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SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms

Aleksandr Timorin
Aleksandr Timorin

The document discusses various industrial control system protocols including Modbus, DNP3, PROFINET DCP, IEC 61850-8-1, and IEC 61870-5-101/104. It describes their functions, security issues like lack of authentication and encryption, and available tools for analyzing the protocols. The speaker is a penetration tester who researches SCADA security and protocols.

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SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms Aleksandr Timorin ! ! ! ! ! ! CONFIDENCE 2014 27-28 V 2014, Krakow
# whoami • penetration tester at Positive Technologies • SCADA security researcher, main specialisation - industrial protocols • SCADAStrangeLove team member • speaker at PHDays, Power Of Community, Chaos Communication Congress (workshop) • @atimorin • atimorin@ptsecurity.com 2SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# whoami 3SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# whoami 4SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
• intro to scada world • current situation in ICS network security • overview of industrial protocols • well-known protocols: profinet, modbus, dnp3 • go to particular: • IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) • IEC 61870-5-101/104 • FTE • Siemens S7 • how to analyse protocols • releases • QA 5SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # agenda
ICS - Industrial Control System SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition PLC - Programmable Logic Controller HMI - Human-Machine Interface RTU - Remote Telemetry Unit Sensor, Actuator ! … and much more 6SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # intro to scada world
many many vendors in the world: • siemens • advantech • citectscada • codesys • moxa • schneider electric • rslogics • general electric • wellintech • sielco sistemi • emerson • abb • advanced micro controls • …. 7SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # intro to scada world problems in security: ! • each vendor - own protocol, technology etc. • out-of-date: don’t touch if it works! wild wild industrial world
! ! ! ! 8SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security ICS NETWORK absolutely unbreakable ???
NO, because of: ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WEP (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols 9SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
! ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WER (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols 10SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
How protocols live in the network ? ! • full expanse • not blocked by firewalls/switches • accessible between LAN segments • works from data link layer to application layer • easy to detect • easy to intercept, analyze, reproduce and reply (but not all ! ) 11SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
• modbus • profibus • profinet • dnp3 • ethernet/ip • s5/s7 (siemens protocols family) • CIP (rockwell automation) • cc-link (mitsubishi electric factory automation) • bacnet • iec 60870, iec 61850, iec 61107 • m-bus • zigbee • … iec - international electrotechnical commission 12SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # overview of industrial protocols
• published by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 • widely used for connecting industrial electronic devices • in XX: through rs-232/rs-485 • in XXI: modbus tcp • standard port 502/tcp 13SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
functions: ! • data access: read/write coils, registers, file records • diagnostics: device identification • user defined functions ! ! ! tools: ! • wireshark dissector • plcscan ( https://code.google.com/p/plcscan/ ) • modbus-discover nse (by Alexander Rudakov) • modbus simulators () ! 14SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
security ? • no authentication • no encryption • no security ! transaction id: 2 bytes protocol id: 2 bytes (always 0) length: 2 bytes unit id: 1 byte function code: 1 byte data … 15SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
# dnp3 DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol • first version in 1990 • standartized by IEEE only on 2010 • mainly used in water and electric industry • master - outstation communication • tcp/udp standard port 20000 ! tools: wireshark dissector free implementation https://code.google.com/p/dnp3/ ! security ? DNP3 Secure Authentication v5. First version in 2007. Add device and user authentication Data protection 16SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# dnp3 dnp3 frame: • header - 10 bytes • data - max 282 bytes ! header: • sync - 2 bytes • length -1 byte • link control - 1 byte • destination addr - 2 bytes • source addr - 2 bytes • crc - 2 bytes ! each device in network has unique address 1..65520 crc for every 16 bytes of data -> max frame len = 292 bytes work on iso/osi layers: data link layer, transport layer, application layer 17SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp