A.

Ordinary Appealed Cases - Rule 44(Relate to rule 41)

De Liano v. CA, G.R. No. 142316, November 22, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro De Liano instituted a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. The trial court rendered a decision adverse to
petitioner, prompting him to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via
a regular appeal. However, petitioner failed to file his appellant’s brief within the
reglementary period prescribed under Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting lack of intent
to delay the proceedings and claiming that he had a meritorious case. Nonetheless,
the CA denied the motion. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme
Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the CA's
dismissal of his appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to file
the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s dismissal of the appeal, emphasizing that
under Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, failure to file the appellant’s brief
within the prescribed period is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. This
procedural rule is intended to expedite the administration of justice and avoid
unnecessary delays. While liberal construction of the rules may be allowed in
meritorious cases, such leniency is warranted only upon a showing of a justifiable
reason for the delay—something the petitioner failed to provide. The petitioner’s
mere invocation of “no intent to delay” is not a sufficient excuse to disregard the
mandatory procedural requirement. As consistently held, the right to appeal is not
a natural right but a statutory privilege, and as such, must be exercised in
accordance with the manner and conditions laid down by law.

B. Original Cases Filed before CA - Rule 46

Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No. 142572, February 20, 2002

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter, the
"Department"), assailing the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of its petition for
certiorari in connection with Civil Case No. C-18264 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City. The said case arose from a complaint for recovery of
possession filed by Carmel Development, Inc. ("Carmel") on March 17, 1998,
seeking to recover a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
64007, allegedly being occupied by Pangarap Elementary School and Pangarap
High School, both established and maintained by the Department. Alongside the
complaint, Carmel likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Department and the Caloocan City School Board ("School
Board"). On April 16, 1998, the Department filed a motion for extension of time to
file its answer; however, on April 27, 1998, Carmel moved to declare the
Department and the School Board in default, alleging failure to file a responsive
pleading within the reglementary period. On the same day, the trial court declared
both defendants in default, thereby allowing Carmel to present its evidence ex
parte. The trial court subsequently denied the Department's motions for
reconsideration, prompting the Department to elevate the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. On August 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not accompanied by certified true
copies of the assailed RTC orders, but only by duplicate originals. The appellate
court further denied the Department’s motion for reconsideration on March 17,
2000, leading to the filing of the present petition before the Supreme Court seeking
to annul the CA's resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of non-compliance with the requirement to submit certified true copies of
the assailed judgments and orders, despite the submission of duplicate originals.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Department of Education (DepEd),
granting its petition and setting aside the Court of Appeals' prior rulings. It
dismissed the complaint filed by Carmel without prejudice.

Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that
petitions must be accompanied by duplicate originals or certified true copies of
the assailed judgment, order, or resolution.

Here, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erroneously dismissed
the DepEd's certiorari petition on the ground that it lacked certified true copies of
the assailed orders. The Supreme Court clarified that under the rules, the
 submission of either duplicate originals or certified true copies is sufficient. Since
this procedural requirement was met, the appellate court should not have
dismissed the petition.

Therefore, the Supreme Court granted DepEd’s petition, reversed the Court of
Appeals’ decisions, and dismissed Carmel’s complaint without prejudice, holding
that the procedural dismissal was unfounded based on a misapplication of Section
3, Rule 46.

China Bank v. Padilla, G.R. No. 143490, February 2, 2007

Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari, China Banking Corporation (CBC) seeks
to annul the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55795, which
dismissed its petition for certiorari on procedural grounds. The case originated
from Civil Case No. 97-3020, a complaint for a sum of money with damages filed
on December 22, 1997, by Dolores Padilla before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 136. Padilla alleged that erroneous and unauthorized
deductions were made from her checking account with CBC’s Tuguegarao branch,
including unauthorized overdrafts and incorrect payments amounting to
significant losses.

CBC conducted an internal investigation and discovered that the discrepancies

were due to the actions of its branch manager, Emelina T. Quitan, who had
allegedly acted beyond her authority and in violation of bank policies. CBC
terminated Quitan’s employment and subsequently filed a motion for leave to file
a third-party complaint against her. The RTC denied the motion, holding that
CBC, as a juridical entity, acts solely through its employees and may not implead
its own agent in the same action but must instead pursue a separate claim.

CBC elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, which
was dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically for failure to attach certified true copies of
the assailed orders. CBC’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, despite
its subsequent submission of the required documents, prompting the present
recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying CBC’s motion for reconsideration
and in dismissing its petition for certiorari despite CBC’s subsequent compliance
with the procedural requirement to attach certified true copies of the assailed RTC
orders.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration
and in dismissing CBC’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal,
citing Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that
a petition for certiorari must be accompanied by certified true copies of the
judgment, order, or resolution being challenged. Non-compliance with this
requirement is a sufficient ground for outright dismissal of the petition.

