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Omnibus Code

The document outlines the Omnibus Election Code, detailing the principles of elections, suffrage, and the electoral process in the Philippines. It defines elections, types of elections, and the right to vote, while explaining the responsibilities of the Commission on Elections and the procedures before, during, and after elections. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process and the legal framework governing election laws.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
7 views26 pages

Omnibus Code

The document outlines the Omnibus Election Code, detailing the principles of elections, suffrage, and the electoral process in the Philippines. It defines elections, types of elections, and the right to vote, while explaining the responsibilities of the Commission on Elections and the procedures before, during, and after elections. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process and the legal framework governing election laws.

Uploaded by

ashparedesbabida
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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E.

The Omnibus Election Code - A

ELECTION LAW

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

2. Define election.

A- It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom
they entrust for the time being, as their representatives, the exercise of the powers of government.

1. What are the two kinds of election?

A- General election - Is one provided for by law for the election of officers throughout the State, or
certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the full term of the former officers.

Special election Is one provided for by law under special circumstances such as when an election is held
to fill a vacancy in office, or when an election is being held because a certain proposal is submitted to the
vote of the qualified electors.

1. Define suffrage.

A- Suffrage is the right to vote in the election of all officers chosen by the people, and in the
determination of all questions submitted to the people.

1. What are the different theories of suffrage?

A- (1) It is a natural and inherent right of every citizen by virtue of his membership in the State, provided
he is not disqualified on account of his own reprehensible conduct or unfitness. (Natural right theory)

(2) It is a public office or function conferred upon those who are fit and capable of discharging it. (Social
expediency theory)

(3) It is regarded as a necessary attribute of membership in the State. (Primitive tribal theory)

(4) It is regarded as an adjunct of a particular status, generally tenurial in character. It is a vested privilege
usually accompanying the ownership of land. (Feudal theory)

(5) It is regarded as a necessary and essential means for the development of industrial character. (Ethical
theory) (Garner, Political Science and Government, 543)

1. Distinguish suffrage from election.

A - Suffrage is a broader term than election because it includes not only the means by which public
officers are chosen for public positions, but also the expression of the choice of the people on a
proposed law or enactment submitted to them for decision. Election is limited to the expression of a
choice of the voters in the selection of their officers.

1. What is the system of election adopted in the Philippines?


A- The Australian Ballot System which was first conceived in 1901 by Francis S. Dutton, a member of the
Legislature of South Australia. This system is adopted by many countries in Europe and its distinguishing
feature is strict secrecy in balloting.

1. Why is suffrage both a right and a privilege under the Constitution?

A- It is a right because it is the expression of the sovereign will of the people. (Lacson v. Posadas, 72 SCRA
468, July 30, 1976) It is a privilege because its exercise is granted not to everybody but only to "such
persons or class of persons are as most likely to exercise it for the purpose of public good." (People v.
Corral, 62 Phil. 945, January 31, 1936)

1. What is the theory upon which suffrage is based?

A- The right of suffrage is predicated on the theory that the people who bear the burden of government
should share the privilege of choosing the officials of that government.

1. Explain the principle that "the enfranchised citizen or voter is the trustee of the people."

A- In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed to have a voice therein
through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribed
qualifications. The people in clothing a citizen with the relative franchise for the purpose of securing a
consistent administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in
the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This
duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be exercised not exclusively for the benefit of the
citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general
benefit and welfare of the state. (Abanil v. Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod, 70 Phil. 28, June 17,
1940; Lacson v. Posadas, 72 SCRA 168, July 30, 1976)

1. What is the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the ballot?

A- A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only
thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate source of established authority. It is their undeniable
right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means
for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and
irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process. (Badelles v. Cabili, 27 SCRA 113,
February 27, 1969)

1. Why do we condemn the derogation of the right of suffrage?

A- To impede, without authority, valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to
inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. The sovereign right of suffrage must not be
thwarted nor defiled without imposing upon those who attempt to do so the severest penalties of the
law. (Hontiveros v. Mobo, 39 Phil. 230, December 5, 1918; Ozamis v. Zosa, 34 SCRA 424, August 31, 1970)

1. Does the power to enforce and administer election laws and to insure free, orderly and honest
elections include the power to annul an election which may not have been free, orderly, and
honest?
A- The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the validity or
nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants. (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 85 Phil. 149, December 13, 1949) Further, in connection with the power to determine the
validity or nullity of the questioned votes, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Commission on
Elections to exclude election returns on the ground of statistical improbability. (Lagumbay v. Commission
on Elections, 16 SCRA 17, January 31, 1966) Election returns which were the products of coercion were
also excluded and the power of the Commission on Elections to exclude the same was also upheld.
(Antonio, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 32 SCRA 319, April 17, 1970) Likewise, the Commission on
Elections has also the power to obtain the testimony of handwriting experts to be able to determine if
the election returns are falsified or not. (Usman v. Commission on Elections, 42 SCRA 667, December 29,
1971)

