NATURALISM AND ANTI-NATURALISM IN CONTEMPORARY
PH ILOSOPHY O F SCIENCE
Johan Mouton Department o f Philosophy, RAU, Johannesburg
T h e early sixties saw th e rise o f m ore a n d m ore schools o f th o u g h t w hich cam e to
q u estion the accepted parad ig m in the philosophy o f science from the 1920’s, i.e.
logical positivism . W h at sta rte d as a “ n o rm al” clash o f opinions, eventually
developed in to , as R .F . B aum called it, th e “ crisis o f the m o d ern intellect” . N o less
th a n the objectivity o r ratio n ality o f scientific know ledge becam e the issue under
discussion. O n the one h an d K uhn, F eyerabend, et. al. rejected the positivists’
co n cep tio n o f ra tio n ality as being a red u ctio n o f the original m eaning o f hum an
ratio n ality . A ccording to th e “ new philo so p h y o f science” ratio n ality has been
reduced to logical o r m ethodological co m p u tab ility , thereby neglecting the essen
tial fa c to r o f h u m an d elib eratio n a n d ju d g em en t as the essence o f h um an ratio n al
beh av iour. Logical p ositivists replied by labelling K u h n ’s new em phasis on subjec
tive factors in the scientific en d eav o ur as “ irrationalistic” a n d ’’relativistic” .
It is therefore evident th a t co n tem p o rary clashes o f philosophies o f science culm i
n ate d in th e fun d am en tal issue o f th e possibility o f reliable hum an know ledge. The
C artesian ideal o f “ tru e a n d certain ” know ledge o r the even earlier G reek ideal of
“ infallible” know ledge, now becam e th e focus o f p h ilosophers o f science. It can
even be said th a t th e b ro k en relatio nship betw een philosophy o f science and
epistem ology, has once again been repaired.
T he m ain objective o f this article is to analyse the tw o prim ary m eanings o f
ratio n ality in th e existing debate. It will be show n th a t the existing difference» in
m ean in g can only tru ly b t u n d ersto o d if intei p reted as the outco m e o f the fu n d a
m ental difference betw een n atu ralism (positivism ) a n d anti-natu ralism (histo-
ricism). T he aforem entioned aim is th u s brok en dow n to the following:
* F irst to give a m ore precise definition o f th e rath e r vague concept o f “ n a tu ra
lism ” ;
* in the second place to give a sh o rt sketch o f tnc tw o m ost im p o rtan t representa
tive p aradig m s o f n atu ralism an d an ti-n atu ralism respectively, i.e. logical positi
vism an d K uhnian historicism ; an d
* an d in the th ird place to discuss the m eaning o f “ ratio n ality ” as it is understood
by these tw o schools.
WHAT IS NATURALISM?
In o rd er to clarify som e o f the m eanings o f th e concept I will introduce a
threefold d istinction am o n g o n tological, epistem ological and m ethodological
naturalism .
Ontological naturalism
A ccording to this thesis the n atu ral w orld is the only tru e w orld — It is Reality.
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T he n o n -n a tu ra l (G o d , spirit, m ind, idea, etc.) is either seen as ap p aren t realities or
reduced to categories in the n atu ral w orld. T he distinctive feature o f the thesis of
ontological naturalism is its m onistic ch aracter. A ccording to one o f its exponents
th e n a tu ra list opposes an y dualism betw een N atu re a n d A rt o r N atu ral and
S u p ern atu ral 01 betw een N atu ral an d T ran scen d en tal1. T h e basic assum ption of
this thesis is therefore th a t there is an unbreakable unity in the natural world.
Epistemological naturalism
T his thesis can be stated as follow s: T he n atu ra l w orld is either the best o r the only
know able world. T he epistem ological n atu ralist has an unqualified belief th at true
an d certain know ledge o f this n atu ral w orld is w ithin m an’s reach. The reason for
th is belief becom es clearer w hen one analyses th eir view o f the relation between
m an an d nature.
F irst o f all, the natural o rd er is seen as the given, a p p aren t world. Invisible,
im m aterial o r spiritual phenom ena over and above this given reality do not exist.
