Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic

Author(s): B. Honig
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 97-113
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 DECLARATIONSOF INDEPENDENCE:
ARENDTAND DERRIDAON THE PROBLEM
OF FOUNDINGA REPUBLIC
B. HONIG
Harvard University

Beginning with Hannah Arendt's depiction of the American Revolution and

founding,I criticallyexamineArendt'sreadingof the Declarationof Independence,com-
paringit with JacquesDerrida'sreadingof (a draft of) the same document,in orderto
show that Arendt is careless in her easy dismissal of the declaration'sessentialist
moments.Derrida, it seems to me, has a better, more subtle appreciationof the both
necessaryand impossiblerole of essentialismin modernpoliticaltheory and practice.I
conclude,however, that Arendt nonethelesssucceedsin theorizinga powerfuland sug-
gestive practiceof politicalauthorityfor modernity,a practicethat is uniquelyactivist
and appropriatefor a democraticpolitics.

The men who create power make an indis- "loss of tradition and the weakening of
pensablecontributionto the Nation'sgreatness, religiousbeliefs"(Arendt1963, 117-18).1
but the men who questionpower make a con-
tributionjust as indispensable,especiallywhen In my view, however, Arendt does not
that questioningis disinterested,for they deter- simply mourn the disappearance of
minewhetherwe use power or power uses us. political authorityin modernity;she also
-John F. Kennedy celebratesit. Moreover, in the spirit of
celebration,she constructsa replacement
for it: through her notably fabulist
T he problemto which the title of renderingof the Americanrevolutionand
this essay refers-that of founding a re- founding, she offers a powerful account
public-is the problemof politics in mod- of a practiceof authorityfor modernity,
ernity. I shall treat Hannah Arendt as a an account that has receivedscant atten-
political theorist interested primarily in tion from Arendt scholars.
respondingto this problem. As Arendt Arendt is ambivalentabout the disap-
conceivesof it, the problemis largelyat- pearanceof authority in modernity. On
tributableto the rise of secularismand to the one hand, it marks the restorationof
the correspondingdearthin modernityof the world to humanity, the recovery of
commonlyheld and publiclypowerfulin- human worldliness,and new possibilities
struments of legitimation, such as of innovative political action. On the
politicalauthority.It is temptingto think other hand, it leaves the modern world
of Arendt as a nostalgic or essentialist bereft of the very things that securedthe
theoristof authority,a theoristfor whom foundation and longevity of the Roman
political authority is (or was) a uniquely republic:tradition, religion, and author-
ancient and Roman experiencethat was ity. Withoutthe resourcesof authority,it
lost, irrevocably,along with the modern seemsas if the task of foundingand main-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 85 NO. 1 MARCH 1991
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

traininglasting institutionsis impossible. the radicalcontingencyof the revolution

Arendt poses the problem, quoting by speaking the language of restoration,
Rousseau: which was indeedtrueto theiroriginalin-
'The greatproblemof politics, which I compare tentions in rebellion.Ultimately, though,
to the problemof squaringthe circlein geometry it became clear to them that restoration
[is]: How to find a form of government was not the whole goal. Their experience
which puts the law above man." Theoretically of public freedom in the revolutionary
[Arend adds], Rousseau'sproblem closely re- process made them value political action
sembles Sieyes's vicious circle: Those who get
together to constitute a new governmentare and participation,the act of coming to-
themselvesunconstitutional,that is, they have gether in deliberation,debate, and deci-
no authorityto do what they set out to achieve. sion. Free political action is seductive
Theviciouscirclein legitimatingis presentnot in (1963, 33).
ordinarylawmaking,but in layingdown thefun-
damental law.... The trouble was-to quote Thus, they were moved to complete
Rousseauonce more-that to put the law above their revolutionary task, seeking in the
man and thus to establishthe validity of man- end not just liberationbut the reconstitu-
madelaws, il faudraitdes dieux, "onewould ac- tion of the political realm in order to
tually need gods." (1963, 183-84)2
enablethe citizenryof the new republicto
For Arendt, then, the problem of experiencethe happiness of public free-
politicsin modernityis, How do we estab- dom and political action. Now conscious
lish lastingfoundationswithout appealing that this new goal, which they had not
to gods, a foundationalistground, or an deliberately chosen, was radically new,
absolute?Can we conceive of institutions they both reveledin theirgood fortuneto
possessed of authority without deriving be a part of this world-historicalevent
that authority from some law of laws, and sought comfort from its weightiness.
from some extrapoliticalsource?In short, They turnedto theory-to the science of
is it possible to have a politics of founda- politics-for aid in their task, "the crea-
tion in a world devoid of traditional tion of new power." And they turnedto
(foundational) guarantees of stability, history, pedanticallydocumentingrepub-
legitimacy, and authority? Arendt lican constitutions of all sorts, driven,
answers yes, and she turns to the Arendt argues, not by the need to learn
American revolution and founding as a how to "safeguard. .. civil liberties-a
model of this possibility. I take her ac- subject on which they certainly knew
count of the American experienceto be more than any previous republic"but by
part of a retheorizationof authorityfor a the need to learn about "the constitution
nonfoundationalpolitics. of power"(1963, 149-50).

The Quest for an Absolute

The American Model
The turn to antiquity,however, consti-
The Quest for Examples tuted not only a searchfor pedagogicex-
amples; it constitutedalso a searchfor a
Arendt glorifies the American revolu- beginningto anchorthe newly constituted
tionaries and founders of the American republic. "Politically speaking," the
republicfor their great innovations, their American revolutionaries were right.
courage, their vision. But she faults them Arendtargues,to believe that they had to
for being inadequatelyconsciousof them- derive "thestabilityand authorityof any
selves as innovators. Their revolution given body politic from its beginning."
took them by surprise(1963, 44). Some- The problem was that "they could not
what frightened,they sought to mitigate conceive of a beginning except as some-