1. Is it the Comelec or the court which has the power to declare failure of election?

A- In Antonio Jr. v. Comelec (32 SCRA 319, April 17, 1970), the Supreme Court ruled that the power to
declare a failure of election involved the power to decide election contests which belonged not to the
Commission on Elections but to the courts and the proper Electoral Tribunals. This was also the same
ruling in Abes v. Comelec (21 SCRA 1252, December 15, 1967). The Supreme Court, however, upheld the
power of the Commission on Elections to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post.
election terrorism, not on the basis of its expanded jurisdiction over election contests. This ruling in
Biliwang v. Comelec (14 SCRA 454, June 19, 1982), which modified the ruling in Antonio v. Comelec (32
SCRA 454 [1982]), is anchored on the broader power of the Commission on Elections to protect the
integrity of the election so that the will of the electorate is not defeated.

1. Can the COMELEC refuse to hold elections due to operational, logistical, and financial
problems?

A- In the case of Sambarani v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004), the Court held that the
operational, logistical and financial problems which COMELEC claims it will encounter with the holding
ofa second special election can be solved with proper planning, coordination and cooperation among its
personnel and other deputized agencies of the government. A special election will require extraordinary
efforts, but it is not impossible.

1. Does the Comelec have the authority to call a special election?

A- The authority to call a special election was upheld in Sanchez v Commission on Elections (32 SCRA
319, April 17, 1970) on the ground that failure of election justifies the calling of a special election in
order to make the Comelec truly effective in the discharge of its functions. Just like the Biliwang case, the
justification in Sanchez is anchored again on the broader power to insure free, orderly and honest
elections so that the will of the electorate is not defeated.

1. Is the prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from cessation of the cause
of the failure of elections absolute?

A- The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the
failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual
power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The deadline in Sec. 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the
Constitution. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special elections to
enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of
special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law.
(Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004)

INTERPRETATION OF ELECTION LAWS

Election laws are liberally and equitably construed to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,
for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in
the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, [the Court] ha[s] held: "x x x (L)aws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled in Frivaldo v.
Comelec, thus: "The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort
to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority. for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that
the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote." (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 120295; Lee v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123755, June 28, 1996, En Banc, Panganiban, J.) (Underlining
supplied)

1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FULL DISCUSSION, INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL


PROVISIONS AND THE CASES INVOLVED, ARE FOUND IN CHAPTER VI, ARTICLE IX,
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)

1. STAGES, POINTERS AND PROCEDURES BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER ELECTION


SIMPLIFICATION:

PART I BEFORE ELECTION

1. Registration

2. Challenge

3. Inclusion

4. Exclusion
5. Voters/ Qualifications and Disqualifications

6. Certificate of Candidacy

7. Precincts and Polling Places

8. Ballot boxes

9. Watchers

10. Petition to Deny Course to or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

11. Political parties

12. Election Campaign/ Expenditures and Propaganda

PART II DURING ELECTION

1. Casting of votes

2. Challenge of illegal voters

3. Records of challenges and oaths a. Minutes of voting and counting of votes b. List of unused
ballots

4. Casting of votes

5. Challenge of illegal voters

6. Records of challenges and oaths a. Minutes of voting and counting of votes b. List of unused
ballots

PART III AFTER ELECTION

1. Counting of votes

2. Board of Election Inspectors

3. Appreciation of Ballots

4. Election returns

5. Announcement of the results of the Election and issuance of the certificate of votes received

6. Canvass and Proclamation

7. Pre-proclamation controversy

8. Election protest against a proclaimed candidate

9. Original and exclusive jurisdiction


10. Appellate jurisdiction

11. Requisites of election protest

12. Quo warranto, its requisites

13. Election offenses

E. The Omnibus Election Code - B

1. Appeal

1. BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

2. A voter must possess the qualifications for suffrage. If he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications, a qualified voter may vote in any election, plebiscite, or
referendum only if he is registered in the list of voters for the city or municipality in which he
resides. (Sec. 115, B.P. Blg. 881)

3. Election Registration Board. There shall be as many Election Registration Boards as there are
election officers in each city or municipality.