In this case, CBC failed to attach the required certified true copies at the time of
filing. While it later submitted the correct documents, the Supreme Court held that
subsequent compliance does not cure the original defect, as procedural rules are
in place to ensure order, efficiency, and fair play in the judicial process. The Court
found CBC’s justifications of “honest mistake” and “excusable negligence”
inadequate to overcome the procedural lapse.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ dismissal,

reiterating the principle that procedural rules must be strictly followed, and that
compliance after the fact does not absolve a litigant from the consequences of its
initial failure to observe the rules.

C. Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions – Rule 47

Antonino vs. Register of Deeds of Makati City, et al., G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012

FACTS:
This case involves petitioner Remedios Antonino and respondents the Register of
Deeds of Makati City and Tan Tian Su. Since March 21, 1978, Antonino had been
leasing a residential property in Makati City owned by Su. The lease contract
contained a right of first refusal clause in favor of Antonino, should Su decide to
sell the property. On July 7, 2004, the parties executed an Undertaking Agreement,
wherein Su agreed to sell the subject property to Antonino for ₱39,500,000.00.
However, the sale was not consummated due to a disagreement regarding the
payment of capital gains tax.

On the same day, Antonino filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City for reimbursement of repair expenses and damages, which
she later amended to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel the sale. On
December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the action was
personal in nature and had been filed in an improper venue, as neither party
resided in Makati City—Antonino resided in Muntinlupa, and Su in Manila. The
RTC further held that its jurisdiction was not properly invoked due to non-
payment of correct docket fees. Antonino’s motions for reconsideration were
 denied. Subsequently, Su moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
and for summary judgment on his counterclaims.

Antonino then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. On May 26,
2008, the CA dismissed the petition, affirming the RTC's ruling that the action was
personal and filed in the wrong venue. Antonino’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied on December 5, 2008. Thereafter, Antonino filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is
proper to assail the final and executory dismissal orders of the RTC rendered on
the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of docket fees, in lieu of the
ordinary remedy of appeal.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the dismissal
of the case.

The Court held that under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, annulment
of judgment is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists, and only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Conversely, under Rule 41, a dismissal order is a final
and appealable order, which must be timely assailed through an ordinary appeal.

In this case, the RTC’s dismissal was premised on procedural grounds—namely,

improper venue and non-payment of correct docket fees. The Court clarified that
while these grounds pertain to the exercise of jurisdiction, they do not equate to
lack of jurisdiction, and as such, they do not fall within the limited grounds
justifying annulment under Rule 47.

Since the petitioner had an available remedy of appeal but failed to avail of it
within the prescribed period, she cannot substitute annulment for her own
procedural default. The Supreme Court emphasized that the extraordinary
remedy of annulment cannot be used to circumvent the ordinary appeal process,
particularly when the failure to appeal was due to the petitioner’s own neglect.

Accordingly, the petition for annulment was properly denied, and the Court
upheld the finality of the RTC’s dismissal order, holding that it had become final
and executory by operation of law.
Springfield vs. Presiding Judge of RTC Misamis Oriental, Br. 40, G.R. No. 142628,
February 6, 2007
FACTS:

This case involves petitioners Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. and the
heirs of Petra Capistrano Piit against the Honorable Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), and other
respondents. Petra Capistrano Piit was the registered owner of Lot No. 2291
located in Cagayan de Oro City, with a total area of 123,408 square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. In the process of development,
Springfield acquired Lot No. 2291-C (68,732 sq. m.) and Lot No. 2291-D (49,778 sq.
m.), which were developed into the Mega Heights Subdivision.

On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of

Coverage, placing the land under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), despite opposition from the heirs
of Piit. This opposition led to the filing of DARAB Case No. X-305, wherein the
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated August 27, 1991, declaring the
property residential in character and unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The
decision attained finality when the Regional Director's appeal was dismissed as
pro forma and frivolous.

Subsequently, however, the DAR Regional Director filed a petition for relief from
judgment in DARAB Case No. 0555, resulting in a DARAB decision dated October
5, 1995, granting the petition and effectively reinstating the land under agrarian
reform coverage. On May 22, 1997, DARAB issued an order directing the heirs of
Piit and Springfield to pay just compensation to farmer-beneficiaries. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the RTC of Misamis
Oriental on June 13, 1997, alleging denial of due process in the DARAB
proceedings.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, prompting petitioners to file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that an action for
annulment is distinct from a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal,
affirming that the RTC had no jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the
DARAB, leading petitioners to seek review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment
rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
RULING:
No. The Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to annul a final judgment
rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The DARAB, as a quasi-judicial agency, is vested by law with exclusive and

original jurisdiction over agrarian disputes pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 and
its implementing rules. Its final decisions and orders are appealable only to the
Court of Appeals, in accordance with the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. As such, the RTC, being a co-equal judicial body, is not vested with
authority to annul or interfere with final adjudications of the DARAB. To hold
otherwise would violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and disrupt the
structure of administrative and judicial review under existing laws.

