ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL KIT

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Enforcement

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V. ENFORCEMENT

Introduction
One key problem faced by those investigating corruption is that, unlike many traditional crimes
such as robbery or murder, there is no clear victim to complain or overt occurrence likely to be
reported by witnesses. In corruption cases, those with direct knowledge of the offence generally
profit in some way, making them unlikely to report it. Corruption is not a “victimless” crime, but
the only victim in many cases is the general public interest, which is not aware of the crime or in
a position to report or complain about it. For this reason, any anti-corruption strategy should
include elements intended to bring to light the presence of corruption. These include elements
intended to encourage those who witness or are aware of corruption incidents to report them and
incentives to complain about sub-standard public services which may be due to corruption,
supported by more general education about corruption, the harm it causes and basic standards
that should be expected in the administration of public affairs. Also included are elements that
generate information and evidence of corruption in other ways, such as audit and inspection
requirements. In some cases, there are relatively direct victims of corruption, such as the
unsuccessful participants in a corrupt competition for a public contract or employment position,
and strategies should also encourage these victims to be aware of the possibility of corruption
and report it when suspected.
In encouraging those aware of corruption to report it, the greatest challenge is often the fact that
those who are victimised directly are often vulnerable to intimidation or retaliation from the
offenders, either because they belong to vulnerable groups, or because of the relationship to the
offenders which made them aware of the corruption in the first place. Those who deal with
officials in circumstances of physical or social isolation, such as new immigrants or residents of
rural areas might be the subject of information campaigns about what standards to expect from
officials and given the means to lodge complaints if the standards are not met, for
example.Government agencies can set up channels that permit corruption to be reported
internally.

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Tool 28 - Guidelines for Successful Investigations into Corruption

Purpose

The following guidelines are meant to give members of the law enforcement community some
general directions for investigating corruption

Description

There are no universal rules for investigating corruption, but some the following elements, if
incorporated into national strategies, will help to develop investigative structures which can
detect corruption and conduct effective investigations that produce information which can be
used to develop and apply effective responses. Investigative results should be capable of
supporting not only criminal prosecutions and other responses directed at those involved as
individuals, but also measures intended to restructure or reorganise public or private
administration to make it more resistant to corruption. The autonomy and security of
investigations is important, both to encourage and protect those who report corruption or assist in
other ways, and to ensure that the results of investigations – whether they find corruption or not
– are both valid and credible.

Education about corruption

Before corruption can be reported, it must first be identified. This requires that the general
population and specific target groups be educated about what constitutes corruption, the full
range of forms of corruption, its true costs and consequences, and more generally about
reasonable expectations for standards of integrity in public administration and private business
practices. Many people have a very narrow appreciation of corruption and may not understand
that behaviour they witness or engage in is harmful. Others may understand the harm, but lack
motivation to take any action because the problem is seen as pervasive and unchangeable. In
environments where corruption has become institutionalised and accepted, considerable
educational efforts may be needed to change the popular perception that corruption is a natural
or inevitable phenomenon and ensure that it is perceived as socially harmful, morally wrong, and
in most cases, a crime. In many countries, similar efforts have proven successful in the past with
respect to other forms of crime such as impaired driving, “white-collar” crime, and
environmental crime.

Opportunities to report corruption

Those who have knowledge of corruption must be placed in a position where they are able to
report it. This requires having officials charged with the responsibility for dealing with
corruption, ensuring that they are properly trained in dealing with cases, that they are easily
available to potential complainants or witnesses, and that those who might report corruption are
aware of the existence of such officials and can readily contact them with information.

Security against retribution

Victims and witnesses will not come forward if they fear retribution, and precautions against this
are commonly incorporated into instruments dealing with corruption and organized crime, where
the problem is particularly acute64. This is particularly true in cases of official corruption, where

64
Recent international provisions dealing with intimidation or retribution include: United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (GA/res/55/25, annex), articles 23 (requiring States

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those who have information are usually relatively close to a corrupt official, and the status of the
official affords him or her opportunities to retaliate. Measures are usually formulated not only to
protect the informant, but also the integrity and confidentiality of the investigation. Common
precautions against this include guarantees of anonymity for the informant, assurances that
officials accused of corruption will not have any access to investigative personnel, files or
records, and powers to transfer or remove an official during the course of an investigation to
prevent intimidation or other tampering with the investigation or evidence.
In cases where the informant is an “insider”, additional precautions may be taken because of his
or her employment in close proximity to the offenders and because in some cases there may be
additional legal liabilities for disclosing the information involved. Many countries have adopted
“whistleblower” laws and procedures that protect insiders who come forward with information.
These protections may apply to inside informants from both the public and private sectors.
Additional protections in such cases may include shielding the informant from civil litigation in
areas such as breach of confidentiality agreements and libel or slander, and in the case of public
officials, from criminal liability for the disclosure of government or official secrets. Such
protections may extend to cases where the information was incorrect, provided that it was
disclosed in good faith.
Safeguards against abuses by the informants themselves may also be needed, particularly in
cases where they are permitted to remain anonymous or are broadly shielded from legal liability.
To balance the interests involved, legislation may limit legal protections to cases of bona fide
good faith disclosures or create civil or criminal liability for cases where the informant cannot
establish good faith or that the belief that malfeasance had occurred was not based on reasonable
grounds.
In cases where the informant’s information proves valid and triggers official action, his or her
anonymity often cannot be maintained, making retribution possible even after changes have been
made to address the complaint. In such cases, legislation may provide for compensation,
transfers to other agencies or employment removed from those involved in the case, or in
extreme cases where the informer is in more serious danger, relocation and a new identity
unknown to the offenders.

Independence and credibility of investigators and prosecutors

Independence from those under investigation is critical to the protection of victims, witnesses
and informants, but it is also important that officials or bodies responsible for investigating
corruption be independent or autonomous for other reasons. Functional independence ensures
that investigations will be effective in identifying corruption by reducing the potential for
tampering with investigations by corrupt officials, and ensuring that evidence obtained will be
credible when used in criminal or disciplinary proceedings65. It is also important as a means of

Parties to provide criminal penalties for obstruction of justice) and 24 (requiring States Parties to take
measures to protect witnesses); the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1998),
Article 22 (Protection of collaborators and witnesses); the Organisation of American States’s Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Article III (preventative measures); Global Coalition for
Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999) (Art. 15); and Principles 2 and 5 of
the Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice
and Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of these instruments, see UN document
E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments Addressing
Corruption).
65
References to disciplinary proceedings are intended to include sanctions taken against a public or private
sector worker which are based on contracts or other legal obligations which arise out of the worker’s
individual position or employment, rather than the general obligations created by criminal or administrative
law. These include such things as terms or conditions of employment contracts, public service standards or
codes of practice, and the rules applied to professional groups such as doctors and lawyers. Common forms

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instilling confidence in both the investigators and in the bureaucracies or agencies they
investigate. Where the investigation is independent, populations have some assurance that if
corruption exists it will be identified and eliminated, and that if investigators conclude that
corruption does not exist or has been eliminated, the bureaucracy can be trusted.
The mechanics of functional independence vary from one country or justice system to another.
Most systems incorporate elements of judicial independence to ensure the integrity of court
proceedings, 66 but the means of securing autonomy for the prosecutorial and investigative
functions differ. In systems where criminal investigations are carried out by magistrates or other
judicial officials, these functions also fall within the ambit of judicial independence. Where
investigations and prosecutions are carried out by non-judicial personnel, judicial oversight may
still play a role, but as this only applies to cases which come before the courts in such systems,
other methods must be found to review or monitor key functions such as the conduct of
investigations and the decisions which determine who is investigated and whether a prosecution
is brought before the courts in each case. 67
The problem of quis custodiet ipsos custodes?68 Also arises in developing structures which
separate anti-corruption investigations from other elements of government. The agencies
involved must be sufficiently independent to protect their functions against undue interference,
but must also be subject to sufficient oversight to prevent abuses and to identify corruption on
the part of investigators and prosecutors should it occur. These are common problems in
establishing law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in any system, but are arguably more
critical in dedicated anti-corruption agencies because those involved will almost certainly be the
subject of attempts at bribery, coercion or other undue influences, often by very sophisticated
and well-resourced corrupt officials or organized criminal groups. It is essential that
investigators be subject to overall regulation and accountability for their activities, but that such
oversight does not extend to interference with operational decisions such as whether a particular
individual should be investigated, what methods should be used, or whether a case should be the
subject of further action, such as criminal prosecution, once the investigation has concluded.

Adequate training and resources for investigators

Adequate training and resources are necessary both to ensure that reported cases will be dealt
with effectively, and to encourage those aware of corruption to come forward with information.
Informants will only assume the risk of reporting if they are confident that effective action
against corruption will be the result. This confidence requires not only assurances that
investigations will themselves be independent and free of corruption, but also that investigators
are actually capable of detecting it, gathering evidence against offenders, and taking whatever
measures are needed to eliminate it. The commitment of significant resources also sends a
powerful signal that the highest levels of government are strongly committed to the prevention
and elimination of corruption, which both deters offenders and encourages informants.

of discipline include dismissal or suspension from employment, removal of the right or license to practice a
profession, limitations on what jobs can be performed and requirements that the individual concerned work
under supervision.
66
See the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August-6 September 1985: report prepared
by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IV.1), chap. I, sect. D.2.
67
See the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials contained in the annex to General Assembly
resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. See also the guidelines on the role of prosecutors contained in the
annex to resolution 26 of the Eighth Congress (Eighth United Nations Congress, pp. 188-194).
68
“Who will watch the watchman?”

