Dan Guido SOURCE Boston 2011
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The document presents an analysis of attacker capabilities and methods in cybersecurity, emphasizing the effectiveness of intelligence-driven and threat-focused security strategies. It discusses trends and exploitation of vulnerabilities in software, particularly focusing on mass malware operations and the significance of timely responses to emerging threats. The presentation highlights the importance of aligning defense mechanisms with the processes attackers employ to improve security outcomes.
![Frequently Asked Question #4
Q: Future analysis?
A:
How [exactly] do researcher disclosures correlate with
massive exploitation?
Are the number of bugs exploited as zero-day
increasing? Why?
Do researchers follow zero-day disclosure trends or
vice-versa?
Exactly how much exploit code is modified from public
PoC’s before being integrated into a kit?
Expect new results some time in June
64](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/eip-final-110423210437-phpapp01/85/Dan-Guido-SOURCE-Boston-2011-64-320.jpg)
Dan Guido SOURCE Boston 2011
- 1. The Exploit Intelligence Project Dan Guido SOURCE Boston, 04/20/2011 https://www.isecpartners.com
- 2. Intro and Agenda I work for iSEC Partners NYC, Seattle, SF – specialize in Application Security I don’t have a product to sell you Today, I’m going to be sharing data and my analysis of attacker capabilities and methods An informed defense is more effective and less costly EIP shows that intelligence-driven, threat-focused approaches to security are practical and effective 2
- 3. WARNING! The commentary is really important for this talk. If you’re a reporter, please contact me and I’ll be happy to provide that commentary for any section you’re interested in: [email protected] 3
- 4. We Have An Analysis Problem Or, you’re counting the wrong beans!
- 5. Let’s Talk About Vulnerabilities 5 *IBM X-Force 2010 Trend and Risk Report
- 6. How many vulnerabilities did you have to pay attention to in 2010? 6
- 7. since 2006 7
- 8. Vulnerability Origin 8 *Secunia Yearly Report 2010
- 9. Affected Vendors (2010) 1 2 Oracle 5 Adobe Microsoft Apple 5 9
- 10. Wheel of Vulnerability Fortune 10 *Secunia: The Security Exposure of Software Portfolios
- 11. Where or how were massively exploited vulnerabilities first discovered in 2010? 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Targeted ZDI Prominent Personal Known Discovered Attacks Researcher Website Behavior by Malware 11
- 12. Google Chrome is Insecure! 12 *Bit 9 Research Report: Top Vulnerable Apps – 2010
- 13. How many vulnerabilities were massively exploited in Google Chrome in 2010? 13
- 14. Are we doing something wrong? Yes, you’re doing it backwards!
- 15. We Have to Start at Attacks 1. 2. 3. Where do bad guys get their info from? How do bad guys view the new vulns that come out? How effective are my defenses against this attacker? 15
- 16. Maslow’s Internet Threat Hierarchy # of Attacks Data Lost APT IP Targeted $$$ Mass Banking Credentials Malware
- 17. Mass Malware How does it work?
- 18. Kill Chain Model Systematic model for evaluating intrusions Helps us objectively evaluate attacker capabilities Align defense to specific processes an attacker takes Typically used as a model to defend against APT Evolves beyond response at point of compromise Assumes unfixable vulnerabilities First described by Mike Cloppert 18
- 19. Recon 19
- 20. Weaponization 20 5-20 exploits, $200-$2000 dollars
- 21. Delivery 21
- 22. Exploitation 22
- 23. Installation 23
- 24. Command and Control 24
- 25. Actions on Objectives 25
- 26. Leads to Cyber Pompeii
- 27. Process Overview Recon Millions of Infected Sites Existing defenses attack Weaponize Thousands of Vulnerabilities the most robust aspects of mass malware operations Delivery Thousands of IPs The last point that you Exploit <100 Exploits have control of your data Install Millions of Malware Samples C2 Thousands of IPs Actions N/A 27
- 28. Going on the Offensive
- 29. Exploit Kit Popularity (2011) 29 *ThreatGRID Data
- 30. Exploit Kit Popularity AVG Threat Labs Malware Domain List Krebs on Security Malware Intelligence Contagio Dump Malware Tracker M86 Security …
- 31. Data Sources Blackhole LuckySploit Bleeding Life Phoenix CrimePack 2.5, 2.4, 2.3, 2.2, 2.1, 2.0 3.1.3, 3.0, 2.2.8, 2.2.1 SEO Sploit pack Eleonore Siberia 1.6, 1.4.4, 1.4.1, 1.3.2 Unique Pack Fragus WebAttacker JustExploit YES Liberty Zombie 2.1.0, 1.0.7
- 32. Data Processing Decode Relate Jsunpack SHODAN HQ Generic JS Unpacker Python API for ExploitDB, Decodeby.us MSF, CVE PHP De-obfuscation Live Testing Vmware Detect Windows XP/7 YARA Project Generic scanning engine Note: All free tools except VMWare/Windows
