Pages from gii 2016 -- the age of innovation diplomacy

91
THEGLOBALINNOVATIONINDEX2016 4:InnovatingTogether?TheAgeofInnovationDiplomacy
InnovatingTogether?TheAgeofInnovationDiplomacy
Kirsten Bound, Nesta, United Kingdom
CHAPTER 4
As the globalization of science and
innovation intensifies, policy mak-
ers around the world are looking for
new ways to shape and influence its
dynamics.
Until recently, these efforts have
focused on science diplomacy: enabling
international scientific research
partnerships and influencing foreign
policies with scientific evidence and
advice. However, there is a grow-
ing interest in facilitating interna-
tional collaboration on innovation,
with a range of new collaborative
approaches emerging.
At first blush, these efforts at
innovation diplomacy look merely like
a continuation of science diplomacy
into a somewhat more commercial
arena. Yet this is precisely what makes
international collaboration more
complex: thorny questions need to
be resolved about which parties in the
relationship are capturing the com-
mercial as well as the public benefits.
This is not to say that collaborating
on innovation is a zero-sum game; on
the contrary, such collaboration often
results in strong mutual advantages.
However, recent experience has
shown that policy makers, businesses,
and other stakeholders need a more
sophisticated approach to assessing the
risks and opportunities found at every
stage of the innovation value chain.
This chapter describes the shift
from science diplomacy to innova-
tion diplomacy, drawing attention
to the new challenges encountered
and the new skillsets required. It
then highlights the range of ini-
tiatives implemented by policy
makers around the world to shape
these dynamics for both national
and mutual interest. Finally, it sets
out steps that policy makers need
to put in place for a more effective
approach to innovation diplomacy
in the future.
From science diplomacy to innovation
diplomacy
Diplomats have never really had a
monopoly on influencing interna-
tional relations. The power of the
international scientific community
to shape international relationships,
for instance—from sidestepping
politics to helping avoid military
conflict—has been demonstrated
as early as the 18th century. The
United Kingdom (UK)’s Royal
Society appointed its first Foreign
Secretary in 1723, nearly 60 years
before the British government cre-
ated an equivalent post.1
Yet there is no doubt that sci-
ence has become an ever more
important force for intermediating
global relations in recent decades. In
their analysis of the trend, the Royal
Society outlines three different ways
in which governments have sought
to support and shape these collabora-
tive relationships:2
• informing foreign policy objec-
tives with scientific advice (sci-
ence in diplomacy);
• facilitating international science
cooperation (diplomacy for sci-
ence); and
• using scientific cooperation to
improve international relations
between countries (science for
diplomacy).
Although science diplomacy
may have multiple objectives, it is
most commonly couched in the
language of global public goods.
A former Chief Scientific Advisor
at the US State Department (a role
first created in 2001, and one that
has since been replicated by many
countries around the world) defined
‘science diplomacy’ as ‘the use of sci-
entific interactions among nations to
address the common problems fac-
ing humanity and to build construc-
tive, knowledge based international
partnerships.’3
The international networks and
institutions used for science diplo-
macy have grown significantly
in profile and professionalism in
recent years: from the annual G7
meeting of science ministers last
held in Berlin in October 2015 and
the first World Summit of official
government scientific advisers held
in Auckland in 2014 to the creation
of a new Scientific Advisory Board
to the UN.4
Yet as science has become ever
more a global endeavour, so has inno-
vation—notjustwiththerelocationof
multinational corporation R&D, but