98
 Foundinga Republic

thing which must have occurredin a dis- But thereis a morefundamentalissueaL

tantpast"(1963, 198). In this respectthen, stake here. Even if appealsto an absolute
the turn to antiquity was in quest of could still bind us, even if religioussanc-
reassurancethat the innovation of the tion was still viablefor the politicalrealm,
revolutionwas not radicalbut derivative. appealsto an absoluteas a groundof poli-
But the reassurancewas false, for theirac- tics, in Arendt'sview, would be illicit. For
tion was unprecedented. Hence its an absoluteis
greatness. a truth that needs no agreement since, because of
The quest for reassurancemarked a its self-evidence, it compels without argumenta-
lack of faith on the part of the revolution- tive demonstration or political persuasion. By
aries in their own action. This lack of virtue of being self-evident, these truths are pre-
faith led them also to attempt to ground rational-they inform reason but are not its pro-
duct-and since their self-evidence puts them
their reconstitutionof the political realm beyond disclosure and argument, they are in a
in an absolute, a law of laws that they sense no less compelling than 'despotic power'
trustedto serve as "thesource of validity and no less absolute than the revealed truths of
of their laws and the fountain of legit- religion or the axiomatic verities of mathematics.
imacy for the new government"(1963, (1963, 192)
199). The result was a paradox: "It was In politics, the appeal to an absoluteis il-
precisely the revolutions . . . which licit because of its constative character.
drove the very 'enlightened'men of the The uniquelypoliticalaction, on Arendt's
eighteenth century to plead for some account, is not the constativebut the per-
religious sanction at the very moment formative utterance,a speech act that in
when they were about to emancipatethe itself brings "somethinginto being which
secular realm from the influences of the did not exist before" (1977, 151). Thus,
churches and to separate politics and the grandeurof the Declarationof Inde-
religiononce and for all" (1963, 185-86). pendence, according to Arendt, consists
This quest for an absolute in which to
ground and legitimate the reconstitution "Inot]so much in its being 'an argument
in supportof an action'as in its being the
of the political realm is, according to perfect way for an action to appear in
Arendt, deeply misguided. The positing words.... And since we deal here with
of an absolute undermines the contin- the written, and not the spokenword, we
gency that is the quintessentialfeatureof are confronted with one of the rare
the public realm, the feature in virtue of momentsin historywhen the power of ac-
which politicalfreedomand humaninno- tion is great enough to erect its own
vation are possible (1958, 179-240; 1963, monument(1963, 130; emphasismine).4
184-85). Moreover, it deprivileges the
very human achievement of reconstitu-
tion and founding, making it dependent The Ambiguityof the
on something external to the human AmericanRevolution
world. And that external something is
untenablein the modern era, whether it In spite of Arendt's celebratory tone,
be god, naturallaw, or self-evidenttruth. she is forcedto admitthat the Declaration
Natural law needs "divine sanction to of Independence does not consistently
become binding for men" and "the maintainthe performativeposture she so
authority of self-evident truth . .. still admires.The preambleto the declaration
bears clear signs of divine origin,"while contains two appeals to a "transcendent
in modernity "the loss of religious sanc- source of authority for the laws of the
tion for the political realm is a matter of new body politic":an appeal to "nature's
accomplishedfact" (1963, 190, 194, 196). god" and an appeal to self-evidenttruths.

99
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

Whatis interesting,though, about the ap- she speculates (somewhat naively), "the
peal to self-evident truths is that the authority of this new body politic in ac-
sentence-"We hold these truths to be tual fact might have crumbledunder the
self-evident"-is partly performative in onslaught of modernity-where the loss
character.These famous words, Arendt of religious sanction for the political
argues, "combinein a historicallyunique realm is an accomplishedfact.... What
mannerthe basis of agreement[we hold] saved the Americanrevolutionfrom this
between those who have embarkedupon fate was neither 'nature'sgod' nor self-
revolution, an agreement necessarily evident truth, but the act of foundation
relative because related to those who itself" (1963, 195-96). In short, Arendt
enter it, with an absolute [self-evident]" believes that in practice, the We hold-
that signals not agreementbut compul- the performativepart of Jefferson's"in-
sion (1963, 192). congruous phrase"-won out over the
The statement's performative quality constative part, the reference to self-
Arendt attributes to Jefferson's dim evident truths. This saved the American
awareness that it was a fallacy that ir- revolution because the We hold consti-
resistiblelaws were "of the samenatureas tutes the only sort of power that is "real"
the laws of a community."Wereit not for and "legitimate,"the sort of power that
this dim awareness,Jefferson"wouldnot "rest[s]on reciprocityand mutuality"and
have indulgedin the somewhatincongru- comes into being only "when men join
ous phrase 'We hold these truths to be themselvestogetherfor the purposeof ac-
self-evident'but would have said: These tion" by binding "themselves through
truths are self-evident, namely, they promises,covenantsand mutualpledges"
possess a power to compel which is as ir- (1963, 181, 175).
resistibleas despoticpower, they are not The appeal to self-evidence stands in
held by us, we are held by them; They opposition to the We hold. It expresses
standin no needof agreement" (1963,193). not a free coming togetherbut an isolated
Jefferson'sawarenessof the fallacy could acquiescence to compulsion and neces-
be no more than dim because he was sity. The appeal, therefore, coerces and
caughtin a period of transition.The new disempowers.It violates the integrity of
political developmentsof his time were politics and denatures and disables its
"nowherematchedby an adequatedevel- practice. This is a crucial point for
opment of new thought." In particular, Arendt, who, throughouther work, in-
"therewas no avoidingthe problemof the sists on the autonomy of the political
absolute ... because it proved to be in- realmand on the sui generischaracterof
herentin the traditionalconceptof law. If politics. In The Human Condition she
the essence of secular law was a com- arguesthat politics should not be held to
mand, then a divinity, not nature but standardsexternal to it, that it has two
'nature'sgod,' not reason but a divinely precepts of its own-forgiving and pro-
informed reason, was needed to bestow mising-precepts that "arenot appliedto
validity on it" (1963, 195). actionfrom the outside[but]arisedirectly
Fortunatelyfor the Americanrepublic, out of the will to live togetherwith others
this problemwas a theoreticalone. This in the mode of acting and speaking"
bondage to the "conceptualand intellec- (1958,245-46). It is now clearthatwhat is
tual framework of the European tradi- unique about these precepts is that they
tion" did not, Arendt argues, determine are both performatives;indeed, it is that
"the actual destinies of the American feature that makes these two practices-
republicto the sameextentas it compelled ordinarily thought of as the subject of
the minds of the theorists."For if it had, ethics-profoundly political in an Arend-
100
 Foundinga Republic

tian schema. As performatives,they are ises and reciprocity for the sake of
markedby all the features characteristic bringing something new into being.)
of actionas Arendtdescribesit: they can- Properlyunderstoodand performed,the
not be judgedtrueor false, rightor wrong act of foundationrequiresno appeal to a
(1958, 205). And they cannot make sense source of authoritybeyond itself: "Itwas
in isolation: performative utterances the authoritywhich the act of foundation
necessarily take place "in concert" and carriedwithin itself, ratherthan the belief
requirefor their success the presence of in an immortalLegislator,or the promises
spectatorsin order to achieve their pur- of rewardand threatsof punishmentin a
pose, which is to bringsomethinginto be- 'future state,' or even the doubtful self-
ing that did not exist before. In my view, evidence of the truths enumeratedin the
Arendt wants to celebratethe American preambleto the Declarationof Indepen-
Declarationof Independenceas a purely dence, that assured stability for the new
performativespeech act; but in order to republic" (1963, 199). Thus, Arendt
do so she must disambiguateit. She dis- squares Sieyes's circle by finding the
misses its constative moments and holds source of authorityin the act of founda-
up the declaration as an example of a tion, therebymakingappealsto an abso-
uniquely political act, an act available lute, transcendentsourceof authoritynot
uniquely to human beings, an authorita- merely illicit but redundantand unneces-
tive exemplificationof humanpower and sary. Arendt'spoliticalperformativedoes
worldliness. not requirethe blessingof a constativein
order to work. Nor, Arendt claims, did
the U.S. Constitution:the preambleto the
The Power of Performatives declarationshe argues, "providesthe sole
source of authorityfrom which the Con-
The performativeWe hold, on Arendt's stitution, not as an act of constituting
account, empowers an existing com- governmentbut as the law of the land,
munity inasmuchas it constitutesa free derives its own legitimacy"(1963, 193).
coming togetherand gives public expres- Arendttherebyseemsto have foundfor
sion of a shared agreementto abide by the new world the new thoughtit needed,
certain rules in the community's subse- the thoughtthatenablesit to conceiveof a
quent being together. The We hold is a foundingthatsecureslaw for a community
promise and a declaration;it signals the without appealing to a law of laws and
existenceof a singularlyhuman capacity: without lapsinginto foundationalism,the
that of world-building(1963, 175). thought that salvages political authority
The source of power in this world- for an age unableor unwillingto support
building act of foundation is the speech the authority of tradition and religion.
act itself, the declarationof the We hold. One might say that Arendt'sprojectis to
And the act of foundationis the sourceof save authority-to find a way to sustain
its own authorityas well. In short, power it-because she realizes that without it
and authority are interdependent, on therecan be no politics. In a world devoid
Arendt'saccount (1970, 47). The author- of authority, we are denied the oppor-
ity of the world built by power derives tunity to exercise our "humancapacity
from all that is implied by the fact that for building,preserving,and caringfor a
that world is the productof power, rather world that can survive us and remain a
than strength or violence. (What is im- place fit to live in for those who come
plied, of course,is that it is the productof after us" (1977, 95).
free action by equals who act in con- This readingof Arendtmay appearim-
cert, bound together by mutual prom- plausiblebecause of what RichardFlath-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

