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 de Gruyter Expositions in Mathematics 38

Editors

O. H. Kegel, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg

V. P. Maslov, Academy of Sciences, Moscow
W. D. Neumann, Columbia University, New York
R. O. Wells, Jr., Rice University, Houston
 de Gruyter Expositions in Mathematics
1 The Analytical and Topological Theory of Semigroups, K. H. Hofmann, J. D. Lawson,
J. S. Pym (Eds.)
2 Combinatorial Homotopy and 4-Dimensional Complexes, H. J. Baues
3 The Stefan Problem, A. M. Meirmanov
4 Finite Soluble Groups, K. Doerk, T. O. Hawkes
5 The Riemann Zeta-Function, A. A. Karatsuba, S. M. Voronin
6 Contact Geometry and Linear Differential Equations, V. E. Nazaikinskii, V. E. Shatalov,
B. Yu. Sternin
7 Infinite Dimensional Lie Superalgebras, Yu. A. Bahturin, A. A. Mikhalev, V. M. Petrogradsky,
M. V. Zaicev
8 Nilpotent Groups and their Automorphisms, E. I. Khukhro
9 Invariant Distances and Metrics in Complex Analysis, M. Jarnicki, P. Pflug
10 The Link Invariants of the Chern-Simons Field Theory, E. Guadagnini
11 Global Affine Differential Geometry of Hypersurfaces, A.-M. Li, U. Simon, G. Zhao
12 Moduli Spaces of Abelian Surfaces: Compactification, Degenerations, and Theta Functions,
K. Hulek, C. Kahn, S. H. Weintraub
13 Elliptic Problems in Domains with Piecewise Smooth Boundaries, S. A. Nazarov,
B. A. Plamenevsky
14 Subgroup Lattices of Groups, R. Schmidt
15 Orthogonal Decompositions and Integral Lattices, A. I. Kostrikin, P. H. Tiep
16 The Adjunction Theory of Complex Projective Varieties, M. C. Beltrametti, A. J. Sommese
17 The Restricted 3-Body Problem: Plane Periodic Orbits, A. D. Bruno
18 Unitary Representation Theory of Exponential Lie Groups, H. Leptin, J. Ludwig
19 Blow-up in Quasilinear Parabolic Equations, A.A. Samarskii, V.A. Galaktionov,
S. P. Kurdyumov, A. P. Mikhailov
20 Semigroups in Algebra, Geometry and Analysis, K. H. Hofmann, J. D. Lawson, E. B. Vinberg
(Eds.)
21 Compact Projective Planes, H. Salzmann, D. Betten, T. Grundhöfer, H. Hähl, R. Löwen,
M. Stroppel
22 An Introduction to Lorentz Surfaces, T. Weinstein
23 Lectures in Real Geometry, F. Broglia (Ed.)
24 Evolution Equations and Lagrangian Coordinates, A. M. Meirmanov, V. V. Pukhnachov,
S. I. Shmarev
25 Character Theory of Finite Groups, B. Huppert
26 Positivity in Lie Theory: Open Problems, J. Hilgert, J. D. Lawson, K.-H. Neeb, E. B. Vinberg
(Eds.)
27 Algebra in the Stone-Čech Compactification, N. Hindman, D. Strauss
28 Holomorphy and Convexity in Lie Theory, K.-H. Neeb
29 Monoids, Acts and Categories, M. Kilp, U. Knauer, A. V. Mikhalev
30 Relative Homological Algebra, Edgar E. Enochs, Overtoun M. G. Jenda
31 Nonlinear Wave Equations Perturbed by Viscous Terms, Viktor P. Maslov, Petr P. Mosolov
32 Conformal Geometry of Discrete Groups and Manifolds, Boris N. Apanasov
33 Compositions of Quadratic Forms, Daniel B. Shapiro
34 Extension of Holomorphic Functions, Marek Jarnicki, Peter Pflug
35 Loops in Group Theory and Lie Theory, Péter T. Nagy, Karl Strambach
36 Automatic Sequences, Friedrich von Haeseler
37 Error Calculus for Finance and Physics, Nicolas Bouleau
Simple Lie Algebras over Fields
of Positive Characteristic
I. Structure Theory

by

Helmut Strade

≥
Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York
 Author
Helmut Strade
Fachbereich Mathematik
Schwerpunkt Algebra und Zahlentheorie
Universität Hamburg
Bundesstrasse 55
20146 Hamburg, Germany
E-mail:
[email protected]

Mathematics Subject Classification 2000:

17-02; 17B50, 17B20, 17B05
Key words:
simple Lie algebras, classification, Lie algebras of characteristic p ⬎ 2, divided power
algebras, Cartan prolongation, recognition theorems

앪
앝 Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Strade, Helmut, 1942⫺

Simple Lie algebras over fields of positive characteristic / by Hel-
mut Strade.
p. cm ⫺ (De Gruyter expositions in mathematics ; 38)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 3-11-014211-2 (v. 1 : acid-free paper)
1. Lie algebras. I. Title. II. Series.
QA252.3.S78 2004
512⬘.55⫺dc22 2004043901

ISBN 3-11-014211-2

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at ⬍http://dnb.ddb.de⬎.

쑔 Copyright 2004 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin, Germany.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission
in writing from the publisher.
Typesetting using the authors’ TEX files: I. Zimmermann, Freiburg.
Printing and binding: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen.
Cover design: Thomas Bonnie, Hamburg.
Für meine liebe Renate, die mit bewundernswerter

Geduld die Enstehung dieses Buches begleitet hat.

 Contents

Introduction 1

1 Toral subalgebras in p-envelopes 17

1.1 p-envelopes 17
1.2 The absolute toral rank 23
1.3 Extended roots 30
1.4 Absolute toral ranks of parametrized families 39
1.5 Toral switching 46

2 Lie algebras of special derivations 58

2.1 Divided power mappings 59
2.2 Subalgebras defined by flags 73
2.3 Transitive embeddings of Lie algebras 79
2.4 Automorphisms and derivations 89
2.5 Filtrations and gradations 91
2.6 Minimal embeddings of filtered and associated graded Lie algebras 99
2.7 Miscellaneous 104
2.8 A universal embedding 111
2.9 The constructions can be made basis free 119

3 Derivation simple algebras and modules 133

3.1 Frobenius extensions 134
3.2 Induced modules 138
3.3 Block’s theorems 151
3.4 Derivation semisimple associative algebras 163
3.5 Weisfeiler’s theorems 167
3.6 Conjugacy classes of tori 176

4 Simple Lie algebras 180

4.1 Classical Lie algebras 180
4.2 Lie algebras of Cartan type 184
4.3 Melikian algebras 199
4.4 Simple Lie algebras in characteristic 3 209
viii Contents

5 Recognition theorems 217

5.1 Cohomology groups 217
5.2 From local to global Lie algebras 228
5.3 Representations 252
5.4 Generating Melikian algebras 258
5.5 The Weak Recognition Theorem 262
5.6 The Recognition Theorem 269
5.7 Wilson’s Theorem 272

6 The isomorphism problem 283

6.1 A first attack 283
6.2 The compatibility property 295
6.3 Special algebras 299
6.4 Orbits of Hamiltonian forms 314
6.5 Hamiltonian algebras 329
6.6 Contact algebras 346
6.7 Melikian algebras 349

7 Structure of simple Lie algebras 357

7.1 Derivations 357
7.2 Restrictedness 363
7.3 Automorphisms 372
7.4 Gradings 386
7.5 Tori 388
7.6 W (1; n) 420

8 Pairings of induced modules 432

8.1 Cartan prolongation 432
8.2 Module pairings 449
8.3 Trigonalizability 461

9 Toral rank 1 Lie algebras 484

9.1 Solvable maximal subalgebras 484
9.2 Cartan subalgebras of toral rank 1 496

Notation 521

Bibliography 527

Index 539
 Introduction

The theory of finite dimensional Lie algebras over fields F of positive characteristic p
was initiated by E. Witt, N. Jacobson [Jac37] and H. Zasssenhaus [Zas39]. Sometime
before 1937 E. Witt came up with the following example of a simple Lie algebra of
dimension p (for p > 3), afterwards named the Witt algebra W (1; 1). On the vector
p−2
space i=−1 F ei define the Lie product

(j − i)ei+j if − 1 ≤ i + j ≤ p − 2,
[ei , ej ] :=
0 otherwise.

This algebra behaves completely different from those algebras we know in charac-
teristic 0. As an example, it contains a unique subalgebra of codimension 1, namely
i≥0 F ei . It also has sandwich elements, i.e., elements c  = 0 satisfying (ad c) = 0
2

(for example, ep−2 ). E. Witt himself never published this example or generalizations
of it, which he presumably knew of. At that time he was interested in the search for new
finite simple groups. When he realized that these new structures had only known au-
tomorphism groups he apparently lost his interest in these algebras. We have only oral
and indirect information of Witt’s work on this field by two publications of H. Zassen-
haus [Zas39] and Chang Ho Yu [Cha41]. Chang determined the automorphisms and
irreducible representations of W (1; 1) over algebraically closed fields. He also men-
tioned that Witt himself gave a realization of W (1; 1) in terms of truncated polynomial
rings. Namely, W (1; 1) is isomorphic with the vector space F [X]/(X p ) endowed with
the product {f, g} := f d/dx(g) − gd/dx(f ) for all f, g ∈ F [X]/(X p ) under the
mapping ei → x i+1 , where x = X + (Xp ).
In [Jac37] N. Jacobson proved a Galois type theorem for inseparable field exten-
sions by substituting the algebra of derivations for the automorphism group of a field
extension. More explicitly, he was able to show that the set of intermediate fields of a
p
field extension F (c1 , . . . , cn ) : F with ci ∈ F is in bijection with the set of those Lie
subalgebras of Der F F (c1 , . . . , cn ), which are F (c1 , . . . , cn )-modules and are closed
under the p-power mapping D  → D p . At that early time Jacobson already introduced
the term “restrictable” for those Lie algebras, which admit a p-mapping x  → x [p]
satisfying the equation ad x [p] = (ad x)p for all x. Later he preferred to use the term
“restricted Lie algebra” for pairs (L, [p]), when such a p-mapping is fixed. The Lie
algebras of linear algebraic groups over F are all equipped with a natural p-mapping,
hence they carry canonical restricted Lie algebra structures.
2 Introduction

H. Zassenhaus [Zas39] generalized the construction of E. Witt in a natural way.

Let G be a subgroup of order pn in the additive group of F and give the direct sum

g∈G F ug a Lie algebra structure via

[ug , uh ] := (h − g)ug+h for all g, h ∈ G.