Secondly, it is assum ed th a t this given reality has its ow n intrinsic structure —
w hich is o f necessity good. A ny m ental construct by m an m ust therefore aim to be
as tru th fu l as possible. P ra tt w rites o n this issue th at N ature has a character o f its
ow n, a n d “ o u r opinions are true only in so far as they conform to this actual
situ a tio n ” 2.
T his has the im plication th at m an’s role in the w hole process o f know ing is rath er
passive. O u r m ental constructs o f reality are a t m ost representations, pictures,
im pressions o r im ages o f reality. M an as know er is no t allow ed to im press his form
on the n atu ral w orld — N ature puts its stam p on the hum an mind!
In the final instance it is ju s t this w hole passivist attitu d e th at guarantees the truth
o r certainty q f o u r knowledge. If m an abides by the laws o f N ature (which are
accepted as being unchanging an d therefore universally valid), true and certain
know ledge is possible. T he only obstacle o n the ro ad to T ru th , is th at m an, more
often than no t, in terp re ts these natural laws w rongly, i.e. o u r m ental constructs are
not tru th fu l rep resentatio n s o f reality. T his is then usually ascribed to some
subjective “ interference” on the p a rt o f m an — factors like personal bias,
prejudice, values an d em otions. Thus: T ru th is m anifest and attainable by m an, but
only if m an is objective and neutral in his ap p ro ach to reality3.
M ethodological naturalism
In the third instance we find n aturalism defending the view th at this n atural order
can only truly be know n th ro u g h the o p eratio n o f the scientific m ethod. The
scientific m ethod com es to be recognized as the only instrum ent by which truthful
know ledge o f reality can be reached. U sually this m ethod is identified with some
stringent and form al logical rules o f inference, be they inductive or deductive. The
im p o rta n t p oin t to m ake is th a t the scientific m ethod m ust be a m echanical
p rocedure — non-subjective and therefore not prone to hum an fallibility — so as to
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ensure objective knowledge.
Sum m ary
N atu ralism tak es its p o in t o f d ep a rtu re in th e assu m ptio n th a t the n atu ral ord er
constitutes a m onistic and un b reakable unity. Because o f this assum ption (w hich
characterizes all natu ralistic philosophies from Bacon to logical positivism ), the
ideal has alw ays been th a t this n a tu ral unity should be m irrored in any hum an
(m en tal) reco n stru ctio n o f this n atu ral order. Because it is fu rther assum ed th at this
o rd e r is inherently good, men should at all tim es con fo rm to this o rd e r and no t vice
versa. If m an does a p p ro a ch N atu re w ith an o pen m ind an d accepts the given data,
T ru th is w ithin his reach. It should be kept in m ind th a t m an is considered to be part
o f the n a tu ral o rd er. If the causal-m echanistic relations th a t hold in the m ain part
o f N atu re can therefore be extended to m an ’s m ental processes, the chance o f error
becom es sm aller. T hus: if th e process o f know ing is seen as the extension o f the
na tu ra l processes to include m an ’s m ental processes, the attain m en t o f T ru th
becom es a m uch bigger reality. T he gap betw een n atu ral laws and m ental
co n stru cts m ust th erefo re be closed by a m echanical ru le /p ro c ed u re o f inference,
such as ind u ction o r d eduction. A lready we find here the genesis o f the positivists’
identification o f hum an ratio n ality w ith som e m echanical means.
L O G IC A L PO S IT IV ISM AND KUHN
O ne o f the interesting p o in ts th a t arises o u t o f a co m p arison o f the w ork o f the
natu ralism o f seventeenth-century Bacon and tw entieth-century logical positivism
is th eir very idealistic aim s o f reform ing existing scientific practice. In the sam e
m an ner th a t Bacon p roposed a G reat R esto ratio n o f the sciences, the Vienna Circle
in th eir pam phlet in 1929 proposes a recon stru ctio n o f existing sciences. The aim o f
bo th is to erect the building o f science on m ore reliable foundations
A ccording to th e m em bers o f the V ienna C ircle this task can now (i.e. in the
tw entieth century) fo r the first tim e in the history o f science, truly be accom plished,
an d only as a result o f the developm ent o f sym bolic logic. T he task o f the
ph ilo sop h er therefo re becom es a logical analysis o f existing scientific concepts and
theories in o rd er to purify science o f all m etaphysical notions.