man calls the essentialistcharacterof her this world spoke and thoughtin the terms
accountof authority.Flathmannotes that of the Old World"(1963, 166; emphasis
Arendt asserts "a necessary connection mine). Arendt understandsthat we can-
between in authorityand a quite definite not recoverthe lost form of authoritythat
and complex constellationof values and sustainedRomefor so long; it is untenable
beliefs about tradition and religion," in modernity.But neithercan we exercise
meaningthat of ancientRome. According our world-buildingcapacitiesin a world
to Flathman, it follows from Arendt's without authority.If we love the world, if
argumentthat once "this particularcon- we are committedto world building-to
stellation of values and beliefs has dis- politics-we must find another form of
appeared,in authorityhas therebydisap- authority, one that can be sustained in
peared as well" (1980, 71; emphasis modernity.Only then will we experience
original). Furthermore,Flathmanargues, the privilegeof political action that is not
given Arendt'sinsistencethat power and just revolutionary(1963, 171, 238).
authorityare interdependent,it is curious Revolutionsare frequentin the modem
that she claims both that authority has age (and peculiar to it) because of the
disappearedfrom the modem world and failure of traditionalauthority. But most
yet insists that power has not (263, n. 6). revolutions themselves fail for the same
On my reading, however, the problem reason. They seek to ground their recon-
disappears,for Arendtis understoodto be stitutionof the politicalrealmin the same
claimingthat a certainkind of authority, sort of traditionalauthority whose very
the kind that sustained the Roman untenability made their own revolution
republic together with tradition and possible. Arendt tries to get out of this
religion, has disappearedin modernity. vicious circle by offering an alternative
This is not, as Arendt herself says, conceptionof authority, one that inheres
"'authorityin general,'but rathera very not in an untenableabsolute, nor in a law
specific form which had been valid of laws, but in the power of reconstitution
throughout the Western World over a itself.5
long period of time"(1977, 92). And it is Only the modem conceptionof author-
this specific form of authority-"author- ity is viable for modernitybecause it re-
ity as we once knew it, which grew out of quires for its sustenance not a shared
the Roman experienceof foundationand belief in particulardeities or myths but a
was understood in the light of Greek common subscriptionto the authoritative
political philosophy"-that, in Arendt's linguistic practice of promising. Conse-
view, "has nowhere been re-established" quently, it assumes a preexisting com-
(1977, 141). munity but not in the strong sense of
In On Revolution, Arendt gives an ac- "homogeneityof past and origin,"which
count of an alternativeform of authority, is the "decisive principle of the nation
the authorityinherentin the performative state"(1963, 174). This is a communityin
Declaration of Independenceand in the a weaker sense, bound togetherby com-
practiceof constitution-making that "pre- mon linguisticpractices, not even neces-
ceded, accompanied,and followed [it] in sarilyby a single, common, inheritedfirst
all thirteen colonies." Both, she argues, language. This is a community whose
"revealedall of a sudden to what an ex- members understand and subscribe to
tent an entirelynew conceptof power and performative practices. Such a com-
authority, an entirelynovel idea of what munity should be able to sustainthis new
was of prime importancein the political kind of authority, in Arendt's view-
realm had already developed in the New assuming,that is, that it can overcomeits
World, even though the inhabitants of nihilisticcravingfor a law of laws, for a

102
 Founding a Republic

sourceof authoritythat is transcendentor authoritativepractice of promising, and

self-evident,assumingthat it can see and not nihilistic because, by virtue of their
be satisfiedwith the power and authority power, they are the guarantorsof their
inherentin its own performatives. own authority. Arendt can do no better
Conversely, one might say not that than this; she refusesto, in fact, because
Arendtseeks to salvage authorityfor the of her conviction that the "realm of
sake of politics but that she seeks to human affairs"is "relativeby definition"
salvage politics for the sake of authority. (1963, 213). Political action has no an-
To see Arendt'spolitics as a responseto chor: a beginning, it "has, as it were,
modem nihilism is to make sense of her nothing to hold on to; it is as though it
claim that we need politics for the sake of came out of nowhere in either time or
the world. We cannot live without stan- space"(1963, 206).7
dards or some stability; yet our tradi-
tional sources of stability are no longer The Postulates of Promising
viable. Consequently,we are left to the
devices of politics and action. Politics is Arendt'scharacterizationof action as a
moreimportantthanever becauseit is the beginningwith nothing to hold on to is
only alternative to violent domination, somewhat misleading. In Arendt's own
the only sourcein modernityof legitimate account,a beginningdoes have something
rules possessed of authority and capable to hold on to-the public subscriptionto
of addressing"theelementaryproblemof an authoritative discursive practice in
humanliving-together"(1977, 141). which performativeutterancesare under-
Arendt's descriptionof the signing of stood to possess their own authority as
the MayflowerCompactis enlighteningin long as they meet the conditionsnecessary
this context. The partiesto the compact for them to function. Arendt's perfor-
obviously feared the so-called state of nature, the
mative politics presupposesa community
untrod wilderness, unlimited by any boundary, of promisers, a preexisting community
as well as the unlimited initiative of men bound composed of people who may hold dif-
by no law. This fear is not surprising; it is the ferent values and beliefs but who, none-
justified fear of men who have decided to leave theless, have shared understandingsof
civilization behind them and strike out on their
own. The really astounding fact in the whole what a promiseis, what it meansto make
story is that their obvious fear of one another a promise,and what one must do in order
was accompanied by the no less obvious confi- for one's performanceto be recognizable
dence they had in their own power, granted and as a promise.!Inshort, promising,even on
confirmed by no one and as yet unsupported by
any means of violence, to combine themselves
Arendt'saccount, is a practice.8
together into a 'civil Body Politick' which, held Yet Arendtgives no accountof the con-
together solely by the strength of mutual pro- ditions of the practice. She only tells us
mises 'in the Presence of God and one another', why the practiceof promisingis of para-
supposedly was powerful enough to 'enact, con- mount importanceto those committedto
stitute, and frame' all necessary laws and instru-
ments of government (1963, 167).6 the activity of politicsin modernity.Butif
the practice of promising is to be the
Like the parties to the compact, the source of legitimacy in an Arendtian
founders of the American republicbuilt politics, the question of the legitimacyof
small"islandsof security"in an "oceanof the practiceand of its own techniquesof
contingency"(1958,237) throughjointac- self-legitimationmust be addressed. In-
tion, promising,and constitutionmaking, deed, FriedrichNietzsche addresses the
all performativesthat are not solopsistic problem directly: "To breed an animal
because they presuppose a plurality of with the right to make promises-is not
participantswho subscribe to a shared this the paradoxicaltask that nature has

