08-P3-Complex Decisions

Chapter 3
Complex Decision-Making Process of
Infrastructure Investment in Indonesian
Public-Private Partnership Arrangements
3.1 Introduction
Although discussions on the effect of infrastructure on the economy
are interesting for both scholars and policymakers, infrastructure
planning and decision making are, in fact, not simple processes.
Decision making for infrastructure such as building roads, ports, and
other major public works is becoming more complex. The issues that
need to be considered are not only technical and economic, but also
environmental and political.
There is a trend all over the world for citizen involvement in
decision making. In line with this trend, governments are exploring
different types of planning and decision making that consider the
increased interdependency of actors. Concepts such as interactive
planning, network management, stakeholder dialogue, community
governance, open-planning procedures, and participatory planning
have emerged (see, for example, Arts & Tatenhove, 2005; Edelenbos
& Klijn, 2006; Woltjer, 2002).
In the present globalized era, we live in a networked society. Any
policy, any strategy, any human project, has to consider this basic
fact (Castells, 2006). It is little wonder that decision making has
become more complex. Problems cannot be solved by organizations on
their own. As a consequence, hierarchy as an organizational principle
has lost much of its meaning, with horizontal networks replacing
hierarchies (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). As Birkland (2001) said,
intuitively we can understand that actors in the policy process can
and must interact with each other to advance policy proposals.
Without this interaction, nothing would happen, and policymaking
would come to a standstill. Organizations and individuals who are
participants in complex decision problems interact in an environment
in which conditions are often changing rapidly and unpredictably,

Chapter 340
which increases the uncertainty experienced by participants dealing
with decision problems (Radford, 1978).
These issues not only affect developed countries but also
countries in transition like Indonesia, which have become
democratized. Reform occurs not only in the political system but also
in public administration and public finance, together with a
decentralization policy. Even though discussions on new perspectives
on decision making usually take place in Western countries, it is
quite interesting to explore the possibility of using a variety of
analytical approaches in a newly democratic country such as
Indonesia, where the concept of participatory planning and citizen
involvement has been growing (see, for example, Dasgupta & Beard,
2007; Timothy, 1999). However, it is also important to note that
political, sociocultural, and economic environments in Indonesia are
different from those in Western countries.
The purpose of this study is to understand the complexity of the
decision-making process in infrastructure investment in Indonesia,
particularly in PPP arrangements: to understand to what extent this
complexity actually exists and how the government as a key actor
deals with these new environments. The researcher uses a network
perspective as a framework for study and the Rounds Model
(Teisman, 2000) as a point of departure to analyze the complexity of
decision making in infrastructure investment. The study contributes
to the discussion on complexity in the context of developing countries
with reference to the configuration of actors in the policy network.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
theoretical framework that underlies the analysis, emphasizing the
network approach. Section 3.3 presents the research methodology,
and section 3.4 describes the research context of the study:
Indonesian infrastructure development and policy. This section also
describes the Indonesian policy on PPP. Section 3.5 presents four
case studies on infrastructure projects in Indonesia. This is followed
by interpretive readings and a discussion in section 3.6. Section 3.7
draws conclusions.
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Model
This section describes the decision-making process for infrastructure
investment. To start with, the theoretical background is outlined and
then the analytical model. Process analysis and decision-making
process analysis receive a lot of attention in the field of political