T he first result o f the use o f logical analysis, is th a t a distinctio n is m ade betw een
tw o types o f statem ents:
“ T o one belong statem ents as they are m ade by em pirical science; their m eaning
can be determ ined by logical analysis or, m ore precisely, throu gh reduction to the
sim plest statem en ts a b o u t the em pirically given. T h e o th er statem en ts, to which
belong those cited above, reveal them selves as em pty o f meaning if one takes then
in the way th a t m etaphysicians in ten d” 4.
It is, how ever, n o t sufficient to show th at statem en ts th a t are m ade by em pirical
science are the only m eaningful statem ents. T he ideal o f science thro ug h the years
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has been the atta in m e n t o f tru e an d certain statem ents. T he latter p art o f their
m anifesto therefore is directed to the objective o f justifying their belief in the tru th
and certainty o f statem ents m ade by the em pirical sciences. In true H um ean
tra d itio n a d istinction is m ade betw een tw o layers o f know ledge in em pirical
science. (W h at Feigl h as called the tw o-tier view o f science.)5. F irst o f all there is the
basis o r fo un dation which contains the so-called P rotocol sentences which refer
directly to th e em pirical d ata . In accordance w ith the thesis o f epistem ological
natu ralism it is accepted th a t these P rotocol sentences are acceptable because they
are only the sym bolic representation o f w hat has been given o r received in
observation. “ T h a t know ledge o f the w orld is possible rests n o t on h um an reason
im pressing its form o n the m aterial, b u t o n the m aterial being ordered in a certain
w ay.” ‘
T hus. T he credibility o f th e fo un datio n al sentences is guaranteed throu gh its
em pirical reference. U pon this fo u nd atio n a superstructure o f theoretical sentences
is erected. A gain, in the spirit o f m ethodological n aturalism , th e credibility o f these
high-level th eoretical sentences is gu aran teed th ro u g h their reduction to the
fo u n d atio n al sentences. “ Since the m eaning o f every statem ent o f science m ust be
statab le by reductio n to statem ent a b o u t the given, likewise the m eaning o f any
concep t, w hatever branch o f science it m ay belong te , m ust be statab le by stepwise
reduction to o th er concepts, dow n to the concepts o f th e lowest level which refer
directly to the given” 7.
It is interesting to note th a t the fu rth er developm ents after 1929 m ore or less
focussed o n these tw o aspects o f the natu ralistic, and th erefore the positivist,
position. O n the one h an d there w as the problem o f th e relation betw een the
b asic/fo u n d a tio n al o r P rotocol sentences and the em pirical given.
O n the o th e r h an d there was the problem o f the gap betw een P rotocol sentences
an d the high-level theoretical superstructure. A lready in the early thirties there was
a long debate betw een C arn a p and N eu rath concerning the first issue, i.e. w hether
th e P rotoco l sentences should be u n dersto od in a phenom enalistic o r physicalist
sense. T he o th e r p roblem was first given serious a tten tio n in 1936 when C arn ap , in
his “ T estability and M eaning” changed the criterion o f verification to a con-
firm ation-criterion. Since then there have been tw o m ain developm ents concerning
this very problem ; the one was C arn ap ’s program m e o f an inductive logic; the o th er
the atte m p t by the Bayesians like Salm on, H esse an d Maxwell, to interpret
con firm ation n o t so m uch as a logical fu nction , b u t m uch m ore as a function o f
perso nal belief o r credence. It can be safely stated to day th a t b o th these attem pts
have proved to be futile.
I now proceed to discuss K u h n ’s philosophical position very briefly.
Since K u h n a p p eared on the scene in the early sixties an d brought a b o u t a
revolution in the philosophy ot science in his ow n way, it has been a favourite topic
in philosophy o f science jo u rn a ls to try and find the real com m on factor in the
so-called “ new philosophy o f science” , i.e. “ W hat is the com m on den om inato r in
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the w orks o f people like H an so n , T ou lm in, F eyerabend, Polanyi, K uhn and even
people like the later W ittgenstein?” .