In the present case, petitioners erroneously sought the annulment of a DARAB

decision before the RTC, notwithstanding the availability of an appeal to the CA.
The Supreme Court emphasized that annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is an
extraordinary remedy that cannot be invoked when another adequate legal
remedy, such as appeal, is available but not availed of. Furthermore, petitioners
failed to establish any valid ground for annulment—such as lack of jurisdiction or
extrinsic fraud—nor did they demonstrate grave abuse of discretion or violation
of due process in the DARAB proceedings sufficient to warrant the nullification of
a final judgment.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to annul decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies such as the DARAB lies exclusively with the Court of Appeals, and not with
the RTC. The petition before the RTC was properly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, and the CA's affirmance of said dismissal was upheld. The remedy
sought by petitioners was not only procedurally flawed but also impermissible
under settled legal doctrine.

Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011

FACTS:
This case involves petitioner Maximina A. Bulawan and respondent Emerson B.
Aquende, with the Supreme Court rendering its decision on June 22, 2011. The
controversy arose when, on March 1, 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for
annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against Lourdes Yap and the
Register of Deeds, docketed as Civil Case No. 9040 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Legazpi City, asserting ownership over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847.
Bulawan based her claim on an alleged purchase from the Yaptengco brothers,
who purportedly inherited the lot from Yap Chin Cun. However, Lourdes Yap
contested the claim, asserting ownership over Lot No. 1634-A of Psd-187165, and
 pointed to a prior ruling in Civil Case No. 5064, which invalidated the Yaptengco
brothers’ title on grounds of simulated ownership.

On November 26, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Bulawan, affirming
her ownership and enjoining Yap from disturbing her possession. Yap’s appeal
was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeals on July 20, 2001, rendering
the RTC’s judgment final and executory on February 7, 2002. A writ of execution
was issued on July 19, 2002, and notice thereof was served to the Register of Deeds,
prompting Emerson Aquende to file an opposition on July 25, 2002, claiming he
was unaware of the litigation and was not impleaded despite being the registered
titleholder of the subject lot. Aquende thereafter filed a Third-Party Claim on
August 2, 2002, asserting that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over his person.

The RTC denied Aquende’s motions, holding that it had already lost jurisdiction
after finality of the appealed decision. Consequently, Aquende filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, invoking extrinsic fraud and
lack of due process, as he was not made a party and was thus deprived of the
opportunity to defend his property rights. On November 26, 2007, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition, declaring the RTC’s November 26, 1996 judgment
void. Bulawan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on May 7, 2008, leading
her to file a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction in annulling a final and
executory judgment of another appellate division.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals did not exceed its jurisdiction in annulling the final and
executory decision of another appellate division. The annulment of judgments, as
governed by Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, is an extraordinary remedy
available in instances of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence has
long recognized that the non-joinder of an indispensable party constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that renders a decision void ab initio.

An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final
determination cannot be made without adversely affecting that party’s rights or
leaving the controversy unresolved (citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
112708, July 16, 1998). In the present case, Emerson Aquende was an indispensable
party, as he was the registered owner of the lot subject to litigation. His non-joinder
in Civil Case No. 9040 constituted a fatal jurisdictional flaw, which invalidated the
proceedings as to him.
 Despite the finality of the RTC's decision and its affirmance by the Court of
Appeals in a separate division, such finality cannot cure a judgment that is void
for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals correctly exercised its authority
under Rule 47 to annul the RTC’s void judgment, thereby protecting Aquende’s
constitutional right to due process.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that
the annulment was proper given the jurisdictional defect resulting from the non-
inclusion of an indispensable party, and that the CA acted within its authority and
did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of another division.

Alma Jose v. Intra Strata, G.R. No. 155316, July 28, 2005

FACTS:
On October 5, 1993, Anhui-Alma Jose Hydrogeologic and Well Drilling Co., Inc.
(hereinafter “ANHUI”) executed an Ordinary Re-Export Bond in favor of the
Bureau of Customs in the amount of ₱3,010,758.00 to guarantee the re-exportation
of 68 drilling tools and equipment and the payment of applicable duties and taxes.
The bond was signed by Porthos P. Alma Jose, ANHUI's President, and co-signed
by Ma. Theresa D. Alma Jose, ANHUI's Treasurer, among others, under an
Indemnity Agreement with Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, the bond’s surety.
The indemnitors obligated themselves to reimburse Intra Strata for any losses
incurred under the bond. All petitioners listed 48 Guijo Street, Town and Country
Executive Village, Antipolo, Rizal as their residence.

Following the Bureau of Customs’ claim of ANHUI’s failure to comply with the
bond’s terms and re-exportation obligations, Intra Strata filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2200, against
ANHUI and the individual signatories to the indemnity agreement on September
25, 1997. Summons were directed to the parties, but personal service failed;
substituted service was effected by leaving the summons with a person of
sufficient discretion at their office. The petitioners failed to file an answer, and
were declared in default, resulting in a June 15, 1998 judgment ordering them to
pay the bond amount plus attorney’s fees.

