ANSI/ANS-2.

26-2004

REAFFIRMED
May 27, 2010 categorization of nuclear facility structures,
ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 systems, and components for seismic design
(R2010)

This standard has been reviewed and reaffirmed by the ANS Nuclear Facilities
Standards Committee (NFSC) with the recognition that it may reference other
standards and documents that may have been superceded or withdrawn. The
requirements of this document will be met by using the version of the standards and
documents referenced herein. It is the responsibility of the user to review each of
the references and to determine whether the use of the original references or more
recent versions is appropriate for the facility. Variations from the standards and
documents referenced in this standard should be evaluated and documented.
This standard does not necessarily reflect recent industry initiatives for risk informed
decision-making or a graded approach to quality assurance. Users should consider
the use of these industry initiatives in the application of this standard.
ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004

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 ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004

American National Standard

Categorization of Nuclear Facility
Structures, Systems, and Components
for Seismic Design

Secretariat
American Nuclear Society

Prepared by the
American Nuclear Society
Standards Committee
Working Group ANS-2.26

Published by the
American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA

Approved December 2, 2004

by the
American National Standards Institute, Inc.

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 American Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests that
the principles of openness and due process have been followed in the approval
National procedure and that a consensus of those directly and materially affected by
Standard the standard has been achieved.

This standard was developed under procedures of the Standards Committee of

the American Nuclear Society; these procedures are accredited by the Amer-
ican National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American
National Standards. The consensus committee that approved the standard
was balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have
had an opportunity to participate.

An American National Standard is intended to aid industry, consumers, gov-

ernmental agencies, and general interest groups. Its use is entirely voluntary.
The existence of an American National Standard, in and of itself, does not
preclude anyone from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using prod-
ucts, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standard.

By publication of this standard, the American Nuclear Society does not insure
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its approval and publication. Changes, if any, occurring through developments
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subjected to periodic review. It may be reaffirmed, revised, or withdrawn at
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The American Nuclear Society accepts no responsibility for interpretations of

this standard made by any individual or by any ad hoc group of individuals.
Requests for interpretation should be sent to the Standards Department at
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accordance with established procedures that ensure consensus on the
interpretation.

Comments on this standard are encouraged and should be sent to Society

Headquarters.

Published by

American Nuclear Society

555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA

Copyright © 2004 by American Nuclear Society. All rights reserved.

Any part of this standard may be quoted. Credit lines should read “Extracted from
American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004 with permission of the publisher,
the American Nuclear Society.” Reproduction prohibited under copyright convention
unless written permission is granted by the American Nuclear Society.

Printed in the United States of America

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Foreword (This foreword is not part of American National Standard Categorization of Nuclear
Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design, ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004.)

This standard has been developed based on methods used by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) for performance categorizing and designing structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) in nuclear facilities to withstand the effects of
natural phenomena (DOE-STD-1021-93, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Perfor-
mance Categorization Guidelines for Structures, Systems, and Components,”
July 1993, Reaffirmed 2002; DOE-STD-1020-2002, “Natural Phenomena Haz-
ards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities,” Jan-
uary 2002; DOE-STD-1022-94, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Site Characterization
Criteria,” March 1994, Reaffirmed 2002; DOE-STD-1023-95, “Natural Phenom-
ena Hazards Assessment Criteria,” March 1995, Reaffirmed 2002).
This standard provides criteria and guidance for selecting a seismic design
category (SDC) and Limit State for the SSCs with a safety function in a nuclear
facility, other than commercial power reactors, whose seismic design require-
ments are established by other standards and regulations. The SDC and Limit
State are to be used in conjunction with standards ANS-2.27, “Criteria for
Investigations of Nuclear Materials Facilities Sites for Seismic Hazard Assess-
ments”; ANS-2.29, “Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis”; and ANSI0ASCE0
SEI 43-05, “Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems and Components in
Nuclear Facilities.” These standards together establish the design response spec-
tra and the design and construction practices to be applied to the SSCs in the
facility, dependent on which SDC and Limit State are assigned to the SSC. The
objective is to achieve a risk-informed design that protects the public, the envi-
ronment, and workers from potential consequences of earthquakes. Application
of this group of standards will produce (a) the design response spectra, (b) the
SSC Limit State necessary to achieve adequate safety performance during and
following earthquakes, and (c) SSC designs that achieve the desired Limit State.
Referenced standards and their procedural relationship to this standard are
discussed in Appendix A of this standard.
Working Group ANS-2.26 of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear
Society had the following membership at the time of approval of this standard
and indeed was stable throughout the development of the standard:
N. W. Brown (Chairman), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
S. Additon, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
H. Chander, U.S. Department of Energy
D. Guzy, U.S. Department of Energy
A. Hadjian, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Q. Hossain, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
C. Morrell, Shaw Group, Inc.
A. Persinko, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
H. C. Shaffer, Consultant
J. D. Stevenson, Consultant
C. M. Vaughan, Global Nuclear Fuel

This standard was prepared under the guidance of Subcommittee 21, Design
Criteria0Operations, of the American Nuclear Society. At the time of the ballot,
Subcommittee 21 was composed of the following members:
R. M. Ruby (Chairman), Constellation Energy
C. H. Moseley (Vice Chairman), BWXT Y-12
T. Dennis (Secretary), Individual
N. Brown, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
C. Eldridge, Pacific Gas & Electric Company
S. Floyd, Nuclear Energy Institute

–i–

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 J. Glover, Graftel, Inc.
M. P. Horrell, Washington Group, Inc.
R. P. Kassawara, Electric Power Research Institute
L. Krieder, Engineering Planning & Management, Inc.
R. Morris, Tennessee Valley Authority
D. Ostrom, Individual
W. J. Rudolph, FirstEnergy Corporation
J. D. Stevenson, Individual
M. Wilson, Millstone Nuclear Generating Station

This standard was processed and approved for submittal to ANSI by the Nuclear
Facilities Standards Committee (NSFC) of the American Nuclear Society on
ANSI0ANS-2.26, “Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and
Components for Seismic Design.” Committee approval of this standard does not
necessarily imply that all members voted for approval. At the time it approved
this standard, the NFSC had the following membership:
D. J. Spellman (Chairman), Oak Ridge National Laboratory
R. M. Ruby (Vice Chairman), Constellation Energy
C. K. Brown, Southern Nuclear Operating Company
R. H. Bryan, Tennessee Valley Authority
H. Chander, U.S. Department of Energy
M. T. Cross, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
T. Dennis, Individual
D. R. Eggett, AES Engineering
R. A. Hill, GE Nuclear Energy
R. Hall, Exelon Nuclear
N. P. Kadambi, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. Labar, General Atomics
E. Lloyd, Exitech
J. E. Love, Bechtel Power Corporation
J. F. Mallay, Framatome ANP
C. Mazzola, Shaw Environmental, Inc.
R. H. McFetridge, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
C. H. Moseley, BWXT Y-12
F. J. Pineau, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
W. B. Reuland, Electric Power Research Institute
J. Saldarini, Tetra Tech FW
R. E. Scott, Scott Enterprises
S. L. Stamm, Stone & Webster
J. D. Stevenson, J. D. Stevenson Consultants
C. D. Thomas, Jr., Individual
J. A. Wehrenberg, Southern Company Services
M. J. Wright, Entergy Operations

– ii –

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Contents Section Page

1 Scope .............................................................. 1

2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

3 Applicability ........................................................ 1

4 Determination of SSC Seismic Design Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4.2 Categorization Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4.3 Rules of Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

5 Determination of Limit States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

6 Analyses to Support Selection of SDC and Limit States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

6.1 General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2 Unmitigated Consequence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.3 Data Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table
Table 1 SDCs Based on the Unmitigated Consequences of SSC
Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendices
Appendix A Risk-Informed Basis for Seismic Design Categorization and
Associated Target Performance Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B Examples of Application of Limit States to SSCs . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C Guidance on a Structured Approach to Support Making the
Judgments Required in Section 6.2 of This Standard . . . . 19