T he thesis th a t I w ould like to defend (as stated in the in tro d u cto ry p aragraph s), is
th a t their com m on critique o f different aspects o f logical positivism can be
generalised as a new torm o f anti-naturalism . F irst o f all I will trv to prove my point
th ro u g h a sh o rt o utline o f K u h n ’s p o sitio n, an d in the second place I will try to
show in the third p a rt o f the article, th at this difference can best be seen in the
d ifferent m eanings th a t the n atu ralists and an ti-n aturalists attach to the concept of
“ ration ality ”
K uhn appro aches the philosophy o f science prim arily as a historian o f science. This
very fact can ’t be em phasized to o m uch. W hereas the positivists ignored the genesis
an d dynam ics o f scientific theories because o f the fact th a t the so-called context of
discovery is really the d o m ain o f psychology, K uhn was prim arily interested in the
d ynam ic grow th o f scientific theories. In his study o f the process he cam e to the
conclusion th a t the positivistic explanation o f the history o f science as grow th-
th rough-accum ulation was false an d th a t the history o f science m ust rath e r be
u n d erstood as the succession o f periods o f norm al and revolutionary scientific
practices.
T he characteristic feature o f the norm al science phases is th a t science is practised in
a p articu lar paradigm or W eltanschauung. A p aradigm , according to K uhn, can be
defined as a set o f theories an d values to which a certain scientific com m unity is
com m itted. T he acceptance o f such a com m on research trad itio n , entails the
acceptance o f som e com m on values an d criteria w hich are used in n orm al scientific
practice. The specific paradigm in w hich you w ork also determ ines how you see the
w orld, how you select your facts an d d a ta , as well as the specific m eaning you assign
to different concepts.
T he appearan ce o f some anom alies, i.e. theoretical and observational discrepancies
which can ’t be explained by the existing parad ig m , usually heralds the rise o f a new
paradigm . Because o f the all-pervasive influence o f a paradigm , it is u n d erstand
able th at the replacem ent o f one paradigm by a new one, is sketched as a scientific
revolution. T h is leads K uhn to m ake the conclusion th a t tw o successive paradigm s
are essentially incom patible.
Because K uh n’s philosophy is very w ell-know n tod ay , this sh ort exposition will
suffice8. It rem ains for me, how ever, to show in w hat ways K uhn can be described
as an anti-naturalist.
T he first thesis o f naturalism , i.e. ontological n aturalism , im plies th a t there is only
one, unchanging, uniform , n atu ral w orld. A lthough I could n o t find any reference
in the w orks by K uhn to the ontological statu s o f the n atu ral w orld, it is, how ever,
possible to infer the follow ing from his p osition. Because every p arad ig m
d eterm ines my percep tion o f the n atu ral o rd er, every new paradigm does im ply a
new an d different “ perceived reality ” . T his philosophical position prob ably comes
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nearest to th a t o f an o th er earlier a n ti-n atu ralist, i.e. Im m anuel K ant with his
distinction betw een a phenom enal and noum enal world.
This h is the second im plication th at K uhn inadvertently also rejects the thesis of
epistem ological naturalism . Because K uhn lends priority to the paradigm in the
relation between paradigm and n ature in the sense that the paradigm determ ines
o ne’s perception o f the w orld, one's selection o f d a ta, the criteria one accepts in
problem -solving, etc., one could say th at the paradigm constitutes a new concep
tual world.
In The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions K uhn writes the following: “ M oppirig-up
o p eratio n s are w hat engage m ost scientists th ro u g h o u t their careers. They consti
tute w hat I am here calling norm al science. Closely exam ined, w hether historically
o r in the co ntem porary laboratory, th at enterprise seems an attem pt to force nature
in to the perform ed and relatively inflexible box th at the paradigm supplies” ''.
