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Mari Olsen
SOVIET–VIETNAM RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF CHINA, 1949–64
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Mari Olsen

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Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the
Role of China, 1949–64

This book analyses Chinese influence on Soviet policies towards Vietnam and
shows how China, beginning in the late 1940s, was assigned the role as the main
link between Moscow and Hanoi.
Drawing on new information on the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relationship in
the early 1960s, this volume offers a fascinating insight into communication within
the Communist camp. As long as this functioned well, Beijing’s role as Moscow’s
major partner in Vietnam was a success. Moscow could focus on other, more
pressing, issues while Beijing took care of Vietnam. With the Sino-Soviet split in
the open, especially from 1963 onwards, Moscow was forced to make the vital
decision on whether to support the Vietnamese communists. This book shows
how the Soviet failure to understand the Vietnamese commitment to reunifica-
tion, combined with the growing tensions between Moscow and Beijing, reduced
Soviet influence in Hanoi in a significant period leading up to the US intervention
in Vietnam.
The author has used two particular approaches, the leverage of smaller states
on superpower politics and the validity of ideology in foreign policy analysis, to
explain the dynamics of Soviet perceptions of the Chinese role in Vietnam, as
well as to determine from what point Moscow began to perceive Beijing as
a liability rather than an asset in their dealings with Vietnam.
This book will be of great interest to students of Cold War history, Interna-
tional History and Asian politics in general.

Dr Olsen received her doctoral degree in History from the University of Oslo in
2005 and has worked within the field of New Cold War History since 1993. Her
main research interests include Soviet foreign policy towards Vietnam and China
and the role of ideology in foreign policy. Dr Olsen now works in the Norwegian
Ministry of Defence.
Cass Series: Cold War History
Series Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox
ISSN: 1471–3829

In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established
truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century
have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpreta-
tions and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will
concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical
surveys of newly available sources.

1. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory

Odd Arne Westad (ed.)

2. Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War

Richard Saull

3. British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War

Marrku Ruotsila

4. Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 1953–1965

Wilfred Loth (ed.)

5. The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation
Olav Njølstad (ed.)

6. Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations

Silvo Pons and Federico Romero (eds)

7. Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History

Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds)

8. US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion and Public Order

William Rosenau

9. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist
Challenge
N. Piers Ludlow

10. Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949–64: Changing Alliances
Mari Olsen
Soviet–Vietnam Relations and
the Role of China, 1949–64
Changing alliances

Mari Olsen
First published 2006
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4 RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
© 2006 Mari Olsen
Typeset in Times by
Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Olsen, Mari.
Soviet–Vietnam relations and the role of China, 1949–64 : changing
alliances / Mari Olsen.—1st ed.
p. cm.—(Cass series—Cold War history ; 10)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–415–38474–5 (hardback)
1. Vietnam (Democratic Republic)—Foreign relations—Soviet Union.
2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
3. Vietnam (Democratic Republic)—Foreign relations—China.
4. China—Foreign relations—Vietnam (Democratic) 5. Vietnam—
History—1945–1975. I. Title. II. Series.
DS560.69.S65057 2006
327.597047′09′045—dc22

ISBN10: 0–415–38474–5
ISBN13: 978–0–415–38474–2
Contents

Acknowledgements ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction xiii

1 Choosing sides: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

and the World, 1945–1949 1
The DRV’s search for allies 1
Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia 4
Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Bangkok and Moscow 5
Renewed Soviet interest in Asia 11

2 Setting the stage: The Soviet Union, China and the First
Indochina War, 1949–1953 13
Moscow and the Communist victory in China 14
Recognition 16
The Franco-Vietnamese War 21
Recognition and new challenges 26

3 The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 28

Preparing for the conference 29
The final offensive 36
Negotiating in Geneva 38
Geneva and the future of Soviet–Vietnamese relations 44

4 Together for Communism? Sino-Soviet cooperation

and the rebuilding of North Vietnam, 1954–1957 48
Reconstruction and consolidation in Vietnam 49
Military cooperation and Chinese withdrawal 53
vi Contents
Sino-Soviet relations and the Geneva agreement 55
Hanoi and the Twentieth Congress 59
Land reform and its critics 62
Moscow, Beijing and Hanoi’s new Southern strategy 66
A balancing act 70

5 Reunification by revolution? The Soviet and Chinese

role in Vietnamese reunification plans, 1957–1961 72
Accepting two Vietnams 73
Renewed interest in the Geneva agreement 76
Sino-Soviet cooperation 77
The Lao Dong debates its policy on reunification 79
Embarking on a new Southern strategy 84
Mediating the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict 88
Moscow and the new Southern strategy 90
The end of diplomacy? 92

6 The fight over Laos, 1961–1962 94

The civil war in Laos 95
Calls for a Geneva conference on Laos 97
Negotiations begin in Geneva 100
A temporary setback 105
Assistance to Laos 108
Geneva: A power struggle? 111

7 From disinterest to active support, 1962–1965 113

Soviet perceptions of China in Vietnam 114
Tougher frontlines within the Communist camp 118
Attempts to improve Soviet–Vietnamese relations 121
Hanoi’s turn to China 125
Moscow and the result of the 9th Plenum
of the Lao Dong 129
The tide is turning 132
From disinterest to active support 133

Conclusions: Changing alliances 136

Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong
Central Committee 151
 Contents vii
Appendix 2: Economic assistance and specialists from the
Socialist camp to the DRV, 1955–1962 155
Appendix 3: Soviet ambassadors to Vietnam, 1954–1965 157
Archives in Moscow, Russia 159
Notes 161
Bibliography 193
Index 199
Acknowledgements

This study would never have been completed without encouragement and good
advice from a large number of people. I am indebted to my main supervisor, Odd
Arne Westad at LSE. He has played an important role in my academic work
since 1993.
This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written while I was a doctoral
student at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). My supervisor
at PRIO, Hilde Henriksen Waage, has been an important source of inspiration.
PRIO director and Vietnam specialist, Stein Tønnesson, has shared with me his
indepth knowledge of Vietnam and Indochina and contributed with numerous
comments and good advice. I would also like to thank Pavel Baev, librarian
Odvar Leine, and his assistant Olga Baeva for their assistance and support over
the years.
I owe my knowledge of the Russian archives to senior researcher Sven G.
Holtsmark at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo. Sven has
been my guide to the archives since my first working trip to Moscow in the
spring of 1994. I could surely not have done this without his support, encourage-
ment and advice. I am also grateful to IFS for publishing my Cand. Philol. thesis
and providing me with a working place while writing my doctoral proposal.
Working in the Moscow archives has not always been easy and has taught me
a lot about patience. However, that is not the fault of the excellent staff, espe-
cially in my main archive, the Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian
Federation (AVP RF). The AVP RF reading room staff all deserve special thanks
for their kind assistance during my frequent stays since the mid-1990s: Sergei
Vitalevich Pavlov, Larissa Ivanovna Semichastova, Galina Alekseevna Chuliga,
Natalija Revazovna Chekerija, and not least the archivist in charge of the
Vietnam and China collections, Elisabeta Igorevna Guseva. Over the years I have
also enjoyed the assistance of many other reading room staff and archivists.
Thank you all. I am also greatly indebted to the assistance of the staff at both
Central Committee archives: the pre-1953 archives, Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History (RGASPI), and the post-1953 archive, the Russian State
Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI).
A number of people have contributed with valuable support, comments and
encouragement to this project from the start. Among these are colleagues and
x Acknowledgements
fellow doctoral students at PRIO, doctoral students at the University of Oslo and
abroad, fellow historians working in the Moscow archives, and friends. Some of
the people I would like to thank are: Ragna Boden, Lorenz M. Luthi, Sophie
Quinn-Judge, Galina Murasheva, Nguyen Vu Tung, Luu Doan Huynh, Ranveig
Gausdal, Arne Røksund, Inger Skjelsbæk, Elise F. Barth and Åshild Kolås for
their support and encouragement during the course of this project – and to the
rest of my friends – thank you!
Last, but not least, I would like to thank those who have remained my main
inspiration during these years – my husband, Stig Rune, and our daughter,
Aurora – for their love and support.
All the people mentioned here are of course without blame for this study’s
many insufficiencies – I am solely responsible for all conclusions.

