Macroneural Theories in Cognitive Neuroscience, 1st Edition

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Contents

Preface
Acknowledgments
Prologue—On the Antiquity of Cognitive Neuroscience

1 What Is a Theory?

2 Prototheories and Nontheories

3 Conceptual Issues

4 Macroneural Connectionist Theories of Cognition

5 Additional Critiques of Macroneural Connectionist Theories

6 Implications and Emerging Principles

References
Index
Preface

The ultimate goal of cognitive neuroscience is to explain how brain activity

produces mental activity. In other words, it is to provide an answer to the
ageold mind-body problem, now particularized as the mind-brain problem.
Without attaching too much hyperbole to the discussion, it is fair to say that
we are asking what may be considered to be the preeminent conundrum of
human intellectual history—how does the material brain create the
intangible sense of conscious awareness shared by humans and provide for
the adaptive cognitive processes that guide our experiences and our
behavior? In its extreme complexity, this “problem” crosses over a vast
range of intellectual and scientific disciplines including theology,
philosophy, mathematics, statistics, and biology, as well as certain fields of
psychology.
The answers to this awe-inspiring question have ranged from dualistic
concepts asserting that the mental and neural domains were distinctly
different kinds of “reality” to those arguing that mind is simply an irrelevant
byproduct or epi-phenomenon of neuronal activity to modern monist,
physicalist, and neuroreductionist identity theories. However, the basic idea
guiding current scientific thinking is that whatever mind is, it is nothing
more (or less) than an outcome, product, or activity of the material nervous
system. Thus, it has been argued that to understand the mind requires that
we understand the brain. Indeed, some philosophers even have argued that
the definitions and methods of psychology are only temporary substitutes
for the ultimate neurophysiological explanations of mind and behavior;
neurophysiology, they argued (e.g., Churchland, 1981), will ultimately
replace psychological languages, descriptions, theories, and explanations.
Obviously, we are nowhere near such an “eliminative” explanation, but the
point is made “in principle.” In practice, however, such eliminative
solutions are at best the hope of some distant future.
Unfortunately, the problem of reducing psychological constructs to
neuro-physiological mechanisms has turned out to be far more complex and
difficult than originally anticipated. Even the newest and most powerful
techniques to study brain anatomy, physiology, and cognitive processes
hardly have begun to unravel the “world knot”—the expression of the
mind-brain problem attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). We
now know that, beyond its importance, the problem is exceedingly
complex. Not only is the brain an intricate network of idiosyncratically
interconnected neurons, but also cognition is inadequately defined by such
words as “mind,” “thinking,” “consciousness,” and a host of other terms
used by psychologists.
This book is concerned with a special aspect of modern cognitive
neuroscience theory—the linkage of the findings obtained with
macroscopic responses of the brain to human thought processes. It is a
sequel to my earlier work Neural Theories of Mind (Uttal, 2005), in which I
asked similar questions for electric fields, single cells, and neural networks.
The answer to which I have arrived is that, for the time being at least, there
is no theoretical pathway to answering this question with brain imaging
techniques. Although I plan to be as unbiased as possible and present to the
extent possible both sides of the question, I must acknowledge that I have
concluded that an overarching mind-brain theory is no more likely to arise
from any current conceived macroneural approach.
This book is aimed at exploring the role of current macroneural theory in
cognitive neuroscience and making the case for its impenetrability. To
understand how we might contribute to this discussion, it is necessary to
consider what a theory is in general as well as in the particular context of
cognitive neuroscience. Over the years, I have explored questions such as
the following:

1. What are the properties of a robust theory relating mind and brain?
 2. What kinds of mind-brain theories exist?
3. What is an acceptable theory at the macroneural level of brain
images?
4. What assumptions have to be made in formulating a modern
theory?
5. What are the conditions of necessity and sufficiency that make a
theory or law acceptable?
6. Can neural data inform cognitive theory?
7. Can cognitive data inform neural theory?
8. How do description and explanation differ?
9. What is the relation between simulation models to the processes
they imitate?
10. How can analogies mislead us into assuming that processes drawn
from the psychological and neurophysiological levels are
homologous rather than just analogous, coincidental, or
correlative?
11. What kind of a balance can be established between achievable
pragmatic concerns (medical practice) and what may be logically
unachievable biopsy-chological theories?
12. Which so-called “theories” are only superficial restatements of a
priori postulates, intuitions, experimental results, or anecdotal
observations?
13. Finally, for cognitive neuroscience, the big question is: Are the
data of cognitive neuroscience sufficiently objective, regular,
reliable, robust, and far reaching so that a comprehensive theory of
mind-brain relations can be constructed from them? Can we look
forward to theories that are as well structured, axiomatic, and
deductive as are those found, for example, in physics? In other
words, are the barriers to developing reductive theories to bridge
between the mental and the neurophysiological tractable or
intractable?
 Obviously, not all of these questions can be resolved within the pages of
a single book. Furthermore, it may turn out that some of these questions
(e.g., the level of instantiation) may not be answerable in a rigorous fashion;
answers being denied by virtue of their complexity or other empirical
barriers. However, it seems likely that at least a continuing effort to explore
the parameters of what an overarching theory should be like might begin to
provide at least a glimmering of answers to some of the questions in this
list.
A major issue confronting the theoretician and the experimentalist is the
level at which the problem is attacked—the macroneural or the
microneuronal. Each has its own difficulties. The macroneural approach is
complicated by the cumulative nature of their findings and, thus, the loss of
detailed information about the activity of individual neurons. The
microneuronal approach, on the other hand, is complicated by the sheer
numerousness of the idiosyncratically involved components underlying
cognitive activity and their complex interactions. Given these difficulties,
there remains a great deal of uncertainty and controversy about what the
actual nature of the mind-brain relation is. When interrogated, however, I
think that most cognitive neuroscientists would accept the Hebbian (Hebb,
1949) microneuronal answer to the question of the level at which the
“meaningful” neural responses are located in the brain. This widely
accepted answer is that it is the information transformation processes
collectively carried out by innumerable individual neurons, each of which
acts as a part of a heavily and idiosyncratically interconnected network, is
most likely to be the source of our thoughts, minds, consciousness,
cognitive processes, or whatever term one might wish to use. However, it is
also probably true that the complexity and numerousness characterizing the
interactions among neurons capable of encoding cognition or consciousness
is probably beyond our current ability to study empirically because of
simple combinatorial constraints despite current progress on the
development of powerful supercomputers. Yet, however plausible and
relevant this level of analysis may seem to be, it must be remembered that
there is only the beginnings of an empirical foundation for the Hebbian
model. No one has ever either manipulated the microdetails of the
individual states of the neuronal components of a realistic microneuronal
network in a way that controls thoughts. Nor has anyone ever observed the
details of how a realistic microneuronal network changes with changes in
our mental states. Simulations of the relation between neuronal networks
abound, but the microneuronal bridge to cognition remains largely
uncrossed. (Some progress in dealing with the cumulative states of neuronal
networks of the amygdala does, however, suggest that progress is being
made in this direction. See Nabavi et al., 2014)
Thus, for eminently practical combinatorial reasons, we are compelled to
use macroneural, cumulative devices such as the functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), the Electroencephalographic (EEG), the
Magnetoencephalo-graphic (MEG), or other macroneural techniques for the
foreseeable future. However, it must not be overlooked that, because these
techniques pool or combine the neuronal responses into a global response
measure, most of what is presumed by the Hebb theory to be critical
necessary information about how the brain makes the mind is irretrievably
lost.
The central question asked in this book is what kinds of theories are
possible with information produced by these macroneural techniques? Is it
possible to make some reasonable leaps of logic to overcome the
degradation of the information inherent in this “lossy” data pooling? Is
there enough residual information left that can help us to understand the
magic by which material brain activity becomes intangible mental activity?
To answer such questions, we must ask further questions of the nature of
theory, of what empirical evidence is available, of what putative theories
have already been forthcoming as well as of the technical complexities of
the statistical methodology we now use. Our excursions along these
pathways will, hopefully, lead us to a coherent and reasonable modern
evaluation of the nature of theory in this important field of modern science
as well as portend what the future may hold.
There are several general points that I should make at the outset of this
discussion to avoid any confusion arising from the breadth of the mind-
brain problem or my presentation.