PROFINET family ! • Profinet CBA/IO/PTCP/DCP • iec 61158, iec 61784 in 2003 • Ethernet type 0x8892 • exchange data in real-time cycles • multicast discovery devices and stations ! security ? • no encryption • no authentication • no security 18SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp PROFINET DCP - Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol 19SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp frame types: • request 0xfefe • response 0xfeff • get/set 0xfefd ! multicast identify (scapy code): payload=‘fefe05000401000200800004ffff’.decode(‘hex’) srp(Ether(type=0x8892, src=smac, dst=’01:0e:cf:00:00:00’)/payload) ! fefe request 05 service id: identify 00 service type: request 04010002 xid (request id) 0080 delay 0004 data len ff option: all ff suboption: all 20SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp • main interesting fields for playing is option and suboption • for example, set/get network info: opt 0x01, subopt 0x02 • led flashing: opt 0x05, subopt 0x03 ! so we can: • scan profinet supported devices and stations • change name of station • change ip, netmask, gateway • request full network info • LED flashing: PLC, HMI (simulates that smth wrong with device) • and much more 21SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp profinet dcp scanner (raw sockets and scapy versions) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! discovering all devices (PC, PLC, HMI) in subnet ! live demo 22SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp profinet fuzzer: fuzz options and sub options on plc siemens s7-1200 ! CVE-2014-2252 “An attacker could cause the device to go into defect mode if specially crafted PROFINET packets are sent to the device. A cold restart is required to recover the system.” ! what is “specially crafted profinet packets” ? 23SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# profinet dcp CVE-2014-2252 ! just “set” request: set network info with all zero values. ! ip 0.0.0.0 mask 0.0.0.0 gw 0.0.0.0 ! ! ! ! live demo 24SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61850-8-1 IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) ! ! ! ! ! MMS - Manufacturing Message Specification 25SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61850-8-1 • since 1980 • ISO 9501-1, 2003 • use ISO-TSAP as transport • standard tcp port 102 ! functions: • read/write tags, variables, domains (large unstructured data, i.e. program code) • start/stop/rewrite firmware on PLC • read/write/del files and directories ! security ? • simple methods whitelist • TLS (in theory, but in practice not supported by vendors and haven’t seen before in products) ! tools: • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts • emulator, open source libs 26SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61850-8-1 27SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61850-8-1 ~ nmap —script mms-identify.nse —script-args=‘mms- identify.timeout=500’ -p 102 <host> 28SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! mainly for gathering telemetry in electricity distribution and power system automation ! huge list of functions, depends on vendors implementation: • read/write tags • upload/download files • broadcast connected devices discovery • time sync • reset process command • query log files • etc. ! security ? • no auth, no encryption • simple ip address whitelist (ip of master devices defined on slaves) 29SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! standard tcp port 2404 ! toolkit: • simulators: sim104, mrts-ng etc. • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts 30SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! 31SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# iec 61870-5-101/104 ~ nmap --script iec-identify.nse --script-args='iec-identify.timeout=500' -p 2404 <host> ! 32SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# FTE Fault Tolerant Ethernet by Honeywell ! Provides robust and low-cost technology for industrial networks. Each FTE-node connected twice to network, support actual route table and exchanges route table with other nodes through multicast request. ! UDP as a transport. ! Proprietary protocol. 33SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# FTE ! attack vectors: • flood udp ports • send multicast packets with fake routing table ! multicast packet ———> ! headers: 0x01000810 0x01a01001 sending each second 34SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# FTE 0x23 node index ! 0x433330302023303335 node name (C300 #5) ! 0x44 and 0xca bytes of some packets counter ! 0x32312032 part of firmware version full: EXP3 10.1-65.57 Sat Dec 06 20:22:33 2008 (Fri Nov 21 20:22:57 2008) 35SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens ! TIA Portal (Totally Intergated Automation Portal) ! ! TIA - intellectual kernel of more than 100000 products created last 15 years. ! ! What about users, passwords and permissions? 36SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens PLC read/write protection for main and critical operations: CPU start/stop/data change, project upload, firmware update, etc. 37SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens TIA Portal PEData.plf passwords history ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! passwords in sha-1 but “helpful” redbox value: password_len * 2 + 1 srsly>? for what??? 38SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens After notification Siemens “strengthened” users passwords and switched to md5… ! ! ! ! TIA Portal V12 UPD 3 39SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens s7 password hashes extractor ! 40SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens Improve user rights ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! User rights - 2 bytes after second md5 hash: 0x8001 —> 0xFFFF 41SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens SCADA <-> PLC auth scheme: ! scada -> plc: auth request scada <- plc: challenge scada -> plc: response = HMAC(SHA1(password), challenge) scada <- plc: auth result ! python scripts (for 1200 and 1500 Siemens S7 PLC) for extracting all challenge-responses, export to JtR format and simple bruteforce ! want to crack password? use john the ripper! 42SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens 43SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens Bruteforce PLC online! ! Use powerful THC-Hydra Tested on S7-300 PLC. Should work on S7-200, S7-400 ! ! ! ~ hydra -F -V -P ./wordlist/500-worst-passwords.txt s7-300://<host> ! ! ! 44SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# Siemens 45SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! CVE-2014-2250, CVE-2014-2251 ! SSA-654382, SSA-456423 Affected devices: Siemens S7-1200 PLC Siemens S7-1500 PLC ! CVSS Base Score: 8.3 46SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! Tested on S7-1200 CPU 1212C, firmware V 2.2.0 47SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! PmzR9733Q8rG3LpwjCGZT9N/ocMAAQABAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! uLiHXZUTy2GMgjr1KmgmcNN/ocMAAQACAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! Mu/vgiIgtrxq0LVp26nkMtN/ocMAAQADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! tjH6vtNWCfa+QZHPDtCnKdN/ocMAAgADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! ! ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b8b8875d9513cb618c823af52a682670d37fa1c30001000200028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! 32efef822220b6bc6ad0b569dba9e432d37fa1c30001000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b631fabed35609f6be4191cf0ed0a729d37fa1c30002000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 48SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f + d37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f - ? d37fa1c3 - ? 0001 - ? 0001 - ? 00028ad7 - ? 0a00aac8 - ? 00000000000000008ad72143 - ? 49SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f MD5 of ? (16 bytes) d37fa1c3 CONST (4 bytes) 0001 user logout counter (2 bytes) 0001 counter of issued cookies for this user (2 bytes) 00028ad7 value that doesn’t matter (4 bytes) 0a00aac8 user IP address (10.0.170.200) (4 bytes) 00000000000000008ad72143 value that doesn’t matter (12 bytes) ! ! ! So, what about 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ??? 50SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ! ! MD5( NEXT 26 BYTES OF COOKIE + 16BYTES OF SECRET + 2 NULL BYTES) ! ! What is SECRET ? 51SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! SECRET generates after PLC start by ~PRNG. ! PRNG is a little bit harder than standard C PRNG. ! SEED in {0x0000 , 0xFFFF} ! ! ! It’s too much for bruteforce (PLC so tender >_<) 52SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! What about SEED ? SEED very often depends on time value ! SEED = PLC START TIME + 320 ! 320 by practical way: secret generates after ~ 3-4 seconds of PLC start using current time ! ! How to obtain PLC START TIME ? ! ! ! PLC START TIME = CURRENT TIME – UPTIME 53SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! ! ! Current time via web interface ! ! ! ! Uptime via SNMP with hardcoded read community string “public” 54SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! ! ! ! * 100 - calculation lapse ! ! To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 65535) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 65535) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) ! ! Still too many values to bruteforce … 55SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! But if user (admin) not logged out properly then after 7 logins it is not possible to login again ! We should restart PLC or wait 30 minutes (cookie expire time) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! We can minimize logout and issued cookies counters to 7 To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 7) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 7) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) 56SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! 57SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# it’s a cookie time ! Exploitation dependences: ! • >= 1 success logins to PLC after last restart • SNMP enabled ! BUT IT DOES NOT NEED LOGIN AND PASSWORD !!! ! CVE Timeline: ! • End of July 2013 – vulnerability discovered • 5 August 2013 – vendor notified • 20 March 2014 – patch released, first public advisory 58SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# S7 protocol Standard port 102/TCP ! By Siemens terms it is ISO-on-TCP (RFC 1006) based communication protocol 59SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# S7 protocol Materials: ! • “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs” by Dillon Beresford • wireshark dissector • libnodave - free communication library • snap7 - open source communication suite • plcscan 60SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# S7 protocol • based on iso-tcp -> block oriented protocol ! • block - PDU (Protocol Data Unit) ! • functions and commands oriented -> each frame contains function request or reply to it ! S7 commands: • plc start/stop cpu • firmware update • read/write data (blocks, tags) • system info • authentication • etc… 61SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# S7 protocol History of S7: • S5 Communication (FETCH/WRITE, Sinec H1) • S7 Communication • “Another” S7 Communication ! Simply “another” S7 looks like: ! ! TCP : HEADER | ISO TCP ! ISO TCP: TPKT | COTP | S7 PDU 62SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# S7 protocol • For old versions: wireshark dissectors, libraries, simulators. ! • Because we know all about that versions of protocol. ! • But we know next to nothing about “another” S7. ! Challenge accepted ! 63SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? ! ! 64SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? How to analyze protocols ? ! this guy should now -> ! Rob Savoye, FOSDEM 2009 “Reverse engineering of proprietary protocols, tools and techniques” ! “Believe it or not, if you stare at the hex dumps long enough, you start to see the patterns” ! ! ! *demo 65SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? ! ! 66SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? show_byte_sequences.py ! 67SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? s7-show-payloads.py 68SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? s7-packet-structure.py 69SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? Use your knowledge about protocols: ! • it’s a universal and complex approach • you can: • detect devices and their protocols • monitor state, commands, exchanging data • inject, modify, reply packets in real-time ! ! Because most of them INSECURE BY DESIGN ! real example? 70SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? Energetic turbine ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Simple UDP packet that set “speed” of turbine to 57 (min=0, max=100) 71SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? What will happen if you send another packet, another value? ! 72SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# How to analyse protocols? Yes, you’re right ! 73SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# outro all scripts, tools -> https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools ! pcaps -> a little bit later after some cleaning ! ! ! ! QA ? 74SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
# outro Thank you! ! @atimorin atimorin@ptsecurity.com ! greetz to: @scadasl @repdet @GiftsUngiven Dmitry Sklyarov 75SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014

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SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms

  • 1. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms Aleksandr Timorin ! ! ! ! ! ! CONFIDENCE 2014 27-28 V 2014, Krakow
  • 2. # whoami • penetration tester at Positive Technologies • SCADA security researcher, main specialisation - industrial protocols • SCADAStrangeLove team member • speaker at PHDays, Power Of Community, Chaos Communication Congress (workshop) • @atimorin • [email protected] 2SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 3. # whoami 3SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 4. # whoami 4SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 5. • intro to scada world • current situation in ICS network security • overview of industrial protocols • well-known protocols: profinet, modbus, dnp3 • go to particular: • IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) • IEC 61870-5-101/104 • FTE • Siemens S7 • how to analyse protocols • releases • QA 5SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # agenda
  • 6. ICS - Industrial Control System SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition PLC - Programmable Logic Controller HMI - Human-Machine Interface RTU - Remote Telemetry Unit Sensor, Actuator ! … and much more 6SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # intro to scada world
  • 7. many many vendors in the world: • siemens • advantech • citectscada • codesys • moxa • schneider electric • rslogics • general electric • wellintech • sielco sistemi • emerson • abb • advanced micro controls • …. 7SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # intro to scada world problems in security: ! • each vendor - own protocol, technology etc. • out-of-date: don’t touch if it works! wild wild industrial world
  • 8. ! ! ! ! 8SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security ICS NETWORK absolutely unbreakable ???
