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banotes.org Printed on June 27, 2025

Neorealism in International
Relations: The Structural Dynamics
of Power
https://banotes.org/international-relations/neorealism-international-relations-structural-
power/
November 3, 2023
Categories: Introduction of International Relations

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Neorealism represents a fundamental shift in how we understand international relations,
moving away from classical realism’s focus on human nature toward an emphasis on
structural factors. Developed primarily by Kenneth Waltz in his groundbreaking 1979 work
“Theory of International Politics,” neorealism (also called structural realism) argues that the
anarchic structure of the international system—not human aggression—is what drives state
behavior, security competition, and power politics on the global stage.

The foundations of neorealism

Neorealism emerged as a response to perceived shortcomings in classical realist theory.
While classical realists like Hans Morgenthau attributed international conflict to human
nature and the innate desire for power, Waltz proposed a more scientific, structurally-
focused explanation.

The anarchic international system

At the core of neorealist theory lies the concept of anarchy—not chaos or disorder, but
simply the absence of a central authority above states. Unlike domestic politics, where
governments enforce laws and maintain order, the international realm lacks a global
government with authority to enforce rules. This creates a self-help system where states
must ultimately rely on themselves for security and survival.
This anarchic structure produces three key implications:
Survival as primary goal: States prioritize survival above all other objectives
Self-help system: States cannot rely on others for their security
Power maximization: States seek to maximize their relative power position

Shifting focus from human nature to structure

Waltz’s neorealism marks a significant departure from classical realism by arguing that
state behavior is primarily determined by external constraints rather than internal
characteristics. While classical realism sees power-seeking as rooted in human nature,
neorealism attributes it to the pressures of the international system.
According to Waltz, even if political leaders were naturally peace-loving, the anarchic
structure would still force them to pursue power and security—or risk their state’s
destruction. This systemic pressure creates a remarkable similarity in state behavior
despite differences in regime type, leadership, or culture.

The security dilemma: A structural inevitability

One of neorealism’s most important insights is its explanation of the security dilemma—a
concept that illuminates why conflict persists even when states merely seek security rather
than domination.

How defensive actions appear threatening

The security dilemma occurs because measures taken by one state to increase its security
often inherently decrease the security of others. For example, when Country A builds up its
military capabilities for defensive purposes, neighboring Country B cannot be certain these
capabilities won’t be used offensively in the future. Country B then feels compelled to
strengthen its own military, which in turn makes Country A feel less secure.
This spiral of mutual insecurity can lead to arms races and heightened tensions even when
neither state initially intended to threaten the other. The tragedy lies in the fact that
genuinely defensive actions can be misinterpreted as offensive threats due to the
fundamental uncertainty about other states’ intentions.

The spiral model and the inevitability of arms races

This dynamic often leads to what scholars call the “spiral model,” where security
competition becomes self-reinforcing. Consider the classic example of the pre-World War I
naval arms race between Britain and Germany. Germany’s naval buildup, partly motivated
by security concerns, threatened Britain’s naval supremacy. Britain responded by
accelerating its own naval construction, which confirmed German fears about British
hostility, further intensifying the arms race.
Neorealists argue that this pattern is not merely a historical accident but a structural
feature of international politics. Without a higher authority to provide security guarantees,
states are trapped in these competitive dynamics regardless of their intentions.

Balancing power: The systemic response

Neorealism predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior against rising powers to
preserve their security. This balancing can occur through internal efforts (building up
military capabilities) or external alignments (forming alliances).

Balance of power theory

Waltz argues that balance of power is not just a policy choice but an inevitable outcome of
the international system. When one state becomes too powerful, others will naturally
combine forces to counterbalance it, resulting in a tendency toward equilibrium in the
distribution of power.
Historical examples abound: the coalitions against Napoleonic France, the alliance systems
before World War I, and the Cold War blocs. In each case, states sought to prevent any
single power from achieving hegemony by forming counterbalancing coalitions.

Defensive versus offensive realism

Neorealism has developed two major variants with different perspectives on how much
power states should seek:
Defensive realism: Associated with Waltz himself, this view holds that states should
seek only enough power for security, as excessive power-seeking provokes
counterbalancing and reduces security
Offensive realism: Developed by John Mearsheimer, this perspective argues that
states should maximize their power to ensure survival, as the intentions of other states
can never be fully known
This debate highlights an important tension within neorealist thinking about whether the
anarchic system incentivizes moderate or maximalist power-seeking behavior.
The relative gains problem
Another distinctive feature of neorealism is its emphasis on relative rather than absolute
gains in international cooperation. Unlike liberal theories that focus on mutual benefits,
neorealism suggests that states worry primarily about how cooperation affects the
distribution of power.

Why cooperation is difficult in an anarchic system

Even when cooperation could benefit all involved states, neorealists argue that concerns
about relative gains often inhibit collaboration. States must always ask not just “Will I gain
from this arrangement?” but “Will others gain more than I do?”
For example, in trade negotiations, states may reject arrangements that would increase
their absolute economic welfare if they believe those arrangements would
disproportionately benefit rivals, potentially shifting the balance of power against them in
the future.