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Categorization of Nuclear Facility
Structures, Systems, and
Components for Seismic Design
1 Scope experience during or following an earthquake
and still perform its safety function. Four Limit
This standard provides (a) criteria for selecting States are identified and used by this standard
the seismic design category 1) (SDC) for nuclear and ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 [1].2)
facility structures, systems, and components
seismic design category (SDC): One of five
(SSCs) to achieve earthquake safety and (b)
categories used in this standard and the accom-
criteria and guidelines for selecting Limit States
panying three standards identified in Appendix
for these SSCs to govern their seismic design.
A that are used to establish seismic hazards eval-
The Limit States are selected to ensure the
uations and SSC seismic design requirements.
desired safety performance in an earthquake.
target performance goal: Target annual fre-
quency of an SSC exceeding its specified Limit
2 Definitions State. Target performance goals of 1 ⫻ 10⫺4 0
year, 4 ⫻ 10⫺5 0year, and 1 ⫻ 10⫺50year are used
common-cause failure: Multiple failures of in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05. The importance of
SSCs as the result of a single phenomenon. target performance goals in this standard is
discussed in Appendix A.
engineered mitigating feature: An SSC that
is relied upon during and following an accident total effective dose equivalent: The sum of
to mitigate the consequences of releases of en- the deep-dose equivalent (for external expo-
ergy, radioactive or toxic material. sure) and the committed effective dose equiva-
lent (for the internal exposure).
failure consequence: A measure of the radio-
logical and toxicological consequences of expo- unmitigated consequences: The product of a
sure to the public, the environment, and workers specific type of consequence analysis used for
that may result from failure of an SSC by itself the selection of the SDC for an SSC. Unmiti-
or in combination with other SSCs. gated consequence analysis is described in 6.2.
graded approach: The process of assuring that
the level of analysis, documentation, and ac-
tions used to comply with requirements in this
3 Applicability
standard are commensurate with (a) the rela-
This standard is applicable to the design of
tive importance to safety, safeguards, and se-
SSCs of nuclear facilities. For the purpose of
curity; (b) the magnitude of any hazard involved;
this standard, a nuclear facility is a facility
(c) the life cycle stage of the facility; (d) the
that stores, processes, tests, or fabricates ra-
programmatic mission of a facility; (e) the par-
dioactive materials in such form and quantity
ticular characteristics of the facility; (f ) the
that a nuclear risk to the workers, to the off-
relative importance of the radiological and non-
site public, or to the environment may exist.
radiological hazards; and (g) any other rele-
These include but are not limited to nuclear
vant factor.
fuel manufacturing facilities; nuclear material
Limit State: The limiting acceptable deforma- waste-processing, storage, fabrication, and re-
tion, displacement, or stress that an SSC may processing facilities; uranium enrichment facil-

1)
The SDCs used in this standard are not the same as the SDCs referred to in the International Building
Code (IBC).
2) Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Section 7, “References.”

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

ities; tritium production and handling facilities; sulting from the consequences of failure of the
radioactive materials laboratories; and nuclear SSC (see Appendix A for additional discussion).
reactors other than commercial power reactors. Each SDC has a defined consequence severity
(Commercial power reactors are excluded be- level that shall not be exceeded. Proper assign-
cause their seismic design requirements are ment of SDCs to the SSCs and constructing 3)
specified by other American Nuclear Society the SSCs in accordance with the International
standards.) Building Code (IBC) or Standard ANSI0ASCE0
SEI 43-05 as required will provide an accept-
The SSC seismic design categories that this ably low risk to the public, the environment,
standard establishes shall be used by the facil- and workers from seismic-induced SSC failures.
ity owner and the facility designer, in conjunc-
tion with ANS-2.27, “Criteria for Investigations 4.2 Categorization Process
of Nuclear Materials Facilities Sites for Seis-
mic Hazard Assessments” [2]; ANS-2.29 “Prob- 4.2.1
abilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis” [3]; and
One of the SDCs listed in Table 1 shall be
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
assigned to the SSCs based on the unmitigated
standard ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05, “Seismic De-
consequences that may result from the failure
sign Criteria for Structures, Systems and Com-
of the SSC by itself or in combination with
ponents in Nuclear Facilities” [1].
other SSCs. If the SSC failure consequences
are equal to or less than the guidance listed in
Table 1 for a given SDC, the SSC shall be
4 Determination of SSC Seismic placed in that SDC. The consequences shall be
Design Categories equal to or less for all three types of conse-
quences listed in Table 1 (i.e., consequences to
4.1 Introduction the public, the environment, and workers), and
SSCs that have been determined to have a safety the SSC shall be placed in the highest SDC
function shall be assigned one of five SDCs. An determined under the consequence type. Sec-
SSC shall be considered to perform a safety tion 6.2 provides guidance on performing un-
function if its failure, by itself or in combina- mitigated consequence evaluations.
tion with other SSCs, could result in any of the
consequence levels identified in Table 1 being 4.2.2
exceeded. In addition, an SSC, the failure of SDC-1 and SDC-2 in conjunction with the IBC
which may adversely affect an operator action and SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5 in conjunction
that is required for restoring another SSC safety with ANS-2.27, ANS-2.29, and ANSI0ASCE0
function or for preventing or mitigating the SEI 43-05 establish the design response spec-
consequences of a design-basis earthquake tra (DRS) and SSC design and analysis
(DBE) during and following the event, shall be requirements. For SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5,
considered to have a safety function. The iden- the DRS are specified as the product of the
tification of SSCs with safety functions is the uniform hazard response spectra obtained using
product of the safety analyses required to sup- ANS-2.27 and ANS-2.29, and a design factor
port application of this standard. Section 6 out- specified in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05. The DRS
lines the scope of the safety analysis required. for SDC-1 and SDC-2 are specified in the IBC.
The scope and comprehensiveness of the safety
analysis will vary with the complexity of the 4.2.3
facility, its operations, and the contained hazard.
Based on the information or data obtained from
The assignment of an SDC to an SSC deter- the safety analyses outlined in Section 6 and
mined to have a safety function is based on the guidance provided here, SSCs assigned
the objective of achieving acceptable risk to SDC-3, SDC-4, or SDC-5 shall also be assigned
the public, the environment, and workers re- one of four Limit States that are identified in

3)“Constructing” includes design, fabrication, erection, excavation, material selection, material qualification
inspection, testing, administrative control, documentation, and quality assurance.

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Table 1 – SDCs based on the unmitigated consequences of SSC failure

Unmitigated Consequence of SSC Failure

Category Worker Public Environment

SDC-1 a) No radiological0 No radiological0 No radiological0

toxicological release toxicological release toxicological release
consequences but fail- consequences. consequences.
ure of SSCs may place
facility workers at risk
of physical injury.

SDC-2 a) Radiological0 Radiological0 No radiological or

toxicological exposures toxicological exposures chemical environmental
to workers will have no of public areas are consequences.
permanent health ef- small enough to re-
fects, may place more quire no public warn-
facility workers at risk ings concerning health
of physical injury, or effects.
may place emergency
facility operations at
risk.

SDC-3 Radiological0 Radiological0 No long-term environ-

toxicological exposures toxicological exposures mental consequences
that may place facility of public areas would are expected, but envi-
workers’ long-term not be expected to cause ronmental monitoring
health in question. health consequences may be required for a
but may require emer- period of time.
gency plans to assure
public protection.

SDC-4 Radiological0 Radiological0 Environmental moni-

toxicological exposures toxicological exposures toring required and
that may cause long- that may cause long- potential temporary
term health problems term health problems exclusion from selected
and possible loss of life to an individual at the areas for contamina-
for a worker in proxim- exclusion area bound- tion removal.
ity of the source of ary for 2 hours.
hazardous material, or
place workers in
nearby on-site facilities
at risk.

SDC-5 Radiological0 Radiological0 Environmental moni-

toxicological exposures toxicological exposures toring required and
that may cause loss of that may possibly potentially permanent
life of workers in the cause loss of life to an exclusion from selected
facility. individual at the exclu- areas of contamination.
sion area boundary for
an exposure of 2 hours.
a)
“No radiological0toxicological releases” or “no radiological0toxicological consequences” means that
material releases that cause health or environment concerns are not expected to occur from failures of
SSCs assigned to this category.

