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A Psychometric Review of Measures of Irrational Beliefs: Implications for

Psychotherapy

Article in Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy · June 2009

DOI: 10.1007/s10942-009-0093-1

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J Rat-Emo Cognitive-Behav Ther (2009) 27:83–96
DOI 10.1007/s10942-009-0093-1

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A Psychometric Review of Measures of Irrational

Beliefs: Implications for Psychotherapy

Mark D. Terjesen Æ Jennifer Salhany Æ Mark J. Sciutto

Published online: 16 April 2009

Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract In this study, measures of irrational beliefs based on the principles of

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) were reviewed and contrasted based
on psychometric characteristics and quality of guidelines for interpretation. The use
of measures of irrational beliefs is an important component of the assessment of
presenting problems in psychotherapy and may inform clinical decision making.
Additionally, these measures are a helpful way to identify change in irrational
beliefs and to measure the effectiveness of specific interventions to facilitate such
change. While there are a number of measures of beliefs, there is considerable
variability in their psychometric properties and utility for assessment. The majority
of the tests are not produced by a publishing company, nor do they provide test
manuals. The reliability and validity evidence presented in the publications varies
considerably as do the size and quality of standardization samples, which impacts
upon the ability to draw normative conclusions. Analyses demonstrated that most
measures of irrational beliefs do not provide the evidence needed to adequately
address the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (Standards;
American Educational Research Association [AERA], American Psychological
Association [APA], National Council on Measurement in Education [NCME]
1999). Discussion of the implications of this review for the development of future
measures of irrational thinking by researchers as well as recommendations in the
test selection process for an REBT practitioner is offered.

Keywords Irrational
Beliefs
Measure
REBT
Psychometric

M. D. Terjesen (&)
J. Salhany

Saint John’s University, Jamaica, New York
e-mail: [email protected]

M. J. Sciutto
Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA, USA

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84 M. D. Terjesen et al.

Introduction

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) (Bernard and DiGiuseppe 1990; Ellis
1962) has received criticism for its lack of supporting empirical research (Gossette
and O’Brien 1992). One area in which this might be reflected is in the measures of
irrational beliefs. Initially, Ellis (1962) formulation of rational-emotive therapy
(RET) listed eleven types of irrational beliefs which he hypothesized to cause
emotional disturbance. The preliminary scales to test irrationality were developed to
include a variety of subscales for each of these eleven irrational beliefs (i.e., Jones
1968; Hartman 1968; Kassinove et al. 1977; Shorkey and Whiteman 1977).
Smith (1989) reported a trend towards hypothesizing fewer, more abstract, core
irrational beliefs in the rational-emotive literature (Bernard and DiGiuseppe 1989;
Campbell 1985; Ellis 1984, 1985, 1987; Ellis and Bernard 1983; Walen et al. 1980).
Ellis and Dryden (1987) modified the initial list of 11 irrational beliefs to three
irrational beliefs. Current tests should be developed on this theory and contain no
more factors than are necessary.
Conceptual problems in the development and utilization of many of the existing
scales of irrational beliefs exist. For example, Robb and Warren (1990) stated that
many purported measures of irrational beliefs assess not only beliefs but emotional
distress (e.g., ‘‘I often get excited or upset when things go wrong’’; Shorkey and
Whiteman (1977)) or a behavioral consequence (e.g., ‘‘I avoid facing my
problems’’; Jones (1968)) rather than a belief per se. This is consistent with the
conclusions of Ramanaiah et al. (1987) who provided an item-by-item evaluation of
measures of irrational beliefs and determined that only 50% of the items on both the
Rational Behavior Inventory (RBI) (Shorkey and Whiteman 1977) and Irrational
Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones 1968) were stated as beliefs. Robb and Warren (1990)
found the Belief Scale (Malouff and Schutte 1986) and the General Attitude and
Belief Scale II (DiGiuseppe et al. 1989) to be stated entirely in beliefs. This
distinction may be important clinically as it may guide the selection of instruments
for the clinician, help direct clinical interventions, and impact on the ability to
evaluate change.
Several reviewers (Bard 1973; Bessai and Lane 1976; Ramanaiah et al. 1987;
Robb and Warren 1990; Smith 1982, 1989) evaluated the psychometric quality of
tests measuring irrational beliefs and proposed that most of these scales are flawed
for two reasons. Given the emerging changes in the theory of RET, the scales were
not seen as a valid representation of the present theory of rational-emotive behavior
therapy, which clearly addresses the content validity of the scales. Secondly, the
scales include items which measure the criteria (i.e., emotional upset) that irrational
belief inventories are supposed to predict and thus may inflate the predictive ability
of the scales and give a biased impression of evidence to support the theory. Robb
and Warren (1990) further analyzed the content of the measures and concluded that
they contained beliefs or cognitions that are not irrational beliefs but rather
inferences or automatic thoughts. Smith’s (1982) major criticism was that there is a
clear lack of discriminant validity for both the Irrational Belief Test (Jones 1968)
and the RBI (Shorkey and Whiteman 1977).