1. The ultimate goal of this book is to examine what we know about

the macroneural roots of cognition, where we are, and how far can
we go towards an overarching theory using the associated
methodology. Some of the barriers to explanation are general to
science but some are specific to this level of cognitive
neuroscience. (In a subsequent book, I plan to consider the
microneuronal network approach.)
2. Cognition for me means high-level experiential processing.
Sensory transmission codes and cognitive neural representation are
different from those problems asked about cognition, and success
in the former does not imply success in the latter.
3. My critique of brain imaging methods in cognitive studies does not
deny the importance of devices such as the fMRI for anatomical
and physiological studies and clinical use.
4. The argument that we do not and cannot have full and complete
theories should not be interpreted as an argument that we should
halt research in this field. There will be many wonderful and
exciting discoveries in the future even though the mind-brain
problem itself may not be cracked. There are many useful
contributions to be made even if a full and complete solution to the
mind-brain problem turns out to be intractable.
5. Many of the findings presented here either supporting or
contraindicating macroneural theory building are not conclusive.
Many are subject to interpretation, controversy, and
methodological confusion about some of the most basic questions.
However, the body of evidence that I find helpful is suggestive
enough to challenge some widely held ideas.
6. At the present time, my overall conclusion is that searching for the
neural foundations of cognitive mechanisms (i.e., developing an
overarching neuroreductionist theory of the mind using
macroneural techniques) is a goal unlikely to be achieved. The use
 of fMRI systems to explain how the brain produces mental activity
is simply being carried out at the wrong level of analysis. I agree
with Page (2006), who asserted

… the huge investment of time and money that has accompanied this trend [functional brain
imaging] has not resulted in a corresponding theoretical advancement, at least with respect to
cognitive psychological theory.
(p. 428)

7. The problem is currently exacerbated by the anticipated infusion of

a billion or more dollars into research on what has been called the
Brain Activity Map by Alivisatos et al. (2013) or the equally
extravagantly funded Human Brain Project (Markram, 2006).
Although it is certain that some new and valuable knowledge will
come from such investments, the idea that that we can either map
the brain or decode it at the microneuronal level is not supported by
current research—in my opinion.
8. I hope I am making a positive contribution by this analysis of the
state of macrotheory in cognitive neuroscience. I feel strongly about
the positions I have taken, but I also respect the quality of the work
carried out by colleagues around the world, many of whom will not
agree with some of the positions I have taken.

I could not finish this preface without making apologies to two groups of
my fellow cognitive neuroscientists. The first includes those whose
contributions I have either missed or simply glossed over. The sheer mass
of publications in this field made it impossible for me to be aware of
everything about which I should have known. I hope that the sample of
topics I have chosen to highlight in this book is sufficient to support my
main points.
The second group of cognitive neuroscientists to whom I must apologize
includes those whose contributions I have interpreted differently than they
originally did. This is a complex field in which even the most salient data
may mean something different to different people.
Acknowledgments