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Section 5. Appendix B provides examples of safety function even after developing some
how this determination may be made. The set significant leaks following an earthquake.
of requirements identified by the SDC and the
Limit State is called the seismic design basis Limit State B: An SSC designed to this Limit
used by ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05. No Limit State State may sustain moderate permanent distor-
identification is required for SDC-1 and SDC-2, tion but shall still perform its safety function.
whose design requirements are identified in The acceptability of moderate distortion may
the IBC. include consideration of both structural integ-
rity and leak-tightness.
4.3 Rules of Application
4.3.1 Examples of SSCs that may be designed to this
Limit State are as follows:
SSCs assigned SDC-1 with Limit States A, B,
and C shall be designed to the IBC seismic use
(1) building structures that cannot be dam-
group (SG I, SG II, and SG III, respectively).
aged to the extent that the ability to perform
4.3.2 their safety function is lost. Such structures
include fire stations, hospitals, or other emer-
SSCs assigned SDC-2 with Limit States A and
gency response structures;
B shall be designed to the IBC seismic use
group (SG II and SG III, respectively).
(2) systems and components designed to be
4.3.3 pressure retaining but may perform their
safety function even after developing some
SSCs assigned SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5 shall
minor leaks following an earthquake (i.e., ei-
be designed to the requirements of ANSI0ASCE0
ther they do not contain hazardous material,
SEI 43-05.
or the leakage rates associated with minor
4.3.4 leaks do not exceed the consequence level of
the assigned SDC category).
SSCs in a facility with a human occupancy rate
of .72 person-hours024-hour period shall be
Limit State C: An SSC designed to this Limit
placed, as a minimum, in SDC-1. SSC failures
State may sustain minor permanent distortion
that result in no consequence to the public or
but shall still perform its safety function. An SSC
environment and present only a physical threat
that is expected to undergo minimal damage dur-
to the workers and are therefore placed in SDC-1
ing and following an earthquake such that no
shall be designed to the IBC Seismic Use
postearthquake repair is necessary may be as-
Group I.
signed this Limit State. An SSC in this Limit
State may perform its confinement function dur-
ing and following an earthquake.
5 Determination of Limit States
Examples of SSCs that may be designed to this
Limit State A: An SSC designed to this Limit
Limit State are
State may sustain large permanent distortion
short of collapse and instability (i.e., uncon-
(1) glove boxes containing radioactive or haz-
trolled deformation under minimal incremen-
ardous material;
tal load) but shall still perform its safety function
and not impact the safety performance of other
(2) confinement barriers for radioactive or
SSCs.
hazardous materials;
Examples of SSCs that may be designed to this
Limit State are as follows: (3) heating ventilation and air-conditioning
systems that service equipment or building
(1) building structures that must function to
space containing radioactive or hazardous
permit occupants escape to safety following
material;
an earthquake;
(2) systems and components designed to be (4) active components that may have to move
pressure retaining but may perform their or change state following the earthquake.

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Limit State D: An SSC designed to this Limit analyses shall provide the basis for assigning
State shall maintain its elastic behavior. An an SSC to one of the SDCs and selecting its
SSC in this Limit State shall perform its safety Limit State. Documented support for the safety
function during and following an earthquake. analysis shall include the unmitigated conse-
Gaseous, particulate, and liquid confinement quence analysis associated with failure of the
by SSCs is maintained. The component sus- SSC being categorized as described in 6.2. Qual-
tains no damage that would reduce its capabil- itative and quantitative values of the critical
ity to perform its safety function. design parameter(s) at which the SSC safety
function fails shall be identified, along with
Examples of SSCs that may be designed to this the unmitigated radiological, toxicological, and
Limit State are environmental consequences of the failure. The
unmitigated consequence analysis is essential
(1) containments for large inventories of ra-
to this standard.
dioactive or hazardous materials;

(2) components that are designed to prevent 6.1.3

inadvertent nuclear criticality; To achieve the objectives of this standard, the
(3) SSCs that perform safety functions that safety analyses shall evaluate the uncertainties
may be impaired due to permanent deforma- with determining failure and the consequences
tion (e.g., valve operators, control rod drives, of failure. The depth and documentation of the
high-efficiency particulate absorber (HEPA) uncertainty analyses should be sufficient to sup-
filter housings, turbine or pump shafts, etc.); port the judgment that categorization based on
Table 1 and the design requirements in ANSI0
(4) SSCs that perform safety functions that ASCE0SEI 43-05 produce a facility that is safe
require the SSC to remain elastic or rigid so from earthquakes.
that it retains its original strength and stiff-
ness during and following a DBE to satisfy 6.2 Unmitigated Consequence Analysis
its safety, mission, or operational require-
ments (e.g., relays, switches, valve operators, 6.2.1
control rod drives, HEPA filter housings, tur-
An unmitigated consequence analysis of the haz-
bine or pump shafts, etc.).
ards in a facility and the function of the items
The combination of SDC (SDC-3, SDC-4, or relied on for safety shall be completed to sup-
SDC-5 only) and Limit State (A, B, C, or D) port SSC seismic categorization. The basic data
determines the DBE and acceptance criteria and analysis identified in 6.3 shall be used to
for designing the SSCs in accordance with ANSI0 support the unmitigated consequence analysis.
ASCE0SEI 43-05 (e.g., SDC-3C uses criteria The unmitigated consequence analysis shall be
given in this standard for SDC-3 and Limit performed considering only the inherent physi-
State C.) cal or chemical characteristics of the hazardous
material and the energy sources for dispersing
the material [4, 6].
6 Analyses to Support Selection
6.2.2
of SDC and Limit States
The SSC being evaluated shall have one or
6.1 General Requirements more safety functions identified by the facility
safety analysis required in 6.1 and related to
6.1.2 preventing accidents, such as nuclear critical-
ity, or mitigating the consequences from an ac-
Following determination of the regulatory re-
cidental release of a specified inventory of
quirements applicable to the project or to the
radioactive or hazardous material.
facility, a safety analysis or integrated safety
analysis shall be performed. The guidelines pro-
6.2.3
vided in this standard and other applicable stan-
dards such as Refs. [4] and [5] should be used. The SSC and all other relevant engineered mit-
In the context of this standard, the safety igating features shall be assumed not to func-

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

tion unless the robustness of each mitigating SSC to be assigned to SDC-3, SDC-4, or SDC-5).
feature can be demonstrated to survive the pos- If the SSC’s failure in conjunction with other fail-
tulated event. Robustness is discussed in 6.3.2.5. ures results in an unacceptable release of haz-
Redundancy may also be used as a mitigating ardous material, then it shall be placed in SDC-3,
feature providing the independence of redun- SDC-4, or SDC-5. For example, failure of a relay
dant features shall be demonstrated, such that required to start an emergency air-cleaning sys-
there is a very low probability of an earthquake- tem may not lead to an unmitigated release un-
induced common-cause failure. less there is a coincident failure of other SSCs
that results in release of hazardous material to
6.2.4 the space serviced by the air-cleaning system.
In this case, it may be necessary to place the re-
ANSI0ANS-5.10-1998, “Airborne Release Frac-
lay in SDC-3, SDC-4, or SDC-5 depending on the
tions at Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities” [7],
unmitigated consequences.
provides guidance concerning mechanisms for
release of the hazardous material into the air
6.2.8
or water and shall be used to support similar
calculations required by this standard. When assigning SDCs in cases of common-
cause failure of redundant SSCs, it will be nec-
6.2.5 essary to exercise judgment about the relative
contribution that each SSC’s postulated failure
Consistent with the risk-informed process that
makes to the unmitigated release.
forms the basis for this standard (see Appendix
A), the unmitigated consequence analysis shall
6.2.9
strive to use mean values for the parameters
related to material release, dispersal in the In some instances it may be possible to justify
environment, and health consequences. In many an SSC as having not failed when evaluating
instances the data available to support these another SSC. In these cases the SSC being
analyses are not prototypic of the situation be- assumed to have not failed should be at least
ing analyzed, or there is large and poorly char- one SDC higher than the SSC being evaluated.
acterized uncertainty. Hence, judgment must Section 6.3.2.5 discusses the bases for using
be used to select a mean value for the param- the characteristic of redundancy and “robust-
eter of concern. The objective of using mean ness” to support such a judgment.
values is not intended to demand many data
points and statistical computation of the mean. 6.2.10
It is intended that the parameters used in the
The information database and unmitigated con-
evaluation be based on consideration of the range
sequence analysis must be comprehensive
of possible values given the physical and chem-
enough to support discrimination between the
ical conditions involved with the failure and
qualitative criteria in Table 1. Both the analy-
the basis for the value judged to be the mean to
sis and the assignment of SSCs to SDCs are
be documented (See Appendix C).
likely to be simpler and more obvious for the
low-consequence categories. Supporting deci-
6.2.6
sions between SDC-3 and SDC-4 and between
The computed dose consequences shall be the SDC-4 and SDC-5 may be expected to be more
total effective dose equivalent, and the dose to difficult. The quantitative guidelines discussed
the public shall be based on the maximally in Appendix A may be used to guide the deci-
exposed off-site individual. The air and water sion process related to the more difficult deci-
transport mechanisms should be modeled using sions on assigning an SDC to an SSC.
mean values for model parameters and associ-
ated uncertainties estimated. 6.3 Data Compilation