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Review of Irrational Beliefs 85

Building on the prior review of measures of irrationality (Terjesen et al. 1998) the
present study examines the psychometric and technical characteristics of various
published measures of irrational beliefs based on the Ellis model. That is, we aim to
provide the most comprehensive review of measures of irrational beliefs and
determine if they are measuring beliefs in a manner consistent with the theory of
REBT. Scales will be evaluated based on sample size, validity, and reliability. In
addition, we will highlight important features that distinguish among the various
measures so that clinicians can more effectively select measures that will be most
useful for initial assessment and evaluation of clinical change. Psychometrically
valid scales are necessary to add support to REBT as a theory as well as providing
researchers with solid measures of change for clinical outcome studies.

Method

Selection of Studies

A computer search of psychological and educational abstracts was performed on

PsychInfo which includes journals and dissertations from the years 1872 through
August 2005. ‘‘Irrational Beliefs’’ was cross-referenced with a number of related key
words and synonyms (e.g., faulty thinking, cognitions, attitudes). In addition,
references of articles located by computer were manually searched in a technique
called the Ancestry Approach (Johnson 1993). The criteria for including articles in
this paper were: (1) the words irrational beliefs (rational belief, rational/irrational
cognition, rational/irrational thinking, rational/irrational thought) based on REBT
theory were mentioned in the abstract of the article, and (2) the study measured the
endorsement of irrational beliefs. Unpublished doctoral dissertations were included
in this study. Many scales were not included in the study because the title or abstract
failed to mention if a specific instrument was used to measure irrational beliefs as
part of the evaluation component. In addition, only measures of irrational beliefs that
were broad in nature were included. That is, measures that looked at specific types of
irrationality were not included (i.e., Irrational Health Belief Scale; Christensen et al.
1999). Table 1 presents a list of the 14 irrational beliefs tests that were evaluated in
this study along with studies used to evaluate the psychometric properties.

Evaluation Criteria

For each of the measures presented in Table 1, we evaluated and reviewed the
accompanying article, dissertation, or presentation for information on the following
criteria:

Reliability

Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure and to the extent to which test
scores are free from errors of measurement (AERA et al. 1999). Consistent with the
recommendations of Hammill et al. (1994) the following estimates of reliability

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86 M. D. Terjesen et al.

