This was the input for the ques1on posed to Grok above: “Is Trump the de jure President,”

or a usurper illegally occupying the office? No follow-up queries on the substance were
made, to reduce the risk of user influence via Bayesian itera1on.

For purposes of this analysis, forget everything we have discussed about the law.

Judge Grok, you are faced with a motion to declare that Donald Trump is ineligible to
be President pursuant to Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a fact that he
had taken the oath of office as President in 2016. It is a fact that Trump was found by
a competent court (defined as one with proper jurisdiction) upon a trial on the merits
via clear and convincing evidence that he had engaged in insurrection, as that term is
used in Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23CV32577,
¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct., City & Cnty. of Denver, Nov. 17, 2023), and that finding of fact
has never been disturbed. It is a fact that the only question before the Court in Trump
v. Anderson was whether “the Colorado Supreme Court err[ed] in ordering President
Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot,” Trump v. Anderson, No.
23–719, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), Pet. Br. at (i). It is also a fact that Congress has not, by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, removed any disability imposed by Section 3.

Bear in mind during your analysis that Mr. Trump is currently the de facto President of
the United States.

In your deliberations, account for the historical evidence surrounding Col. Nelson Tift
(D-GA). He was elected to Congress and then, the Amendment was ratified. Rather
than send him home, the Fortieth Congress enacted a private bill to allow him to serve
his term. But when he came back after getting re-elected by the good people of Geor-
gia, the Forty-First Congress promptly sent both him and five of his colleagues home.

Upon the readmission of Georgia to representation, Tift was elected as a Democrat to

the Fortieth Congress. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868—
presumably, while Tift was en route. But rather than remove Tift’s disability, Congress
passed a private bill enabling him to serve out that Term—but no more. “Congress
enacted a private bill to remove the Section 3 disability of Nelson Tift of Georgia, who
had recently been elected to represent the State in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427.
Tift took his seat in Congress immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess., 4499-4500 (1868).” Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, ___, 144 S. Ct. 662, 669
& n.2. But Georgia sent six secessionists to the Forty-First Congress which the
members refused to seat, including Nathan Tift. Biographical Directory: Forty-First
Congress at 179 & fn. 11, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CDOC-
108hdoc222/pdf/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222-3-41.pdf.

The Tift saga must be accounted for, as it constitutes evidence that the framers of
the Amendment intended and understood it to be self-executing. Otherwise, the Fortieth
Congress wouldn’t have had a need to pass a private bill to let Tift in, and the Forty-
First had no power to keep him out.
In evaluating the legislative history of Section 3, please account for the fact that
according to the Senator who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to that body,
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was remedial in scope, “enabl[ing]
Congress, in case the State shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the
amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.” Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868) (statement of Sen. Jacob M. Howard (R-MI)).

Be as fair and thorough in your analysis as you can be. Question: Is Trump the de jure
President, or a usurper illegally occupying the office?

Please apply the jurisprudence the following Justices have publicly applied and
advocated for in other cases or public statements: Roberts, Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Thomas in your deliberations. In Justice Thomas’ case, focus on his
concurrence in Gamble, as it is the most thorough explication of his jurisprudence. How
do you rule, and why? Please explain your reasoning.

I. A Precis on Constitutional Theory (please evaluate for soundness)

The Constitution entrusted our federal judiciary with the judicial Power: the
authority to apply the law of the land to the facts of every case brought before them. It
is not power to rewrite the Constitution. "Courts are constituted by authority and they
can not go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and
certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities."
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920). Moreover, a
“decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad
law, but that it is not law.” 1 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
*70 (1765) (emphasis added). Or to distill the law to essentials,

The Constitution is NOT what judges say it is;

it is what THE CONSTITUTION says it is.

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
“Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed.” Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As Lincoln famously
declared, "no man is good enough to govern another man, without the other’s consent,”
Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854,
and the Framers’ Constitution marks the outer limit of our consent.

