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3 Theories of Migration

Migration is hardly ever a simple individual action in which a person decides to move in
search of better life-chances, pulls up his or her roots in the place of origin and quickly
becomes assimilated in a new country. Much more often migration and settlement are
long-term processes that will be played out for the rest of the migrant’s life, and affect
subsequent generations too. Migration can even transcend death: members of some
migrant groups arrange for their bodies to be taken back for burial in their native soil
(see Tribalat 1995: 109–111). Migration is often a collective action, arising out of social,
economic and political change and affecting entire communities and societies in both
origin and destination areas. Moreover, the experience of migration and of living in
another country often leads to modification of original plans, so that migrants’ inten-
tions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behaviour.
Conventional wisdom holds that migration is driven by geographical differences
in income, employment and other opportunities. However, the paradox is that eco-
nomic and human development in poor societies tends to initially increase movement.
Improved access to education and information, social capital and financial resources
typically increase people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate (see de Haas 2014a).
Development typically expands people’s access to material resources, social networks and
knowledge. As noted earlier, this explains why most migrants do not move from the poor-
est to the wealthiest countries, why the poorest countries tend to experience lower levels
of long-distance emigration and why industrializing societies have the highest levels of
internal and international mobility.
However, if it is true that development and global inequality boost migration, it is
difficult to understand why the volume of international migration as a share of the
world population has remained remarkably stable at levels of around three per cent
over the past decades. Such paradoxes show that the relation between migration and
broader processes of development is intrinsically complex, and that patterns and trends
of real-world migration often defy intuition. In order to achieve a better understanding
of the nature and causes of migration processes, this chapter reviews the main insights
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

offered by various migration theories. This will help to understand the more descrip-
tive accounts of migration, settlement and minority formation from around the globe in
later chapters. However, the reader may prefer to read those first and come back to the
theory later.
Since the late nineteenth century, various social science disciplines have developed sev-
eral theories that aim to understand the nature and causes of migration processes. These
theories differ in their assumptions, thematic focus and level of analysis, ranging from
global accounts of shifting migration patterns to theories of migrants’ transnational iden-
tities. Often, theoretical and disciplinary divides are artificial. For instance, it does not
seem very useful to develop separate theories for internal and international migration.
Although international migration is more often (albeit not always) subject to control by
states and internal migration is generally (albeit not always) free, both forms of migration

Haas, Hein de, et al. The Age of Migration : International Population Movements in the Modern World, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2019.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/suss/detail.action?docID=6235069.
Created from suss on 2022-10-04 12:57:08.
Theories of Migration 43

are driven by the same processes of social, economic and political change and the two are
often closely linked.
It is equally debatable whether it is useful to develop separate theories for different
categories of migrants, such as for ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ or for refugee, family or eco-
nomic migration. Motives for migrating are often manifold. For instance, migrants who
primarily move for economic reasons may also flee political oppression. The other way
around, political oppression often goes along with economic exclusion. It is thus diffi-
cult to strictly separate economic from social, cultural and political causes of migration.
To gain a deeper understanding of migration processes, it is important to see migration

• On the macro-level, as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and

social transformation rather than ‘a problem to be solved’ or a temporary reaction to
geographical inequalities or ‘disequilibria’;
• On the micro-level, as a function of (1) capabilities and (2) aspirations to migrate
within a given set of constraints – instead of some sort of automated reaction
to, or linear function of, ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. This helps to understand the
complex, and often counterintuitive, ways in which macro-level processes of social
transformation and development shape migration processes.

These two central theoretical premises will guide the analysis in this chapter and through-
out the book. For this review of theories, it is useful to make a basic distinction between
theories on the (1) causes of migration processes, and theories on the impacts of migra-
tion for (2) destination and (3) origin societies. This chapter will focus on the first set
of concepts and theories, while Chapters 4 and 14 will focus on the second and third set
of concepts and theories. However, it is important to link theories on causes and conse-
quences of migration in order to develop an understanding of migration as a dynamic
process which is in constant interaction with broader change processes in destination
and origin societies. This book uses the term ‘migration studies’ in the widest sense, to
embrace both bodies of investigation.
In looking at the causes of migration, it is useful to also make a further distinction
between

• Macro- and micro-level theories on the causes of migration; and

• Meso-level theories on the continuation of migration which focus on feedback
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

mechanisms such as migrant networks that explain why migration processes can gain
their own momentum and become partly self-perpetuating (see Massey et al. 1993).

Any migratory movement can be seen as the result of interacting macro- and
micro-structures. Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors, such as
the political economy of the world market, labour market dynamics, interstate relation-
ships, and efforts by the states of origin and destination countries to control migration.
Micro-structures embrace the practices, family ties and beliefs of migrants themselves.
These two levels are linked by a number of meso-level social mechanisms and structures:
examples of these include migrant networks, immigrant communities, business sectors
catering to migrants and the migration industry. Such social structures tend to facilitate
further migration within established migration corridors.

Explaining the migratory process

The concept of the migratory process sums up the complex sets of factors and interactions
which shape migration. Migration is a process which affects every dimension of social
existence, and which develops its own complex ‘internal’ dynamics. The great majority of
people in the world (around 97 per cent) may not be classified as international migrants,
yet their communities and way of life are often affected by migration. The changes are
generally much bigger for the migrants themselves.
Research on migration is interdisciplinary: sociology, anthropology, political science,
history, economics, geography, demography, psychology, cultural studies, law, archae-
ology and the humanities are all relevant (see also Brettell and Hollifield 2014). Within
each discipline a variety of approaches exist, based on differences in theory and methods.
For instance, researchers who base their work on quantitative analysis of large data-sets
(such as censuses or surveys) will ask different questions and get different results from
those who do qualitative studies of small groups based on open interviews or participant
observation. Those who examine the role of migrant labour within the world economy
using long-term historical approaches will again reach different conclusions. Each of these
methods has its place, as long as it lays no claim to be the only correct one.
This chapter will not review migration theories along disciplinary lines. This is done on
purpose, because such distinctions are often artificial and can obstruct a more compre-
hensive understanding of migratory processes. Different disciplines and theories provide
different views on migration, which are more often complementary than mutually exclu-
sive. After all, most disciplines – ranging from anthropology to economics – are part of
the family of the social sciences, and each of these disciplines as well as theories and meth-
odologies should be seen as different ways or angles of looking at the same social realities
rather than exclusive truth statements.
An early contribution to migration studies consisted of two articles by the nineteenth-
century geographer Ravenstein (1885; 1889), in which he formulated his ‘laws of migra-
tion’. Ravenstein saw migration as an inseparable part of economic development, and he
asserted that the major causes of migration were economic. Lee (1966) argued that migra-
tion decisions are determined by ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors in areas of origin and destina-
tion; intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration laws and so
on); and personal factors. Ravenstein and Lee provide many basic insights that are still
valid, such as that migration in one direction tends to generate movements in the oppo-
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

site direction and that migration often takes place in clear spatial patterns linking particu-
lar destination and origins.
Most migration theories can be grouped together into two main paradigms, follow-
ing a more general division in social sciences between ‘functionalist’ and ‘historical–
structural’ theoretical paradigms. Functionalist social theory tends to see society as a
system, a collection of interdependent parts (individuals, actors), somehow analogous to
the functioning of an organism, in which an inherent tendency toward equilibrium exists.
Functionalist migration theory generally treats migration as a positive phenomenon, as
an ‘optimization’ mechanism serving the interests of most people, increasing productivity
and contributing to greater equality within and between societies.
Rooted in neo-Marxist political economy, historical–structural theories primarily
see migration as an exploitation mechanism. They emphasize how social, economic, cul-
tural and political structures constrain and direct the behaviour of individuals in ways

that generally do not lead to greater equilibrium, but rather reinforce such disequilibria,
unless governments intervene to redistribute resources. They emphasize that economic
and political power is unequally distributed, and that cultural beliefs (such as religion and
tradition) and social practices tend to reproduce such structural inequalities. They see
migration as providing a cheap, exploitable labour force, which mainly serves the interests
of the wealthy in receiving areas, causes a ‘brain drain’ in origin areas, and therefore rein-
forces social and geographical inequalities.

Functionalist theories
Push–pull models
A particularly popular analytical framework is what is often referred to as the ‘push–pull’
model (Passaris 1989). Push–pull models identify economic, environmental and demo-
graphic factors which are assumed to push people out of places of origin and pull them
into destination places. ‘Push factors’ usually include population growth and population
density, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while ‘pull factors’ usually
include demand for labour, availability of land, economic opportunities and political free-
doms. In this logic, ‘gravity’ models developed by geographers from the early twentieth
century were derived from Newton’s law of gravity and predict the volume of migration
between places and countries as a more or linear function of distance, population size and
economic opportunities in destination and origin areas.
At first sight, the push–pull framework seems attractive because of its apparent abil-
ity to incorporate all major factors affecting migration decision-making (Bauer and
Zimmermann 1998: 103). However, in reality push–pull models are inadequate to explain
migration, since they are purely descriptive models enumerating factors which are
assumed to play ‘some’ role in migration in a relative arbitrary manner, without specifying
their role and interactions. As Skeldon put it:

The disadvantage with the push-pull model is that ... it is never entirely clear how the
various factors combine together to cause population movement. We are left with a list
of factors, all of which can clearly contribute to migration, but which lack a framework
to bring them together in an explanatory system ... The push–pull theory is but a plati-
tude at best. (Skeldon 1990: 125–126)
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

The same conditions that make some people leave, make others stay or attract people
from other places. Push–pull factors models therefore have difficulties explaining why
many countries and regions simultaneously experience substantial immigration and
emigration, why migrants would return, or why most people do not migrate at all. People
have different perceptions, preferences and ambitions, and therefore react in different
ways to the same circumstances. As Lee (1966) argued there are many factors that retain
people in origin areas. Push–pull models also tend to feed into dichotomous, stereotypical
worldviews in which countries in the ‘Global South’ are unilaterally portrayed as pools of
poverty, violence and misery from which everybody wants to leave to go to the beacons of
prosperity and progress in the ‘Global North’.
The way they are usually applied, push–pull models are often also deterministic
by assuming that demographic, environmental, political and economic factors ‘cause’

migration, without taking account of the role of other factors. For instance, population
growth, resource scarcity or environmental adversity in rural areas do not necessarily
result in migration, because ‘population pressure’ can also encourage innovation (such
as the introduction of irrigation, terraces or fertilizers), enabling peasants and farmers
to maintain or even increase productivity (see Boserup 1965). Furthermore, scarcity and
impoverishment can actually impede migration if people cannot afford the costs and risk
of migrating (Henry et al. 2004). Because conflict and impoverishment tend to immobilize
people, the ‘involuntarily immobile’ are therefore the greatest victims of economic, politi-
cal and environmental havoc (Carling 2002; Lubkemann 2008) (see also Box 2.1).
Environmental or demographic factors should not be isolated from other social, eco-
nomic, political and institutional factors affecting people’s living standards and aspira-
tions. For instance, while Eastern European countries have very low fertility and low or
negative population growth, they have experienced large-scale emigration. At the same
time, the Gulf countries have combined high fertility with low emigration and very high
immigration. Improved education and media exposure may increase feelings of relative
deprivation, and may give rise to higher aspirations and, therefore, increased migration,
even if local conditions and opportunities have improved. As long as aspirations rise
faster than local opportunities, this will result in increasing migration. This explains the
paradox of development-driven emigration booms.

