18TH CENTURY
INTRO - The eighteenth century in Indian history marks it relevance by two crucial developments-the
decline of Mughal Empire and the expansion of British Empire, which changed the social, economic
and political structure. An extensive study of these two phases has resulted in diverging views. There
is the traditional view of a period of ‘Dark Age’ which is of decline and stagnation, and the recent
view of economic prosperity. Moreover, historians stress on the changing and evolutionary pattern
and also a substantial continuity. The 18th century, once dismissed as a ‘dark age’ of decline and
stagnation, has been reimagined through recent scholarship.
The break-up of the Mughal State was followed by the emergency of large number of independent
and semi-independent smaller units. These were of three-distinct types- firstly, the warrior states
established by Sikhs, Jats and Marathas in the course of rebellions against the Mughals, who adopted
military fiscalism; secondly, independent kingdoms where subedars asserted their independence,
e.g. Nawabs of Bengal, Nizams of Hyderabad; and thirdly, local kingdoms whose sovereignty
acquired more substance in the 18th century, e.g. the Rajput states, Mysore etc., which resorted to
military fiscalism within compact domains, achieving varying degrees of success in extracting
revenues from trade and production.
NATIONALIST AND COLONIALIST SCHOOL:
N+C blamed the Mughal Empire's decline on weak rulers, rebellions, and economic stagnation,
portraying the 18th century as an era of decline. Influential NATIONALIST historians of the early-
twentieth century like Jadunath Sarkar claimed that the Maratha, Jat and Sikh resistance was
evidence of a strong Hindu opposition against Aurangzeb’s religiously bigot policies and they were
the reason for the ultimate collapse of the Mughal empire. ISHWARI PRASHAD AND SR SHARMA
further argue that Hindu rulers such as the Marathas should have been the legitimate successors of
Mughals. COLONIALISTS James Mill and William Irvine believed that the British East India Company,
with its rule of law, governance model, and the so-called “gift” of civilization, was the legitimate
successor to the declining Mughal rulers. They viewed themselves as bringing civilization to the
"barbaric" and "despotic" rulers of the East. British colonialists tried to depict India as a timeless,
unchanging land, contrasting it with their own progress and dynamism. Indian nationalists
countered the colonial narrative of India being a stagnant and backward society by highlighting the
rich and ancient heritage of Indian culture, politics, and philosophy. They argued that India had a
long history of advanced civilization, governance, and moral values, which were timeless and
continued to inspire Indian society. By doing so, they aimed to assert India's dignity and refute the
colonialists' claims of bringing "civilization" to a supposedly uncivilized land.
ALIGARH SCHOOL OF MARXIST HISTORIANS:
The Aligarh School of Marxist historians focused on the processes of state formation, emphasizing
the critical roles played by bankers, merchants, and elites who owned land in shaping both pre-
colonial and colonial states. These historians adopted a Marxist framework, considering the
economy as the foundation (base) upon which politics, society, and culture (superstructure) were
built.
Irfan Habib points to an agrarian crisis in Mughal India while recognizing the centralized structure of
the Mughal state and the large surplus collected through land taxes. He argues that “the peculiar
feature of the state in Mughal India was that it served not merely as the protective arm of the
exploiting classes but was itself the principal instrument of exploitation.” Habib suggests that Mughal
authority worked closely with hereditary elites like zamindars, who also profited from the surplus.
This view challenges earlier ideas that the Mughal agrarian system was a direct link between the
state and the peasantry. Instead, Habib proposes a three-tier system with the imperial ruling class,
zamindars, and peasants. The frequent reassignment of land to mansabdars increased revenue
demands on the peasantry, which led to over-taxation, loss of soil fertility, and illegal extractions.
These pressures drove peasants into poverty and rebellion, further weakening Mughal rule. Muzaffar
Alam’s study of Awadh highlights that landlords, rather than peasants, often refused to pay revenue
to the state, asserting their independence. Despite differences between jama (estimated revenue)
and hasil (actual revenue collected), peasants received little relief from the system.
Satish Chandra offers an in-depth analysis of Mughal political history and administration, identifying
crises in both the jagirdari and mansabdari systems. He explains jama as the estimated revenue and
hasil as the actual revenue collected in the jagirdari system. In the mansabdari system, zat referred to
the rank of a mansabdar, while sawar indicated the number of horses a mansabdar had to maintain.
Satish Chandra explained that under Aurangzeb, the Mughal nobility grew to include Marathas and
deccanis, leading towards Jagirdari crisis or be-Jagiri (shortage of jagirs) because all nobles wanted
fertile land in North India. As a result, many nobles received poor quality land, making it difficult to
collect enough revenue. This caused the exploitation of peasants, leading to their migration and
further revenue loss. This also caused a widening gap between Jama and Hasil and in turn led to
revenue deficit. He argued that how Mughal empire depended on the nobility for their effective
functioning of administration and military expansion of the empire.
M. Athar Ali agrees with Chandra’s theory but blames the financial crisis on Aurangzeb’s
overambitious territorial expansion and prolonged military campaigns. These campaigns disrupted
revenue collection and reduced officials’ ability to maintain troops, further weakening the empire.
Athar Ali also criticizes the assumption that Mughal centralization and administrative unity were
similar to the European Enlightened Despotism of the post-Reformation era. He is particularly critical
of revisionist historians and argues that the breakup of the Mughal Empire into smaller, conflicting
political units—each weaker than the centralized empire—paved the way for European colonial
dominance.
J.F. Richards challenges Athar Ali’s argument regarding a shortage of jagirs in the Deccan. Based on
his study of Mughal administration in Golconda, Richards concludes that the Deccan was not facing a
shortage of land. As a result, the issue of be-jagiri (lack of jagirs) could not have been a major factor
contributing to the Mughal Empire's decline.
CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL OR REVISIONIST SCHOOL:
The Cambridge School challenges the traditional understanding of colonialism in India, describing it
as a gradual historical process rather than a sudden event. C.A. Bayly offers a revisionist perspective
on the Mughal Empire, analyzing its structure and decline in a new light. According to Bayly, the
Mughal Empire was vast and centralized, but its decline was not entirely negative. He argues that
‘corporate groups’ or ‘social classes’ actively participated in this transformation. These groups drove
the processes of ‘commercialization’ and ‘decentralization,’ leading to agricultural growth and
increased trade. Over time, these groups recognized the advantages of aligning with the British and
shifted their support to the new colonial power. Bayly’s continuity thesis focuses on the role of
regional elites in shaping the transitional states of the 18th century.
Muzaffar Alam supports this idea, suggesting that practices like the permanent jagir system and
revenue farming (ijara) were not signs of a collapsing government. Instead, these developments
reflected trends of regional growth, commercialization, and greater local control. STUDY OF AWADH
- According to Muzaffar Alam, the decline of centralized Mughal power was a complex process of
decentralization, where local elites began asserting control by adopting both the symbols of
authority and sovereignty. Using Persian sources, Alam examined agrarian uprisings in regions like
Awadh and Banaras. His research shows that various castes and communities held zamindari
rights, often leading to conflicts among clans. Peasants resisted zamindars as they often suffered
during such conflicts. Alam attributes the rise of zamindar power to economic prosperity driven by
trade, particularly by the Banjaras (nomadic traders).
Andre Wink shares some agreement with Bayly’s perspective but critiques the Mughal sources for
presenting an incomplete picture. He believes that Mughal chronicles often emphasized religious or
moral judgments, which obscured the deeper social and economic realities of the time.
Sanjay Subrahmanyam takes a global approach to studying the Mughal period. He stresses the
importance of connections between local and supra-local contexts during this time. He highlights
how travel, commerce, conflict, and cultural or intellectual exchanges played a key role in shaping
early modernity. Subrahmanyam also introduces the concept of ‘portfolio capitalists’ to describe
traders, merchants, and bankers who operated in both commerce and politics simultaneously.
NEO-REVISIONISTS
Together, Parthasarathi and Washbrook present a perspective that challenges earlier interpretations
of colonialism of revisionists by highlighting regional economic strengths and the favourable
conditions for certain labouring classes in 18th-century India.
Prasannan Parthasarathi highlights that labourers in South India had higher earnings and a better
standard of living compared to their British counterparts. This was largely due to the region’s high
agricultural productivity, which allowed artisans to survive on lower wages. As a result, industries in
South India gained a competitive edge in terms of production costs and pricing. Parthasarathi further
explains that high demand for goods gave merchants considerable power. He notes that the absence
of any tradition of state intervention in labour disputes worked in favor of the weavers, as it
prevented the establishment of coercive control structures. Parthasarathi ultimately argues that the
Industrial Revolution in Britain was, in part, driven by the British need to compete with India’s
thriving textile industry and reduce the outflow of bullion to India.
David Washbrook argues that the closing decades of the 18th century were a Golden Age for
labourers from lower ritual status backgrounds, such as non-specialized workers (pariahs).
Washbrook explains that wars during this period led to an increased demand for labour. The
competition among mercantilist states for trade and cash to sustain their armies created
opportunities for labourers to negotiate better working conditions. Furthermore, as many labourers
shifted away from agriculture, those who remained in farming benefited from increased bargaining
power due to the reduced labour supply. Thus, Washbrook suggests that, for certain regions, the
18th century was a time of relative prosperity for labourers.
CONTINUITY VS. CHANGE
The 18th century in India was marked by trends that reflected both continuity and change across
polity, economy, and society. This debate becomes particularly significant in the second half of the
18th century, when British colonial expansion began in northern India, impacting local society and
the economy. The key question here is whether 1757—the year of the Battle of Plassey—represented
a decisive break from the pre-colonial past or whether, as the revisionists argue, the foundations of
colonialism already existed in India and were only further developed by British rule.
Continuity and change can also be seen in areas like music, architecture, economic systems, and
culture. For example, as the Mughal Empire declined and could no longer support artists through
patronage, these artists moved to new regional centers. This marked a change; however, the
traditional patron-client relationship between rulers and artists continued. Politically, the Mughal
Empire remained the symbolic head, even though regional powers adopted the same administrative
and economic systems as the Mughals, but without any direct control from the Mughal throne in
Delhi.
DARK AGE VS. PROSPERITY
The economy of the 18th century is another subject of intense debate. The dominant view is that
political decentralization caused economic decline. Supporters of this perspective point to the
increasing use of revenue farming and describe groups like the Marathas as “looters” who were
unable to establish effective administrations. These examples are used to argue that the 18th century
was a Dark Age.
However, despite political changes, the economy and society continued to show signs of growth and
dynamism. Many agrarian regions had experienced economic prosperity since the 1600s, and this
momentum did not stop in the 18th century. States continued to collect revenue from agricultural
production, which connected villages to large networks of trade and exchange. This thriving
commercial activity made India appealing to European trading companies. The rise of British power
through the Company Raj can be described as a “revolution within tributary commercialism,” where
pre-existing systems of commerce and revenue collection were restructured under colonial control.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the 18th century cannot be dismissed as a period of complete decline, whether
politically, socially, or economically. The 18th century witnessed significant progress in areas like
religion, culture, literature, and music. It was not merely a transitional gap between two empires or a
dark phase before the so-called “gift” of civilization by European powers. The period was marked by
both change—as new regional polities emerged—and continuity, as indigenous economic and
cultural elements were incorporated into the colonial system.