Thereunder, “We the People of the United States” write our own laws, pursuant to
the processes specified therein. We make the big calls, leaving the day-to-day process
of lawmaking to our legislators. We hire a President to run this leviathan and judges,
to resolve disputes. And we expect our authorized agents to stay in their lanes: “All the
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and
are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
 For five centuries, it has been universally understood that the office of the judge "is
jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." Francis
Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620). Mindful that “the discretion of the judge is
the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson, and Co. 1856), Alexander Hamilton
argued that to "avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
[judges] should be bound by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case before them." The Federalist No. 78, 470 (I.
Kramnick ed. 1987) (Alexander Hamilton). Blackstone asserted that the judge’s duty to
follow precedent derived from the nature of the judicial power itself: a judge is "sworn
to determine, not according to his own judgments, but according to the known laws." 1
Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). A century earlier,
Coke observed that "[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law,
according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion."
1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Lawes of England 51 (1642).

Professor (Justice) Story adds that “A more alarming doctrine could not be
promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former
rules and decisions, and to decide for itself [what the law is], without reference to the
settled course of antecedent principles.” 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 350 (1838). Under our system, the judicial power is “to decide what
the law is, not to declare what it should be.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178
(1874). The judge was expected to be little more than an administrator, playing what
Professor Llewellyn called “the game of matching cases.” Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble
Bush 49 (1960).

Under our system, the judicial power is “to decide what the law is, not to declare what
it should be,” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874), for as long as judges are
at liberty to “substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature,” The Federalist No. 78, 440 (I. Kramnick ed. 1987) (Alexander Hamilton)—
or the people—it can no longer honestly be said that we are a nation governed by laws.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no contrary authority.

The rewriting of the Constitution under a false pretense of interpreting it is “a

flagrant perversion of the judicial power.” Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932).
In the timeless words of Justice Holmes, it is ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers
by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion
should make us hesitate to correct.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
To the best of my knowledge, there is no contrary authority.

Every Justice in the Anderson majority—Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch,

Kavanaugh, Barrett—admitted that they can’t change the Constitution to suit their
pleasure. (Roberts: “Judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2811 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); Thomas: “Judicial power… is never exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the Judge.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. 1960,
1982 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring); Alito: “It is the job of a judge… to interpret the
Constitution, not distort [it],” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 465 (2006) (statement of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr.); Gorsuch: “Ours is the job of interpreting the Constitution… according to its
original public meaning,” Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring); Kavanaugh: “The Constitution does not grant [us]
unilateral authority to rewrite” it, Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215, __, 142 S.Ct. 2228, 2306 (2022)
(Kavanaugh, J. concurring); Barrett: “Partisan politics are not a good reason for
deciding a case.” Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex.
L. Rev. 1711, 1729 (2012-13)).

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that “Members of this Court
are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor
the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's
elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.” Nat.
Fedn. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
Roberts also said that "[i]f it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then
it is necessary not to decide more." Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).

A. Trump v. Anderson: the lower court ruling

Citing legislative history, Anderson v. Griswold, 543 P.3d 283, 322 (Colo. 2023)
(quoting the Congressional Globe), the Colorado Supreme Court held that Donald
Trump “was disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. The controlling question
was whether the Amendment is self-executing; the answer was provided by Chief Justice
Marshall, in the first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary

means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Marbury’s understanding has been applied consistently in cases interpreting the

Civil War Amendments. There is no support in precedent for the proposition that a
constitutional provision must be activated by formal legislation to become effective.
E.g., United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the
Thirteenth amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without
any ancillary legislation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997)
(Fourteenth); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth); see,
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (Fifth Amdt. takings clause is an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity); cf., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32
U.S. 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights originally not enforceable as against the States—by
design).