Neoclassical migration theory

As part of the functionalist paradigm, neoclassical migration theory assumes that social
forces tend towards equilibrium. Rooted in modernization theory (Rostow 1960), it sees
migration as a constituent part of the whole development process, by which surplus
labour in the rural sector supplies the workforce for the urban industrial economy (Lewis
1954; Todaro 1969: 139). Neoclassical theory sees migration primarily as a function of
geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour. The resulting wage dif-
ferentials encourage workers to move from low-wage, labour-surplus areas to high-wage,
labour-scarce areas.
At the micro-level, neoclassical theory views migrants as individual, rational actors,
who decide to move on the basis of a cost–benefit calculation, maximizing their income.
Migrants are expected to go where they can be the most productive and can earn the
highest wages. In this context, Borjas (1989; 1990) proposed the idea of an international
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

immigration market, in which potential migrants base their choice of destination on indi-
vidual, cost–benefit calculations.
At the macro-level, neoclassical theory views migration as a process which optimizes the
allocation of production factors. Migration will make labour less scarce at the destination
and scarcer in origin areas. Capital is expected to move in the opposite direction, in search
for cheaper labour, such as through outsourcing of industrial production. Neo-classical the-
ory suggests that this process will eventually result in convergence between wages (Harris
and Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961; Schiff 1994; Todaro and Maruszko
1987). In the long run, migration should therefore help to make wages and conditions in
sending and receiving countries more equal, lowering the incentives for migrating.
Neoclassical migration theory was advanced by Todaro (1969) and Harris and
Todaro (1970) to explain rural–urban migration in developing countries but has also
been applied to international migration (c.f. Borjas 1989; Todaro and Maruszko 1987).

Harris and Todaro tried to explain the continuation of rural-to-urban labour migration
in developing countries despite high unemployment in cities. They argued that it is
necessary to extend the wage differential approach by adjusting the ‘expected’ rural–
urban income differential for the probability of finding an urban job (Todaro 1969:
138). Migration would continue as long as income differences remain high enough to
outweigh the risk of becoming unemployed (Todaro 1969: 147). Later, this model was
refined (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998: 97) to include other factors, such as the finan-
cial and social costs of migration.

Human capital theory

An alternative but complementary approach was proposed by Sjaastad (1962), who
applied human capital theory to migration. He viewed migration as an investment
that increases the productivity of human capital – such as knowledge and skills. People
vary in terms of personal skills, knowledge, physical abilities, age and gender, so there
will also be differences in the extent to which they can expect to gain from migrating.
People decide to invest in migration, in the same way as they might invest in educa-
tion, and they are expected to migrate if the additional lifetime benefits (primarily
derived from higher wages) in the destination are greater than the costs incurred
through migrating (Chiswick 2000). Differences in such expected ‘returns on invest-
ments’ partly explain why the young and the higher skilled tend to migrate more.
Sjaastad’s model can be extended by also conceptualizing student migration as an
investment in human capital.
Human capital theory helps to explain the ‘selectivity’ of migration (the phenomenon
that migrants tend to come from particular sub-sections of origin populations) and helps
to understand how migration is shaped by the structure of labour markets as well as dif-
ferences in skills and income distributions in origin and destination societies. A related,
important insight is that the geographical scope of labour markets generally increases with
specialization levels. While lower skilled workers can often find jobs nearby, specialized
workers often have to move more often to find a job that matches their skills and prefer-
ences. The growing structural complexity of labour markets and concomitant increases in
specialization is an additional explanation for understanding why levels of migration and
mobility tend to increase with development, increasing education and divisions of labour.
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

Critique of functionalist theories

Neoclassical and human capital theory are valuable in understanding the selective nature
of migration. However, neoclassical theory can be criticized because of the unrealistic
nature of its central assumptions. The first assumption is that people are rational actors
who maximize income or ‘utility’ based on a systematic comparison of lifetime costs and
benefits of remaining at home or moving to an infinite range of potential destinations.
The second, related assumption is that potential migrants have perfect knowledge of
wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions. The third assumption
is that (capital, insurance and other) markets are perfect and accessible for the poor. For
instance, neoclassical models implicitly assume that (poor) people could borrow money
from banks in order to finance migration. Yet in reality, banks often do not cater to non-
elite groups lacking collateral. Because these assumptions are unrealistic, neoclassical

theories are often incapable of explaining real-life migration patterns, particularly if

migration occurs in conditions of poverty and high constraints.
Neither push–pull nor neoclassical theories have much room for human agency, which
is the limited, but real ability of human beings to make independent choices. They por-
tray human beings as socially isolated individuals who react in predictable, uniform and
therefore rather passive ways to external factors, while in practice people’s aspirations and
capabilities to migrate depend on factors such as age, gender, knowledge, social contacts,
preferences and perceptions of the outside world. These theories generally do not con-
sider how migrants perceive their world and relate to their kin, friends and community
members. As far as they deal with structural factors, such as states, government policies
or recruitment practices, at all, neoclassical approaches see them as distortions of perfect
markets which affect migration costs rather than as migration drivers in their own right.

Historical–structural theories
Structural constraints such as limited access to money, connections and information have
proven to be crucial factors affecting migration decisions. Historians, anthropologists,
sociologists and geographers have shown that state actors and factors such as historical
ties, recruitment practices, structural inequality and past migrations have a deep impact
on migrants’ decisions and behaviour (Portes and Böröcz 1989). This explains why real-
life migration patterns often deviate enormously from neoclassical predictions. Instead
of a random process, migration is a strongly patterned process because structural factors
such as social stratification, market access, power inequalities and cultural repertoires
constrain people’s individual choices, affecting their preferences and ‘channelling’ their
decisions in very particular directions.
An alternative explanation of migration was provided in the 1970s and 1980s by what
came to be called the historical–structural approach. Instead of an optimisation mechanism
as in neo-classical theories, historical–structural theories tend to see migration as an
exploitation mechanism. Historical–structural theories view the control and exploitation of
labour by states and corporations as vital to the survival of the capitalist system. While
neoclassical and other ‘functionalist’ theories reduce state regulation to one of the ‘inter-
mediate’ factors influencing migration costs, historical–structural theories see states,
multinational corporations and employment agencies as drivers of migration processes in
their own right.
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

Historical–structural theories see migration as one of the manifestations of capi-

talism, imperialism and the unequal terms of trade between developed and underde-
veloped countries (Massey et al. 1998: 34–41). Migration is seen mainly as a way
of mobilizing cheap labour for capital. They stress that the availability and control
of migrant labour is both a legacy of colonialism and the result of war and structural
international inequalities (see Cohen 1987). Functionalist migration theories were
developed to explain migrations which are seen as largely spontaneous, voluntary and
unconstrained, like most internal migrations, or the migrations from Europe to the US
before 1914. Historical–structural accounts of migration stress the key role of large-
scale recruitment of labour, whether of indentured Indian workers by the British for the
railways in East Africa, Mexicans for the US agribusiness, or Turks and Moroccans for
the factories and mines of Germany, France and the Netherlands, in shaping contempo-
rary migration systems.

Historical–structural theories criti-

cize neoclassical approaches by arguing
that migrants do not really have a free
choice because they are fundamen-
tally constrained by structural forces.
Within this perspective, inhabitants of
rural areas are forced to move because
traditional economic structures have
been undermined as a result of their
incorporation into the global capitalist
economy and social transformations
accompanying the mechanization of
agriculture, concentration of land-
ownership, and the indebtedness and
dispossession of smallholder peasants.
Through these processes, rural popu-
lations consisting of peasants, farm
workers and craftspeople would have
become increasingly deprived of their
Photo 3.1 Italian emigrant family on their traditional livelihoods. These uprooted
way to America, departing from the central rail rural populations then become part
station in Milan, 1889 of the urban proletariat to the ben-
Source: Giuseppe Primoli/inv. 2478/A, Archivio Primoli, efit of employers relying on their
Fondazione Primoli cheap labour. From this perspective,
businesses have a strong interest in
high immigration, as this will create a disposable, vulnerable and cheap ‘labour reserve’
that can be hired and fired at will, while the socioeconomic costs of unemployment (dur-
ing recessions) and marginalization of migrants are borne by migrants and the general
population.
Historical–structural theory emphasizes that while economic and political power
is unequally distributed, the capitalist economy has the tendency to reinforce these
inequalities unless governments intervene through taxing the rich and redistributing
resources to poor people and peripheral regions. Within this context, historical–struc-
tural theory sees migration as a way of mobilizing cheap labour for capital, which pri-
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

marily serves to keep wages down and boost profits of businesses and economic growth
in destination countries while depriving origin countries of valuable labour and skills
through the ‘brain drain’ (see Chapter 14). In opposition to neoclassical theory, histori-
cal–structural theory therefore argues that migration increases geographical and class-
based income gaps, exploiting the resources of poor countries and poor people to make
the rich even richer, contributing to increased inequalities within and between socie-
ties (Castles and Kosack 1973; Cohen 1987; Sassen 1988).