Complex Decision-Making Process 41
sciences and public administration. Theoretical developments in
those academic disciplines have made a valuable contribution to
researchers working with planning and policymaking to cope with
environment and spatial issues and problems.
In analyzing decision making, the researcher needs to reconstruct
the study object. Decision making cannot be depicted without making
assumptions about its appearance (Teisman, 2000). Terms such as
framework and model have been used to define approaches to
address the topic of policy process analysis. Models of a policy process
can help us to learn what is most important in the policy process
(Birkland, 2001).
Various approaches have been developed as a foundation for
either a policy process or a decision-making process analysis.
Sabatier (1991) noted that there are four frameworks: the open-
systems framework of Richard Hofferbert, an approach involving
rational actors within institutions developed by Elinor Ostrom and
her colleagues, John Kingdon's "policy streams" framework, and his
own "advocacy coalition" framework. In addition to those
frameworks, there are also more models like Birkland (2001), who
noted the garbage can model developed by Michael Cohen, James
March, and Johan Olsen (1972). Teisman (2000) elaborates on three
models: phases, streams, and rounds. Monnikhof (2006) reviews four
models and their relevance to the Netherlands: network theory,
garbage can and stream theory, the rounds model, and the advocacy
coalition framework.
Each framework or model has its own assumptions. Readers
should also note that researchers have developed these models based
on case studies in developed countries. Therefore, the contextual
aspects should be considered before applying the model for analysis.
In order to find a model that suits the context of analysis, the
researcher will briefly present three of the most prominent
approaches for decision-making process analysis: the policy network
approach, the advocacy coalition framework, and the rounds model.
3.2.1 Policy Networks
One of the perspectives that scholars in political sciences and public
administration now discuss is the policy network. The concept of
policy network has received a lot of attention from researchers in
various countries, mostly in developed countries such as the United
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Chapter 342
However, the observation of network configurations in the literature
of public policymaking is not completely new. It can be traced back to
the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Klijn,
1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).
Basically, the network perspective on public policy sees policy as
being formed through interactions between different actors who have
their own perceptions and strategies (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). The
core of this perspective is a decentralized concept of social
organization and governance: society is no longer exclusively
controlled by a central intelligence; rather, controlling devices are
dispersed, and intelligence is distributed among a multiplicity of
action (or “processing”) units. The coordination of these units is no
longer the result of “central steering” or some kind of “prestabilized
harmony” but emerges through purposeful action by exchanging
information and other relevant resources (Marin & Mayntz, 1991).
The network approach assumes that policy is made through
complex interaction processes among a large number of actors. The
interaction takes place within networks of interdependent actors.
These actors are mutually dependent, so policy can only be realized
on the basis of co-operation. This co-operation, however, is by no
means simple or spontaneous, and it requires different types of game
management and network constitution (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).
The network approach assumes that actors are mutually dependent.
Actors cannot achieve their objectives without resources that are
possessed by other actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).
In the literature on governance, the concept of policy network
could be located somewhere beyond or between the market and
hierarchies (Kenis & Schneider, 1991). In relation to decision-making
processes, many decisions in the public sector have to be made in
networks that consist of various actors who are mutually dependent
and have diverging interests (de-Bruijn, 2005).
Policy networks have been intensively criticized in the literature
(Blom-Hansen, 1997; Borzel, 1998; Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 1996).
One central point of criticism is that the network approach is not
based on a solid theoretical body of knowledge (Borzel, 1998).
Another criticism is that policy networks are not able to deploy any
explanatory power (see Borzel, 1998; Dowding, 1995). In response to
such criticism, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) clarify the theoretical
concepts and axioms of the policy network approach and argue that
this framework has important explanatory power for both, strategic
interaction processes as well as institutional relations. The
researcher argues that the policy network approach has developed

into a relatively elaborate, empirically grounded, and recognizable
theoretical framework.
Klijn (1997) offers an excellent overview of the theoretical
background of the policy network approach. As shown in Figure 3.1,
the theoretical roots of the policy network can be found in policy
science, organizational science, and political science.
In spite of such criticism and limitations, however, policy network
has some advantage as an approach for analysis. An advantage of the
network concept is that it helps us to understand not only formal
institutional arrangements but also highly complex informal
relationships in the policy process (Kenis & Schneider, 1991).
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Roots of Policy Networks (Klijn, 1997)
neo-
corporatism
organizational
science
policy
science
political
science
rational
organization
rational
actor
pluralism
contingency
approach
bounded
i li
agenda
research
interorganizational
theory
process
model
subsystems/policy
communities
resource
dependencies
policy as multi-
actor process
policy as process in
closed communities
policy networks