103
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

set itself in the case of man? Is it not the by itself be able to provide the stability
real problem regardingman?"(1969, pt. Arendt expectsit to: the stability is com-
2, sec. 1). ing from somewhere else, possibly from
The processby which this problemhas somethingexternalto action'spurelyper-
been resolved historicallyis the object of formativespeechact. And this is precisely
Nietzsche'sscathing criticism in the sec- the observationmade by JacquesDerrida
ond essay of On the Genealogyof Morals. in his own readingof (Jefferson'sdraftof)
Arendt, however, never addresses these the American Declaration of Indepen-
questions, perhaps because she does not dence, a reading that, like Arendt's,
shareNietzsche'sambivalencetowardthe focuses on the document'scurious struc-
constructionof promisersand the practice tural combinationof constative and per-
of promising. Promising is the "highest formativeutterance.
human faculty." Indeed, Arendt denies
Nietzsche's own ambivalence, claiming The Inadequacy of Performatives
with approvalthat "hesaw in the faculty
of promises. . . the very distinction Since Arendt dismisses the constative
which marksoff humanfrom animallife" moments of the declaration, and insists
(1958, 245), ignoring the fact that in the that the power of its performative We
phraseto which she refersNietzschesays hold is the sole sourceof authorityfor the
the problem is how to breed an animal Americanrepublicand its Constitution,it
with the right to make promises. seemslikely that the We of the declaration
Moreover,Arendt'spracticeof promis- (and of all politicalaction) is the sourceof
ing, if it is to do the work she expectsof it, stability in Arendt's account. Yet if we
must be highly sophisticated,even ritual- take seriously Arendt'sclaim that action
ized.9As such, it would belie the moment is a "beginning"that occurs ex nihilo, if
of contingency that, on her account, we are persuadedby her that the We (the
characterizesthe moment of politics. In- people) does not exist as such priorto the
deed, there is an apparentparadox here. declaration,"the question emerges,How
Action, which for Arendt consists partly can the We stand as the guarantorof its
in the activity of promising, is terribly own performance?How can it functionas
riskybecauseit takesplace in a contingent the sole source of stability for the
world where its meaning and conse- republic?
quences are always underdeterminedif The problem is posed by JacquesDer-
not indeterminate.Yet Arendtalso claims ridain his essay "Declarationsof Indepen-
that promising serves as a "control dence":
mechanism,"that it "countersthe enor-
The "we"of the declarationspeaks"inthe name
mous risksof action"by establishinglittle of the people."But thispeopledoes not yet exist.
islands of stability in the radical contin- They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist,
gency of the public realm (1958, 245-46). before this declaration,not as such. If it gives
The problemis that if promisingis to be a birthto itself, as freeand independentsubject,as
source of reassuranceand stability, the possiblesigner[of the declaration],this can hold
only in the act of the signature.The signaturein-
operationof the practiceof promisingand vents the signer. This signercan only authorize
the meaning of particularpromises must him- or herselfto sign once he or she has come to
be relatively unproblematic.In that case the end, if one can say this, of his or her own
actionas promisingcannotoccurex nihilo signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.
and it will not be as risky-as con- (1986, 10)
tingent and unpredictable-as Arendt
says it is.j1 On the otherhand, if action is On Derrida's account, the signers are
as contingentas that, promisingwill not stuck in Sieyes'svicious circle. They lack

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 Foundinga Republic

the authority to sign until they have act of founding(or signing, or promising)
already signed. The American founders' is free of this aporia-this gap that needs
invocation of "the name of the laws of to be anchored-and this is a struc-
nature and the name of God" manifests tural feature of language. This gap that
thispredicament.They appealedto a con- marks all forms of utterance is always
stative, according to Derrida, not (as filled (whetheror not we acknowledgeit)
Arendtwould have it) becauseof a failure by a deus ex machina-if not by God
of nerve nor becausethey underestimated himself, then by nature, the subject,
the power of their own performativebut language, or tradition. Arendt sees that
because they did not overestimate its this aporia is a structuralfeature of all
power. In order to guaranteethat power performatives.13 But she insists that the
and secure their innovation, they had to aporia, the gap that marks all performa-
combine their performativewith a con- tives, can and should be held open. She
stative utterance. They needed "another understands that there is often a felt
'subjectivity'. . . to sign, in order to human need to fill this gap but she does
guarantee it, this production of signa- not see it as a systemic, conceptual, or
ture"; for "in this process," Derrida linguistic need. Quite the contrary. The
argues, "there are only countersigna- differencebetween her position and Der-
tures."12 rida'son this point is made clearby their
different assessments of the American
It is still "inthe name of" that the "goodpeople"
of America call themselvesand declare them- declaration'scombinedperformativeand
selves independent,at the instantin which they constativestructure.
invent for themselvesa signing identity. They
sign in the nameof the laws of natureand in the
name of God. They pose or posit their institu- The Ambiguity of the
tionallaws on the foundationof naturallaws and
by the samecoup (theinterpretivecoup of force) Declaration, Reconsidered
in the nameof God, creatorof nature.He comes,
in effect,to guaranteethe rectitudeof popularin- UnlikeArendt, Derridadoes not see the
tentions, the unity and goodness of the people. declaration's structural combination of
He foundsnaturallaws and thus the whole game performativeand constative utteranceas
which tends to presentperformativeutterances incongruous.It is not a question "of an
as constative utterances. (1986, 11; emphasis
mine) obscurity or of a difficulty of interpreta-
tion, of a problematicon the way to its
Founding,promising, or signing, can- resolutiono"because "thisobscurity, this
not occur ex nihilo: "Forthis Declaration undecidabilitybetween, let's say, a per-
to have a meaning and an effect there formative and a constative structure, is
must be a last instance. God is the name, requiredin order to produce the sought
the best one, for this last instanceand this after effect" (1986, 9). The insecureper-
ultimate signature";that is, God is the formative is not always and necessarily
nameDerridagives to whateveris used to anchoredby another utterance.The We
hold the place of the last instance, the hold, on Derrida'saccount, is capableof
place that is the inevitable aporia of anchoringitself not becauseof its power-
founding(or signingor promising)(1986, ful purity as a performative,but because
12). In short, Derrida,like Rousseau(and it is in fact both a constativeand a perfor-
yet quite unlike Rousseau), sees that in mative. It is unclear whether "indepen-
order to break Sieyes's vicious circle, in dence is stated or produced by this ut-
order to posit the law of institutional terance."And its rhetoricalforce derives
laws, "i1[biensur]faudraitdes dieux." in largemeasurefrom this unclarity,from
The moral of Derrida'sstory is that no the fact that one cannot decidewhich sort