6.2.7 6.3.1 Facility Review

The unmitigated consequence of an SSC’s fail- A systematic review of the facility’s mission,
ure by itself may not lead to an unacceptable re- usage, process, and operation and its inventory
lease of hazardous material (i.e., requiring the of radioactive and chemically hazardous mate-

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

rials shall be performed to obtain the following quences such that no one layer by itself, no
minimum data0information necessary for de- matter how robustly designed, is solely relied
termining the SDC and Limit States: upon either to prevent the failure or to miti-
gate the consequences. For nuclear facilities,
(1) quantity, type (e.g., radioactive or chem- compliance with defense-in-depth philosophy
ical), and form (gaseous, liquid, powder, solid, typically requires (a) safety consideration in
etc.) of the hazardous material inventory. For site selection; (b) minimization of material at
particulate releases, size spectra are very im- risk; (c) conservative design margins and a
portant to the analysis; formal quality assurance program; (d) succes-
(2) normal and emergency (if any) functions sive physical barriers and0or administrative
of the SSC during seismic and other design- controls for protection against radioactivity
basis events; releases to the environment and significant
public exposure to radioactivity; (e) provision
(3) number of workers in the facility and of multiple means to ensure the safety func-
at the site who may be adversely affected tions needed to control the processes and to
during or following an earthquake and its maintain them in a safe state; (f ) equipment
consequences; and administrative controls restricting devia-
tions from normal operations and providing
(4) proximity of the site boundary from the
for recovery from accidents; (g) means to mon-
facility and proximity of population centers
itor accidental releases (eff luent monitors) as
from the site;
well as environmental monitors; and (h) emer-
(5) regulatory and project requirements and gency plans for minimizing the effects of an
commitments regarding safety; accident on workers, the public, and the
environment.
(6) design specifications for the SSCs, includ-
ing applicable industry codes and standards. 6.3.2.2 Redundancy
These may vary in level of detail depending In the context of safety analysis, redundancy
on the status of design (conceptual, prelimi- refers either to the redundancy of an SSC or to
nary, or final), but the seismic classification the redundancy of a particular SSC safety func-
should be included at each stage of design tion. An SSC is said to be redundant when it is
commensurate with the level of detail avail- one of two or more SSCs in the facility that
able at each stage. have similar configurations and perform iden-
tical functions and only one SSC must func-
6.3.2 Facilities with SSCs Assigned
tion. An SSC function is redundant if another
SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5
SSC is available to perform the same function
The safety analyses required in 6.1 shall be or an administrative measure or control may
performed based on the following five princi- be put in place that may substitute for the SSC
ples and concepts: function with the same or higher degree of as-
surance. Redundancy may be introduced either
(1) defense-in-depth; as an element of “defense-in-depth” philosophy
(2) redundancy; [see 6.3.2(1)] to provide multilayered protec-
tion against adverse effects of the DBE or as a
(3) common-cause failure; design feature to support meeting the desired
failure probability. The treatment of redundant
(4) system interaction;
SSCs provided from defense-in-depth consider-
(5) robustness. ations has been addressed previously. For the
latter case, when redundancy is introduced as
These are described in detail in 6.3.2.1 through a design feature to achieve the desired failure
6.3.2.5. probability, the additive effect of the mitigating
functions of all redundant SSCs may be consid-
6.3.2.1 Defense-in-Depth
ered. However, the possibility and effects of
Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which common-cause failure (see 6.3.2.3) of redun-
a system or a facility is designed with layers of dant SSCs shall also be considered in seismic
defense against adverse SSC failure conse- safety analysis.

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

6.3.2.3 Common-Cause Failure (4) by designing the target SSC to withstand

the imposed interaction load.
The failure of multiple SSCs as a result of a
given postulated event is called common-cause 6.3.2.5 Robustness
failure. This phenomenon of exceeding a given
criterion due to a common-cause failure shall As discussed in 6.2.9, for an SSC’s mitigating
be considered in performing the facility seismic effects to be considered in the unmitigated ac-
safety analysis. However, the SSC seismic cat- cident consequence analysis, the SSC must be
egorization described in Section 4 shall be per- identified as robust and be given special atten-
formed assuming common-cause failure has tion in its construction. Assured margins shall
occurred unless an SSC(s) qualifies as robust be provided, typically at Limit State C or D
or incorporates redundancy with low probabil- levels, in its resistance to seismic damage. When
ity of common-cause failure during the earth- evaluating SSCs for placement in SDC-3 or
quake under the guidance provided in 6.2 and SDC-4, it may be permissible to take credit for
6.3.2.5. the consequence mitigation benefit of another
SSC in SDC-5. For this application to be ac-
6.3.2.4 System Interaction ceptable, it must be shown that the SSC has
substantial seismic margin to failure modes that
In some instances an SSC may not perform a may cause interaction with the SSC being eval-
safety function by itself, but its failure may ad- uated. In this special case, substantial seismic
versely affect the safety function of another SSC. margin is a judgment that must be supported
This phenomenon, commonly referred to as sys- by design and by the attention given to the
tem interaction or “two-over-one phenomenon,” SSC throughout its entire life cycle (i.e., de-
shall be considered in the facility safety analy- sign, procurement, construction, operation,
ses and SSC seismic categorization. Earthquake- maintenance, and decommissioning). An exam-
caused fire, f looding, and impact from movement ple of this situation is a building that is de-
or collapse of nearby objects are recognized signed with a containment function at SDC-5
sources for producing these potential failure se- that contains glove boxes whose unmitigated
quences. System interaction considerations shall failure may cause them to be placed in SDC-5.
also include the adverse effects of failure of a If it is demonstrated that the building has sub-
lower-category (i.e., SDC or Limit State) SSC (i.e., stantial seismic margin against collapse that
the source SSC) on the safety function of a higher- may cause glove box failures, then it may be
category SSC (i.e., the target SSC). The target acceptable to take credit for the building miti-
SSC is to withstand the imposed loading. gation of releases from glove boxes to support
placement of the glove boxes into a lower-level
System interaction effects may be addressed in SDC (i.e., SDC-3 or SDC-4).
one of the following four ways:

(1) by upgrading the nonsafety or lower SDC 7 References

or Limit State SSC (i.e., the source SSC) to
the extent necessary to preclude its adverse
[1] ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05, “Seismic Design
interaction with the affected or target SSC;
Criteria for Structures, Systems and Com-
ponents in Nuclear Facilities” (2005).
(2) by placing the source SSC in the same
SDC or higher and by modifying its Limit
State, if necessary, so that no interaction with [2] ANS-2.27, “Criteria for Investigations of
the target SSC occurs; Nuclear Materials Facilities Sites for Seis-
mic Hazard Assessments” (to be published
(3) by configuring the facility layout or SSC in 2006).
design to preclude adverse interaction be-
tween the source SSC and the target SSC. [3] ANS-2.29, “Probabilistic Seismic Hazard
Examples of such modifications are the fol- Analysis” (to be published in 2006).
lowing: creating sufficient physical separa-
tion, installing barriers, adding automatic [4] DOE-STD-3009-94, “Preparation Guide for
control systems, etc.; U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nu-

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

clear Facility Safety Analysis Reports,” Notice No. 1, U.S. Department of Energy
Change Notice No. 1, U.S. Department of (Sep. 1997).
Energy (Jan. 2000).
[7] ANSI0ANS-5.10-1998, “Airborne Release
[5] NUREG-1513, “Integrated Safety Analy- Fractions at Non-Reactor Nuclear Facili-
sis Guidance Document,” U.S. Nuclear Reg- ties,” American Nuclear Society.
ulatory Commission (May 31, 2001).
NOTE: When any of the American National
[6] DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categoriza- Standards referred to in this document is su-
tion and Accident Analysis Techniques for perseded by a revision approved by the Amer-
Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nu- ican National Standards Institute, the revision
clear Safety Analysis Reports,” Change shall apply.