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The wide range of forms of corruption requires a wide range of specific skills and knowledge on
the part of investigators, but most will find frequent need for legal and accounting skills in order
to identify, preserve and present evidence, whether in criminal proceedings, disciplinary
proceedings or other fora. Adequate capabilities also depend to a large degree on the presence of
adequate resources to ensure that sufficient numbers of investigators are present and that they
have the necessary skills and training to work effectively. Apart from personnel and funding,
other resources, such as systems for the creation, retention and analysis of records, can also be
important. Often the strongest evidence of high-level corruption will be a long-term pattern in
complaints about lesser abuses, for example.

Liaison with other investigative agencies

Given the need for autonomy and independence and the extreme sensitivity of many corruption
cases, a careful balance should be struck when establishing the relationship between anti-
corruption investigators and other agencies. In environments where corruption is believed to be
relatively pervasive and widespread, complete autonomy is advisable. Establishing an anti-
corruption unit in a police force may not be advisable, for example, if there is a significant
likelihood that the police themselves may be investigated or if they are suspected of corruption.
On the other hand, it will be important that anti-corruption investigators interact effectively with
other agencies. Information from tax authorities or agencies investigating money-laundering or
other economic crimes may uncover evidence of corruption or of unexplained wealth which may
have been derived from corruption, for example, and audits of government agencies may
uncover inefficiency or malfeasance which is not due to corruption, but which warrants further
investigation or reform by other agencies.

Other means of detecting corruption

While encouraging those who witness corruption to report it is clearly a major means of
detection, other methods should not be overlooked. Many of these can also be considered as
preventive in nature and are discussed in the previous part of this Manual. Others are examined
in more detail in the following segments.

Disclosure and reporting requirements

Requiring that public officials make periodic disclosure of their assets both deters unjust
enrichment and provides investigators and auditors with a powerful instrument to detect
corruption by detecting the existence of unexplained wealth. Similarly, non-compliance with
requirements to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest may alert auditors or
investigators to the possibility that the official intends to corruptly exploit undetected or
undisclosed conflicts. Such measures may be effective even if the official is not honest in
complying with the reporting requirements, since gaps and inconsistencies may well trigger
more thorough investigations, and the official may ultimately be held liable not only for
corruption per se, but for non-compliance with the reporting requirements themselves.
Sanctions against non-disclosure or false reporting should be approximately as severe as those
against the underlying corruption, to prevent offenders from avoiding liability for corruption by
committing the lesser disclosure and reporting offences. 69They should also always permit at

69
With respect to relevant recent international principles addressing this issue, see e.g., Principle 5, point 2
of the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of this
instrument, see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International
Legal Instruments Addressing Corruption).”

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least the possibility of dismissal or removal from office to ensure that corrupt behaviour can be
ended even in cases where the inadequate disclosure is successful in concealing unjust
enrichment and the underlying corruption. As noted in the previous Part, regular periodic
disclosure is also preferable to requiring disclosure only on entering and leaving office, as this
will detect corruption while it is still ongoing, reducing the harm caused to the public interest.

Audits and inspections

Audits of records, physical inspections of premises or items, or interviews with potential victims,
witnesses or others who may have relevant information can be used both proactively as a means
of monitoring the quality and integrity of public administration and identifying possible abuses,
and reactively as a means of investigating those already suspected of corruption or other
malfeasance. 70Audits may be conducted on an internal or local basis, but overall anti-corruption
strategies should provide for a central, national audit agency. Such agencies require adequate
resources and expertise, and in order to audit senior levels of government, they must enjoy a
substantial degree of autonomy approaching if not equal to judicial independence. This
independence should extend to decisions about which officials, sectors or functions should be
audited, how audits should be carried out, the drawing and formulation of conclusions about the
results of audits, and to some degree the publication or release of such conclusions.
Auditors and their investigative staffs should have the power to conduct regular or random audits
to ensure overall deterrence and surveillance, as well as specific targeted audits directed at
individuals or agencies suspected of malfeasance. In many countries, the mandate goes beyond
suspected malfeasance, as auditors are also responsible for identifying and addressing cases of
waste or inefficiency deriving from problems other than crime or corruption. Where problems
are identified, auditors generally have the power to recommend administrative or legal reforms
to address institutional or structural problems, and can refer cases to law enforcement agencies
or criminal prosecutors if criminal wrongdoing is suspected.
Auditors should be supported by legal powers such as requirements that compel individuals or
agencies being audited to cooperate, but auditors should not be allowed to become law
enforcement agencies. In most countries, once criminal offences are suspected, higher standards
of procedural safeguards are applied to protect the human rights of those involved, but once the
procedural requirements have been met, criminal investigators are authorised to use much more
intrusive powers to detain suspects and gather evidence. 71Maintaining the distinction between
auditors or inspectors and criminal investigators ensures that the former retain the legal powers
needed to monitor relatively broad areas of public administration in order to identify corruption
and inefficiencies and to propose systemic or structural solutions. When individual malfeasance
is uncovered as a result, it can then be referred to other agencies, which have the necessary
powers, resources and expertise to conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions.

“Sting” or “integrity testing” operations

70
In some countries, human rights protections limit the use of general inspections or require additional
procedural safeguards once a crime is suspected.
71
In many justice systems, a person cannot be compelled to assist investigators once he or she is suspected
of having committed a criminal offence. Article 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (GA/res/2200A of 12 December 1966, UNTS#14668) establishes the right of a criminal
suspect “…Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”, which is interpreted in many
national human rights instruments as a general right against self-incrimination. Where such suspicions are
established to an appropriate standard, however, criminal investigators gain powers to engage in more
intrusive powers of search and seizure in order to obtain the necessary evidence.

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A more controversial – but also unquestionably effective – means of identifying corrupt officials
is the use of decoys or other integrity-testing tactics. These involve undercover agents who offer
officials opportunities to engage in corruption in circumstances where evidence of their reaction
can be easily and credibly gathered. Depending on local policy or legal constraints, officials may
be targeted at random or on the basis of evidence or reason for specific suspicion of corruption.
The criticisms of these tactics are substantial. Arguably, even the most honest official might
yield to temptation if the offer is sufficiently convincing, and the willingness to do so when
approached may not necessarily establish that he or she is inherently corrupt or that similar
transgressions have occurred in the past. This problem underlies restrictions intended to prevent
“entrapment” in some countries. Usually in such countries, undercover agents are permitted to
create opportunities for a suspect to commit an offence, but not to offer any actual
encouragement to do so. Police officers might be occasionally exposed to undercover agents in
circumstances where a corrupt officer would normally solicit a bribe to see if this occurs, for
example, but the undercover agents would be prohibited from actually offering bribes.
These tactics represent a powerful instrument for both deterring corruption and detecting and
investigating offenders. As they do not necessarily require any inside information or assistance,
they can be used quickly against any official at virtually any level who is suspected of
corruption. If the suspect is corrupt, they quickly provide highly-credible evidence, usually in the
form of audio- or videotapes, photographs and the personal testimony of the investigators
involved, which may form the basis of a criminal prosecution or serve as the justification for
other investigative methods such as electronic surveillance or the search of financial records. If
the suspect is not corrupt, his or her refusal also tends to reliably establish, provided that
adequate confidentiality precautions are take to ensure that investigative targets are not warned
beforehand and that undercover agents are well-trained and competent.

Electronic surveillance, search and seizure and other investigative methods

Techniques such as wiretapping or the monitoring of electronic communications and search and
seizure have limited use in the initial detection of corruption in many countries because human
rights safeguards usually prohibit their use unless there is already substantial evidence that a
crime has been, or is about to be, committed. 72As noted in (b) above, procedural protections and
questions relating to the competence of investigators and control over the use of intrusive
investigative methods will usually also restrict the use of such methods to criminal law
enforcement agencies, as opposed to more general surveillance agencies such as auditors,
inspectors or ombudsmen.
Where evidence of criminal wrongdoing justifies their use, however, these are well-established
and proven methods of gathering the evidence necessary to identify and link offenders and
establish criminality in criminal prosecutions. Electronic communications using telephones, fax
machines, e-mail and other technologies may be intercepted and recorded as evidence, and
physical premises, computers, bank or financial records, files and other sources of evidence may
be physically or electronically searched. Searches may target virtually any location at which
there is a reasonable expectation of finding evidence, including locations associated with the
suspected offender or third parties. Thus, search warrants or similar documents could be
obtained to search not only the bank accounts of persons suspected of taking bribes for example,
but also those suspected of paying them. Similarly, they may be used for any offence, including

72
Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (GA/res/2200A of 12 December
1966, UNTS#14668) provides that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence…”, which has been interpreted in many domestic constitutional
and legal provisions as requiring prior authorization by a judicial or other independent authority based on
adequate grounds to believe that a crime has been or will be committed and that the invasion of privacy is
needed to prevent the crime or gather evidence of it.