92
also with the globalization of many
kinds of value chains and the ability
to commercially exploit discoveries
ever further from their origin.
In response, a shift is under way to
move beyond the traditional agendas
of science diplomacy—which are
often operationalized by promoting
academic research collaborations—
to the more expansive and at times
treacherous terrain of innovation
diplomacy. In this diplomacy, col-
laborative opportunities and risks
need to be assessed across every link
in the innovation value chain.5
Although there is no agreed defi-
nition of ‘innovation diplomacy’, the
term is widely considered to include
publicly funded support for the fol-
lowing four types of activities:
• exerting soft power and influ-
ence through the attractiveness
(to talent, ideas, and investment)
of a nation, region, or cluster as
an innovation hub;
• developing early-stage interna-
tional pre-commercial and com-
mercial partnerships between
businesses, or between businesses
and universities, that sow the
seeds for future national economic
growth and competitiveness;
• creating the framework con-
ditions (intellectual property
regimes, migration rules, trade
conditions, and information
about opportunities and threats)
for regional and global innova-
tion partnerships to flourish; and
• encouraging and enabling collab-
orations between public, private,
and non-governmental actors to
address global grand challenges
from health pandemics to climate
change.
Innovation policy initiatives
are already undertaken under con-
ditions of ‘radical uncertainty’.6
International collaboration adds a
host of additional challenges that
range from contrasting national
intellectual property regimes and
enforcement capabilities and shifts
in the alignment of incentives
and interests between public and
private actors acting overseas to
unequal national abilities to absorb
and exploit the results of partner-
ships. Although most innovation
diplomacy initiatives are at least
intended to allow partners to reap
mutual advantage, some analysts
have warned of a growing trend in
‘innovation mercantilism’ in which
countries try to exploit international
collaborations and trade scenarios to
boost domestic innovation capac-
ity—for example, through forced
technology transfer or discrimina-
tory public procurement.7
Innovation diplomacy should
not be seen merely as an ‘add-on’ to
science diplomacy, but as a distinct
set of activities and capabilities. The
next section looks at how different
countries are undertaking innova-
tion diplomacy.
How policy makers around the world
approach innovation diplomacy
Despite a dearth of published strate-
gies for innovation diplomacy, the
number of bilateral and multilateral
dialogues, networks, programmes,
and funds designed to boost inter-
national innovation collaborations
is growing all the time.
A toolkit of practical initiatives
for innovation diplomacy is emerg-
ing that reaches beyond the realm
of foreign affairs to engage several
different ministries. For example:
• Incentivizing collaboration
through new funding oppor-
tunities. Examples include col-
laborative R&D partnerships—
both independent bilateral
funds and matched funding for
bilateral R&D partnerships—
which are gradually becoming
more common. MATIMOP, the
Israeli Industry Centre for R&D,
operates over 40 of these inter-
national partnerships.8
• Influencing policy frameworks
and conditions. For example,
policy dialogues can take mul-
tiple forms, from innovation pol-
icy and intellectual property dia-
logues to chief executive forums
or joint economic and trade
commissions. They can often
proliferate—which requires
coordination, as seen recently
with the latest approach to refin-
ing and consolidating the US-
India Strategic and Commercial
Dialogue in September 2015.9
• Improving access to informa-
tion and capabilities. Inter-
national institutional networks
are an example. International-
izing institutional footprints has
become a common strategy for
leading global universities and
research institutes. This has been
far less true for publicly funded
organizations that focus on inno-
vation support. Germany’s net-
work of Fraunhofer Institutes,
with bases in over a dozen coun-
tries beyond Europe, is a notable
exception.10
• Clarifying national priorities
and objectives for innovation
to chosen partners. Examples
would include published regional
or national strategies. Despite the
obvious benefit in helping dip-
lomats craft engagement mod-
els, these formal strategies are
extremely rare. The political
challenges to implementing this
type of long-term strategy are
exemplified by the fact that one
of the best-known instances of
this kind of strategy, Australia in
the Asian Century,11 developed