C oncerning the first aspect o f the thesis o f epistem ological naturalism Kuhn
therefore rejects the view that concepts and theories are only representations o f an
u nchanging na tu ral w orld. This view o f the ch aracter o f theories will in the second
place also have im plications for the problem o f truth. In a response to Popper Kuhn
states the following: “ Sir Karl takes it for granted that the proponents o f com peiing
theories do share a neutral language adequate to the com parison o f such observa
tion reports. I am a b o u t to argue th a t they d o n et. If I am right, then ‘tru th ’ may.
like ‘p r o o f be a term with only intra-theoretic applications” 10. K uhn then goes on
to discuss the w hole problem o f the incom m ensurability o f successive paradigm s,
an d concludes as follows: “ In the absence o f a nutral language, the choice of a new
th eo ry is a decision to ad o p t a different native language, and to deploy it in a
correspondingly different world. T h at sort o f tran sitio n is, however, not one which
the term s ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ quite fit” " .
T o sum m arise: K uhn is com pelled, in a sense, because o f his particular view of
paradigm s and their relation to n ature, to reject the view th at tru th is som ething
universal, objective and therefore inter-paradigm atic. At the m ost K uhn is prepa
red to defend the intra-paradigm atic goal o f tru th and especially then as the
continued solving o f problem s.
T he m ost im portant o f K uh n ’s critiques o f positivism can, however, be found in his
rejection o f the thesis o f m ethodological naturalism . As you will rem em ber this
thesis am o u nts to the belief that the scientific m ethod is the only instrum ent
throu gh which true and certain know ledge o f reality can be searched. The other
im p o rtan t point th a t we m ade was th at the scientific m ethod is usually seen as a
m echanical procedure whereby scientific and non-scientific knowledge can be
dem arcated. A lready on the th ird page o f T SO SR , K uhn rem arks th a t one o f the
results o f his historical study is to show , and I q uote, “ The insufficiency of
m ethodological directives, by them selves, to dictate a unique substantive conclu
sion to many sorts of scientific q u estion s’’12. In an o th er article he writes that
“ T here can be no set o f rules o f choice adequate to dictate desired individual
beh aviou r in the concrete cases th at scientists will meet in the course o f their
r a r i ^ r c ” 13
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K uhn therefore explicitly rejects the positivist and also n aturalist ideal o f a strictly
m echanical (o r logical) p rocedure w hich will decide as it w here on b ehalf o f the
scientist betw een scientific an d non-scientific knowledge. A ccording to K uhn it is
th e scientist's com m itm ent to certain paradigm atic values that helps him to choose
acceptable scientific theories.
In conclusion, K u h n ’s position is thus: Because o f the inverted relation between
paradigm and changing reality, as well as the inner com plexity o f the paradigm ’s
stru ctu re, it is unrealistic to believe (like the positivists do) th a t an analysis o f the
form al relation betw een theory an d evidence can give us an explanation o f why one
theory is replaced by a new one. It is only when one takes in to consideration
inter-paradigm atic relations a n d especially the paradigm -induced values that
scientists accept in tim es o f theory-choice th a t one can get a b etter u nd erstanding of
scientific evaluation.
RATIONALITY
T his brings me to my last an d final p o in t, i.e. th e m eaning o f rationality in the
positivist an d K uhnian paradigm s.
Since the earliest philosophizing a b o u t problem s o f know ledge, the search for
know ledge has been synonym ous w ith the search fo r infallible know ledge. The
central role in philosophy o f the quest fo r infallibility is equally well illustrated by
the persistent search fo r som e unequivocal fo u n d ation on which the edifice of
know ledge can be built. We have exam ined the logical positivists’ attem p t to take
the em pirically given as the fo u n d atio n o f know ledge. It is, how ever, p ertin en t to
take a closer look at the o th e r pillar o f know ledge in the positivists’ program m e, i.e.
the inference from the su p erstru ctu re to fo u n d atio n al sentences. We have seen
earlier th a t an im p o rta n t im plication o f th e epistem ological natu ralist’s p o in t of
view is the elim ination o f all h u m an , an d by d efinitioin, subjective facto rs from the
scientific process. T his aspect finds it m ost evident effect in the positivists’s distinc
tio n betw een the contexts o f discovery a n d justificatio n . By lim iting the legitim ate
d o m ain o f th e philosophy o f science to the la tte r, the positivist was ju s t follow ing
th e tra d itio n o f replacing fallible hum an judgem ent by a set o f algorithm s. I quote
H a ro ld B row n to the effect th a t “ T his ideal co n tro lled early logical positivist ideas
o n th e verification o f theories, receiving its m ost extrem e expression in W ittgen
stein’s attem p t to reduce all p ro po sition s to tru th factions o f atom ic propositions.
