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Provided by Archive of European Integration No. 75
June 2016
The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European
Characteristics
Sven Biscop
On 28 June 2016 High Representative First of all, the EUGS introduces a new overall
Federica Mogherini presented the Global approach to foreign and security policy, which
Strategy for the European Union’s can be read as a correction on the 2003
European Security Strategy (ESS) that preceded it.
Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to
“The best protection for our security is a
the European Council. Many pundits world of well-governed democratic states”, we
will present it as another example of said in 2003. Unfortunately, spreading good
Brussels’ otherworldliness to table an governance and democracy proved more
external strategy just a few days after the difficult than expected, and when their
UK created a huge internal challenge by absence provoked crises, we did not always
voting to leave the Union. But would it muster the will and the means to respond.
Where the ESS proved to be overoptimistic
have demonstrated a better sense of
(and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper
reality to pretend that because of the said), the EUGS is more conscious of the
British decision to put a stop to its EU limits imposed by our own capabilities and by
membership the world around Europe others’ intractability, and therefore more
will come to a stop as well? The EU modest. It charts a course between
needs the EUGS and that “is even more isolationism and interventionism, between
true after the British referendum”, as “dreamy idealism and unprincipled
pragmatism”, as I put in a 2014 policy brief, 1
Mogherini rightly says in the foreword.
under the new heading of what the EUGS
Many will also gladly find fault with the now calls “principled pragmatism”.
document, looking for the deficiencies.
But it is the strategy now. Therefore the This represents a return to Realpolitik. Not
question is not what it could have said Realpolitik as it has come to be understood,
that it doesn’t, but whether it gives us the end justifying the means, but Realpolitik in
the original sense of the term. As John Bew
something to work with to render EU
usefully reminds us, Realpolitik as coined by
foreign and security policy more the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in
effective. The answer is: yes, and quite a 1853 meant a rejection of liberal utopianism,
lot. Having gotten that out of the way, but not of liberal ideals themselves. Rather, “it
we can move on to the substance of the held out a vision of the future and a guide for
EUGS. how to get there”, for how to achieve those
ideals in a realistic way.2 Or, as the EUGS has
it, “responsible engagement can bring about
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
positive change”. This, says Bew, is the “real range of our capabilities. It is defined very
Realpolitik”; given that other actors still pursue broadly though, going beyond what Brussels
the Machiavellian version, let’s call it now often calls the “neighbours of the
Realpolitik with European characteristics. neighbours”: “to the east stretching into
Central Asia, and south down to Central
The fact that for the first time ever an EU Africa”. Stabilizing this part of the world is no
document lists our vital interests (which is a mean task, yet the EUGS achieves the right
breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of balance for it does not ignore the challenges in
this new approach. Policy is about interests; if Asia (“There is a direct connection between
isn’t, no one will invest in it. That applies to European prosperity and Asian security”) and
the EU as much as to a state, and: “There is at the global level (such as the freedom of the
no clash between national and European global commons).
interests”. The vital interests that the EUGS
defines are vital to all Member States: the Second, there is much less emphasis on
security of EU citizens and territory; democracy. In line with the November 2015
prosperity (which, the EUGS states, implies Joint Communication on the future of the
equality – otherwise we would indeed not be European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
talking about the prosperity of all citizens); (though the EUGS looks at a broader region),4
democracy; and a rules-based global order to democratization no longer is a compulsory part
contain power politics. Setting these interests of the package. The EU will support
off against the analysis of the global democracies where they emerge, for “their
environment that Mogherini presented to the success […] would reverberate across their
European Council in June 2015,3 the EUGS respective regions” – but in our broad
identifies five priorities: (1) the security of the neighbourhood it only mentions Tunisia and
EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to Georgia as positive examples. As many others
deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional don’t wish closer relations with the EU, the
orders across the globe; and (5) effective EUGS puts the emphasis on reducing the
global governance. fragility of these states rather than on changing
their regimes, for which we have but limited
PRIORITIES FOR PRINCIPLED leverage. But since many of our neighbours are
PRAGMATISM “repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in
the long term”, that requires targeting civil
The way to pursue the first three priorities society instead. The aim is to increase the
especially clearly reflects the modesty or resilience of people and societies, notably by
realism imposed by “principled pragmatism”, fighting poverty and inequality, so that over
by emphasizing our own security, the time home-grown positive change can emerge.
neighbourhood, and hard power, and by no Just like in the Joint Communication, it is not
longer emphasizing democratization. entirely clear where the funds for this will
come from.
