1953

 Korean War armistice; post-war monetary clean-up via a 100-to-1 currency reform (the
“new won”), alongside tight foreign-exchange controls.

 US/UN aid structures define the economy: the Merchandise Procurement Committee
and the domestic “counterpart fund” system channel resources into reconstruction and
controlled imports.

1954

 State sets up long-term development finance by establishing the Korea Development

Bank (KDB) to fund industrial projects.

1955–1956

 Multiple exchange-rate regime entrenched (low official rate for imports; export-dollar
premiums for exporters) and high protection for import substitution—framework that
lasts to 1964.

1957

 US aid peaks; Washington pushes a formal Financial Stabilization Program (1957–

1960) to rein in deficits and money growth—Korean officials get their first systematic
monetary-control experience.

1958–1959

 Export-dollar premiums and subsidies rise; the effective (real) exchange rate for
exports peaks in 1959 under the multi-rate system.

1960

 Two devaluations begin the move toward a realistic rate (Feb and Oct): official rate
starts shifting up from 50 won/US$ toward 130 by early 1961, compressing the
premium on export dollars.

1961

 May coup ushers in the Park regime; within 10 days the Economic Planning Board
(EPB) is created with planning, budgeting and foreign-capital functions concentrated
under a deputy prime minister.

 Government takes effective control of banking to direct credit; short-term export credit
is streamlined with automatic bank loans against export L/Cs.

 A 10-to-1 currency redenomination further tidies the won.

1962

 First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–1966) launched; heavy early

reliance on commercial foreign loans.

 To unlock external finance, the state enacts the Act on Payment Guarantee of Foreign
Borrowing (government guarantees private foreign loans); initial West German credits
follow.
1963

 Facing reserve pressure, the government introduces a full export-import link system
(imports rationed in proportion to export performance) and removes most “automatic”
import approvals.

1964

 Comprehensive Export Promotion Program (June) puts incentives on a systematic

footing.

 Exchange-rate reform consolidates multiple rates into a single, adjustable rate and
devalues to ≈255 won/US$, phasing out export-dollar premiums and making prices
more coherent for exporters.

1965

 Financial reform nearly doubles bank deposit rates to mobilise savings, while
exporters’ preferential rates are cut further—strengthening targeted credit.

 New export tools: wastage allowances on input imports; local L/Cs that extend export
benefits down the supply chain; and the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting chaired
by the president begins.

 Treaty with Japan normalises relations and brings US$300m grants, US$200m soft
loans, and US$300m commercial credits—a pivotal capital inflow.

 The state also starts organising labour export (Korea Overseas Development
Corporation) to earn FX and relieve unemployment.

1966

 KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology) is founded to back industrial

upgrading; export credit instruments expand (incl. Vietnam-related US offshore
procurement).

1967

 Second Five-Year Plan (1967–1971) ramps up industrialisation; sectoral laws begin to

steer capacity building (Machinery and Shipbuilding Promotion Acts).

 Trade regime shifts toward a negative list (more items liberalised by default, with
explicit prohibitions kept).

1968

 Loans for Machine Industry Promotion begin—large directed-credit windows to

priority capital-goods makers.

1969

 Blue-chip infrastructure/industry pipeline takes shape (roads, petrochemicals,

integrated steel); government sets up a Taskforce to Restructure Insolvent Firms
(May–Aug) to merge/close weak companies amid debt issues.

1970
  Gyeongbu (Seoul–Busan) Expressway opens, slashing logistics times and knitting the
home market.

 Industry statutes multiply: Petrochemical Industry Promotion Act and Steel Industry
Fostering Act (legal scaffolding for complexes like Ulsan petrochemicals and Pohang
steel).

 Defence-industrial groundwork: Park approves the “four core plants” concept; Agency
for Defense Development (ADD) is established—pre-HCI state-capacity build-out.

1971

 KDI (Korea Development Institute) set up as the EPB’s macro/industry think-tank.

 IMF-backed stabilisation: won devaluation (~11.9%), tighter money/credit; growth

decelerates and highly leveraged firms feel the squeeze.

1972

 Second won devaluation (~13.0%) under continuing IMF programme; recessionary

external environment persists.

 3 August Emergency Decree freezes and restructures the informal-credit (curb)

market: mandatory reporting; 3-year grace + 5-year amortisation; capped rates (16.2%
p.a.); large-scale rescheduling and conversion of short-term bank loans to long-term at
8% backed by BOK special debentures.

 October Yushin constitutional change centralises executive power—consolidating the

political machinery that will drive the HCI push the following year.

1973

 Park’s HCI drive begins. The state designates six “strategic” sectors (steel, non-ferrous
metals, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, petrochemicals), creates an HCI
promotion committee, and concentrates cheap policy credit, tax breaks, and protection
to scale them up—also with a defense-security rationale.

 1973 also brings a big competitiveness jump (tight price controls cut inflation and the
REER for exports spikes), exports surge, and growth hits 14.9%.