Chapter 344
3.2.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was developed by Sabatier
(1988). Its goal was to provide a coherent understanding of the major
factors and processes affecting the overall policy process, including
problem definition, policy formulation, implementation, and revision
in a specific policy domain—over periods of a decade or more. This
framework emerged out of the following: (a) a search for an
alternative to the stages heuristic that was then dominating policy
studies, (b) a desire to synthesize the best features of the 'top-down'
and 'bottom-up' approaches to policy implementation, and (c) a
commitment to incorporate technical information in a more
prominent role in policy process theories (Sabatier, 1998).
The ACF was developed upon a policy subsystem that is also
known as a part of network theory. Various terms have been used by
scholars, such as policy network, policy community, policy subsystem
or policy domain (Coleman & Perl, 1999). Figure 3.2 presents a
general overview of the framework from Sabatier (1998). On the left
side are two sets of exogenous variables—one quite stable and other
more dynamic—that affect the constraints and opportunities of the
subsystem actors.
Figure 3.2 ACF Diagram 1998 Version (Sabatier, 1998)

Within the subsystem, the ACF assumes that actors can be
aggregated into a number of 'advocacy coalitions’ (usually one to
four), each composed of actors from various government and private
organizations, who both (a) share a set of normative and causal
beliefs and (b) engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity
over time. The ACF explicitly argues that most coalitions will include
not only interest group leaders but also agency officials, legislators
from multiple levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps
even a few journalists. At any given point, the subsystem will usually
contain a number of individuals and organizations unassociated with
any coalition, but the ACF assumes that most will be unimportant
over the long term because they will either leave or be incorporated
into one of the coalitions (Sabatier, 1998).
Elliot and Schlaepfer (2001) used the ACF to analyze the
development of forest certification systems in Canada, Indonesia, and
Sweden. For the Indonesian case study, they confirm that the
Indonesian forest policy subsystem is dominated by a close alliance
between the forest industry and the Ministry of Forestry, which is
called a Forestry Coalition. There is a second, much weaker, coalition
of NGOs and social organizations, which could be called the
Environmental Coalition. Furthermore, the researcher found changes
in international public opinion, leading to greater environmental
concerns in some of Indonesia’s export markets, and the nomination
of a new Minister of Forestry in 1993, who expressed concerns about
the environmental impacts of forestry. Meanwhile, within the
Indonesian forest policy subsystem, active policy learning was
occurring throughout the 1990s, based on numerous national and
international research projects and publications.
3.2.3 The Rounds Model
Teisman (2000) has compared and elaborated three models: the
phase, the streams, and the rounds model in the Netherlands. The
phase model focuses on successive and distinctive stages in a process,
i.e. defining a problem, searching for, choosing and implementing
solutions. The stream model emphasizes concurrent streams of
participants, problems and solutions, defining decision making as the
connection between these streams. Teisman then emphasized the
third approach, the so-called rounds model, which assumed that
decision making consists of different decision-making rounds.

Chapter 346
The terms of rounds in decision making have been mentioned
before by Kunreuther, Lathrop, & Linnerooth (1982). They developed
an approach labeled the multi-attribute multi-party model (MAMP).
The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature
on the key role that limited time, attention, and information
processing capabilities play in political decision making when there
are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among interested parties.
The model also highlights the importance of decentralized and
sequential decision making and indicates the role that formal risk
assessments have played at each stage of the process. The decision-
making process can be separated into different rounds. A round is
simply a convenient device to illustrate a change in the focus of
discussions. This new focus or direction can be triggered by: (1) a key
decision taken (or stalemate reached due to conflicts among parties)
or (2) a change in the context of discussions due to an anticipated
event, the entrance of a new party, or new evidence brought to the
debate (Kunreuther et al., 1982).
As Radford (1978) and Monnikhof (2006) noted, the concept of
rounds in decision making has been mentioned by Braybrooke (1974).
Many complex decision problems are cyclical in nature. A round
opens with an initiative or policy intention of one of the parties that
serves as the “trigger” for the others. Each round ends with a crucial
decision, a decision that offers a solution for the question that is
central in the particular policy round. A crucial decision heralds a
new round where it guides the subsequent policy game (Koppenjan &
Klijn, 2004).
Teisman (2000) argues that the added value of the rounds model
as compared to the phases and streams models can be summed up in
three points. First, in term of actors, problems, and solutions, the
rounds model focuses on the interaction between actors, during
which they can negotiate acceptable combinations of problems and
solutions. In the rounds model, decision making is not about a single
issue, or about separated streams of problems, solutions, and
participants, but about dynamic combinations of sets of problems and
solutions represented by different actors. Second, in terms of policy
adoption, yardsticks, or results, a round begins and ends with the
adoption of a certain combination of a problem definition and a
(virtual) solution by one or more actors. Third, in terms of policy
evaluation and evaluation criteria, evaluation in the rounds model no
longer focuses on the question of whether the policy result agrees
with a single policy intention, but whether the result responds to the