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of utterance it is: constative or perfor- structureof the declarationis a guarantor

mative (1986, 9).14 of constitutional authority. Recall that
For Derrida, the combined constative Arendt identifiesspeech with power and
and performativestructureof the docu- characterizes violence as mute (1953,
mentand its We hold illustratebeautifully 378). Recall, too, that in her view, con-
a structuralfeature of all language:that statives are violent, despotic, and disem-
no signature,promise, or performative- powering: they are not the products of
no act of foundation-possesses resources sharedpublicagreement,they demandan
adequateto guaranteeitself, that eachand isolatedacquiescenceto a truth. They are
every one necessarilyneeds some exter- not held by us, we are held by them. In
nal, systemicallyillegitimateguaranteeto short, they silenceus-hence Arendt'sin-
work. This need marksthe Declarationof sistencethat they are illicit in the realmof
Independencejust as it marks utterances action, which is the realmof speech.Con-
that are more quotidian. "This happens sequently,the fact that the Constitutionis
every day," Derridasays (indeed, "Every "silent" on this question of ultimate
signaturefinds itself thus affected"),"but authority is not overwhelmingevidence
it is fabulous"(1986, 10). that the authorityof the republicinheres
For Arendt, however, the declaration's in the performativeWe hold. That silence
constative moments are marks of impur- can be read equally well-as evidencethat
ity, taintingwhat is really, and ought to the constativemomentsof the declaration
have been, a purelyperformativeact. She contribute importantly to the establish-
does not see that her cherishedperfor- ment of ultimate authority in the new
mative We hold is also a constative ut- republic.The silencecan do no more than
terance.And so thereis no undecidability confirm the undecidability that Arendt
here for her. The other constative resists.
moments of the declaration are unfor- In my view, Arendtresiststhis undecid-
tunate errors or lapses, marringbut not ability becauseshe seeks in the American
obviating modernity'sgreatest moment, declaration and founding a moment of
the momentwhen a new revolutionsplen- perfectlegitimacy. Insofaras the author-
didly completedits coursein the founding ity of the founding derives from a con-
of a republic whose authority rested stative, it is rooted not in power but in
exclusivelyin the power of the purelyper- violence. This undecidability, then, de-
formativeWe hold. The power of this ut- ligitimates the republic; and so, for the
terance as a performativeis sufficientto sake of her moment of pure legitimacy,
produce the sought after effect. Acts of Arendt must do away with it. What
founding are not aided, but compro- Arendt does not see is that the American
mised, by the unnecessaryand illicit in- declaration and founding are paradig-
trusion of a constative. matic instances of politics (however im-
As evidence for her claim that the pure) because of this undecidability,not
declaration (and its performative We in spite of it. Derrida'spoint, like Nietz-
hold) is the sole source of authority for sche's,is that in every system (everyprac-
the Constitution,Arendt notes that "the tice), whether linguistic, cultural, or
Constitutionitself, in its preambleas well political, there is a moment or place that
as in its amendmentswhich form the Bill the system cannot account for. Every
of Rights,is singularlysilent on this ques- system is securedby placeholdersthat are
tion of ultimate authority" (1963, irrevocably, structurally arbitrary and
193-94). But there are two ways to read prelegitimate.They enablethe systembut
this silence.The alternativesees this same are illegitimate from its vantage point.
silence as evidence that the constative The question, then, for Arendt is, What

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 Foundinga Republic

placeholderfills this place, the placeof the gods in orderto found a legitimaterepub-
last instance,in her account? lican politics; hence, neitherdo we. This
fable of founding is meant to inspireus,
The Place of Fables just as "the classical examples shining
through the centuries"emboldened the
On my reading,Arendtfills the place of Americanrevolutionaries"for what then
the last instancewith a fable, her fable of turnedout to be an unprecedentedaction"
the American revolution and founding. (1963, 196).
Froma Derridianperspective,it is appro- Arendt'sfable, like all of her spectators'
priatethat she turnsto a fable to hold the stories, is meantto defineand enablenew
place; for all placeholders,according to horizonsof possibility.It presentsitselfas
Derrida, including those that are con- a recoveryof the originsand heroesof the
stativein structure,are fables. RecallDer- republic,as an act of memoryand dereifi-
rida's claim that the signer'sauthorizing cation meantto recaptureand therebyre-
himself to sign by signing is a "fabulous enable the revolutionaryspirit that is the
retroactivity." By the word fabulous, vitality of republicanpolitics. The fable
Derrida signals that this retroactivityis must take the place of the constative in
enabledby a fable: "Therewas no signer, order for Arendt to theorize a viable
by right,beforethe text of the Declaration politicsfor modernity,a politics born not
which itself remains the producer and of violence but of power, a nonfounda-
guarantorof its own signature. By this tional politics possessed of legitimacy,
fabulous event, by this fable which im- authority, stability, and durability.
plies the structureof the traceand is only Arendt claims that this fable is the
in truthpossible thanks to the inadequa- product of her commitmentto memory,
tion to itselfof a present,a signaturegives to the recovery of the Americanrevolu-
itself a name" (1986, 10). Arendt herself tionary spirit;but it invents that spirit. It
recognizesthis "inadequationto itself of a claimsto be a dereification,a recoveryof
present"; her historical fable is an origins;but it erases the violence and the
acknowledgmentof it and a response to ambiguitythat markedthe originalact of
it. Thus, her criticism of the American founding.And the effect of Arendt'sfable
foundersfor their inabilityto conceive of is the same as that of all legitimating
a beginning that was not rooted in the fables:to prohibitfurtherinquiryinto the
past mustbe in the serviceof herfable;for originsof the systemand protectits center
she, too, proves to be unable to conceive of illegitimacyfrom the scrutinyof prying
of such a totally presentevent. eyes.
Arendt turns to the declarationin the Arendt seems to recognizethis. At the
hope that it will provide her with the end of Willing,she acknowledgesthat she
resourcesshe needs to fill the gap in her has come to an impasse. Her account of
own theorizationof a politics of found- freedom, natality, and the will "seemsto
ing. The historicalevent is the inspiration tell us no more than that we are doomed
of the fable, but it does not bind it. to be freeby virtueof beingborn, no mat-
Arendtdismisses,amongotherthings,the ter whetherwe like freedomor abhor its
constativestructureof the Declarationof arbitrariness."The only way out of this
Independenceand insists that the pure impasse,Arendt suggests, is through"an
performativeof the declarationwas a suf- appealto anothermentalfaculty,"that of
ficient guarantorof the authority of the judgment (1978, 217). Judgmentis the
new republic-in order to fill the place faculty used by the spectatorswho turn
with a fabulous faith, the faith that the actions into stories. It is the faculty
Americanfounding fathers did not need used by Arendt as a spectator of the