Petitioners alleged that they first learned of the judgment upon receipt of a Notice
of Sheriff’s Sale on September 23, 1999, and subsequently filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment, claiming lack of proper service of summons and asserting that
Atty. Bernabe, who entered an appearance, did so without authority. The RTC
denied the petition, stating that it had acquired jurisdiction and that the petitioners
were in default. A Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was
dismissed for lack of grave abuse of discretion, and a subsequent Petition for
 Annulment of Judgment was likewise dismissed. Petitioners then elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment despite allegations of lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of
summons.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the petition
for annulment of judgment was proper under Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, which allows annulment based solely on extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either through valid
service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance. Citing
jurisprudence, including Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141387,
September 9, 2005), the Court reiterated that strict compliance with the rules on
service of summons is mandatory. Failure to do so renders the court’s jurisdiction
defective and any resulting judgment void.

In the present case, no valid service of summons was effected on the petitioners,
and the mere appearance of Atty. Bernabe, who was also the corporate secretary,
did not constitute voluntary appearance sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the
individual defendants. Neither did he show any authority from the petitioners to
act on their behalf in the proceedings. Therefore, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the RTC judgment was void for lack of
jurisdiction, and the annulment petition filed before the Court of Appeals should
have been given due course. The Court found the dismissal of the petition
improper, as it sought relief grounded on lack of jurisdiction, a recognized basis
under Rule 47.

Dela Cruz v. Sison, G.R. No. 142464, September 26, 2005

FACTS:
In the case Guillermo Dela Cruz v. Hon. Deodoro J. Sison and Metrobank, G.R.
No. 142464 (September 26, 2005), Guillermo Dela Cruz filed a complaint against
Metrobank in the RTC of Dagupan City on March 19, 1998. He sought the return
 of ₱730,000.00 that he and Adelina Dela Cruz had deposited under two time
deposit certificates. He also asked for damages, including ₱1 million for moral
damages, ₱200,000 for exemplary damages, ₱50,000 attorney’s fees, and ₱30,000
for litigation costs.

Dela Cruz later found out that the certificates were declared lost, replaced, and the
money was withdrawn on August 11, 1986, using a cashier’s check, allegedly
without his knowledge. Metrobank claimed the money was withdrawn by
Adelina Dela Cruz, who was the main account holder, and that they followed
proper procedures in replacing the certificates.

Since the bank submitted its Answer late, the trial court declared it in default and
ruled in favor of Dela Cruz on November 5, 1998. Metrobank later filed a motion
to inhibit the judge and a petition for relief, claiming it was denied due process. It
also asked the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment, citing extrinsic fraud.

On October 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the bank’s petition, nullified
the RTC judgment, and ordered a retrial. Dela Cruz’s motion for reconsideration
was denied on March 17, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether the negligence of Metrobank’s former counsel constitutes extrinsic fraud
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, justifying the annulment of judgment.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling and dismissed the
petition.

The Court held that annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
confined to the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. While the Court
ruled that the former counsel’s negligence in failing to timely file an answer did
not amount to extrinsic fraud, it nevertheless found that strict application of
procedural rules should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice or result in
denial of due process, especially where meritorious defenses exist and substantial
amounts are involved.

The alleged negligence of Metrobank’s former counsel, though not constituting

fraud external to the proceedings, did not justify depriving the bank of its day in
court. The Court reiterated that while clients generally bear the consequences of
their counsel’s acts or omissions, exceptions exist, particularly where there is a
gross or reckless disregard of the client’s interests. However, the instant case did
not rise to such level.
 Nonetheless, in the interest of due process, the annulment was proper because the
default judgment, coupled with Metrobank’s substantial defenses, warranted a
retrial to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.

Ramos v. Combong, Jr., G.R. No. 144273, October 20, 2005

FACTS:
In the case of Rodolfo Ramos, Emma R. Millado, and Norma R. Erie v. Hon. Judge
Alfonso V. Combong, Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 144273), decided on October 20, 2005 by
the Second Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, the petitioners
sought to challenge several lower court rulings concerning the ownership of a
parcel of land designated as Lot 196 within the La Carlota Cadastre.

The dispute stemmed from a Decision dated February 25, 1977, issued by the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which adjudged the petitioners as co-
owners pro indiviso of the western half of Lot 196, while the respondents—
Teodoro, Jesus, and Teresita Medina—were declared co-owners of the eastern half.
This ruling was later affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court and became
final and executory upon the Entry of Judgment dated May 23, 1986.

Subsequently, in Civil Case No. 402 filed by the Medinas, the Regional Trial Court
of La Carlota City, through an Order dated May 8, 1996, granted the Medinas’
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. The court declared the titles of the
Ramos petitioners null and void and directed the reconveyance of the disputed
property.

When the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment, the Court of
Appeals dismissed it through a Resolution dated January 13, 2000, citing the
petitioners’ failure to indicate material dates necessary to determine whether the
petition was filed within the allowable period. Dissatisfied, the petitioners
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for further review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need to state the material dates in a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to
demonstrate timeliness of filing.

RULING:
Yes. Although Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not explicitly
mandate the inclusion of material dates in a petition for annulment of judgment,
the petition must nevertheless clearly demonstrate that it was filed within the four-
year prescriptive period from the discovery of the alleged extrinsic fraud.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 47, an action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud
must be commenced within four (4) years from the time such fraud is discovered.
 While the Rules do not prescribe a specific format or require the express recital of
material dates, jurisprudence has consistently held that the petition must allege
sufficient facts to establish compliance with this period. In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to specify when they discovered
the alleged fraud, a critical element to determine the timeliness of the petition. The
absence of this information rendered the petition’s timeliness unsubstantiated,
warranting its dismissal.