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not only initial corruption offences, but also related crimes such as the concealment or
laundering of the proceeds of corruption.
In some cases, intrusive investigative methods being used to investigate other crimes may also
uncover previously-unsuspected corruption, particularly in organized crime cases, where
offenders often try to corrupt officials or obstruct justice in order to shield their other criminal
operations from detection or criminal liability. Corruption and the obstruction of justice are both
offences for which international cooperation can be sought between countries that are parties to
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime73.
Other forms of electronic surveillance, such as the use of video or audio recordings may also be
used as evidence in corruption cases. Procedural safeguards and restrictions based on privacy
rights may not apply where these are used in circumstances where there is no privacy to protect,
such as public places or communications channels which are open broadcasts or where
participants are warned that conversations may be monitored. Depending on national laws, it
may be possible to routinely or randomly monitor communications between public officials and
those they serve, if such a warning can be given and if this is not inconsistent with the public
function being performed.
If this is feasible from a standpoint of human rights, technical and cost considerations, it will
create a powerful deterrent, since corrupt officials always face the possibility that their
conversations may be recorded and used as evidence if corrupt transactions take place. Where
resources limit the extent of monitoring, a system of universal notification combined with
occasional random monitoring may still provide an effective deterrent.
The detection of fraud and other forms of economic corruption may also be accomplished or
assisted using forensic accounting techniques. These generally consist of examining financial
records for patterns that are unusual or at variance with the patterns or norms established by
other records. Such things as abnormally high balances in accounts used for discretionary
spending, abnormal fluctuations in balances, payments which are unusually high or unusually
frequent, records kept in formats which make them difficult to read or interpret, or any other
pattern of spending or record keeping which cannot be attributed to operational requirements
may suggest the presence of corruption or other economic crime. Basic forensic tests may be
applied by auditors as part of the process of screening for evidence of corruption, or by criminal
investigators who suspect particular individuals or agencies and are gathering evidence.
The time-honoured practice of interviewing suspects and possible witnesses also remains a major
investigative tool, once corruption is suspected. The investigative skills needed are similar to
those for other forms of criminal investigation, although specialised knowledge of corrupt
practices and related matters will generally be an advantage. Given the concerns about
retribution against witnesses or informants, it will also generally be important that investigators
interview contacts in a secure, confidential environment, take steps to protect any information
gained and the identity of the source from disclosure, and be able to conduct interviews in a
manner which will reassure informants.

Choice when disposing corruption cases

Cases where corruption on the part of individuals is identified can be dealt with in several ways:

73
GA/res/55/25, annex, articles 8 (general corruption) and 23 (obstruction of justice). The obligation upon
States Parties to criminalize corruption sets out various forms of corruption applicable to the corruption of
any “public official” for any purpose. The obligation regarding obstruction of justice is more specific,
covering only corruption which seeks to interfere with investigative or judicial proceedings relating to
Convention offences, but it extends to both positive (e.g., offering an “undue advantage”) and negative
(e.g., force, threat or intimidation) inducements.

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• By criminal or administrative prosecutions, which lead to incarceration, fines, restitution

requirements or other punishments;
• By disciplinary actions, which lead to employment-related measures such as dismissal or
demotion;
• By bringing or encouraging civil proceedings, in which those directly affected, or in some
cases the State, seek to recover the proceeds of corruption or civil damages; and,
• Remedial actions such as the retraining of individuals or restructuring of operations in ways
which reduce or eliminate opportunities for corruption.
Generally, the same detection techniques, investigative procedures and evidentiary requirements
will apply regardless of the process chosen, although criminal prosecutions usually entail higher
standards of reliability and probative value for evidence because of the serious penal
consequences for offenders. The decision about whether to apply criminal sanctions or to seek
less- drastic remedies can be exceedingly difficult, balancing moral and ethical considerations
against pragmatic costs and benefits, and is itself susceptible to corruption in systems which
embody relatively broad prosecutorial discretion.
Criminal prosecutions may not be desirable or possible in the following circumstances:

The conduct may not be a crime

In some cases, behaviour might be considered as “corrupt” for the purposes of a national anti-
corruption programme or the internal programmes of a company or government agency, but not
be the subject of a criminal offence. Alternatively, it may be conduct which has been overlooked
in the development of the criminal law, or conduct such as purely private-sector malfeasance
which is seen as corrupt, but which does not sufficiently harm the public interest to warrant
criminalisation.

Available evidence may not support prosecution

As noted above, the evidence and burden of proof in criminal prosecutions involve relatively
high standards because of the penal consequences involved. In some cases, there may be
sufficient evidence to justify lesser corrective measures, but not to support a criminal
prosecution. Where this occurs, authorities must generally decide whether the circumstances
warrant the additional delay, effort and expense needed to gather sufficient evidence to proceed,
or whether measures such as disciplinary or remedial action should be pursued instead. One cost
factor in such cases is the cost of leaving a corrupt official in place long enough to complete a
full criminal investigation. Another consideration is the possibility that evidence of past
corruption has been lost, making prosecution impossible.

Prosecution may not be in the public interest

In some cases the conduct may amount to a crime, but official discretion may be exercised not to
prosecute the offender on the basis that the public interest is better served by some other course
of action. Where large numbers of officials are involved, for example, the costs of prosecution
include not only litigation costs, but also the costs of incarceration or other punishment, and the
loss of expertise and costs of replacing the convicted officials. Discretionary decisions on this
basis can be extremely problematic. On one hand, officials may face high costs of prosecuting
offenders on a case by case basis, but if a decision is made not to prosecute, it may create the
impression that the justice system itself is corrupt, which encourages corruption in other sectors
and seriously erodes any deterrence value in criminal justice measures. Where such a decision is
made, it is important that it be well documented and made in the most transparent way possible
to prevent actual corruption and dispel any public perception of corruption.

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Criminal prosecutions and punishments effectively remove corrupt officials from any position
where they can commit further offences, and deter both the individuals involved and others in
similar positions. Since most corruption is economic in nature and is pre-planned rather than
spontaneous, general deterrence is likely to form a significant part of the criminal justice
component of anti-corruption strategies. The high financial and human costs impose practical
limits on the extent of such prosecutions, however, and attempting large numbers of prosecutions
as part of an anti-corruption drive may pressure investigators or prosecutors to engage in
improprieties that effectively distort or corrupt the criminal justice system itself.
In formulating anti-corruption strategies, it is important that criminal prosecution and
punishment be seen as only one of a number of options, and that other possibilities, ranging from
preventive measures such as education or training and the incorporation of security measures to
administrative or disciplinary sanctions which remove offenders at a lesser cost to them and
society also be considered, and where appropriate, applied.

Case management

Managing investigations

Corruption investigations tend to be large, complex and expensive, however, and to ensure the
efficient use of resources and a successful outcome the elements and personnel involved must
also be managed effectively. Such management should be seen not only as a matter of
administrative necessity, but also part of the overall strategy of protecting the integrity of the
investigation and ensuring public confidence in its outcome. As part of an ongoing anti-
corruption strategy, some management issues may be dealt with as matters of standing practice
or procedure, while others will require attention or review on a case-by-case basis.
Teams working on specific cases will generally require expertise in the use of investigative
techniques ranging from financial audits or other inspections to intrusive techniques. If legal
proceedings are not excluded as an outcome from the outset, experience in assembling such
cases and legal expertise in areas such as the law of evidence and the human rights constraints on
such things as search and seizure may also be needed. In large, complex investigations, teams of
investigators may be assigned to specific target individuals or aspects of the case. One group
might be engaged in the tracing of proceeds, for example, while others interview witnesses or
maintain surveillance of suspects.
It is essential that all of these functions be conducted in accordance with an agreed strategy and
coordinated under the supervision of an investigative manager or lead investigator who receives
timely information about the progress of investigators on a regular and frequent basis. The
interviewing of witnesses or conduct of search and seizure operations will generally disclose the
existence of an investigation and to some degree its purpose, and should not be undertaken until
other measures which are only effective if conducted without alerting the targets have been
concluded. On the other hand, such procedures may become urgent, if it appears that proceeds
will be moved out of the jurisdiction or evidence destroyed unless rapid steps are taken.
Coordinating these factors in order to maximise effectiveness require competent and well-
informed senior investigators. Given the magnitude of many investigations, human and financial
resources will also often become a concern, and lead investigators will often have to seek out the
necessary resources and allocate scarce resources to areas of the investigation where they will be
most effectively used.
Investigative management must be flexible, capable of quickly adapting both strategy and tactics
to take account of experiences and information as they accumulate. While investigators usually
develop theories about what individual pieces of information mean and how they fit together,
these theories often require amendment as investigations proceed, and investigators must always
be open to alternative possibilities and information or evidence which does not appear to be

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consistent with the theory being pursued at any given time. Investigations initiated into particular
incidents of corruption will often turn up evidence of other, hitherto unsuspected corruption, or
other forms of improper or criminal activity.