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AmericanRevolution and founding. Her of resistibility that distinguishessecular

fabulistrenderingof those events is meant law from divine command, political
to bridge the impasse of freedom, the authority from religious devotion. The
abyss that afflicts all performative ut- Americanfounders invoked God (and a
terance,all declarationsof independence, whole series of constative anchors)
all acts of founding. because they (mistakenly)believed that
the "essenceof secular law was a com-
mand." Their political development,
Arendtargues,"wasnowherematchedby
Intervention,Augmentation,and an adequate development of new
Resistibility:Arendt'sPractice thought";and this is why "therewas no
of Political Authority avoiding the problem of the absolute"
(1963, 195). It was the New World's
In spite of theirapparentirreconcilabil- failure to distinguish secular law from
ity, I believe that it may be possible to divine command that left it unable to
bridge-or at least negotiate-the impasse comprehendthe fact that "power under
betweenDerridaand Arendt.If insteadof the condition of human plurality can
dismissing,as Arendtdoes, the constative never amount to omnipotence, and laws
moment of founding, we treat that mo- residingin humanpower can neverbe ab-
ment, as Derridadoes, as an invitationfor solute"(1963, 39).
intervention, we could respect Arendt's JacquesDerridarecognizesthis fact. In-
prohibitionagainstanchoringpoliticalin- deed, his deconstructionof the American
stitutionsin an absolutewhile at the same declaration is in the service of this
time acknowledgingthat all acts of found- recognition.He exposes "thewhole game
ing are (as Derrida claims) necessarily which tends to present performativeut-
securedby a constative. By this strategy terancesas constative utterances."But he
of intervention,we do not deny the con- knows that this exposurecannotbringthe
stative moment of founding, but neither game to an end. The game proceeds;and
do we succumbto its claim to irresistibil- Derrida,by his very intervention,by his
ity. We resistit. Our interventiontestifies adoption of a posture of intervention,
to the resistibilityof this (allegedly irre- declareshimself a player. In so doing, he
sistible) constative anchor; and it posts joins Arendt in proclaiminghis commit-
our opposition to the attemptto "putthe ment to resistibility.Like her, he refuses
law above man,"to securethe law of laws to allow the law of laws to be put, un-
from all (political)intervention. problematically, above man; but he
This notion of resistibility is at the recognizes, more deeply than does
center of Arendt's new conception of Arendt, that the law will always resisthis
authority for modernity. Recall that for resistance (1987). His unwillingness to
Arendt, an absolute is illicit in politics passively accept that is a commitmentto
becauseit is irresistible.God, self-evident politicization, resistibility, and interven-
truths, natural law, are all despotic in tion. And his strategy of interventionis
character because they are irresistible. not only consistentwith Arendt'sown ac-
Becausethey are irresistible,they do not count of the practiceof politicalauthority
persuade to agreement, they command (as I read it); it is requiredby it.
acquiescence.Thus, it is in virtue of their Arendt's theorization of authority
irresistibilitythat they are, for Arendt, builds on the close connection in Roman
antipolitical.In short, resistibilityis the thoughtand practicebetween the concept
sine qua non of Arendt'spolitics.'5 of authorityand a practiceof augmenta-
On Arendt'saccount, it is this feature tion:

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 Foundinga Republic

The very concept of Roman authority suggests

violent alternative to his earlier notions
that the act of foundation inevitably develops its
about the desirabilityof recurringrevolu-
own stability and permanence, and authority in
tions" (1963, 250). The ward system,
this context is nothing more or less than a kind of
Arendt says, could correct the fatal flaw
necessary "augmentation" by virtue of which all
innovations and changes remained tied back to
of the Constitution(which "hadgiven all
the foundation which, at the same time, they
power to the citizens,withoutgiving them
augment and increase. Thus the amendments to
the Constitution augment and increase the the opportunityof being republicanand
of actingas citizens"[1963,253; emphasis
original foundations of the American repub-
oridinal]) by subdividing counties into
lic; . . . the very authority of the American Con-
stitution resides in its inherent capacity to be
small republics in which every citizen
amended and augmented. This notion of a coin-
would have an opportunityto participate
cidence of foundation and preservation by virtue
in the activity of politics.
of augmentation . .. was deeply rooted in the
Roman spirit. (1963, 202; cf. 1977, 123)16 This republican commitment to
politicalaction is importantto Arendtfor
Since republics do not rest on one two distinctbut relatedreasons. The first
world-buildingact of foundation but are is connected to her motif of self-
manifestly committed to augmentation, realization.In Arendt'sview, human be-
to the continualpreservationand amend- ings denied the opportunity to exercise
ment of their foundation, they are theirworld-buildingcapacitieslive an im-
uniquely endowed with political vigor: poverishedlife, a life that is somehowless
Not so the Americanrepublic, however. than human, a life without freedom,
In it "therewas no space reserved, no without happiness(1963, 255).
room left for the exercise of precisely The second reason is connected to
those qualities which had been instru- the character of Arendt's new concep-
mental in building it." This was, Arendt tion of authority for modernity. Where
argues, no mere oversight;the American other theorists of authority, like
founders, intent on "startingsomething Rousseau, believe that the problem of
permanentand enduring,"succumbedto authority is how to put the law above
the charmsof the irresistibleabsolute.As man, that is, how to makethe law of laws
a result,the experienceof freepoliticalac- irresistible,Arendtbelievesthe problemis
tion remained"theprivilegeof the genera- how to prevent the law of laws from
tion of the founders." That privileging, becomingirresistible:she rejectsthe com-
Jeffersonfelt, was an injustice. No con- mandmodel of authorityas inappropriate
stitution, in his view, was perfect; and for the humanconditionof living together
none should be treatedwith "sanctimoni- in a secularand political world. A prac-
ous reverence."Consequently,he greeted tice of authoritycenteredon an irresistible
the news of Shay'sRebellionwith enthusi- law of laws is inappropriatefor the post-
asm: "God forbid we should ever be foundational age for which Arendt
twentyyearswithout sucha rebellion,"he theorizesa politics, and it is also deeply
said (1963, 233), expressinga sentiment antipolitical.It prohibits the practicesof
reminiscent of Machiavelli's advice to augmentation and amendment that she
princes to reinvigoratetheir rule with a valorizes, and it encouragesa withdrawal
repetitionof the violence of their found- from active politics; it deactivates
ing about every 10 years. politics. Arendt's account (as I see it) is
Arendt does not endorse this reliance aptly summarized by Hanna Pitkin's
on violence as a way to reinvigoratethe description of Machiavelli's view, in
republic.But she does admireJefferson's which "republicanauthoritymustbe exer-
lateridea of a ward system, a system that cised in a way that furtherpoliticizesthe
he came to see as "theonly possible non- people rather than renderingthem qui-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

escent. Its function is preciselyto keep a Derrida, this maintenanceis an augmen-