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Appendix A
RISK-INFORMED BASIS FOR SEISMIC DESIGN
CATEGORIZATION AND ASSOCIATED
TARGET PERFORMANCE GOALS

This appendix provides a discussion about the risk-informed basis for the seismic design categori-
zation and the relationship of the seismic design categories (SDCs) and Limit States to the target
performance goals used in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 [A.1].1)

The objective of ANSI0ANS-2.26, in conjunction with three accompanying standards, ANS-2.27

[A.2], ANS-2.29 [A.3], and ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 [A.1], is to produce a consistent risk-informed
design of a nuclear facility that protects the workers, the public, and the environment from the
effects of earthquakes. This appendix discusses the rationale for the requirements in this standard
and the interface between this standard and the accompanying standards. Key parameters in the
procedure are the unmitigated consequence levels used to assign structures, systems, and compo-
nents (SSCs) to SDCs and the target performance goals used in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 to establish
design criteria. This appendix initially discusses the basis for the target performance goals and
then the basis for the consequence levels in Table 1 of this standard. Although this standard has a
risk-informed basis and some applications may benefit from completing a seismic risk assessment,
there is generally no need to apply ANSI0ANS-58.21-2003, “External-Events PRA Methodology”
[A.4].

Figure A.1 shows the interfaces between this standard and the three accompanying standards and
their procedural relationship. All four standards are needed to design facilities that contain SSCs
in SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5. Iterative interactions during application of the standards that are not
illustrated in Fig. A.1 should be anticipated.

Considerable progress has been made over the past 20 years toward the development of probabilistic-
based seismic design criteria and methods that achieve approximately a risk-informed seismic
design. Experience gained from seismic design and probabilistic seismic risk assessments of nu-
clear power plants and other high-hazard nuclear facilities has been a major contributor to this
progress. That experience was used to develop a probabilistic performance goal-based design
method to protect against natural phenomena hazards described in four U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) technical standards ( [A.5] through [A.8] ). The DOE standards are intended to
achieve approximately a consistent risk-informed design [A.9]. The introduction of seismic use
groups in the International Building Code (IBC) also indicates industry’s direction toward risk-
informed and graded methods of seismic design. These DOE standards and the IBC provide much
of the basis for the risk-informed and graded method of seismic design that this standard and its
accompanying standards intend to achieve.

A risk-informed design method has an objective of achieving an acceptable and balanced risk to the
workers and public over a wide range of hazardous facilities and operations. This is achieved by
applying increasingly stringent seismic design requirements commensurate with the severity of
consequences from SSC failure. A key part of the method is the use of quantitative target perfor-
mance goals that correspond to an estimate of the mean probability of failure of the SSC to perform
its safety function. These probabilistic goals are used to support selecting the return period for the
design-basis earthquake (DBE) or the probability of exceeding the DBE and to develop a rational
gradation in the design criteria and methods in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05. They are based on exten-
sive experience in seismic design and results from seismic risk assessments of commercial nuclear

1) Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in “References” on p. 14.

10

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Figure A.1 — Schematic showing the relationships of the seismic standards

power plants. However, there is no requirement to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in
order to apply these standards.
The SSC target performance goals are given in Table A.1. These goals and the SSC failure
consequence criteria in Table 1 of this standard have been selected to support development of
seismic design loads and SSC design criteria that will protect the public, the environment, and the
worker from hazards resulting from damages that might occur in nuclear facilities during earth-
quakes. The target performance goals are used in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 to establish the design
criteria as a function of the SDC level for SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5. The mean seismic failure
probability of building structures designed to the IBC is estimated to be ,1 ⫻ 10⫺30year. The design
requirements in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 for SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5 have been selected to be
more demanding than the building codes. The objective is for SSCs designed to SDC-3 criteria to
have the probability of failing to perform their safety function to be ,1 ⫻ 10⫺40year. It has been
judged that avoiding SDC-3 unmitigated consequences, at this probability, achieves approximately
a balanced risk relative to the other SDC levels. Seismic PRAs of a large number of commercial
nuclear power plants in the United States indicate that the mean seismic core damage frequency in
nuclear power plants is ;1 ⫻ 10⫺50year [A.10]. Although unmitigated consequences of SSC failures
in the facilities addressed by this standard are expected to be much less than those in nuclear
power plants, the unmitigated consequences in category SDC-5 are severe enough that it is
reasonable for SSCs placed in this category to have a target performance goal of 1 ⫻ 10⫺50year. The
log-linear uniform midpoint between 1 ⫻ 10⫺40year and 1 ⫻ 10⫺50year is 3.16 ⫻ 10⫺50year and could
have been selected as the target performance goal for SDC-4. However, a value of 4 ⫻ 10⫺50year was
selected in recognition of the approximate nature of the target performance goals and to achieve
some simplification in the ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 design methods.
Seismic risk assessments of facilities with SSCs designed using the methods in Ref. [A.6] (similar
to those specified in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05) for earthquake levels associated with earthquakes

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Table A.1 – Target performance goals used

in ANSI/ASCE/SEI 43-05

Seismic design Target performance

category goals

SDC-3 10⫺40year
SDC-4 4 ⫻ 10⫺50year
SDC-5 10⫺50year

Table A.2 – DBE used with design methods in ANSI/ASCE/SEI 43-05

Category Frequency of DBE

SDC-1 U.S. Geological Service (USGS) 2500-year return period map and the IBC
SDC-2 USGS 2500-year return period map and the IBC
SDC-3 Use ANS-2.29, and select uniform hazard response spectrum (UHRS) at
4 ⫻ 10⫺40year (mean), per ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05
SDC-4 Use ANS-2.29, and select UHRS at 4 ⫻ 10⫺40year (mean), per ASCE0SEI
43-05
SDC-5 Use ANS-2.29, and select UHRS at 10⫺40year (mean), per ASCE0SEI
43-05

having a 10,000-year mean return period (mean frequency of 1 ⫻ 10⫺40year) support that SSCs
designed to the most stringent level are expected to perform their safety functions at the SDC-5
target performance goal. The design methods in ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05 have been graded so that
at an earthquake frequency of 4 ⫻ 10⫺40year (mean), SSCs designed for SDC-3 and SDC-4 are
expected to achieve the target performance goals identified in Table A.1.
For nuclear facilities that contain small or no hazardous inventory, the risks are dominated by
damage to the facility and occupants, and it is appropriate to apply the IBC design methods.
Table A.2 summarizes the DBE frequencies and referenced methods for developing the design
response spectra.
The other key factor in the procedure is the assignment of an SDC to an SSC based on the
consequences of the unmitigated failure of the SSC. Unmitigated consequence analysis is a proce-
dure that has been used by the DOE for the purpose of incorporating safety in design and operation
of its nuclear facilities [A.11, A.12]. The concept is also used in 10 CFR 70, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation that applies to fuel cycle facilities [A.13], and the asso-
ciated Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1520 [A.14] ). In the latter case the SSCs or procedural
practices are addressed individually, and their importance to reducing the likelihood of unmitigated
consequences is evaluated. The qualitative criteria in Table 1 for unmitigated consequence analysis
were selected based on experience in accident analysis and criteria developed for NRC regulation
of nuclear facilities. The criteria in 10 CFR 70 for guiding license applications for Special Nuclear
Material were also used to develop Table 1. Quantitative consequence values very similar to the
NRC guidance and consistent with the qualitative criteria in Table 1 are provided in Table A.3 for
SDC-3, SDC-4, and SDC-5.2) These values combined with the target performance goals were used

2)The NRC consequences values and associated target performance goal that correspond to SDC-4 are more
conservative than the values used in this standard.

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Table A.3 – Guidance for SDC Based on Unmitigated Consequences of SSC Failures

Unmitigated consequence of SSC failure

Category Worker Public

SDC-1 a) No radiological or chemical release No consequences

consequences but failure of SSCs
may place facility workers at risk of
physical injury.

SDC-2 Lesser radiological or chemical expo- Lesser radiological and chemical

sures to workers than those in exposures to the public than those in
SDC-3 below in this column as well SDC-3 below in this column, sup-
as placing more workers at risk. porting that there are essentially no
This corresponds to the criterion in off-site consequences as stated in
Table 1 that workers will experience Table 1.
no permanent health effects.

SDC-3 0.25 Sv (25 rem) , dose , 1 Sv 0.05 Sv (5 rem) , dose , 0.25 Sv

(100 rem) AEGL2, ERPG2 , concen- (25 rem)
tration , AEGL3, ERPG3. Concen- AEGL2, ERPG2 , concentration ,
trations may place emergency facility AEGL3, ERPG 3
operations at risk, or place several
hundred workers at risk.