4. General Registration of voters. The Comelec shall undertake a general registration of voters.
(Voters Registration Act of 1996)

5. System of continuing registration: The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall
be conducted daily in the Office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before the special election. (Sec. 8. R.A. No. 8189)

PROCEDURE:

1. Application for Registration may be challenged Requirements: (a) Challenge must be in writing,
under oath and attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the
challenger and applicant.

2. Said challenge may be opposed (a) It must be filed not later than the second Monday of the
month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or processed by the Election Registration
Board.

3. Said challenge shall be heard (a) It shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the
decision shall be rendered before the end of the month.

4. Registration records may be deactivated by the Election Registration Board (a) What are the
records that may be deactivated?

THE REGISTRATION RECORDS OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS MAY BE DEACTIVATED:

1. Those who have been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one
year, and such disability have not been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty. Can said persons
automatically reacquire right to vote? Yes, upon expiration of five years after service of sentence
as certified by the clerk of court.

2. Those who have been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime involving
national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law. Can
they regain their right to vote? Yes, upon expiration of five years from service of sentence.

3. Those declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent. Can they regain their right
to vote? Yes, upon declaration of a proper authority that said persons are no longer insane or
incompetent.

4. Those who did not vote in two successive regular elections (SK Elections are not included)

5. Those whose registration have been ordered excluded by the court.

6. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship. (Sec. 27, R.A. No. 8189)

7. How can a voter reactivate his registration?

A- He may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for registration in the form of an affidavit
stating that the grounds for deactivation no longer exist.

1. When should the said application be filed?

A- Not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.

1. Who shall decide this?

A- The Election Officer shall submit such application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate
action. (Sec. 28, R.A. No. 8189)

PROCEDURE FEW MONTHS BEFORE ELECTIONS

1. 190 DAYS BEFORE REGULAR ELECTION AND 60 DAYS BEFORE SPECIAL ELECTION The Election
Registration Board shall prepare and post a certified list of voters, furnish copies thereof to the
provincial, regional and national central files.

2. What else shall be posted? Copies of the certified list, along with a list of deactivated voters
categorized by precinct per barangay.

3. Where shall it be posted? In the Office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin board of each
city/municipal hall.

4. PETITION FOR INCLUSION

5. PETITION FOR EXCLUSION

6. Who may file a petition for inclusion?


A- Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent
list of voters in his precinct at any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or 75 days prior to a
special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of
service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be decided within 15 days after its
filing. (Sec. 34, R.A. No. 8189)

1. Who may file a petition for exclusion?

A- Any registered voter, representative of a political party or the Election Officer, may file with the court
a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address
and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except 100 days prior to a special election. The
petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter, and shall be
decided within 10 days from its filing. (Sec. 35, R.A. No. 8189)

1. If the said petition for inclusion or exclusion is decided, and it becomes final and
unappealable, does said decision acquire the nature of res judicata?

A- Except for the right to remain in the list of voters or being excluded therefrom for the particular
election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in a proceeding for inclusion or
exclusion, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.

1. Does that decision operate as a bar to any further action, that a party may take concerning the
subject passed upon in the proceeding?

A- No.

1. Is the said decision conclusive on the political status of a voter?

A- No.

1. Is the said decision a bar to subsequent proceedings on the right to be registered as a voter in
any other right to be election?

A- No. (Domino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1994)

1. For two (2) times, then Mayor Asistio of Caloocan City indicated non-existent or false address
in his certificate of candidacy. Does this operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City?

A- No. They do not serve as proof that Mayor Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or
that he has established residence of Caloocan City. However, they may serve as basis for an election
offense under the Omnibus Election Code, or it may serve as basis for an action to deny due course to his
certificate of candidacy.

1. Can any book of voters be annulled?

A- Yes, for the following grounds:

1. When the book of voters is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 8189.
2. When the book of voters was prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, force, or
any similar irregularity.

3. When the book of voters contains data that are statistically improbable.

4. What is the limitation regarding annulment of book of voters?

A- An order, ruling, or decision annulling a book of voters shall not be executed 90 days before an
election.

1. Assuming that a book of voters is annulled, is it a ground for a pre-proclamation controversy?

A No. (Ututalum v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 335, January 22, 1990)

RULES REGARDING INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND CORRECTION OF NAMES OF VOTER'S PETITION

1. It shall be filed during office hours

2. Upon filing of the petition, the members of the board and the challenged voter shall be notified
of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition.

