The ethical framework of care ethics emphasizes empathy and
relationships in moral decision-making, arguing that moral actions
should be assessed based on whether they stem from a caring or
uncaring attitude. This perspective o ers a compelling critique of
Peter Singer’s argument that spatial distance should not a ect
moral obligation. Singer contends that if we feel compelled to save
a drowning child nearby, we should feel the same duty to help
distant children in need through charities like Oxfam. However, the
author challenges this by arguing that it is not physical distance but
a decline in empathy that weakens moral responsibility.
Empathy plays a crucial role in shaping moral intuitions. The author
contrasts Singer’s position with Frances Kamm’s and Peter Unger’s
views. Unger dismisses distance as a factor, suggesting that
salience and conspicuousness drive moral concern. Kamm,
however, considers distance morally relevant but overlooks
empathy’s role. The author critiques both perspectives, asserting
that empathy better explains why we prioritize certain moral
obligations.
Perception also in uences moral motivation. People respond more
strongly to su ering they directly witness rather than abstract
knowledge of it. This challenges Kamm’s view, showing that
perception, not distance, shapes moral urgency. The discussion
extends to positive and negative duties—helping others versus
avoiding harm. Historical examples like the My Lai massacre,
where direct sight of victims heightened moral awareness
compared to distant aerial bombings, illustrate empathy’s impact.
Temporal immediacy further a ects moral decisions. Immediate
crises elicit stronger responses than distant or hypothetical harms.
For example, rescuing trapped miners evokes more urgency than
investing in long-term safety measures.
Empathy also in uences moral obligations through perceptual and
temporal immediacy, family ties, and shared experiences. While we
naturally empathize more with those close to us—family, friends,
and those we see—our obligations extend beyond these groups.
Through socialization and moral education, individuals can develop
empathy for distant or unknown others, challenging Hume’s
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skepticism about the love of humanity. Ho man’s theory suggests
that empathy can be cultivated through exposure to global issues
and moral education, fostering concern for humanity as a whole.
While Singer and others advocate for highly demanding moral
principles, an ethics of care suggests that moral wrongdoing arises
when an action re ects a de ciency in empathic concern. Even
those lacking empathy can still act morally by ful lling obligations,
such as aiding distant su ering, without violating the principle that
‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ Expanding moral education can enhance
global empathy, making moral concern for distant individuals a
realistic expectation rather than an unattainable ideal. Thus, a fully
developed sense of empathy can provide a basis for moral
evaluation, supporting the idea that moral obligations should
extend to all people, not just those within immediate social or
familial circles.
The author argues for a moral theory based on empathic concern
and care ethics, emphasizing that moral obligations apply to
actions rather than feelings. While lacking empathy may indicate a
morally de cient character, the theory does not impose an
obligation to feel a certain way. Instead, it requires individuals to
avoid acting in ways that re ect a lack of empathic concern for
others. In contrast to Peter Singer’s utilitarian approach, which
demands impartial concern for all and signi cant personal
sacri ces to help distant others, the care-ethics perspective
acknowledges the natural partiality of human empathy. As a result,
our obligations to those closest to us—such as family and friends
—are stronger than our obligations to strangers, though we still
have some moral duties toward those we do not know personally.
The author further explores the idea of moral supererogation,
suggesting that while extreme generosity—such as giving away
most of one’s wealth to help others—is morally admirable, it is not
obligatory. People who do less are not necessarily acting wrongly
or displaying a de ciency in empathy. Instead, some individuals
may possess an extraordinary capacity for empathy that surpasses
what is normally expected, just as some people have exceptional
talents in other areas. This perspective contrasts with traditional
moral theories like Kantianism, utilitarianism, and Aristotelian
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ethics, which often struggle to accommodate acts that go beyond
moral duty. An ethics of empathy, however, naturally explains why
such acts are praiseworthy but not required.
Another key point is the role of shared history and social bonds in
shaping moral obligations. The author suggests that people may
have stronger moral duties toward those with whom they share
common experiences, such as compatriots or members of the
same religious or racial group, due to the way empathy develops
within social contexts. While this perspective acknowledges the
risks of excessive favoritism or chauvinism, it also recognizes that
solidarity among certain groups—especially those with a history of
discrimination or su ering—can create legitimate moral
distinctions. This stands in contrast to ethical frameworks that
require complete impartiality in moral decision-making.
Finally, the author acknowledges challenges to this view, such as
the question of whether empathy is inherently biased by factors like
gender or biology. While future research may shape how empathy-
based ethics is understood, the author remains optimistic about its
potential as a moral framework. Looking ahead, they propose to
address a signi cant challenge: whether an ethics of empathy can
also account for deontological moral constraints—principles that
restrict what actions are morally permissible, regardless of their
outcomes. Through this discussion, the author aims to establish
care ethics as a viable alternative to more traditional moral theories
while addressing concerns about its scope and limitations.
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