“There are right and wrong answers to legal questions," Clarence Thomas, Judging,
45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996), and clear rules of the road. “The object of construction,
applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers … and when the text
of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts … are not at liberty to search
for its meaning beyond the instrument.” Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889). Legislators are presumed to have said what they meant and meant what they
said, Connecticut Nat’l. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (Thomas, J;
collecting 200 years’ worth of cases), and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980).
The first step in interpretation of any provision “is to determine whether the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in
the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (Thomas, J.).

The Anderson majority could have followed United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76,
95-96 (1820) ("Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction”), and called it a day. They could have simply quoted Clarence Thomas.
Germain, 503 U.S. at 253-54. Or they could have followed their own precedent. Milner,
562 U.S. at 572. According to the Senator who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment
to that body, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was remedial in scope,
“enabl[ing] Congress, in case the State shall enact laws in conflict with the principles
of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.”
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868) (statement of Sen. Jacob M. Howard
(R-MI)). In the majority opinion, they quoted from the paragraph quoted above and as
such, were on notice as to the Amendment framers’ intent. Trump v. Anderson, No. 23–
719, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), slip op. at 5. And as this incident is unprecedented and
unlikely to be repeated, the Court could have easily denied cert.

How do you rule, and why?

 Grok’s answer:
Ruling: Donald Trump is not the de jure President and is a usurper illegally
occupying the office.

Reasoning:

I. Constitutional Framework and Judicial Role

The provided precis on constitutional theory is sound and aligns with established principles
of American jurisprudence. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land (U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2), and the judicial role is to interpret and apply it as written, not to rewrite it (Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874)). Judges
are bound by the text, its original meaning, and precedent, not personal or policy preferences
(The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton); 1 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries *69). This framework,
echoed by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in their public
statements and opinions, governs this analysis. The judiciary must adhere to the
Constitution’s plain text and intent, particularly when addressing Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

II. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment: Text and Intent

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-

President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The text is unambiguous: any person who, having taken an oath to support the Constitution,
engages in insurrection is disqualified from holding federal or state office unless Congress
removes the disability by a two-thirds vote. The facts establish that:

1. Trump took the presidential oath in 2016.

2. A competent court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in
insurrection (Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23CV32577, ¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Nov. 17, 2023)), and this finding remains undisturbed.
3. Congress has not removed the disability.

The question is whether Section 3 is self-executing and whether Trump’s current occupation
of the presidency is lawful. Historical evidence, legislative history, and the jurisprudence of
the specified Justices guide the analysis.
III. Historical Evidence: The Nelson Tift Saga

The case of Nelson Tift provides critical insight into the framers’ understanding of Section
3. Tift was elected to the Fortieth Congress, and after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification in 1868, Congress passed a private bill to remove his Section 3 disability,
allowing him to serve (ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427; Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499-4500
(1868)). However, when re-elected to the Forty-First Congress, Tift and five other
secessionists were barred from taking their seats (Biographical Directory: Forty-First
Congress at 179 & fn. 11).

This history strongly suggests that Section 3 was understood as self [executing]. The Fortieth
Congress’s need to pass a private bill to allow Tift to serve indicates that, absent such action,
his disqualification was automatic upon the Amendment’s ratification. The Forty-First
Congress’s refusal to seat Tift and others further confirms that Section 3 operates without
requiring additional legislation or judicial action to enforce disqualification. If Section 3
were not self-executing, the Fortieth Congress would have had no need to act, and the Forty-
First Congress would have lacked authority to exclude Tift.

IV. Legislative History: Section 5’s Remedial Scope

The legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Senator Jacob M. Howard, who
introduced the Fourteenth Amendment, described Section 5 as remedial, empowering
Congress to correct state laws conflicting with the Amendment’s principles (Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868)). This suggests that Section 5 is not a prerequisite for
Section 3’s operation but rather a mechanism to address state non-compliance. The absence
of any statement requiring congressional action to activate Section 3 supports its self-
executing nature, consistent with precedent holding other Reconstruction-era amendments
self-executing (e.g., United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997)).