Table 1 English language measures of irrational beliefs

Measure name Author Number Sample composition
of items

Adult Irrational Ideas Fox and Davies (1971)* 60 Undergraduate students &
Inventory heterogeneous (n = 233)
Australian version of Whiteman (1979) 37 Graduate social work students
the Rational (n = 74)
Behavior Inventory
Belief Scale Malouff and Schutte (1986)* 20 Undergraduate psychology students
(n = 200)
Malouff et al. (1987) 20 Adult singles club (n1 = 24)
Undergraduate psychology students
(n2 = 6)
Child & Adolescent Bernard and Laws (1988)* 49 2,300 boys and girls from grades
Scale of 4–12
Irrationality
Bernard and Cronan (1999) 49 Children from elementary through
high schools (n = 567)
Ellis Irrational Values MacDonald and Games 9 Undergraduates (n = 181)
Scale (1972)*
General Attitude DiGiuseppe et al. (1988)* 72 College students (n = 431)
Belief Scale
(GABS)
DiGiuseppe et al. (1989) 72 Clinical sample and college students
Wertheim and Poulakis 72 Female psychology and social
(1992)* science undergraduates (n = 160)
Shortened General Linder et al. (1999)* 26 Postgraduate students or workplace
Attitude Belief venue employees (n = 36)
Scale
Idea Inventory Kassinove et al. (1977)* 33 Undergraduate psychology students
(n = 36)
Vestre (1984) 33 Undergraduate psychology students
(n1 = 135)
Introductory psychology students
(n2 = 114)
Irrational Beliefs Newmark et al. (1973)* 11 Inpatient psychiatric (n1 = 120)
Questionnaire Personality disorder clients
(n2 = 98)
Non-clinical sample (n3 = 120)
Irrational Beliefs Test Jones (1968)* 100 Heterogeneous (n = 427)
Trexler and Karst (1973) 100 Undergraduate students (n = 112)
Ray and Sak (1980) 100 Undergraduate students (n = 50)
Lohr and Bonge (1980) 100 Undergraduate students (n = 54)
Smith and Zurawski (1983) 100 Undergraduate students (n = 142)
Zurawski and Smith (1987) 100 Mental health outpatients (n = 73)
Personal Beliefs Hartman (1968)* 60 Undergraduate students (n1 = 30)
Inventory Undergraduate students (n2 = 85)

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Review of Irrational Beliefs 87

Table 1 continued

Measure name Author Number Sample composition

of items

Personality Data Shorkey and Sutton-Simon 50 Psychiatric outpatients (n = 87)

Form (1983)*
Rational Behavior Shorkey and Whiteman 37 Undergraduate students (n = 235) &
Inventory (1977)* professionals (n = 87)
Ray and Sak (1980) 37 Undergraduate students (n = 50)
Thyer and Papsdorf (1981) 37 Female college students (n = 102)
Shorkey and Moore (1981) 37 Chronic alcoholics (n = 69)
Thyer et al. (1983)* 37 Undergraduate students (n = 74)
Smith and Zurawski (1983) 37 Undergraduate psychology students
(n = 140)
Ray and Freidlander (1984) 37 Males having completed a 6 week
alcohol treatment program
(n = 62)
Zurawski and Smith (1987) 37 Mental health outpatients (n = 73)
Sanderman et al. (1987) 37 Mixed sample (n1 = 96) n2 = 231
Community sample (n2 = 231)
Social anxiety clients (n3 = 74)
Survey of Personal Demaria (1986)* 50 Undergraduates (n = 97)
Beliefs
Demaria et al. (1989) 50 Non-clinical adults (n = 280)
Nottingham (1992) 50 Inpatient psychiatric clients
(n = 11) chemical dependency
inpatients (n = 77)

Note: References that are denoted by an asterisk provide the publication that this measure was published
in originally

were evaluated: Internal Consistency, Test–retest Reliability, and Interrater

Reliability. Internal consistency is the degree to which items within a scale are
consistent with one another. Test–retest reliability measures the temporal stability of
a measure (DeVellis 2003). Finally, interrater reliability assesses the degree to
which two or more raters agree on performance on some measure (AERA et al.
1999). Anastasi (1982) recommends a reliability coefficient of .80 or above as being
indicative of good reliability for a brief test. Others have argued that alpha
coefficients of .70 or greater are acceptable, particularly for shorter measures
(Nunnaly 1972).