The Court underscored that, although no rigid formalism is required, a petition

must still provide an adequate factual basis to prove compliance with the four-
year prescriptive rule. Accordingly, the petitioners’ failure to establish the timeline
for the discovery of the extrinsic fraud justified the dismissal of their petition for
annulment. It is therefore imperative that the petition clearly show that the action
was filed within the allowable period under Rule 47.

Alaban v. CA, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

FACTS:
On November 8, 2000, Francisco H. Provido filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo, SP Proc. No. 00-135, a petition for the probate
of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased aunt, Soledad Provido
Elevencionado, who died on October 26, 2000, in Janiuay, Iloilo. Provido alleged
himself as sole heir and executor under the will. On May 30, 2001, the RTC granted
the petition for probate and issued letters testamentary in his favor. Thereafter, on
October 4, 2001, more than four months following the issuance of letters
testamentary, the petitioners—Cynthia C. Alaban, Francis Collado, Jose P.
Collado, Judith Provido, Clarita Provido, Alfredo Provido, Manuel Provido, Jr.,
Lorna Dina E. Provido, Severo Arenga, Jr., Sergio Arenga, Eduardo Arenga, Carol
Arenga, Ruth Babasa, Norma Hijastro, Dolores M. Flores, Antonio Marin, Jr., Jose
Marin, Sr., and Mathilde Marin—filed a motion to reopen the probate proceedings
and opposed the probate on grounds including intestacy, forgery, improper
attestation, lack of testamentary capacity, duress, absence of testamentary intent,
misdescription of property, defective publication, lack of notice, and incorrect
docket fees.

The RTC denied the motion to reopen as untimely on January 11, 2002, ruling that
the publication of the notice imparted jurisdiction to the court and that the
deficiency in docket fees was curable. The petitioners then elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) by filing CA-G.R. SP No. 69221 for annulment of the
RTC’s decision, alleging extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. On February 28,
2002, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to establish the absence of other
available remedies, and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration on
 November 12, 2002. The petitioners then sought recourse before the Supreme
Court on appeal, asserting grave abuse of discretion by the CA, unresolved issues
under Rule 47, lack of notice, extrinsic fraud, and non-party status, while the
respondent alleged forum-shopping due to a parallel intestate administration suit
pending in General Santos City. The Supreme Court promulgated its decision on
September 23, 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment
on the ground that they failed to show that they had no other available remedies.

RULING:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment was proper
since the petitioners failed to exhaust available remedies. Under Section 2, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court, annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy which
may only be availed of when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

In the instant case, the petitioners did not file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration under Rule 37 within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days
from notice of judgment, nor did they file a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38 within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment and six (6) months
from its entry. Instead, they filed a motion to reopen the probate proceedings,
which amounted to a belated motion for new trial. After its denial, the petitioners
still failed to pursue other available remedies. The Court emphasized that these
remedies were accessible, and the petitioners offered no valid justification for their
failure to avail themselves thereof.

Consequently, since the petitioners had other remedies available but failed to
utilize them without just cause, the Court of Appeals acted within its discretion in
dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. There was no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Orbeta v. Sending, G.R. No. 155236, July 8, 2005

Facts:
In the case of Dr. Teresito V. Orbeta et al. v. Paul B. Sendiong (G.R. No. 155236,
July 8, 2005), petitioners, heirs of Simeona Montenegro, together with spouses
Orbeta, sought recovery of possession, quieting of title, and damages over a 4,622-
square-meter portion of Lot 606 in Dumaguete City originally sold in 1925 by
 Montenegro to spouses Maximo Orbeta and Basilisa Teves-Orbeta. Notably,
Maximo Orbeta’s subsequent 1934 sale of the entire tract to spouses Juan Sendiong
and Exequila Castellanes was invalid insofar as it included his wife’s conjugal
share, limited to half the property (2,311 square meters). The disputed property
later passed via donation, sale, and partition to the spouses Pretzylou Sendiong,
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Paul B. Sendiong, who was not impleaded
in the initial suit despite motions to include him as an indispensable party. The
RTC, in Civil Case No. 10173 filed in 1992, ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring
them absolute co-owners and ordering restoration of possession. The RTC
decision became final after dismissal of Pretzylou Sendiong’s appeal. Thereafter,
respondent Paul Sendiong filed a petition for annulment under Rule 47 before the
Court of Appeals (CA), asserting lack of jurisdiction due to the non-joinder of
indispensable parties—Paul and his sister Lourdes Sendiong. The CA granted the
petition and annulled the RTC judgment. Petitioners then elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 petition, assailing the CA ruling on procedural
and substantive grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly annulled the RTC’s April 16, 1998 decision
for lack of jurisdiction owing to non-impleader of indispensable parties;