  • 9. NO, because of: ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WEP (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols 9SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
  • 10. ! ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WER (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols 10SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
  • 11. How protocols live in the network ? ! • full expanse • not blocked by firewalls/switches • accessible between LAN segments • works from data link layer to application layer • easy to detect • easy to intercept, analyze, reproduce and reply (but not all ! ) 11SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # current situation in ICS network security
  • 12. • modbus • profibus • profinet • dnp3 • ethernet/ip • s5/s7 (siemens protocols family) • CIP (rockwell automation) • cc-link (mitsubishi electric factory automation) • bacnet • iec 60870, iec 61850, iec 61107 • m-bus • zigbee • … iec - international electrotechnical commission 12SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # overview of industrial protocols
  • 13. • published by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 • widely used for connecting industrial electronic devices • in XX: through rs-232/rs-485 • in XXI: modbus tcp • standard port 502/tcp 13SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
  • 14. functions: ! • data access: read/write coils, registers, file records • diagnostics: device identification • user defined functions ! ! ! tools: ! • wireshark dissector • plcscan ( https://code.google.com/p/plcscan/ ) • modbus-discover nse (by Alexander Rudakov) • modbus simulators () ! 14SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
  • 15. security ? • no authentication • no encryption • no security ! transaction id: 2 bytes protocol id: 2 bytes (always 0) length: 2 bytes unit id: 1 byte function code: 1 byte data … 15SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014 # modbus
  • 16. # dnp3 DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol • first version in 1990 • standartized by IEEE only on 2010 • mainly used in water and electric industry • master - outstation communication • tcp/udp standard port 20000 ! tools: wireshark dissector free implementation https://code.google.com/p/dnp3/ ! security ? DNP3 Secure Authentication v5. First version in 2007. Add device and user authentication Data protection 16SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 17. # dnp3 dnp3 frame: • header - 10 bytes • data - max 282 bytes ! header: • sync - 2 bytes • length -1 byte • link control - 1 byte • destination addr - 2 bytes • source addr - 2 bytes • crc - 2 bytes ! each device in network has unique address 1..65520 crc for every 16 bytes of data -> max frame len = 292 bytes work on iso/osi layers: data link layer, transport layer, application layer 17SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 18. # profinet dcp PROFINET family ! • Profinet CBA/IO/PTCP/DCP • iec 61158, iec 61784 in 2003 • Ethernet type 0x8892 • exchange data in real-time cycles • multicast discovery devices and stations ! security ? • no encryption • no authentication • no security 18SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 19. # profinet dcp PROFINET DCP - Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol 19SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 20. # profinet dcp frame types: • request 0xfefe • response 0xfeff • get/set 0xfefd ! multicast identify (scapy code): payload=‘fefe05000401000200800004ffff’.decode(‘hex’) srp(Ether(type=0x8892, src=smac, dst=’01:0e:cf:00:00:00’)/payload) ! fefe request 05 service id: identify 00 service type: request 04010002 xid (request id) 0080 delay 0004 data len ff option: all ff suboption: all 20SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 21. # profinet dcp • main interesting fields for playing is option and suboption • for example, set/get network info: opt 0x01, subopt 0x02 • led flashing: opt 0x05, subopt 0x03 ! so we can: • scan profinet supported devices and stations • change name of station • change ip, netmask, gateway • request full network info • LED flashing: PLC, HMI (simulates that smth wrong with device) • and much more 21SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 22. # profinet dcp profinet dcp scanner (raw sockets and scapy versions) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! discovering all devices (PC, PLC, HMI) in subnet ! live demo 22SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 23. # profinet dcp profinet fuzzer: fuzz options and sub options on plc siemens s7-1200 ! CVE-2014-2252 “An attacker could cause the device to go into defect mode if specially crafted PROFINET packets are sent to the device. A cold restart is required to recover the system.” ! what is “specially crafted profinet packets” ? 23SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 24. # profinet dcp CVE-2014-2252 ! just “set” request: set network info with all zero values. ! ip 0.0.0.0 mask 0.0.0.0 gw 0.0.0.0 ! ! ! ! live demo 24SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 25. # iec 61850-8-1 IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) ! ! ! ! ! MMS - Manufacturing Message Specification 25SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 26. # iec 61850-8-1 • since 1980 • ISO 9501-1, 2003 • use ISO-TSAP as transport • standard tcp port 102 ! functions: • read/write tags, variables, domains (large unstructured data, i.e. program code) • start/stop/rewrite firmware on PLC • read/write/del files and directories ! security ? • simple methods whitelist • TLS (in theory, but in practice not supported by vendors and haven’t seen before in products) ! tools: • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts • emulator, open source libs 26SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 27. # iec 61850-8-1 27SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 