Management of information

Internal information

This flexibility should be supported by effective information management, in which information

is made available to those who require it as quickly as possible, and then retained in a format
which is cross-referenced and quickly accessible so that it can be reviewed as needed and so that
links to other relevant information are made apparent. Assessment of the relative sensitivity or
confidentiality for each piece of information should also be done and linked to the information
itself. This sensitivity may not be obvious to those not familiar with the information. Disclosure
of facts that may seem insignificant in the context of an ongoing investigation, for example, may
inadvertently disclose or help identify a source or informant who had been promised anonymity,
for example, reducing the credibility of investigators and their ability to obtain similar
information in future cases.

Media relations

Another critical element of information-management is media-relations. Ensuring that

information is passed to the public media is important to ensuring transparency and the
credibility of investigations. More fundamentally, media scrutiny and publicity is essential to
raising public expectations, public awareness of the presence of corruption or substandard
practices, and to generating political pressure for measures against corruption. Public awareness
of the existence of anti-corruption investigators is also an important means of encouraging and
assisting those who witness or suspect corruption to report it and provide evidence. Ensuring that
the media have access to accurate and authoritative information may also be important as a
means of reducing the tendency to report information that may be incorrect or harmful to the
investigation or persons or agencies being investigated.
Measures should be taken to ensure that any information released for publication has been
carefully reviewed, both to ensure accuracy, and to eliminate disclosures that could be harmful to
the investigation. It is also important to ensure that only specified individuals release such
information or participate in press conferences and similar activities to ensure that information is
properly reviewed and that all information given the media is consistent. Those in contact with
the media must also be competent, both in media-relations and in the subject matter they will
discuss, and should not comment on matters which are beyond their expertise.

Managing the security of investigations and investigators

The management of security is also a critical function. As noted in the previous segment,
protecting the confidentiality of informant and other sources is often the only way to ensure
cooperation, and the leakage of sensitive information may warn targets, allowing them to modify
their behaviour, conceal or destroy evidence, or make attempts to corrupt or disrupt the
investigative process. Maintaining effective security requires an assessment of the full range of
attempts that might be made to penetrate or disrupt anti-corruption investigators, both in general
and in the context of specific investigations. Attempts may be directed at obtaining information
or denying information to investigators by disrupting, distorting or destroying it, or at the
intimidation or even murder of the investigators themselves. The following areas should be
assessed.

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Physical premises

The premises where investigators base their work and store information should be chosen with a
view to the ability to control entry, exit and access to exclude unauthorised persons, and
resistance to attempts using force or stealth to gain entry when unoccupied. Where premises are
part of larger law-enforcement or other government establishments, they should also be isolated
from the remainder of the establishment in which they are located. Threats to destroy
information or evidence by destroying the premises themselves using methods such as arson or
explosives may also require consideration. Also important is security against various forms of
electronic surveillance in the form of concealed microphones, transmitters and similar apparatus.
This entails both premises that reduce the possibility of such surveillance and regular inspections
or “sweeps” to detect devices that may have been installed since the last inspection.

Personnel Security

Personnel security consists of two major threats. The physical safety and security of personnel
must be assessed and protected in order to ensure that competent investigators can be employed
and to frustrate any attempts to disrupt investigations by threatening, intimidating or actually
harming personnel. Investigations may also be disrupted if key personnel are corrupted or
intimidated or if corrupt individuals succeed in gaining employment for that purpose. Generally,
employees should be screened by examining their past history, family ties or other relationships
to identify factors that suggest vulnerability to corruption. Threats to physical safety should be
regularly assessed and when identified, vigorously pursued by other law enforcement agencies.
Other protective measures may include advice with respect to security precautions, anonymity,
and arming investigators.

Information, documents and communications

Most of the security concerns raised by investigations revolve around the possibility that critical
information will fall into the hands of investigative targets, frustrating attempts to obtain
evidence against them. Addressing these concerns requires management of each investigation so
that steps which generate public attention are not taken prematurely, that documents are used,
stored and transported in secure conditions, that access to copying equipment is limited and
monitored, and that channels of electronic communication including wire- and wireless
telephones, fax machines, radios, electronic mail and other media are made resistant to
unauthorised interception or monitoring. Where the physical security of channels cannot be
ensured, this will often entail the use of encryption or similar technologies to ensure that those
who can receive data cannot decipher and read them.

Relationships with other agencies

Anti-corruption agencies must still ultimately be accountable for their activities, which requires
some degree of timely disclosure of information to political or judicial bodies responsible for
their oversight. When such disclosure should be made may vary and can be a difficult issue. As a
general principle, investigations should only be externally reviewed after they have concluded,
but this will not prevent some harm from occurring if abuses occur sooner, and in some cases
this may include irreversible consequences. In such cases, it may be appropriate to permit
investigators to consult more senior officials such as judges for advice or direction, and many
systems make some provision for this.

Threat assessment

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Threats to the security of investigators and investigations should be assessed both in general
terms and in the context of each specific investigation. Relevant factors will include the numbers
of individuals suspected, whether they are organised or not, the sophistication of the corruption
suspected, the sophistication of the individuals or group targeted, the magnitude and scope of the
corruption and its proceeds, whether the targets are involved in crimes other than corruption, and
whether there is any specific history of violence or attempts to obstruct investigations or
prosecutions.

Managing transnational or “grand corruption” cases

Cases which involve “grand corruption” or which have significant transnational aspects raise
additional management issues. For example, cases where very senior officials are suspected raise
exceptional concerns about integrity and security and are likely to attract extensive media
attention. Large-scale and sophisticated corruption is well-resourced and well-connected, making
it more likely that conventional sources of information will either not have the necessary
information or evidence, or that they will be afraid to cooperate. Senior officials may be in a
position to interfere with investigations. The magnitude of proceeds in grand corruption cases
make it more likely that part of the overall case strategy is the tracing and forfeiture of the
proceeds, and where they have been transferred abroad, obtaining their return. Allegations that
senior officials are corrupt may also be extremely damaging in personal and political terms if
they become public and later turn out to be unsubstantiated or false.
Transnational elements are more likely to arise in grand corruption cases. Senior officials realise
while in office that there is no domestic shelter for the proceeds which will not be located once
they are out of office, and generally transfer very large sums abroad, where they are invested or
concealed. In many cases, the corruption itself has foreign elements, such as the bribery of
officials by foreign companies seeking government contracts or the avoidance of costly domestic
legal standards in areas such as employment or environmental protection. The offenders
themselves also often maintain foreign residences and flee there once an investigation becomes
apparent.
Generally, transnational or multi-national investigations require much the same coordination as
do major domestic cases, but the coordination and management must be accomplished among
law enforcement agencies that report to sovereign governments with a potentially wide range of
political and criminal justice agendas. This will generally involve liaison between officials at
more senior levels with their foreign counterparts to set overall priorities and agendas, and more
direct cooperation between investigators within the criteria set out for them. From a substantive
standpoint, investigative teams in such cases will generally be much larger and will involve
additional areas of specialisation such as extradition, mutual legal assistance and international
money laundering.

Case Selection Strategies and Techniques

Given the extent of corruption, the range of cases likely to exist, the range of possible outcomes,
and the limits imposed by human and financial resource constraints, most national anti
corruption programmes will find it necessary to make priority choices about which cases to
pursue, and what outcomes to seek. This involves the exercise of considerable discretion that
should be carefully managed to ensure consistency, transparency and the credibility of both the
decision-making process and its outcomes. A major element of this process is the setting and,
where appropriate, publication of criteria for case-selection. These will ensure that like cases are
dealt with similarly, and reassure those who make complaints and members of the general public
that decisions not to pursue reported cases are based on objective criteria and not on improper or
corrupt motives.

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The interaction of criteria will vary from case to case, but criteria that should generally be
considered include the following.

Seriousness and prelevance of the other corruption alleged

Assuming that the fundamental objective of a national anti-corruption strategy is to reduce

overall corruption as quickly as possible, priority may be given to cases that involve the most
common forms of corruption. Where large numbers of individuals are involved, these will often
lead to proactive outcomes such as the setting of new ethical standards and training of officials,
rather than criminal prosecutions and punishments.

Legal nature of the alleged corruption

Broadly speaking, corruption could be categorised as including criminal or administrative

corruption offences such as bribery, related criminal offences such as money-laundering or
obstruction of justice, and non-criminal corruption. As previously discussed, the legal nature will
often affect both the availability and choice of outcomes. Conduct that is not a crime cannot be
punished as such for example. This same nature will often determine which agency deals with it
and how it is prioritised.

Cases which set precedents

Cases that raise social, political or legal issues that, once resolved in the context of an initial
“test” case, can be applicable to many other cases to follow, may be given priority. Examples of
this include dealing publicly with common conduct which has not been perceived as corruption
in order to change public perceptions, and cases which test the extent of criminal corruption
offences, either setting a useful legal precedent or establishing the need for legislation to close a
legal gap or correct a problem. In the case of legal precedents, time-consuming appeals may be
required which is another reason for starting the process as soon as a case that raises the
necessary issues is identified.

Viability or probability of satisfactory outcome

Cases may be downgraded or deferred if an initial review establishes that no satisfactory

outcome can be achieved. Examples of this include cases in which the only desirable outcome is
a criminal prosecution, but the suspect is deceased or unavailable, or essential evidence has been
lost. Part of the assessment of such cases should include a review of possible outcomes to see if
other appropriate remedies might be achievable.