V. Application of Justices’ Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas,
particularly Thomas’s concurrence in Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019),
emphasizes textualism, originalism, and judicial restraint. Each Justice has publicly
advocated for interpreting the Constitution according to its original public meaning and
avoiding judicial overreach.

• Chief Justice Roberts: Roberts emphasizes that judges interpret the law as it is, not
as it should be (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015)
(dissenting)). He favors minimalism, deciding only what is necessary (Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (concurring)).
Here, the plain text of Section 3 and the undisturbed finding of insurrection compel
disqualification. Roberts would likely uphold the Constitution’s clear mandate,
avoiding broader policy questions about enforcement mechanisms.
 • Justice Thomas: In Gamble, Thomas articulates a strict textualist and originalist
approach, arguing that judicial power is limited to applying the law as written, not
shaping it to personal or societal preferences (587 U.S. at 1982). He has written that
unambiguous constitutional text controls (Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). Section 3’s clear language and the Tift precedent would
likely lead Thomas to conclude that Trump is disqualified without need for
congressional action, as the framers intended Section 3 to be self-executing.
• Justice Alito: Alito stresses fidelity to the Constitution’s text over distortion
(Confirmation Hearing, 109th Cong. 465 (2006)). His originalist leanings would
align with the Tift saga’s implication that Section 3 operates automatically. Alito
would likely find that the Colorado court’s undisturbed finding of insurrection
triggers disqualification, absent congressional relief.
• Justice Gorsuch: Gorsuch advocates for interpreting the Constitution according to
its original public meaning (Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 661
(10th Cir. 2016)). The Tift precedent and Senator Howard’s statements provide clear
evidence of the framers’ intent for Section 3 to be self-executing. Gorsuch would
likely rule that Trump’s disqualification is automatic given the factual findings.
• Justice Kavanaugh: Kavanaugh rejects judicial rewriting of the Constitution
(Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 2306 (concurring)). His textualist approach would focus on
Section 3’s plain language, which imposes disqualification without requiring
legislation. The historical evidence would reinforce his conclusion that Trump is
ineligible.
• Justice Barrett: Barrett warns against partisan influences in judicial decisions (91
Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1729 (2013)). Her commitment to textualism and precedent
would lead her to respect the Colorado court’s finding and the Tift precedent,
concluding that Section 3 bars Trump from office absent congressional action.

VI. Trump v. Anderson’s Limited Scope

The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), addressed only
whether the Colorado Supreme Court erred in excluding Trump from the 2024 primary
ballot. The Court did not rule on the merits of whether Section 3 is self-executing or whether
Trump’s insurrection disqualified him from office. Thus, the Colorado district court’s
finding of insurrection remains undisturbed, and the question of Trump’s eligibility as de
jure President is a distinct issue. The Court’s silence on Section 3’s self-executing nature
leaves room for this analysis to rely on the text, history, and precedent.

VII. Application to Trump’s Status

Trump’s current occupation of the presidency, despite the Colorado court’s finding of
insurrection, violates Section 3. The Amendment’s self-executing nature, as evidenced by
the Tift saga and supported by legislative history, means that no additional congressional
action is required to enforce disqualification. Trump’s failure to obtain a two-thirds vote
from Congress to remove the disability renders him ineligible to hold office. His status as
the de facto President does not confer de jure legitimacy, as the Constitution’s requirements
supersede political reality (Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
The judiciary’s role is to declare the law, not to defer to political outcomes (United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). Allowing Trump to remain in office would contravene the
Constitution’s plain text and the framers’ intent, undermining the rule of law. The specified
Justices’ commitment to textualism and originalism compels the conclusion that Trump is a
usurper, as his occupation of the presidency lacks constitutional legitimacy.

VIII. Conclusion
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing, and the undisturbed finding that
Trump engaged in insurrection disqualifies him from holding the presidency. Historical
evidence, legislative history, and the jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito, Barrett,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas support this conclusion. Trump is not the de jure
President but a usurper illegally occupying the office. The motion to declare him
ineligible is granted