objective of all the parties involved at the moment policy effects can
be distinguished.
Figure 3.3 visualizes Teisman’s version of the concept of decision
making in the rounds model. Teisman (2000) has applied the model
to the case of the Betuwe line, a railway line intended for the
transport of cargo between the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands
and Germany.
Figure 3.3 The Concept of Decision Making in the Rounds Model
(Teisman, 2000)
3.2.4. Applying the Rounds Model and Networks Approach for
Decision-making Process Analysis
In the foregoing section (3.2.1-3), the study has discussed three
conceptual models or frameworks that are found in the decision-
making process analysis literature. In regard to the large number of
existing frameworks for decision-making process analysis, it is
important to avoid creating and adding new ones unnecessarily. The
most fruitful strategy would be to take the rounds model as the
starting point since it explains the complexity of the decision-making
process. The advantage of the rounds model is that it focuses on the

Chapter 348
interaction between actors, and covers dynamic combinations of sets
of problems and solutions in the decision-making process.
Since the study aims to elaborate the complexity of the decision-
making process, the researcher has avoided binding himself too
dogmatically or rigidly to one model or approach as each model has
its own assumption. The aim is not to validate a preferred theoretical
approach; rather, to borrow the model that has relevance in the
context of the study. In addition to the rounds model, the policy
network approach could complement the analysis.
To conduct the analysis, the study adopts the rounds model
(Teisman, 2000) to identify the rounds of decision making and the
actors involved. To get an insight into the actors and their
interaction, an analysis of actor and arena of decision making is
undertaken following Koppenjan and Klijn (2004).
3.3 Context: Infrastructure Policymaking, Changing
Environment, and PPPs in Indonesia
This section briefly presents Indonesia’s infrastructure development
and policy and the changing environment of policymaking as a
background to understand the actors, rules, and interactions: who
participates and how they participate in the decision-making
processes.
Despite major infrastructural development since the first five-
year planning program was launched in the late 1960s, Indonesia
still faces major challenges in its infrastructure sectors. In the
transportation sector, roads in and around major cities are heavily
congested, while many inter-urban and rural roads are in poor
condition. The situation is almost the same for other sectors. There is
a problem of insufficiency and spatial difference in infrastructure
availability and service.
Geographic conditions and an uneven distribution of the
population pose a challenge in infrastructure provision. Developing a
transportation system that serves the needs of the people and links
densely populated Java, the rugged and sparsely populated terrain of
Papua, and the hundreds of small populated islands in the Malukus
and Nusatenggaras is no mean feat, as the system has to encompass
inter-island shipping, river transportation, and civil aviation.
Electricity supply systems outside the Java-Bali grid are highly
fragmented. The fact that the primary energy resources are located

far from the main demand centers also makes infrastructure
provision more difficult (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs,
2006b). To overcome the situation, Indonesia has adopted a regional
approach in developing infrastructure by dividing the country into
three regions: the developed region located in the western part of
Indonesia and the developing and the newly developing regions
located in the east (see Figure 3.4). The developed region is where the
economic activities are concentrated with high demand for
infrastructure and high commercial viability. The other two less
developed regions, although they have similar needs for
infrastructure, have low commercial viability (Coordinating Ministry
for Economic Affairs, 2005).
Figure 3.4 The Three Economic Regions in Indonesia
3.3.1 Changing Environment
During the Soeharto government regime (the New Order regime)
beginning in 1966, the key components of the centralized system of
public administration were put into place. The new system required
all local government officials to be tied to a line ministry of the
central government for budget and responsibility, and to the
employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs for their salary. The
national government appointed the district head (bupati), city
mayors (walikota), and governors of the provinces. In addition,
central government ministries operated offices at the local level, and