Dependency and world systems theory

The intellectual roots of such analyses lay in Marxist political economy – especially in
dependency theory, which became influential in the 1960s. Rooted in the Latin American
experience with US political and economic hegemony, Andre Gunder Frank (1966; 1969)

argued that by draining poor countries of their resources, global capitalism contributed to
the ‘development of underdevelopment’. From this perspective, migration can be seen as
one of the very causes of underdevelopment and growing global inequality, which is the
opposite of neoclassical perspectives.
Reversing the idea that developing countries will ‘catch up’ with rich countries,
dependency theory sees the underdevelopment of ‘Third World’ countries as a result of
the exploitation of their resources, including labour, though colonial interference. In the
postcolonial period such dependency was being perpetuated by unfair terms of trade
with powerful developed economies and hegemonic relations (Baeck 1993; Frank 1969).
From this perspective, selective immigration policies privileging the already privileged
(the skilled and wealthy) and discriminating against the vulnerable (lower-skilled work-
ers and the poor in general) can be seen as another manifestation of these unequal forms
of trade.
In the 1970s and 1980s, a more comprehensive world systems theory developed (Amin
1974; Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1984). It focused on the way ‘peripheral’ regions have been
incorporated into a world economy controlled by ‘core’ capitalist nations. The incorpora-
tion of peripheral regions into the capitalist economy and concomitant growth of multi-
national corporations accelerated rural change and deprived peasants and rural workers
of their livelihoods, leading to poverty, rural–urban migration, rapid urbanization and the
growth of informal economies.
Dependency and world systems theory were at first mainly concerned with internal
migration (Massey et al. 1998: 35), but from the mid-1970s, as the key role of migrant
workers in wealthy economies became more obvious, world systems theorists began to
analyse international labour migration as one of the ways in which relations of domi-
nation were forged between the core economies of capitalism and its underdeveloped
periphery. From this perspective, migration and immigration regimes depriving migrant
workers of rights and protection can be seen as reinforcing the effects of hegemony and
control of world trade and investment in keeping the ‘Third World’ dependent on the
‘First’.

Globalization theory
Dependency and world systems theories were precursors of the globalization theories that
emerged in the 1990s. Globalization can be defined as ‘the widening, deepening and speed-
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

ing up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life’ (Held

et al. 1999: 2). Globalization is manifest in a rapid increase in cross-border exchanges of
all sorts, ranging from finance and trade to media products and ideas. Globalization is
often portrayed primarily as an economic process associated with the upsurge in foreign
direct investment (FDI) and the liberalization of cross-border flows of capital, goods and
services, as well as the emergence of new international divisions of labour (Petras and
Veltmayer 2000: 2).
However, globalization is not just about technological and economic change: it
is also a deeply political process, often conceived in normative or ideological terms.
Critics of globalization argue that it is not a natural or inevitable new world order,
but rather the latest phase in the evolution of the capitalist world economy, which,
since the fifteenth century, has expanded into every corner of the globe (Petras and

Veltmayer 2000). The current globalization paradigm emerged in the context of neolib-
eral ideologies – initiated in the 1980s by the Reagan administration in the US and the
Thatcher government in the UK – designed to roll back the welfare states and decrease
government intervention in labour and capital markets. This process accelerated after
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – often seen as the start of the era of ‘neoliberal
globalization’ and market triumphalism.
Globalization is therefore also as an ideology about how the world should be reshaped –
summed up in the Washington consensus, a development ideology which stresses the
importance of market liberalization, privatization and deregulation as development
recipes (Gore 2000; Mitchell and Sparke 2016; Stiglitz 2002). International institutions,
especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are key instruments in efforts to impose this new neoliberal eco-
nomic world order, for instance through structural adjustment programmes, onto poor and
weaker states.
The effects of globalization on migration are more ambiguous than it may seem. It
is often thought that globalization has spurred migration as a consequence of grow-
ing inequality and revolutions in transport and communication technology. However,
such improvements have also increased the scope for trade and the outsourcing of
production and services, which has arguably replaced some forms of migration. The
opening of markets and transfer of industrial production to low-wage economies –
like the maquiladoras of Mexico, export processing zones in North Africa, the offshore
production areas of Southeast Asia or call-centres around the world – have given rise
to a new international division of labour. The partial relocation of production to low-
wage economies is often thought to have weakened the political left and trade unions
in industrial countries and shored up authoritarian regimes in the ‘South’ (see Froebel
et al. 1980).
Far from weakening the nation state, neoliberal globalization can be seen as a new
form of imperialism, designed to reinforce the power of core states, their ruling classes
and multinational corporations whose interests they serve (Hardt and Negri 2000; Petras
and Veltmayer 2000; Weiss 1997). In this process, they support corrupt and authoritar-
ian elites in peripheral countries who play a vital role in ensuring access to export mar-
kets and the reproduction of a docile workforce. Control of migration and differential
treatment of various categories of migrants have become the basis for a new type of
transnational class structure (Glick and Salazar 2013; Schewel 2019). While immigration
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

restrictions often fail to curb migration as long as labour demand persists, they lead to
an increase in irregular migration and the increased vulnerability of migrants in labour
markets (see Castles et al. 2012).

Critique of historical–structural approaches

Historical–structural theories stress structural constraints and the limited extent
to which migrants are free to make choices. This has led to the criticism that some
historical–structural views largely rule out human agency by depicting migrants as victims
of global capitalism who have no choice but to migrate in order to survive. Such determin-
istic views often do no justice to the diversity of migration and the fact that many people
do make active choices and succeed in significantly improving their livelihoods through

migrating. It would be just as unrealistic to depict all migrants as passive victims of capi-
talism as it would be to depict them as entirely rational and free actors who constantly
make individual cost-benefit calculations, as functionalist theories do. Such extreme views
actually do no justice to neo-Marxist theories that have paid ample attention to migrants’
agency by emphasizing the role of migrant workers in trade unions and industrial dis-
putes (Castles and Kosack 1973; Lever-Tracey and Quinlan 1988).
With their assumption that capitalism uprooted stable peasant societies, historical–
structural views are often based on the ‘myth of the immobile peasant’ (see Skeldon 1997:
7–8), which is the implicit assumption that pre-modern societies consisted of isolated,
stable, homogeneous and egalitarian peasant communities, in which migration was
exceptional. Historical research has shown that peasant societies were mobile (de Haan
1999; Moch 1992). Skeldon (1997: 32) pointed out that the whole idea that the Industrial
Revolution uprooted peasants from their stable communities was based on a romanticized
elitist view of peasants. Views that capitalism has ‘uprooted’ peasants by ruining egalitarian,
self-sufficient communities are often based on idealized views of the past, ignoring the fact
that pre-modern societies were often characterized by high mortality, conflict, famines and
epidemics as well as extreme inequalities, in which entire classes, castes, ethnic groups as
well as women, serfs or slaves were often denied the most fundamental human freedoms.
For instance, Vecoli (1964) argued that the notion that Southern Italian peasants
(contadini) living in the US were ‘uprooted’ from the Italian countryside (Handlin 1951)
was based on the myth of the Italian village as a harmonious social entity based on
solidarity, communality and neighbourliness. In reality, typical Italian peasants lived
in dismal and highly exploitative conditions. For them, migration to the US did provide
unprecedented opportunities. In such cases, migration can be an active choice and an
opportunity to escape from the constraints put on them by ‘traditional’ societies. This
makes it difficult to portray migrants unilaterally as victims of global capitalism. In the
same way, it is difficult to portray employers unliterally as exploitative capitalists, since
many employers value migrants’ contribution and experience, seek to retain them by
giving them promotion or helping them in to obtain legal status. While labour market
exploitation is an important part of the migration experience, the danger of unilaterally
subscribing to historical–structural theories is a failure to understand why many work-
ers have a strong interest in migrating in spite of the discrimination and exploitation –
whether by smugglers, bureaucrats, employers or co-workers – they frequently encounter.
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Conceptualizing migratory agency

Both functionalist and historical–structural migration paradigms are too one-sided
to fully explain migration processes. Neoclassical approaches neglect historical causes
of movements and downplay the role of the state and structural constraints, while
historical–structural approaches put too much emphasis on political and economic struc-
tures, often see the interests of capital as all-determining, and fail to explain why people
see an interest in migrating and working abroad – even if they are exploited. Both sets of
theories are helpful to understand various dimensions and manifestations of migration,
but their common weakness is that they are top-down perspectives that largely rule out
agency by portraying human beings as rather passive ‘reactors’ to macro-forces. Neither
approach offers a meaningful, realistic conceptualization of migrants’ agency within a
set of broader constraints. We will therefore review a third set of theories, which help to

explain migratory agency within a wider set of structural constraints, such as immigration
restrictions, discrimination and inequality. While dual labour market theory focuses on
the ways in which the structure of labour markets in destination countries perpetuates
the demand for migrant labour, the new economics of labour migration and livelihood
approaches provide additional important insights into why migrants often seem so eager
to do seemingly unattractive jobs.

Dual labour market

Dual labour market theory helps us to understand how the demand for skilled immigrant
labour is structurally embedded in modern capitalist economies while simultaneously
explaining why migrants are highly motivated to do jobs that natives shun. Piore (1979)
argued that international migration is caused by structural and chronic demand within
advanced economies for lower-skilled workers to carry out production tasks (for example,
assembly line work or garment manufacture) and to staff service enterprises (catering,
cleaning, care, etc.). This challenges the popular idea that wealthy nations mainly need
high-skilled migrant workers. Changes in the economic and labour market structure of
receiving countries drive the demand for particular labour skills. While demands of manu-
facturing industries in Europe and North America were met by inflows of manual workers
until the early 1970s, the growing importance of the tertiary (service) sector has triggered
a demand for both highly qualified and low-skilled workers over recent decades despite
the declining importance of the secondary (industrial) sector.
Through outsourcing, international corporations can move the production process
to cheap labour, or they can try to replace labour with machines, computers and robots.
However, particularly in the service sector, construction and intensive agriculture, not all
work processes can be mechanized, automated or outsourced. Domestic supply for such
low-skilled labour has dramatically decreased because women have massively entered the
formal labour market and youngsters continue education for much longer. Dual labour
market theory shows the importance of institutional factors as well as race and gender
in bringing about labour market segmentation. A division into primary and secondary
labour markets emerges (Piore 1979) marked by a growing gulf between the highly paid
core workers in finance, management and research, and the poorly paid workers, in unsta-
ble, precarious and often informal jobs, who service their needs (see also Sassen 2001).
The growth of the secondary sector and informal employment have been reinforced
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through neoliberal reforms and the concomitant de-regularization of labour markets,

which have put the middle class under pressure and have increased inequalities in income
and, particularly, wealth (see Piketty 2014).
The workers in the primary labour market are positively selected on the basis of their
degrees and formal skills, but also often through membership of majority ethnic groups,
male gender and, in the case of migrants, regular legal status – which is facilitated by
selective immigration policies discriminating in favour of the educated and wealthy.
Conversely, workers in the secondary labour market are disadvantaged by lack of educa-
tion – or, in the case of migrant workers, a lack of formal recognition of foreign degrees –
as well as by gender, race, and uncertain or irregular legal status. The increasing labelling
of precarious jobs – also known as 3D jobs (dirty, difficult and dangerous) – as low-status
‘migrant jobs’ further decreases their attractivity for native workers. Dual labour market
theory is useful to understand how the irregular status of migrants may serve employers’

interests by creating a vulnerable and docile workforce. In this perspective, politicians’

xenophobic discourses not only fulfil a symbolic function in order to rally voters, but can
also serve to legitimize exploitation of migrants on labour markets by providing a moral
justification for depriving them of their basic rights.
Motivational issues and job status are a key elements of Piore’s (1979) explanation of
why migration continues even when domestic unemployment is high. Even when unem-
ployed, native workers are often generally no longer willing to do these jobs because of the
low status attached to work in jobs in sectors such as planting and harvesting, gardening,
personal care, cleaning, garbage collection, bricklaying, hairdressing, dry-cleaning and
ironing, dishwashing and catering work. In other cases, migrants do such work as self-
employed workers, such as in Mexican gardeners in the US or Polish plumbers in the EU.
Since migrants are motivated to do jobs that native workers are unwilling or unable to do,
employers have increasingly relied on migrant workers to fill such gaps. As long as their
migrants’ social frame of reference is in origin communities, these jobs often represent
significant progress in terms of salary, status and future prospects. This exemplifies the
need to overcome the ‘receiving country bias’ by learning to also understand migration
from an origin country perspective.