Oslo, 27 April 2005

Mari Olsen
Abbreviations

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese)

CC Central Committee
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CMAG Chinese Military Assistance Group
CPAG Chinese Political Assistance Group
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
GRU Main Intelligence Directorate (Soviet foreign and domestic military
intelligence)
ICC International Control Commission
KGB Committee on State Security
Lao Dong Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese title of the VWP)
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MID Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NLF National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (also NLF(SV))
PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese)
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
RVN Republic of Vietnam (from 23 October 1955)
SEAD Southeast Asia Department (sub-department in MID)
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SVN State of Vietnam (to 22 October 1955)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VNFF Vietnam Fatherland Front
VWP Vietnam Worker’s Party
Introduction

In July 1949, shortly before the Communist victory in China, Liu Shaoqi, one of
Mao Zedong’s chief lieutenants, made a secret visit to Moscow. During the meet-
ings in Moscow, Liu and Josef Stalin discussed China’s future role in the world,
as well as the future relationship between Moscow and Beijing. As part of the
discussions, Stalin proposed an arrangement which had the character of a divi-
sion of labour, in which China should take on responsibility for helping what he
called ‘national and democratic revolutionary movements in colonial, semi-colonial,
and subordinate countries [. . .].’1 He emphasized that China was in a much better
position than the Soviet Union to play such a role in Asia.
Stalin’s vision of the future labour division between the Soviets and the
Chinese soon became visible in Soviet policies towards the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV). On 18 January 1950, when the Chinese Communists, less
than three months after the declaration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
recognized the DRV, Moscow followed, announcing its recognition on 30 January.
The decision to establish diplomatic relations marked the start of the official
Soviet–DRV relationship. Both the Soviet and Chinese recognitions were of vital
importance to the Vietnamese leaders, who, at the time, were in the middle of a
war against the French. But in a short-term practical perspective, it was the
victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949–50 that had the strongest
impact on the Vietnamese situation, as the CCP immediately began to support the
Vietnamese in their struggle.
The Soviets, on the other hand, seemed from the early days content with
leaving the practical responsibility to Beijing. The change of power in China
strongly influenced Moscow’s view on the region and, as a result, forced the
Soviet leadership to pay more attention to the Asian continent. Thus, for the
decades following 1950, the Communist victory in China and, with it, the domi-
nant role of the new Communist state in Asia would have a profound influence
on the future direction of Soviet policies towards Vietnam.
The aim of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it is an analysis of
Soviet policies towards Vietnam from the establishment of the PRC in October
1949 until the late autumn of 1964. A part of this is a discussion of how the
Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet–Vietnamese relations taking
place during this period and what they expected to achieve with regard to the
xiv Introduction
relationship. On the other hand, it is an analysis of how Soviet leaders from Josef
Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev perceived China’s role in Vietnam relative to the
Soviet role, and how these perceptions influenced the Soviet–Vietnamese
relationship. The main emphasis will be on explaining how and when Moscow’s
enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end – or, in other
words, from what point was Beijing’s involvement in Vietnam perceived as
a liability, rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers.