Such Lie algebras are now called Zassenhaus algebras. He also proved the first
classification result, saying that a simple Lie algebra having a 1-dimensional CSA (=
Cartan subalgebra) such that all roots are GF(p)-dependent and all root spaces are
1-dimensional is isomorphic to sl(2) or W (1; 1).
Since then a great number of publications on this new theory of modular Lie alge-
bras have appeared. We were shown how to construct analogues of the characteristic
0 simple Lie algebras [Jac41], [Jac43], [Che56], [M-S57] (these algebras, including
the exceptional ones, are called classical in the modular theory), and in which way
classes of non-classical algebras (called Cartan type) arise from infinite dimensional
algebras of differential operators over C [K-S66], [K-S69], [Wil69], [Kac74], [Wil76].
In some sense [Wil76] was a cornerstone. In this paper the previously known finite
dimensional simple Lie algebras had been categorized into the classes of classical Lie
algebras and “generalized” Cartan type Lie algebras for characteristic p > 3. People
began to believe that the list of finite dimensional Lie algebras known so far could pos-
sibly be complete, at least for p > 5. There were some indications that characteristic
5 is a borderline case. In fact, additional examples of simple Lie algebras were known
in characteristics 2 and 3 (G. Brown, M. Frank, I. Kaplansky, A. I. Kostrikin) as early
as from 1967. In 1980 G. M. Melikian published a new family of simple Lie algebras
in characteristic 5 ([Mel80]), now named Melikian algebras. The present Classifica-
tion Theory of Block–Wilson–Strade–Premet indeed proves that the classical, Cartan
type, and Melikian algebras exhaust the class of simple Lie algebras for p > 3. It
could also well be that the list of known simple Lie algebras in characteristic 3 is close
to complete. But, as an example, Yu. Kotchetkov and D. Leites [K-L92] constructed
simple Lie algebras in characteristic 2 from superalgebras. This indicates that a greater
variety of constructions could yield many more examples in characteristic 2.
A more complete history of this search for new simple Lie algebras would have
to mention many other mathematicians who prepared the ground well, whose names,
unfortunately, will remain in the dark during this short introduction.
Let us briefly describe the known simple Lie algebras for p > 3. The construction
of C. Chevalley provides in a finite dimensional simple Lie algebra g over C a basis
B of root vectors with respect to a CSA h such that the multiplication coefficients
are integers of absolute value < 5. The Z-span gZ of B is a Z-form in g closed
under taking Lie brackets. Therefore, gF := F ⊗Z gZ is a Lie algebra over F with
basis 1 ⊗ B and structure constants obtained from those for gZ by reducing modulo
p. For p > 3, the Lie algebra gF fails to be simple if and only if the root system
 = (g, h) has type Al where l = mp−1 for some m ∈ N. If  has type Amp−1 , then
gF ∼= sl(mp) has the one dimensional center of scalar matrices and the Lie algebra
 Introduction 3

gF /z(gF ) ∼= psl(mp) is simple. The simple Lie algebras over F thus obtained are
called classical. All classical Lie algebras are restricted with p-mapping given by
(1 ⊗ eα )[p] = 0 and (1 ⊗ hi )[p] = 1 ⊗ hi for all α ∈  and 1 ≤ i ≤ l. As in
characteristic 0, they are parametrized by Dynkin diagrams of types Al , Bl , Cl , Dl ,
G2 , F4 , E6 , E7 , E8 . We stress that, by abuse of characteristic 0 notation, the classical
simple Lie algebras over F include the Lie algebras of simple algebraic F -groups
of exceptional types. All classical simple Lie algebras are closely related to simple
algebraic groups over F .
In [K-S69] A. I. Kostrikin and I. R. Šafarevič gave a unified description of a
large class of non-classical simple Lie algebras over F . Their construction was mo-
tivated by classical work of E. Cartan [Car09] on infinite dimensional, simple, tran-
sitive pseudogroups of transformations. To define finite dimensional modular ana-
logues of complex Cartan type Lie algebras Kostrikin and Šafarevič replaced algebras
of formal power series over C by divided power algebras over F . Let Nm denote
!mof non-negative integers. For α, β ∈ N define
the m

α  additive

α(1)monoid

α(m)of all m-tuples
β = β(1) . . . β(m) and α! = i=1 α(i)!. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m set i = (δi1 , . . . , δim )
and 1 = 1 + · · · + m . Give the graded polynomial algebra F [X1 , . . . , Xm ] its
standard coalgebra structure (with each Xi being primitive) and let O(m) denote the
graded dual of F [X1 , . . . , Xm ], a commutative associative algebra over F . It is well-
known (and easily seen) that O(m) has basis {x (α) | α ∈ Nm } and the product in O(m)
is given by
α (α+β)
x (α) x (β) = x for all α, β ∈ Nm .
β
We write xi for x (i ) ∈ O(m), 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For each m-tuple n ∈ Nm we denote by
O(m; n) the F -span of all x (α) with 0 ≤ α(i) < p ni for i ≤ m. This is a subalgebra
of O(m) of dimension p |n| . Note that O(m; 1) is just the commutative algebra with
p
generators x1 , . . . , xm and relations xi = 0 for all i. Hence it is isomorphic to the
p p
truncated polynomial algebra F [X1 , . . . , Xm ]/(X1 , . . . , Xm ). There is another way
of looking at these algebras. Define in the polynomial ring C[X1 , . . . , Xm ] elements
! Xi
α(i)
X(α) := m i=1 α(i)! . Then PZ := α ZX
(α) is a Z-subalgebra of C[X , . . . , X ]
1 m
∼
and O(m) = F ⊗Z PZ under the mapping x  → 1 ⊗ X .
(α) (α)

A derivation D of O(m) is called special, if

%
m
D(x (α) ) = x (α−i ) D(xi )
i=1

for all α. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the i-th partial derivative ∂i of O(m) is defined as the
special derivation of O(m) with the property that ∂i (x (α) ) = x (α−i ) if α(i) > 0 and
0 otherwise. Each finite dimensional subalgebra O(m; n) is stable under the partial
derivatives ∂1 , . . . , ∂m . Let W (m) denote the space of all special derivations of O(m).
Since each D ∈ W (m) is uniquely determined by its values D(x1 ), . . . , D(xm ), the
Lie algebra W (m) is a free O(m)-module with basis ∂1 , . . . , ∂m .
4 Introduction

The Cartan type Lie algebra W (m; n) is the O(m; n)-submodule of W (m) gen-
erated by the partial derivatives ∂1 , . . . , ∂m . This Lie algebra is canonically embed-
ded into Der O(m; n). If n = 1, it is isomorphic to the full derivation algebra of
p p
F [X1 , . . . , Xm ]/(X1 , . . . , Xm ), the truncated polynomial ring in m variables. Thus
this family generalizes the p-dimensional Witt algebra.
Give the O(m)-module
!1 (m) := HomO(m) (W (m), O(m))
the canonical W (m)-module structure by setting (Dα)(D  ) := D(α(D  ))−α([D, D  ])
for all D, D  ∈ W (m) and α ∈ !1 (m), and define d : O(m) −→ !1 (m) by the rule
(df )(D) = D(f ) for all D ∈ W (m) and f ∈ O(m). Notice that d is a homomorphism
of W (m)-modules and !1 (m) is a free O(m)-module with basis dx1 , . . . , dxm . Let

!(m) = !k (m)
0≤k≤m

be the exterior algebra over O(m) on !1 (m). Then !0 (m) = O(m) and each graded
component !k (m), k ≥ 1, is a free O(m)-module with basis (dxi1 ∧ · · · ∧ dxik | 1 ≤
i1 < · · · < ik ≤ m). The elements of !(m) are called differential forms on O(m).
The map d extends uniquely to a zero-square linear operator of degree 1 on !(m)
satisfying
d(f ω) = (df ) ∧ ω + f d(ω), d(ω1 ∧ ω2 ) = d(ω1 ) ∧ ω2 + (−1)deg(ω1 ) ω1 ∧ d(ω2 )
for all f ∈ O(m) and all ω, ω1 , ω2 ∈ !(m). Each D ∈ W (m) extends to a derivation
of the F -algebra !(m) commuting with d. As in the characteristic 0 case, the three
differential forms below are of particular interest:
ωS := dx1 ∧ · · · ∧ dxm , m ≥ 3,
%
r
ωH := dxi ∧ dxi+r , m = 2r ≥ 2,
i=1
%
r
ωK := dx2r+1 + (xi dxi+r − xi+r dxi ), m = 2r + 1 ≥ 3.
i=1

These forms give rise to the following families of Lie algebras:

S(m) := {D ∈ W (m) | D(ωS ) = 0}, (Special Lie algebra)

CS(m) := {D ∈ W (m) | D(ωS ) ∈ F ωS },
H (m) := {D ∈ W (m) | D(ωH ) = 0}, (Hamiltonian Lie algebra)
CH (m) := {D ∈ W (m) | D(ωH ) ∈ F ωH }
K(m) := {D ∈ W (m) | D(ωK ) ∈ O(m)ωK }, (Contact Lie algebra).
 Introduction 5

Each X(m; n) := X(m) ∩ W (m; n) is a graded Lie subalgebra of W (m), viewed with
its grading given by deg(xi ) = 1 for all i if X = W , S, CS, H , CH , and deg(xi ) = 1
(i = 2r + 1), deg(x2r+1 ) = 2 in case X = K.
Suppose p ≥ 3. It is shown in [K-S69] that the Lie algebras S(m; n)(1) , H (m; n)(1)
and K(m; n)(1) are simple for m ≥ 3 and that so is H (2; n)(2) . Moreover, K(m; n) =
K(m; n)(1) unless p|(m + 3). Any graded Lie subalgebra of X(m; n) containing
X(m; n)(∞) for some X ∈ {W, S, CS, H, CH, K} is called a finite dimensional
graded Cartan type Lie algebra, and any filtered deformation of a graded Cartan
type Lie algebra is called a Cartan type Lie algebra.
In characteristic 5 the additional family of Melikian algebras M(n1 , n2 ) occurs.
Set n = (n1 , n2 ) ∈ N2 , let W(2; n) denote a copy of W (2; n), and endow the vector
space
M(n1 , n2 ) := O(2; n) ⊕ W (2; n) ⊕ W
(2; n)

with a multiplication by defining


[D, Ẽ] = [D, E] + 2 div(D)Ẽ
[D, f ] = D(f ) − 2 div(D)f
[f1 ∂˜1 + f2 ∂˜2 , g1 ∂˜1 + g2 ∂˜2 ] = f1 g2 − f2 g1
[f, Ẽ] = f E



[f, g] = 2 g∂2 (f ) − f ∂2 (g) ∂˜1 + 2 f ∂1 (g) − g∂1 (f ) ∂˜2

for all D, E ∈ W (2; n), f, g ∈ O(2; n). M(n1 , n2 ) is a Z-graded Lie algebra by
setting

degM (D) = 3 deg(D),

degM (Ẽ) = 3 deg(E) + 2,
degM (f ) = 3 deg(f ) − 2, for all D, E ∈ W (2; n), f ∈ O(2; n).