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ annulment of the RTC
judgment, holding that the non-joinder of indispensable parties—Paul and
Lourdes Sendiong, heirs of Luis Sendiong—rendered the RTC’s decision void for
lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a judgment may be annulled for extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Under Rule 3, Section 7, failure to join indispensable parties mandates the court to
order their inclusion; absent such joinder, all subsequent proceedings are void.
The Court further clarified that defenses predicated on res judicata and forum-
shopping are inapplicable in this instance since these doctrines require identity of
parties, causes of action, and subject matter, none of which was established
between the instant and prior cases. Laches was likewise inapplicable given that
the respondent filed the petition for annulment within one year from discovery of
the RTC judgment in 1999, satisfying the timeliness requirement under Rule 47.
Finally, the Court recognized the procedural validity of a Certification Against
Forum Shopping executed by an attorney-in-fact pursuant to a duly executed
General Power of Attorney, which authorized such acts on behalf of Paul
Sendiong.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the nullification of the RTC decision on
the ground of jurisdictional defect due to the absence of indispensable parties. The
 petition complied with the requisites of Rule 47, and the defenses of laches, res
judicata, and forum-shopping were properly rejected.

Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta B. Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta were married
on March 5, 1959, and had eight children. After years of cohabitation in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, respondent abandoned petitioner and their children
on December 6, 1992. In January 1994, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, resulting in a compromise agreement adjudicating certain
conjugal properties, including a resort known as Munting Paraiso in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, in favor of petitioner and the children. Respondent vacated the
property in June 1994, acknowledging petitioner’s possession. Subsequently,
respondent filed a petition to declare the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC of Naic, Cavite, on June 5, 1995 (Special
Proceedings No. NC-662). In said petition, respondent deliberately
misrepresented petitioner’s residence as No. 72 CRM Avenue, BF Homes, Las
Piñas, despite actual knowledge that petitioner resided at Munting Paraiso,
Carmona, Cavite. Summons was issued to petitioner at the Las Piñas address and
served via substituted service on petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III, at Bancal, Carmona, who allegedly signed the summons but failed to deliver it
to petitioner. Petitioner did not file an answer. Thereafter, respondent filed an ex
parte motion to declare petitioner in default, which the RTC granted, admitting ex
parte evidence and declaring the marriage null and void ab initio on July 7, 1995.
A certificate of finality was issued in 1996, and respondent remarried in 1998. In
2000, petitioner filed a petition under Rule 47 before the Court of Appeals (CA) to
annul the RTC order, alleging extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction due to
defective service of summons and misrepresentation of residence. The CA
dismissed the petition for failure to allege unavailability of ordinary remedies and
denied reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the service of summons on petitioner was proper and valid to confer
jurisdiction on the RTC over her person in the annulment petition filed by
respondent;

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals’
resolutions, and remanded the case for further proceedings under Rule 47. The
Court held that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over petitioner due to invalid
service of summons. Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, valid service of
 summons, preferably personal and, if impracticable, substituted service under
strict legal conditions, is a jurisdictional requisite. Here, summons was served on
petitioner’s son without proof of diligent efforts to personally serve petitioner or
compliance with the strict requisites of substituted service. Consequently,
jurisdiction over petitioner was not acquired. Under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction is an exception to
the requirement of exhaustion of ordinary remedies, allowing the ground to be
raised at any time. Furthermore, procedural safeguards under Article 48 of the
Family Code and relevant jurisprudence mandate the participation of the public
prosecutor in annulment proceedings to prevent collusion and safeguard due
process. The RTC’s failure to involve the public prosecutor, coupled with allowing
the case to proceed ex parte, constitutes extrinsic fraud and a denial of due process.
Therefore, the annulment judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, improper
service of summons, and failure to comply with mandatory procedural
safeguards. The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the CA rulings and
remanded the case for proper proceedings consistent with Rule 47, thereby
upholding due process and the sanctity of judicial proceedings.

Republic v. “G” Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, November 22, 2005