Availability of financial, human and technical resources

The overall availability of resources is always a concern in determining how many cases can be
dealt with at the same time or within a given period, and the tendency for cases to change as
investigations proceed require periodic reassessment of case-loads. Generally this will not be
related to the setting of priorities with respect to the type of case taken up or the priority of
individual cases, but there are exceptions. A single major case, if pursued, may result in the
effective deferral of larger numbers of more minor cases, for example, and unavailability of
specialised human expertise may make specific cases temporarily impossible. This makes the
assessment of costs and benefits important, before any decisions are made. “Grand corruption”
and other transnational cases raise substantial costs in areas such as travel and foreign legal
services, but may also raise the need to make examples of corrupt senior officials for reasons of
deterrence and credibility, and to recover large proceeds hidden both at home and abroad.

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Criminal intelligence criteria

As national anti-corruption programmes gain overall expertise and knowledge and deal with
numbers of individual cases, intelligence information should be gathered and assessed. This will
usually include open research and assessment of overall corruption patterns, leading to
conclusions about which are the most prevalent or which case the most social or economic harm.
It will also include the gathering of confidential information about patterns and links between
specific offenders or organised criminal groups. Both of these will assist in identifying cases in
which the allocation of high priorities and significant resources will end the activities of criminal
groups or bring about other far-reaching improvements. In some cases, investigations may also
be given priority in areas where intelligence is needed, in order to develop sources and gather
information.

Investigative Techniques

Some of the following techniques have proven highly efficient in the investigation of wide-
spread large-scale corruption. In particular, various types of financial investigations into
suspected corrupt individuals are often the most direct and successful method of proving
criminal acts.
Focus Investigations. If the results of a corruption investigation suggest that corruption and
bribery in a certain public service is widespread, it is advisable to concentrate on the systematic
checking of the assets of all possible bribe takers (See Financial Investigations & Monitoring
of Assets). However, this exercise may not yield enough information to warrant further
investigation. For example, certain government functions are prone to inviting widespread
corruption in terms of the number of officials receiving the bribes but in relatively small money
amounts. Branches involved in licensing and permitting are good examples. A high volume of
potential bribe-givers, the public in this case, visits these branches on a daily basis. Quite often,
the frustrations of applying for a drivers license, or getting permission to construct a new home,
or requesting copies of documents or just about any other service to the public becomes a
quagmire of government ‘red tape’ and delay. This sort of environment breeds bribery as a
means to quickly solving the frustration and delay of ‘red tape’. In such cases, an investigation
into the working files of the branch will be more effective and efficient than investigating
financial records of employees. Before devoting efforts in any investigation, it is important to
evaluate the most cost-effective means of deploying staff and focusing investigative energies.
Terms of Reference. Before starting investigations, clear and comprehensive terms of reference
(TOR) should be drafted. They should contain a comprehensive list of all the resources needed
(human, financial, equipment) to conduct the investigations. Particular consideration should be
given to the possible need of additional resources to maintain the secrecy of the investigation.
The suspect corrupt civil servant might have connections to other civil servants who might alert
them to investigations or they might even be members of the criminal justice system and thus
have access to restricted information. It is therefore essential at the outset to evaluate methods to
ensure the confidentiality of the investigation. Steps taken to protect the secrecy of the
investigations could include:
• Renting non-police or undercover locations and making them secure;
• Use of fictitious names to purchase or rent equipment; and
• Use of stand-alone computer systems not tied into any other governmental operation.
Policy Document. In addition to the TOR, a policy and procedures document must be created
containing a clear description of the facts giving rise to the investigation, all decisions rendered
during the investigation with their justifications and reasons for the involvement / non-
involvement of the senior management of the institution for which the suspect works. It should
be noted that there can be hidden costs involved with the investigation such as loss of morale

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within the target institution and their potential loss of public trust. Every investigation must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis with regard to its cost and benefit to the government and the
public.
Selection of the Investigative Team. The selection of an effective team will be crucial to the
success of an investigation. Its members should possess the specific investigative skills needed,
should have proven integrity and high ethical standards and be willing to undertake the work.
Their backgrounds should be thoroughly checked, including their social and family ties and
lifestyle. The team must be made aware of the personal implications of the investigation, in
particular when undercover work needs to be conducted. Skills that are typically needed to
conduct large-scale corruption investigations include financial investigative skills, undercover
and surveillance skills, information technology skills, interviewing and witness preparation
abilities, excellent report writing skills and the ability to analyse intelligence.
Intelligence and Analysis. Both are vital in corruption investigation. During the course of
investigation, fragments of information, or intelligence, is collected. This intelligence must be
analysed in order for the investigator to piece together fragments of information in order to have
a clear picture of the relationships and events that taken together can constitute proof of criminal
activity. Unlike other crimes such as theft or murder, where a complainant with some interest in
uncovering the crime comes forward, crimes of corruption and bribery are committed in the
shadows with both parties benefiting from the crime. This unique relationship, since neither
party believes they are victims of any crime, prevents authorities from knowing that a crime has
taken place. It is unlikely that either party is going to report the crime. For this reason, corruption
investigation is especially challenging and difficult. Intelligence gathering and analysis is
therefore critical in uncovering corruption. In addition, a constant analysis of the results will help
to redirect and adjust efforts and will serve to help allocate resources efficiently.
Proactive Integrity Testing. Although this activity might initially require considerable
preparation and resources, it can produce rapid results that serve as an excellent deterrent. Close
monitoring and strict guidelines are essential to avoid the danger of entrapping a target. Any
decision to use integrity testing must have a sound and defensible basis. The test itself must be
fair to the target so that can be defended in court as reasonable and fair (see Integrity Testing).
All integrity testing should be electronically recorded in the interest of fairness to the target and
for accurate evaluation of criminal responsibility by judge and jury. Conviction’s resulting from
integrity testing must be based clearly on the necessary mens rea, or criminal intent, on the part
of the accused. The government must not engage in convincing anyone to commit a crime they
are not predisposed to commit. More than in any other area of policing, the public must be
protected from false accusations or behavior tending to entrap an individual into committing and
offence he or she would not have otherwise committed but for the encouragement of the police.
Multi-faceted Approach. Rather than following only one investigative path, it is advisable to
pursue reasonable leads that might prove useful. It is not unusual that seemingly insignificant
information becomes vital in proving criminal activity. This also applies to statements and
documents. They should be carefully analysed and cross-referenced using the names, places and
all other information that can help to provide information and may serve to confirm the validity
of evidence gathered.
Identify Middleman and Facilitators. Middlemen are often involved in committing corruption on
behalf of others. For example, politicians often provide the necessary link between bribe givers
and bribe takers, and international businessmen facilitate the creation of slush funds, commit the
actual bribe transaction and help to launder the proceeds of corruption.
Financial Investigation. One of the most successful ways to produce evidence against corrupt
public officials is to conduct financial investigations to prove that they spend or possess assets
beyond the means of their income (see Financial Investigations and Monitoring of Assets). This
will help to produce a preponderance of evidence of corruption, and can identify those illegal
assets that might later be confiscated. However, suspects are unlikely to place the bounty from a

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bribe into their daily bank accounts and instead may transform the proceeds into other forms of
property. Therefore, financial investigations should also concentrate on the lifestyles,
expenditures and property of the suspected persons. In this respect, it might be extremely helpful
to look not only at what has actually been spent, but also to compare the amounts of money
deposited into the bank accounts of suspects with deposits from previous years. Efforts should
also be focused on identifying whether the suspected corrupt person maintains foreign accounts.
The existence of such an account can be suspicious alone and indicate that funds are being
hidden. In order to be effective, financial investigations should be extended to the suspected
persons’ family members and those living in the same household: experience shows that they are
often used as conduits for corruption proceeds.
Identification of Slush Funds. In order to avoid paying bribes directly out of the corporate bank
account, it is common practice for larger organisations to create so-called slush funds, i.e. funds
that do not appear in official corporate accounts and records. Money needed to pay bribes can be
taken from these funds as needed. The methods adopted to create these funds are very similar to
techniques used to launder money. One common method is where the costs of services or goods
are falsified and funds used to pay for these alleged services or goods are transferred into the
slush fund account. It is usually extremely difficult to prove the actual receipt of this money as,
for example, in the case where consultants are hired and schemes enacted where monies paid are
actually returned to the slush fund in cash.
Investigation into the Slush Fund. Once a slush fund has been identified, the investigation should
be broadened to include all payments made out of this fund. All individuals with access to the
funds should be identified. Companies and private persons that have ongoing business with the
state and are found paying a bribe on one occasion are most likely to have done so on several
occasions.
Court Orders. If court orders are needed to carry out specific covert evidence gathering activities,
particular care should be given to the particular judge receiving the request. It is not unusual that
politically and socially connected suspects and other suspects having connections to the criminal
justice system might have contacts with the judge issuing the order.
Suspension. During the period of investigation, a decision might be made to suspend suspects
from their official duties. In particular, if they are involved in making important decisions and a
subsequent conviction may negatively influence the validity of their decisions, actual or
perceived, it may become necessary to remove them from any approval processes. When the
suspect is employed by an institution of the criminal justice system, measures should be taken to
prevent him from “networking” after any suspension. Colleagues of the suspected persons
should be given strong warnings about relating information to the suspended colleague who
should be authorized to contact only one specific supervisor within their organisation.
Witnesses. A comprehensive interviewing strategy should be designed. It should include
measures to overcome obstructive lawyers, witness protection, ensuring the credibility of the
witness and to avoid suspected illegal managing of witnesses. Witnesses often have a criminal
background themselves and therefore might not be very credible. It is essential that witnesses
admit their involvement in prior criminal acts, particularly if they are involved in the acts of
corruption for which the suspects are being investigated. Nothing is more damaging to a
prosecutor’s case than for an important witness to be exposed to the jury as a criminal. The
personal background of the criminal witness must be offered to the jury as soon as possible in
the proceedings. Witnesses must be protected against threats. The most cost-effective means to
do this is to protect the identity of witnesses for as long as possible. The best way to avoid
allegations of illegal enquiry methods or promises made to witnesses by the investigating team is
to electronically record all interviews.
Preparation of Court Presentation. It is essential that as many facts as possible are corroborated.
In particular, if witnesses are used, it is important to obtain secondary evidence, where possible,
to support their credibility. In those systems where the police are not required by law to conduct

