[ G.R. No. 203353.

February 14, 2023 ]

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY ("DTI"),
THE DTI SECRETARY, ZENAIDA C. MAGLAYA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DTI UNDERSECRETARY, AND VICTORIO
MARIO A. DIMAGIBA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR FOR DTI'S BUREAU OF TRADE REGULATIONS AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: On May 25, 2010, Director Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba of the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection wrote to Universal Robina and other local millers to inquire why their ex-mill flour
prices had not decreased, despite falling wheat prices, lower freight costs, favorable exchange rates, and
the imposition of zero tariffs. Universal Robina responded, citing the global wheat price and rising
operational costs, including labor. Dimagiba countered that, despite similar wheat prices between 2007
and 2010, flour prices had increased, and ordered Universal Robina to lower its ex-mill price to P630.00
to P680.00 per bag.

Dimagiba later filed a complaint against Universal Robina and other millers for profiteering under the
Price Act, arguing their flour prices were too high. A preliminary order was issued, requiring Universal
Robina to reduce its prices while the case was pending. However, the order was lifted after the Philippine
Association of Flour Millers stated that they had lowered their prices and supported following the
Department of Trade and Industry's directive. Ultimately, the complaint was dismissed due to a
procedural issue regarding forum shopping.

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) noticed that Universal Robina's ex-mill flour prices were
higher than expected, despite the appreciating peso. DTI highlighted price increases in August and
September 2010 and compared Universal Robina's prices to its own calculations based on importation
data. DTI requested that Universal Robina submit a response within five days and offered to meet to
discuss the issue.

In response, Universal Robina filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the Regional Trial Court. The
petition sought to have the following declared invalid: (1) the provision in the Price Act prohibiting
profiteering, due to unclear definitions; (2) Executive Order No. 913 and related rules, arguing they were
an invalid exercise of power and violated due process; and (3) any actions or proceedings based on these
rules. The Regional Trial Court’s ruling dismissed the petition for the reason that no justiciable
controversy existed.

Universal Robina's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court in August 2012.
Consequently, the company filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and its officials filed a comment, and Universal Robina
responded with a reply, leading to the submission of memoranda by both parties.

Universal Robina argued that there was a legitimate legal dispute that warranted judicial review,
especially as the dismissal of the profiteering case was due to a technicality, leaving unresolved legal
issues. It also claimed that even if the case was moot, it raised significant constitutional issues and public
interest. The company challenged the vagueness of the Price Act's definition of "profiteering" and
argued that it violated due process, as the law lacked clear guidelines to determine when a price was
"grossly in excess of its true worth."
Additionally, Universal Robina contested the validity of Executive Order No. 913 and DTI Administrative
Order No. 07, asserting they were invalid exercises of quasi-legislative power, as they allowed for
injunctions without due process, notice, or hearing. The company argued these orders went beyond the
power granted by the legislature and violated the standards required for administrative actions.

In contrast, public respondents (DTI) argued the petition was premature since no administrative or
criminal case had been filed against Universal Robina, and the company was not suffering any injury.
They defended the Price Act as a legitimate exercise of police power, asserting it aimed to ensure
reasonable prices for basic commodities. They argued that the statute’s language was clear, and the
challenge to its vagueness was inappropriate for a penal statute.

Issue: Whether the provisions penalizing profiteering under the Price Act is void for vagueness.

Ruling: The Court is not convinced.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan is instructive in cases assailing penal provisions as being void for vagueness:

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
(Citation omitted)

As Estrada teaches, flexibility is permissible in statutory provisions, for there are situations when it would
be impossible for legislators to provide mathematical exactitude.

A statute is vague when:

. . . it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted [sic] by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

While the provision certainly could set forth more exacting standards, petitioner has not established
that it is void for vagueness. Petitioner has not shown that the law enforcers have unbridled discretion
to determine that profiteering has been committed. Neither has it established that it did not have fair
notice of the conduct to be avoided.

Although the Price Act does not define the terms "true worth" or "price grossly in excess" of true worth,
our laws recognize that a reasonable price is a question of fact that can be determined based on the
circumstances. Moreover, the Price Act enumerates instances when there can be a prima facie evidence
of profiteering, namely where the product:
 (a) has no price tag; (b) is misrepresented as to its weight or measurement; (c) is adulterated or
diluted; or (d) whenever a person raises the price of any basic necessity or prime commodity
he sells or offers for sale to the general public by more than ten percent (10%) of its price in
the immediately preceding month: Provided, that, in the case of agricultural crops, fresh
fish, fresh marine products, and other seasonal products covered by this act and as
determined by the implementing agency, the prima facie provisions shall not apply.

Thus, the law specifies that the 10% increase will be the basis for a prima facie determination of
profiteering. This provides some anchor for assessing whether profiteering has occurred, though that
determination is inconclusive. The increase may, at the implementing agency's discretion, be used to
determine further whether the prima facie presumption will hold.

Given the general circumstances before us, petitioner has not shown that the law enforcers have
unbridled discretion in implementing the provision on profiteering. This Court is unconvinced that the
provision is void for vagueness.

Dispositive Portion:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court's April 3, 2012
Decision in Civil Case No. 72854 is AFFIRMED.