Chapter 350
revenues for these offices (dinas) came directly from the central
government (Silver, 2003).
There have been marked changes in the public management of
infrastructure, particularly after the financial crisis in 1998. The
environment in which policymaking takes place has changed.
Basically, the policy and framework for infrastructure development
were embedded in a five-year development plan, or Repelita [now
Indonesia’s medium-term development plan, or Rencana
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM)], which outlined the main
policy priorities and direction of the government. Nowadays, the
RPJM encapsulates the new president's vision of the future for the
country and the strategy for its realization. This strategy marks yet
another departure in the formulation of development policy. It
underscores policy and institutional reform, and the role and
involvement of civil society in development. It is more balanced in
that the social and political agendas are just as important as the
economic agenda.
The decentralization program that was launched initially in 1999
has transferred many responsibilities relating to infrastructure
provision to sub-national entities. The role of central government
agencies in infrastructure policymaking changed. There is now
greater distribution of resources in decision making. In the past,
Bappenas (the Ministry of National Development Planning) played
an important role, which some people called a “super ministry.”
Bappenas prepared the Repelita. Along with the Coordinating
Ministry for the Economy and Industry, it also coordinated
Indonesia’s policy development and had budgetary powers.
Currently, its powers have been circumscribed, mainly because the
ministry is no longer involved in budget decision making, focusing
only on planning.
The role of budget allocation was then shared between the
Ministry of Finance and the House of Representatives. This gave the
latter a stronger role in decision making than in the past. As part of
the institutional reformation, several new ministry-level committees
were established. For infrastructure-related institutions, new
committees such as the Committee on Policy for the Acceleration of
Infrastructure Development (KKPPI), Toll Road Authority Agency
(BPJT), Telecommunication Regulatory Agency (Badan Regulasi
Telekomunikasi Indonesia—BRTI) and other sector specific or cross-
sector committees were set up.
As a result, public management in terms of planning,
coordination and implementation in infrastructure became

complicated. Responsibilities were divided both horizontally and
vertically, making integration of planning and coordination of
implementation a formidable challenge (World Bank, 2004).
Bappenas serves as the planning advisor for the committees, and
the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs focuses more on the
short-term implementation matters.
New institutions, new actors and changing roles for the actors
resulted in the decision making powers becoming more distributed.
Other dimensions in Indonesia’s environment of policymaking were
corruption and governance (a sector department commonly combined
the role of policymaker, regulator, and shareholder representative.)
Much effort has been made since the collapse of Soeharto’s
government to tackle corruption and create better governance.
However, with the new environments and uncertainties involved,
private businesses find that investment in infrastructure is more
risky.
3.3.2 Public–Private Partnership
The lack of financing sources from the government budget has led
policymakers to believe that PPP is one of the most promising
answers for infrastructure investment. Infrastructure projects have
been traditionally financed by government budgets and foreign loans,
and operated by public entities. Driven by fiscal austerity and
widespread disenchantment with the performance of SOEs, the
government is now turning to the private sector to build, operate,
finance, own, and transfer infrastructure facilities in many sectors.
Indonesia is now in transition, moving from the state to private
provision of infrastructure. However, private involvement in
Indonesia is hampered to a varying degree by factors such as an
inadequate legal and regulatory framework, poorly structured
concession and contractual arrangements, high transaction costs, and
a lack of an established reputation and track record where PPPs are
concerned (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2006a).
Much effort has been made, however, to restructure the
government’s role in many infrastructure sectors. In term of
operations, the public sector’s role is being transformed from that of a
service provider to one of an overseer of service contracts. In policy-
making, the government separates responsibility of strategic
planning, from regulation, and operation. The demarcation of roles
and the creation of independent regulatory agencies are particularly