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investigations under the direct supervision of a public prosecutor, it is crucial to involve the
Prosecutor’s Office at a very early stage.
Media Strategy. During investigations and court proceedings, a clear media strategy should be
elaborated that assigns one person to interface with and report to the media All other personnel
and investigators involved should be made aware of the potential damage that may be caused to
the successful outcome of the investigation and prosecution if they make comments to the media.
This also applies to the witnesses. In the case where a public official is accused, the senior
managers of the institution in which the accused works should be informed of the risks of
commenting to the media.
International Focus. Cases of grand corruption often include international aspects. For example,
the bribe giver may be a foreign investor, the slush fund might be located in a country other than
that where the bribe is paid, or the bribe might be transferred directly into a recipient’s foreign
bank account. Investigators and prosecutors should therefore be trained on mutual legal
assistance and exchange of information procedures at the international level.

Preconditions and Risks

The following factors contribute to successful investigations:

Independence of the Prosecutor, both Internally and Externally. Especially in cases of

investigations into high-level corruption, political interference can interfere with investigations
and prevent prosecution if executive branches of government directly control the Prosecutor’s
Office. The judicial police should report directly to the prosecutor in order to integrate
investigation and prosecution, to ensure mutual loyalty and to protect the investigations from
being jeopardised by undue political interference in the work of the investigating police team.
Secrecy of the First Stages of the Investigation. There should be no obligation to inform the
suspect about the investigation during its early stage. When a suspect has knowledge of an
investigation prior to the time the police can secure sufficient evidence, the suspect might
destroy evidence and warn other targeted persons to do the same.
Strong Investigative Powers. Strong investigative powers are fundamental for successful
investigation. In particular, the ability to order searches and seizures without court authorisation,
ability to remove banking secrecy during investigations and the ability to request preventive
detention and telephone interception have proved extremely helpful.
Plea-Bargaining and Summary Proceedings. The possibility of making recourse to plea
bargaining and summary proceedings have been extremely helpful in increasing efficiency
during what are normally long and complex proceedings. Plea-bargaining has also been
successfully used to help identify other criminal activity as reported by suspects wishing to
reduce the severity of a potential conviction.
Seeking the Support of the Media and General Public Support. Several factors are likely to place
investigation and prosecution of corruption at risk. These include:
• Statutes of Limitation. Given the complexity of investigations into “victimless” crimes
such as corruption, statutes of limitation often expire before the accused is charged with a
crime. Therefore, an extension or exception to a statute of limitation should be considered
especially in those cases where the lengthiness of the investigation is due to factors beyond
the control of the government.
• Inefficient International Cooperation. Requests for information and for mutual legal
assistance should be submitted as soon as possible since experience shows that even well
meaning collaborating jurisdictions normally give the lowest priority to requests for
assistance.

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A likely related tools could be:

• Establish, disseminate, discuss and enforce a Code of Conduct for public servants
• Establish and disseminate, discuss and enforce a Citizen Charter
• Establish an independent and credible complaints mechanism where the public and other
parts of the criminal justice system can file complaints
• Establish a Disciplinary Mechanism with the capability to investigate complaints and
enforce disciplinary action when necessary
• Conduct an independent comprehensive assessment of the governments levels, cost,
coverage and quality of service delivery, including the perceived trust level between the
public service and the public
• Simplifying procedures of complaining,
• Raising public awareness where and how to complain (e.g. by campaigns telling to public
what telephone number to call), and
• Introducing a computerized complaints system allowing the institutions to record and
analyse all complaints and monitor actions taken to deal with the complaints.

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Tool 29 - Financial Investigations and The Monitoring of Assets

Purpose

Financial investigations, in addition to assessments of directly or indirectly owned assets, are an

extremely efficient tool for pro-active and re-active investigations into corruption. The
information gained from such investigations might be used either as a starting point for further
investigation or as back-up evidence for corruption allegations.

Description

Initial Target (Group) Restriction. When financial investigations are used in a traditional law
enforcement context, for example, after a suspect has been caught and his crime identified, the
target of the financial investigation is already well defined. Specifically, the suspect’s finances
should be investigated to uncover additional evidence of the crime. Investigative accountants can
be used to unravel even complex and confusing financial crimes especially where they have a
specific target on which to focus their efforts.
In cases where an anti-corruption agency or similar institution desires to use financial disclosure
information or other indicia of ones finances and purchasing power to uncover potential
corruption, the task is much more difficult. This sort of pro-active monitoring aimed at targeting
indicators of corruption, for example, living beyond ones means, requires clever use of available
resources and careful consideration as to who will be targeted and why. Of course, where
resources are not limited, it is possible to thoroughly investigate each and every official or group.
Since this scenario is unlikely in just about every jurisdiction, selective and efficient allocation
of resources is necessary.
Where monitoring resources are limited, rigorous evaluation in the selection of a target group
should include the likelihood of uncovering corruption. For example, if available data suggests
that employees of the driver’s license issuing office have solicited bribes, it may be tempting to
launch a review of financial disclosures filed by the employees assigned to that office. However,
such an exercise will most likely be a waste of time and energy. The money amount of bribes
paid to such employees is likely small and, in all probability, is used as ‘pocket money’ and not
deposited into a bank account or used to make large purchases. Investigators should instead
direct their efforts towards reviewing disclosures by employees whose public duties expose them
to a higher money level of potential bribes. While it is probable that a larger percentage of the
employees in a licensing office solicit bribes versus the percentage of employees, for example, in
a procurement office, for the purpose of allocating pro-active financial investigative resources,
there is a greater likelihood of uncovering indicia of corruption by reviewing financial
disclosures of procurement office employees.
Evaluation of Key Life Style Indicators. Prior to in-depth asset and life style monitoring, a
target’s lifestyle should undergo initial screening to determine whether further investigation
should be undertaken. This might be restricted to a few significant assets that are given priority
over others, such as homes, second houses or holiday homes, means of transport and other items
of significant value.
Initial Screening Methods. The initial methods used should be limited to acquisition of readily
accessible information, such as public registers and direct observation. The latter has proven to
be more accurate since corrupt officials tend to disguise their acquisitions by registering property
in the names of others.
Target Definition. Once initial grounds for suspicion have been found and a concrete target for
further investigation has been identified, the screening should not be limited to the suspected
persons, but should also target persons with whom they have strong ties, such as spouses and

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family members. Quite frequently, corruption proceeds are deposited into bank accounts
belonging to husbands or wives (less frequently to children, brothers or parents). This same
scheme to disguise actual ownership is often used for the registration of property.
Life Style Indicators. Investigators should focus on owned or rented residential homes, including
short-term vacation rentals, cars, boats, planes, holiday trips, recreational expenses (for example
restaurants), clothing expenses, the purchase of works of art and antiques, the purchase of jewels,
medical expenses and other large purchases in general. These parameters are usually used to
verify whether an in-depth asset assessment is justified.
Sources of Information. The instruments used to investigate disproportionate living standards
include public registers and contracts that can indicate excessive availability of money or
property (for example, a contract for the lease of a particularly expensive house). Bank and
company documentation might contain further information. In addition, verification of expenses
incurred by the public officials or persons close to them has proven extremely effective in
uncovering indicators of corruption.
Third Party Protection. In-depth investigations into the origins of third party property should
only be made when there are elements to reasonably justify the suspicion that third parties
possess property that belongs to the suspected corrupt official.
International Investigations. 74 Unlawfully received money is frequently hidden in foreign
bank accounts registered under false names or corporations. Illegal property is also sometimes
registered in foreign jurisdictions using false identities while the corrupt official enjoys the
property. For example, vacation homes and boats are examples of property whose ownership can
be disguised by the use of registration under a false name or corporation. Depending upon
whether or not the jurisdiction in which the funds are deposited has signed a Mutual Legal
Assistance document, it can be very difficult to obtain assistance from that jurisdiction in
identifying and recovering stolen assets.
Alternatives to Enhance Monitoring. Some jurisdictions have introduced measures that place
the burden on public officials to account for their assets. Where it can be shown that the living
standards of public officials exceed their known lawful income and when they are unable or
unwilling to account for the discrepancy, such excess property can be confiscated. This measure
does not reverse the burden of proving illicit enrichment but simply provides that where there is
a preponderance of evidence that an official posses ill-gotten property, it is up to them - and not
the prosecuting agency – to produce satisfactory explanations as to the origins of the excess
property (see Facilitating the Gathering of Evidence in Corruption Cases – Easing the Burden of
Proof).