No characteristic 0 analogue of this algebra is known. Its connection with a charac-

teristic 0 Lie algebra is of different kind. Namely, one looks at the classical simple
algebra G2 with CSA h and its depth 3 grading determined by a parabolic decomposi-
tion associated with a simple short root. Let {α1 , α2 } be a root base, α1 the short root
and α2 the long root. Give α1 the degree −1 and α2 the degree 0. Then G2 is graded,

G2,[0] = G2,α2 + h + G2,−α2 , G2,[−1] = G2,α1 + G2,α1 +α2 ,

G2,[−2] = G2,2α1 +α2 , G2,[−3] = G2,3α1 +α2 + G2,3α1 +2α2 .

For a Chevalley basis of G2 one computes αi (hi ) = 2, α2 (h1 ) = −3 = 2 (since

6 Introduction

p = 5), α1 (h2 ) = −1. Thus identifying

h1 = 2x1 ∂1 , h2 = x1 ∂1 − x2 ∂2 ,
eα2 = x1 ∂2 , e−α2 = x2 ∂1 ,
eα1 = ∂˜1 , eα1 +α2 = ∂˜2 ,
e2α1 +α2 = 1/2,
e3α1 +α2 = ∂1 , e3α1 +2α2 = ∂2

gives an isomorphism of the local algebras i≤0 G2,[i] and i≤0 M(n1 , n2 )[i] .
About 30 years after the first appearance of non-classical Lie algebrasA. I. Kostrikin
and I. R. Šafarevič [K-S66] conjectured that every simple restricted Lie algebra over
an algebraically closed field of characteristic p > 5 is of classical or Cartan type.
An early step towards the Classification had been undertaken by W. H. Mills and
G. B. Seligman [M-S57], who characterized the classical algebras by internal prop-
erties in characteristic > 3. They showed that, if a simple Lie algebra has an abelian
CSA and a root space decomposition with respect to this CSA with the properties we
are familiar with in characteristic 0, then these algebras are classical.
Note, however, that in the characteristic p situation most of the classical methods
fail to work. Generally speaking, no Killing form is available, Lie’s theorem on
solvable Lie algebras is not true, semisimplicity of an algebra does not imply complete
reducibility of its modules, CSAs in simple algebras need neither be abelian nor have
equal dimension, root lattices with respect to a CSA may be full vector spaces over
the prime field. The occurrence of the Cartan type Lie algebras indicates that filtration
methods should by very useful. In another Recognition Theorem, A. I. Kostrikin and
I. R. Šafarevič[K-S69] and V. Kac [Kac70] proved that a simple graded Lie algebra is
of Cartan type, if its gradation has some rather special properties. In particular, it is
required that the 0-component L0 is close to classical.
The Kostrikin–Šafarevič conjecture has been proved for p > 7 by R. E. Block
and R. L. Wilson [B-W88]. Since the known classical methods no longer work in the
modular case, people had to develop a variety of new techniques. Unfortunately, these
techniques often rely on complex detailed arguments and subtle computations. The
most basic idea is to choose a suitable toral subalgebra T in the simple restricted Lie
algebra L (this choice has to be done in a very sophisticated manner), and to determine
the structure of 1-sections i∈GF(p) Liα (T ) and 2-sections i,j ∈GF(p) Liα+jβ (T ).
The investigation of the 2-sections covers the hardest part of the Block–Wilson work.
From the knowledge obtained this way they construct a filtration on L, and deduce
that either the Mills–Seligman axioms or the Recognition Theorem applies for gr L.
In the first case L is classical, in the second L is classical or a filtered deformation of
a graded Cartan type Lie algebra, hence is a Cartan type Lie algebra.
The generalization of the Kostrikin–Šafarevič conjecture for the general case of
not necessarily restricted Lie algebras and p > 7 has been proved by the author (partly
in conjunction with R. L. Wilson) in a series of papers, the result has been announced
 Introduction 7

in [S-W91]. In order to achieve this result one embeds the simple Lie algebra L into
a restricted semisimple Lie algebra L[p] , and proves that the essential parts of the
Block–Wilson results on the 2-sections remain valid. The last step of constructing
the filtration and recognizing the algebra, which in the restricted case had been rather
easy compared with the work on the determination of the 2-sections, is incomparably
more complicated in the general case.
About 30 years after the first definition of a non-classical Lie algebra by E. Witt,
the conjecture of A. I. Kostrikin and I. R. Šafarevič had been stated. After another 35
years A. A. Premet and the author have settled the remaining case of the Kostrikin–
Šafarevič conjecture, the case p = 7. Moreover, they completed the classification for
p > 3. The result is the following
Classification Theorem. Every simple finite dimensional Lie algebra over an al-
gebraically closed field of characteristic p > 3 is of classical, Cartan, or Melikian
type.
The strategy of a proof for the small characteristics p = 7, 5 is the same as
before, however because of the small characteristic, is even more subtle. There is
some promising progress for characteristic 3 due to M. Kuznetsov and S. Skryabin,
but in my opinion the classification of the simple Lie algebras in characteristic 2 is far
beyond the range of the presently known methods.
Let us give an outline of the major steps of this classification work. In principle
one
proceeds as in the classical case. Start with a root space decomposition L = H ⊕ Lα
with respect to a CSA H . There is, in general, no Jordan–Chevalley decomposition
of elements available. But this decomposition is a very important tool. In order to
obtain that, one needs to consider p-envelopes. There is an injective homomorphism
ad : L → L ⊂ Der L,
where L is the subalgebra generated by ad L and associative p-th powers. L is a
restricted Lie algebra (a p-envelope of L), but it is no longer simple.
Next one takes a toral subalgebra T ⊂ L of maximal dimension. As in the classical
case one determines the structure of 1-sections and 2-sections with respect to T ,
% %
L(α) = Liα (T ), L(α, β) = Liα+jβ (T ),
i∈GF(p) i,j ∈GF(p)

and puts this information together. In the classical case this procedure already yields
the list of Dynkin diagrams. In characteristic p things are much more involved. To
begin with, even a simple restricted Lie algebra might contain maximal toral subalge-
bras of various dimensions. Even worse, not all tori of maximal dimension are good
for our purpose, as we shall see below. So define the absolute toral rank TR(L) of a
simple Lie algebra L to be the maximum of the dimensions of toral subalgebras in L.
This concept has to be generalized to all finite dimensional Lie algebras. One proves
that k-sections with respect to a toral subalgebra of maximal dimension have absolute
toral rank ≤ k.
8 Introduction

The next obstruction we face is the fact that Lie’s theorem on solvable Lie alge-
bras does no longer hold. However, various substitutes for particular cases have been
proved. Historically, every new result on this problem finally allowed an extension
of the Classification. As examples, R. L. Wilson [Wil77] proved that CSAs act trig-
onalizably on L (provided L is simple and p > 7). This was one major item for
Block and Wilson to achieve their classification result. The present author extended
this result to CSAs of p-envelopes of simple Lie algebras, which are the 0-space for
toral subalgebras of maximal dimension [Str89/2]. This result allowed one to apply
the Block–Wilson classification of semisimple restricted Lie algebras of absolute toral
rank 2 to 2-sections of p-envelopes of simple Lie algebras with respect to toral subal-
gebras of maximal dimension, and so became the starting point for the classification
of not necessarily restricted simple Lie algebras (p > 7). Finally, A. A. Premet clar-
ified the situation for p = 5, 7 and showed that the Melikian algebras are the only
exceptions to this trigonalizability theorem [Pre94]. This result encouraged us to start
the classification for p = 5, 7.
The semisimple quotient of a 1-section L(α)/ rad L(α) with respect to a toral
subalgebra of maximal dimension in L has absolute toral rank at most 1, and from
this one concludes that it is (0), or contains a unique minimal ideal S which has
absolute toral rank 1. If L(α) is solvable, then due to Wilson, Premet, Strade, L(α)(1)
acts nilpotently on L (which is another important substitute for Lie’s theorem). In the
other case, S is simple containing a CSA, for which the root lattice is spanned by a
single root. At least S is then known by a result of Wilson [Wil78] and its extension
to p > 3 by Premet [Pre86].
Next, consider the T -semisimple quotients of 2-sections L(α, β)/ radT L(α, β)
with respect to a toral subalgebra T of maximal
 dimension in L. The T -socle of
this algebra is defined to be the direct sum Si of all its minimal T -invariant ideals.
These algebras Si are either simple or, due to Block’s theorem (see below) of the form
S̃i ⊗F O(m; 1), where S̃i is a simple Lie algebra. One can prove that the simple
ingredients of the socle have absolute toral rank ≤ 2. This result implies that one has
to classify the simple Lie algebras M with TR(M) = 2 in order to obtain the necessary
information on the 2-sections. I shall now indicate some principles of a proof for this
case in the work of Premet–Strade.
(A) Choose a T -invariant filtration of M,

M = M(−r) ⊃ · · · ⊃ M(s) ⊃ (0), [T , M(i) ] ⊂ M(i) .

At first one has to decide if such a filtration exists for which M(1)  = (0). To attack
that problem we construct T -sandwiches, i.e., elements c ∈ M satisfying

[T , c] ⊂ F c  = (0), (ad c)2 = 0.

One first decides on the existence of an element satisfying (ad x)3 = 0, which is
difficult only in the case p = 5. Then one uses Jordan algebra theory to construct
sandwiches. The result is the following.
 Introduction 9

Theorem ([P-S97]). Let M be a simple Lie algebra of absolute toral rank 2 over an
algebraically closed field of characteristic p > 3. Then M is either classical or of
Cartan type H (2; 1; (τ ))(1) , or there is a 2-dimensional toral subalgebra T in the
semisimple p-envelope of M such that M contains T -sandwiches.
Here H (2; 1; (τ ))(1) is a filtered deformation of a graded Hamiltonian algebra.
Every T -sandwich c gives rise to a filtration of the required form, namely let M(0) be
a maximal T -invariant subalgebra of M containing ker(ad c). Then [M, c] ⊂ M(0)
and c ∈ M(1) hold. Here is the place to make a comment on the toral subalgebra. In
W (1; 1) = Der O(1; 1) the “good” toral subalgebra F x∂ respects the natural filtration.
There are F x∂-sandwiches. The toral subalgebra F (1 + x)∂ does not respect the
natural filtration and in fact there are no F (1 + x)∂-sandwiches. One would like to
start with a toral subalgebra, which behaves “well” simultaneously in all 1-sections,
but it is not clear at the beginning whether there are “globally well behaving” toral
subalgebras.
(B) One now has to make very technical choices of T and M(0) . By the above
theorem we may assume that M(1)  = (0). Put G := gr M, let M(G) be the maximal
ideal of G in i<0 Gi and set Ḡ := G/M(G). By a result of Weisfeiler [Wei78], Ḡ is
semisimple and has a unique minimal ideal A(Ḡ). This is a graded ideal. In this step
it is our goal to gain information on this minimal ideal and then lift this information
to determine M.
Thus let us look at semisimple Lie algebras. In characteristic p, semisimple
algebras are not necessarily direct sums of simple algebras.
Theorem ([Blo68/1]). Let I be a minimal ideal in a semisimple Lie algebra L. Then
there are m ≥ 0 and a simple Lie algebra S such that

I∼= S ⊗ O(m; 1),

∼
I = adI I ⊂ adI L → (Der S) ⊗ O(m; 1) + IdS ⊗W (m; 1).