Positional competition and zero-sum thinking

This focus on relative position leads to what neorealists call “positional competition”—
where states evaluate their success not by their absolute achievements but by their
standing compared to others. In military security matters especially, this often produces
zero-sum thinking where one state’s gain is perceived as another’s loss.
This dynamic helps explain why arms control agreements are difficult to negotiate and
maintain. Even when all parties would benefit from reduced military spending, concerns
about cheating and relative advantage often undermine such initiatives.

Thomas Schelling and strategic realism

Building on neorealist foundations, Thomas Schelling developed what some call “strategic
realism”—an approach focusing on the strategic dynamics of deterrence, coercion, and
crisis management in nuclear politics.
Game theory and nuclear deterrence
Schelling applied game theory to international relations, analyzing how rational actors
might behave in situations of strategic interdependence. His work on nuclear deterrence
demonstrated how the logic of mutually assured destruction could produce stability despite
—or even because of—the devastating potential of nuclear weapons.
In his classic works “The Strategy of Conflict” (1960) and “Arms and Influence” (1966),
Schelling showed how concepts like “the threat that leaves something to chance” and “the
reciprocal fear of surprise attack” shape crisis behavior and military strategy.

Brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy

Schelling’s analysis of brinkmanship—deliberately creating risk of disaster to compel an
adversary to back down—illuminated how states might use controlled risk-taking as a
bargaining tool. The Cuban Missile Crisis exemplified this dynamic, as both superpowers
engaged in calculated escalation while trying to avoid nuclear war.
His work helps explain why states sometimes adopt seemingly irrational postures or create
risks that could lead to unwanted conflict. By demonstrating resolve and a willingness to
accept risk, states may actually enhance their bargaining position—a paradoxical logic that
flows directly from the structural pressures identified by neorealism.

Criticisms and limitations of neorealism

Despite its theoretical elegance and explanatory power, neorealism has faced significant
critiques from various perspectives.

The problem of change

Critics argue that neorealism’s structural focus makes it better at explaining continuity than
change in international politics. Its emphasis on recurrent patterns and structural
constraints struggles to account for transformative developments like the peaceful end of
the Cold War or the evolution of the European Union.
Alexander Wendt and other constructivist scholars have argued that neorealism treats as
fixed what are actually socially constructed and potentially changeable patterns of
interaction. “Anarchy is what states make of it,” as Wendt famously claimed, suggesting
that the security dilemmas neorealists describe are not inevitable but dependent on
intersubjective understandings that can evolve.

Neglect of domestic politics and identity

Another major criticism concerns neorealism’s tendency to treat states as “black boxes”
whose internal characteristics matter little for their external behavior. Liberal theorists
argue that domestic political structures significantly influence foreign policy, while
constructivists emphasize the importance of identity and norms.
For instance, neorealism struggles to explain why democratic states rarely go to war with
each other (the democratic peace theory) or why some states prioritize values-based
foreign policies over pure power considerations.

Contemporary relevance of neorealism

Despite these criticisms, neorealism remains highly influential in both academic and policy
circles for its parsimonious explanations of persistent patterns in international politics.

Great power competition in the 21st century

Many analysts see the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China
through a neorealist lens. China’s rising power has triggered classic balancing behaviors,
including the strengthening of U.S. alliances in Asia and increased military spending by
regional powers. This pattern aligns closely with neorealist expectations about systemic
responses to shifting power distributions.

Security dilemmas in new domains

Neorealist insights about security dilemmas have proven applicable to emerging domains
like cyberspace and outer space. The development of offensive cyber capabilities, for
instance, creates new security dilemmas as states cannot easily distinguish between
defensive and offensive intentions in this domain.
Similarly, the militarization of space reflects the competitive logic that neorealism identifies,
with states developing anti-satellite weapons and space-based defense systems in
response to perceived vulnerabilities—despite the shared interest in preserving space as a
peaceful domain.

Conclusion: The enduring insights of

neorealism
Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism represented a theoretical revolution in international relations
by shifting focus from human nature to systemic structure. By highlighting how the anarchic
international system shapes state behavior regardless of individual leaders’ intentions,
neorealism provides a powerful explanation for the persistence of security competition
despite changing historical circumstances.
While its critics correctly identify limitations in explaining change, cooperation, and the
influence of domestic factors, neorealism’s core insights about the structural pressures
facing states remain essential for understanding international politics. The security
dilemma, concerns about relative gains, and the tendency toward balancing behavior
continue to shape state interactions in ways that Waltz’s theory anticipated.
Thomas Schelling’s strategic extensions of neorealist thinking further illuminate how
rational actors navigate crises and employ risk as a bargaining tool—insights that remain
relevant for understanding contemporary security challenges from nuclear deterrence to
cyber conflict.
Perhaps neorealism’s greatest contribution is forcing us to recognize how structural
constraints limit policy options even for the most powerful states. By highlighting these
systemic pressures, neorealism provides a sobering counterweight to idealistic approaches
that underestimate the challenges of cooperation in an anarchic world.
What do you think? If the international system’s anarchic structure inevitably produces
security competition, are efforts to build international institutions and norms futile? Or can
international society evolve beyond the security dilemmas that neorealists identify as
structural features of world politics?