93
in 2012 under Prime Minis-
ter Julia Gillard, was ‘officially
dumped’ a year after its release
by Tony Abott’s government.12
• Addressing cross-border inno-
vation challenges. Examples
include building global coali-
tions: These are often facilitated
by multilateral or non-govern-
mental actors. Notable recent
efforts include Mission Innova-
tion, a commitment by 20 coun-
tries and a host of leading indus-
trialists at the United Nations
Climate Change Conference in
Paris (COP 21) held in Novem-
ber 2015 to work together to
accelerate the green energy revo-
lution.13
The case of the UK
Some countries have taken very
visible steps to improve their abil-
ity to shape and influence global
science and innovation relation-
ships and outcomes. A case in point
is the UK. The UK boasts one of
the most highly internationalized
systems of science and innovation
in the world. Approximately 46%
of the UK’s scientific publications
have an international co-author, and
an exceptionally high proportion of
UK business R&D is funded from
abroad.14
The last 10 years have seen a sig-
nificant increase in the UK’s efforts
to build capabilities for influencing
and enabling international collabo-
ration on science and innovation.
Part of this is the result of greater
information sharing. The Global
Science and Innovation Forum, for
instance, chaired by the UK gov-
ernment’s chief scientific advisor,
helps coordinate the various efforts
of UK ministries, funding bodies,
academies, and government-funded
agencies. Part of this is the result of
growing infrastructure—for exam-
ple, the UK’s Network of Science
and Innovation attachés has grown
to over 90 staff, based in embas-
sies and consulates in 28 countries
and 47 cities around the world,
and is supplemented by an inter-
national network of IP experts.15
Additionally, in a move that would
have been seen as countercultural
to the UK’s bottom-up approach to
science in the past, the UK research
funding body Research Councils
UK now has several permanent
overseas offices, including in India
and China.
One of the biggest shifts, how-
ever, has been in the creation of sig-
nificant new funds to enable global
collaborations not only in research,
but also in innovation. One example
is the Newton Fund. Launched in
2014, this fund originally commit-
ted £75 million a year for five years
to support collaboration with 15
emerging economies in three types
of activity:
• People: increasing capacity in
science and innovation, individ-
ually and institutionally, in part-
ner countries;
• Research: establishing research
collaborations on development
topics; and
• Translation: translating science
into commercial activities and
creating collaborative solutions
to development challenges and
strengthening innovation sys-
tems.
In 2015, the Newton Fund was
extended by two years (from 2019
to 2021) while the UK’s annual
commitment to the fund was set to
double—from £75 million per year
to £150 million per year by 2021—
leading to an overall investment
of £735 million, with partner coun-
tries expected to provide matched
resources.
A similar level of ambition is
displayed by the 2015 commitment
from the UK’s Foreign Office to
create a £1.3 billion Prosperity
Fund over the next five years to
‘promote the economic reform and
development needed for growth’ in
priority partner countries.16
The case of China
Another notable case is that of
China. China’s approach to inter-
national collaboration as a whole is
increasingly strategic.17 Ever since it
began the process of opening up in
1978, foreign policy has been used
to advance economic development.
Morerecently,anintensifyingwebof
international connections has spread
across every aspect of China’s inno-
vation system— from joint academic
research to technology transfer and
licensing, foreign direct investment,
and mergers and acquisitions.18 As
a result, the Chinese innovation
system is now densely connected to
sources of expertise elsewhere. One
thing that distinguishes China’s
innovation pathway from that of
Japan or the Republic of Korea is its
willingness, where necessary, ‘to buy
expertise off the shelf’.19 Time and
again, examples of highly targeted
collaborations in research and inno-
vation are evident.20 As Adam Segal,
a China expert at the US Council
on Foreign Relations, outlined in
his testimony to Congress, ‘One of
China’s great strengths has been a
laser-like focus on shaping foreign
interactions to serve national inno-
vation goals.’21
Steps towards a more effective and
impactful approach to innovation
diplomacy
Although it is possible to discern
a broad range of strategies and a
growing prioritization of innovation
diplomacy in many countries, it is far