- 33. Jsunpack/YARA Rules rule IEStyle { meta: ref = “CVE-2009-3672” hide = true impact = 8 strings: $trigger1 = “getElementsByTagName” nocase fullword $trigger2 = “style” nocase fullword $trigger3 = “outerhtml” nocase fullword condition: all of them } 33
- 34. Jsunpack vs Eleonore 1.4.1 34
- 35. vuln_search.py CVE Metasploit Name Authors ID Description ID Name Exploit DB Rank Author Date ID References Name Vendor URLs (ex. MSB) ZDI Other Notable URLs Powered by:
- 36. Sample Results: CVE-2010-1818 Exploit DB 08/30/2010 Ruben Santamarta Apple QuickTime "_Marshaled_pUnk" Backdoor 14843 Metasploit Ruben Santamarta, jduck Apple QuickTime 7.6.7 _Marshaled_pUnk Code Execution “… exploits a memory trust issue in Quicktime…” exploit/windows/browser/apple_quicktime_marshaled_punk Rank: Great Refs http://reversemode.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=69&Itemid=1 OSVDB-67705 36
- 37. Recap Mapping of Exploit Kits -> CVEs + Metadata 37
- 38. Targeting Trends Java from 2008 to Present
- 39. Targeting Trends Java, Round One 12-08 – Prominent researcher finds CVE-2008-5353 08-09 – Wins a Pwnie (researcher interest runs high) 08-09 – ZDI submissions start trickling out 11-09 – 1 kit incorporates CVE-2008-5353 39
- 40. Java, Round Two 11-09 – ZDI publishes 2nd batch of Java vulns CVE-2009-3867 01-10 – Three kits integrate 1st and 2nd vulns CVE-2008-5353 and CVE-2009-3867 04-10 – 3rd batch of researcher disclosures CVE-2010-0886, CVE-2010-0840, CVE-2010-0842 Back and forth between researchers/malware keeps interest in Java running high 40
- 41. From April 2010 onwards, new Java exploits are added to almost all popular exploit kits 41
- 42. Java Today Popularity 11 out of 15 kits include at least one Java exploit (73%) 7 out of 15 kits include more than one (46%) Where did this trend come from? Who followed who? The malware or research community? Why can we even compare these two groups together? What is next? Java and Flash will continue to be a pain point Quickest path to install malware in IE and Firefox 42
- 43. The New Trend: more exploits are being rapidly repurposed from targeted attack campaigns in 2010-2011 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Targeted ZDI Prominent Personal Known Silent Patch Attacks Researcher Website Behavior 43
- 44. Capabilities Assessment If we only had a time machine
- 45. Optimized Defense Jan 1, 2009 – what can we put in place to mitigate all exploits for the next two years? Restrictions: no patching allowed 2009 recap Internet Explorer 7, Firefox 3.0 Adobe Reader 9 Java, Quicktime, Flash, Office 2007 Windows XP SP3 Dataset represents 27 exploits 45
- 46. Slice and Dice Memory Logic Corruption (8) (19) Partition exploits based on mitigation options 46
- 47. 19 Memory Corruption Exploits 5 unique targets IE, Flash, Reader, Java, Firefox, Opera Do I have my sysadmins adhere to patch schedules or have them test and enable DEP in four applications? Patch schedules: Monthly, Quarterly, Ad-hoc Two years: 60+ patches in these apps I choose Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Good choice! It mitigates 14 exploits. 47
- 48. 8 Logic Flaws 4 unique targets Java, Reader, IE, Firefox, FoxIt Do we have a business case to justify getting repeatedly compromised by mass malware? No? Remove Java from the Internet Zone in IE Configure Reader to prompt on JS execution “Disallow opening of non-PDF file attachments” This leaves two exploits, one in IE and one in FF 48
- 49. Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010 IE Help Center XSS Firefox SessionStore Reader libTIFF Reader CoolType SING Flash (IE) newfunction Quicktime (IE) _Marshaled_pUnk Java getSoundBank 49
- 50. Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit Microsoft utility that adds obstacles to exploitation On XP: DEP, SEHOP, Null Page, Heap Spray, EAT filter Distributed as an MSI, controlled via CLI or Registry Apply it to one application at a time Harden legacy applications Temporary protections against known zero-day Permanent protections against highly targeted apps http://blogs.technet.com/cfs- file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer-Components- PostAttachments/00-03-35-03-78/Users-Guide.pdf 50
- 51. Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010 IE Help Center XSS Firefox SessionStore The Firefox exploit is only in one kit. We can make an informed decision about the amount of risk we are assuming. 51
- 52. Intelligence-Driven Mitigations Easy mitigations (22 out of 27 exploits) DEP on IE, Firefox, and Reader No Java in the Internet Zone Disallow opening of non-PDF file attachments Hard mitigations (all the rest) EMET on IE and Reader, the two most attacked apps Upgrade to IE8 for that pesky Help Center XSS Disallow Firefox, patch it, or accept the risk Extremely limited susceptibility going forward 52