Suppose A(Ḡ) is isomorphic to S ⊗ O(m; 1), where S is simple and m  = 0. The

technical choice of T and M(0) eventually gives

S∼ = H (2; 1)(2) , S0 ∼= sl(2), G−2 = (0), m = 1.


As a consequence, G = i≥−1 Gi is graded of depth 1. In particular, M(G) = (0)



and Ḡ = G. Therefore G0 = sl(2) ⊗ O(1; 1) ⊕ Id ⊗D , where D ⊂ W (1; 1).
The multiplication of M gives rise to an sl(2)-invariant pairing G−1 × G−1 → D.
Determining this pairing yields p = 5, D = sl(2). This last result allows to construct
another maximal subalgebra M{0} of M of codimension 5, and shows that the graded
algebra associated with the standard filtration determined by M{0} is Melikian. From
this one deduces that M is a Melikian algebra, if m  = 0.
(C) So we may assume that m = 0. Arguing with the absolute toral rank one
obtains that
A(Ḡ) = S is simple, TR(S) = 2.
10 Introduction

Suppose that S is in the list of the Classification Theorem. It follows from the prop-
erties of M/M(0) and the representation theory of these simple Lie algebras that
M(G) = (0). Then Ḡ = G = gr M ⊂ Der S and hence M is a filtered deformation
of G. This means that there is a Lie algebra Q over the polynomial ring F [t], such
that
Q/(t − λ)Q ∼ = M if λ  = 0, Q/tQ ∼ = G ⊃ S.
Since M contains sandwiches, so does G. Then S cannot be classical.
Suppose S is Melikian. Then S has a CSA H , for which H (1) acts non-nilpotently.
Hence G does so, and M does so as well. But then M is a Melikian algebra, since this
is the only algebra having such a CSA.
Suppose S is of Cartan type. Recall that G is Z-graded. This grading defines a
1-dimensional algebraic torus in Aut S. By classical theory of linear algebraic groups
this torus can be mapped under conjugation into a naturally given maximal torus. As
a result, one associates a degree with the generators x1 , . . . , xm , this defines a grading
of S, and then G is obtained up to isomorphisms as a graded subalgebra of Der S. Due
to the technical choice of M(0) the only possible grading is the natural grading. Then
M is of Cartan type.
(D) So we are left with the case that S is a counterexample to the Classification
Theorem. One repeats applying the gr-operator for good choices of the toral subalgebra
T and the maximal subalgebra M(0) , and by this one obtains very strong information
on the number and dimensions of the T -weight spaces of i<0 Si .
The most difficult task now is to describe the extension

0 → rad S0 → S0 → S0 / rad S0 → 0.

Applying the theory of Cartan prolongation, Skryabin [Skr97] proves that one of the
following cases occurs.


= (0),
rad S0 = C(S0 ) is 1-dimensional,


 = C(S0 ) is abelian.

In the first case one applies the method mentioned in (B) of determining semi-
simple Lie algebras, in the second case one concludes that (S0 / rad S0 )(2) ∈
{sl(2), W (1; 1), H (2; 1)(2) }. The central extensions of these algebras are known.
In the third case one proves that S−1 is a coinduced S0 -module, and similar to the
method mentioned in (B) there is a simultaneous realization

S−1 ∼
= V ⊗ O(m; 1), m > 0
S0 → gl(V ) ⊗ O(m; 1) + IdV ⊗W (m; 1).

The theory of Cartan prolongation then yields that in this case (with π2 the projection
onto W (m; 1))
 Introduction 11

– π2 (S0 ) is O(m; 1)-invariant, whence π2 (S0 ) = (0) or π2 (S0 ) = W (m; 1), and
– the extension splits.
This then gives the required list for S0 . Our detailed knowledge on T -weights of
i<0 Si in combination with the representation theory of S0 finally yields that S0 is
abelian. But then S is classical or of Witt type. Hence there is no graded counterex-
ample. This proves the theorem for the case TR(M) = 2.
Now return to the general case. By the former investigations the simple ingredients
S̃i of the T -semisimple quotients of T -2-sections of any simple Lie algebra L are
known. This information then provides a list of 2-sections.
In a next step one determines some of the simple Lie algebras M with TR(M) = 3.
Suppose all 1-sections of M with respect to a torus of maximal dimension are
solvable. Then there is a 2-section having a semisimple quotient isomorphic to
H (2; 1; (τ ))(1) . The representation theory of this algebra yields information, which
allows to determine the multiplication of M.
Suppose all 1-sections are solvable or classical, and there are 1-sections of either
type. Then one shows that there is a 2-section of type H (2; 1; (τ ))(1) . The represen-
tation theory of this latter algebra yields a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
Suppose all non-zero 1-sections are classical. Then one rather easily shows that
M is generated by elements x satisfying (ad x)3 = 0. For such elements exp(ad x) is
an automorphism of M (since p ≥ 5). The theory of linear algebraic groups shows
that the connected component of Aut M is simple and the Lie algebra of this group is
M. Then M is classical.
Suppose M has a 2-section of Melikian type. Then M contains non-trigonalizable
CSAs, and from this one deduces that the 2-sections have semisimple quotients of
Melikian type or type H (2; (1, 2)) only.
Now one puts all the information together. Start with an arbitrary toral subalgebra
T in L of maximal dimension. The k-sections (k = 1, 2) are known. Every 1-section
is solvable, or classical, or has a distinguished subalgebra of maximal dimension.
There is a procedure (D. Winter’s toral switching) to pass to another toral subalgebra
T  of maximal dimension which stabilizes all these distinguished subalgebras of T  -
1-sections (that requires arguing in T  -2-sections as well). Looking at 2-sections one
realizes that the sum of all distinguished subalgebras is a T  -invariant subalgebra L(0)
of L, which gives rise to a filtration satisfying L(1)  = (0). The partial knowledge
on the 3-sections gives information on L(0) , and this information allows to apply the
Mills–Seligman theorem to L(0) /L(1) . Thus one knows gr 0 L, and this enables one to
apply the Recognition Theorem to gr L. Once knowing gr L one can determine L.
So far we mentioned only those authors who announced and proved the respective
final classification results. It should be said that, of course, many other mathematicians
have contributed to these results. Thus a large number of publications has to be read
if someone tries to follow the classification from the beginning to the end. It is rather
hard to do so. Some of these publications are even not easy to accede, most of them
use very specific techniques and rather detailed computations. People often realized
12 Introduction