New economics and household theory approaches

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) emerged as a critical response to neoclas-
sical migration theory. The economist Stark (1978; 1991) argued that, in the context of
migration in and from the developing world, migration decisions are often not made by
isolated individuals, but usually by families or households. NELM also highlights factors
other than income maximization as influencing migration decision-making. First, NELM
sees migration as risk-sharing behaviour of families or households. Such social groups may
decide that one or more of their members should migrate, not primarily to obtain higher
wages, but to diversify income sources in order to spread and minimize income risks
(Stark and Levhari 1982), with the money remitted by migrants providing income insur-
ance for households of origin. Importantly, NELM sees migration as an investment by
families, who pool resources to enable the migration of one or more household member.
For instance, the addition of an extra source of income can make peasant households
less vulnerable to environmental hazards such as droughts and floods. This risk-spreading
motive is a powerful explanation for the occurrence of internal and international migra-
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tion even in the absence of wage differentials. This helps us to explain the continuation
of large-scale rural-to-urban migration in developing countries that has so frequently
puzzled – and frustrated – policy makers. Notwithstanding the frequently challenging
conditions in cities, rural-to-urban migration allows families to diversify their income
besides improving their access to education, health care and economic opportunities.
Second, NELM sees migration as a family or household investment strategy to
provide resources for investment in economic activities, such as the family farm or
another small business. NELM examines households in the context of the imperfect
credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets that prevail in most developing countries
(Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark and Levhari 1982; Taylor 1999). Such markets are often
not accessible for non-elite groups. In particular through remittances, households can
overcome such market constraints by generating capital to invest in economic activi-
ties and improve their welfare (Stark 1980). While international remittances usually

receive most attention, internal remittances are also an important source of livelihood
improvement (Housen et al. 2013).
Third, NELM argues that relative deprivation (or poverty), rather than absolute poverty,
within origin communities are important migration-motivating factors. While the
extremely poor are generally deprived of the capability to migrate over larger distances,
the feeling of being less well-off than other community members can be a powerful incen-
tive to migrate in order to attain a similar of higher socioeconomic status. This corrobo-
rates empirical evidence showing that although international inequality can obviously
motivate people to migrate, it has limited explanatory power compared to the role of
community-level income inequalities (see Czaika and de Haas 2012; de Haas et al. 2019a).
This complements Piore’s (1979) dual labour market theory, which argued that migrants
are often motivated to do jobs that seem underpaid and unattractive to native workers
(as long as the origin community remains their prime social reference group) as such
work allows them to make huge progress in comparison to what they could have earned at
home.
With NELM, economists began to address questions of household composition tradi-
tionally posed by anthropologists and sociologists (Lucas and Stark 1985: 901). NELM has
therefore strong parallels with so-called ‘livelihood approaches’ that evolved from the late
1970s among geographers, anthropologists and sociologists conducting micro-research in
developing countries. Questioning dependency theory, they observed that the poor cannot
be reduced to passive victims of global capitalist forces but exert human agency by trying
to actively improve their livelihoods despite the difficult conditions they live in (Lieten and
Nieuwenhuys 1989).
This went along with the insight that – particularly in circumstances of uncertainty
and economic hardship – people organize their livelihoods not individually (as neo-
classical theories assume) but within wider social contexts. The household or family was
often seen as the most appropriate unit of analysis, and migration as one of the main
strategies which households employ to diversify and secure their livelihoods (McDowell
and de Haan 1997). Rather than a response to emergencies and crises or a ‘desperate
flight from misery’, field studies showed that migration is often a pro-active, deliberate
decision to improve livelihoods and to reduce fluctuations in rural family incomes by mak-
ing them less dependent on climatic vagaries and market shocks (de Haan et al. 2000: 28;
McDowell and de Haan 1997: 18).
This shows that migration cannot be sufficiently explained by focusing on income
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differences alone. Factors such as social insecurity, income risk and inequality, difficult
access to credit, insurance and product markets can also be important migration deter-
minants. For instance, as Massey et al. (1987) point out, Mexican farmers may migrate
to the US because, even though they have sufficient land, they lack the capital to make
it productive. Migration can then become a mechanism to maintain or increase the pro-
ductivity of their farms while working in the US. Household approaches seem particularly
useful to explain migration within and from developing countries and also of disadvan-
taged social groups in wealthy countries, where the lack of socioeconomic security and the
risk of falling into absolute poverty increase the importance of mutual help and risk shar-
ing within families.
Household models have been criticized because they can obscure intra-household
inequalities and conflicts of interest along the lines of gender, generation and age (de
Haas and Fokkema 2010). It is thus important not to lose sight of intra-household

power struggles, and the fact that families may disagree about migration decisions. For
instance, some migrants leave without consent of knowledge of their family members.
Instead of a move to help the family, migration can also be an individual strategy for
rebellious youngsters to escape from asphyxiating social control, abuse and oppres-
sion within communities, wishing to cut ties with their families (see de Haas 2009).
Conversely, male or female family members may feel forced to migrate as they are
socially pressured to assume the role of breadwinner although they may not aspire to
leave themselves, and suffer from the loneliness, separation and estrangement from
loved ones that migration often involves.

Migration transition theories

Despite their fundamental differences, functionalist and historical–structural theories
share an important central assumption, which is that migration is primarily an outgrowth
of poverty, development ‘disequilibria’ and the resulting geographical income inequali-
ties. This assumption, which is implicitly or explicitly based on push–pull models, informs
the popular idea that growing inequalities associated to neoliberal globalization have
spurred migration and that migration can be significantly curbed by reducing poverty and
stimulating development in origin countries. However, as we have seen, this assumption is
undermined by empirical observations that development in poor societies often increases
emigration (see de Haas 2010c; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Skeldon 1997; Tapinos 1990,
see Box 3.1). Prominent emigration countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Morocco and the
Philippines are typically not amongst the poorest. Some of the theories discussed so far
already help to explain part of this paradox. For instance, taken together, human capital
theories and dual labour market theory show how specialization, divisions of labour and
the growing structural complexity and segmentation of labour markets can increase various
forms of migratory and non-migratory mobility. NELM and livelihoods approaches help us
to understand how, instead of a desperate flight from poverty and misery, migration is a
resource and part of a deliberate strategy of families to increase their long-term wellbeing.

The migration transition

A more comprehensive explanation of why development initially tends to increase
emigration is provided by migration transition theories. These theories see migration as
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an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and social transformation associ-

ated with processes of modernization and industrialization (de Haas 2010b). Transition
theories conceptualize how migration patterns tend to change over the course of this
development process. They argue that development processes are generally associated
with increasing levels of migratory and non-migratory mobility, but they also stress that
this relation is complex and fundamentally non-linear.
This idea was initially developed by Zelinsky (1971), who linked the several phases
of the demographic transition (from high to low fertility and mortality) and concomi-
tant development processes (which he called the ‘vital transition’) to distinctive phases
in a mobility transition. He argued that there has been a general expansion of individual
mobility in modernizing societies, and that the specific character of migration processes
changes over the course of this transition. While pre-modern societies would be charac-
terized by limited circular migration, Zelinsky (1971) argued that all forms of internal

and international migratory and non-migratory mobility increase in early transitional

societies due to population growth, a decline in rural employment and rapid economic
and technological development. This was the case in early nineteenth-century Britain,
just as it was in late nineteenth-century Japan and Western Europe, in early twentieth
century Italy, Korea in the 1970s and China in the 1980s and the 1990s.
From this perspective, migration is driven by pervasive processes of social transforma-
tion all around the world (see Polanyi 1944). It is necessary to seek the main migratory
impacts of capitalist development in profound transformations in production structures
and labour markets. Particularly since the Industrial Revolution, the fundamental socio-
economic transformation has been that of the massive transfer of economic activities
and population from rural to urban areas, going along with large-scale urbanization as
well as increasing cross-border movement. This was the case in nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century Europe, but also currently in many African, Asian and Latin American
countries.
For instance, in many developing countries, the post-1945 ‘green revolution’ has
involved the introduction of new strains of rice and other crops, which gave higher
yields, but required big investments in fertilizers, pesticides and mechanization. This
contributed to a concentration of land ownership in the hands of wealthy farmers while
mechanization inevitably decreased rural employment. As a consequence, peasants often
lost their livelihoods and agricultural workers their employment, and often migrated into
burgeoning cities like São Paolo, Mexico City, Casablanca, Lagos, Johannesburg, Shanghai,
Calcutta, Manila or Jakarta.
In late transitional societies, international emigration decreases with industrialization,
declining population growth and rising wages, and falling rural-to-urban migration.
As industrialization proceeds, labour supply declines and wage levels rise; as a result,
emigration falls and immigration increases. In ‘advanced societies’ with low population
growth, residential mobility, urban-to-urban migration and circular non-migratory mobil-
ity increase, after which countries transform into net immigration countries.
Figure 3.1 summarizes this non-linear relationship between development and levels
of emigration: the migration transition. Recent studies based on global migration data
confirmed that countries with medium levels of development generally have the high-
est emigration rates (de Haas 2010b;
Clemens 2014) (see Box 3.1). Historical
and contemporary experiences sup- Emigration
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port the idea that development initially

boosts emigration, but that beyond a
certain level of development, societies
Migration

transform from net emigration into net

immigration countries (Massey 2000).
The migration transition of Southern
European countries such as Spain and
Italy (since the 1970s), Asian countries Immigration
such as Malaysia, Taiwan and South
Korea (see DeWind et al. 2012), and Development
more recently Turkey, Brazil and China
seem to fit within this pattern (de Haas Figure 3.1 The migration transition
2010b). Source: de Haas, 2010c

Zelinsky (1971) already envisaged that technological advances do not necessarily

increase migration, but can also remove the need to migrate such as through teleworking
and forms of non-migratory mobility such as commuting, while rural-to-urban migra-
tion tends to slow down when urbanization reaches a certain saturation point. This can
explain decreasing levels of internal migration in high-income countries, although they
generally remain higher than in low-income societies. This highlights the ambiguous
effects of technology on migration and may help to understand why global migration lev-
els have not accelerated despite globalization processes.

