemmät säät kuin odotin. Eilisiltana
pukeuduin parhaaseen puserooni ja vastoin kaikkia hyviä tapoja
läksin hänen kotiinsa! Mutta omituisinta oli se, että vaikka minä olin
lähtenyt ottamaan selkoa kaikesta mikä koski häntä, en ollut
kymmentä minuuttiakaan hänen luonaan, ennenkuin hän kertoi
tarkoin minusta, ainakin minun isästäni ja hänen elämästään
Lontoossa. Luulen, että hän tunsi minut siinä yhteydessä ja tahtoi
vaikuttaa tyttären tunteisiini. Ja hän vaikuttikin, niin voimakas on
luonnon ääni. Ja sitten ja sen jälkeen ja vielä koko illan. Minusta
tuntui aivan kuin olisin ollut maanjäristyksessä ja tahdoin itkeä ja
tunnustaa. Vasta sitten, kun muistin, mitä isäni oli ollut — tai
oikeastaan, mitä hän ei ollut — ja ettei hän ollut minulle mitään
muuta kuin nimi ja että hän oli jättänyt minut julmimman kohtalon
valtaan, mihin nainen koskaan voi joutua, silloin vasta virkosin
D.R:n dynamiitin vaikutuksista.

Hän lupasi istua minun mallinani ja tulee tänä aamuna tänne!

Onneksi Roma on oma itsensä jälleen. Älkää siis tulko hänen
luokseen nyt, vaan antakaa hänen yksin hoitaa Piazza Navonan
Pontifex Maximusta.

Teidän Romanne.

P.S. — Sillä herralla on hyvä ulkomuoto, kauniit silmät ja

ihmeellinen ääni, ja vaikka minä luulen, että hän vapisee
nähdessään naisen eikä koskaan ole ollut rakastunut, on hänellä
hämmästyttävä vaikutusvoima. Mutta minua naurattaa
ajatellessani, kuinka vähän hänen hyökkäyksensä tähän suuntaan
vaikuttivat.»

»Parlamentin jäsen Rossi», kuului Felicen haudantakainen ääni

Donna
Roman takana, ja samassa Davido Rossi astui atelieehen.
II.

Huolimatta vakuutuksistaan Donna Roma oli hermostunut ja

hämillään ja puhui ensin mitä sattui. Asettaen Davido Rossin
istumaan nojatuoliin ylempänä olevalle siltamalle hän laverteli jos
jotakin — savestaan, työaseistaan, sienestään ja vedestä, joka oli
jäänyt muuttamatta. Herra Rossin ei tullut välittää siitä, vaikka hän,
Roma, tuijotti häneen — se ei ollut kohteliasta, mutta se oli
välttämätöntä — ja herra Rossin täytyi luvata olla katsomatta työhön
niin kauan kuin se vielä oli puolivalmis — lapsille ja narreille — —
tunnettehan tuon mehevän sananparren.

Ja puhuessaan Roma sanoi itselleen, että Tuomas oli se apostoli,

jota Davido Rossi tuli esittämään. Nuo anarkistit ovat kaikki
epäilijöitä, ja kaikkien epäilijäin päämies oli edustava heitä.

Davido Rossi ei puhunut paljoa ensin eikä ottanut osaa Roman

hermostuneeseen nauruun. Joskus hän katsoi Romaan vakavalla
katseellaan, joka olisi ollut häiritsevä, ellei se olisi ollut niin vilpitön ja
lapsellinen. Sitten hänen tummat silmänsä kääntyivät pois anteeksi
pyytävin ilmein, ja hän istui kauan aikaa vaiti hyväillen pörhöpäistä
koiraa, joka oli äkkiä mieltynyt häneen ja hieroi kuonoaan hänen
kylkeensä. Vihdoin hän katsahti ulos ikkunasta auringon valaiseman
kaupungin yli, missä lintuset lentelivät kohti kirkasta, sinistä
taivaankantta, ja alkoi puhua vakavista asioista.

»Kuinka kaunista tuolla on», sanoi hän. »Eipä ihme, että

englantilaiset ja amerikkalaiset, jotka tulevat Italiaan hakemaan
terveyttä ja taidenautintoa, pitävät tätä paratiisina, jossa jokaisen
tulisi olla onnellinen. Ja kumminkin…»

»Mitä?»

»Tässä hymyilevässä, Jumalan siunaamassa maassa on sellaista

kärsimystä, jota tuskin löytää mistään muualta maan päältä.»

»Onko? Todellako?»

»Taivas tietää, etten luota väkivaltaan, mutta en ihmettele, että

syntyy kapinoita, kun näen tuon poliisien rasittaman valtion
kurjuuden.»

»Niin — tietysti verot…»

»Verot työmiehen palkasta, hänen leivästään, hänen suolastaan,

siitä ilmastakin, jota hän hengittää. Valtion panttilaitokset imevät
häneltä viimeisen veripisaran, valtion arpajaiset vievät häneltä
viimeisen itsenäisyyden hiukkasen! Ei ole kumma, jos hän vaipuu
kaikkiin paheisiin ja muuttuu raakalaiseksi. Minä en milloinkaan kulje
puistokäytävien tungoksessa, jossa on humalaisia miehiä ja naiset
tappelevat ja lapset huutavat äitiensä liepeissä, tuntematta halua
paljastaa pääni noiden ihmiskunnan marttyyrien edessä. Joskus
tuntuu kuin en jaksaisi kestää sitä, vaan täytyisi mennä pois kuten
muutkin ovat tehneet.»
 »Pää hiukan ylemmäksi, olkaa hyvä. Kiitos! Parantaako se asioita,
että menee pois?»

»Parantaa, sillä maanpakolaisten enkeli kulkee heidän kanssaan.

Ja sillä aikaa kuin heidän toverinsa, jotka keksivät maailmaa
mullistavia suunnitelmia, luopuvat kauniista teorioistaan toinen
toisensa jälkeen tai kääntävät vaippansa taskujensa tähden, sillä
aikaa he kylvävät siemeniä vieraissa maissa — herättävät
kansakuntien myötätuntoisuutta paljastamalla oman maansa
haavat.»

»Hiukan enemmän tuonne päin, olkaa hyvä — kiitos! Se ei auta

heitä paljoa, vai mitä?»

»Heitäkö? Ei! Jumala suojelkoon maanpakolaisraukkoja — heidän

tiensä on huokauksien silta! Niin sanoi aina vanha ystäväni. Köyhinä,
ilman ystäviä, kokoon sullottuina jonkun vieraan kaupungin
likaisessa osassa, yksi musiikin opettajana, toinen kielen opettajana,
kolmas teatterin avustajana, neljäs posetiivinsoittajana tai
kerjäläisenäkin kaduilla, he ovat kumminkin aseita Jumalan kädessä
ja tulevat kerran järkyttämään maailman valtaistuimia!»

»Te olette itse nähnyt tuota, eikö niin?»

»Olen.»

»Lontoossako.»

»Niin. Siellä on vanha kaupunginosa komean osan laidassa. Sen

nimi on Soho. Se on tiheään asuttu, täynnä pahetta, koko kaupungin
lokaviemäri, mutta siitä huolimatta se on vapauden kehto. Euroopan
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebookfinal.com