SDC-4 1 Sv (100 rem) , dose , 5 Sv (500 0.25 Sv (25 rem) , dose , 1 Sv (100
rem) concentration . AEGL3, rem), . 300 mg sol U intake, concen-
ERPG3 tration . AEGL3, ERPG3

SDC-5 Radiological or toxicological effects 1 Sv (100 rem) , dose, concentra-

may be likely to cause loss of facility tion . AEGL3, ERPG3
worker life.
a)
“No radiological or chemical release consequences” or “No consequences” means that material
releases that cause health or environment concerns are not expected to occur from failures of SSCs
assigned to this category.

to judge the balance in risk over the range of design categories and may also be used to support
making judgments concerning SSC categorization.
These consequence values should not be considered as mandatory requirements but may be used
judiciously as guidelines for assigning an SDC to an SSC. Many analytical steps and assumptions
must be completed to obtain the numerical dose consequence values, and the analyses frequently
have a high degree of uncertainty. The qualitative criteria in this standard are intended to
encourage the use of experienced judgment in making assignment of the SDCs to SSCs, with
quantitative accident consequence analysis providing guidance.

As stated in 6.1 the consequence analysis should strive to obtain the most likely environmental
safety and health consequences, consistent with the risk-informed objective and the approach for
developing the seismic loads and conservatism in the design methods. This does not mean that
every parameter must be supported with a statistical calculation of the mean value. Many of the
parameters must be based on experience that is characteristic of the physical and chemical envi-
ronment involved in the failure scenarios postulated. It is desirable to reduce any tendency toward
overconservatism in order to achieve the risk-informed balance in the design of the SSCs.

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

References
[A.1] ANSI0ASCE0SEI 43-05, “Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems and Components
in Nuclear Facilities” (2005).
[A.2] ANS-2.27, “Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Materials Facilities Sites for Seismic
Hazard Assessments” (to be published in 2006).
[A.3] ANS-2.29, “Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis” (to be published in 2006).
[A.4] ANSI0ANS-58.21-2003, “External-Events PRA Methodology,” American Nuclear Society
(2003).
[A.5] DOE-STD-1021-93, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Categorization Guidelines
for Structures, Systems, and Components,” U.S. Department of Energy (July 1993) (Reaf-
firmed 2002).
[A.6] DOE-STD-1020-2002, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for
Department of Energy Facilities,” U.S. Department of Energy (Jan. 2002).
[A.7] DOE-STD-1022-94, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Site Characterization Criteria,” (Mar.
1994) (Reaffirmed 2002).
[A.8] DOE-STD-1023-95, “Natural Phenomena Hazards Assessment Criteria,” U.S. Department
of Energy (Mar. 1995) (Reaffirmed 2002).
[A.9] R. C. Kennedy and S. A. Short, “Basis for Seismic Provisions of DOE-STD-1020,” UCRL-
CR-111478, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Apr. 1994).
[A.10] P. G. Prassinos, “Evaluation of External Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the United
States: Seismic Hazards,” NUREG0CR-5042, Supplement 1, prepared by Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory for U.S. Regulatory Commission (Apr. 1988).
[A.11] DOE-STD-3009-94, “Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear
Facility Safety Analysis Reports,” Change Notice No. 1, U.S. Department of Energy (Jan.
2000).
[A.12] DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compli-
ance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,” Change Notice No. 1
(Sep. 1997).
[A.13] “Performance Requirements,” Title 10, Paragraph 70.61, Code of Federal Regulations.
[A.14] NUREG-1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel
Cycle Facility,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Mar. 2002).

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Appendix B
EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF LIMIT STATES TO SSCs
The selection of a Limit State for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) will depend on SSC
component type and the safety function it performs. This appendix provides guidance for selection
of a Limit State through use of examples. The examples should not be interpreted as requirements.
The selection of the Limit State should be based on the specific safety analysis and the safety
function of the SSC.

SSC Type Limit State A Limit State B Limit State C Limit State D

Generic Refer to Section 5 for the definitions of the four Limit States addressed in this
table.

Building struc- Substantial loss Some loss of SSC The SSC retains SSC damage is
tural components of SSC stiffness stiffness and nearly full stiff- negligible; struc-
and some strength may ness and retains ture retains full
strength loss occur, but SSC full strength, strength and
may occur, but retains substan- and the passive stiffness capaci-
some margin tial margin component it is ties; building is
against collapse against collapse; supporting will safe to occupy
is retained so building may perform its nor- and retains nor-
that egress is need some repair mal and safety mal function.
not impaired; for operations functions during
building needs and occupancy to and following an
major repair and continue. earthquake.
may not be safe
for occupancy
until repaired.

Structures or Applicable to Applicable to Applicable to Content and

vessels for con- vessels and vessels and low-pressure location of item
taining hazard- tanks that con- tanks whose vessels and is such that even
ous material tain material contents if re- tanks with con- the smallest
that is either not leased slowly tents sufficiently amount of leak-
very hazardous over time hazardous that age is suffi-
or leakage is through small release may po- ciently
contained or cracks will either tentially injure hazardous to
confined by an- be contained by workers. Damage workers or the
other SSC to a another SSC or will be suffi- public that leak-
local area with acceptably dis- ciently minor to tightness must
no immediate persed with no usually not re- be assured. Most
impact to the consequence to quire repair. likely applicable
worker. Recovery worker, public, to moderate and
from a spill may or environment. highly hazardous
be completed Cleanup and pressurized
with little risk, repair may be gases but may be
but the vessel is completed expe- required for
not likely to be diently. Most high-hazard liq-
repairable. Most likely applicable uids. Postearth-
likely applicable to moderate- quake recovery
to vessels con- hazard liquids or is assured.
taining low- solids or low-
hazard solids or hazard low-
liquids. pressure gases.

(Continued)

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

SSC Type Limit State A Limit State B Limit State C Limit State D

Confinement No SSC of this Barriers could be Barriers could be Systems with

barriers and type should be designed to this designed to this barriers de-
systems contain- designed to this Limit State if Limit State if signed to this
ing hazardous Limit State. exhaust equip- exhaust equip- Limit State may
material (e.g., ment is capable ment is capable not require ac-
glove boxes, of maintaining of maintaining tive exhaust
building rooms, negative pres- negative pres- depending on the
and ducts) sures with many sure with few contained haz-
small cracks in small cracks in ardous inventory
barriers and is barriers and is and the potential
also designed to also designed to for development
Limit State D Limit State D of positive pres-
for long-term for long-term sure. Safety-
loads. Safety- loads. Safety- related electrical
related electrical related electrical power instru-
power instru- power instru- mentation and
mentation and mentation and control if re-
control if re- control if re- quired must also
quired must also quired must also be assured in-
be assured in- be assured in- cluding the loss
cluding the loss cluding the loss of off-site power.
of off-site power. of off-site power.
Localized impact Adequate con-
and impulse finement without
loads may be exhaust equip-
considered in ment may be
this Limit State. demonstrable for
some hazardous
materials.

Equipment sup- The SSC may The SSC may The SSC retains No SSC of this
port structures, undergo substan- undergo some nearly full stiff- type should be
including sup- tial loss of stiff- loss of stiffness ness and retains designed to this
port structures ness and some and strength, full strength, Limit State.
for pressure ves- loss of strength, and yet the and the passive
sels and piping, and yet the equipment it is equipment it is
fire suppression equipment it is supporting may supporting may
systems, cable supporting may perform its perform its nor-
trays, heating perform its safety functions mal and safety
ventilation and safety functions (normal function functions during
air-conditioning (normal function may be im- and following
ducts, battery may be im- paired) following exposure to spec-
racks, etc. paired) following exposure to spec- ified seismic
exposure to spec- ified seismic loads.
ified seismic loads; the SSC
loads; the SSC retains substan-
retains some tial margin
margin against against such
such failures failures that
that may cause cause systems
systems interactions.
interactions.

(Continued)

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

SSC Type Limit State A Limit State B Limit State C Limit State D

Mechanical or The SSC must The SSC must The SSC must The SSC remains
electrical SSCs maintain its remain anchored, remain anchored, essentially elas-
structural integ- and if designed and if designed tic and may per-
rity. It may un- as a pressure- as a pressure- form its normal
dergo large retaining SSC, it retaining SSC, it and safety func-
permanent dis- must maintain must maintain tions during and
tortion and yet its leak-tightness its leak-tightness after exposure to
perform its and structural and structural its specified seis-
safety functions; integrity. It may integrity. It may mic loads.
no assurance undergo moder- undergo very
that the SSC ate permanent limited perma-
will retain its distortion and nent distortion
normal function yet perform its and yet perform
or will remain safety functions; its normal func-
repairable. there is some as- tions (with little
surance that the or no repair) and
SSC will retain safety functions
its normal func- after exposure to
tion and will re- its specified seis-
main repairable. mic loads.