Facts:
The instant case involves the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), as petitioner, and "G" Holdings, Inc. as respondent. The
controversy arose from the APT’s approval on May 21, 1992, of the negotiated sale
of ninety percent (90%) of the shares of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC) to
respondent "G" Holdings. Following the submission of the highest offer by "G"
Holdings, a Contract of Sale was executed on October 2, 1992, stipulating a total
purchase price of ₱673,161,280, which included an initial payment of ₱98,704,000
and subsequent installment payments to be made over a ten-year period. A
dispute ensued between the parties regarding the commencement date of the
installment payments: the Republic asserted that payments were due seven
months after execution of the agreement, while "G" Holdings contended payment
would commence seven months following the fulfillment of certain closing
conditions. Failing resolution, "G" Holdings instituted a complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 49, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-76132. During pre-trial, both parties
agreed that the issue was purely one of law and requested judgment on the
pleadings. The RTC rendered judgment on June 11, 1996, ruling in favor of "G"
Holdings and ordering the APT to execute the necessary documents to transfer
shares and notes upon payment of the balance due. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals (CA) instead of the proper forum, the RTC en banc. Nearly three years
thereafter, on July 2, 1999, the Republic filed a petition for annulment of judgment
 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction by the
RTC. The CA dismissed the petition on December 21, 1999, holding that the RTC
properly exercised jurisdiction and that no grounds for annulment existed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Solicitor General’s failure to file the notice of appeal with the proper
forum constitutes extrinsic fraud sufficient to warrant annulment of the trial
court’s judgment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ December 21, 1999 resolution. The Court ruled that the Solicitor
General’s procedural error in improperly filing the notice of appeal with an
incorrect forum does not constitute extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Rule 47,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which limits annulment of judgments strictly to
cases of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud is defined as deceit
that prevents a party from fully participating in the proceedings, and mere
mistakes or negligence of counsel—including procedural errors such as erroneous
appeal filings—do not meet this standard. Jurisdictional defects must relate to the
court’s power to hear the case or subject matter; errors amounting to grave abuse
of discretion or errors in the exercise of jurisdiction do not render the judgment
void. Here, the trial court possessed valid jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter, and the procedural misstep by the Solicitor General did not preclude the
Republic from fully participating in the proceedings. The claim of grave abuse of
discretion conceded the RTC’s jurisdiction and pertains only to alleged errors in
judgment. Hence, the procedural irregularity in the appeal process is attributable
solely to counsel’s error and does not constitute a jurisdictional or fraudulent
defect warranting annulment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Court
of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition and affirmed the validity of the RTC’s
judgment.

Sps. Benatiro v. Heirs of Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, July 30, 2008

FACTS:
The case concerns the heirs of the late Evaristo Cuyos and his spouse, Agatona
Arrogante Cuyos, who left six parcels of land situated in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Following Evaristo’s death on August 28, 1966, the estate was administered
under intestate probate proceedings before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu, Branch XI, upon a petition filed in 1971 by heir Gloria Cuyos-Talian seeking
Letters of Administration, which was opposed by her brother, Francisco Cuyos.
During a hearing on January 30, 1973, the parties allegedly entered into a
compromise agreement settling the estate amicably and resulting in the
 appointment of Gloria as administratrix. In December 1975, the CFI appointed its
Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo, as Commissioner to facilitate the settlement
and prepare a proposed partition. Atty. Taneo thereafter submitted a report in July
1976 stating that a conference was conducted with the heirs, at which six out of
nine heirs purportedly agreed to sell the properties to another heir, Columba
Cuyos-Benatiro, for the sum of ₱40,000, with proceeds to be divided among the
other heirs accordingly. Notably, the report failed to identify the conference
attendees, contained no signatures of consenting heirs, and some heirs expressly
denied knowledge of any such meeting. Despite objections from several heirs, the
CFI issued an order on December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner’s Report
and authorizing the sale to Columba. Subsequently, in 1978, another heir, Lope
Cuyos, was appointed administrator, who in 1979 executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale for ₱36,000 covering all parcels in favor of Columba. Decades later, in 1998,
certain heirs, namely Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique (represented by
attorney-in-fact Salud Cuyos), discovered that tax declarations and land titles had
been transferred to Columba and subsequently to spouses Renato and Rosie
Benatiro. They filed a petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2001 seeking
annulment of the 1976 CFI order, alleging that the Commissioner’s Report and
resulting order were tainted with fraud and irregularities, specifically extrinsic
fraud and denial of due process. The CA, in 2003, annulled the CFI order, declaring
the Commissioner’s Report unsubstantiated, the compromise agreement void for
lack of due process, and the sale and title transfers fraudulent and void. The
purchasers of the land thereafter elevated the matter to the Supreme Court,
asserting procedural defects and invoking laches.

ISSUE:
Whether the annulment of the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court, was proper notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the annulment of the CFI Order dated December 16,
1976, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was proper despite the availability
of other remedies, as the order was void for lack of due process, which constitutes
a valid ground for annulment. Rule 47 permits annulment only in cases of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction and when ordinary remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. Due process, as guaranteed under the 1987
Philippine Constitution, mandates that all interested parties be properly notified
and afforded the opportunity to be heard; failure to comply with these
requirements renders the order void ab initio and incapable of producing any
binding or legal effect, including valid transfer of title. In the present case, the
Commissioner’s Report upon which the CFI based its approval of the compromise
and sale was fatally defective, as it failed to demonstrate that all heirs were duly
 notified, present, or gave consent; affidavits from several heirs denied any
knowledge or attendance at the alleged proceedings, thus constituting a
deprivation of constitutional due process rights. Consequently, the 1976 order is
void for want of jurisdiction to render a valid judgment. Hence, annulment under
Rule 47 was proper, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’
judgment annulling the order and declaring the compromise agreement, sale, and
subsequent title transfers null and void.

