World War II and defeat
Prologue to war
The European war presented the Japanese with tempting opportunities. After
the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941, the Japanese were torn between German
urgings to join the war against the Soviets and their natural inclination to seek
richer prizes from the European colonial territories to the south. In 1940 Japan
occupied northern Indochina in an attempt to block access to supplies for the
Chinese Nationalists, and in July 1941 it announced a joint protectorate with
Vichy France over the whole colony. This opened the way for further moves
into Southeast Asia.
The United States reacted to the occupation of Indochina by freezing Japanese
assets and embargoing oil. The Japanese now faced the choices of either
withdrawing from Indochina, and possibly China, or seizing the sources of oil
production in the Dutch East Indies. Negotiations with Washington were
initiated by the second Konoe cabinet. Konoe was willing to withdraw from
Indochina, and he sought a personal meeting with Roosevelt, hoping that any
U.S. concessions or favors would strengthen his hand against the military. But
the State Department refused to agree to such a meeting without prior
Japanese concessions. Having failed in his negotiations, Konoe resigned in
October 1941 and was immediately succeeded by his war minister, General Tōjō
Hideki. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hull rejected Japan’s “final offer”: Japan
would withdraw from Indochina after China had come to terms in return for U.S.
promises to resume oil shipments, cease aid to China, and unfreeze Japanese
assets. With Japan’s decision for war made, the negotiators received
instructions to continue to negotiate, but preparations for the opening strike
against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor were already in motion. Japan’s war aims
were to establish a “new order in East Asia,” built on a “coprosperity” concept
that placed Japan at the center of an economic bloc consisting of Manchuria,
Korea, and North China that would draw on the raw materials of the rich
colonies of Southeast Asia, while inspiring these to friendship and alliance by
destroying their previous masters. In practice, “East Asia for the Asiatics,” the
slogan that headed the campaign, came to mean “East Asia for Japan.”
Early successes
The attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7 [December 8 in Japan], 1941)
achieved complete surprise and success. It also unified American opinion and
determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion. The Japanese
had expected that, once they fortified their new holdings, a reconquest would
be so expensive in lives and treasure that it would discourage the
“soft” democracies. Instead, the U.S. fleet was rebuilt with astonishing speed,
and the chain of defenses was breached before the riches of the newly
conquered territories could be effectively tapped by Japan.
The first years of the war brought Japan great success. In the Philippines,
Japanese troops occupied Manila in January 1942, although Corregidor held
out until May; Singapore fell in February, and the Dutch East Indies and
Rangoon (Burma) in early March. The Allies had difficulty maintaining
communications with Australia, and British naval losses promised the Japanese
navy further freedom of action. Tōjō grew in confidence and popularity and
began to style himself somewhat in the manner of a fascist leader. But the U.S.
Navy had not been permanently driven from the South Pacific. The Battle of
Midway in June 1942 cost the Japanese fleet four aircraft carriers and many
seasoned pilots, and the battle for Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons ended
with Japanese withdrawal in February 1943.
Japan on the defensive
After Midway, Japanese naval leaders secretly concluded that Japan’s outlook
for victory was poor. When the fall of Saipan in July 1944 brought U.S. bombers
within range of Tokyo, the Tōjō cabinet was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki.
Koiso formed a supreme war-direction council designed to link the cabinet and
the high command. Many in government realized that the war was lost, but
none had a program for ending the war that was acceptable to the military.
There were also grave problems in breaking the news to the Japanese people,
who had been told only of victories. Great firebombing raids in 1945 brought
destruction to every major city except the old capital of Kyōto; but the generals
were bent on continuing the war, confident that a major victory or protracted
battle would help gain honorable terms. The Allied talk
of unconditional surrender provided a good excuse to continue the fight.
In February 1945 the emperor met with a group of senior statesmen to discuss
steps that might be taken. When U.S. landings were made on Okinawa in April,
the Koiso government fell. The problem of the new premier, Admiral Suzuki
Kantarō, was not whether to end the war but how best to do it. The first plan
advanced was to ask the Soviet Union, which was still at peace with Japan, to
intercede with the Allies. The Soviet government had agreed, however, to enter
the war; consequently, its reply was delayed while Soviet leaders participated in
the Potsdam Conference in July. The Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26
offered the first ray of hope with its statement that Japan would not be
“enslaved as a race, nor destroyed as a nation.”