First, there is a strong focus on Europe’s own
security (which was much less present in the Lowering the level of ambition in terms of
ESS) and on the neighbourhood: “We will take democratization is but the acceptance of
responsibility foremost in Europe and its reality. This is all about being honest with
surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted ourselves. The EU cannot democratize Egypt,
engagement further afield”. Following the so it should not pretend to. At the same time,
terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the it should then also not feel obliged to pretend
refugee crisis that is visible across Europe, that the Al-Sisi regime is a great friend – it is
addressing our internal and border security not. But we maintain diplomatic relations with
was indispensable for the EUGS to be credible (nearly) everybody, not just with our friends,
with citizens and Member States alike. The and we work with (nearly) everybody where
focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the interests coincide. As long as they are there, we
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2
can indeed be obliged to work with Furthermore, our efforts “should enable the
authoritarian regimes in order to address EU to act autonomously while also
urgent problems; the anti-IS coalition is a case contributing to and undertaking actions in
in point. The EUGS doesn’t say much about cooperation with NATO”. This can be read as
this dimension: how to work with regimes, in the EU constituting the European pillar that
line with “principled pragmatism”, without allows its Member States to act with the US
further strengthening their hold on power? where possible and without US assets when
necessary (which could actually also be through
This question demonstrates that resilience is a NATO, the UN or an ad hoc coalition as well
tricky concept to be used in this context. as the EU itself).
Increasing the resilience of a state against
external threats can easily lead to increasing the The ends to which the EU should apply this
resilience of a repressive regime. While we “strategic autonomy” (as Mogherini calls in in
have to be modest about our ability to change the foreword) are spread throughout the text.
regimes, we should not be propping them up First, “this means living up to our
either. It makes sense therefore for the EUGS commitments to mutual assistance and
to simultaneously advocate capacity-building solidarity”, i.e. Articles 42.7 TEU and 222
and the reform of the justice, security and TFEU. Second, where conflict is ongoing, the
defence sectors, as well as human rights EU should “protect human lives, notably
protection. The strong emphasis on human civilians” and “be ready to support and help
rights (which is indeed to be distinguished consolidate local ceasefires”, presumably in the
from democratization) is indispensable, for it is broad neighbourhood as a matter of priority.
often against their own governments that This is an ambitious undertaking, for it entails
people have to be resilient. But can we deliver deploying troops on the ground, with serious
on that promise? Perhaps fighting inequalities firepower, who are backed up by serious air
would have been a better heading for the new support and ready reserves, and who don’t
strategy towards our eastern and southern necessarily seek out and destroy an opponent
neighbours than resilience (the meaning of but who will fight when the civilians for whom
which is not really clarified by the introduction they are responsible are threatened. Third, the
of “energy and environmental resilience”). EU “is seeking to make greater practical
contributions to Asian security”, including in
By the way, if the EU wants to be more honest the maritime area. Finally, the EU “could assist
with itself, then (the Balkans excepted) “a further and complement UN peacekeeping” as
credible enlargement policy” does not really a demonstration of its belief in the UN as “the
have a place in the section on the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order”.
neighbourhood, for enlargement no longer is a
credible project, least of all for Turkey. These are more than sufficient elements to
translate the EUGS into a revised military level
Third, there is a much stronger awareness of of ambition in “a sectoral strategy, to be agreed
the indispensability of a credible military by the Council” – into a white paper, in other
instrument. “Soft and hard power go hand in words, that should kick-start more cooperation
hand”, Mogherini rightly says in the foreword. and even integration in defence. The EUGS
The EUGS has not rediscovered geopolitics also offers guidelines on how to do that: “an
per se – the ESS already stated that “even in an annual coordinated review process at EU level
era of globalisation, geography is still to discuss Member States’ military spending
important” – but more than the ESS it plans”. Or, as an earlier draft had it, a
recognizes that some powers don’t hesitate to European semester on defence.
use blackmail and force in what they consider
to be a geopolitical competition. Hence the
ambition “to protect Europe, respond to
external crises, and assist in developing our
partners’ security and defence capacities”.
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 3
AN AMBITIOUS DIPLOMATIC dealing with conflicts and crises, the third
PROGRAMME priority. In contrast with the ambitious
(though perhaps not fully realized) military
Of the remaining two priorities, the focus on implications of the goal to protect civilians, the
“cooperative regional orders” also reflects the EUGS appears rather reactive on the
awareness of ongoing geopolitical competition diplomatic front. When peace agreements are
between different global and regional powers. reached, the EU will support them and provide
The intention to ensure a coherent response to security, but when they are not, the EUGS
China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative not just seems to prioritize the local level. To take the
through the EU-China Connectivity Platform case of Syria: brokering local ceasefires will
(to create the link with the EU’s own investment save people (if they are guaranteed militarily),
plans) but through ASEM and the EU-ASEAN but ultimately only diplomatic success in
partnership as well could signal the start of a Geneva will end the war. The EU actually is
sophisticated diplomatic initiative. In the same good at diplomacy, and the EUGS refers at
vein, the aim to deepen dialogue with Iran and several instances to the successful example of
the GCC countries ought to be the beginning of the Iran nuclear negotiations, so it could have
a new vision on the future regional order in the been more ambitious in this area.