politicalmovementor actionthat the peo- tation that takes place by way of transla-
ple have initiated... from disintegrating tion, by way of a translationthat is called
into riot, apathy, or privatization"(1984, for and heardin the originaltext. Justas,
88). on Arendt's account, the Constitution
RecallArendt'sclaimthat the American calls out to be amended,so Derrida'stext
founders correctly perceived that the calls out to be translated:it is not present
authorityof any body politicderivesfrom yet. This is not translationin the ordinary
its beginningbut mistakenlybelievedthat sense: just as Arendt's performative
a beginningwas "somethingwhich must founding could never be content merely
have occurred in a distant past." The to transmita sense of obligation or pro-
great good fortune of the American duce obedient subjects, neither can Der-
republicwas that this mistakenbelief lost rida's act of translation be "content
out. The success of the revolution "was merelyto transporta contentinto another
decidedthe very moment when the Con- language, nor just to communicateor to
stitution began to be worshipped";for transmit something,"merely to produce
that constitution-worship,Arendtargues, comprehension. Translation augments,
evidenced the fact that the republicwas necessarily. It does not merely copy or
built on a beginning that was very reproduce;it is a new linguisticevent, it
present:"IftheirattitudetowardsRevolu- produces"newtextualbodies."It does not
tion and Constitutioncan be calledreligi- simply preservean original in a practice
ous at all, then the word 'religion'mustbe of mererepetition,it dislodgesthe consta-
understoodin its original Roman sense, tive yearnings of the original and finds
and their piety would then consist in therethe point of departurefor a new way
religare,in binding themselvesback to a of life-hence Derrida'sclaim that this is
beginning"(1963, 198). This constitution- survivance not "in the sense of poster-
worship has always been ambiguous,its ity . . . but of 'moreliving',"in the sense
object being "at least as much the con- of plus de vie and plus que vie (1985,
stituting act as it was the written docu- 24-25). This augmentation,says Derrida,
ment itself." Consequently, Arendt can is "whatsurvivalis." And this augmenta-
say both that the "American remem- tion is, in one sense, arguably like
brance of the event" of constitution is Arendt's practice of authority, which
what keeps the authority of the republic responds to the text or document that
safe and intact and that the "veryauthor- seeksto preserveand referto the past mo-
ity of the AmericanConstitutionresides ment of founding by augmentingit with
in its inherentcapacityto be amendedand another event, another speech act or, as
augmented"(1963, 204, 202). ForArendt, in this case, by an act of translation.
this commitmentto augmentationmain- Finally, Machiavelli, too, exploresthis
tains a republic and its revolutionary structureof maintenance.He sees the im-
spirit by, in a curious sense, keeping its portance of maintainingthe act of foun-
beginningalways present. dation, understandsthat human institu-
Derridaidentifiesthis same structureof tions need frequent revitalization, and
maintenanceand calls it survivance, by seeks that revitalizationin the return to
which he, too, means a kind of preserva- beginnings, a kind of invitation to aug-
tion throughaugmentation.Here, as with mentation. As Pitkin points out, this
Arendt, survival is not producedby the returnto beginningsmay be readas a way
maintenanceof a presentinto a future in of frighteningthe population back into
the way that a fixed monumentseeks to obedience, but there is also anotherway
preservethe presenceof what is past. For to thinkabout it. "Perhaps,"she suggests,

110
 Foundinga Republic

"one should construe the forgetfulness postureof intervention-becomes part of

that graduallycorruptsa compositebody a practiceof authority,not simplyan un-
as reification: a coming to take for authorizedassault on the institutionsof
grantedas 'given'and inevitablewhat in authorityfrom some outside. This inclu-
fact is the productof humanaction."This sion is the genius of Arendt'saccount.
reification distances citizens from their It is noteworthy that for both Derrida
political institutions. From this perspec- and Arendt, the moment of intervention
tive, Pitkin argues, the return to origins is the momentof politics. Butfor Derrida,
does not signal the recurrenceof violence politics begins with the entry of the ir-
but a return"to the spirit of origins, the resistible absolute; it is the impossible
human capacity to originate." If we superimpositionof constative on perfor-
assumeherethat "inthe beginninglies not mative utterancethat occasions the Der-
chaos but human capacity" (1984, ridianintervention,an interventionthatis
275-79),17 we can see that Machiavelli's political. For Arendt, however, politics
return to beginnings, like Nietzsche's ends with the entry of the antipolitical
genealogies and Derrida's deconstruc- (because irresistible) absolute. Arendt's
tions, is a dereificationand a political in- interventionconsistsin her insistencethat
tervention. acts of foundingcan and shouldresistthe
Arendt, like Machiavelli, sees that a urge to anchorthemselvesin an absolute.
beginningtoo firmly rooted in the past is But Arendt's account of authority as a
in dangerof becomingreifiedand founda- practiceof augmentationand amendment
tional. Our commitmentto augmentation does not, in my view, commit her to this
and amendment may derive from our insistence.It commits her only to the in-
reverencefor a beginning that is in the sistence that we treat the absolute as an
past; but our practices of augmentation invitation for intervention, that we
and amendmentmake that beginningour declare ourselves resistant to it, that we
own-not merelyour legacy but our own refuse its claim to irresistibilityby de-
constructionand performative.The com- authorizingit. And this, in effect, is what
mitment to augmentation protects that Arendt herself tries to do in her own in-
which was glorious becauseit was a per- terventionist critique of the constative
formative from being sanctified and structureof the AmericanDeclarationof
turned into a law of laws, an absolute Independence.
whose irresistibilitywould ultimatelyand The impassebetween Arendt and Der-
necessarilydestroy the uniquelypolitical rida is not easy to bridge,but neitheris it
character of the republic.18 On this nonnegotiable. If it is at all possible to
readingof Arendt,augmentationis both a negotiateit, it is in all likelihoodbecause
necessaryconditionof politics and consti- both these thinkers-Derrida throughhis
tutive of one form of the activity of strategy of intervention,Arendt through
politics itself. What Leo Strauss says of her fable of the American Revolution-
Machiavelli applies equally to Arendt: seem to be inspiredby Nietzsche'scounsel
"Foundationis, as it were, continuous to seek "apast from which we may spring
foundation"(1978, 44). rather than that from which we seem to
Since, on Arendt'saccount, the practice have derived"(1957).
of authorityconsists largely in this com-
mitment to resistibility, the practice of
authority turns out to be, paradoxically Notes
enough,a practiceof deauthorization.On Thanksto RichardFlathman,WilliamConnolly,
this account, then, Derrida'sown project Peter Digeser, David Mapel, Tom Keenan, Tom
of deauthorization-his adoption of a Eagles,JudithButler,JeffIsaac, and GeorgeKateb.