3. The Election Registration Board shall be impleaded as respondents.

4. A petition shall refer only to one precinct.

5. Any voter, candidate or political party affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his
evidence.

6. No costs shall be assessed against any party.

7. If the court finds that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause
him to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.
(Sec. 32, R.A. No. 8189)

HEARING AND DECISION

1. The petition shall be heard and decided within 10 days from date of its filing.

2. The decision shall be based on the evidence presented.

3. The decision shall not be rendered upon a stipulation of facts.

4. If the question is whether or not a voter is real or fictitious, his non- appearance on the day of
the hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious. (Sec. 32. R.A. No.
8189)

APPEAL

1. If the decision of the MTC or MTC is appealed, the same shall be filed in the RTC which shall
decide it within 10 days from receipt of appeal.
2. The petition shall be decided by the court not later than 15 days before the election and the
decision shall become final and executory. (Sec. 32[g], R.A. No. 8189)

JURISDICTION PROCEEDINGS IN INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

1. What court has jurisdiction over inclusion and exclusion proceedings?

A- The Municipal Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction in their respective cities and municipalities.

1. Can the decision of said courts be appealed?

A- Yes, as aforementioned.

VOTES IN FAVOR OF A POLITICAL PARTY

1. Can qualified voters cast their votes in favor of a political party?

A- Yes, if said political party is registered under the party list system (Sec. 7, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution)

1. What is a party?

A- A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

1. Define the following: (a) political party; (b) sectoral party; and (c) coalition of parties?

A- Political Party A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates some of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.

When is a political party a national party?

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions.

When is a political party a regional party?

It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

Sectoral Party - A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following
sectors; labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.

Sectoral Organization - A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of


citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interest, or concerns.

Coalition- A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.

REGISTRATION IS NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM


1. What is the procedure?

A- A group that likes to participate in the party list system must file a verified petition in the Comelec
stating its desire to participate in the party list system, either as a national, regional, sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.

1. What cannot be registered as political parties?

A-1 . Religious denominations or sects;

1. Those who seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means;

2. Those who refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution; and

3. Those supported by foreign governments (Sec. 2[5], Art. IX- C, 1987 Constitution)

. The Omnibus Election Code - C

1. Can registration of any national, regional, sectoral party, organization or coalition be


cancelled?

A- Yes, on the following grounds:

1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious


purposes;

2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

3. It is a foreign party or organization;

4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through
third parties, for partisan election purposes;

5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

7. It has ceased to exist for at least one year; and

8. It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections, or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it
was registered.

9. Are political parties registered under the party list system entitled to poll watchers?

A - Yes, by express constitutional provision. (Sec. 8. Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution)

JUST AS THERE ARE QUALIFICATIONS AND DIS- QUALIFICATIONS TO QUALIFY A CITIZEN TO VOTE, THE
CANDIDATES HAVE ALSO THEIR OWN QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

1. What is a candidate?
A- Under the Omnibus Election Code, the term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. (Sec. 79[a], B.P. Blg. 881)

1. What are the qualifications of a candidate?

A- It depends on the position he is aspiring for.

For President and Vice-President. Section 2, Art. VII provides for the following qualifications:

1. He must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. He must be a registered voter; 3. He must


be able to read and write; 4. He must at least be forty years of age on the day of the election; 5.
He must be a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years immediately preceding such
election. (Sec. 2, Art. VII. 1987 Constitution)

Senators

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines 2. Thirty-five years of age on the day of the election 3.
Able to read and write 4. A resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election (Sec. 3. Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Members of the House of Representatives

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines 2. Thirty-five years of age on the day of the election 3.
Able to read and write 4. A resident in the district for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Elective Local Officials

1. Must be a citizen of the Philippines 2. A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, in the district where he intends to be elected; 3. A resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; 4. Able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language; 5. A resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election. (Sec. 39[a] of R.A. No. 7160, Local
Government Code)

Section 39 (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) provides as follows:

"(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice- governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

"(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice- mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least be twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

"(d) Candidates for the position of member sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at
least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

"(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at
least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
"(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES

SIMPLIFICATION OF AGE QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES

23 years of age on election day Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Councilor (highly urbanized
cities)

21 years of age on election day Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Councilor (component cities, municipalities)

18 years of age on election day Punong Barangay and Sanggunian, Barangay Members

WHO CAN VOTE AND RUN IN SK ELECTIONS

15 to 30-They can vote in SK Elections

18 to 24-They can run as SK officials

REGARDING CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT IN LGC

The citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be possessed by the elective official, at the latest as of the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. The LGC does
not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike the
requirement for residence or age. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996)

IN CASE OF REPATRIATION

Repatriation under PO 825 is valid and effective and retroacts to the date of application. (Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC, Ibid.)