Middle East, though the EUGS itself could have
offered more guidance already. After all, there is CONCLUSION: TO WORK
not one but several wars ongoing in an area that
clearly falls within the neighbourhood in which The EUGS is a strategy, and strategies have to
the EU ought to assume responsibility. This will be translated into sub-strategies, policies and
also be one of the issues (though it is not among action to achieve their objectives. Unlike in
the examples explicitly listed in the EUGS) on 2003, the EUGS itself already provides the
which the EU will have to cooperate with linkage to what should become a systematic
Russia, while making “substantial changes in process of implementation and review. First, it
relations” dependent on Russia’s respect for calls for a prompt decision on “clear
international law. On Russia, the EUGS basically procedures and timeframes” for the revision of
advocates strategic patience. existing and design of new sectoral strategies.
Second, it announces an annual reflection on
The fifth priority puts global governance firmly the state of play, “pointing out where further
back on the EU agenda, after “effective implementation must be sought”, though not a
multilateralism” (as the ESS phrased it) had systematic overall review. “A new process of
more or less disappeared from the radar screen. strategic reflection will be launched whenever
Now the EUGS ambitiously sets out “to the EU and its Member States deem it
transform rather than simply preserve the necessary”, so not automatically every five
existing system”, which will indeed be necessary years, for every legislature.
to prevent “the emerging of alternative
groupings to the detriment of all”. Under this For this scheme to succeed, it is crucial that it
heading as well, an ambitious programme on be firmly anchored institutionally, not just
free trade (envisaging FTAs with the US, Japan, within the EEAS but in the Commission as
Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others) and on the well. Of course, the High Representative has
freedom of the global commons could herald a the main ownership of the EUGS and will
creative diplomatic initiative – and a more assure overall coordination and initiative. But
strategic use of EU trade policy, which ought to which body, including Commission and EEAS
be as embedded in overall strategy as it is in the officials, will monitor implementation and
US. prepare the annual state of play? (Analogous to
the National Security Council in the US, which
Of course, the EUGS does also show some not only coordinates the drafting of the
deficiencies. Most eye-catching is the curious National Security Strategy but also monitors
lack of diplomatic ambition when it comes to whether all relevant subsequent documents
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 4
comply with its approach). And, most crucially,
will the Member States feel ownership of the
EUGS? Mogherini will obviously drive
implementation, but if it is only her, it cannot
work. And implementing this ambitious Strategy
will demand a serious drive.
This is where the Brexit will have the most
impact on the EUGS. Not on substance: the
analysis of the environment, the definition of
our vital interests, and the identification of our
priorities do not change because we will be one
Member State fewer. But, unfortunately, it will
have a negative impact on the capacity for
delivery. For one, the EU has quite simply lost
face – and face is important in diplomacy. The
credibility and persuasiveness of any EU
initiative will be undermined by the fact that one
of the three biggest Member States has just
decided to leave. And, unlike the High
Representative in her preface, I am less
confident that “we are the best in this field” of
soft power. Furthermore, the UK can no longer
directly contribute its impressive diplomatic and
military clout to EU foreign and security policy.
What options there are to bring it to bear
indirectly will have to be explored.
Nevertheless, Federica Mogherini is absolutely
right when she says: “A fragile world calls for a
more confident and responsible European
Union”. Even though the EU itself is somewhat
more fragile now than in 2003. Hiding inside for
fear of the world around us will not solve
anything however, whereas “responsible
engagement can bring about positive change”.
Hence: to work.
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is the Director of the
Europe in the World Programme at Egmont
and teaches at Ghent University and at the
College of Europe in Bruges. He is an
Honorary Fellow of the European Security
and Defence College.
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5
Endnotes
1
Sven Biscop, EU Foreign Policy Between the Revolution and the Status Quo. Policy Brief No. 9.
Brussels, Institute for European Studies, 2014, http://www.ies.be/files/2014_9_PB.pdf.
2
John Bew, Realpolitik. A History. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 28.
3
Federica Mogherini, The European Union in a Changing Global Environment. A More Connected,
Contested and Complex World. Brussels, EEAS, 2015,
4
European Commission & High Representative, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint
Communication JOIN (2015) 50 final. Brussels, EU, 2015.