Box 3.1 Will development stop migration?

It has often been argued that stimulating development is the only way to reduce
unwanted migration. This is based on the underlying idea that much ‘South–North’
migration is driven by poverty. However, this ignores evidence that most migration
neither occurs from the poorest countries nor from the poorest segments of the
population. According to migration transition theory (Zelinsky 1971; Skeldon 1997),
demographic shifts and economic development initially increase levels of internal
and international migration.
Historical experiences seem to support the idea that societies go through
migration transitions as part of broader development processes. In their
study on large-scale European migration to North America between 1850 and
1913, Hatton and Williamson (1998) found that development initially boosts
emigration. Migration was driven by the mass arrival of cohorts of young
workers on the labour market, increasing incomes and a structural shift of
labour out of agriculture towards the urban sector. The rapidly industrializ-
ing Northwestern European nations initially dominated migration to North
America, with lesser developed Eastern and Southern European nations fol-
lowing suit only later.
However, it has long remained the subject of controversy whether these historical
experiences can be generalized and apply to the contemporary world. Fortunately,
recent advances in data have improved insights about the relationship between devel-
opment and migration. In 2010, newly available global data on migrant populations
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enabled a first global assessment of the relationship between levels of development

and migration (de Haas 2010c). Figure 3.2 shows how levels of emigration and immi-
gration are related to development levels, as measured by the Human Development
Index (HDI). The pattern for immigration is linear and intuitive: more developed
countries attract more migrants. The relation between levels of human development
and emigration is non-linear and counter-intuitive: middle-income countries tend to
have the highest emigration levels.
Later studies using global data covering the 1960–2015 period confirmed that
higher levels of economic and human development are initially associated with
higher levels of emigration. (Clemens 2014; de Haas and Fransen 2018). Only when

Labour frontiers, migration hierarchies and replacement migration

Skeldon (1990; 1997; 2012) elaborated on and amended Zelinsky’s work and applied his
model to actual global migration patterns. The core of his argument was that

there is a relationship between the level of economic development, state formation and
the patterns of population mobility. Very generally, we can say that where these are
high, an integrated migration system exists consisting of global and local movements,
whereas where they are low the migration systems are not integrated and mainly local
(Skeldon 1997: 52).
Percentage of population (%)

16
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Very low Low Middle High Very high
Human development index
Emigrants Immigrants

Figure 3.2 Immigrant and emigrant populations, by levels of development

Source: de Haas, 2010c

countries achieve upper-middle income status, such as has recently been the case
with Mexico and Turkey, does emigration decrease alongside increasing immigra-
tion, leading to their transformation from net emigration to net immigration coun-
tries. Clemens (2014: 6) estimated that, on average, emigration starts to decrease if
countries cross a wealth-threshold of per-capita GDP income levels of $7,000–8,000
(corrected for purchasing power parity), which is roughly the current GDP level of
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India, the Philippines and Morocco.

Development in low-income countries boosts migration because improvements
in income, infrastructure and education typically increase people’s capabilities and
aspirations to migrate. International migration involves significant costs and risks
which the poorest generally cannot afford, while education and access to informa-
tion typically increases people’s aspirations. Middle-income countries therefore tend
to be the most migratory and international migrants predominantly come from
relatively better-off sections of origin populations. Although these are averages that
cannot be blindly applied to individual countries, it seems therefore very likely that
any form of development in low-income countries such as in sub-Saharan Africa will
lead to more emigration in the foreseeable future.

Skeldon distinguished the following global ‘migration and development tiers’:

• The old and new core countries (for example, Western Europe, North America,
Japan, South Korea) characterized by net immigration;
• The expanding core (for example, Eastern China, Southern Africa, Eastern Europe)
with high immigration and emigration as well as rural-to-urban migration;
• The labour frontier (for example, Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Philippines,
Indonesia), which simultaneously experience high emigration and rural-to-urban
migration; and
• The resource niche (for example, many sub-Saharan countries, parts of Central Asia,
Andean countries), with variable, weaker forms of migration and low international
migration (Skeldon 1997).

Skeldon emphasized the functional relations between migration and development tiers.
For instance, the labour frontier countries generating migration to the US and EU tend
to be middle-income, industrializing and urbanization countries such as Mexico, Turkey
and Morocco going through profound social transformations. In such countries, rapid
economic, educational and demographic transitions coincide with a temporary surplus
of educated and ambitious young adults who are often prone to migrate for cultural and
economic reasons. Such countries are also better connected to wealthy countries in terms
of infrastructure and flows of information, capital, goods and tourists. This combination
of factors is likely to foster the emergence of migration systems between such societies.
From this perspective, as countries go through migration transitions and economic core
areas are expanding, the labour frontier is also shifting outward geographically, expand-
ing the ‘catchment areas’ from which migrant workers are coming, either spontaneously
or through recruitment, while new core areas (former labour frontier countries) trans-
form into destinations. In the case of Europe, for instance, since the 1960s and 1970s
the labour frontier has shifted across the Mediterranean, from Southern Europe to the
Maghreb and Turkey. In North America the labour frontier had recently expanded from
Mexico to Central America, and future shifts are plausible.
From this perspective, it is possible to conceptualize global migration patterns as
consisting of multi-layered migration hierarchies, with migrants from middle-income
countries often moving to high-income countries, but with middle-income coun-
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tries attracting migrants from poorer countries in their own right. This goes back to
Ravenstein’s (1885) original observation for Britain that migration from counties sur-
rounding big cities such as London and Manchester leaves gaps in the rural population,
which are subsequently filled by migrants from more remote districts. This results in
complex geographical migration hierarchies, with labour gaps left by people leav-
ing semi-peripheral areas to central areas being filled by migrants from even more
peripheral areas. This can set in motion a chain of interdependent migrations, which
is also known as replacement migration, with immigrants filling the places vacated by
emigrants. Examples include migration from Ukraine and Nepal to Poland in partial
reaction to large-scale Polish emigration to Western Europe, or the emergence of global
care chains, which may for instance involve ‘(1) an older daughter from a poor family
who cares for her siblings while (2) her mother works as a nanny caring for the children
of a migrating nanny who, in turn, (3) cares for the child of a family in a rich country’
(Hochschild 2000: 131; see also Parreñas 2000; Yeates 2004).

The migration hump, development stagnation and migration plateaus

The concept of migration transitions needs to be distinguished from the concept of
migration hump. They are related, but conceptually distinct, concepts. Migration transition
theory focuses on long-term associations between development and migration. The idea
of the migration hump refers to short- to medium-term hikes in emigration in the wake
of trade reforms and other economic shocks. Within the context of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996) argued that
adjustment to new economic market conditions is never instantaneous and may lead to
economic dislocations and rising unemployment. While the negative impacts of liber-
alization (particularly in previously protected sectors such as agriculture through imports
of cheap US agrarian products) are often immediate, they argued that the expansion of
production in sectors potentially favoured by trade reforms always takes time (Martin and
Taylor 1996: 52).
For instance, free trade can drive peasants out of business who cannot compete with
cheap imports of mass-produced agrarian products such as wheat. So, we can expect more
short-term migration even if the long-term effects of free trade would be beneficial. In
line with this argument, evidence suggests that for this reason NAFTA contributed to
increasing migration from Mexico to the US in the first 15–20 years after the enactment
of the trade agreement (Mahendra 2014b).
Migration hump theory can also be applied to fundamental political–economic reforms
or shocks in other contexts, for instance to analyse the migratory consequences of post-
communist reforms in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, the economic
dislocations generated by the sudden shift of political–economic regimes and market
liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 contributed an unprecedented
emigration surge, particularly from countries which dismantled social security systems
(Kureková 2013).
Unequal terms of trade, higher productivity and economics of scale in wealthy countries
may structurally harm the competitiveness of poorer countries, leading to development
stagnation. Under such circumstances, liberalization can lead to further concentration of
economic activities in wealthy countries along with sustained migration of labourers to sup-
port them. This may result in a migration plateau of sustained out-migration (Martin and
Taylor 1996) with may last for generations, which seems to have occurred in countries such
as Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Egypt and the Philippines. Migration transitions may also
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be reversed, if countries transform from net immigration into net emigration countries, as
happened in Argentina and other South American nations over the second half of the twen-
tieth century (see Chapter 7). This shows the continued relevance of historical–structural
theories, as they show that ‘development’ is not inevitable and how global inequalities can
sustain or worsen situations of underdevelopment.
This reveals that transition theories should not be blindly applied to predict the future.
The more general danger of the migration transition and migration hump theories is to
think that development and demographic change automatically leads to certain migration
outcomes or that migration transitions are inevitable or irreversible. There is significant
variation across countries in terms of the levels and composition of immigration and
emigration over their development experiences. It also remains to be questioned whether
and under which conditions the long-term effects of economic liberalization are beneficial
for poorer population groups (see Rodrik 2011). More in general, whether countries will

transform from emigration into immigration countries depends on many factors such
as countries’ positions in the global political economy trade as well as political reform
needed to create the conditions for sustained and equitable development (Castles and
Delgado Wise 2008; Nayar 1994).