REMEMBER THE SC RULING IN THE CASE OF LOPEZ V. COMELEC & TESSIE VILLANUEVA ON THE
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED FROM CANDIDATES WHO RE-ACQUIRED FILIPIΝΟ CITIZENSHIP AND ARE
RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

The issue in that case is "is the filing of a certificate of candidacy an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship? Is it considered compliance with the requirement of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Held: The petitioner must comply with R.A. No. 9225 before seeking public office. He should first "make
a personal sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer oath.

It is true that respondent was able to regain his Filipino citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship law
when he took his allegiance before the Vice-Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los
Angeles, California, but the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.

R.A. 9225 mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no
evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225, Absent
such proof, respondent cannot run as Barangay Chairman of Barangay. (Lopez v. COMELEC & Tessie P.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008)
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DUAL CITIZENS MUST ESTABLISH RESIDENCE AND PHYSICALLY STAY IN
THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE THEY CAN EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE, THE SUPREME COURT HAD THIS
RULING

A natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American Citizenship having been born of an American
father and a Filipino mother, IS EXEMPT from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act (R.A. No. 9225) before running for public office.

REGARDING THE QUESTION ON WHAT A CANDIDATE, WHO POSSESS DUAL CITIZENSHIP (A NATURAL-
BORN FILIPINO, WHO ALSO POSSESSES AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP) MUST COMPLY WITH IF HE DESIRES
TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

The Supreme Court, in the case of Cordora v. Comelec (G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2008) had this
ruling:

A natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American Citizenship having been born of an American father
and a Filipino mother, IS EXEMPT from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
(R.A. No. 9225) before running for public office.

The Supreme Court held that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his
birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to American
citizenship. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public
office.

It distinguished dual citizenship which is involuntary, from dual allegiance that refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes loyalty by some positive act to two or more states.

ANOTHER SCENARIO - A CASE OF A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO WHO WENT TO THE USA TO WORK, AND
LATER, HE BECAME A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN

He applied for reacquisition of his Philippine Citizenship, and later, he filed a certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of the Municipality of General Me Arthur, Eastern, Samar for the May 2007 Election.

When should his residence be reckoned?

HELD: His residence shall not retroact to the time of his birth. The length of his residence therein shall be
determined only from the time he renounced his foreign citizenship and made the Municipality of
General Mc Arthur, Eastern Samar, as his domicile of choice.

IN FERNANDEZ v. HRET, G.R. NO. 18748, DECEMBER 29, 2009, THE QUESTION THAT WAS RAISED IS
WHETHER HE WAS QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR CONGRESSMAN OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF LAGUNA

Dan Fernandez filed his certificate of candidacy as Congressman of the First District of Laguna. He
indicated that his complete and exact address is in Sta. Rosa City, Laguna, an address which is different
from the address he declared when he was a candidate for Vice-Governor of Laguna.

At that time, the address he declared was Pagsanjan, Laguna, a town in the Fourth District of Laguna.
At that time that he ran as Congressman of Laguna, he does not own a house in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and
he was merely leasing a property in his alleged Sta. Rosa residence.

Is he qualified to run as Congressman in the First District of Laguna even if he does not own a house in
that place?

HELD: The fact that Dan Fernandez, was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa Laguna, is not a barrier for
him to run in that district. The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run. What is required is merely his residence in that district for a
year prior to election day.

1. What are the disqualifications of a candidate?

A- "Section 68. Disqualifications - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having;

(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;

(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Secs. 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or

(e) violated any of Secs. 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run
for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws."

NOTE:

1. Section 80 Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period

2. Section 83 Removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda

3. Section 85 Prohibited forms or election propaganda

4. Section 86 media Regulation of election propaganda through mass

5. Section 261 Prohibited acts which are considered as election offenses. (B.P. Blg. 881)

6. Who are disqualified as candidates for local elective office?

A- a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment
and within two years after serving sentence. In Dela Torre v. Comelec (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996), it
was held that probation simply suspends the execution of the sentence; it does not erase the
disqualification brought about by the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
1. b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. In Grego v. Comelec (G.R. No.
125955, June 19, 1997), it was held that an elective local official who was removed from office as
a result of an administrative case prior to January 1, 1992 (the date of effectivity of the Local
Government Code), is not disqualified from running for an elective local public office, because
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code cannot be given retroactive effect.

2. c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

3. d) Those with dual citizenship.