Previous accounts
Both classical and recent works on Soviet foreign policy and on Soviet–Vietnamese,
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations have inspired this study. While
completing my Candidata philologiae2 thesis on relations between the Soviet
Union and the Vietnamese Communists in the latter half of the 1950s, I became
increasingly interested in the influence China exercised on this relationship.3 The
specific question of how the Chinese role in Vietnam was perceived by the lead-
ership in Moscow, by the relevant departments in the Soviet foreign ministry and
by Soviet diplomats in both Hanoi and Beijing remains to be the main topic of an
analysis based on available Soviet documents and literature. This study aims to
fill that gap and to expand our knowledge of Soviet perceptions of their prime
ally, and rival-to-be, in Southeast Asia.
In classical works on Soviet foreign policy, Moscow’s role in Vietnam is
characterized as passive in the early years, dictated by its relations with China, but
not to the extent that Soviet policy makers would allow Vietnam to ‘lapse exclusively
into the Chinese sphere’.4 A common conclusion is that, in spite of the low Soviet
interest in the area, Moscow had a high degree of leverage on the Vietnamese
Communists and that Hanoi would not make a decision to resume armed struggle
to reunify Vietnam unless it had been sanctioned by the Soviets in advance.5
These conclusions were made at a time when access to primary sources on the
Soviet side was a far-fetched fantasy at best. During the 1980s, most scholars working
on Soviet–Vietnamese relations subscribed to the theory that the Vietnamese
Communists were loyal clients of the Soviet Union, unable to pursue policies that
would gain their cause and reduced to a pawn in a Great Power puzzle.6
The current work falls within the field of new Cold War history and is an attempt
to complement the already existing works on Soviet–Vietnamese relations by
adding a new perspective. So far three larger studies and several articles based on
Soviet documents have become central in the new history of Soviet foreign rela-
tions with Indochina.7 These new works have further expanded our views on the
Soviet–Vietnamese relationship and contest previous assumptions of Moscow’s
leverage in Hanoi, especially in important questions such as the means and
methods used to achieve Vietnamese unification. Access to fresh sources has
shown that the DRV’s decision to launch armed struggle in order to supplement the
diplomatic struggle for reunification was made in spite of Soviet disapproval.8
In his two works on Soviet–Vietnamese relations, Russian scholar Ilya V. Gaiduk
sees Vietnam as a problem that should be eliminated from the Soviet foreign
 Introduction xv
policy agenda to prevent it from becoming a disturbing element for other, more
important issues, such as Soviet relations with the United States and détente with
the West. In the years from 1954 to 1963, Gaiduk views Vietnam first and fore-
most as a ‘thorny issue’ in Moscow’s relations with the West. He claims that the
Soviet wish for peace in Southeast Asia was dictated by this attitude, and not so
much by a peaceful disposition on the part of the Soviet leaders. Moscow’s main
problem was, according to Gaiduk, its failure to dictate orders to the Vietnamese, and
also a lack of allies that could help the Soviets discourage the Vietnamese from their
military plans, combined with the escalating Sino-Soviet dispute, which finally made
Moscow decide in favour of a disengagement from Indochina in the early 1960s.9
Similar arguments prevail in his account of the relationship in the period from
1964 to 1973.10 In this work, emphasis is on how the growing Sino-Soviet split
accelerated the rapprochement in Soviet–DRV relations, while at the same time
forcing Moscow to be very careful in handling its Vietnamese allies in the new
situation. He underlines that, although Moscow did prevail as the main provider
of assistance to the Vietnamese, Chinese influence remained strong. According
to his findings, the Vietnamese skilfully manoeuvred between Moscow and
Beijing and thus preserved their independence, formulating their political aims
while at the same time becoming more and more dependent on material assist-
ance from their allies. He claims that the Soviet Union never obtained monopoly
on such assistance because its influence was wrecked by that of China throughout
the war. Gaiduk further argues that the Soviet Union was the only winner in the
Vietnam War because it was able to promote itself as an ardent supporter of the
principles of proletarian internationalism, leading to a position of status within
the world Communist movement. Unfortunately, Moscow was not able to use the
devastating experience of the American involvement in Vietnam to avoid similar
failures of its own later.11
In view of Gaiduk’s good access to sources from the Russian archives, his
work on the latter part of the 1950s adds surprisingly little new information to the
history of Soviet–Vietnamese relations in the period. The major problem seems
to be a preoccupation with the American side of the story, combined with a
predisposed view of the Soviets as interest-driven only. As a result, he fails to
properly grasp both the climate in the bilateral relations, and the possible impact
of factors such as ideology on the relations between Moscow and Hanoi. Addi-
tional problems are the gap of time between the two studies and his failure to
properly explain why the Soviet Union took over from China as Hanoi’s major
beneficiary from late 1964.
French historian Benoit de Tréglodé has undertaken research in several
Russian archives, focusing on the early formative years of the Soviet–Vietnamese
relationship. He shows how Soviet–Vietnamese relations were re-established
after the Second World War largely due to Vietnamese efforts out of their repre-
sentative office in Bangkok in 1947 and 1948. From a Vietnamese point of view,
however, these attempts were unsuccessful, and the Vietnamese were obliged to
wait for the success of the Chinese Communists before they could receive
substantial assistance in their war against the French.12
xvi Introduction
The many new books and articles released on Sino-Vietnamese relations based
on Chinese sources have been of undeniable value and a great inspiration for this
study. Qiang Zhai’s China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, is a detailed
analysis on the development of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, starting with
the Chinese recognition of the DVR in January 1950. Zhai’s analysis of Mao’s
preoccupation with the Soviet factor in the making of China’s foreign policy
forms a particularly interesting background for my work on Chinese influence on
Soviet policies. Chen Jian’s Mao’s China and the Cold War includes several arti-
cles on China’s involvement in the two Vietnam Wars as well as articles on
the Sino-Soviet relationship, and Ang Cheng Guan’s Vietnamese Communists’
Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956–1962 aims to
show the gradual change in Beijing’s attitude towards the Vietnamese Communists’
intensification of the reunification battle, taking into account domestic policies in
both countries, the role of individual leaders and the changing international
conditions, especially within the Communist bloc. Without these and similar
works on Chinese foreign policy the completion of the current study would have
been impossible.13
Another topic which has benefited from the release of sources from both
Soviet and Chinese archives is, of course, the history of Sino-Soviet relations.
Several works on the topic, both classical and recent, have helped define ideas for
the present study.14 Among the more recent works shedding light on this conflict
are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov’s Inside the Kremlin’s Cold
War, and O.A. Westad (ed.) Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance, 1945–1963, a collection of articles by former Soviet, Chinese and
American historians.15 In addition to the works mentioned above, a significant
effort to publish documents and articles on the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relation-
ship has been made by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at
the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C.16
Over the last few years a number of new studies have appeared that
further explain the Vietnamese side of the story. Of particular interest to the
present study are the works by American historians Mark Philip Bradley and
Robert K. Brigham. Bradley’s work Imagining Vietnam and America analyses
the failure to establish relations between the United States and the DRV and
shows how predetermined perceptions of the other disturbed the US–DRV rela-
tionship in the pre-Cold War years.17 Brigham’s study of the foreign policy of the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF(SV)) is the first of its kind
looking at the complex relationship between the NLF in the south and the Viet-
namese Communist leadership in the north. Brigham argues in this study that the
Front was neither a puppet of Hanoi nor an autonomous organization.18

Sources and methods

This is a study of Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the light of the triangular
relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing. It is written from a Soviet
point of view, and the primary sources used come from several former Soviet
 Introduction xvii
archives. However, this is not only a bilateral study nor a complete triangular
study, but rather a study of how the bilateral relationship between two countries
(the Soviet Union and the DRV) was influenced by the policies of a third country
that has close relations with both, namely the PRC.
These distinctions are important because they determine the sources and
perspectives of this study and challenge the author to define the possible pitfalls
inherent in choosing such an approach. The exclusive use of Soviet primary
sources is not unproblematic, and as an author one faces several methodological
problems. I would like to single out four: The first is related to the problem of
studying a triangle from only one side. I have compensated for the problem
of one-sidedness inherent in using only Soviet sources through extensive use of
scholarly works written by experts on Chinese and Vietnamese foreign policy.
A second critical problem has been gaps in the source material. A full coverage
will never be possible, but by using several archives and a wider interpretation of
existing sources, a satisfactory account should still be possible. The last two
problems circle around the question of sources and how they are used: first, to
what extent they reflect what I am looking for, and second, how key issues and
approaches will influence the choice of sources. These four problems are consid-
erable, and with these in mind I hope to have reduced the possibility of a bias that
would seriously undermine the project’s main purpose – namely to describe and
analyse how the Soviet view of China influenced Moscow’s perceptions of and
actions towards Vietnam.
The main bulk of documents for this study has been retrieved from the Foreign
Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiyskoy
Federatsii (AVP RF)) and from the two Central Committee archives: the
pre-1953 archive, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI))19, and the
post-1953 archive, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI))20.
Of these three archives, the Foreign Policy archive contains the largest avail-
able holdings on Soviet–Chinese and Soviet–Vietnamese relations and contains
documents for the entire period covered in this study. In addition, it also contains
materials on Soviet relations with Laos and Cambodia, as well as collections
from the work of the two conferences in Geneva: the 1954 conference on Korea
and Indochina, and the 1962 conference on Laos. For the period after 1953,
relevant documents are stored in the RGANI. Two parts of this archive have been
of particular interest: the international department responsible for relations with
ruling parties in Socialist countries, and the propaganda department.21 While
working in this study I have had good access to files in the AVP RF and have
gone through all available relevant materials from the Vietnam fund from
1947 to 1965, the China fund for the same period, the Geneva conference fund
(1954/1961–62), and to a lesser extent the Laos fund, as well as several Foreign
Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister funds for the relevant years.22
The Soviet archives contain documents in several different categories such as
memorandums, analytic and merely descriptive reports of events, instructions to
xviii Introduction
ambassadors, suggestions to, and resolutions by, the Central Committee and the
Politburo, and a large amount of records of conversations. All conversations
between Soviet representatives and local officials, as well as Soviet ministers and
deputy ministers’ conversations with foreign officials at home and abroad are
recorded and filed in chronological order in the archives. Documents that account
for direct meetings, confrontations between Soviet officials and locals and in
particular the Soviet ambassadors’ conversations are particularly useful to under-
stand the cultural conceptions that influenced how they saw the Vietnamese and
Chinese.