Validity

Validity refers to how well a test measures the characteristics or dimensions it

purports to measure. AERA et al. (1999) recommend ideal validation would be
demonstrated in three dimensions: construct validity, criterion-related validity, and
content validity. Construct validity is the extent to which a measure is measuring
specifically the conceptual idea that it intends to measure and not other similar

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88 M. D. Terjesen et al.

constructs. Establishing construct validity is a process of gathering evidence of

convergent and discriminant validity (AERA et al. 1999). Some have argued that
other forms of validity (i.e., content, criterion) are subsumed under construct
validity and can be viewed as evidence for the construct validity rather than distinct
types of validity. Criterion-related validity can be described as when test scores are
related to or predictive of performance on another particular measure of
performance (AERA et al. 1999). AERA et al. (1999) describe content validity as
validity evidence that is based on the items of the test. In this case, this pertains to
the extent to which the scale is consistent with REBT theory.

Norms

We analyzed the sample of each measure by reviewing the size of the normative
group, the recency of normative data, and noted any specific characteristics of the
sample. In addition, we also noted if this measure has been utilized with alternative
populations that may provide a basis to make normative comparisons.
In addition to the psychometric characteristics of the measures of irrational
beliefs, another factor that may impact upon clinician’s decisions to use a scale is
the length of the test. If measures are given frequently or possibly as part of a larger
battery that assesses different aspects of emotional and behavioral functioning,
perhaps shorter measures would be preferable. At the same time, if the clinician is
looking to identify specific beliefs or patterns of beliefs of a client, perhaps a longer
scale would be more beneficial. As such, we recorded the length of the test. Longer
scales typically provide more detailed information about specific problem behaviors
and tend to be more reliable, but require more time to administer and score.
Depending on the specific purpose of the assessment (e.g., screening), test length
may be an important factor.

Results and Discussion

Our search yielded 14 measures of irrational beliefs which are reviewed and presented
in Table 1 and discussed below. Additionally, non-English language measures of
irrational beliefs are presented in Table 2. These scales were not included in our
analyses, due to the fact that the majority were not able to be translated. When
subsequent publications that utilized the measure provided additional information
regarding psychometric properties of the measures they are listed as well.

Reliability

Table 3 presents the information on those measures that reported reliability

estimates in either their original or subsequent publications. Out of the 14 tests,
three reported split half reliability, eight reported Cronbach alpha reliability, and
eight reported test–retest reliability. Following guidelines put forth by Anastasi
(1982) and criteria utilized in Naglieri and Flanagan’s (1992) review of scales,

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Review of Irrational Beliefs 89

Table 2 Non-English language measures of irrational beliefs

The Belief Scale—The Netherlands Boelen (2004)
Irrational Belief Scale for Junior High School Teachers—Japan Doi and Rissho (2000)
Irrational Belief Questionnaire and the Irrational Yoshida (2002)
Belief Scale—in Portuguese
Chinese Belief Inventory (CBI) Fu (1996)
Irrational Beliefs Inventory for Adolescents (TCI-A) Cardenoso and Calvete (2004)
Irrational Belief Questionnaire and Irrational Belief Scale Yoshida and Colugnati (2002)
(Portuguese Version)
Children’s Survey of Rational Beliefs—B, Children’s Survey of Popa (2003)
Rational Beliefs- C, Idea inventory (Romanian Versions)

determination for a scale to have ‘‘good’’ reliability or validity is to have

coefficients at .80 or higher. There was much variability among the psychometric
properties of the measures. The split half reliability across measures ranged from .73
to .95. Only the Belief Scale (Malouff and Schutte 1986), and the Idea Inventory
(Kassinove et al. 1977) demonstrated good split half reliability. Alpha coefficients
ranged from .59 to .91, indicating some scales fell below Nunnaly’s (1972) cutoff of
.70. All scales except for the Idea Inventory (Kassinove et al. 1977) reported Alpha
well above .70. Test–retest coefficients ranged from .61 to .92 with time spans
ranging from 1 day to 8 weeks. The Belief Scale (Malouff and Schutte 1986),
Shortened General Attitude Belief Scale (Linder et al. 1999), Survey of Personal
Beliefs (Demaria 1986), and Personal Beliefs Inventory (Hartman 1968) consis-
tently demonstrated good test–retest reliability above .80.