4. e) Fugitives from injustice in criminal and non-political case here and abroad. A "fugitive from
justice," as defined by the Supreme Court in Marquez v. Comelec (243 SCRA 538, April 18, 1995)
"includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." Rodriguez cannot be considered a "fugitive from
justice," because his arrival in the Philippines from the U.S. preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court and the issuance of the arrest warrant by the same foreign
court, by almost five months. (Rodriguez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996)

5. f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of the [Local Government]
Code; and

6. g) Those who are insane and feeble-minded.

E. The Omnibus Election Code - D

CASES:

1. Probation does not erase disqualification resulting from conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude Probation only suspends the execution of the sentence. (Dela Torre v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 121592, July 5, 1996)

2. Effect if an elective local official was removed from office on account of an administrative case
prior to the date when the Local Government Code became effective he is not disqualified from
running for an electivę local public office because Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code cannot
be given retroactive effect. (Grego v. Comelec, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)

3. The electoral aspect of a disqualification case is not rendered inutile by the death of the
petitioner provided there is proper substitution or intervention of parties while there is a
pending case. (Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006)

4. What is the requirement in order that a candidate shall be eligible for any public office?

A- No person shall be eligible for an elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed by the Omnibus Election Code.

1. Can a certificate of candidacy be withdrawn?

A- Yes, by submitting a written declaration under oath that a candidate is withdrawing the same.
EXAMPLE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OR A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHICH WAS NULLIFIED
BY THE COMELEC BUT WHICH NULLIFICATION WAS INVALIDATED BY THE SUPREME COURT

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO GR. NO.
221697, MARCH 8, 2016

AND

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.


CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ G.R. NO. 221698, MARCH 8, 2016

FACTS:

1. The petitioner was found abandoned as a newborn Infant in the Parish Church of Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968;

2. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed by Edgardo to his relative, Emiliano Militar
and his wife.

3. Emiliano Militar reported and registered petitioner as foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City on September 6, 1968. In the foundling certificate, petitioner was given
the name "MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD CONTRERAS MILITAR[.]"

4. When petitioner was five (5) years old, Spouses Fernando Poe Jr., and Susan Roces filed a
petition to adopt petitioner in the Municipal Court of San Juan City. Said petitioner was granted
by the trial court which ordered that petitioners' name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

5. When petitioner reached 18 years old in 1986, she registered as a voter with the Local Comelec
Office in San Juan City on December 13, 1986.

6. On April 4, 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 by the
DFA. After two (2) renewals, she secured Philippine Passport No. L881511 and DD156616.

7. She studied initially in UP, but she left for the U.S. in 1988. She finished AB in Political Studies in
Boston College.

SHE GOT MARRIED ON JULY 27, 1991

1. Petitioner got married to Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S. at San Juan City. The couple flew back to U.S. on July 29, 1991.

2. The couple has three (3) children: Brian Daniel, born in the U.S. on April 16, 1992; Hanna
MacKenzie and Jesusa Anika, both of whom were born in the Philippines on July 10, 1998 and
January 5, 2004.

PETITIONER BECAME A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN ON OCTOBER 18, 2001 AND OBTAINED U.S.
PASSPORT ON DECEMBER 19, 2001
1. Petitioner came back to the Philippines on April 8, 2004 to support Fernando Poe Jr's candidacy
for President in the May, 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to the
youngest daughter, Anika..

2. She returned to the U.S. with her two (2) daughters on July 8, 2004.

3. On December 13, 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines because of his sick father. The
latter slipped into a coma and eventually expired.

4. Petitioner stayed in the Philippines until Feb. 3, 2005, to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements and to assist in the settlement of estate.

COUPLE DECIDED TO RESIDE PERMANENTLY IN THE PHILIPPINES IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2005

1. In her desire to be with her grieving mother, petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in the first quarter of 2005.

2. The couple began preparing for resettlement (i.e. transferring their children to Philippine
Schools, relocations of household good, furniture and cars from U.S. to the Philippines and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their
pet dog into the country).

3. Petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. as early as 2004.

PETITIONER FINALLY CAME HOME TO THE PHILIPPINES ON MAY 24, 2005

1. She secured a TIN number from BIR, and so with her three children.

2. Her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects and to arrange the sale
of their family home in the U.S.

PETITIONER AND CHILDREN STAYED BRIEFLY IN HER MOTHER'S PLACE

1. Later, petitioner and her husband purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City in the second
half of 2005, and title to said condominium was issued to them on February 20, 2006.

2. Her children of school age began attending private schools.

3. On February 14, 2016, she made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of her
remaining household belongings.