- 53. Taking It Further Mass malware exploits are: 1. Result of users browsing internet sites 2. Shortest path to install malware w/ a single exploit Google DEP Sandbox Chrome Bypass Escape Malicious DEP IE8 HTML Bypass IE7, Plugins, Install Java, Flash, SpyEye etc. 53 *DDZ – Memory Corruption, Exploitation and You
- 54. Google Chrome Frame “X-UA-Compatible: chrome=1” 54
- 55. Google Chrome Frame Internet sites standardized around HTML/JS This is why you don’t need IE6 or IE7 at home For internet sites, add HTTP header w/ Bluecoat Browser is sandboxed Uses auto-updated Google version of Flash No other plugins are loaded Maintain whitelist of internet sites that need IE Typically, established vendor relationships All intranet websites will load with IE as usual Seamless to the user, mitigates all exploits in use 55
- 56. Maslow’s Internet Threat Hierarchy # of Attacks Data Lost APT IP Targeted $$$ Now you’re ready to defend against Banking more advanced attackers Credentials
- 57. Intelligence-Driven Conclusions Don’t wait to act with Flash and Java Pay attention to targeted attack disclosures in 2011 Force malware authors to use multiple exploits Seriously consider Google Chrome Frame Are your consultants/MSSPs/scanners evaluating vulnerabilities the same way that attackers are? Intelligence-Driven Response Informed defense is more effective and less costly Threat-focused security is practical Attack data is necessary to adequately model your risk 57
- 58. Thanks Rcecoder, Mila Parkour, Francois Paget, Adam Meyers Exploit Pack Table on Contagio Dump & Exploit Kit Source Mike Cloppert and Dino Dai Zovi Inspiration, ideas, and encouragement Chris Clark Getting started with the research process at iSEC John Matherly Creating SHODAN and fixing my bugs Dean De Beer ThreatGRID data, screenshots, and background material 58
- 59. References and Q&A Updates with more data at SummerCon, 6/10 Related Presentations (online) Memory Corruption, Exploitation, and You – DDZ Intelligence-Driven Response to APT – M. Cloppert Any Mandiant Presentation Related Presentations (at SOURCE) 2011 Verizon Data Breach Report, Hutton Fuel for Pwnage, Diaz and Mieres Dino Dai Zovi Keynote [email protected] 59
- 60. Appendix
- 61. Frequently Asked Question #1 Q: What do you think about network detections? A: Apply the same analysis process (kill chain) to the adversary you care about and determine major source of overlaps in intrusions. You may find better indicators than simply IP addresses. ie., “Hey, all the malicious domains attacking me are registered with the same whois data.” or, “All the domains that compromise me have low TTL values in common.” See some of Mike Cloppert’s writings See ThreatGRID when it comes out 61
- 62. Frequently Asked Question #2 Q: How can we keep up with this data? You did a point in time assessment, but I want this going forward. A: This analysis process and data should be picked up by the security industry and used effectively. AV companies have been doing you a disservice by not doing this in the past. They should start now. 62
- 63. Frequently Asked Question #3 Q: Aren’t you cheating by saying we should use EMET to mitigate past exploits? A: If we were smart enough to enable mitigations like DEP, we would have had a solid 1.5 years where we weren’t affected by mass malware mem corruption exploits at all, buying us a huge amount of time to investigate other mitigations techniques. The exploits that EMET was needed for came after the tool was released in Oct 2009. If you had someone performing this analysis, you could have observed the exploits that bypassed DEP and responded the same way I did. Intelligence gathering is not a static process, we have to continue collecting and responding to new information. There are more ways to use this intelligence. For instance, since we know that Flash and targeted attacks are so rapidly incorporated into mass exploitation campaigns, we would have known on April 11th that CVE-2011- 0611 would be a significant issue. The patch came out on April 15th, but I doubt many orgs patched over the weekend or enabled other mitigating options before it was massively exploited on April 18th. With this data in hand, they would have realized the seriousness of the original event on the 11th. 63
- 64. Frequently Asked Question #4 Q: Future analysis? A: How [exactly] do researcher disclosures correlate with massive exploitation? Are the number of bugs exploited as zero-day increasing? Why? Do researchers follow zero-day disclosure trends or vice-versa? Exactly how much exploit code is modified from public PoC’s before being integrated into a kit? Expect new results some time in June 64