28. # iec 61850-8-1 ~ nmap —script mms-identify.nse —script-args=‘mms- identify.timeout=500’ -p 102 <host> 28SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 29. # iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! mainly for gathering telemetry in electricity distribution and power system automation ! huge list of functions, depends on vendors implementation: • read/write tags • upload/download files • broadcast connected devices discovery • time sync • reset process command • query log files • etc. ! security ? • no auth, no encryption • simple ip address whitelist (ip of master devices defined on slaves) 29SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 30. # iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! standard tcp port 2404 ! toolkit: • simulators: sim104, mrts-ng etc. • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts 30SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 31. # iec 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! 31SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 32. # iec 61870-5-101/104 ~ nmap --script iec-identify.nse --script-args='iec-identify.timeout=500' -p 2404 <host> ! 32SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 33. # FTE Fault Tolerant Ethernet by Honeywell ! Provides robust and low-cost technology for industrial networks. Each FTE-node connected twice to network, support actual route table and exchanges route table with other nodes through multicast request. ! UDP as a transport. ! Proprietary protocol. 33SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 34. # FTE ! attack vectors: • flood udp ports • send multicast packets with fake routing table ! multicast packet ———> ! headers: 0x01000810 0x01a01001 sending each second 34SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 35. # FTE 0x23 node index ! 0x433330302023303335 node name (C300 #5) ! 0x44 and 0xca bytes of some packets counter ! 0x32312032 part of firmware version full: EXP3 10.1-65.57 Sat Dec 06 20:22:33 2008 (Fri Nov 21 20:22:57 2008) 35SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 36. # Siemens ! TIA Portal (Totally Intergated Automation Portal) ! ! TIA - intellectual kernel of more than 100000 products created last 15 years. ! ! What about users, passwords and permissions? 36SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 37. # Siemens PLC read/write protection for main and critical operations: CPU start/stop/data change, project upload, firmware update, etc. 37SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 38. # Siemens TIA Portal PEData.plf passwords history ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! passwords in sha-1 but “helpful” redbox value: password_len * 2 + 1 srsly>? for what??? 38SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 39. # Siemens After notification Siemens “strengthened” users passwords and switched to md5… ! ! ! ! TIA Portal V12 UPD 3 39SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 40. # Siemens s7 password hashes extractor ! 40SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 41. # Siemens Improve user rights ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! User rights - 2 bytes after second md5 hash: 0x8001 —> 0xFFFF 41SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 42. # Siemens SCADA <-> PLC auth scheme: ! scada -> plc: auth request scada <- plc: challenge scada -> plc: response = HMAC(SHA1(password), challenge) scada <- plc: auth result ! python scripts (for 1200 and 1500 Siemens S7 PLC) for extracting all challenge-responses, export to JtR format and simple bruteforce ! want to crack password? use john the ripper! 42SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 43. # Siemens 43SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 44. # Siemens Bruteforce PLC online! ! Use powerful THC-Hydra Tested on S7-300 PLC. Should work on S7-200, S7-400 ! ! ! ~ hydra -F -V -P ./wordlist/500-worst-passwords.txt s7-300://<host> ! ! ! 44SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 45. # Siemens 45SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 46. # it’s a cookie time ! CVE-2014-2250, CVE-2014-2251 ! SSA-654382, SSA-456423 Affected devices: Siemens S7-1200 PLC Siemens S7-1500 PLC ! CVSS Base Score: 8.3 46SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 47. # it’s a cookie time ! Tested on S7-1200 CPU 1212C, firmware V 2.2.0 47SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 48. # it’s a cookie time ! PmzR9733Q8rG3LpwjCGZT9N/ocMAAQABAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! uLiHXZUTy2GMgjr1KmgmcNN/ocMAAQACAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! Mu/vgiIgtrxq0LVp26nkMtN/ocMAAQADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! tjH6vtNWCfa+QZHPDtCnKdN/ocMAAgADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! ! ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b8b8875d9513cb618c823af52a682670d37fa1c30001000200028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! 32efef822220b6bc6ad0b569dba9e432d37fa1c30001000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b631fabed35609f6be4191cf0ed0a729d37fa1c30002000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 48SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 49. # it’s a cookie time ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f + d37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f - ? d37fa1c3 - ? 0001 - ? 0001 - ? 00028ad7 - ? 0a00aac8 - ? 00000000000000008ad72143 - ? 49SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 50. # it’s a cookie time ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f MD5 of ? (16 bytes) d37fa1c3 CONST (4 bytes) 0001 user logout counter (2 bytes) 0001 counter of issued cookies for this user (2 bytes) 00028ad7 value that doesn’t matter (4 bytes) 0a00aac8 user IP address (10.0.170.200) (4 bytes) 00000000000000008ad72143 value that doesn’t matter (12 bytes) ! ! ! So, what about 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ??? 50SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 51. # it’s a cookie time ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ! ! MD5( NEXT 26 BYTES OF COOKIE + 16BYTES OF SECRET + 2 NULL BYTES) ! ! What is SECRET ? 51SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 52. # it’s a cookie time ! SECRET generates after PLC start by ~PRNG. ! PRNG is a little bit harder than standard C PRNG. ! SEED in {0x0000 , 0xFFFF} ! ! ! It’s too much for bruteforce (PLC so tender >_<) 52SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 53. # it’s a cookie time ! What about SEED ? SEED very often depends on time value ! SEED = PLC START TIME + 320 ! 320 by practical way: secret generates after ~ 3-4 seconds of PLC start using current time ! ! How to obtain PLC START TIME ? ! ! ! PLC START TIME = CURRENT TIME – UPTIME 53SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 54. # it’s a cookie time ! ! ! Current time via web interface ! ! ! ! Uptime via SNMP with hardcoded read community string “public” 54SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 55. # it’s a cookie time ! ! ! ! * 100 - calculation lapse ! ! To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 65535) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 65535) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) ! ! Still too many values to bruteforce … 55SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 56. # it’s a cookie time ! But if user (admin) not logged out properly then after 7 logins it is not possible to login again ! We should restart PLC or wait 30 minutes (cookie expire time) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! We can minimize logout and issued cookies counters to 7 To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 7) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 7) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) 56SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 57. # it’s a cookie time ! 57SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 58. # it’s a cookie time ! Exploitation dependences: ! • >= 1 success logins to PLC after last restart • SNMP enabled ! BUT IT DOES NOT NEED LOGIN AND PASSWORD !!! ! CVE Timeline: ! • End of July 2013 – vulnerability discovered • 5 August 2013 – vendor notified • 20 March 2014 – patch released, first public advisory 58SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 59. # S7 protocol Standard port 102/TCP ! By Siemens terms it is ISO-on-TCP (RFC 1006) based communication protocol 59SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 60. # S7 protocol Materials: ! • “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs” by Dillon Beresford • wireshark dissector • libnodave - free communication library • snap7 - open source communication suite • plcscan 60SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 61. # S7 protocol • based on iso-tcp -> block oriented protocol ! • block - PDU (Protocol Data Unit) ! • functions and commands oriented -> each frame contains function request or reply to it ! S7 commands: • plc start/stop cpu • firmware update • read/write data (blocks, tags) • system info • authentication • etc… 61SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 62. # S7 protocol History of S7: • S5 Communication (FETCH/WRITE, Sinec H1) • S7 Communication • “Another” S7 Communication ! Simply “another” S7 looks like: ! ! TCP : HEADER | ISO TCP ! ISO TCP: TPKT | COTP | S7 PDU 62SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 63. # S7 protocol • For old versions: wireshark dissectors, libraries, simulators. ! • Because we know all about that versions of protocol. ! • But we know next to nothing about “another” S7. ! Challenge accepted ! 63SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 64. # How to analyse protocols? ! ! 64SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 65. # How to analyse protocols? How to analyze protocols ? ! this guy should now -> ! Rob Savoye, FOSDEM 2009 “Reverse engineering of proprietary protocols, tools and techniques” ! “Believe it or not, if you stare at the hex dumps long enough, you start to see the patterns” ! ! ! *demo 65SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 66. # How to analyse protocols? ! ! 66SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 67. # How to analyse protocols? show_byte_sequences.py ! 67SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 68. # How to analyse protocols? s7-show-payloads.py 68SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 69. # How to analyse protocols? s7-packet-structure.py 69SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 70. # How to analyse protocols? Use your knowledge about protocols: ! • it’s a universal and complex approach • you can: • detect devices and their protocols • monitor state, commands, exchanging data • inject, modify, reply packets in real-time ! ! Because most of them INSECURE BY DESIGN ! real example? 70SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 71. # How to analyse protocols? Energetic turbine ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Simple UDP packet that set “speed” of turbine to 57 (min=0, max=100) 71SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 72. # How to analyse protocols? What will happen if you send another packet, another value? ! 72SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 73. # How to analyse protocols? Yes, you’re right ! 73SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 74. # outro all scripts, tools -> https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools ! pcaps -> a little bit later after some cleaning ! ! ! ! QA ? 74SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014
  • 75. # outro Thank you! ! @atimorin [email protected] ! greetz to: @scadasl @repdet @GiftsUngiven Dmitry Sklyarov 75SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms CONFIDENCE 2014