that, in order to achieve a next result, they had to modify some older concepts and
terminology. It was inevitable that some attempts led into a fruitless direction and
some became superfluous.
This two-volume work will include a complete presentation of the classification
of the simple Lie algebras over an algebraically closed field of characteristic p > 3,
in the sense that a list of simple Lie algebras will be presented, and a proof will be
given that this list is complete. I have included all definitions and almost all proofs.
The prospective reader is supposed to be familiar with major parts of [S-F88]. In fact,
I shall often use [S-F88] as a reference, even for results which originally have been
proved elsewhere. Besides that only some very fundamental results like the Mills–
Seligman characterization of classical algebras, Kac’ Recognition Theorem, and some
basic results on linear algebraic groups will be included without giving proofs.
The original Classification Theorem does not say anything about isomorphism
classes. The present monograph will also include the solution of this isomorphism
problem, as is given in a variety of publications of several authors. There are no
isomorphisms between algebras of the different types of classical, Cartan, and Me-
likian algebras (p > 3). Among the classical algebras there are only the natural
isomorphisms. The Witt and Contact algebras are weakly rigid, this meaning that no
non-trivial filtered deformation of naturally graded Witt or Contact algebras exist. The
isomorphism classes of Witt, Special, and Contact algebras are determined, and so are
those of the Melikian algebras. The isomorphism classes of Hamiltonian algebras are
ruled by the orbits of Hamiltonian differential forms under a subgroup of automor-
phisms. Determining these has been accomplished by Skryabin. It was a challenging
task, and its complete presentation lies beyond the scope of this book. So we include
the result but only part of its proof. We shall use in the Classification Theory only
those parts which are proved in this monograph.
Finally, a list of all presently known simple Lie algebras over algebraically closed
fields of characteristic 3 is included.
The main classification work will be presented in Volume 2, while Volume 1
contains methods and results which are of general interest. More detailed, Volume 1
contains the following.
Chapter 1. The basic concepts of a p-envelope and the absolute toral rank of
an arbitrary Lie algebra are introduced. The universal p-envelope of L is the Lie
subalgebra L̂ of U (L) spanned by L and iterated associative p-th powers. Every
homomorphic image L̂/C with C ⊂ C(L̂), C ∩ L = (0), is called a p-envelope
of L. The absolute toral rank TR(L) of a finite dimensional Lie algebra L is the
maximum of dimensions of toral subalgebras of L̂/C(L̂). Note that in contrast to the
characteristic 0 theory CSAs of simple Lie algebras over algebraically closed fields
of positive characteristic need not be toral subalgebras, but may contain ad-nilpotent
elements. The absolute toral rank substitutes the concept of the rank of a simple Lie
algebra in characteristic 0, and thus is an important measure of the size of a Lie algebra.
Several results on the absolute toral rank of subalgebras and homomorphic images are
proved. In particular, TR(L) ≥ TR(gr L) holds for filtered algebras. Finally, we
Other documents randomly have
different content
of the Church. Although he himself was a Catholic, he wished the
Protestant Church to have a stronger position in Germany, since
Germany was two-thirds Protestant.
The Protestant Church, however, was divided into provincial
churches, and there were various small differences which the
dogmatists took very seriously. For that reason they once in the
past, as we know, fought each other for 30 years; but these
differences did not seem so important to us. There were the
Reformed, the United, and the pure Lutherans—I myself am not an
expert in this field.
Constitutionally, as Prussian Prime Minister, I was, to be sure, in a
certain sense the highest dignitary of the Prussian Church, but I did
not concern myself with these matters very much.
The Führer wanted to achieve the unification of the Protestant
Evangelical Churches by appointing a Reich Bishop, so that there
would be a high Protestant church dignitary as well as a high
Catholic church dignitary. To begin with, he left the choice to the
Evangelical churches, but they could not come to an agreement.
Finally they brought forward one name, exactly the one which was
not acceptable to us. Then a man was made Reich Bishop who had
the Führer’s confidence to a higher degree than any of the other
provincial bishops.
With the Catholic Church the Führer ordered a concordat to be
concluded by Herr Von Papen. Shortly before that agreement was
concluded by Herr Von Papen I visited the Pope myself. I had
numerous connections with the higher Catholic clergy because of my
Catholic mother, and thus—I am myself a Protestant—I had a view
of both camps.
One thing, of course, the Führer and all of us, I, too, stood for
was to remove politics from the Church as far as was possible. I did
not consider it right, I must frankly say, that on one day the priest in
church should humbly concern himself with the spiritual welfare of
his flock and then on the following day make a more or less
belligerent speech in parliament.
 A separation was planned by us, that is to say, the clergy were to
concentrate on their own sphere and refrain from becoming involved
in political matters. Owing to the fact that we had in Germany
political parties with strong church leanings, considerable confusion
had arisen here. That is the explanation of the fact that, because of
this political opposition that at first played its role in the political field
in parliament, and in election campaigns, there arose among certain
of our people an antagonistic attitude toward the Church. For one
must not forget that such election disputes and speeches often took
place before the electors between political representatives of our
Party and clergymen who represented those political parties which
were more closely bound to the Church.
Because of this situation and a certain animosity, it is
understandable that a more rabid faction—if I may use that
expression in this connection—did not forget these contentions and
now, on its side, carried the struggle on again on a false level. But
the Führer’s attitude was that the churches should be given the
chance to exist and develop. In a movement and a party which
gradually had absorbed more or less the greater part of the German
nation, and which now in its active political aspect had also absorbed
the politically active persons of Germany, it is only natural that not
all the members would be of the same opinion in every respect,
despite the Leadership Principle. The tempo, the method, the
attitude may be different; and in such large movements, even if they
are ever so authoritatively led, certain groups form in response to
certain problems. And if I were to name the group which still saw in
the Church, if not a political danger, at least an undesirable
institution, then I should mention above all two personages:
Himmler on one side and Bormann—particularly later on much more
radically than Himmler—on the other side.
Himmler’s motives were less of a political and more of a confused
mystical nature. Bormann’s aims were much more clear-cut. It was
clear, too, that from the large group of Gauleiter, one or another
might be more keenly interested in this fight against the Church.
Thus, there were a number of Gaue where everything was in the
best of order as far as the Church was concerned, and there were a
few others where there was a keen fight against the Church.
I did interfere personally on frequent occasions. First of all, in
order to demonstrate my attitude and to create order, I called into
the Prussian State Council, as men in whom I had special
confidence, a high Protestant and a high Catholic clergyman.
I myself am not what you might call a churchgoer, but I have
gone now and then, and have always considered I belonged to the
Church and have always had those functions over which the Church
presides—marriage, christening, burial, et cetera—carried out in my
house by the Church.
My intention thereby was to show those weak-willed persons
who, in the midst of this fight of opinions did not know what they
should do, that, if the second man in the State goes to church, is
married by the Church, has his child christened and confirmed, et
cetera, then they can calmly do the same. From the number of
letters which I received as the result, I can see that I did the right
thing.
But as time went by, in other spheres as well as this, the
situation became more critical. During the early years of the war I
spoke to the Führer about it once more and told him that the main
concern now was, that every German should do his duty and that
every soldier should go to his death, if need be, bravely. If in that
connection his religious belief is a help and a support to him,
whether he belongs to this or that confession, it can be only an
advantage, and any disturbance in this connection could conceivably
affect the soldier’s inward strength. The Führer agreed absolutely. In
the Air Force I deliberately had no chaplains, because I was of the
opinion that every member of the Air Force should go to the
clergyman in whom he had the most confidence.
This was repeatedly told to the soldiers and officers at roll call.
But to the Church itself I said that it would be good if we had a clear
separation. Men should pray in church and not drill there; in the
barracks men should drill and not pray. In that manner, from the
very beginning, I kept the Air Force free from any religious
disturbances and I insured complete liberty of conscience for
everyone.
The situation became rapidly more critical—and I cannot really
give the reasons for this—especially in the last 2 or 3 years of the
war. It may have something to do with the fact that in some of the
occupied territories, particularly in the Polish territory and also in the
Czech territory, the clergy were strong representatives of national
feeling and this led again to clashes on a political level which were
then naturally carried over to religious fields. I do not know whether
this was one of the reasons, but I consider it probable. On the whole
I should like to say that the Führer himself was not opposed to the
Church. In fact, he told me on one occasion that there are certain
things in respect to which even as Führer one cannot entirely have
one’s way if they are still undecided and in need of reform, and that
he believed that at the time much was being thought and said about
the reorganization of the Church. He said that he did not consider
himself destined to be a reformer of the Church and that he did not
wish that any of his political leaders should win laurels in this field.
DR. STAHMER: Now, in the course of years, a large number of
clergy, both from Germany and especially from the occupied
territories—you yourself mentioned Poland and Czechoslovakia—
were taken to concentration camps. Did you know anything about
that?
GÖRING: I knew that at first in Germany a number of clergymen
were taken to concentration camps. The case of Niemöller was
common knowledge. I do not want to go into it in detail, because it
is well known. A number of other clergymen were sent to
concentration camps but not until the later years when the fight
became more critical, for they made political speeches in the pulpit
and criticized measures of the State or the Party; then, according to
the severity of this criticism, the police intervened.
I told Himmler on one occasion that I did not think it was wise to
arrest clergymen. As long as they talked in church they should say
what they wanted, but if they made political speeches outside their
churches then he could proceed against them, just as he would in
connection with any other people who made speeches hostile to the
State. Several clergymen who went very far in their criticism were
not arrested. As far as the arrest of clergy from occupied territories
is concerned, I heard about it; and I said earlier that this did not
occur so much on the religious level just because they were
clergymen, but because they were at the same time nationalists—I
understand that from their point of view—and consequently often
involved in actions hostile to the occupying forces.
DR. STAHMER: The Party program included two points, I believe,
dealing with the question of the Jews. What was your basic attitude
towards this question?
GÖRING: This question, which has been so strongly emphasized
in the Indictment, forces me under all circumstances to interpose
certain statements.
After Germany’s collapse in 1918 Jewry became very powerful in
Germany in all spheres of life, especially in the political, general
intellectual and cultural, and, most particularly, the economic
spheres. The men came back from the front, had nothing to look
forward to, and found a large number of Jews who had come in
during the war from Poland and the East, holding positions,
particularly economic positions. It is known that, under the influence
of the war and business concerned with it—demobilization, which
offered great possibilities for doing business, inflation, deflation—
enormous shifts and transfers took place in the propertied classes.
There were many Jews who did not show the necessary restraint
and who stood out more and more in public life, so that they
actually invited certain comparisons because of their numbers and
the position they controlled in contrast to the German people. In
addition there was the fact that particularly those parties which were
avoided by nationally minded people also had Jewish leadership out
of proportion to the total number of Jews.
That did not apply only to Germany, but also to Austria, which we
have always considered a part of Germany. There the entire Social
Democratic leadership was almost exclusively in Jewish hands. They
played a very considerable part in politics, particularly in the left-
wing parties, and they also became very prominent in the press in all
political directions.
At that time, there thus ensued a continuous uninterrupted
attack on everything national, national concepts and national ideals.
I draw attention to all the magazines and articles which dragged
through the mud things which were holy to us. I likewise call
attention to the distortion which was practiced in the field of art in
this direction, to plays which dragged the fighting at the front
through the mud and befouled the ideal of the brave soldier. In fact I
could submit an enormous pile of such articles, books, plays, and so
forth; but this would lead too far afield and I am actually not too
well informed on the subject. Because of all this, a defense
movement arose which was by no means created by National
Socialism but which had existed before, which was already strong
during the war and which came even more strongly to the fore after
the war, when the influence of Jewry had such effects.
Moreover, in the cultural and intellectual sphere also many things
which were not in accordance with German feeling came to be
expressed. Here, too, there was a great split. In addition there was
the fact that in economic matters, if one overlooks the western
industry, there was an almost exclusive domination on the part of
Jewry, which, indeed, consisted of elements which were most
sharply opposed by the old, established Jewish families.
When the movement then drew up its program, which was done
by a few simple people—as far as I know, not even Adolf Hitler
himself took part in the drafting of the program, at least not yet as a
leader—the program included that point which played a prominent
part as a defensive point among large sections of the German
people. Shortly before that there had been the Räte-Republik in
Munich and the murder of hostages, and here, too the leaders were
mostly Jews. It can be understood, therefore, that a program drawn
up in Munich by simple people quite naturally took this up as a
defense point. News also came of a Räte-Republik in Hungary—
again consisting mainly of Jews. All this had made a very strong
impression. When the program became known, the Party—which
was at that time extremely small—was at first not taken seriously
and was laughed at. But then, from the very beginning, a
concentrated and most bitter attack on the part of the entire Jewish
press, or the Jewish-influenced press, was started against the
movement. Everywhere Jewry was in the lead in the fight against
National Socialism, whether in the press, in politics, in cultural life by
making National Socialism contemptible and ridiculous, or in the
economic sphere. Whoever was a National Socialist could not get a
position; the National Socialist businessman could not get supplies or
space for advertisements, and so on. All this naturally resulted in a
strong defensive attitude on the part of the Party and led from the
very beginning to an intensification of the fight, such as had not
originally been the intention of the program. For the program aimed
very definitely at one thing above all—that Germany should be led
by Germans. And it was desired that the leadership, especially the
political shaping of the fate of the German people, should be in the
hands of German persons who could raise up the spirit of the
German people again in a way that people of a different kind could
not. Therefore the main point was at first merely to exclude Jewry
from politics, from the leadership of the State. Later on, the cultural
field was also included because of the very strong fight which had
developed, particularly in this sphere, between Jewry on the one
side and National Socialism on the other.
I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was
said by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should
still be in a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and
speeches in which the expressions and insults coming from the other
side were far in excess. All that obviously was bound to lead to an
intensification.
Shortly after the seizure of power countless exceptions were
made. Jews who had taken part in the World War and who had been
decorated were treated differently and shown consideration; they
remained unaffected by measures excluding Jews from civil services.
As I have said, the chief aim was to exclude them from the
political sphere, then from the cultural sphere.
 The Nuremberg Laws were intended to bring about a clear
separation of races and, in particular, to do away with the notion of
persons of mixed blood in the future, as the term of half Jew or
quarter Jew led to continuous distinctions and confusion as far as
their position was concerned. Here I wish to emphasize that I
personally had frequent discussions with the Führer regarding
persons of mixed blood and that I pointed out to the Führer that,
once German Jews were clearly separated, it was impossible to have
still another category between the two which constituted an
unclarified section of the German people, which did not stand on the
same level as the other Germans. I suggested to him that, as a
generous act, he should do away with the concept of the person of
mixed blood and place such people on the same footing as the other
Germans. The Führer took up this idea with great interest and was
all for adopting my point of view, in fact, he gave certain preparatory
orders. Then came more troubled times, as far as foreign policy was
concerned—the Sudeten crisis, Czechoslovakia, the occupation of the
Rhineland, and afterward the Polish crisis—and the question of
persons of mixed blood stepped into the background; but at the
beginning of the war the Führer told me that he was prepared to
solve this matter in a positive, generous fashion, but only after the
war.
The Nuremberg Laws were to exclude, for the future, that
concept of persons of mixed blood by means of a clear separation of
races. Consequently it was provided in the penal regulations of the
Nuremberg Laws, that never the woman but always the man should
be punishable, no matter whether he was German or Jewish. The
German woman or the Jewess should not be punished. Then quieter
times came, and the Führer was always of the opinion that for the
time being Jews should remain in economy, though not in leading
and prominent positions, until a controlled emigration, gradually
setting in, then intensified, should solve this problem. In spite of
continuous disturbances and difficulties in the economic field, the
Jews on the whole remained unmolested in their economic positions.
 The extraordinary intensification which set in later did not really
start in until after the events of 1938, and then to a still greater
extent in the war years. But here, again, there was naturally one
more radical group for whom the Jewish question was more
significantly in the foreground than it was for other groups of the
Movement; just as, as I should like to emphasize at this point, the
idea of National Socialism as a philosophy was understood in various
ways—by one person more philosophically, by another mystically, by
a third in a practical and political sense. This was also true of the
different points of the program. For one person certain points were
more important, for another person less so. One person would see in
the point of the program which was directed against Versailles and
toward a free and strong Germany the main point of the program;
another person, perhaps, would consider the Jewish question the
main point.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
Dr. Stahmer, can you inform the Tribunal how much longer you think
the Defendant Göring’s examination will last?
DR. STAHMER: I think that we shall finish in the course of
tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a very long time.
DR. STAHMER: I shall do my best to shorten it.
[A recess was taken.]

DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you participate in the issuing

of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935?
GÖRING: In my capacity as President of the Reichstag I
announced those laws and the law concerning the new Reich flag
simultaneously here in Nuremberg when the Reichstag was meeting
at that time.
DR. STAHMER: In the Indictment it says that the destruction of
the Jewish race was part of the planning of aggressive wars.
GÖRING: That has nothing to do with the planning of aggressive
wars; also, the destruction of the Jewish race was not planned in
advance.
DR. STAHMER: Were you a party to the action against the Jews
in the night of 9-10 November 1938?
GÖRING: I should like to discuss that briefly. I gathered
yesterday, from the cross-examination of the witness Körner, that a
misunderstanding had arisen in regard to this. On 9 November the
march to the Feldherrnhalle took place. This march was repeated
every year and for this occasion the prominent leaders of the
movement gathered. Körner referred to that when he said that
everybody came to Munich. It was customary, after the march was
over, for practically everybody to meet at the Munich City Hall for a
dinner, at which the Führer was also present.
I never attended that dinner in any of the years in question, as I
used to utilize my stay in Munich by attending to various other
matters in the afternoon of that day. I did not take part in the dinner
on this occasion either, nor did Körner. He and I returned in my
special train to Berlin in the evening. As I heard later, when the
investigation was carried out, Goebbels announced at that dinner,
after the Führer had left, that the seriously wounded counsellor of
the Embassy in Paris had died of his wounds. There was a certain
amount of excitement and then Goebbels apparently spoke some
words about retaliation and in his way—he was probably the very
strongest representative of anti-Semitism—must have brought on
this development of events; but that was after the Führer had left.
I myself, in fact, heard of the events upon my arrival in Berlin.
First of all the conductor in my car told me that he had seen fires in
Halle. Half an hour later I called my adjutant, who reported to me
that riots had taken place during the night, that Jewish stores had
been broken into and plundered and that synagogues had been set
on fire. He did not know any more about it himself.
I proceeded to my apartment and at once had a call put through
to the Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night.
That is the report which has been referred to here and which was
made to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, concerning the
events, as much as he knew about them at that time; that was the
evening of the following day, I believe. The Führer, too, arrived in
Berlin in the course of the morning. Having in the meantime heard
that Goebbels had at least played an important part as instigator, I
told the Führer that it was impossible for me to have such events
taking place at this particular time. I was making every effort, in
connection with the Four Year Plan, to concentrate the entire
economic field to the utmost. I had, in the course of speeches to the
nation, been asking for every old toothpaste tube, every rusty nail,
every bit of scrap material to be collected and utilized. It could not
be tolerated that a man who was not responsible for these things
should upset my difficult economic tasks by destroying so many
things of economic value on the one hand and by causing so much
disturbance in economic life on the other hand.
The Führer made some apologies for Goebbels, but on the whole
he agreed that such events were not to take place and must not be
allowed to take place. I also pointed out to him, that such a short
time after the Munich agreement such matters would also have an
unfavorable effect on foreign policy.
In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Führer. In the
meantime Goebbels had been to see him. The latter I had told over
the telephone in unmistakable terms, and in very sharp words, my
view of the matter. I told him then, with emphasis, that I was not
inclined to suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled utterances,
as far as economic matters were concerned.
In the meantime the Führer, influenced by Goebbels, had
somewhat changed his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and to
what extent he referred to the excitement of the crowd, to urgently
needed settlements, I do not know. At any rate, the Führer’s views
were not the same as they were on the occasion of my first
complaint.
While we were talking, Goebbels, who was in the house, joined
us and began his usual talk: that such things could not be tolerated;
that this was the second or third murder of a National Socialist
committed abroad by a Jew. It was on that occasion that he first
made the suggestion that a fine should be imposed. Indeed, he
wished that each Gau should collect such a fine and he named an
almost incredibly high sum.
I contradicted him and told the Führer that, if there was to be a
fine, then the Reich alone should collect it, for, as I said, Herr
Goebbels had the most Jews right here in Berlin and would therefore
not be a suitable person for this, since he was the most interested
party. Apart from that, if such measures were to be taken, then only
the sovereign State had the right to take them.
After a short discussion, this way and that, about the amount,
1,000,000,000 was agreed upon. I pointed out to the Führer that
under certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions on
the tax returns. The Führer then expressed the wish and ordered
that the economic solution also be carried through now. In order
that there should be no further occasion for such events, businesses
obviously Jewish and known to be Jewish were first of all to be
Aryanized, in particular the department stores. These were often a
source of friction, as the officials and employees from the ministries,
who could shop only between 6 and 7 in the evening, often went to
these stores and had difficulties. He ordered, in general terms, what
should be done.
Thereupon I called the meeting of 12 November with those
departments which had jurisdiction over these matters.
Unfortunately, the Führer had demanded that Goebbels should be
represented on this commission—actually a commission was to be
appointed. He was, in fact, present, although I maintained that he
had nothing to do with economic questions. The discussion was very
lively. We were all irritated at this meeting. Then I had the economic
laws drafted and later I had them published.
I rejected other proposals which lay outside the economic
sphere, such as restriction of travel, restriction of residence,
restriction in regard to bathing resorts, et cetera, as I was not
competent to deal with these things and had not received any
special orders. These were issued later on by the police authorities,
and not by me; but through my intervention various mitigations and
adjustments were made.
 I should like to point out that although I received oral and written
orders and commands from the Führer to issue and carry out these
laws, I assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws which
bear my signature; for I issued them and consequently am
responsible, and do not propose to hide in any way behind the
Führer’s order.
DR. STAHMER: Another matter. What were the reasons for the
refusal to take part in the Disarmament Conference and for the
withdrawal from the League of Nations?
GÖRING: The chief reasons for that were, first of all, that the
other states who, after the complete disarming of Germany, were
also bound to disarm, did not do so. The second point was that we
also found a lack of willingness to meet in any way Germany’s
justified proposals for revisions; thirdly, there were repeated
violations of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Covenant of the
League of Nations by other states, Poland, Lithuania, et cetera,
which were at first censured by the League of Nations, but which
were then not brought to an end, but were rather accepted as
accomplished facts; fourthly, all complaints by Germany regarding
questions of minorities were, indeed, discussed, and well-meaning
advice was given to the states against which the complaints had
been brought, but nothing was actually done to relieve the situation.
Those are the reasons for leaving the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference.
DR. STAHMER: Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce
compulsory service?
GÖRING: When Germany left the League of Nations and the
Disarmament Conference, she simultaneously announced to the
leading powers concerned her definite decision to aim at universal
disarmament. The Führer then made various proposals which, it can
be assumed, are historically known: restriction of active armed
forces to a certain number of men; restriction of weapons to be
used; abolishing of certain weapons as, for example, bombers; and
various other points. Each one of these proposals was rejected,
however, and did not reach a general realization, nor were even
discussed.
When we and the Führer recognized clearly that the other parties
did not think of disarming and that, on the contrary, that mighty
power to the east of us in particular, Russia, was carrying out an
armament program as never before, it became necessary for us, in
order to safeguard the most vital interests of the German people,
their life and their security, to free ourselves from all ties and to
rearm to such an extent as was now necessary for the interests and
security of the Reich. That was the first reason for the necessity of
reintroducing compulsory service.
DR. STAHMER: To what extent did the Luftwaffe participate in
this rearmament?
GÖRING: In 1933, when I founded the Air Ministry, we had not
yet gone into the question of rearmament. In spite of that I did
arrange for certain basic conditions. I immediately extended
manufacture and increased air traffic beyond the extent of necessary
traffic, so as to be able to train a larger number of pilots. At that
time I took over a number of young people, lieutenants, cadets, who
then had to leave the Wehrmacht in order to take up commercial
flying and there to learn to fly.
I was aware from the beginning that protection in the air was
necessary as one of the most essential conditions for the security of
my nation. Originally it was my belief that a defensive air force, that
is, a fighter force, might suffice; but upon reflection I realized—and I
want to underline what witness Field Marshal Kesselring said on that
subject—that one would be lost with merely a fighter force for
defense purposes and that even a defensive force must contain
bombers in order that it can be used offensively against the enemy
air force on enemy territory.
Therefore I had bomber aircraft developed from commercial
airplanes. In the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly.
Everything had to be created anew since nothing existed in the way
of air armament.
 In 1935 I told the Führer that I now considered it proper, since
we had repeatedly received refusals in answer to our proposals, to
declare to the world openly that we were creating an air force, and
that I had already established a certain basis for that. This took
place in the form of an interview which I had with a British
correspondent.
Now I could proceed to rearm on a larger scale; but in spite of
that we confined ourselves at first to what we called a “Risk Air
Force,” that is a risk insofar as an enemy coming to attack Germany
should know that he could expect to meet with an air force. But it
was by no means strong enough to be of any real importance.
In 1936 followed the famous report, which was presented to the
witness Bodenschatz, in which I said that we must from this moment
on work on the basis of mobilization, that money mattered nothing,
and that, in short, I should take the responsibility for overdrawing
the budget.
Since nothing had existed before, I should be able to catch up
quickly only if aircraft production on one hand were made to work
with as many shifts and as much speed as possible, that is with
maximum effort and on a mobilization basis, and if, on the other
hand, extension of the ground forces and similar matters was carried
out at once with the greatest possible speed.
The situation in 1936 is defined by me, in that report to my co-
workers, as serious. Other states had, to be sure, not disarmed, but
here and there they had perhaps neglected their air force and they
were catching up on lost ground. Violent debates were taking place
in England with regard to modernizing and building up the air force;
feverish activities were taking place in Russia, concerning which we
had reliable reports—I shall refer to the question of Russian
rearmament later.
When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco sent a call for help
to Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. One should
not forget that Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa and
that he could not get the troops across, as the fleet was in the
hands of the Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time,
the competent Revolutionary Government in Spain. The decisive
factor was, first of all, to get his troops over to Spain.
The Führer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support
under all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further spread
of communism in that theater and, secondly, to test my young
Luftwaffe at this opportunity in this or that technical respect.
With the permission of the Führer, I sent a large part of my
transport fleet and a number of experimental fighter units, bombers,
and anti-aircraft guns; and in that way I had an opportunity to