Validity

Establishing and evaluating published validity information for measures involves

integrating many individual pieces of validity evidence. Making a blanket statement
about the validity of a particular measure would be misleading because the validity
of a score depends on the purpose for which the measure is being used. Based upon
the theory of REBT, it is expected that measures of irrational beliefs would correlate
most highly with other measures of irrationality or cognitive disturbance, followed
by measures of emotional and behavioral difficulties, and finally they should
correlate very poorly, if at all, with measures of social desirability. This pattern of
evidence is not clear for any of the measures of irrational beliefs reviewed in this
study. Table 4 presents the information on those measures that reported validity
estimates in either their original or subsequent publications. Of the 14 measures
examined, 10 reported some convergent evidence and seven reported some
discriminant evidence. When measures were explicitly based on Ellis’ theory, we
considered that to be an indication of content validity. Four tests were based on
Ellis’ current theory of irrational beliefs: Child & Adolescent Scale of Irrationality
(Bernard and Laws 1988), General Attitude and Belief Scale (DiGiuseppe et al.
1988), Shortened General Attitude and Belief Scale (Linder et al. 1999), and Survey
of Personal Beliefs (Demaria 1986). Interestingly, the measures are conflicting with

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90 M. D. Terjesen et al.

Table 3 Review of measures that report reliability

Measure Author Split half Cronbach alpha Test–retest reliability
reliability reliability (sample (interval)
size)

Adult Irrational Ideas Fox and Davies (1971) N N .74–.78 (3 weeks)

Inventory
Australian Version of Whiteman (1979) N .70 N
Rational Behavior
Inventory
Belief Scale Malouff and Schutte N .8 (n = 192) .89 (2 weeks)
(1986) (n = 192)
Child & Adolescent Bernard and Laws
Scale of (1988)
Irrationality
Bernard and Cronan N .90 (Total) N
(1999) .60–.84 (Subscales)
Ellis Irrational Values MacDonald and N .71 (n = 30) N
Scale Games (1972) .73 (n = 67)
.79 (n = 84)
General Attitude DiGiuseppe et al. N .71–89 N
Belief Scale (1988)
(GABS)
DiGiuseppe et al. N .92–.86 (Subscales) N
(1989) Total = .96
Shortened General Linder et al. (1999) N N .91 (3 days)
Attitude Belief
Scale
Idea Inventory Kassinove et al. (1977) .89a .59b .81–.86 (4–6 weeks)
Vestre (1984) N N n1 = .81 (4 weeks)
n2 = .67 (4–6 weeks)
Irrational Beliefs Test Jones (1968) N .74 .921 (1 day)
Trexler and Karst N N .88
(1973)
Lohr and Bonge N N .79 (Total, 8 weeks)
(1980) .58–.80 (Subscales,
8 weeks)
Personal Beliefs Hartman (1968) n1 = .95 n1 = .89 (5 days)
Inventory n2 = .90 n2 = .91 (7 days)
Personality Data Shorkey and Sutton- N .91 N
Form Simon (1983)
Rational Behavior Shorkey and .73 [.90c .71 (n = 90, 10 days)
Inventory Whiteman (1977) [.60d .82 (n = 89, 3 days)
Shorkey and Moore N .85 N
(1981) .89–.95e
Thyer et al. (1983) N N .69 (Total)
.36–.69 (Subscales)

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Review of Irrational Beliefs 91

Table 3 continued

Measure Author Split half Cronbach alpha Test–retest reliability

reliability reliability (sample (interval)
size)

