4/13/25, 9:34 PM Lagman vs.

Pimentel III

Title
Lagman vs. Pimentel III

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 235935 Feb 6, 2018

President Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao in 2017 to address rebellion;

Congress extended it, upheld by the Court as constitutional.

Jur.ph - Case Digest (G.R. No. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155)

Reasoning Model - Advanced

Facts:

Proclamation and Initial Extension

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
a state of martial law in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding 60 days.
This proclamation suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
designated area and was justified as a necessary response to an alleged armed
public uprising—“actual rebellion”—by terrorist groups such as the Maute Group
and elements of Abu Sayyaf in Marawi City.
In a Special Joint Session held on July 22, 2017, Congress, relying on the President’s
report, extended the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

Request for a Further Extension

On December 8, 2017, President Duterte sent a letter to Congress requesting an
extension of martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus over Mindanao for an
additional period of one year (January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018).
The request, based on a security assessment submitted by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), was supported by letters
from Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and AFP Chief of Staff General Rey
Leonardo B. Guerrero.
The justification included allegations that despite the death of key leaders (Hapilon
and the Maute brothers) the remnants of these terrorist groups were “rebuilding”
through recruitment, reorganization, and training; and that other groups (such as
the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, elements of Abu Sayyaf, and even the
New People’s Army) were allegedly intensifying their activities.
The security threats were described in terms of increased recruitment, planning of
bombings, and additional violent incidents—even though certain events (e.g., the
liberation of Marawi on October 17, 2017) indicated that the overt armed
confrontation had ceased.
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Congressional Action
During a Joint Session of Congress—constrained by rules giving each member only
a three-minute opportunity to interpellate—the legislature passed Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4 on December 13, 2017, effectively extending Proclamation No. 216
and the suspension of habeas corpus in Mindanao for one year.
The process and the limited debate time have been alleged by petitioners to have
compromised a full, democratic review of the extension.

Filing of the Petitions

Several consolidated petitions (with docket numbers such as G.R. Nos. 235935,
236061, 236145, and 236155) were filed challenging the constitutionality of the
extension.
Petitioners contend that there is insufficient factual basis for the extension, that the
rebellion as originally declared does not persist, and that the procedures adopted by
Congress were inadequate.

Issue:

Factual Sufficiency and Persistence of Rebellion

Does the extension have a sufficient factual basis under Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution?
Is there an “actual” rebellion or invasion still ongoing that justifies an extension, or
are the allegations merely based on potential, preparatory, or isolated violent acts?

Public Safety Requirement

Do the facts presented prove that public safety requires the continuation of martial
law and the suspension of habeas corpus in Mindanao?
Can the “threat” (e.g., recruitment by remaining rebel remnants) be equated with an
emergency situation warranting the imposition of martial law?

Procedural and Institutional Concerns

Was Congress’s process—especially the limited time for debate—consistent with its
constitutional duty to review the extension?
Is the joint executive–legislative nature of the extension proper and within the
powers conferred by the Constitution?
Should the judiciary’s role be limited to reviewing the sufficiency of the factual
basis without substituting its own assessment for that of the executive and
legislative branches?
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Scope of Judicial Review

What is the proper standard of review for these petitions under Section 18, Article
VII, and how does it differ from review in certiorari cases under Article VIII?

Inclusion of New Groups

Can the extension be justified by including additional rebel groups (for example, the
New People’s Army) that were not part of the original Proclamation No. 216?

Ruling:

Majority Decision
The plurality (or majority, as reflected in the "ponencia") held that the extension of
Proclamation No. 216 by Congress—via Resolution No. 4—is constitutional.
The holding was based on the government’s submission that there exists probable
cause and sufficient factual basis to believe that rebellion persists in parts of
Mindanao and that public safety requires the continuation of martial law measures.
The decision clarified that the President’s initiative and Congress’s concurrence,
though based on assessments (including recruitment efforts, planning by terrorist
groups, and isolated violent incidents), need only meet the standard of “probable
cause” rather than an absolute or incontrovertible proof of an ongoing full-scale
uprising.
The extension is viewed as a joint executive–legislative act distinct from the initial
60‑day declaration and, because Congress is given broad discretion to establish its
own rules and to approve extensions, the limitations inherent in the process were
deemed acceptable.