ascertain, under combat conditions, whether the material was equal
to the task. In order that the personnel, too, might gather a certain
amount of experience, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow,
that is, that new people were constantly being sent and others
recalled.
The rearming of the Air Force required, as a basic condition, the
creation of a large number of new industries. It was no help to me
to build a strong Air Force and not to have any gasoline for it. Here,
too, therefore, I had to speed up the development of the refineries
to the utmost. There were other auxiliary industries, above all,
aluminum. Since I considered the Luftwaffe the most important part
of the Wehrmacht, as far as the security of the Reich was concerned,
and, in view of the modernization of technical science, it was my
duty as Commander-in-Chief to do everything to develop it to the
highest peak; and, too, as nothing was there to begin with, a
supreme effort and a maximum amount of work had to be achieved.
That I did.
Much has been said here in a cross-examination about four-
engine bombers, two-engine bombers, et cetera. The witnesses
made statements to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they
were familiar only with small sections and they gave their opinions
from that point of view. I alone was responsible and am responsible,
for I was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and Minister for Air. I
was responsible for the rearmament, the training and the morale of
the Luftwaffe.
 If at the beginning I did not build any four-engine bombers, it
was not because I had qualms that they might be construed as an
aggressive force. That would not have disturbed me for one minute.
My only reason was that the necessary technical and production
conditions did not exist. That kind of bomber simply had not yet
been developed by my industry, at any rate not so that I could use
it. Secondly, I was still short of aluminum, and anyone only half an
expert knows how much aluminum a four-engine bomber swallows
up and how many fighters, that is, two-engine bombers, one can
build with the same amount.
To start with, I had to ascertain who were likely to be Germany’s
opponents in a war. Were the technical conditions adequate for
meeting an attack against Germany by such an enemy? Of all
possible opponents I considered Russia the main opponent, but of
course England, France, and Italy also had to be considered. It was
my duty to consider all possibilities.
As far as the European theater of war was concerned, I could, for
the time being, be satisfied with bombers which could operate
against the important centers of enemy armament industry. Thus,
for the time being, I did not need anything more than aircraft which
would enable me to do that, but it was important to have more of
that kind.
But in a speech to the aircraft industrialists I let it be clearly
known that I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded
with the necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. I asked
them to work on that diligently so that, if America should enter into
war against Germany, I could also reach the American armament
industry. It was not a question, therefore, of not wanting them. I
even, as far as I remember, inaugurated a prize competition for
bombers capable of flying at great heights and at great speeds over
large distances. Even before the beginning of the war we had begun
to develop propellerless aircraft.
Summing up, I should like to say that I did everything possible
under the technical and production conditions then prevalent, to
rebuild and rearm a strong Air Force. The technical knowledge of
that time led us to believe that, after 5 years of war, new technical
and practical advances would be made. That is a principle based on
experience. I wanted to be prepared to have an Air Force which,
however the political situation might develop, would be strong
enough to protect the nation and to deal blows to Germany’s enemy.
It is perfectly correct for Mr. Justice Jackson to ask whether the
speedy elimination of Poland and France was due to the fact that the
German Air Force, acting according to modern principles, contributed
so much. It was the decisive factor. On the other hand, though this
does not concern me, the use of the American air force was also a
decisive factor for the Allied victory.
DR. STAHMER: Has the fact that you were given control of raw
materials already in April 1936 anything to do with this rebuilding of
the Air Force?
GÖRING: I need not repeat what the witness Körner elaborated
yesterday, or the day before yesterday, with regard to my gradual
rise in economic leadership. The starting point was the agricultural
crisis in the year of 1935. In the summer of 1936 the then Minister
of War, Von Blomberg, the Minister of Economy and President of the
Reichsbank, Schacht, and Minister Kerrl came to me and asked me
whether I was prepared to back a suggestion of theirs which they
wanted to submit to the Führer, namely, that I be appointed
Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. It was
agreed that I should not function as an economics expert, which I
was not; but someone was needed to take care of the difficulties
due to shortage of foreign currency, which continuously arose
because of our heavy demands, and at the same time to make
available and accumulate raw materials—someone who was capable
of taking measures which would perhaps not be understood by
many people, but would have the weight of his authority. Secondly,
it was decided that in this sphere, though not as an expert, I should
be the driving power and use my energy.
Minister Schacht, who was the expert, had difficulties with the
Party. He was not a member of the Party. He was at that time on
excellent terms with the Führer and me, but not so much with the
members of the Party. The danger arose that the appropriate
measures might not be understood by the latter, and in this
connection I would be the right man to make these things known to
the people and the Party.
That is how that came about. But since I, as Minister of Air, was,
as I have explained, interested in raw materials, I played an ever
increasingly important role. Then the differences between agriculture
and economy in regard to foreign currency came more to the fore,
so that I had to make decisions, decisions which became more
drastic. Thus I entered the field of economic leadership. I devoted a
great deal of time and work to this task, particularly to procuring the
raw materials necessary for economy and for rearmament. Out of
this the Four Year Plan arose which gave me far-reaching plenary
powers.
DR. STAHMER: What was the aim of the Four Year Plan?
GÖRING: The Four Year Plan had two aims: First, that German
economy as far as possible and particularly in the agricultural sector,
should be made secure against any crisis; secondly, in the event of
war, Germany should be able to withstand a blockade to the greatest
extent possible. Therefore it was necessary, first, to increase
agriculture to the utmost, to control and direct it, to control
consumption, and to store up supplies by means of negotiations with
foreign countries; secondly, to ascertain which raw materials,
imported until then, could be found, produced, and procured in
Germany itself, and which raw materials that were difficult to import
could be replaced by others more easily obtainable. Briefly, as far as
the agricultural sphere was concerned: utilization of every available
space; regulation of cultivation according to the crops needed;
control of animal breeding; building up of reserves for times of need
or crop failures; as far as the industrial sector was concerned, the
creation of industries supplying raw materials: First, coal—although
there was sufficient coal, its production would have to be increased
considerably, since coal is the basic raw material on which so many
other things are dependent; iron—our mining industry had made
itself so dependent on foreign countries that, in the event of a crisis,
a most disastrous situation might arise here. I can quite understand
that from the purely financial and business point of view that was all
right but, nevertheless, we should have to mine and make available
the German iron ores which were at our disposal, even though they
were inferior to the Swedish ores; we should have to compel
industry to make alloys and manage with German ores.
I recklessly allowed industry a year’s time. As industry by then
had still not begun to exploit these ores, I founded the Reich works
which were given my name. They were primarily for opening up
iron-ore reserves in German soil and using them in the mining
industry. It was necessary to set up oil refineries, aluminum works
and various other works, and then to promote the development of
the so-called synthetic material industry in order to replace
necessary raw materials which could be obtained only from abroad
and under difficult circumstances. In the field of textiles this involved
the conversion of the textile industry and of I. G. Farben.
That, roughly, was the task of the Four Year Plan.
Naturally a third question is of importance in this connection: the
question of labor. Co-ordination was necessary here too. The most
important industries had to have workers; less important industries
had to dispense with them. The control of this allocation of labor,
which before the war functioned only within Germany, was another
task of the Four Year Plan and the Department for the Allocation of
Labor.
The Four Year Plan as such very quickly assumed too large
proportions as an official organization. Then, after Schacht had left, I
took over the Ministry of Economy for 2 months and fitted the Four
Year Plan into it. I retained only a very small staff of collaborators
and carried out the tasks with the assistance of the ministries
competent to deal with these things.
DR. STAHMER: Was the purpose of carrying out these plans that
of preparing for aggressive war?
GÖRING: No, the aim of the plans was, as I said, to make
Germany secure against economic crises, and to make her secure
against a blockade in the event of war, and, of course, within the
Four Year Plan to provide the necessary conditions for rearmament.
That was one of its important tasks.
DR. STAHMER: How did the occupation of the Rhineland come
about?
GÖRING: The occupation of the Rhineland was not, as has been
asserted here, a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed
previously did not deal with the occupation of the Rhineland, but
with the question of mobilization measures in the Rhineland in case
of an attack on Germany.
The Rhineland occupation came about for two reasons. The
balance which was created through the Locarno Pact had been
disturbed in western Europe, because a new factor had arisen in
France’s system of allies, namely Russia, who even at that time had
an extraordinarily large armed force. In addition, there was the
Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance pact. Thus, the
conditions upon which the Locarno Pact had been based no longer
existed, according to our way of thinking. So, there was now such a
threat to Germany, or the possibility of such a threat, that it would
have been a neglect of duty and honor on the part of the
Government if it had not done everything to ensure, here also, the
security of the Reich. The Government therefore—as a sovereign
state—made use of its sovereign right and freed itself from the
dishonorable obligation not to place a part of the Reich under its
protection, and it did place this important part of the Reich under its
protection by building strong fortifications.
The construction of such strong fortifications, such expensive
fortifications and such extensive fortifications, is justified only if that
frontier is regarded as final and definitive. If I had intended to
extend the frontier in the near future, it would never have been
possible to go through with an undertaking so expensive and such a
burden to the whole nation as was the construction of the West
Wall. This was done—and I want to emphasize this particularly—
from the very beginning only in the interest of defense and as a
defensive measure. It made the western border of the Reich secure
against that threat which, because of the recent shift of power, and
the new combination of powers such as the Franco-Russian mutual
assistance pact, had become a threat to Germany. The actual
occupation, the decision to occupy the Rhineland, was made at very
short notice. The troops which marched into the Rhineland were of
such small numbers—and that is an historical fact—that they
provided merely a token occupation. The Luftwaffe itself could not,
for the time being, enter the Rhine territory on the left at all, since
there was no adequate ground organization. It entered the so-called
demilitarized territory on the right of the Rhine, Düsseldorf and other
cities. In other words, it was not as if the Rhineland were suddenly
occupied with a great wave of troops; but, as I said before, it was
merely that a few battalions and a few batteries marched in as a
symbol that the Rhineland was now again under the full sovereignty
of the sovereign German Reich and would in the future be protected
accordingly.
DR. STAHMER: What were Hitler’s aims when he created the
Reich Defense Council and when he issued the Reich Defense Law?
GÖRING: The Reich Defense Council, during the last months,
played a very important role here. I hope I shall not be
misunderstood; I believe that during these months more has been
said about it than was ever said since the moment of its creation. In
the first place it is called Reich Defense Council and not Reich
Council for the Offensive. Its existence is taken for granted. It exists
in every other country in some form or other, even if it has another
name. First of all, there was a Reich Defense Committee already,