Approaches and theoretical framework

In this study, two particular approaches, the leverage of smaller states on super-
power politics and the validity of ideology as a useful concept for analysis of
international politics, will be used in an attempt to better explain the dynamics of
Soviet perceptions of the Chinese role in Vietnam. With access to more and more
materials from both sides of the conflict, new possible frameworks for the study
of the Cold War have emerged. And with the new materials a need for new
approaches has developed contending that the complex relations between states
during this period cannot be fully understood on the basis of the classical schools
of interpretation of the Cold War.23 Nor can these schools explain all aspects of
the dynamics in the triangular relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing.
Thus, to fully comprehend the history of Soviet–Vietnamese relations from the
late 1940s until the mid-1960s, it is necessary to complement classical theories of
the Cold War with new approaches and theoretical explanations.
New sources and new research have highlighted the fact that during the Cold
War the policies of many smaller, and more peripheral, states had a much more
significant impact on the decision-making of the superpowers than was previ-
ously thought. But what can Soviet sources reveal about the leverage of a smaller
client state on the formation of Great Power policy decisions? This study will
examine whether this applied to the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship. To what
extent did Hanoi, rather than listening to its larger allies, first and foremost
follow its own independent policies, at times regardless of whether these were
approved by its allies? And did this behaviour impact Soviet policy towards
Vietnam? Recent studies based on fresh sources point to a more complex rela-
tionship between Moscow and Hanoi than what was previously assumed and also
refute some of the earlier arguments on the relationship of strength between the
two countries.24 Both Soviet and Chinese sources seem to support the picture of a
much more independent and strong-minded Vietnamese leadership than previ-
ously assumed by historians in the field.25
A second approach is to examine more closely the role of ideology. Ideas,
pre-existing systems of beliefs and values – all these are names that attempt to
explain the very content of the category more commonly named ideology. But is
it usable – can it be applied to the history of the Cold War and constitute a useful
 Introduction xix
framework for analysis? During the Cold War, ideology was seen as a tool of
limited relevance in helping us understand Soviet policies. Access to new sources
have modified that view, and the impact of ideology now seems to be the major
new finding after more than ten years with at least limited access to archives in
the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China.26
There is yet no universally, or even generally, accepted understanding of the
term ‘ideology’ and its role in politics. Thus one of the main problems in the use
of ‘ideology’ within an interpretative framework is how to define it. What is,
within a Soviet policy framework, Soviet ‘real politik’? Could it be that what we
define as ‘ideological’ was considered to be ‘real politik’ and interest-driven in
the eyes of Soviet policy makers? In the sources now available the evidence that
ideology was taken seriously, especially by Soviet officials and leaders, is over-
whelming. In forums never intended for public scrutiny, both Soviet leaders and
officials articulated ideological principles and at times even cited the classics of
Marxism–Leninism to support specific positions. According to Vojtech Mastny
there was no double book-keeping.27 Others have described the reading of declas-
sified Soviet communist documents as entering into ‘a conceptual world whose basic
assumptions and categories are fundamentally different from our own’.28
With these reflections on the concept of ideology we have to ask ourselves to
what extent the new sources can help us define whether ideology played an
important role and, if it did, in what way? How important was it in Soviet foreign
policy-making during the Cold War, and to what extent may it help us to better
understand the complex relationships within the Socialist camp? According to
William C. Wohlforth, a stronger emphasis on the role of ideology might help to
explain why the relatively weak Soviet Union often seemed so keen to compete
with the wealthy West. And also why Moscow took actions that only fostered
cooperation between its adversaries, and why, when realizing the cost of such
behaviour, the Soviet Union did not stand back from these overextended
commitments.29
The main aim of this study is to evaluate the influence of the PRC on Soviet
policy-making towards Vietnam, and thus fill a gap in the already existing litera-
ture on Soviet–Vietnamese relations. Whereas the general international situation
did, of course, play an important part in Soviet policy makers’ considerations
when planning policies towards Vietnam, the situation with China was special, in
relation both to Vietnam and to the Soviet Union. Moscow depended on Chinese
practical assistance, Chinese knowledge of Vietnam, and in several cases the
Chinese ability to put pressure on or restrain the Vietnamese. As long as the
Sino-Soviet relationship functioned well, Beijing’s role as Moscow’s major
partner in Vietnam was a success because it enabled the Soviet leaders to
focus on other issues while ensuring that the Chinese took care of the situation
in Vietnam. However, once Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, the
more aggressive Chinese stance with regard to developments in Vietnam,
especially from 1963 onwards, forced the Soviets to engage themselves more
actively and make the vital decision on whether to support the Vietnamese
Communists or not.
xx Introduction
One of the major shortcomings of earlier studies of Soviet–Vietnamese rela-
tions has been the exaggerated focus on Moscow’s power in Hanoi. New sources
available today highlight the fact that during the Cold War many smaller actors
had a stronger position in their relationship with larger powers than previously
thought. Such was also the case in Vietnam. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese
expected the Vietnamese to act as independently as they sometimes did. This
study will show that in the early phases of the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship,
and especially in the years up to 1949, it was the Vietnamese, and not the Soviets,
who played the most active role in seeking and establishing contact with the
other. During the later part of the 1950s, and especially with regard to the shift
from diplomatic to military struggle to achieve a unified Vietnam made during
the 15th Plenum of the Lao Dong in January 1959, the Vietnamese made their
own decisions regardless of, and even at times in opposition to, the Soviets (and
also the Chinese).
In spite of the many new sources indicating that ideology played an important
role as part of Soviet foreign policy thinking, existing studies of the Soviet–
Vietnamese relationship have paid surprisingly little attention to this side of the
story. Thus, another argument of this study is that ideological considerations did
play a part in Soviet foreign policy planning towards Vietnam. The Soviet
leaders were convinced that the Vietnamese should learn from the Soviet
experience, and in many areas Soviet advisors attempted to transmit Soviet ideas
and plans to the DRV leadership. At the same time there was a strong conviction
among the DRV leaders that the Soviet Union and China possessed the models
necessary to rebuild and re-strengthen Vietnamese society. These mechanisms
explain why practical cooperation between the Soviets and the Chinese with
regard to Vietnam lasted longer than suggested by the existing literature and the
growing ideological differences at the time. Even during the very early years of
the 1960s, when the polemics were rather strong, and the Soviets had withdrawn
their advisors from China, Moscow and Beijing were able to cooperate in
Vietnam and Indochina.
1 Choosing sides
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the
World, 1945–1949

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was established in August–September

1945, in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender in the Second World
War. In the so-called August Revolution, revolutionary committees paying alle-
giance to the Communist-led Vietminh1 seized power in all main parts of Vietnam
and established the new Democratic Republic, with Ho Chi Minh as president.
The insurrection was brought about on local initiative, with no significant
involvement by either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed, the successful August Revolution
seems to have taken Communists worldwide by surprise, and there was virtually
no reporting of the events in Indochina in the international Communist press.2
After the August Revolution, the DRV leaders, in particular President Ho Chi
Minh, initiated an active search for allies. In the latter part of the 1940s, he and
his envoys actively sought support from both the United States and the Soviet
Union, but without any significant effect. The purpose of this chapter is first and
foremost to analyse the role of these initial contacts between the Vietnamese and
the Soviets in the period leading up to Soviet recognition of the DRV in January
1950, while at the same time evaluating Soviet views of the early years of the
Franco-Vietnamese war, and also the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
attempts to support the Vietnamese Communists.