... T h is p ro g ram m e has, we have seen, been ab an d o n ed an d replaced, am ong
logical em piricists, by th e search fo r an inductive logic based on probability theory.
A gain the project is to find an alo go rith m o n the basis o f w hich we can evaluate
scientific theories, the assu m ptio n being th a t even if we can n o t prove the final tru th
o f an hypothesis, we can pro d u ce a set o f rules w hich will allow us to determ ine the
degree to w hich it has been confirm ed by th e available evidence” 14.
B row n th en m akes th e very relevant rem ark th a t “ T he attem p t by logical
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em piricists to identify rationality w ith algorithm ic com putability is som ew hat
stran ge, since it deem s ratio n al only those h um an acts which could in principle be
carried o u t w ithout the presence o f a hum an being!” 15. If one takes B row n’s
arg u m en t to its logical conclusion it m eans th a t to be ratio n al in th e positivist’s
m eaning o f the w o rd, is to act no n -ratio n a lly (i.e. w ith o u t using y o u r mind).
Brow n, how ever, takes an o th e r line: A ccording to him it is even, w ith all the
algorithm s in the w orld, possible to act irration ally , in the positivists' sense o f the
w ord. “ T here are m any different directions in w hich the scientist can proceed in
attem ptin g to deduce testable consequences from his hypothesis, each o f which
may be strictly in accordance with a set o f algorithm s, b u t he has no algorithm for
determ ing w hich line to pursue. A n inform ed judgem ent is required an d it is in
m aking such judgem ents th a t we m ust rely on reason. As long as decisions can be
carried o u t by m eans o f algorithm s, hum an intervention is not necessary, it is
exactly when we have no effective p rocedures to guide us th a t we m ust tu rn to an
inform ed, ratio nal hum an ju d g m ent” 16.
If we tu rn to K uhn now , we see th a t it is precisely because o f his historical survey of
scientific theories th a t he cam e to reject the positivist concept o f rationality. Both
he an d people like Feyerabend an d H olto n have conclusively show n, I think, that
there is no clear, sim ple relation betw een the results c f experim ent o r observation
an d scientific theories. Even in the sim plest, m ost straig h tfo rw ard instance, i.e. the
case o f an observational result w hich con trad icts a theory, the practising scientist is
n o t b o u n d autom atically to reject p a rt o f his theory. T he decision as to how a
discrepancy betw een theory an d observ atio n is to be handled requires a judgem ent
by scientists. T his, I take it, is the th ru st o f som e o f K u h n ’s most-widely attack ed
claim s, e.g. th a t such questions (o f theory choice) “ can never be settled by logic and
experim ent alone” and “ the com petition betw een paradigm s is no t the sort of
battle th at can be resolved by proofs” .
T o u n d erstan d K u h n ’s concept o f ration ality b etter, Brow n suggests th a t one
should com pare K uhn’s position with A ristotle’s m an o f practical wisdom as he is
sketched in his Ethics. F o r A ristotle, ethics is concerned w ith hum an behaviour and
because o f the com plexity o f hum an behaviour, there are no first principles on the
basis o f w hich to construct a science. Ethical decisions require deliberation, the
ability to weigh inform ation and m ake decisions in cases in w hich there is no
necessary knowledge. The conclusion is no t infallible an d there is no guarantee th at
all adequately inform ed people w ho deliberate on an issue will reach the sam e
decision, bu t this does n ot m ake the decision a rb itra ry o r irrational. While A ris
to tle ’s m an o f p ractical w isdom , i.e. th e m an w ho has had sufficient experience to
u n d erstan d h u m an behav iou r an d has developed his ability to deliberate, offers a
m odel o f individual ratio nality , K uhn uses, I th in k , basically the sam e m odel o f
ratio nality — only on the level o f the com m unity o f scientists. In a well-known
statem ent K uhn gives a description o f the process o f com m unal deliberation:
“ T ake a group o f the ablest available people with the m ost ap p ro p riate m otivation;
train them in som e science an d in the specialities relevant to the choice at hand;
im bue them with the value system, the ideology, current in their discipline and,
finally, let them m ake the choice” 17.