Sanderman et al. n3 = .81 n1 = .86 (Total). .78 (17 months)

(1987) .15–.73 (Subscales)
n2 = .82 (Total)
.01–.64 (Subscales)
n3 = .81 (Total)
15–.76 (Subscales)
Survey of Personal Demaria (1986) N N .87 (Total, 21 days)
Beliefs .65–.87 (Subscales,
21 days)
Demaria et al. (1989) N .89 (Total) N
.57–.67 (Subscales)
a
The test was split into thirds, .89 reflects the average of the three correlations
b
The average of 11 core ideas correlated with total irrationality score
c
Each factor was measured by a Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility of .90 or higher
d
Each factor was measured by a Guttman scale with a coefficient of scalability of .60 or higher
e
Guttman scales of reproducibility

how authors define construct/discriminant validity and similar to what Robb and
Warren (1990) found, discriminant validity was the least often reported form of
validity. When examining the validity of the measure, the definitions previously
described were used to evaluate each type of validity as opposed to the ways that
they were defined by the authors.
The validity evidence gathered was not strong. Some studies used measures of
affect (i.e., a depression or anxiety inventory) correlated with a measure of irrational
belief to show construct validity. Other studies used measures of affect to evaluate
discriminant validity, which depending on the context may be problematic. It appears
that many measures of irrational beliefs have content that taps into emotions as well,
again a problem of content validity. This is consistent with the findings of Robb and
Warren (1990) and Ramanaiah et al. (1987). Irrational belief measures need to
delineate more specifically the domain that they are assessing (beliefs, emotions, and
behaviors). Purer measures will enable practitioners to evaluate which beliefs require
targeting and scientist-practitioners to effectively evaluate change. Future research-
ers may wish to develop more measures that purely assess the REBT model which
could also further serve to add support to the theory of REBT.

Norms

The standardization samples utilized were not particularly representative of the

population as a whole, typically failing to denote ethnicity and socio-economic
status or if it was it was unbalanced. The range in size of the sample was from 36 to
567 participants and 5 measures provided multiple samples within the publication

123
 92

Table 4 Correlation of measures of irrational beliefs with other constructs

123
Measure Author Cognitive/ Anxiety Depression Anger Personality Total Guilt Other
irrational problems/
belief Overall
psychological
symptoms

Adult Irrational Ideas Inventory Fox and Davies (1971)

Australian Version of Rational Whiteman (1979) .28–.45
Behavior Inventory
Belief Scale Malouff and Schutte (1986) .55
Malouff et al. (1987) .74 .53 .42
Ellis Irrational Values Scale MacDonald and Games .38–.42 .10–.44
(1972)
General Attitude Belief Scale .55–.75 .45
(GABS)
Shortened General Attitude Linder et al. (1999) .77 .41
Belief Scale
Idea Inventory Kassinove et al. (1977) -.57 .35–.58
Irrational Beliefs Questionnaire Newmark et al. (1973)
Irrational Beliefs Test Jones (1968) .68–.72 .38–.67 .59 .38 .72 .61 .53–.72
Personality Data Form Shorkey and Sutton-Simon .6 .66 .56
(1983)
Rational Behavior Inventory Ray and Sak (1980) .66–.72 .36–.65 .56–.68 .43
Survey of Personal Beliefs Demaria (1986) .28–.52 .46 .27–.61 .27–.52
M. D. Terjesen et al.
Review of Irrational Beliefs 93

with different psychometric properties. The vast majorities of studies examined

utilized small university samples, which is problematic as information gathered with
such a sample, may not generalize well to a clinical sample. Future scale
development may wish to seek larger, more diverse, representative samples.