The DRV’s search for allies

One author has argued that ‘Vietnam’s post war diplomatic contacts with the
region and the world began in Thailand in 1945, and not in China in 1950’.3 In
the years before Soviet and Chinese recognition of the DRV in January 1950,
while the Vietminh was waging a guerrilla war against French colonial forces,
there was little contact between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders. However, during
these years several attempts were made by the Vietnamese side to build a rela-
tionship. Although the attempts at securing Soviet support for the struggle against
the French failed, they form an important background for the establishment of a
Soviet–Vietnamese relationship in the years following Soviet recognition of the
DRV. They also highlight the important fact that the Vietnamese Communists
were able to conduct foreign affairs independently before the victory of the Chinese
2 Choosing sides
Communists in 1949–50 and may help to explain why the China factor became
the single most important denominator in Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the
following two decades.
Between the August Revolution and the outbreak of war in December 1946,
Ho Chi Minh and his government searched for allies who would both secure him
support against the French reconquest of southern Vietnam and contribute to the
construction of the DRV in the north. While searching for allies, the DRV
government tried to build alliances or solicit support for their new state within
Southeast Asia, with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese
(Chiang Kai-Shek government/the Guomindang). The very first efforts of this
kind were made in the immediate aftermath of the August Revolution when
Ho Chi Minh sent parallel series of cables to both Stalin and Truman asking for
recognition and support.4 Nothing came out of either. Cooperation with Chiang
Kai-Shek also broke down when he agreed with France to withdraw the Chinese
occupation troops from northern Indochina.5 After the outbreak of full-scale war
from 1947, the DRV government used Bangkok as its main diplomatic outlet.6
Although the Thai government did not recognize the DRV, it allowed the
opening of a ‘Representational Office of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’
in Bangkok in the late summer of 1946. The office was set up with the help of
Vietnamese nationals in Thailand and began to operate fully from 14 April 1947. The
office was tolerated by the progressive national government of Pridi Banomyong.
According to one Vietnamese author, the Bangkok office received money and
funds from Pridi, who also allowed the Vietnamese to set up a war base at the
frontier where soldiers could receive training before being sent back through
Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam. Bangkok was a very important liaison point
for the Vietnamese because the DRV’s diplomatic mission there could initiate
and maintain contacts with other Southeast Asian countries and world powers
through their Thai embassies. The office was not recognized as a legitimate legation
or embassy but played a significant role in the DRV’s foreign affairs. Bangkok
would function as the DRV’s main opening to the world until the conservative
coup in Thailand in 1948, after which Rangoon took over some of Bangkok’s
role. Thailand’s new ruler from 1948 deprived the DRV representative office of
its diplomatic status, and it was forced to reduce its activity.7
During 1947, Bangkok was the scene of encounters between Vietnamese and
American officials, as well as Vietnamese and Soviet officials. Ho Chi Minh’s
encounters with American officials in France and Vietnam during 1946 had been
characterized by a friendly and respectful atmosphere. The American attitude
towards colonialism and the independence of the Philippines may have provided
some of the Vietnamese leaders with hope that the United States could support
them against France or at least put a moderating pressure on France.8 During
early 1947, shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war between the Vietnamese
and the French, the DRV launched a four-month diplomatic initiative to secure
the support of the Truman administration. The initiative was led by Dr Pham
Ngoc Thach, deputy minister in the Office of the President and one of Ho Chi
Minh’s closest advisors. From April to June, Thach approached the Americans in
 Choosing sides 3
Bangkok with several proposals. Among these were calls for recognition,
requests for assistance in mediating the conflict with the French, for loans for
Vietnamese rehabilitation, for economic concessions to US businesses in Vietnam,
and appeals for technical assistance and cultural exchange. However, just like Ho
Chi Minh’s attempt to secure American support immediately after the August
Revolution, Pham Ngoc Thach’s initiatives in the first half of 1947 failed.9
The DRV began constructing their fragile new state in a period of international
turmoil. On the eve of the Cold War a growing fear of Communism was slowly
spreading among American policy makers. Despite many favourable assessments
from American officials in both Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries,
Ho Chi Minh’s government received no support for its case from the Truman
administration and began to realize that it was necessary to turn to other countries
for support. The DRV’s approaches to the United States must be evaluated within
the context of the Vietnamese relationship with the French. In the aftermath of
the war anti-colonial sentiments prevailed in the international arena with one dis-
tinct exception – the French attitude towards its former colony Indochina. In
order to prevent a French re-colonialization of the area, the Vietnamese needed a
strong and independent ally for support.
Parallel to the approaches to the Americans, the DRV leaders also sought sup-
port from the Soviet Union. As in the case with the Americans, in the latter half
of the 1940s, contact with Moscow was initiated and maintained largely through
the DRV delegation in Bangkok. Ho Chi Minh had strong links with the Commu-
nist world from his prewar work with the Comintern, his role within the French
Communist Party, and, not least, his long-term stays in Moscow. Still, in the
immediate period after the August Revolution, the DRV government was not
successful in securing material support from any of its future Communist allies.10
At that point Mao Zedong did not yet hold power in China and was far away. So
was the Soviet Union.
Soviet sources describe how the first encounters between Soviet and Vietnamese
officials took place in early spring 1947.11 From 23 March to 2 April, a Soviet
delegation led by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii participated at the Asian
Relations Conference in New Delhi.12 During the conference the Soviets met
with Tran Van Giau, former leader of the August Revolution in Saigon and
southern Vietnam, who led the Vietnamese delegation to the conference. Tran
Van Giau described the situation in Vietnam as a disaster and appealed, on behalf
of Ho Chi Minh, for assistance from Moscow. According to Giau, ‘the French
were gradually tightening the rope around the virtually unarmed Vietnamese
units,’[. . .] ‘and would crush the Democratic Republic completely within 4 to 5
months’.13 That would happen regardless of the fact that Ho Chi Minh and the
Communist party had the full support and respect of the Vietnamese people.
‘Vietnam needs immediate assistance’, he continued and emphasized that the
major problem was the lack of weapons. The Vietnamese government primarily
needed money in order to purchase weapons through China. In addition, Tran
Van Giau reminded the Soviet delegates that diplomatic support through the
United Nations would also be very much appreciated.14
4 Choosing sides
The meetings between Tran Van Giau, Zhukov and Plishevskii took place
around the same time as Pham Ngoc Thach began his approaches to the Americans
in Bangkok. However, in the first years after Second World War the Soviet
Union was primarily concerned with developments in Europe. In postcolonial
Asia, Moscow first and foremost paid attention to Indonesia,15 and of course
China and Korea, but showed little interest in the national liberation struggle in
Indochina before 1950.

Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia

Previous accounts of Soviet relations with Southeast Asia in general, and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in particular, suggest that during the early years
of the DRV’s existence the Soviet Union appeared to have been appropriately
sympathetic to the Vietminh cause, although non-committal concerning any specific
assistance the Vietnamese might expect.16 In the early post-war years the Soviet
Union did not want to disturb its relations with Paris, where the Communists
were part of the government until March 1947. This fact undermines the suggestions
that the Soviet Union, as early as 1947, played the role as moderator for the
Southeast Asian Communist parties.
In his work Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Charles B. Mclane distin-
guishes between two separate developments when characterizing Moscow’s
colonial strategies in the period from 1947 to 1950. From 1945 to 1947 Moscow
seemed to follow a relatively moderate strategy. A change came, according to
Mclane, towards the end of 1947, when Zhdanov presented a more militant line in
Soviet foreign policies. This was further enhanced with the acceptance of Chinese
views (Liu Shaoqi) through 1949 and early 1950 – views that were clearly more
aggressive in terms of assisting Communist revolutions than the initial Soviet
stand. Another equally important development according to Mclane was the shift
of focus from Europe to Asia. This shift apparently began with the Calcutta Con-
ference in 1948, and continued with the CCP’s establishment of the PRC in the
fall of 1949.17
In the first years following the Second World War, Stalin’s attention was
focused on Europe. Naturally enough, the Soviet leaders were much more con-
cerned about their relationship with France, Great Britain and the United States
than with the events in Indochina. There are no records of worldwide appeals on
Vietnam’s behalf from the Soviet side. When negotiations between Ho Chi
Minh and the French broke down in December 1946, and the Franco-Vietminh
War broke out, the Soviet Union apparently never even considered intervening.
Ignoring the fact that the Franco-Vietminh war was the first case of conflict
between a colonial subject and an imperialist power in an Asian country,
Moscow underestimated a war that would seriously affect the course of events
throughout the East.18 The Soviet reluctance to get directly involved in the
Vietnamese situation underlines how much importance Moscow attached to a
reasonable relationship with the West European states, especially France, and
the United States.
 Choosing sides 5
In a speech at the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
in September 1947 in Poland, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov presented
the so-called ‘two-camp’ thesis. He divided the world into two distinct camps, an
imperialist one led by the United States and the other that of anti-imperialism,
socialism and peace.19 Within that context the DRV was described as ‘associated’
with the anti-imperialist camp, and the Vietminh war was termed ‘a powerful
movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies’.20 The speech
marked a watershed in Soviet post-war strategies. It affirmed a policy already
decided upon by Stalin and the CPSU Central Committee and was an event that
set the tone of international relations during the Cold War.21
In his speech Zhdanov encouraged Communists abroad to be more energetic in
their ways of advancing the common goal. He underlined that through economic
power the Americans aimed at organizing Western Europe and countries politi-
cally and economically dependent on the United States such as Near Eastern and
South American countries and Chiang Kai-Shek’s China into an anti-Communist
bloc. The Russians, on the other hand, were in the process of forming another
bloc together with the so-called new democracies in Eastern Europe, Finland,
Indonesia and Vietnam and with the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. With
this division into blocs, Zhdanov announced what may be seen as the rebirth of
the ‘two-camp’ view of the world that was characteristic of Soviet foreign policy
in the late 1920s and early 1930s.22
Although the message inherent in Zhdanov’s speech was aimed at all Communist
parties in the world, only the European Communist parties were present during the
founding meeting of the Cominform. There were no representatives from any
colonial or previously colonial country. To convey the message to these parties the
Cominform decided to hold an Asian conference in mid-November the same year.
But the message at this conference only partly reflected the new line in Communist
policy. The key note address to the participants at the conference was delivered by
Asia expert and historian Evgenii Michalovich Zhukov. He acknowledged the need
for a more vigorous role for Communist parties in the colonies, an attitude that to a
much larger degree reflected a way of thinking that was more characteristic of
pre- than post-Zhdanov attitudes towards the Eastern question. At the same time,
records from the conference did not confirm the idea of a more active Soviet policy
towards the colonial world, but rather added more confusion to the state of
Moscow’s intent in these countries.23 The same Zhukov who gave the opening
speech at the Asian conference was the one who met with Tran Van Giau in New
Delhi in late March or early April 1947 to discuss the situation in Vietnam. As an
academic his role was more as an advisor than a policy maker, but his views on
Soviet policies towards the colonies were influential in the post-war years.

Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Bangkok and Moscow

We have seen how the attempts made by Tran Van Giau to solicit support from
the Soviet Union in the spring of 1947 were unsuccessful. Judging by previous
accounts on the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship, the Soviet attitude towards the
6 Choosing sides
revolutionary struggle in Vietnam was more sympathetic after the Zhdanov
speech. Thus the picture ought to change after September 1947, but Soviet
archival sources do not support this view. In the period after the Cominform
meeting Moscow was equally hesitant once the issue of practical economic or
military assistance was raised. At this time there was also considerable suspicion
of Ho Chi Minh as a rightist deviator who had dissolved the Indochinese
Communist Party.24
Pham Ngoc Thach, who during spring and summer had been in charge of
approaches to the US government, met with the Soviet envoy to Switzerland,
Anatolii Georgevich Kulazhenkov, in Bern in early September of 1947.25 Pham
Ngoc Thach, then described as deputy state secretary of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Vietnam, was in Switzerland under the
pretext of being treated for tuberculosis. His main aim was to make an illegal trip
to France, where he was supposed to present his credentials to the leading French
Communists Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. He came to the Soviet mission
in Bern to provide information about the current situation in Vietnam. Describing
how the DRV government organized the fight against the French army, he
emphasized the lack of weapons in the Vietnamese army. Military units did not
have the necessary equipment, and the government did not have enough foreign
currency to buy what they needed. There was also a lack of senior cadres to take
the command. Owing to the situation the CCP decided to assist Vietnam and send
in a group of military advisors.26
On the current situation in Southeast Asia, Pham Ngoc Thach underlined that
during the fight for independence Communist parties had been founded in most
countries and had an important influence among the populations. He emphasized
Vietnam’s role as the proliferation centre of Communist influence in Southeast
Asia. On his way to Europe Pham Ngoc Thach had met with Communist leaders
in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Burma. He also told
them that the Vietnamese Communist Party (‘Kompartii Vietnama’)27 had
planned a congress of all Southeast Asian Communist parties in 1947, but that
this had proved impossible due to the ongoing war between Vietnam and France.
With regard to the French Communist Party (PCF) Thach reported that they had
so far not discussed the question of Vietnam and had done nothing substantial to
hinder the French imperialist war against the republic.28
Within the PCF the attitude towards support for the Vietminh changed in 1947.
They offered only very prudent political and diplomatic support to the DRV in
1946 while the PCF was a member of the French government coalition and war
had not yet broken out in Indochina. In the spring of 1947, however, the war had
become a highly debated issue in France, and the PCF was evicted from the
coalition. They now became gradually more sympathetic to the Vietminh but had
neither any real power in France nor any influence over Ho Chi Minh. After the
PCF left the French government coalition, the Soviet Union also started to voice
some support for the DRV and blamed the civil war in Indochina on French reac-
tionary circles and British imperialist manoeuvres. According to Moscow, the
French government should bear full responsibility for the situation.29 Pham Ngoc
 Choosing sides 7
Thach also underlined the importance of the many different factions within the
Vietnamese Communist Party and the fact that this party was not an entity as it is
perceived in Europe. According to him, the two PCF leaders he had been in touch
with had expressed the view that Vietnam should focus all its energy on the fight
for independence and not give any concessions to the French imperialists.30
Describing the attitudes towards the United States and Great Britain, Pham
Ngoc Thach claimed that they were hated in all Southeast Asian countries; how-
ever, in spite of this the US position was becoming increasingly solid. Countries
were flooded with American goods, and the Americans pretended not to be
against the fight for national liberation. They even encouraged it, assuming that
as soon as the countries were free from English, French and Dutch influence,
they would automatically fall into the hands of the Americans. According to the
US military attaché in Siam, who proclaimed his sympathy with the Vietnamese
people, the Americans could not interfere with the war and had no plans to assist
the French. Pham Ngoc Thach also expressed his wish to visit the Soviet Union
and personally inform them about the situation in Southeast Asia. However, he
did not want a Soviet visa in his passport since that could create problems once
he tried to return to Thailand (Siam).31
There are no records of direct support from the Soviet Union to the Vietnamese in
1948. However, the Southeast Asian Youth Conference that took place in Calcutta
in February 1948 has been regarded as a turning point, and there has been much
discussion on the role of the Calcutta conference in Soviet strategies towards
Southeast Asia. According to one scholar, Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnam received more
Soviet attention after the Calcutta conference and full Soviet approval from the
spring of that same year.32 The conference took place between 19 and 25 February,
and 39 organisations from both Communist and non-Communist countries sent
their delegations to participate in, or observe, its work. Many of the discussions
at the conference circled around the ‘two-camp’ doctrine presented by Zhdanov
in September 1947, and the general atmosphere revealed the spreading of mili-
tancy in the world Communist movement.33
Because of the outbreak of numerous Communist-led uprisings shortly after
the conference, there have been allegations that Moscow used the conference to
pass on instructions to the Southeast Asian parties. Two specific arguments stand
in the way of such a possibility. The first is that the composition of the conference
did not make it a suitable vehicle for revolutionary instructions. Most participants
were non-Communists, and Moscow did not view meetings such as the Southeast
Asian Youth Conference as a revolutionary tool, but more as an arena to project
Moscow’s ideas on world affairs to Communist sympathizers and leftists.
Secondly, there was the question of who would have been in charge of passing on
these instructions. The Soviet delegation to the conference consisted of a group
of Central Asians, none of whom held high-ranking positions in the CPSU. It is
unlikely that any of these were trusted to pass on such instructions, and, in addition,
there were few other Communist representatives to receive such instructions. The
only known Southeast Asian Communist who attended the conference was the
Burmese party leader Than Tun.34
8 Choosing sides
The absence of materials on the Calcutta conference in Soviet diplomatic and
Communist party records reduces the likelihood that this conference played an
important role in distributing instructions from the Soviet Union to the Southeast
Asian Communist parties. However, there are still unexplored sources that might
reveal more about the conference, such as those of the Soviet Youth Organization
Komsomol.35 But even if the conference was not used to pass on instructions, it
has been argued that it served a useful purpose within Soviet strategy. The reason
for that was the emphasis put on discussing the Zhdanov theories and the fact that
one participant after another spoke out in favour of militant anti-imperialism.
Whether Moscow approved of the more militant course taken by the Southeast
Asian Communists after Calcutta is difficult to establish through available mate-
rials. There was no fixed pattern in the Soviet response to the upcoming rebel-
lions in Southeast Asia. Nor was there any to draw significant conclusions from
Communist experiences there which might be applied to the rest of the colonial
world. As such the overall conclusion must be that, to find explanations for the
uprisings in the Southeast Asian countries in those years, it will be more fruitful
to look at conditions within the countries themselves.36
Whether it was due to the Calcutta conference or not, from 1948 on meetings
between Soviet and Vietnamese representatives took place on a more regular
basis. The recurring theme at these meetings was the question of Soviet assistance
to the Vietnamese, both economic and military. At a meeting in Moscow in late
August 1948 between the deputy head of the Vietnamese information bureau in
Bangkok, Le Hy, and M. Sh. Bakhitov, deputy head of the Southeast Asia
Department (SEAD) in the Soviet foreign ministry, these issues were raised. The
purpose of the meeting was, according to Le Hy, to report on the situation in
Vietnam. Le Hy informed Bakhitov that at that point the Republic of Vietnam37
(‘Respublika Viet-Nam’) had already for three years fought against the French
military intervention, supported by the British and the Americans and with the
tacit approval of the Guomindang clique in China. Due to its geographic location
(China in the north and French forces in the south) and the developing interna-
tional political situation, Vietnam fought without any help or support – except
moral – from the outside. For tactical reasons, the leaders of the Vietnamese
Communist Party had decided to disperse the party into different democratic and
mass organisations to preclude it from officially standing forth as the leading
force in the government and among the masses.38 Le Hy’s emphasis on the divi-
sion of the party might have been his way of defending the official dissolution of
the ICP in November 1945, which had caused suspicion in Moscow.
During the meeting with Bakhitov, Le Hy also talked about the original purpose
of his trip. He was on his way to Prague to open a Vietnamese information
agency. The purpose of the office would be to strengthen the ties and improve
contacts with progressive and democratic states. Le Hy would be in charge of the
agency, and the staff would consist of three people – among them Australian
Communist Alexander Brotherton. He also reported that he was forced to wait in
Moscow for further instructions from his government. The purpose of his visit to
Moscow was among other things to present an unofficial inquiry on behalf of the
 Choosing sides 9
Communist party circles in Vietnam whether the Soviet government and the
party could help the Vietnamese Republic with weapons, ammunition and other
kinds of equipment and present this as a loan. In case of a positive answer to the
inquiry, Le Hy wondered whether the Soviet Union could send a plenipotentiary
delegation to Vietnam for proper negotiations.39
Le Hy also had another request. He wondered whether the Soviet government
would allow some Vietnamese students to come to the Soviet Union to study. He
underlined the respect of the Vietnamese people for the Soviet Union and empha-
sized the fact that Ho Chi Minh had lived for nine years in the Soviet Union. He
also added that the Vietnamese government reckoned that for the moment it would
be inconvenient to address an official request for assistance from the Soviet
Union. Because of this he had to present this request on behalf of the Communist
circles in Vietnam and ask whether the Soviet Union could give any kind of assist-
ance to Vietnam in any form that would be convenient for the Soviet Union. If it
should prove impossible to get such support from the Soviet government, he
would do it through the Soviet Communist Party. Bakhitov did not give any
promises, but answered that some action would be taken to clear this up.40
Apparently the Soviets found the organization of Vietnamese representation in
Thailand somewhat confusing. The role of Le Hy was the most prominent
example. His claim to be an official representative of the DRV, and his
approaches to the Soviets for support, seemed to be a source of concern to other
Vietnamese officials. That also caught the attention of the Soviets in Bangkok.
Sergei Nemtchin confronted Nguyen Duc Quy on the issue of Le Hy and was told
that Le Hy had a limited task – to organize propaganda about Vietnam in Europe
and that he was not an official representative of the Vietnamese government and
took all decisions on his work independently.41 The confusion around the role of
Le Hy could be part of the reason why Soviet envoy Nemtchin characterized the
behaviour of Vietnamese diplomats in Bangkok as disorganized and amateurish.42
The August meeting with Le Hy was followed up in late September 1948
when the Soviet envoy in Thailand, Sergei Sergeevitch Nemtschin, met with the
head of the Vietnamese delegation in Southeast Asia, Nguyen Duc Quy – who
was a proper representative for the DRV. In 1948 the Soviet legation in Bangkok
was the only Soviet representation in Southeast Asia. At that time Thailand and,
from 1948, Burma were the only independent countries in the region, and thus
the only possibilities for setting up representation. Thailand gave Moscow per-
mission to set up the legation in exchange for the Soviet Union’s vote at the
United Nations on Thailand’s bid to join. Thailand was accepted as a UN mem-
ber, and Moscow formed its first formal diplomatic post in Southeast Asia by
March–April 1948.43
The purpose of Nguyen Duc Quy’s visit to the Soviet envoy was to establish
contacts with the representative of the Soviet Communist Party in Thailand. He
assumed that the envoy, Nemtchin, was also the CPSU representative. Nemtchin,
however, explained that that was not the case and that he only represented the
Soviet state as such. While talking to Nemtchin, Nguyen Duc Quy also referred
to the September 1947 meeting that had taken place in Switzerland between
10 Choosing sides
Pham Ngoc Thach and Anatolii Kylashenkov. The lack of reference to Le Hy’s
mission in this context further confirmed his unofficial status and accentuated
Nguyen Duc Quy’s distrust of Hy. From the records of this meeting we have
already seen how Pham Ngoc Thach presented a request from the Vietnamese
government for assistance from the Soviet Union. In addition, according to
Nguyen Duc Quy, Pham Ngoc Thach had also used the opportunity to deliver a
direct request to the Soviet government from Ho Chi Minh, in which the latter
sought support for a proposal that the United Nations intervene in the Franco-
Vietnamese conflict.44
In addition to Nguyen Duc Quy, another Vietnamese official, referred to as
Chuong, was involved in the discussions.45 He is referred to in Nemtchin’s reply
as a member of the Vietnamese government and a secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Vietnamese Communist Party. His mission was to establish contact
with the Soviet Communist Party, and he needed a visa to go to Moscow. Due to
the situation, Nguyen Duc Quy wondered whether the Soviet mission in Thailand
could act as a liaison between the Vietnamese and the Soviet Communist parties
and assist Chuong in getting a visa to the Soviet Union. According to Nguyen
Duc Quy, Chuong had two tasks to perform: one was to inform Moscow of the
situation in Vietnam, and the second was to discuss assistance to Vietnam.
Returning to conditions in Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Quy reported that the struggle
was in such a phase that it was necessary to receive assistance from abroad since
the Vietminh’s heavy weapons were insufficient.46
On a direct question of how to implement this assistance, Nguyen Duc Quy
answered that the Vietnamese wanted the Soviets to help them raise money that
was needed to buy necessary weapons from American smugglers. Vietnam
would need about 2–5 million US dollars. However, with the ongoing French
blockade it was too difficult to transfer money out of Vietnam. Nguyen Duc Quy
explained that they did have an opportunity to buy weapons from American
smugglers, overcome the blockade and transport these into Vietnam. On numer-
ous occasions during the conversation Nguyen Duc Quy referred to ‘our party’ as
if to assure Nemtchin that the Vietnamese Communist Party was in charge of
everything in Vietnam.47
Throughout 1948 Vietnamese diplomats in Bangkok continued to approach the
Soviets with requests for assistance, but without any apparent success. Toward
the end of September 1948 Nguyen Duc Quy informed the Soviet attaché in
Siam, Igor Grigorevich Ysatchov, that the Vietnamese Communist Party was
about to send a request to the CCP for military aid – and as a part of that they
would also ask for two senior officers to lead military operations. To solve the
most immediate problems related to supplies of weapons, they had made a deal
with Burma on intermediate landing of Vietnamese aircraft on Burmese territory
for loading. The Vietnamese were also ready to buy Burmese weapons (US surplus
weapons) and let aircraft drop them over Vietnam with parachutes. That would
help overcome the French blockade.48
In the years before the establishment of the PRC contact between the Chinese
and Vietnamese Communists remained limited, even though Ho Chi Minh, as
 Choosing sides 11
well as several of the other leaders in Hanoi, previously had entertained close
connections with the Chinese Communists in the 1920s and 1930s. During his
time as an active member of the PCF in Paris, Ho met several of the men who
would become central within the CCP, such as Zhou Enlai, Wang Ruofei, Xiao
San and Li Fuchun. Ho had also worked in China for a long period in the mid-
1920s when the Communist International sent him from Moscow to Guangzhou,
where he assisted Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern representative to the new
Chinese revolutionary government led by the Guomindang.49
According to Chinese sources, from 1945 to 1949 assistance from the Chinese
Communists to the Vietminh was mostly in the category of mutual assistance.
One example was the incident in March 1946, when a unit from the CCP’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) sought refuge in North Vietnam and was welcomed by
the Vietnamese Communists. The unit had withdrawn into Vietnam to avoid a
Guomindang attack, and Ho Chi Minh asked if they could help train his troops so
they would be better prepared for a war against the French. That encounter was
important for the future of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Although no evidence sug-
gests that the CCP provided regular contributions to the Vietminh until 1949, the
CCP sub-bureau in British Hong Kong seems to have provided them with some
funds on a more irregular basis from 1947. Even the lines of communication
between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were not very strong before
1950. The first direct line of telegraphic communications between the two parties
was set up in the spring of 1947.50
Chinese aid was a welcome support, but the Vietnamese strongly emphasized
that they were not interested in receiving aid only from the CCP. The requests for
Soviet support continued. In early October 1948 Nguyen Duc Quy requested
both military and economic assistance. At the time there was no military acad-
emy in Vietnam, and this had resulted in a general lack of officers to lead the
fight against the French. Duc Quy therefore asked about the possibility of educat-
ing 50 officers – captains and lieutenants – in higher military academies in the
Soviet Union. In addition he asked for stipends and educational opportunities
within the area of economy, so that in turn the Vietnamese would be better
equipped to run their own national economy.51
The immediate Soviet reaction was negative. Nemtchin explained that since
the end of the Second World War Soviet educational facilities has been filled up
with those who had interrupted their studies due to the war, and hence there was
very little space for foreign students. Nguyen Duc Quy once again asked
Nemtchin to pass a request for money and weapons to conduct the war to the
Soviet Communist Party, upon which Nemtchin once again replied that since he
was not a Communist party official, he could not pass on such a request.52