277
B row n concludes th a t “ It is the consensus o f the w orkers in a discipline th at
d eterm ines w hat co n stitu tes know ledge in this discipline, b u t th e gro up m ay later
d iscover th a t it m ade a m istake. T h e g ro u p is no m ore infallible th a n the individual
(b u t this does n o t m ean th a t it is as fallible as the individual” " .
It sh o u ld be evident by now in w hat w ay K u h n ’s concept o f ratio n ality is also the
result o f his p articu lar an ti-naturalistic p o in t o f view.
Because K uhn rejects th e m ain thesis o f natu ralism , and proceeds o n the basis o f
th e p rio rity o f som e th eo retical stru ctu re, i.e. a p arad ig m , it could be interp reted in
a negative way, as a restrictio n o f scientist’s activities. Scientists’ w hole perceptual,
con ceptual a n d even sem antic m ake-up is already laid dow n by th e paradigm to
w hich they are co m m itted. If one looks a t it, how ever, from the po in t o f view of
decision-m aking, th e adherence to a parad igm seem s to becom e m ore a n d m ore
a ttractiv e. Because a paradigm dictates certain ways o f doing things, because a
p arad ig m provides com m on criteria an d values th a t can be utilised in tim es of
crisis, th e possibility o f consensus is so m uch g reater. T he reason why grou p
decisions th ro u g h o u t the history o f science, seem to be relatively unanim ou s can
then be und ersto o d as a function o f the paradigm s th a t scientists adhered to.
In conclusion I th in k th a t the m ain lesson to be learned, can be found in the
trad itio n o f W estern Philosophy to identify know ledge with infallibility an d truth.
If one accepts know ledge to be reasonable o r even ju stified belief, it does no t entail
th e fu rth e r thesis, i.e. th a t know ledge should necessarily be true an d infallible.
W hat co u n ts as a reaso n ab le belief will certainly differ from tim e to tim e, a n d from
con text to context If this is seen as relativism , then all hum an know ledge will be
relativistic.
REFERENCES
1. Randall. J.H. 1944. The nature of naturalism, p. 357.
2. Pratt, J.P. 1939. Naturalism, Greenwood Press, Connecticutt, p. 3-4.
3. The thesis of epistemological naturalism is in many aspects similar to Popper's “Theory of
Manifest Truth” . See his Conjectures and Refutations, 1974, Sth ed., London, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, p. 5.
4. 1929. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, D. Reidel Publ. Co.,
Dordrecht, Holland, p. 8-9.
5. The 'orthodox' view of theories: Remarks in defense as well as Critique. (In Radner &
Winokur, Analyses of theories and methods of physics and psychology; University of
minnesota Press), p. 3-16.
6. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, p. 14-1 S.
7. Idem, p. 11.
8. For further articles on Kuhn in South African journals, see my articles in Perspektief,
16(l):38-53, 1977. (Paradigma: Ideologic of nie?) and N.T. van der Merwe, Paradigm,
science and society, Koers. 40 (4, 5 A 6):328-358), 1975.
9. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
p. 24.
278
10. Lakentos & Musgrave. 1970. Reflections on my critics. Criticism and the growth of
knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 265-266.
11. Idem, p. 277.
12. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 3.
13. Reflections on my critics, p. 238.
14. 1977. Perception , theory and commitment, Precedent Publ. Inc., Chicago, p. 146.
15. Idem, p. 147-148.
16. Idem, p. 148.
17. Reflections on my critics, p. 237-238.
18. Perception, theory and commitment, p. 150.
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