High-efficiency Assemblies de- Assemblies de- This Limit State This Limit State
particulate ab- signed to this signed to this may be expected may be expected
sorber filter as- level should have level should have to be applied to to be applied to
semblies and no nuclear or no nuclear or systems catego- systems classi-
housings toxic hazard toxic hazard rized as SDC-4 fied as SDC-5
safety functions. safety functions. or lower. and possibly
some in SDC-4.

Electrical race- The electrical The electrical Cable connec- Cable connec-
ways (cable raceways may raceways may tions (e.g., at the tions (e.g., at the
trays, conduits, undergo substan- undergo some penetrations or penetrations or
raceway tial distortion, distortion, dis- at the junction at the junction
channels) displacement, placement, and boxes) are rigid boxes) are very
and loss of stiff- loss of stiffness, or brittle or are rigid or brittle or
ness, but the con- but the connec- such that the are such that the
nections (e.g., at tions (e.g., at the electrical race- electrical race-
the penetrations penetrations or ways may un- ways may un-
or at the junction at the junction dergo only very dergo essentially
boxes) are very boxes) have some limited distor- no distortion or
f lexible or are f lexibility or are tion, displace- loss of stiffness
such that the ca- such that the ca- ment, and loss of during exposure
bles may still bles may still stiffness during to specified seis-
perform their perform their exposure to spec- mic loads before
function during function during ified seismic the cable func-
and following and following loads before the tions are
exposure to spec- exposure to spec- cable functions impaired.
ified seismic ified seismic are impaired.
loads. loads.

Deformation sen- These types of These types of Functional evalu- This type of SSC
sitive SSCs a) SSCs should not SSCs should not ation is required should typically
be designed to be designed to when designing be designed to
this Limit State. this Limit State. to this Limit this Limit State,
State. Compo- and testing may
nent testing may be required.
be required.

(Continued)

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

SSC Type Limit State A Limit State B Limit State C Limit State D

Anchors and To ensure that The anchors or The anchors or The anchors or
anchor bolts for system inter- anchor bolts may anchor bolts may anchor bolts
equipment and actions do not undergo only undergo very need to remain
equipment sup- occur during an moderate perma- limited perma- essentially elas-
port structures earthquake, no nent distortion nent distortion tic so as not to
anchors or an- without impair- without impair- impair the nor-
chor bolts should ing the safety ing the normal mal and safety
be designed to function of the and safety func- functions of the
this Limit equipment (nor- tions of the equipment dur-
State. b) mal function equipment fol- ing and following
may be im- lowing exposure exposure to the
paired) following to the specified specified seismic
exposure to the seismic loads. loads.
specified seismic
loads.

Pressure vessels Tanks, pressure Tanks, pressure Tanks, pressure Tanks, pressure
and piping c) vessels, and pip- vessels, and pip- vessels, and pip- vessels, and pip-
ing systems that ing systems that ing systems that ing systems that
do not contain or can perform may have no are required to
carry any haz- their safety func- significant spills have very high
ardous f luid, tion even if they and leakage dur- confidence of no
have no safety develop small ing and following spills and leak-
functions, and leaks as a result an earthquake. age during and
whose gross of moderate per- Includes vessels following an
leakage during manent distor- and piping sys- earthquake. In-
and following an tion caused by a tems that have cludes vessels
earthquake will design-basis confinement as a and piping sys-
not impact earthquake. In safety function. tems that have
safety. Repair situ repair of containment as a
may require re- vessel may be safety function.
placement of possible. The
vessel and safety function of
piping. the SSC may
include confine-
ment if the ra-
diological release
is within pre-
scribed limits.

a)
Deformation-sensitive SSCs are defined as those whose safety functions may be impaired if these
SSCs undergo deformations within the elastic limit during an earthquake (e.g., a valve operator, a relay,
etc.).
b) Anchor bolts designed to code allowables generally will exceed this Limit State because of conser-

vatism inherent in the standard design procedures (e.g., factor of safety of 4 for expansion anchors). This
assumes that appropriate overstrength factors of the attached members are considered.
c) Pressure vessels and piping systems designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec-

tion III, Service Level D [B.1] 1) are capable of providing containment function (i.e., Limit State D), even
though the code permits stress levels beyond the yield stress. Thus, pressure vessels and piping systems
that have confinement as a safety function are permitted to be designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section III, Service Level D.

Reference
[B.1] “ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1,” American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers (2001).

1) Number in brackets refers to corresponding number in “Reference” on this page.

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Appendix C
GUIDANCE ON A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO SUPPORT
MAKING THE JUDGMENTS REQUIRED IN
SECTION 6.2 OF THIS STANDARD

C.1 Introduction
Together with the other standards cited, this standard presents a specific approach to seismic
design. Elements of this approach should benefit from methods summarized in Ref. [C.1],1) namely,
methods of structured decision analysis. These methods do not eliminate the use of judgment but
furnish a context for application of judgment that can help to promote acceptance of the approach.
This perspective should serve to improve the implementation of the guidance provided herein.

In particular, the formulation of seismic design categories (SDCs) is shown to be a specific instance
of application of a “constructed attribute.” Assignment of SDCs to structures, systems, and compo-
nents (SSCs) should be enhanced if the bases for the SDC assignments are from a more structured
perspective. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information, if it is available, may be used to
augment the compilation of basic data as well as support the qualitative judgments required by this
standard. This standard as a whole is a performance-based standard.
This appendix offers a technically well-founded basis for documenting the judgments by which the
expected performance will be accomplished. The user choosing to apply this appendix should record
as part of the process of application of this standard the definition and the scales of the natural and
constructed measures, including binary measures, employed to obtain the benefits of this standard.
Regardless of the level of methods used in considering factors in 6.2.1 through 6.2.10 and the
factors discussed in 6.3, documentation for specific application of these factors, whether by the
methods in Ref. [C.1] or other methods, ought to be developed and maintained for transparency and
efficiency.
Structured decision analysis methods for safety activities, including regulation and oversight, are
applied in Ref. [C.1]. This appendix brief ly discusses some of the key ideas from that development
and relates them to selected elements of the present standard.
There are also several questions that may arise when applying this standard:
(1) Under what circumstances could a conclusion be reached that the standard has been misapplied?
(2) If a misapplication is found, how is the significance to be evaluated?
(3) What corrective actions might restore compliance?
This appendix provides information that may help in addressing these questions.

C.2 Objectives Hierarchy

In order to focus clearly on the properties that need to be addressed in facility design, it is desirable
to proceed by first developing an objectives hierarchy as described in Ref. [C.1]. For purposes of
illustration, Fig. C.1 shows a simple hierarchy for objectives focusing on selected elements of the
problem addressed by this standard. At the top is the overall goal of “Safety.” (There are other goals

1) Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Section C.6, “References.”

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Figure C.1 — Objectives hierarchy

besides safety in constructing a facility, and it is appropriate to ref lect these in the full objectives
hierarchy; the focus on safety ref lects the scope of the present standard.) Immediately below the
goal, the three fundamental objectives at the top are displayed: “Worker Safety,” “Public Safety,”
and “Environmental Protection.”

Below the “Fundamental Objectives” are the “Means Objectives.” These are not ends in themselves
but are achieved in order to serve the fundamental objectives. A hierarchy as shown in Fig. C.1
promotes completeness of the development (somewhat analogously to fault tree development), and
it helps decide on the level in the hierarchy at which details of implementation can most appro-
priately be considered.

This standard covers a spectrum of consequence types, including release of radioactive materials,
release of nonradioactive but toxic materials, and ordinary life safety. Specific aspects of public
safety, worker safety, and environmental protection are considered in the formulation of the safety
functions. The fidelity of the as-built design to the fundamental objectives depends on the care with
which this step is taken.

Note that although this standard does not mandate the performance of a PRA, or even the
development of a qualitative logic model, its thought process requires consideration of a set of
scenarios that need to be mitigated or prevented. Operationally, performance of the safety functions
means mitigation or prevention of these scenarios. Hence, PRA information, if it is available, may
be used to augment the compilation of basic data as well as support the qualitative judgments
required by this standard.