Preconditions and Risks

National laws must provide for comprehensive registration of assets and identification of the
beneficial owners of such assets. It must also empower the monitoring agency to gain access to
official registers and to company and bank documentation. Anonymity of ownership is the
natural enemy of transparency and accountability. If a country’s legislation does not provide for
transparency in this regard, financial monitoring and investigative efforts will likely not produce
meaningful results.

Related tools

74
W.H. Heath, Civil Processes to Combat Corruption, paper presented at the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference, http://www.transparency.de/iacc/9th_iacc/papers/day3/ws1/d3ws1_whheath.html

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Tools which may be required before declaration of assets can be successfully implemented
include:
• A code of conduct that spells out who has to declare their assets and how it is expected to be
done.
• The establishment an independent and credible complaints mechanisms to deal with
complaints that the prescribed standards have not been met;
• The establishment of appropriate disciplinary procedures, including tribunals and other
bodies to investigate complaints, adjudicate cases and impose and enforce appropriate
remedies or other outcomes;
Tools which may be needed in conjunction with codes of conduct include:
• Tools which involve the training and awareness-raising of officials subject to each code of
conduct to ensure adherence and identify problems with the code itself;
• Assessments of institutions and where necessary, of individuals, to
• The enforcement of the code of conduct by investigating and dealing with complaints, as
well as more proactive measures such as “integrity testing”; and,
• The linking of procedures to enforce the code of conduct with other measures which may
identify corruption, such as more general assessments of performance and the comparison
of disclosed assets with known incomes

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Tool 30 - Integrity Testing

Purpose

Integrity testing is an instrument that enhances both the prevention and prosecution of
corruption. The objectives of integrity testing are to:
• Determine whether or not a public civil servant or branch of government engages in corrupt
practices and;
• Increase the actual and perceived risk for corrupt officials of being detected thereby
deterring corrupt behaviour

Description

Sting operations

A more controversial – but also unquestionably effective – means of identifying corrupt officials
is the use of decoys or other integrity-testing tactics. These involve undercover agents who offer
officials opportunities to engage in corruption in circumstances where evidence of their reaction
can be easily and credibly gathered. Depending on local policy or legal constraints, officials may
be targeted at random or on the basis of evidence or reason for specific suspicion of corruption.
These tactics represent a powerful instrument for both deterring corruption and detecting and
investigating offenders. As they do not necessarily require any inside information or assistance,
they can be used quickly against any official at virtually any level who is suspected of
corruption. If the suspect is corrupt, they quickly provide highly credible evidence, usually in the
form of audio- or videotapes, photographs and the personal testimony of the investigators
involved, which may form the basis of a criminal prosecution or serve as the justification for
other investigative methods such as electronic surveillance or the search of financial records. If
the suspect is not corrupt, his or her refusal also tends to reliably establish, provided that
adequate confidentiality precautions are take to ensure that investigative targets are not warned
beforehand and that undercover agents are well-trained and competent.
The criticisms of these tactics are substantial. Arguably, even the most honest official might
yield to temptation if the offer is sufficiently convincing, and the willingness to do so when
approached may not necessarily establish that he or she is inherently corrupt or that similar
transgressions have occurred in the past. This problem underlies restrictions intended to prevent
“entrapment” in some countries. Usually in such countries, undercover agents are permitted to
create opportunities for a suspect to commit an offence, but not to offer any actual
encouragement to do so. Police officers might be occasionally exposed to undercover agents in
circumstances where a corrupt officer would normally solicit a bribe to see if this occurs, for
example, but the undercover agents would be prohibited from actually offering bribes.

Integrity Testing

Integrity testing has been used effectively to ‘test’ whether public officials resist bribe offers and
refrain from bribe solicitation. Integrity tests have proved to be an extremely effective and
efficient deterrent to corruption.
Targeted and Random Integrity Testing. Integrity testing can be used to verify the integrity, or
dishonesty, of an employee in a specific situation. A scenario is created in which a public civil
servant, for example, is placed into a typical everyday situation where he has the opportunity to
use his discretion in deciding whether or not to engage in criminal or other inappropriate

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behavior. The employee may be offered a bribe by an agent provocateur or be presented with an
opportunity in which to solicit a bribe.
Integrity testing can also be used as a “targeted test” to help verify the genuineness of an
allegation or suspicion of corrupt behavior. Members of the public, criminals or other officials
may have provided information to law enforcement alleging that a certain person or even an
entire branch of government is corrupt. Quite frequently, complainants include those who allege
that a corrupt official has solicited them for a bribe.
When used as a random test, for example, where law enforcement has actively identified groups
of officials or entire operations particularly susceptible to corruption, random testing can be used
to ascertain the degree of corruption present. When carried out in secret, very reliable data can be
gathered which will assist in accurately gauging the true extent of corrupt practices within the
group selected. After reliable baseline data has been established, corrupt targets identified and
other secret use of the data has been completed, integrity testing can be used as an effective
deterrent to corrupt behavior. Public notification that such testing will be carried out at random
and with consistency serves to greatly deter corruption.
Fairness. In democratic society, it is unacceptable that government would engage in activities
that encourage individuals to commit crimes. However, it is quite acceptable for government to
observe whether or not one will commit a crime under ordinary and everyday circumstances. For
this reason, integrity testing must be carried out with the strictest discipline. Integrity testing, as
such an aggressive government effort, demands that audio and visual recording of the actual test
be made to show that the accused person was not acting with any motivation other than his own
free will. This measure will also help to ensure that government has sufficient evidence to pursue
a successful prosecution.
As an additional safeguard to both the government and the person subjected to testing, witnesses
should be placed in the vicinity of the test to augment what may or may not be seen and heard on
the recording devices. Both random and targeted tests must be as realistic as possible in order not
to expose the test-taker to a greater temptation than that to which they are normally exposed. In
order to ensure the fairness of the test and for its acceptance by both those subjected to it and the
general public, the methods and scenarios used should be evaluated and approved by competent
authorities. The test should be carefully prepared to include detailed intelligence work about the
types, situations, forms and amounts of bribes that the tested person might be exposed to.
Regular Repetition. Experiences in various police forces where integrity tests have been carried
out, such as the London Metropolitan Police, the Police of Queensland, Australia and the New
York Police Department, have shown that it is not enough to “clean up” an area of corruption
when problems appear. Instead, systems must be developed that help to ensure that follow-up
testing is undertaken. The most desirable situation possible includes publication of the fact that
consistent integrity testing of all government branches is performed at unknown intervals. Even
where this is not possible, the object is to convince potential bribe takers that integrity testing is
performed regularly.

Preconditions and Risks

Integrity Testing and Constitutional Concerns. Although integrity tests can be extremely
effective as an investigative tool as well as an excellent deterrent, courts do not always easily
accept this method of collecting evidence. Notwithstanding this fact, there are substantial reasons
for their use. It is one of the most effective tools for eradicating corrupt practices in government
services in an extremely short time. In particular, in cases of rampant corruption and low trust
levels by the public, it is one of the few tools that can promise immediate results and can help to
restore trust in public administration. Legal systems that provide for “agent provocateur”
scenarios should try and ensure that they are never designed to instigate conduct that makes
criminals out of those who might otherwise have reacted honestly in a given scenario. It is

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therefore important to ensure that the degree of temptation not be extreme and unreasonable.
Many criminal law systems exclude evidence of an agent provocateur when the provocation is
considered to be excessive.
Appropriate Public Service Salaries. If public service salaries are extremely low, there is the
risk that integrity testing will not be accepted as fair play by either the tested person or by the
general public. In this case, the tests will be counter-productive and can serve to damage the
morale of those in public service.

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Tool 31 - Electronic Surveillance Operations

Purpose

Electronic surveillance encompasses all information gathering, or intelligence gathering, by use

of electronic means. This can include covert activities such as video recording, wiretapping or
eavesdropping, and also includes the use of audio and video recorders and transmitters secreted
on or in the presence of collaborating witnesses and informants for the purpose of consensual
recording of activities.
The difference between covert and consensual is that covert surveillance, as we will use the
term, is undertaken where none of the parties whose activities are being observed is aware that
law enforcement is secretly listening and/or watching. Consensual recordings always involve the
knowledge and consent of at least one of the parties to a conversation or activity.