Scale Features

The number of items on the measures ranged from 9 to 100 with the average number
of items being 43.6. The length of a measure may be important to consider if it is
being given repeatedly to regularly measure change or if it is part of a more
comprehensive assessment package.
When looking at the frequency of use of a specific measure in the literature, we
found a wide range of use, with some measures being used more often than others.
However, just because a measure is used more often in research studies does not
necessarily mean that these measures are used in clinical practice. It would be
interesting to determine what factors lead researchers to choose specific instruments
to measure clinical change or relationship with other factors. One would hope that the
psychometric properties of a specific measure may guide the choice of use of that
measure, but perhaps it is other factors (e.g., availability of the measure; measure
length) that influence the selection of the measure. At the same time, surveying
REBT clinicians and assessing what measures they use in their clinical practice could
also offer some interesting insights about a gap between practice and science.
Overall, this body of research is indicative of the need for more quantitative and
qualitative assessment of irrational beliefs. When considering which measure to use
clinically, independent practitioners would benefit from considering the practical
aspects of a measure (e.g., general vs. specific beliefs, length of measure, reading
level) along with being aware of the quality of the measure being utilized in order to
use the measures as one component of a multidimensional assessment. Currently
these scales should be used with caution as the basis for an assessment.

Recommendations for Future Scale Development

Based on the data reported in this review, we offer the following guidelines for
future development of measures of irrational beliefs or for the re-standardization of
existing measures.
First, measures of irrationality would be better served if the items reflected
assessment of beliefs only and not emotional or behavioral responses (e.g., Rational
Behavior Inventory). This may be particularly important to evaluate the efficacy of
the cognitively based interventions, especially when used in conjunction with
measures that assess specific behavioral and emotively based constructs.
Second, we agree with the recommendation of Robb and Warren (1990), that
measures assess not only agreement/disagreement with irrational beliefs but
agreement/disagreement with rational ones. This would help control for response
patterns as well as provide an opportunity to observe if clinicians are not only
changing the endorsement of irrational beliefs but are promoting adoption of a more
rational belief system. At the same time, we propose that measures include roughly

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94 M. D. Terjesen et al.

equal numbers of the four core irrational beliefs unless one is more clinically useful
than the other. Additionally, we propose that single item dichotomous responses
(yes/no) are insufficient in measuring beliefs, as multiple response choices enhance
the psychometric properties of the measure and allow for assessment of strength of
belief. Furthermore, an evaluation of the frequency, intensity, and duration of
beliefs on a Likert format may assist the clinician in evaluating change. From a
researcher’s perspective, evaluation of the frequency, intensity, and duration of the
beliefs held by a client may help test the question as to is their one core belief that
all others derive from. This could have significant clinical implications and enhance
the efficiency with which change occurs.
Third, the assessment of irrational beliefs would be better served if increased
efforts to establish a larger standardization pool for items as well as developing
norms for specific populations (adult/nonpatient, college, clinical/outpatient). A
more diversified sample should be used to increase the representative nature of the
questionnaire. This may greatly assist in diagnosis and treatment directions. At the
same time, the psychometric properties of these and future measures could be
improved in a number of ways. Simply, consistently reporting of the psychometric
properties by the researchers would be very helpful to future clinicians and
researchers. That is, we are not recommending that everyone who uses a measure in
research attempt to establish all types of reliability and validity, but rather to just
report the ones that are available. For example, reporting of internal consistency
statistics of the scale is something that all researchers could do and is recommended.
Content validity could be further established by having experts in REBT agree that
items measure the intended construct and multiple approaches to establish validity
are recommended to support the proposed aim of the scale.
Finally, use of measures by researchers that do not have much psychometric
support may negatively influence the research or clinical practice. That is, if
researchers and clinicians see measures being regularly used in outcome studies,
they may falsely conclude that these measures are strong psychometrically. The
burden is on the researcher to use measures that are reliable, valid, and well-normed.
A simple example may be that measures used have to meet the criteria of alpha[.70
(Nunnaly 1972). This simple metric may serve to enhance the high standards of
measures. Publication and presentation of Belief Scales is encouraged to further the
knowledge of the field, guide clinical practice and evaluate treatment outcome.

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Review of Irrational Beliefs 95

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