4. She travelled back to the Philippines on March 11, 2006.

LATE MARCH, 2006, PETITIONER'S HUSBAND OFFICIALLY INFORMED THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE THAT
THEY WERE LEAVING THEIR ADDRESS IN THE U.S.

1. Subsequently, their family home was sold on April 27, 2006. petitioner's husband resigned his
job in the U.S. on April, 2006, and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.

2. The couple acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Q. C. where they built their
family home up to this day.

PETITIONER TOOK HER OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ON JULY 7, 2006
1. She filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI), a sworn petition to re- acquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship for the three (3) minor children on
July 10, 2006.

2. Said petition was formally acted upon by the BI which declared that she is deemed to have re-
acquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered citizens of the Philippines.

3. The BI issued Identification Certificates and she was issued Phil. Passport No. EC0588861 by the
DFA.

4. Petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.

PETITIONER WAS APPOINTED AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE MTRCB ON OCTOBER 6, 2010

1. Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
USA and Renunciation of American Citizenship.

2. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American Passport.

3. On July 12, 2011, petitioner executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the


United States.

4. She accomplished a sworn questionnaire, before the U.S. Vice Consul that she had taken her
oath as MTRCB Chairman and that she had resided outside of the U.S., particularly in the
Philippines, from September 3, 1968 to July, 1961 and from May 2015 to the present.

5. On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective October 21, 2010.

PETITIONER FILED HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY AS SENATOR OF RP ON OCTOBER 21, 2012

1. In her certificate of candidacy, she said that her period of residence is "6 years and 6 months"
before May 13, 2013.

2. She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator.

3. On December 19, 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport.

PETITIONER FILED HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE PRESIDENCY ON OCTOBER 15, 2016

1. In her COC, she declared that (1) she is a natural-born citizen; (2) That her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016, would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from May 24, 2005.

2. Attached to her COC is an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship," subscribed and
sworn to before a Notary Public in Quezon City on October 14, 2015.

PETITIONER'S FILING OF HER COC FOR PRESIDENT TRIGGERED THE FILING OF SEVERAL COMELEC CASES
AGAINST HER

1. Estrella Elamparo's contention: Petitioner committed material mis- representation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months up to the day before the May 9, 2006 elections.
She argued:

(a) That Petitioner cannot be considered as a natural born Filipino citizen on account of the fact that she
was a foundling. Assuming that she was a natural born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status
when she became naturalized American citizen.

(b) That natural born citizenship must be continuous from birth.

(c) On the matter of residency, petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC
for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for 6 years and 6 months as of
May, 2013. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the
Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006 when she re-acquired
Philippine Citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire
lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.

REGARDING FRANCISCO TATAD'S PETITION:

1. He alleged that petitioner lacked the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
presidency

2. Reason: The Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, hence person of unknown of
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural born Filipino citizens since
blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.

3. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred
that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935
Constitution in indicated of the framer's to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.

IN BOTH PETITIONS, THE COMELEC, SECOND AND FIRST DIVISIONS, RESOLVED TO CANCEL THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SEÑORA POE-LLAMANZARES

1. Because of the adverse rulings of the Comelec, the petitioners instituted the present petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of our ex-parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/ or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

The main issued is whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it cancelled petitioner's certificate of candidacy as President of the Philippines. The
said issue is necessarily connected with the issue of whether the petitioner is a qualified candidate for
President or not.

HELD:

1. Petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.


2. It must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and
is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling
did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her
parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty,
that her parents are Filipinos. 4. The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as
their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec.

3. Relevancy, collateral matters Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or no- existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of
the fact in issue.

4. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the
child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -99.9% that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings.

E. The Omnibus Election Code - E

1. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either

2. We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the


contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Art. II, Sec. 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Sec. 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities" and
Art. XV, Sec. 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

3. Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.

4. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 15(1) which effectively affirms Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Art. 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness"
merely "gives effect" to Art. 15(1) of the UDHR.

5. More importantly, Comelec's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time
of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In
Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the
1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:

6. Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.

7. This position disregards one important fact-petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of
adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also
entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue." That
law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files
of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or
institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was
what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality
of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

8. Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the
same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous.
The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

ON RESIDENCE

1. Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time
she travelled abroad, e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 tis September 2006 with a
freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000
pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine
schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued
on July 2005;

2. The Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a
permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence
of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided
to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re- established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here).

3. It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence.

4. For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of
her senatorial candidacy.

5. Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.

6. In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall
under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

7. All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc
are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
DECISION

The questioned resolutions of the Comelec were annulled and set aside. Petitioner MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SEÑORA POE- LLAMANZARES is declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections on May 9, 2016.