before our seizure of power. In this committee there were official
experts from all the ministries for the purpose of carrying out
mobilization preparations or, better said, mobilization measures,
which automatically come into consideration in any kind of
development—war, the possibility of war, the facts of war involving
bordering states and the subsequent need to guard one’s neutrality.
These are the usual measures to be taken—to ascertain how many
horses have to be levied in case of mobilization, what factories have
to be converted, whether bread ration cards and fat ration cards
have to be introduced, regulation of traffic, et cetera—all these
things need not be dealt with in detail, because they are so obvious.
All such discussions took place in the Reich Defense Committee—
discussions by the official experts presided over by the then chief of
the ministerial office in the Reich Ministry of War, Keitel. The Reich
Defense Council was created, for the time being, as a precautionary
measure, when the armed forces were re-established, but it existed
only on paper. I was, I think, Deputy Chairman or Chairman—I do
not know which—I heard it mentioned here. I assure you under oath
that at no time and at no date did I participate in a meeting at which
the Reich Defense Council as such was called together. These
discussions, which were necessary for the defense of the Reich,
were held in a completely different connection, in a different form
and depended on immediate needs. Naturally, there were
discussions about the defense of the Reich, but not in connection
with the Reich Defense Council. This existed on paper, but it never
met. But even if it had met, that would have been quite logical, since
this concerns defense and not attack. The Reich Defense Law, or
rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense, which is
probably what you mean, was created only one day before the
outbreak of the war, since the Reich Defense Council actually did not
exist. This Ministerial Council for Reich Defense is not to be
considered the same as, for instance, the so-called War Cabinet that
was formed in England when the war broke out, and perhaps in
other countries. On the contrary, this Ministerial Council for the Reich
Defense was—by using abbreviated procedure—to issue only the
regulations necessary for wartime, laws dealing with daily issues,
explanations to the people, and it was to relieve the Führer to a
considerable extent, since he had reserved for himself the leadership
in military operations. The Ministerial Council therefore issued, first
of all, all those laws which, as I should like to mention, are to be
expected in any country at the beginning of a war. In the early
period it met three or four times, and after that not at all. I, too, had
no time after that. To abbreviate the procedure, these laws were
circulated and then issued. One, or one and a half years afterwards
—I cannot remember the exact time—the Führer took the direct
issuance of laws more into his own hands. I was the co-signer of
many laws in my capacity as Chairman of this Ministerial Council. But
that, too, was practically discontinued in the latter years. The
Ministerial Council did not meet again at all after 1940, I think.
DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has presented a document,
Number 2261-PS. In this document a Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935 is mentioned, which for the time being was kept in abeyance
by order of the Führer. I shall have that document shown to you and
I ask you to give your views on it?
GÖRING: I am familiar with it.
DR. STAHMER: Would you please state your views?
GÖRING: After the Reich Defense Council had begun to exist, a
Reich Defense Law was provided in 1935 for the event of a
mobilization. The agreement or, better said, decision, was made by
the Reich Cabinet and this law was to be applied and became
effective in the case of a mobilization. Actually it was replaced when
mobilization did come about, by the law I have mentioned regarding
the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense. In this law, before the
time of the Four Year Plan, that is 1935, a Plenipotentiary for
Economy was created, at first for the event of a mobilization, and a
Plenipotentiary for Administration; so that if war occurred, then all
the departments of the entire administration would be concentrated
under one minister and all the departments concerned with economy
and armament were likewise to be concentrated under one minister.
The Plenipotentiary for Administration did not function before
mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, on the other hand—
this title was not to be made known to the public—was to begin his
tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary. This is perhaps the
clearest explanation of the fact that the creation of the Four Year
Plan necessarily led to clashes between the Plenipotentiary for
Economy and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, since both of
them were more or less working on the same or similar tasks. When,
therefore, in 1936, I was made Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the
activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy practically ceased.
 DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the
questioning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
 Afternoon Session
DR. STAHMER: A word has been repeatedly used here: Reich
Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat). What kind of institution was
that?
GÖRING: I believe it was in the year 1943 that I received the
order to concentrate the entire field of German research, particularly
insofar as it was of urgent importance to the conduct of war.
Unfortunately, that was done much too late. The purpose was to
avoid parallel research and useless research, to concentrate all
research on problems important for the war. I myself became
President of the Reich Research Council and established directives
for research according to the purpose mentioned.
DR. STAHMER: Did this have any connection with the Research
Office of the Air Force?
GÖRING: No, the Research Office of the Air Force was entirely
different, and it had nothing to do with either research on the one
hand or the Air Force on the other hand. The expression was a sort
of camouflage, for, when we came to power, there was considerable
confusion on the technical side of control of important information.
Therefore, I established for the time being the Research Office, that
was an office where all technical devices for the control of radio,
telegraph, telephone, and all other technical communications could
be provided. Since I was then only Reich Minister for Air I could do
this within only my own ministry and therefore used this
camouflaged designation. This machinery served to exert control
above all over foreign missions, and important persons, who had
telephone, telegraph, and radio connections with foreign countries,
as is customary everywhere in all countries, and then to decipher the
information thus extracted and put it at the disposal of other
departments. The office had no agents, no intelligence service, but
was a purely technical office intercepting wireless messages,
telephone conversations, and telegrams, wherever it was ordered,
and passing on the information to the offices concerned. In this
connection I may say that I have also read much about those
communications made by Mr. Messersmith, which figured here. He
was at times the main source for such information.
DR. STAHMER: What was the purpose and importance of the
Secret Cabinet Council which was created a short time after the
seizure of power?
GÖRING: In February 1938 there came about the retirement of
the War Minister, Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Simultaneously,
because of particular circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, Colonel General Von Fritsch, retired, that is to say, the Führer
dismissed him. The coincidence of these retirements or dismissals
was, in the eyes of the Führer, disadvantageous to the prestige of
the Wehrmacht. He wanted to divert attention from this change in
the Wehrmacht by means of a general reshuffling. He said he
wanted above all to change the Foreign Office because only such a
change would make a strong impression abroad and would be likely
to divert attention from the military affairs. At the time I opposed
the Führer very strongly about this. In lengthy, wearisome personal
conversations I begged him to refrain from a change in the Foreign
Office. He thought, however, that he would have to insist upon it.
The question arose as to what should be done after Herr Von
Neurath’s retirement or after the change. The Führer intended to
keep Herr Von Neurath in the Cabinet by all means for he had the
greatest personal esteem for him. I myself have always expressed
my respect for Herr Von Neurath. In order to avoid a lowering of
Herr Von Neurath’s prestige abroad, I myself was the one to make a
proposal to the Führer. I told him that in order to make it appear
abroad that Von Neurath had not been entirely removed from foreign
policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret
Cabinet Council. There was, to be sure, no such cabinet in existence,
but the expression would sound quite nice, and everyone would
imagine that it meant something. The Führer said we could not
make him chairman if we had no council. Thereupon I said, “Then
we shall make one,” and offhand I marked down names of several
persons. How little importance I attached to this council can be seen
in the fact that I myself was, I think, one of the last on that list.
Then, for the public at large the council was given out to be an
advisory council for foreign policy. When I returned I said to my
friends, “The affair has gone off all right, but if the Führer does not
ask the Foreign Minister for advice, he certainly will not ask a cabinet
council for advice on foreign policy; we will not have anything to do
with it!” I declare under oath that this Cabinet Council never met at
all, not even for a minute; there was not even an initial meeting for
laying down the rules by which it should function. Some members
may not even have been informed that they were members.
DR. STAHMER: When was the Reich Cabinet in session last?
GÖRING: As far as I remember, the last meeting of the Reich
Cabinet was in 1937, and, as far as I can remember, I presided over
the last meeting, the Führer having left shortly after the beginning.
The Führer did not think much of Cabinet meetings; it was too large
a circle for him, and perhaps there was too much discussion of his
plans, and he wanted that changed.
From that time on there were only individual conferences—
conferences with single ministers or with groups of ministers from
the ministries concerned. But since the ministers found, very rightly,
that this made their work difficult, a solution was adopted whereby
I, under the title of the Four Year Plan, called the ministers together
more frequently, in order to discuss general matters with them. But
at no time in the Cabinet or the Ministerial Council was any political
decision of importance mentioned or discussed, as, for instance,
those decisions—the annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and
Czechoslovakia—which finally led to war. I know how much
importance the Führer attached to the fact that in all these matters
only those ministers should be informed who absolutely had to be
informed, because of the nature of their work, and that only at the
very last minute. Here too, I can say under oath that quite a number
of ministers were not informed about the beginning of the war or
the march into Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, or Austria until the
next morning, when they learned about it by radio or through the
press, just as any other German citizen.
DR. STAHMER: What part did you have in making the Munich
Pact of September 1938?
GÖRING: The incorporation of the Sudeten Germans or, better
said, the solution of the Sudeten German problem I had always
emphasized as being something that was necessary. I also told the
Führer after the Anschluss of Austria that I should regret it if his
statements were misunderstood to mean that with the Anschluss of
Austria this question had been settled.
In November 1937, I stated to Lord Halifax that the Anschluss of
Austria, the solution of the Sudeten German question in the sense of
a return of the Sudeten Germans, and the solution of the problem of
Danzig and the Corridor were integral parts of German policy.
Whether they were tackled by Hitler one day, or by me or somebody
else the next day, they would still remain political aims which under
all circumstances would have to be attained sometime. However,
both of us agreed that all efforts should be made to achieve that
without resorting to war.
Furthermore, in my conversations with Mr. Bullitt I had always
taken up the very same position. And I told every other person,
publicly and personally, that these three points had to be settled and
that the settlement of the one would not make the others
unimportant.
I also want to stress that, if in connection with this, and also in
connection with other things, the Prosecution accuses us of not
having kept this or that particular promise that Germany had made
in the past, including the Germany that existed just before the
seizure of power, I should like to refer to the many speeches in
which both the Führer—this I no longer remember so well—and I, as
I know very well, stated that we warned foreign countries not to
make any plans for the future on the basis of any promises made by
the present government, that we would not recognize these
promises when we acquired power. Thus there was absolute clarity
in respect to this.
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