Dissenting and Concurrence Views

A number of justices dissented (including Justices Carpio, Jardeleza, and Caguioa)
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show an active, ongoing rebellion that
meets the constitutional threshold.
The dissenters contended that mere post-conflict rebuilding, recruitment, and
preparatory measures do not justify a further extension because they do not
amount to the “actual” armed public uprising or invasion required by the
Constitution.
Concurring opinions (such as those by Justices Leonardo-De Castro, Gesmundo,
and others) agreed with the majority on the extension’s constitutionality and
emphasized the deference due to the executive and legislative branches in
assessing emergencies.

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Some dissenters further argued that extending martial law for one full year based
on these factors sets a dangerous precedent that could erode fundamental civil
liberties and pave the way for authoritarian rule.

Final Disposition
The Court’s decision is split: while the majority opinion dismissed the petitions
(thus upholding the extension), several concurring and dissenting opinions urged
that the extension was not justified by the factual basis and should be declared
unconstitutional.
Ultimately, the consolidated petitions challenging the extension of martial law in
Mindanao were dismissed by the majority, though the dissenting opinions disagree
strongly.

Ratio:

Constitutional Test for Martial Law Extension

Under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the imposition or extension of
martial law (and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus) requires two
concurrent conditions:
There must be an actual invasion or rebellion.
Public safety must require that extraordinary measures be taken.
For an extension, the power is a joint executive–legislative act initiated by the
President and approved by Congress. The judiciary’s role is to review whether there
is sufficient factual basis (i.e. probable cause) for the continued existence of these
conditions.

Application to the Present Case

The government’s evidence relied heavily on intelligence reports and data
concerning the regrouping, recruitment, and isolated violent incidents by various
rebel groups.
The majority held that even if the fighting in Marawi had ceased, the continued
organization and preparatory acts by the rebel remnants (including additional
recruitment and planning of further attacks) provided a sufficient basis to conclude
that an “actual rebellion” persists.
The Court assumed that the measure of public safety was not solely the occurrence
of widespread violent fighting but also the potential that the threat could escalate
and undermine civil governance.

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The standard applied is one of “probable cause” based on the totality of the
evidence available to the executive and confirmed by Congress, rather than an
independent, definitive determination by the Court.
Dissenters argued that the evidence merely shows a possibility or threat rather than
actual, active hostile uprising, and that only an actual and substantial breakdown of
civil authority would justify martial law.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Deference

The decision emphasizes that while the President and Congress have wide
discretion to assess emergencies, the judiciary retains authority to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis—but only to the extent of ensuring that the
conditions required by the Constitution are met.
The Court is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the executive or
legislative branches regarding the wisdom of employing martial law; rather, its
review must be rooted in whether there is enough factual support for the claim that
an actual rebellion persists and that public safety is in jeopardy.

Doctrine:

Limited and Conditional Nature of Martial Law

Martial law under the 1987 Constitution is an extraordinary power that may only be
invoked when two strict conditions are met: the existence of an actual invasion or
rebellion and a demonstrated necessity to protect public safety.
The initial proclamation is limited to 60 days, and any extension must be subject to
the joint approval of Congress and is reviewable by the Supreme Court for its
factual sufficiency.
The doctrine emphasizes that merely speculative or preparatory actions (such as
recruitment or isolated violent incidents) do not automatically constitute an actual
rebellion deserving of martial law.

Review Standard for Extraordinary Powers

The appropriate proceeding under Section 18, Article VII is sui generis; it is not a
standard petition for certiorari under Article VIII.
The judiciary’s review is limited to determining whether there is “probable cause”
or sufficient factual basis—not whether the executive’s decision was the best
alternative as a matter of policy.
This ensures that while the President’s emergency powers are given effective
deference, they nonetheless remain subject to constitutional constraints and the

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rule of law.

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

The extension of martial law is a joint exercise of power: the President initiates the
request based on his intelligence and assessment, and Congress has the authority
to approve or revoke the extension based on its own deliberation.
The Constitution expressly protects civil liberties (the writ of habeas corpus
remains in force for those not judicially charged) and mandates that martial law
does not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor supplant the functioning of
civil courts.
In effect, the doctrine asserts that the use—and in particular, the extension—of such
extraordinary powers must be limited, temporary, and strictly justified by the
factual circumstances.

Implications for Future Cases

The decision (and the split opinions) illustrates that the assessment of whether
martial law may be extended hinges on a careful, evidence-based evaluation of the
threat.
Courts must be prepared to scrutinize executive and legislative determinations of
“actual rebellion” and the need for extraordinary measures, using objective and
reasonable standards rather than mere deference or political question doctrines.
Although some Justices upheld the extension based on a deferential reading, the
dissent warns that an unchecked extension based on ambiguous or minimal factual
findings may lead to a dangerous erosion of civil liberties.

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