Renewed Soviet interest in Asia

The Vietnamese Communists’ first attempts to establish relations with the out-
side world have the characteristic of a classic history of rejections. Their attempts
to establish relations with the United States and the Soviet Union went on more
12 Choosing sides
or less parallel tracks. A second wave of attempts to secure assistance from the
United States or the Soviet Union was made through the DRV representative
office in Bangkok during 1947. First, the Vietnamese representatives flirted with
the Americans in the spring, hoping that the US stand on colonialism could
secure support against the French. That attempt failed because those who
favoured support to Ho Chi Minh did not have enough influence within the
Truman administration, and the final lid on the possibility of American support
came with the start of the Cold War, when the Americans already believed that
the DRV was part of the Communist world. The unsuccessful attempts at estab-
lishing relations with the Americans were followed by an attempt to secure
assistance from the Soviet Union in the fall of 1947. But Moscow was no more
eager than Washington to assist the Vietnamese, and the DRV was rejected once
again.
Even after the French Communists were expelled from the government, Moscow
remained reluctant to support the Vietminh in their struggle against the French
forces. Thus, by the end of 1948 the Vietnamese Communists had to realize that
their attempts to secure Soviet support in their war against the French had failed.
Repeated requests and pleas to the Soviets both in Bangkok and Moscow had led
to moral support at most. Europe was still the major target of Soviet foreign
policy, and Stalin was not willing to risk that over support for the Vietnamese.
In the late 1940s Vietnam was too far away and too insignificant to become the
main focus of Moscow’s foreign policy. Thus, as one historian has put it, from
1948 onwards, the Vietnamese had to accept that in the coming years the success
of the CCP and Mao Zedong represented their best chance to break the isolation
in their war for independence.53 So, in short, one could argue that while the
DRV’s relations with the world began in Thailand in 1945, and from 1947 were
represented by Bangkok as the only diplomatic outlet for the DRV, the successful
Vietnamese relations with the world began with the Communist victory in China
in 1949, and the subsequent Chinese recognition of the DRV in January 1950.
However, in 1949 the situation in Asia changed dramatically, and in 1950 the
success of the Chinese Communists forced Stalin to pay more attention not only
to China but also to Vietnam. In May 1949 Soviet analysts concluded that ‘the
success of the People’s Liberation Army of China undoubtedly has a strong
influence on the outcome of the Vietnamese people’s fight for national independ-
ence’.54 The role of both Moscow and Beijing in Asia was discussed during Liu
Shaoqi’s visit to Moscow in the summer of 1949, when Stalin suggested that
China take on the main responsibility for supporting revolutionary movements in
the former Asian colonies once the People’s Republic was in place.55
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