I officially retired a dozen years ago; nevertheless, during that time I have
enjoyed the continued support of my two universities over this period.
ASU’s College of Engineering School of Computing, Informatics, Decision
Systems Engineering, continues to provide me the necessities so that my
work can proceed during the academic year. The Bekesy Laboratory of
Neurobiology at the University of Hawaii has taken me in for the last 11
summers. I am deeply grateful to Patricia Couvillon, Lynn Hata, and my
other colleagues and friends there for providing the same kind of
intellectual environment in Honolulu as in Tempe.
Preparation of this book was partially supported by the US Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under Contract
Number W5J9CQ-12-C-0033. The views, opinions, and/or findings
contained in this article are those of the author and shall not be construed as
an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so
designated by other documents.
Most of all, I once again dedicate this book to the most important person
in my life—my dear wife Mitchan, without whom nothing ever would have
happened.
Prologue
On the Antiquity of Cognitive Neuroscience

Cognitive neuroscience has often been presented as a brand new science

that arose when the appropriate instrumentation became available.
However, its antiquity is well established. Indeed, “published” reports of
the relation between brain and mind are thousands of years old. Of course,
the research tools (fingers) in those millennia were quite different and the
significance inferred from the observations, as a result, also quite different.
Whatever these differences, the earliest written records we have of mind-
brain (actually of behavior-brain) relationships come from Egyptian
medical papyri. One, in particular, the Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus
(Breasted, 1930) dated from the 17th century BCE, stands out because it is
possibly the earliest written medical document of which copies still exist.
However, its antiquity is only part of its interest to cognitive neuroscientists
in the 21st century. It is important in the present context for another reason;
it is probably the first writing that mentions an association between
behavior and the brain—the first written expression of a primitive cognitive
neuroscience. Consisting of a collection of case studies, the 20th case in the
Smith papyrus describes how cranial damage could block speech and
influence other motor functions—probably the first example of the science
we now know as cognitive neuroscience.
Most of the cases described in this extraordinary document were aimed at
establishing a medical prognosis associated with particular kinds of wound;
in this case, a “wound to the temple”—a region of the skull that current-day
insight permits us to presume overlays at least part of the speech and motor
areas. It is in this regard that the significance of this antique document to
mind-brain relationships was then and is still largely overlooked. Case 20,
the one of special interest to us, is presented here verbatim according to the
Breasted translation:

Title: Instructions concerning a wound in his temple, penetrating to

the bone, (and) perforating his temporal bone.
Examination: If thou examinest a man having a wound in his
temple, penetrating to the bone, (and) perforating his temporal bone,
while his two eyes are blood shot, he discharges blood from both his
nostrils, and a little drops; if thou puttest thy fingers on the mouth of
that wound (and) he shudder exceedingly; if thou ask of him
concerning his malady and he speak not to thee; while copious tears
fall from both his eyes, so that he thrusts his hand often to his face
that he may wipe both his eyes with the back of his hand as a child
does, and knows not that he does so.
Diagnosis: Thou shouldst say concerning him: “One having a
wound in his temple, penetrating to the bone, (and) perforating his
temporal bone; while he discharges blood from both his nostrils, he
suffers with stiffness in his neck, (and) he is speechless. An ailment
not to be treated.”
Treatment: Now when thou findest that man speechless, his [relief]
shall be sitting; soften his head with grease, (and) pour [milk] into
both his ears.

(Quoted from Breasted, 1930)