The aspirations-capabilities model

Transition theories show how migration is an intrinsic part of broader processes of develop-
ment and social transformation. They argue that the various demographic, economic and
cultural transitions that industrializing, modernizing and urbanizing societies go through
initially tend to boost levels of internal and international migration. But transition theories
are less strong in explaining why people would actually be motivated to migrate when such
development occurs. In order to reach a better understanding of how development processes
shape people’s migration behaviour, it is useful to conceptualize individual migration as a
function of capabilities and aspirations to move (Carling 2002; de Haas 2003).
The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen defined human capability as the ability of
human beings to lead lives they have reason to value, and to enhance the substantive choices
(or ‘freedoms’) they have (Sen 1999). Although Sen did not analyse migration, his framework
can be applied to migration to develop a richer understanding of human mobility (de Haas
2009; 2014a). From this perspective, human mobility enhances people’s capabilities and,
therefore, wellbeing for (1) instrumental (means to an end) and (2) intrinsic (directly wellbeing-
enhancing) reasons. The instrumental dimension is related to the idea that migration is a
resource that enables people to access better opportunities. The intrinsic dimension is the well-
being derived from the awareness of having the freedom to explore new horizons, irrespective
of the question whether people actually use such mobility freedoms (de Haas 2009; 2014a).
Income growth, improved education and improved communication and transport links
increase people’s capabilities to migrate over increasingly large distances. The same fac-
tors are also likely to change notions of the ‘good life’ (for instance, away from agrarian
to urban lifestyles) and increase awareness about opportunities elsewhere. This typically
increases aspirations to migrate as local opportunities no longer match changing cultural
preferences and rising material aspirations. With development, both capabilities and
aspirations to migrate can increase fast (see Figure 3.3), which explains that paradox
that rapid development in low- and lower-middle income societies often coincides with
increasing emigration (de Haas 2003; 2010c).
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Aspirations are a function of people’s general life aspirations and perceived geographi-
cal opportunity structures. If people have broader life aspirations that cannot be fulfilled
at home, this often generates aspirations to migrate. For instance, education in rural areas
tends to increase awareness of alternative, consumerist and urban lifestyles elsewhere –
potentially leading to migration aspirations. As long as aspirations grow faster than the
livelihood opportunities in origin communities, out-migration is likely to continue or
even increase (de Haas 2003; 2014a). This for instance explains the paradox why emigra-
tion from rural Morocco has continued unabatedly despite significant improvements in
living conditions over the past decades (de Haas 2003). In a study on Ethiopia, Schewel
and Fransen (2018) showed that widening access to formal education, even at the primary
level, tends to increase aspirations to leave. Development agendas aiming to keep people
‘on the farm’ (Rhoda 1983) by providing education, building roads or other services seem
therefore based on flawed assumptions about the causes of migration.

However, the relation between develop-

Migration aspirations ment and migration aspirations tends to be
non-linear. While migration capabilities will
further increase with development levels,
migration aspirations are likely to decrease
Migration

beyond a certain level of development,

particularly when opportunity gaps with
Migration capabilities destination countries decrease significantly.
However, for several reasons, migration and
mobility in industrialized countries tend
to remain higher than in pre-industrial,
low-income societies. Besides transport and
Development
communication infrastructure, high levels
Figure 3.3 Hypothetical effect of development of education and occupational specializa-
on capabilities and aspirations to migrate tion generate the migration of people who
Source: de Haas, 2010c seek to match their particular skills and
preferences to particular jobs. The speciali-
zation, segmentation and overall structural
complexity of labour markets typically increase with education and economic develop-
ment, and migration therefore remains an essential mechanism to make demand meet
supply both domestically and internationally. Obviously, this labour market complexity
argument is related to several elements of neo-classical theory, human capital theory,
globalization theory and dual labour market theory reviewed earlier in this chapter. This
shows how different theories can complement each other. Such factors help to under-
stand why high emigration and immigration remain a structural feature of industrialized,
wealthy societies.
Conceptualizing migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to move within
a given set of opportunity structures may also help to bridge certain rather dichotomous
distinctions between migration categories (see Chapter 2). An example is the distinction
between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration. Rather than applying such dichotomous clas-
sifications, it seems more appropriate to conceive of a continuum running from low to
high constraints under which migration occurs, in which all migrants have agency and
deal with structural constraints, although to highly varying degrees (see de Haas 2009). It
also shows the need to see migration as intrinsic well-being enhancing capability, resource
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or freedom, in itself.
Table 3.1 shows the various individual mobility types derived from the aspirations-
capability perspective. This resulting perspective has the advantage of integrating vol-
untary and involuntary mobility as well as movement and non-movement within the
same conceptual framework. From this perspective, people are only voluntarily mobile if
they have both the aspirations and capabilities to move. Many people have the capabili-
ties but do not aspire to move: they are the voluntarily immobile. Schewel (2019) proposed
the category of acquiescent immobility to describe situations in which people are unable to
migrate but also prefer to stay.
From a capabilities perspective, the term ‘forced migration’ may appear to be an oxy-
moron, because refugees need to have a certain level of agency (capabilities) in order to
move. However, as already argued in Chapter 2, refugees are forced migrants because they
have no option to stay. In situations of violent conflict, economic crisis, environmental

Table 3.1 Aspirations and capabilities: Mobility types

Migration capabilities

Low High
Involuntary immobility (Voluntary) mobility
Migration
High (Carling 2002) (most forms of migration)
aspirations
(feeling ‘trapped’)
Voluntary immobility
Acquiescent immobility and
Low
(Schewel 2019) Involuntary mobility
(e.g., refugees)

Source: Adapted from de Haas, 2014a

degradation or natural disaster, the most deprived are typically the ones ‘forced to stay’ –
the involuntarily immobile cannot use migration as resource to cope with adversity and
build resilience (see Lubkemann 2008). The most vulnerable often lack the resources to
flee. In the same vein, restrictive migration policies can decrease capabilities to migrate
among people who aspire to do so, and this can also create situations of involuntary immo-
bility (Carling 2002).
It is only possible to speak about ‘voluntariness’ of mobility or immobility if there was
a reasonable option to stay. We should therefore define human mobility freedoms not by
the criterion of actual movement, but as ‘people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to
live, including the option to stay at home’. The resulting view on migration does not presume
either moving or staying as the norm, but acknowledges that they are the two sides of
the same freedom-of-mobility coin (de Haas 2014a). Within this perspective, people can
still enjoy migration capabilities without ever using them, because it adds to their sense
of freedom. This may be one of the reasons why ‘open borders’ regimes sometimes lead to
surprisingly low (permanent) emigration (see Vezzoli 2015); people who would otherwise
have felt deprived of mobility options are not as obsessed with moving out at the first
occasion as the involuntarily immobile tend to be.
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The internal dynamics of migration processes

While the previous theories focused on the causes of migration and people’s motives to
migrate, another set of theories explain why migration processes, once started, tend to
gain their own momentum over time (Massey et al. 1993). These theories focus on the
social ties that are forged between origin and destination areas through reciprocal flows
of people, information, ideas, money and goods. Most of these theories are interested
in what motivates people and social groups to migrate, how they perceive the world and
how they shape their identity during the migration process. These theories on the internal
dynamics of migration analyse how migrants’ agency leads to the emergence of interme-
diate, meso-level social structures through various feedback mechanisms, as well as the
formation of transnational identities, and how this tends to sustain migration processes
between particular areas and places. These theories underscore how, through their

individual and collective agency, migrants can actively challenge and defy structural con-
straints such as poverty, social exclusion, oppression and migration restrictions.

Migration networks
Macro-structural factors such as warfare, colonialism, conquest, occupation, military service
and labour recruitment, as well as shared culture, language and geographical proximity,
often play a crucial role in the initiation of migration processes (Massey et al. 1998; Skeldon
1997). However, once a critical number of migrants have settled at the destination, other
forces come into play. The choices made by recruiters or pioneer migrants influence the
location choices of subsequent migrants. For instance, research on Mexican migrants in
the 1970s showed that 90 per cent of those surveyed had obtained legal residence in the US
through informal family and employer connections (Portes and Bach 1985).
Migration network theory explains how migrants create and maintain social ties with
other migrants and with family and friends back home, and how this can lead to the
emergence of social networks. Such networks are meso-level social structures which can
facilitate further migration. The idea that migration is a path-dependent process with
interpersonal relations shaping subsequent migration patterns is quite old (see Franz
1939; Lee 1966; Petersen 1958). Earlier scholars used the concept of ‘chain migration’
(Kenny 1962; Price 1963), which has been replaced with the term ‘network migration’ in
recent research literature.
Migrant networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants,
former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of
kinship, friendship and shared community origin (Massey et al. 1993: 448). Migrant net-
works are a form of location-specific social capital that people draw upon to gain access to
resources elsewhere (Massey et al. 1998). Bourdieu (1979; 1985) defined social capital as
‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and
recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group’ (Bourdieu 1985: 248, emphasis
in original French version).
Migrant networks tend to decrease the economic, social and psychological costs of
migration. Migration can therefore be conceptualized as a diffusion process, in which

tion to rise; these trends feed off one another, and over time migration spreads out-
ward to encompass all segments of society. This feedback occurs because the networks
are created by the act of migration itself ... Once the number of network connections
in an origin area reach a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because
migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it. (Massey 1990: 8)

Thus, besides (1) financial and (2) human capital, (3) social capital is a third resource
affecting people’s capabilities to migrate. Already settled migrants often function as
‘bridgeheads’ (Böcker 1994), reducing the risks and costs of subsequent migration and
settlement by providing information, organizing travel, finding work and housing and
assisting in adaptation to a new environment. Migrant groups develop their own social
and economic infrastructure: places of worship, associations, shops, cafés, specialized
services (such as lawyers and doctors speaking migrant languages) and other services.

The formation of a migrant community at one destination therefore increases the likeli-
hood of more migration to the same place.