94
harder to be clear about what works—
and about the specific link between
a particular intervention and its
outcome. Evaluating diplomatic
initiatives is notoriously difficult.
Their influence is often indirect and
very long term. However, instead
of waiting for a future historian’s
account of the impact of innovation
diplomacy, it is useful to consider
whether it is possible (1) to construct
a better framework for analysis by
identifying the players and prin-
ciples of innovation diplomacy; (2)
to identify and improve the range of
tools and public initiatives in ques-
tion and determine how they map
onto different strategic goals; and (3)
to consider whether the right data
are being collected to judge what is
working.
First, it is clear that innovation
diplomacy is not merely a subset of
science diplomacy. Because of this,
policy makers need to be cautious
about applying the approaches of
science diplomacy to innovation
diplomacy. Acknowledging the
wider range of players (and therefore
interests and incentives) involved is a
first step. These players include:
• national innovation agencies,
which are playing a greater role
as their initiatives become more
internationalized;22
• companies, both large and small,
with wide-ranging risk appe-
tites as well as widely varied pre-
paredness and commitments to
corporate nationality;23
• philanthropic and powerful non-
governmental organizations,
such as the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation; and
• new supranational or multilat-
eral bodies—such as the EU’s
proposed European Innovation
Council—which stem from a
recognition that current science
diplomacy initiatives do not meet
the needs of small and medium-
sized enterprises or provide suf-
ficient support to scaling.24
Second, investment must be
made in mapping, evaluating, and
improving the toolkit of public pro-
grammes, exploiting what has been
learned about successfully promoting
open innovation in recent decades.
Much of the focus of international
economic relations to date has been
on the overall enabling conditions,
legal frameworks, and trade agree-
ments, with efforts to connect
individuals often limited to one-
off workshops and trade missions.
However, support to build relation-
ships and trust over time can be
critical to the success of innovation
partnerships.25 As Nick Rousseau,
former Head of Innovation Strategy
at the UK’s Department of Business
Innovation and Skills, points out,
‘We need to build skills and relation-
ships across governments to facilitate
the human side of innovation diplo-
macy, including recognition of the
extensive time and effort involved
in reaching agreement about shared
priorities across such a diverse range
of stakeholders and perspectives.’26
Given what has been learned
about the complementary invest-
ments in innovation required to
exploit R&D spending (such as
design, organizational learning, and
training),27 innovation diplomacy
initiatives should not be limited to
forging R&D partnerships.
Indeed, one of the most valuable
aspects of innovation diplomacy
initiatives could be to improve the
quality and flow of information to
companies, universities, and policy
makers about the new opportunities
and dynamics of innovation around
the world. By now, the tropes of
globalization are entirely familiar:
these include the emergence of
transnational production and inno-
vation chains; the growing flows
of people, goods, money, and ideas
through multiple networks; the
shift of economic and hard power
towards new strategic centres; and
the growing importance of soft
power, culture, and people-to-
people connections in shaping the
evolution and performance of dif-
ferent communities. Policy makers
and companies are getting used to
the idea that disruptive technologies
and business models could arise from
and be exploited by any number of
emerging innovation hubs. There is
constant analysis of what these new
forms of power mean—from social
media storms that could topple dic-
tators to new business models and
methods that range from Uber to 3D
printing that might eclipse existing
industries. Yet this analysis veers
from wildly romanticized to danger-
ously underestimated. Innovation
diplomacy efforts could support a
more balanced analysis that helps
companies and other stakeholders
make better strategic decisions about
innovation investment and collabo-
ration around the world.
Third, and finally, if ‘what gets
measured gets done’, it is important
to ensure that the right things are
being measured. That has implica-
tions for how innovation diplomacy
efforts are tracked and evaluated.
Policy makers need to invest in
their theory of change for innova-
tion diplomacy, and they need to
get far better at articulating desired
goals and outcomes. Standard met-
rics such as joint publications and
joint patents are only one part of
the story of judging the impact of
collaboration, while even metrics
like the number of joint ventures
agreed are in danger of being lag-
ging indicators that provide infor-
mation only at an advanced stage.
What is required is to see how