1974
 First oil shock hits; Seoul expands demand and doubles down on HCI. Inflation soars
(24.1%); current-account (CA) deficit widens to 10.4% of GDP. A 21.3% devaluation
comes in December.

1975
 Inflation remains high (25.3%); CA deficit ~8.7% of GDP; HCI push continues.

1976
 Growth rebounds to 13.2%; inflation eases; CA deficit shrinks to ~1% of GDP; fixed
nominal rate from Dec-1974 remains in place.
1977
 CA turns small surplus as oil shock fades and devaluation effects filter through.

1978
 With the exchange rate still fixed amid double-digit inflation, competitiveness erodes
and the CA slips back to a ~2% deficit.

1979
 Second oil shock + overheating: Seoul announces a Comprehensive Stabilization
Program (credit tightening, anti-inflation shift) as macro strains mount; political shock
follows later that year.

1980

 Output contracts; Chun Doo-hwan’s government pivots to “stability first,” restraining

fiscal/credit growth and moving from a hard dollar peg to a multiple-basket peg to
regain external balance.

1981–1982
 Monetarist stabilization hardens: administered prices (incl. rice) restrained; zero-
based budgeting introduced (1982) to lock in fiscal discipline.

1983
 Diplomatic finance: after pressing Washington and Tokyo, Seoul lands a US$4 bn
Japanese package (Jan-1983), easing BoP stress and helping avoid a currency crisis.

1984
 “Advance Notice of Tariff Reduction” sets an 11-year path of gradual tariff cuts—
signaling sustained market opening.

1985
 Plaza Accord depreciates the dollar; because the won’s basket weights still favour the
dollar, the won weakens vs. the yen, boosting Korea’s price-competitiveness just as oil
prices collapse—the start of the “three-lows” tailwind.

 Growth averages 10.6% in 1983–85 with low inflation.

1986
 GDP surges; CA flips to a 2.2% surplus, beginning a three-year super-surplus.
Sterilization strains build as the BoK’s net foreign assets balloon.

1987
 Democratization arrives amid a wage explosion that ends the undervalued-won era;
nominal manufacturing wages rise 11.6% in 1987 and accelerate further.

1988
 CA surplus peaks (~6.4% of GDP); Seoul Olympics and US pressure accelerate opening
(External Trade Act 1987, capital-market opening 1988). Won revaluation begins late
(1988), after delaying since 1985.

1989
 Boom cools (growth ~7.1%); inflation returns; rapid revaluation + wage-cost pressures
hit the REER. Government pivots to domestic-demand support via
construction/housing programs.
1990
 Korea adopts the Market Average Exchange Rate (MAER), a step toward a more
flexible, market-linked FX regime.

1991–1992
 Financial-market liberalization plan (1992) and looser rules on outward FDI (1992)
advance.

1993
 “New Economy” Five-Year Plan prioritizes internationalization/liberalization; the Real-
Name Financial Transaction System cleans up opaque finance.

1994
 Broad FDI liberalization (more sectors opened; prior obligations removed).

1995
 REER overvaluation peaks; competitiveness deteriorates in the first half of the 1990s
despite official comfort with the rate at the time.

1995–1996
 Labor reorganization and new union landscape (KCTU, 1995) collide with attempted
labor-law changes (1996–97), adding wage/rigidity pressures; at the same time, short-
term cross-border liabilities and merchant-bank risk-taking swell under liberalization.

1997
 After early-year bankruptcies and capital-flow reversals, Korea is swept into the Asian
crisis; the won plunges and Seoul signs an IMF-led program in December.

1998
 Crisis policy mix: initially tight money and fiscal restraint to stabilize the currency;
sweeping structural conditionality follows.

 Authorities articulate “Five-Plus-Three” principles for corporate reform (focus on core

businesses, transparency, deleveraging to ≤200% debt-equity, better governance),
push Big Deals and workouts, and strengthen bank resolution/deposit insurance.

 Large public funds are mobilized for financial restructuring (₩64 trn in May).

 Labor-market flexibility is negotiated via a Tripartite Pact (February), enabling layoffs

while adding social protections. FDI/M&A restrictions are slashed to draw in foreign
capital.

1999
 Recovery takes hold; KAMCO is established as the centralized bad-asset
buyer/manager; further funds are committed to bank clean-up.

 Daewoo implodes mid-year, triggering unprecedented enforcement (including auditor

sanctions) and catalyzing governance reform.

2000
 IT/KOSDAQ bubble bursts; growth momentum softens. (KOSDAQ’s 2000 collapse is
linked to very low post-crisis interest rates used to jump-start recovery.)
2001
 External tech slump + global slowdown weigh on Korea; the system remains more
open and banks cleaner after the restructuring. (Your sources tie later growth
composition to trade/REER dynamics after 1997.)

2002
 Policy support leans on easy credit to households: tax incentives and deregulation spur
a credit-card lending boom that props up demand but seeds a mini-crisis ahead.