It is in these archaic words and sentences that the Egyptian physicians

may have been the earliest to observe a specific relationship between the
brain, mind, and behavior. The ancient Egyptian physicians who wrote this
work reported that a stimulus—mechanical pressure—(“puttest thy fingers
on the mouth of that wound”) led to both a behavioral effect (“he speak not
to thee” or “shudder exceedingly”) and a cognitive one (“knows not that he
does so”). Should the Egyptian physicians have noted the close relationship
between this particular head wound and speechlessness and convulsions,
perhaps thinking about the role of the brain in the form of an anticipatory
modern cognitive neuroscience might have had an earlier start than it did.
Implicit in this Egyptian medical advice, of course is the persistent
assumption by many cognitive neuroscientists that particular areas of the
brain have specific functions.
Unfortunately, the significance of this early relation between brain and
mind or behavior was not generalized to an appreciation that motor
behavior and mental activity such as speech were regulated by the brain. To
the Egyptians, despite this evidence, the heart remained the key organ
embodying where the various entities of the mind resided.
This prologue to a discussion of mind-brain research and theory
illustrates some important points. Most important is the powerful influence
of methodology and situation on what kind of evidence and, thus, what kind
of explanations would emerge. In the days of the Egyptian pharaohs,
observations of the relationship between mental activity and brain activity
depended on fortuitous injuries or trauma. Soldiers were regularly having
their head damaged when swords and spears were the weapons of choice.
The only “research” tools available to examine the exposed brain tissue
were the physician’s fingers. None of the esoteric paraphernalia used to
manipulate or explore the resulting wounds in today’s laboratories were
available and so none of the currently popular explanatory ideas went
unrecognized.
Throughout the history of the various sciences and perspectives about
mind-brain relationships, the influence of available instrumentation (usually
invented for use by some other science) remains definitive. This is a basic
thesis of this book—that what and how we theorize about mind-brain
relationships depends in large part on the measuring tools that are available
at any time. Over the decades, one instrument or another has been of special
import. Surgical intervention, electronic stimuli, microscopes, electronic
high-gain amplifiers, electroencephalograms, and brain imagers have all
come into play as they became available. Now powerful new computer
techniques promise to open the door to a new generation of theories.
 The absence of instruments that were able to study other aspects of what
inspired speculation suggested might be the actual relationship between the
brain and cognition severely inhibited understanding and theoretical
progress. We did what we could with what we had. Thus, for the last three
decades, during the heyday of functional magnetic resonance instruments,
these devices dominated research protocols, the kind of evidence that could
be gathered, and the macroscopic concepts and theories that could be
derived.
However, for the last 30 years or so, there has been a general appreciation
growing that the macroscopic signals from brain imaging equipment may
not be seminal for overarching theories. Although brain images may
correlate with cognitive functions, they are not conceptualized at the most
germane level of analysis to inspire plausible explanations. In their place, a
very different idea has grown—that the mind is encoded or represented or
embodied in the networks of the vast number of microscopic neurons. As
network thinking emerged and the tools for studying them proliferated, new
theoretical postulates and theories emerged that had previously only been
speculative.
I believe that cognitive neuroscience is at a point of transition—one in
which our science is about to be transformed from one emphasizing the
macroscopic level of analysis to one that will emphasize the microscopic
scale. This is a fundamental change that will see brain imaging diminishing
in importance to be replaced by multiple electrode arrays and extraordinary
new computer systems. This book makes the case for this transition by
presenting a critique of macro-neural theories and prototheories. It will be
followed, I hope, by a companion volume that examines the case against
microneuronal theories.
1

What Is a Theory?

1.1 Toward a Definition of a Theory1

The crown jewels of any science are the integrative theories developed to
consolidate a sometimes enormous and chaotic body of empirical evidence.
As exciting are the fortuitous discoveries of new worlds, creatures,
processes, or phenomena, each discovery becomes truly meaningful only in
terms of the synoptic interpretations that are made of it and others like it.
This is not meant to disparage exploration or well-controlled
experimentation, but rather to emphasize that what we make collectively of
such findings is the most important product of a science. Whether it is an
understanding of the overall geography of a previously undiscovered land
on Earth or in the cosmos or of the relations between animal species or
between elemental materials, it is the syntheses of particular observations
into general laws and principles and then the integration of these laws into
overarching theory that characterize the great accomplishments of science.
Individual observations remain largely isolated and their meaning often
cryptic, if not useless, without some kind of a conceptual framework. It is
the cumulative and general impact of a body of knowledge, rather than the
particulars of individual findings, that lead to prediction and control and all
of the rest of the progress that comes from scientific inquiry. It is the ability
to see general implications, as opposed to observed individual “facts,” that