95
relationships are blossoming early
on, in real time, using innovative
sources of data such as web scraping,
social media, and collaboration plat-
forms (such as GitHub in software
development)—these better reflect
the wider intangible investments in
relationships beyond formal R&D,
and thus eventually lead to successful
innovation outcomes.
Notes
1 Royal Society, 2010.
2 Royal Society, 2010.
3 Royal Society, 2010, p. 2.
4 See G7 Germany, 2015; the International
Network for Government Science Advice,
available at http://www.ingsa.org/; and
UNESCO, 2014.
5 Wilsdon et al., 2013.
6 Bakhshi et al., 2011.
7 Atkinson, 2013.
8 Information about MATIMOP is available at
http://www.matimop.org.il/bilateral.html.
9 U.S. Department of State, 2015.
10 Information about Fraunhofer is available
at http://www.fraunhofer.de/en/institutes/
international.html.
11 Australian Government, 2012; Bason, 2014;
Bentley, 2104.
12 Beeson, 2013.
13 Information about Mission Innovation is
available at http://mission-innovation.net/.
14 BIS, 2011, p. 2; BIS, 2012—see Figure 24, p. 34.
15 Nesta’s Innovation Policy Toolkit articulates
a range of case studies of the Science and
Innovation Network’s efforts in innovation
diplomacy. See http://www.nesta.org.uk/
innovation-policy-toolkit.
16 See the UK government’s Cross-Government
Prosperity Fund, available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/cross-
government-prosperity-fund-programme.
17 Simon, 2012.
18 Bound et al., 2013.
19 Breznitz and Murphree, 2013.
20 Shambaugh, 2013.
21 Segal, 2011.
22 Glennie and Bound, 2016.
23 Jones, 2006.
24 Information about the European
Commission’s Research & Innovation website
and its ‘Designing a European Innovation
Council: A Call for Ideas’ is available at https://
ec.europa.eu/research/eic/index.cfm.
25 Reid et al., 2015.
26 Private communication from Nick Rousseau,
BIS, March 2016.
27 Information about Nesta’s Innovation Index
project is available at http://www.nesta.org.
uk/project/innovation-index.
References
Atkinson, R. 2013. ‘Innovation Mercantilism’s
Dangerous Consequences for American
Manufacturing’. Industry Week, 22 October.
Available at http://www.industryweek.com/
competitiveness/innovation-mercantilisms-
dangerous-consequences-american-
manufacturing.
Australian Government. 2012. Australia in the
Asian Century. White Paper, October.
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Available at http://www.defence.gov.au/
whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_
asian_century_white_paper.pdf.
Bakhshi, H., A. Freeman, and J. Potts. 2011. ‘State
of Uncertainty: Innovation Policy through
Experimentation’. Provocation 14. London:
Nesta. Available at http://www.nesta.org.uk/
publications/state-uncertainty.
Bason, C., ed. 2014. Design for Policy (Design for Social
Responsibility). New York: Routledge.
Beeson, M. 2013. ‘Is This the End of the “Asian
Century”?’ The Conversation, 28 October.
Available at http://theconversation.com/
is-this-the-end-of-the-asian-century-19616.
Bentley, T. 2014. ‘Design in Policy: Challenges and
Sources of Hope for Policymakers’. In Design
for Policy (Design for Social Responsibility)., ed.
C. Bason. New York: Routledge.
BIS (Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills, UK). 2011. International Comparative
Performance of the UK Research Base – 2011:
Executive Summary. Available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/32489/11-
p123-international-comparative-
performance-uk-research-base-2011.pdf.
———. 2012. Annual Innovation Report: Innovation,
Research and Growth, November. Available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/34805/12-p188-annual-innovation-
report-2012.pdf.
Bound, K., T. Saunders, J. Wilsdon, and J. Adams.
2013. China’s Absorptive State: Research,
Innovation and the Prospects for China-UK
Collaboration. London: Nesta.
Breznitz, D. and M. Murphree. 2013. ‘China’s Run:
Economic Growth, Policy, Interdependences,
and Implications for Diverse Innovation
Policies in a World of Fragmented
Production’. In The Third Globalization: Can
Wealthy Nations Stay Rich in the Twenty-First
Century? ed. D. Breznitz and J. Zysman. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
G7 Germany. 2015. Ministers’ Summary.
Communiqué, Meeting of the G7 Ministers
of Science, Berlin, 8–9 October. Available at
https://www.bmbf.de/files/English_version.
pdf.
Glennie, A. and K. Bound. 2016. How Innovation
Agencies Work: International Lessons to Inspire
and Inform National Strategies. London: Nesta.
Jones, G. 2006. ‘The Rise of Corporate Nationality’.
Harvard Business Review, October.
Reid, B, P. Williamson, and K. Bound. 2015.
Harnessing China’s Commercialisation Engine:
Collaborating with China to Help UK Innovation
Scale-Up and Succeed in the Global Market.
London: Nesta. Available at http://www.
nesta.org.uk/publications/harnessing-chinas-
commercialisation-engine.
The Royal Society. 2010. New Frontiers in Science
Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance
of Power. London: The Royal Society.
Available at https://royalsociety.org/~/
media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/
publications/2010/4294969468.pdf.
Segal, A. 2011. ‘The United States, China, and the
Globalization of Science and Technology’.
Prepared statement before the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Council on
Foreign Relations, 2 November. Available at
http://www.cfr.org/china/united-states-china-
globalization-science-technology/p26412.
Shambaugh, D. 2013. China Goes Global: The
Partial Power. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
Simon, D. 2012. ‘The Changing Face of China’s
International S&T Relations.’ Presentation at
University of Twente, October.
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization). 2014. Inaugural
Meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board
of the United Nations Secretary-General:
Outcomes of the Inaugural Meeting.
Available at https://en.unesco.org/scientific-
advisory-board-united-nations-secretary-
general-outcomes.
U.S. Department of State. 2015. U.S.-India
Commercial, Trade, and Economic
Cooperation. Fact Sheet. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of State. Available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247174.
htm.
Wilsdon, J., K. Bound, and T. Saunders. 2013.
‘Beijing’s Innovation Diplomacy’, The Guardian
Science Policy Blog, 9 October. Available
at https://www.theguardian.com/science/
political-science/2013/oct/09/science-policy.

Pages from gii 2016 -- the age of innovation diplomacy

Pages from gii 2016 -- the age of innovation diplomacy

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Similar to Pages from gii 2016 -- the age of innovation diplomacy (20)

More from Asia Pacific Intellectual Capital Centre Ltd (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

Pages from gii 2016 -- the age of innovation diplomacy