Senho v. PS Bank, G.R. No. 219810, May 12, 2021 (Resolution)

FACTS:
The case of Liao Senho v. Philippine Savings Bank, G.R. No. 219810, resolved by
the Supreme Court on May 12, 2021, arose from an Ex Parte Petition for Writ of
Possession filed by Philippine Savings Bank (respondent) involving Unit No. 602
of Cianno Plaza Condominium in Makati City. The controversy traces back to a
loan agreement dated September 12, 2006, whereby spouses Jenny S. Liao and Chi-
Ah Horng Liao (hereinafter “Spouses Liao”) borrowed the sum of ₱2,446,000.00
from the bank, secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage over the
subject property, as evidenced by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 97781
registered in Jenny Liao’s name. Upon default by the Spouses Liao, the bank
conducted an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on January 15, 2008, where it emerged
as the highest bidder. The Spouses Liao did not exercise their statutory right of
redemption, which expired one year thereafter. The bank then demanded
possession of the property, which was refused by the Spouses Liao, prompting the
filing of a petition for writ of possession. Petitioner Liao Sen Ho intervened,
asserting ownership over the property and alleging that the title registered in
Jenny Liao’s name was fraudulent. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on
September 2, 2009, refusing to entertain Liao Sen Ho’s opposition, emphasizing
that the proceeding was summary in nature and concerned solely with possession
predicated on an existing registered title. The RTC subsequently affirmed the
bank’s ownership and granted the writ of possession on November 22, 2010.
Petitioner’s motion to consolidate the possession case with a separate mortgage
action was denied by the RTC due to the execution stage of the possession order.
On appeal, Liao Sen Ho failed to timely file the appellant’s brief and instead
submitted an appeal memorandum not compliant with procedural requisites,
resulting in dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Liao Sen
Ho’s appeal on procedural grounds without delving into the substantive issues
regarding ownership of the subject property.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, affirming that the Court of Appeals did
not err in dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds. Pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction on petitions for review is
generally confined to questions of law, with re-examination of factual findings
proscribed. Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court explicitly mandates
dismissal of appeals where the appellant fails to file the appellant’s brief within
the prescribed period. The principle of finality of judgments underpins judicial
stability and precludes disturbance of final and executory orders except as
provided by law. In the present case, Liao Sen Ho failed to comply with mandatory
procedural requirements, including the timely filing of his appellant’s brief and
did not submit valid or timely documentation to justify any extension.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion to dismiss
the appeal pursuant to applicable procedural rules. The contention that the
dismissal was an overly technical enforcement of rules was rejected, as adherence
to procedural rules is essential to ensure fairness and judicial efficiency. Moreover,
the procedural posture of the case, coupled with the finality of prior judgments,
barred reconsideration of the merits of the ownership claim at this stage.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Liao Sen Ho’s appeal on
procedural grounds and denied further review of the substantive issues,
emphasizing the imperative of compliance with procedural rules and the sanctity
of final judgments.

Heirs of Kukungan Timbao v. Enojado, GR No 200539, August 2, 2023

FACTS:
This case involves a dispute over a 5.25-hectare parcel of agricultural land located
in General Santos City between the petitioners, the Heirs of Kukungan Timbao,
and respondent Oscar D. Enojado. Petitioners assert rightful ownership by
succession from their deceased father, Kukungan Timbao, who allegedly
possessed the land prior to his displacement during the Ilaga-Blackshirt conflict in
the 1970s. Upon their return, the petitioners discovered that the property had been
titled in the name of the respondent under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-2887, pursuant to a Free Patent. They challenged the validity of the title, arguing
that the respondent was a minor at the time of the Free Patent application, thereby
rendering the title void ab initio.

The respondent conceded his minority during the application but claimed a valid
basis for his claim through a "Transfer of Rights and Sale of Improvements"
executed by his mother, Rosario Enojado, in whose favor the land had allegedly
been transferred prior to issuance of the title. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
dismissed petitioners’ complaint, holding that the respondent had sufficiently
 established ownership through documentary evidence including the deed of
transfer and an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but their appeal was dismissed
on procedural grounds, specifically for failure to file the required Appellant’s Brief
under the Rules of Court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA, claiming
that the brief had been filed via registered mail.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
petitioners’ appeal for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief.

RULING:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It held that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in peremptorily dismissing the appeal
despite indications of substantial compliance. The Court emphasized that while
the right to appeal is a statutory privilege subject to procedural rules, the CA
retains the discretion to relax procedural strictures in the interest of substantial
justice. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present an affidavit of mailing or
other convincing evidence to establish the timely filing of their Appellant’s Brief,
notwithstanding the existence of a registry receipt. However, the respondent’s
judicial admission that he received a copy of the brief undermined the basis for
outright dismissal and warranted a liberal application of procedural rules.

Nevertheless, on substantive grounds, the Court found that the appeal lacked
merit. It upheld the RTC’s ruling, noting that there is no age requirement under
applicable laws for applicants of a free patent, and the respondent’s minority at
the time of application did not invalidate the issuance of title. Furthermore, the
respondent’s title, issued pursuant to a free patent and duly registered, had
become indefeasible and was protected under the Torrens system. Petitioners’
action for reconveyance was also barred by prescription and laches, given their
prolonged inaction.

The Supreme Court set aside the CA's dismissal of the appeal for grave abuse of
discretion but affirmed the RTC’s judgment on the merits, thereby denying the
petitioners’ claim for recovery of the subject property.