1ll
 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 85

Versions of this paper were presented at the 1989 Although Arendt never mentions it, it is notable
meetings of the American Political Science Associa- that the Mayflower Compact was drawn up in Bri-
tion and the Northwestern University Workshop in tain under the sanctioning and supporting gaze of
Contemporary Political Theory. Britain's legal and political institutions, before the
1. This view, that Arendt's account of authority colonists left for the uncertain and unknown New
is antimodernist, is the standard interpretation. See, World. Moreover, the document was signed on the
for example, Richard Flathman 1980, whose account ship, before the colonists disembarked in America. It
of Arendt I discuss briefly below, and Richard Fried- would seem that the colonists' "confidence. .. in
man 1973, who cites Arendt's account as an instance their own power" was perhaps a little less hardy
of the "peculiar but interesting and important claim than Arendt estimates it. See n. 12.
that the very concept of authority has been cor- 7. Sometimes Arendt toys with the notion that a
rupted or even lost in the modern world, and that it "principle"might save "the act of beginning from its
is this loss of understanding that lies behind the con- own arbitrariness" (1963, 212-13; cf. 1977, 156). At
fusion over authority prevailing in contemporary other times she concedes that the arbitrariness of
thought" (p. 122). beginnings is "complete" (1963, 201).
2. Arendt is quoting Rousseau (1985, 3; 1988, bk. 8. As we know from Austin, discursive practices
2, chap. 7). In this paper I cite without comment postulate a vast array of political and cultural in-
Arendt's use of gendered language. I explore the stitutions that set many of the conditions for discur-
issue elsewhere (Honig 1991). sive felicity: for example, they distinguish and sanc-
3. The words performative and constative are tion the distinction between those who are in author-
Austin's (1962), not Arendt's. Arendt's description ity and those who are not; that is, they identify the
of action as a form of utterance (The "doer of deeds authorized speaker of the performative "I call this
is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker meeting to order" as the chair of the board and for-
of words" [1958, 178-791), a de novo creation; her bid, punish, and fail to comprehend or sanction the
identification of this form of utterance with politics; interrogation of anyone who impersonates the chair
and her characterization of politics as world- and usurps the chair's performative privilege.
building-all lead me to believe that her account 9. On Austin's account, the felicity of performa-
draws on the model of the originary performative, tives is often secured by the use of formulaic or
the Divine utterance Let there be. ritualistic utterance for performative purposes, as in
4. Arendt's distinction between an "argument in "I declare this meeting adjourned."
support of an action" and actions that "appear in 10. The same point can be made with reference to
words" implies that only performative utterances are Arendt's stories, which (Arendt assumes) are
speech acts. Austin began with this assumption but univocal, possessed of a force and meaning that are
later found he could not maintain it and concluded unproblematic. These are curious assumptions from
that both performative and constative utterances are one so insistent that plurality is the sine qua non of
speech acts. the public realm. Perhaps Arendt's account of the
Note that Arendt is not the only one to make the role of stories in politics is too influenced by the
interesting claim that the written document is the Greek model, in which an authoritative poet
"perfect way for an action to appear in words." See (Homer) gives the authoritative account of events.
Warner 1987 on the importance of writing, printing, 11. Identity is the product, not the condition of
and textuality to the legitimation of the early action, on Arendt's account (1958, 193; Honig 1988,
American republic. 86-88; Kateb 1983, 1-51).
5. Both the new conception of authority and the 12. This claim that signing requires countersigna-
older Roman one are sustained by the foundings in tures again renders problematic Arendt's faith in the
which they originated. Arendt says that Roman power of the We to ensure its own action. In
authority was sustained by particular religious and Arendt's process, there are only cosigners; but
traditional beliefs, but she does also claim that "the cosigners, on Derrida's account, are not sufficient to
very coincidence of authority, tradition, and get us out of Sieyes's vicious circle. Hence, the par-
religion, all three simultaneously springing from the ties to the Mayflower Compact combined "them-
act of foundation, was the backbone of Roman selves together into a 'civil Body Politick"' not
history from beginning to end" (1963, 199; emphasis "solely by the strength of mutual promises" but (as
mine). Arendt well knows) "in the Presence of God and one
6. Arendt makes no note of it but the phrase "in another" (emphasis added; see n. 6). The parties in-
the Presence of God and one another" instantiates voke the Presence of God because they need the
the same incongruous unification of a constative and validation of his witness and the security of his
performative utterance as does Jefferson's "We hold countersignature.
these truths to be self-evident." It suggests, contra 13. Arendt believes that this gap marks only the
Arendt, that the confidence the parties had in each speech acts of her public realm-hence the risk and
other, far from being "granted and confirmed by no danger of public action, which she celebrates. Con-
one," was guaranteed by "the Presence of God." tra Derrida, she assumes that some language is safe

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and unproblematic (or at least uninteresting)- Arendt, Hannah. 1977. Between Past and Future.
nonpolitical, nonproductive, nonperformative Enl. ed. New York: Penguin.
speech, which addresses "immediate, identical needs Arendt, Hannah. 1978. Willing. Vol. 2 of The Life
and wants." For this sort of thing, "signs and of the Mind, ed. Mary McCarthy. New York:
sounds ... would be enough" (1958, 176). Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
14. Here Derrida refers to the phrase We the peo- Austin, John L. 1962. How to Do Things with
ple; I take his argument to apply equally well to the Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
We hold. Derrida, Jacques. 1985. "Deconstruction in Amer-
15. This identification of politics with resistibility ica: An Interview with Jacques Derrida." In
is what leads Arendt to insist on her problematically Critical Exchange 17:1-32. Eds. James Creech,
severe distinction between the public and the private Peggy Kamuf and Jane Todd.
realm. The private realm is the realm of the body, Derrida, Jacques. 1986. "Declarations of Indepen-
whose demands upon us are, according to Arendt, dence." New Political Science 15:7-15.
necessarily irresistible. I suggest that Arendt's Derrida, Jacques. 1987. "Devant la loi." In Kafka
public-private distinction would lose some of its and the ContemporaryCriticalPerformance,ed.
(problematic) force if instead of insisting on the in- Alan Udoff.
admissibility of the irresistible to the public realm we Flathman, Richard E. 1980. Authority and the
responded to it with a Derridian strategy of in- Authoritative:The Practiceof PoliticalAuthor-
tervention (see Honig 1991). ity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
16. Arendt is not the only one to note the ety- Friedman, Richard B. 1973. "On the Concept of
mological and conceptual connections between Authority in Political Philosophy." In Concepts
authority and augmentation (see Friedman 1973; in SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,ed. RichardE.
Friedrich 1973; Peters 1973); but she alone reasons Flathman. New York: Macmillan.
from them to an account of authority as deeply tied Friedrich, Carl J. 1973. "Authority, Reason, and
to a practice of augmentation. Discretion."In Conceptsin Social and Political
17. The return to beginnings will be violent only Philosophy, ed. Richard E. Flathman. New
in regimes that are corrupt, Pitkin argues. Others York: Macmillan.
will respond to nonviolent forms of reinvigoration. Honig, B. 1988. "Arendt, Identity, and Difference."
18. The absence in the American republic of Political Theory 16(1):77-98.
something like a ward system that would allow Honig, B. 1991. "Toward an Agonistic Feminism:
citizens to participate in the political activity of Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity." In
augmentation does not mean that the republic lacks Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. Judith
authority. It does mean that "the true seat of author- Butler and Joan W. Scott. New York: Routledge
ity in the American Republic" is the Supreme Court, Press. Forthcoming.
which is, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "a kind of Kateb, George. 1983. Hannah Arendt: Politics,
Constitutional Assembly in continuous session." Conscience, Evil. Oxford: Rowman & Allanheld.
Consequently, Arendt argues, the American concept Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1957. The Use and Abuse of
of authority is very different from that of Rome: "In History. Trans. Adrian Collins. Indianapolis:
Rome the function of authority was political, and it Bobbs-Merrill.
consisted in giving advice, while in the American Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1969. On the Genealogy of
republic the function of authority is legal, and it con- Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.
sists in interpretation" (1963, 200). This substitution Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books.
of legal for political authority, together with the Peters, R. S. 1973. "Authority." In Concepts in
failure of the American republic to vouchsafe spaces Social and PoliticalPhilosophy, ed. RichardE.
of freedom for popular participation in politics, Flathman. New York: Macmillan.
marks, according to Arendt, the loss of the Amer- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1984. Fortune Is a Woman.
ican republic's revolutionary spirit. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1985. The Government of
Poland. Ed. and trans. Willmore Kendall. In-
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Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

B. Honigis AssistantProfessorof Government,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,MA

02138.

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