Migration intermediaries and the ‘migration industry’

The internal dynamics of migration processes embrace non-migrants too: employers
stimulate formal and informal recruitment and seek to retain capable workers. Krissman
(2005) argued that definitions of migration networks should therefore include the
employers who want new immigrant workers, as well as smugglers and other intermedi-
aries that respond to this demand. Once a migratory movement is established, a variety
of needs for special services arise. Researchers have often used the concept of migration
industry when referring to such meso-level structures that go beyond migrant networks.
The ‘migration industry’ would consist of employers, travel agents, recruiters, brokers,
smugglers, humanitarian organizations, housing agents, immigration lawyers and other
intermediaries who have a strong interest in the continuation of migration (see also
Boswell and Geddes 2011: 39–41, 43–50).
Financial institutions have become part of the ‘migration industry’ as well, as
many banks and other companies have established special transfer facilities for remit-
tances. In a larger sense, organizations such as the IOM, the UNHCR and Frontex
(the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), and private companies building and
maintaining border control infrastructure, can also be seen as part of the ‘migration
industry’. For instance, soaring public expenditure on controlling the US–Mexican bor-
der has fuelled a military-industrial complex consisting of arms manufacturers, technol-
ogy firms, (privatized) migrant detention centres, the military and state bureaucracies
involved in deporting people (see Meissner et al. 2013). This in turn has created a huge
parallel market for smugglers helping migrants across the border. In these ways, the
migration control and migration facilitation industries can feed into and reinforce each
other.
The term ‘migration industry’ has been contested because of its negative connotations,
and its frequent association to illicit and profitable aspects of migration facilitation and
control (Olayo-Méndez 2018). An alternative concept is ‘migration intermediaries’, which
can be defined as actors that facilitate, and sometimes drive, migration within and across
borders (Agunias 2009: 2). Although usually cast as exploitative, Agunias argues that such
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

intermediaries can in fact be empowering for migrants:

By providing information and extending critical services in many stages of migra-

tion and in places of origin, transit and destination, legitimate intermediaries build
migrants’ capabilities and expand their range of choice – the very essence of human
development. (Agunias 2009: 2)

Yet their value is, in many cases, ‘overshadowed by the costs they impose on migrants,
from charging exorbitant fees to outright abuse of basic human rights’ (Agunias 2009).
There is rarely a bright line separating legitimate services and reasonable costs on one
hand, and exploitative practices on the other (Agunias 2009: 60). In the same vein, the
role of smugglers is often ambiguous. Contrary to politicians vilifying smugglers as
‘unscrupulous’ criminals, migrants often view smugglers as ‘social bandits,’ if not heroes,

Source: Getty Images/Michael Gottschalk

Photo 3.2 UNHCR tents at Debaga refugee camp for refugees from Mossul in February
2017, Debaga, Iraq

rather than as criminals (Kyle and Liang 2001: 1). Although deceit, abuse and extortion
occur, most smugglers are service providers who have an interest in staying in business
and therefore generally care about their reputation and have a certain interest in deliver-
ing (Pastore et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2018) (see also Chapter 2).
Most literature on ‘migration intermediaries’ focuses on the role of recruiters, smug-
glers and other brokers, such as police officers or bureaucrats seeking to make money
on the side by showing people loopholes in regulations or issuing false documents. But
intermediaries can also include members of migrant communities such as shopkeepers,
priests, teachers and other community leaders. It also includes humanitarian and religious
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organizations which are often active in organizing search and rescue operations, such as
the involvement of Médecins sans Frontières in the Mediterranean Sea, or the network of
shelters across Mexico that provide protection to Central American migrants on their way
to the US (Olayo-Méndez 2018).
The development of dense networks of migration intermediaries is an inevitable
extension of the social networks and transnational linkages which are part of the
migration process. The cost and risk-reducing role of migration networks together
with role of migration intermediaries have often frustrated governments in their
efforts to control migration (Castles 2004) However, governments usually stimulate
the growth of the ‘migration industry’ themselves. Even governments which initiate
labour recruitment rarely provide all of the necessary services. While some countries
use bilateral treaties, others, as the UK, have used private operators to contract guest-
workers (GAO 2006: 21–23). Gulf and East Asian states (Japan, Taiwan and South

Korea) have made considerable use of brokers for migrant labour and (in South Korea)
for marriage migration (Surak 2013). The role of the agents and brokers is vital: with-
out them, many migrants would not have the information or contacts needed for suc-
cessful migration.

Migration systems theory

While migration network theories focus on the role of social capital, migration systems
theory looks at how migration is intrinsically linked to other forms of exchange, nota-
bly flows of goods, ideas and money; and how this changes the initial conditions under
which migration takes place, both in origin and destination societies. The Nigerian
geographer Mabogunje (1970), who pioneered migration systems theory, focused on
the role of flows of information and new ideas (such as on the ‘good life’ and consump-
tion patterns) in shaping migration systems within and across national borders.
A migration system can be defined as a ‘set of places linked by flows and counter-flows
of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange,
including migration, between the places’. Mabogunje stressed the importance of feedback
mechanisms, through which information about the migrants’ reception and progress at
the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin. Favourable information would
then encourage further migration and lead to situations of

almost organized migratory flows from particular villages to particular cities … In many
North-African cities, for instance, it is not uncommon for an entire district or craft
occupation in a city to be dominated by permanent migrants from one or two villages.
(Mabogunje 1970: 13)

Migration systems link people, families and communities over space. This encourages
migration along certain spatial pathways or migration corridors, and discourages it along
others: ‘The end result is a set of relatively stable exchanges; yielding an identifiable
geographical structure that persists across space and time’ (Mabogunje 1970: 12). While
Mabogunje focused on rural–urban migration within Africa, Kritz et al. (1992) and oth-
ers applied this framework to international migration. International migration systems
consist of countries – or rather places within different countries – that exchange relatively
large numbers of migrants, and concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas
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and information (see also Fawcett 1989; Gurak and Caces 1992). Migration systems can
be conceptualized at various levels of analysis. In the South Pacific, West Africa or the
Southern Cone of Latin America we can identify regional migration systems (Kritz et al.
1992). However, more distant regions may also be interlinked, such as the migration
systems embracing the Caribbean, Western Europe and North America; or those linking
Egypt, Sudan, Jordan and Yemen to the Gulf countries.
The key insight of migration systems theory is that one form of exchange between
countries or places, such as trade, is likely to engender other forms of exchange, such as
people, in both directions. Migratory movements generally arise from the existence of
prior links between countries based on colonization, political influence, trade, investment
or cultural ties. Thus migration from Mexico originated in the south-westward expan-
sion of the US in the nineteenth century and the recruitment of Mexican workers by
US employers in the twentieth century (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 354–355), and both

the Korean and the Vietnamese migrations to the US were consequences of US military
involvement (Sassen 1988: 6–9) (see Chapter 7). The migrations from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh to Britain are inextricably linked to the British colonial presence on the Indian
sub-continent (see Chapter 6). But it also works the other way around: large-scale migra-
tion between two countries tends to boost trade, capital flows, investment, travel and
tourism between the same set of countries.

Cumulative causation
In a seminal paper, Massey (1990) reintroduced Myrdal’s (1957) concept of cumulative
causation to express ‘the idea that migration induces changes in social and economic struc-
tures that make additional migration likely’ (Massey 1990: 4–5). We can conceptualize such
broader migration-affected changes in the communities and societies, as ‘contextual feed-
back mechanisms’ (de Haas 2010a), which, in their turn, often have a stimulating effect on
subsequent migration. The money remitted by migrants is a good example. Remittances
can increase income inequality in origin communities, which can subsequently increase
feelings of relative deprivation and, hence, and in line with NELM theory (see above),
migration aspirations among non-migrants. Relative deprivation and migration-facilitating
network effects often reinforce each other, while remittances may also be used to pay for
new journeys. While pioneer migrants are often relatively well-off, such feedback mecha-
nisms can make migration more accessible for poorer groups and lead to a diffusion of
migration within and across communities (de Haas 2010a; Jones 1998a; Massey 1990).
Information is not only instrumental in facilitating migration by increasing people’s
migratory capabilities, but new ideas and exposure to new lifestyles conveyed by migrants
may also change people’s cultural repertoires, preference and aspirations. Levitt (1998)
coined the term social remittances to capture this flow of ideas, behavioural repertoires,
identities and social capital from destination to origin communities (see also Levitt and
Lamba-Nieves 2011). Such forms of cultural exchange can give rise to transnational and
diasporic identities (see Chapter 4) that also tend to encourage migration in established
migration corridors linking particular places and communities.
If migration becomes strongly associated with success, migrating can give rise to a
culture of migration in which migration becomes the norm and staying home is associated
with failure (de Haas 1998; Massey et al. 1993). Such migration-affected cultural change
combined with social remittances can further strengthen migration aspirations. Other
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examples of contextual feedback include the formation of immigrant-specific economic

niches in destination countries which create a specialized demand for co-ethnic work-
ers (for example, Chinese cooks, Kosher or Halal butchers, musicians and clergymen).
Table 3.2 summarizes the main contextual feedback mechanisms which have been iden-
tified in the literature. It also shows the extent to which social, economic and cultural
transformation processes in origin and destination societies associated with migration are
interrelated, highlighting the need to study them together.

Explaining migration system breakdown

Theories on migrant networks, migration intermediaries, migration systems and cumu-
lative causation are useful to understand the crucial role of migrants’ agency in creating
meso-level social, cultural and economic structures which can make migration processes

Table 3.2 Feedback mechanisms perpetuating migration processes

Domain
Level
Social Economic Cultural
Intermediate Migrant networks; Remittance-financed Transfers of
(migrant group) migration migration migration-related ideas
intermediaries, and information
‘Migration
industry’
Origin Social Income distribution, Social remittances;
community stratification productivity and cultures of migration
(contextual) and relative employment
deprivation
Destination Patterns of Demand for migrant Transnational
community clustering, labour generated identities, demand for
(contextual) integration and by clusters of marriage partners from
assimilation migrant busi- origin countries
nesses and sectors
where immigrants
concentrate

Source: Adapted from de Haas, 2010a

self-sustaining. However, these theories also have a number of weaknesses. First, they
cannot explain why most initial migrations by pioneer migrants do not lead to the forma-
tion of migration networks and migration systems (de Haas 2010a). Second, through their
focus on migration-facilitating mechanisms, they also have difficulties explaining the
stagnation and weakening of migration systems over time. After all, In their circular logic,
migration goes on ad infinitum (Böcker 1994; de Haas 2010a; Massey et al. 1998).
They do not specify under what general conditions migrant networks and migration
systems weaken, or migration to new destinations occurs (de Haas 2010a). This shows
the need for a more critical understanding of the role of social capital in migration pro-
cesses (de Haas 2010a). Portes (1998) criticized one-sided, positive interpretations of
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social capital by researchers such as by Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000) by arguing
that strong social capital can also have negative implications, such as exclusion of non-
group members and other outsiders, excessive social and material claims on successful
group members and freedom-restricting pressures for social conformity (Portes 1998).
These ‘downsides’ of social capital can be applied to migration to understand non-
formation and breakdown of migration networks (de Haas 2010a). Tight networks may be
extremely useful in facilitating migration of group members but tend to exclude outsiders.
Particular ethnic, religious or class groups can monopolize the access to migration oppor-
tunities, and thus exclude non-group members. This can explain the limited diffusion
of migration within and across communities. Studies on Somali refugees and Moroccan
migrants showed that constant claims on support from migrants by family and friends
in origin communities, can lead to social distancing and a declining willingness to pro-
vide network assistance (de Haas 2010a; Lindley 2012). This may eventually lead to the

breakdown of networks. Migration assistance does not automatically happen. After all,
migrants have limited resources and might not always see the arrival of more immigrants
as beneficial, particularly if they are perceived to compete for jobs, housing and other
scarce resources. This can explain why settled migrants can evolve from being ‘migration
bridgeheads’ to ‘migration gatekeepers’, who are hesitant or outright reluctant to assist
prospective migrants (Böcker 1994; Collyer 2005), or who may therefore favour restrictive
immigration policies, particularly when new arrivals are perceived to be a threat to group
status.

Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the most important migration theories. One central argu-
ment is that we should conceptualize migration as an intrinsic part of broader processes
of development, social transformation and globalization rather than a ‘problem to be
solved’. Instead of reducing migration to more or less passive responses to poverty and
geographical inequalities, as predicted by push–pull models, neoclassical and historical–
structural theories, social transformation processes associated with industrial–capi-
talist development tend to boost migration by increasing people’s capabilities and
aspirations to move. This highlights the need for a socially embedded understanding of
migration as a normal process, rather than more conventional views of migration as a
largely temporary reaction (and solution) to development disequilibria (in functional-
ist thinking) or even the sign (and cause) of development failure (in historical–struc-
tural thinking). A theoretical understanding of migration also shows the need for more
nuanced views, that neither buy into simplistic optimistic or pessimistic views on
migration, but that have an eye for the complexity of migration processes and the diver-
sity of its causes and impacts.
A second argument is that migration processes have internal dynamics based on
social networks and other contextual feedback mechanisms, which often give migration
processes their own momentum. These internal dynamics are a testimony to the agency
of migrants, leading to the formation of immigrant communities in receiving countries,
the emergence of international networks and the rise of new transnational identities,
which facilitate reverse flows of money (financial remittances) and ideas (social remit-
tances) to origin societies. By lowering social, economic and psychological costs and
risks, such feedback mechanisms can stimulate more migration between particular
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places and countries. In this way, migrants are frequently able to defy and circumvent
government restrictions, often making migration notoriously difficult for governments
to control.
A third argument is that the acknowledgment of migrants’ agency should not obscure
the real constraints migrants face. While theories on networks, migration intermediaries
and migration systems help us to understand how migrants can actively overcome struc-
tural constraints, they cannot explain why not all migrants are eager to help others to
come, how migrants can behave like gatekeepers instead of bridgeheads and why networks
can disintegrate over time. It would also be naïve to assume that migration continues irre-
spective of changes in macro-level conditions such as political transformation, economic
growth or labour market dynamics. Examination of historical and contemporary migra-
tions (see Chapters 5–9) shows that origin and destination states continue to play a major
role in initiating and shaping population movements.

In their seminal survey of migration theories, Massey et al. (1993) argued that the
various theories operate at different levels of analysis and focus on different aspects of
migration, but that they all provide important insights into migration. Insights from
different theories can be useful to understand particular manifestations of migration
occurring in particular contexts or at different levels of analysis. For instance, while neo-
classical theories seem particularly useful to understand much migration of the highly
educated within and among wealthy countries, historical–structural theories and the new
economics of labour migration seem useful to understand migration taking place under
conditions of high constraints, poverty and oppression. It may be possible to perceive
irregular migration between Mexico and the US or between Morocco and the EU as part
of a labour exploitation mechanism on the macro-structural level which mainly benefits
employers, while at the same time acknowledging that, for the migrants themselves, it can
be a rational strategy as remittances may enable them to significantly improve the living
conditions of their families. This example shows the dangers of subscribing to one par-
ticular train of theoretical thought in trying to understand migration.
It is regularly argued that attempts at theorizing migration are futile because migra-
tion is such a diverse and complex process. This is not a very convincing argument,
because, after all, almost all social processes are complex by nature. In fact, the argument
can be turned around: We actually need theories and categories in order to make sense
of complex and ‘messy’ social realities, as they help us to see the ‘wood for the trees’.
Furthermore, complexity does not imply that there are no patterns and that no regulari-
ties can be discerned. One can even argue that migration is actually a strongly patterned
social process, with most people migrating along a select number of specific geographical
pathways as a result of networks and other migration system dynamics.
The different theoretical approaches lead to different ideas for migration policy.
Neoclassical economists sometimes advocate ‘open borders’ and ‘freedom of migration’,
believing that this will increase efficiency and lead to a global equalization of wage levels
and opportunities in the long run. However, critics argue that immigration mainly serves
the interest of capital by depressing wage levels – especially for low-skilled work – and
undermining the bargaining power of trade unions. This is why left-wing parties and
trade unions have historically opposed recruitment of guestworkers and other low-skilled
workers, or demanded safeguards, such as equal pay and conditions so as not to under-
mine the position of local workers. Historical–structural perspectives also argue that
migration deprives poor countries of vital human resources through the brain drain (see
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Chapter 14). This is one of the reasons why, until recently, many countries have tried to
limit or prevent emigration of the skilled.
The new economics and livelihood approaches explain migration occurring within
and from developing countries because of economic insecurity, inequality (relative
deprivation) and market failure. Within this perspective, policies concerned merely
with controlling exit or entry are unlikely to succeed, but origin country governments
could perhaps affect migration indirectly through progressive taxation and other poli-
cies decreasing income inequality and increasing the access of the poor to insurance,
credit, public health, education, state pensions and other social benefits (see also
Massey et al. 1998: 27). As Kureková (2011) has shown for post-communist migration
from Central and Eastern Europe, in middle- to high-income societies social spend-
ing and increased social security may reduce forms of migration that are primarily
driven by inequality and livelihood insecurity. However, as Mahendra (2014a) showed

for Indonesia, cash transfers may increase internal migration in low-income societies
through releasing resource constraints.
Dual labour market theory focuses on the demand-side, emphasizing that migration is
driven by a chronic demand for immigrant labour that is structurally embedded in modern
capitalist economies. Strong employer demand for cheap labour that is easy to control and
exploit (such as undocumented migrants) creates unregulated markets for migrant labour
and opportunities for smugglers and recruitment agents, which, in combination with the
migration-facilitating role of networks, can defy immigration restrictions. Governments
could counteract undocumented migration mainly by increasing labour market regulation,
improving workers’ protection and thereby removing incentives for employing irregular
or temporary workers. However, this may push up labour cost and thus render unviable
various businesses in agriculture, food processing and labour-intensive services.
Network, migration systems and dual labour markets theories help to explain why
migration processes, once set in motion, often gain their own momentum, often frustrat-
ing states’ efforts to control migration (see Chapter 11). This seems particularly true for
liberal democracies, which have limited legal means to prevent migration and settlement,
in particular of family migrants and asylum seekers. World systems, globalization and,
particularly, transition theories argue that labour market dynamics and development
processes drive migration, and that it is very difficult to significantly affect long-term
migration trends, unless states and multinational organizations introduce rather radi-
cal changes in their political and economic systems. The key lesson is perhaps that while
states are in many ways shaping migration processes, this influence is primarily felt
through ‘non-migration’ policies.

Guide to Further Reading

Some valuable overviews of migration theory are available: Massey et al. (1993) is
a seminal review of migration theories. Brettell and Hollifield (2014) survey theo-
retical contributions across a broad range of disciplines. Massey et al. (1998) give
a comprehensive overview of theories and development impacts of migration.
Skeldon’s (1997) Migration and Development is essential reading for those wishing
to understand how development drives migration. Hatton and Williamson’s (1998)
book illustrates how massive migrations from Europe to North America in the late
Copyright © 2019. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were embedded in demographic and socio-
economic transformation processes on either side of the Atlantic. Important col-
lections on migration theory can be found in special issues of the Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies (Castles et al. 2010; Carling and Collins 2018) and Population,
Space and Place (Smith and King 2012).
Sassen (1988) gives an original perspective on the political economy of migra-
tion, while Borjas (1990; 2001) presents the neoclassical view. Stark (1991) offers
a comprehensive introduction to the new economics of labour migration, while
Stark and Bloom (1985) provide a useful summary. Carling (2002) introduces the
concept of involuntary immobility, while de Haas (2009; 2014a) provides introduc-
tions to the aspirations-capabilities model. Massey (1990) provides an introduction

into cumulative causation theory. De Haas (2009) reviews theories on the internal
dynamics of migration processes.
Students are encouraged to read classic theoretical texts which are still surpris-
ingly relevant. Ravenstein’s (1885; 1889) pioneering articles which analyse British
and West-European migration are still useful to gain a foundational understand-
ing of migration patterns and the history of migration research. Building upon
Ravenstein’s work, Lee’s (1966) Theory of Migration provides a concise, well-written
and useful introduction into key patterns of migration. Mabogunje (1970) provides
a useful introduction into migration systems theory, primarily based on African
examples. Zelinsky’s (1971) Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition provides a com-
prehensive overview into how demographic transitions and modernization have
reshaped migration and mobility patterns. Piore’s (1979) Birds of Passage is one
of the best books ever written about migration, explaining why the demand for
migrant labor is structurally built in the economies of industrialized countries.

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Haas, Castles and Miller 2020

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Haas, Castles and Miller 2020

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3 Theories of Migration

• On the macro-level, as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and

• Macro- and micro-level theories on the causes of migration; and

Explaining the migratory process

Neoclassical migration theory

Human capital theory

Critique of functionalist theories

theories are often incapable of explaining real-life migration patterns, particularly if

Historical–structural theories see migration as one of the manifestations of capi-

Historical–structural theories criti-

Dependency and world systems theory

ing up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life’ (Held

Critique of historical–structural approaches

Conceptualizing migratory agency

Dual labour market

through neoliberal reforms and the concomitant de-regularization of labour markets,

interests by creating a vulnerable and docile workforce. In this perspective, politicians’

New economics and household theory approaches

Migration transition theories

The migration transition

an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and social transformation associ-

and international migratory and non-migratory mobility increase in early transitional

port the idea that development initially

transform from net emigration into net

Zelinsky (1971) already envisaged that technological advances do not necessarily

Box 3.1 Will development stop migration?

enabled a first global assessment of the relationship between levels of development

Labour frontiers, migration hierarchies and replacement migration

Figure 3.2 Immigrant and emigrant populations, by levels of development

India, the Philippines and Morocco.

Skeldon distinguished the following global ‘migration and development tiers’:

The migration hump, development stagnation and migration plateaus

The aspirations-capabilities model

However, the relation between develop-

beyond a certain level of development,

Table 3.1 Aspirations and capabilities: Mobility types

Source: Adapted from de Haas, 2014a

The internal dynamics of migration processes

Migration intermediaries and the ‘migration industry’

intermediaries can in fact be empowering for migrants:

By providing information and extending critical services in many stages of migra-

Source: Getty Images/Michael Gottschalk

Migration systems theory

examples of contextual feedback include the formation of immigrant-specific economic

Explaining migration system breakdown

Table 3.2 Feedback mechanisms perpetuating migration processes

Source: Adapted from de Haas, 2010a

Guide to Further Reading

Extra resources can be found at: www.age-of-migration.com

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