C.3 Allocation and Implementation of Performance Requirements

Quite generally, in formulating an approach to prevention, two aspects need to be addressed: (a) the
allocation of performance over SSCs and (b) the implementation of that allocation. This standard
focuses on allocation, with a view toward simplifying implementation.

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

Allocation refers to deciding what levels of SSC performance are needed in order to address the
target performance objectives associated with higher levels of the hierarchy. In many cases, there
may be many different ways to satisfy fundamental objectives by preventing scenarios. One exam-
ple considered in the main body relates to the case of nested barriers, where different allocations
over the two barriers can achieve nominally equivalent overall performance (prevention of release
of material outside the outer barrier) but with substantially different costs and operational impli-
cations. This standard allows for relaxing performance of the inner barrier, provided that perfor-
mance of the outer barrier is assured.
Implementation refers to the measures taken in order to make sure that the allocated levels of
performance “come true.” These measures may occur during design, construction, or operation. In
the case of seismic performance, the ability to link specific implementation measures to levels of
seismic performance is the result of much work [C.2] that supports the standards invoked (Fig. A.1)
to implement the allocation developed under this standard.
A given scenario may affect more than one of the fundamental objectives, and a given SSC may
affect more than one scenario. This means that even in a fairly simple facility, characterizing all
feasible allocations that satisfy the fundamental objectives could be a complicated task. This
standard simplifies this task considerably by first focusing only on seismic aspects of each funda-
mental objective and second by constructing an attribute called “seismic design category” (SDC),
with each SDC being associated with specific implementation measures. SSCs are assigned to
SDCs based on the most limiting of the consequences potentially associated with SSC failure.

C.4 SDC as a Constructed Attribute

Design alternatives differ with respect to their relative fulfillment of a given set of fundamental
objectives. The attributes of a design alternative can be formulated using quantitative and0or
qualitative measures (as described in Ref. [C.1] ):
• natural measures, which directly quantify fundamental or other objectives;
• constructed measures, which ref lect fundamental and0or means objectives but do so on scales
of performance that must be developed through application of value judgments. Constructed
measures are generally characterized by descriptive statements of specific attributes that are
presented in a graded manner. A special case of a constructed measure is a binary measure
that represents a “true” or “false” judgment on a hypothesis;
• proxy attributes, which support the fundamental objectives but typically in some partial or
indirect way. For example, they may correspond directly to means objectives and thereby
ref lect some, but typically not all, of the considerations ref lected in the fundamental objectives.
Natural measures (ones that more or less directly quantify performance with respect to an objec-
tive) are desirable but, in general, can be difficult to find for safety performance with respect to
severe, catastrophic events. As a practical matter, metrics are frequently constructed. Quite gen-
erally, the need in consensus standards for operability and understandability dictates for the
application of constructed and0or proxy attributes whose assessment by qualified persons will be
reasonably unambiguous.
Three fundamental objectives (i.e., worker safety, public safety, and environmental protection) are
being addressed in this standard, and it takes the simplifying step of constructing levels of the SDC
attribute, each of which addresses a specific level of performance under one of the fundamental
objectives. A scale from 1 through 5 has been defined; each level corresponds to a specific level of
performance with respect to each of the fundamental objectives. In order to establish the absolute
scale of significance of the consequences, and the comparability of designated consequence levels
across fundamental objectives, judgmental value trade-offs have necessarily been made, as dis-
cussed in Ref. [C.3]. For example, SDC-5 is imposed on SSCs whose unmitigated consequences of
failure are any of the following:

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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

• Unmitigated failure would cause loss of life of workers in the facility other than structural
collapse;
• Unmitigated failure would possibly cause loss of life to an individual at the exclusion area
boundary for 2 hours;
• Unmitigated failure would require potentially permanent exclusion from contaminated areas.
The achievement of consensus on the formulation of the SDCs, and especially on these value
judgments, is the core of the value added by the consensus standard.

C.5 Analyses to Support Selection of SDC and Limit States

As stated in 6.1, the necessary unmitigated consequence analysis identifies qualitative and quan-
titative values of design parameters at which the SSC safety function fails along with the unmit-
igated radiological, toxicological consequences to the environment due to the failure. In addition, it
is expected that uncertainties will be quantified and considered. Section 6.2 describes the charac-
teristics of the unmitigated consequence analysis. Mitigating features will be assumed not to
function unless redundancy with independence of the redundant features can be shown. If an SSC
is assumed not to fail when another SSC is being evaluated, the former SSC should have an SDC
designation at least one higher than the SSC being evaluated. In general, mean values of param-
eters are to be used.
Given that a safety analysis of the facility is being developed to meet oversight0regulatory require-
ments, the required information related to the facility design is expected to be available. The key
judgmental aspects of this standard are associated with performing the unmitigated failure analy-
sis required in 6.2. There are ten factors in 6.2.1 through 6.2.10 that must be considered in
performing this analysis. Some of these are prescriptive, while others require judgments that can
be made and verified in a relatively straightforward manner, while still others will benefit from
applying the methods in Ref. [C.1]. The following provides an analysis of each of the items in 6.2.1
through 6.2.10 to better illustrate the potential applicability of these methods.
6.2.1: This item is relatively unambiguous in that it calls for “. . . considering only the inherent
physical or chemical characteristics of the hazardous material and the energy sources for dispers-
ing the material.” This can be viewed as a binary constructed measure with a “Yes” or “No” answer
to the question, “Are the physical or chemical characteristics of the hazardous material and the
energy sources for dispersing the material of sufficient intensity to warrant consideration in the
unmitigated consequence analysis?”
6.2.2: The statement “The SSC . . . shall have one or more safety functions . . . related to preventing
accidents” is similar to 6.2.1 as a binary measure.
6.2.3: The statement “. . . unless the robustness of each mitigating feature can be demonstrated. .
. . Redundancy may also be used as a mitigating feature providing the independence of redundant
features shall be demonstrated, such that there is a very low probability of an earthquake-induced
common-cause failure” requires judgment to be applied to robustness and redundancy. Two sepa-
rate constructed measures may be required.
6.2.4: The statement “ANSI0ANS-5.10-1998, ‘Airborne Release Fractions at Non-Reactor Nuclear
Facilities,’ [7] provides guidance concerning mechanisms for release of the hazardous material . . .”
may or may not require judgment pursuant to the application of ANS-5.10-1998. A binary measure
may suffice.
6.2.5: A formal approach using a combination of natural and constructed measures may be required
to address “. . . the unmitigated consequence analysis shall strive to use mean values for the
parameters related to material release, dispersal in the environment, and health consequences. In
many instances the data available to support these analyses are not prototypic of the situation
being analyzed, or there is large and poorly characterized uncertainty. Hence, judgment must be

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 American National Standard ANSI0ANS-2.26-2004

used to select a mean value for the parameter of concern. The objective of using mean values is not
intended to demand many data points and statistical computation of the mean. It is intended that
the parameters used in the evaluation be based on consideration of the range of possible values
given the physical and chemical conditions involved with the failure. . . .”
6.2.6: This item may predominantly employ natural measures to estimate dose consequences and
model parameters.
6.2.7: This item employs substantially quantitative criteria related to acceptability of potential
release of material. Natural measures may suffice, but constructed measures may help simplify
some issues.
6.2.8: The statement “When assigning SDCs in cases of common-cause failure of redundant SSCs,
it will be necessary to exercise judgment about the relative contribution that each SSC’s postulated
failure makes to the unmitigated release” calls for judgment and application of the formal ap-
proaches, and methods in Ref. [C.1] would be helpful.
6.2.9: This item deals with the complexities of assigning an SSC to the SDCs, and a binary or proxy
measure may provide the needed decision factors.
6.2.10: This item deals with the complexities of assigning an SSC to the SDCs, and a binary or
proxy measure may provide the needed decision factors.
The basis for the judgments on the above factors should be documented as required by this
standard.

C.6 References
[C.1] NUREG0BR-0303, “Guidance on Performance-Based Regulation,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Dec. 12, 2002).
[C.2] R. C. Kennedy and S. A. Short, “Basis for Seismic Provisions of DOE-STD-1020,” UCRL-CR-
111478, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Apr. 1994).
[C.3] NUREG-1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel
Cycle Facility,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Mar. 2002).

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