NUISANCE CANDIDATES

1. What is the rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates?

A The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties
should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise.

The COMELEC further pointed out in its Comment (in the promulgation of Resolution No. 6558) that
there is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national
positions because the election process becomes a mockery if even those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run.

EFFECT OF FILING CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

1. What is the effect of the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a person taking a public
appointive office or position?

A- He shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

1. What is the effect of the filing of a certificate of candidacy by any elective official?

A- The same.

1. Atty. A filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor long before the start of the campaign period,
as allowed by law. When is Atty. A considered a candidate? Is it from the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, or from the start of the campaign period?

A- Atty. A is considered as candidate at the start of the campaign period.

1. If after filing his certificate of candidacy, but before the start of the campaign period, Atty. A
already started to hold caucuses and meetings in different Barangays and visits prospective
leaders and tell them that he already filed his certificate of candidacy. Can he be charged with
premature campaigning?

A- No. REASON: He shall be considered as a candidate only at the start of the campaign period for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Before the start of the campaign period, there is no candidate yet.
(Lanot v. COMELEC, 507 SCRA 114, November 16, 2006)

1. What is the effect of two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Mr. A for two different offices?
A- Mr. A becomes ineligible for either position. (Sec. 73, B.P. Blg. 881)

1. Can Mr. A become eligible again?

A- Yes, if Mr. A withdraws one of his certificates before the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. He can do this by filing a sworn declaration with the Comelec before the said deadline. (Ibid.)

1. Mr. A, an official candidate of X Party, dies after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. Can another person file a certificate of candidacy as a replacement of Mr. A?

A- Yes, but said person must belong to X Party and certified by said party as its candidate. (Sec. 77, B.P.
Blg. 881)

1. A, a Vice-Mayor, became an acting Mayor after Mayor B was suspended. A subsequently filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor. Is A considered resigned as Vice-Mayor?

A- Yes, because he is not holding the office of Mayor in a permanent capacity.

1. A filed a certificate of candidacy which contains a false representation that he possesses the
required residency in the municipality where he is serving as Mayor when in truth and in fact,
he is not a resident thereof. Can B, his political opponent, file a petition to deny course to said
petition or to cancel A's certificate of candidacy?

A- Yes, by express provision of Sec. 78, B.P. Blg. 881.

1. What is the procedure?

A- B should file a verified petition not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. After due notice and hearing, it shall be decided not later than 15 days before the election.
(Ibid.)

1. Where should said petition be filed?

A- It should be filed with the Comelec in division, not with the Commission En Banc.

1. A filed his certificate of candidacy beyond the statutory period. His political opponent did not
question it. He won. Later, A's opponents questioned it.

DECIDE.

A- The technicality should have been raised before the election. It can be disregarded after the people
have expressed their choice. (Collado v Alonzo, 15 SCRA 502, December 24, 1965)

1. Can a candidate whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled and denied due course be
substituted by another of the same party?

A- No. The Court held in Miranda v. Abaya (311 SCRA 617, July 28, 1999) that a candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party.

The Court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius because when the law
enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, no mention was made of the
case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 163295, 163354, January 23, 2006)

1. Despite lingering questions about his Filipino citizenship and his one-year residence in the
district, Gabriel filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman before the deadline set by
law. His opponent, Vito, hires you as lawyer to contest Gabriel's candidacy.

(a) Before election day, what action or actions will you institute against Gabriel, and before which court,
commission or tribunal will you file such action/s? Reasons.

(b) If, during the pendency of such action/s but before election day, Gabriel withdraws his certificate of
candidacy, can he be substituted as candidate? If so, by whom and why? If not, why not?

(c) If the action/s instituted should be dismissed with finality before the election, and Gabriel assumes
office after being proclaimed the winner in the election, can the issue of his candidacy and/or citizenship
and residence still be questioned? If so, what action or actions may be filed and where? If not, why not?

A- (a) A petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Gabriel can be filed with the Comelec on
account of the false representation he made in his Certificate of Candidacy. Such a petition cannot be
filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal because he is not yet a member of the House of
Representatives. (Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, September 18, 1995)

(b) Gabriel may be substituted by a candidate nominated by his political party, under Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows: "If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified."

(c) The issue of Gabriel's candidacy on account of the lingering question about his said citizenship may
be questioned in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, by filing a quo warranto case.
REASONS: (1) The House of Representatives has already acquired jurisdiction over Gabriel because he
was already proclaimed; and (2) The House of Representatives has jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications.

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