Description

Electronic surveillance, as an investigative tool, is often the only method available to

investigators powerful enough to pierce the veil of secrecy shielding corrupt activities from
discovery. The most commonly used form of electronic surveillance is consensual in nature and
involves the assistance of collaborating witnesses, whistle blowers and victims of extortion and
other corrupt offers. This is because in most democratic societies, the public enjoys a right to
privacy from government intrusion and has the expectation that their words and actions are not
subject to interception by the police. Where one of the parties to a corrupt or criminal conspiracy
decides to expose the enterprise using electronic means to secure evidence, society tolerates that
government invades an otherwise private affair. However, society does not easily tolerate when
government secretly and with no consent or knowledge by any of the parties, decides to ‘spy’ on
the conversations and activities of citizens.
This intoleration towards government’s covert activities stems from distrust on the part of
society towards government in general. Past abuses of government authority arising from
political interests, personal vendetta’s and other nefarious motivations have served to instil
enough distrust on the part of the public to the point where society is unwilling to entrust the
government with the unbridled authority to ‘spy’ on the activities of the citizenry. In America,
for example, the Constitution protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the
government75. Although this provision of American law was written over 200 years ago, the
principal remains as strong today as when it was first written. Its applicability to electronic
surveillance can be stated quite simply. Given that democratic society expects to have freedom
of speech and movement, and that government is supposed to protect the citizenry from any and
all threats to democratic principals, society considers it to be unreasonable for government to
search using electronic means to uncover behaviour it proscribes and to then seize such evidence
by recording it. This helps to account for the fact that only 1190 court approvals for covert
wiretapping operations in the US were granted for all of the year 2000.76 Approximately 75 per
cent of those approvals were for drug trafficking investigations.

Covert Interceptions and Recording

This category of electronic surveillance includes wiretapping, eavesdropping and video

surveillance operations. Covert interceptions of private citizens’ words and activities are

75
4th. Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, also known as the Bill of Rights, 1791
76
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, April, 2001

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arguably the most invasive and aggressive sort of government intrusion into ones privacy.
Notwithstanding this fact, it is sometimes the only method available to law enforcement to
collect sufficient amounts of evidence against criminal enterprises. The extreme sensitivity with
which the public views this law enforcement effort demands that strict guidelines and oversight
of covert operations be firmly in place. Covert interceptions should be used as a last resort and
only after it has been shown that all other efforts at evidence collection have failed or are likely
to have no effect.
Wiretaps and eavesdropping are generally illegal in most countries. In the US, the federal
government and more than thirty state governments have legalised interceptions by law
enforcement of wire, oral and electronic communications. In all of these jurisdictions, however,
very strict guidelines must be followed before a judge will grant a court order authorising such
interceptions. The guidelines are designed to help assure protection of citizen rights to privacy
and Fourth Amendment rights while, at the same time, allowing for the use of wiretaps during
investigations of serious criminal activity and for foreign intelligence.
Due to technological advancements in electronic communications over the past 20 years, state
statutes have been modified to keep pace with these advances in telecommunications. For
example, New Jersey has amended its electronic surveillance statute to include cellular
telephones, cordless telephones, digital display beepers, fax transmissions, computer-to-
computer communications, and traces obtained through "caller-ID".

Application for Court Order

All government wiretaps and eavesdropping should require a court order based upon a detailed
showing of probable cause. To obtain a court order, a three-step process should be involved.
First, the law enforcement officer responsible for the investigation must draw up a detailed
affidavit showing that there is probable cause to believe that the target telephone or other
communication device is being used to facilitate a specific, serious, indictable crime. Second, an
attorney for the federal, state, or local government must work with the law enforcement officer
to prepare an application for a court order, based upon the officer's affidavit. At the national
level, the competent judicial officer must approve the application. At the state and local level, the
application should be made and approved by the principal prosecuting attorney of the state or
political subdivision. The government attorney should be authorised by a statute of that state to
make such applications.
Third, the attorney must present the approved application ex parte (without an adversary hearing)
to a judge who is authorised to issue a court order for electronic surveillance. A state or local
police officer or national law enforcement agent should not be allowed to make an application
for a court order directly to a judge.
Typically, a court order should only be requested after investigation and the use of a "Dialed
Number Recorder" (DNR). The DNR is used to track the outgoing calls from the suspect's phone
or other communication device in order to demonstrate that the suspect is communicating with
known criminals. In the case of eavesdropping, it is similarly important to ascertain with
precision the likelihood that the person or group under investigation will gather in a certain place
to discuss criminal activity. Any request for a court order should contain the following
information:
• (a) The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application and
the high-level government attorney authorizing the application;
• (b) The facts and circumstances of the case justifying the application, including details of
the particular offence under investigation, the identity of the person committing it, the type
of communications sought, and the nature and location of the communication facilities;

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• (c) Whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
would likely fail or be too dangerous;
• (d) The period of time for the interception
• (e) The facts concerning all previous applications involving any of the same suspects or
locations;

Issuance of a Court Order

Before a judge can approve an application for electronic surveillance and issue a court order, the
judge must determine that:
• (a) There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit an offence covered by the law;
• (b) There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that
offence will be obtained through such interception;
• (c) Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous;
• (d) There is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where the
communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection
with the commission of such offence, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by such person.
In addition to showing probable cause, one of the main criterions for determining whether a
court order should be issued is whether normal investigative techniques have been or are likely
to be unsuccessful. Electronic surveillance is a tool of last resort and should not be used where
other less intrusive methods of investigation could reasonably be used instead. Such normal
investigative methods usually include visual surveillance, interviewing subjects, the use of
informers and telephone record analysis. However, these techniques often have limited impact
on an investigation. Continuous surveillance by police can create suspicion and therefore be
hazardous; further, surveillance alone will not disclose the contents of a personal meeting nor a
telephone conversation. Questioning identified suspects or executing search warrants at their
residence can substantially jeopardise an investigation.
Informants are useful and should be sought out by police, but the information they provide does
not always reveal all of the players or the extent of an operation, and great care must be taken to
ensure that the informants are protected. Moreover, because informants are often criminals
themselves, they may not be believed in court. Telephone record analysis is helpful, but does not
reveal the contents of conversations nor do they always reveal the identities of parties. Other
methods of investigation that may be tried include undercover operations and stings. But while
effective in some cases, undercover operations are difficult and dangerous, and sting operations
are costly and not always successful.
If the judge approves the application, then a court order is issued specifying the relevant
information given in the application, namely, the identity of the person (if known) whose
communications are to be intercepted, the nature and location of the communication facilities,
the type of communication to be intercepted and the offence to which it relates, the agency
authorised to perform the interception and the person authorising the application, and the period
of time during which such interception is authorised. A court order may also require that interim
status reports are made to the issuing judge while the wiretap or eavesdropping is in progress.

Minimization

Once the covert electronic recordings begin, the law enforcement officers should limit
interception of communications to the offences specified in the court order. Before the

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surveillance actually begins, a government attorney should convene a meeting with the officers
who will participate in the case to ensure that recorded material conforms to the crimes alleged
in the enabling affidavit. Turning off the recording equipment and then performing a spot check
every few minutes to determine if the conversation has turned to the subject of the court order
usually accomplishes minimisation. This avoids picking up unrelated gossip. Special problems
may arise where criminals communicate in codes that are designed to conceal criminal activity in
what sounds like uninteresting or unrelated discussion. If an intercepted communication is in a
code or foreign language, and someone is not simultaneously interpreting the code or foreign
language, then the conversation can be recorded and minimisation deferred until an expert in that
code or language is available to interpret the communication. Should a wiretap or eavesdropping
effort fail to meet the minimisation parameters, all of the evidence obtained from the wiretap
could be inadmissible.

Recording

All intercepted communications are to be recorded when possible. As a practical mater, law
enforcement officers make working copies of the original tapes. In many instances at the
national and local level, the originals are delivered to the prosecutor's office and maintained in
the prosecutor's custody.
The case officer should screen conversations that tend to prove that a crime has been, is being or
will be committed A compilation of the relevant conversations, together with the corroborating
surveillance reports often provide probable cause for search warrants and/or arrest warrants.

Termination of Covert Electronic Surveillance

In order to continue an interception beyond the limit set by the original court order, the
responsible law enforcement officer, through a government attorney, should apply for and be
granted an extension based upon a new application and court order. When the period of a court
order, or extension, expires, the original tapes must be made available to the issuing judge and
should be sealed under court supervision. The tapes should be maintained in such fashion for a
period of years.

Consensual Recording Operations

Unlike covert electronic surveillance operations, consensual operations involve the cooperation
of at least one party who is trusted by the criminal target. This government collaborator might be
a person who is being extorted or victimised in some manner, may be an ostracised member of a
criminal enterprise with a personal vendetta, or might be a criminal who is trading information
for leniency from the court. The vast majority of electronic surveillance operations involve these
sorts of collaborators. With respect to corruption investigations and other so-called victimless
crimes, the time needed to complete the criminal arrangement is usually not critical and most
often involves the payment of cash money between the parties. This fact is important for anti-
corruption investigators. For example, most cases of mid- and higher level bribery usually
require that substantial amounts of money be assembled. In the case where a government
inspector demands a bribe from a citizen or where the citizen conversely offers the bribe, there is
often sufficient time for the honest citizen or government employee to notify the appropriate
authorities before the actual transaction takes place. In the case of the collaborating criminal
seeking leniency, he can usually control to some extent the timing of his meetings with the
targeted criminals. This flexibility presents the opportunity for law enforcement officials to
prepare the cooperating person to respond to the corrupt offer in such a way as to provide legal
recourse to the authorities. For example, electronic surveillance methods could be used to record
the bribe offer or solicitation.

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