Chapter 352
important when there is competition between private and publicly
owned service providers, and when there is a need to insulate tariffs
from political pressure. One such example can be found in the road
sector. Jasa Marga (the SOE for toll roads) is no longer the regulator
as well as the road service provider. A new toll road regulator agency
(BPJT) has been established.
This study assumes increased complexity in decision making. The
changing environment has brought with it uncertainties. Raising
networks and new players in policymaking can contribute to
complexity. Even unitary decision makers face complexity, as Keeney
and Raiffa (1976) noted; simple value problems would be
conceptually easy to solve if there were no uncertainties. In complex
value problems, consequences at the ends of the decision tree cannot
be adequately described objectively by a single attribute.
3.4 Research Method
The previous section presented frameworks or models for the
analysis. As Borzel (1998) has elaborated, in terms of the network
approach, there are two methods (quantitative and qualitative) that
researchers usually choose. Both methods consider networks as an
analytical tool. The distinction is that the quantitative method
approaches network analysis as social structure analysis. The
relationships between actors are analyzed in terms of their cohesion,
structural equivalence, and spatial representation using quantitative
methods such as ascendant hierarchical classification, density tables,
block models, etc. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is
more process-oriented. It focuses less on the mere structure of
interaction between actors and more on the content of these
interactions using qualitative methods. In this sense, the study
prefers to use qualitative methods in order to respond to the research
objective and questions.
The objective of this study is to understand the complexity of the
decision-making process in infrastructure investment in Indonesia,
particularly in PPP arrangements. The research question is how
decision making in infrastructure investment, particularly in the
PPP scheme, has been conducted in Indonesia. The sub-questions
are: to what extent do complexities of decision making actually exist?
How does the government, as a key actor deal with the new
environment?

Like many other research studies that have been conducted in
this area, this one, too, works with case studies. Case study as a
research strategy has been extensively applied for the topic of
decision making. It is also useful for covering contextual conditions.
Yin (1994) has defined a case study as an empirical enquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the
context are not clearly evident.
Four case studies on infrastructure investment based on the PPP
scheme were selected (for a full description see section 3.5). These
projects were selected because decision making in a PPP is extremely
complex—there is not only institutional complexity but also strategic
complexity (Klijn & Teisman, 2003).
The theory, framework, or model described had to be supported
by evidence or facts. Gathering evidence for policy analysis can be
usefully divided into two broad categories: document research and
field research. Field research includes conducting interviews and
gathering original data. Document research includes reviewing
relevant literature dealing with theory and evidence and locating
existing sources of raw (primary) data (Weimer & Vining, 2004).
The researcher’s strategy in collecting data and evidence was
twofold. First, collection of data on events: lists of actions and
policies, i.e., what is recorded in newspaper archives. The researcher
collected archival records of news related to the four projects from
major national newspapers and magazines, (many are from
KOMPAS, the daily newspaper). Then the data and results were
verified by interviewing actors from the private sector and the
government staff involved with or likely to know about the project.
Interview guides (see Appendix 3.2) were used to interview 22 actors
(for names and designations, see Appendix 3.3). These were among
the most influential people in the network, with prominent positions
in the major organizations or institutions in the network. In addition,
the researcher gathered a number of policy documents from
government offices and from preeminent actors such as private
companies involved in the project.
The study concentrates on case studies related to the transport
sector since transport infrastructure is closely related to economic
geography and spatial development (see chapter 5). Another reason is
that a transportation project such as a toll road is most suitable for a
PPP case analysis in Indonesia. The study also considers case studies
during different project time spans in order to capture policy
evolution. Hence, four case studies covering different time periods

Chapter 354
have been selected. The first one is the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll
road project for building an inner ring road in Jakarta. The project
was completed in the 1990s and could be categorized as a success
story. It is assumed that private-sector participation in this project
was quite high. The second case study is the Cipularang toll road, a
new toll road built in 2005 connecting two cities (Jakarta and
Bandung) in two provinces (Jakarta and West Java). The third case
study is the Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) Project, which was
completed recently. The fourth case study is a triple-decker project, a
combination of arterial road, toll road, and light rail transportation
located in Jakarta. This project, however, failed and was finally
abandoned. So the study covers more and less recent cases among the
research projects, and more and less successful ones. For each of the
case studies, the analysis will start by identifying the “rounds” of
decision making and the actors involved, and subsequently analyze
the “arenas” of interaction between the actors.
3.5 Case Studies: Four PPP Toll Road Projects
This section presents a description of each of the infrastructure
projects selected as a case study. To recapitulate, the researcher
selected PPP project cases because PPPs are well suited as examples
of decision making, cooperation, and coordination in a complex
situation (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). The
study deliberately selected PPP projects (toll roads) in the transport
sector, which is one of the sectors in infrastructure development that
is widely discussed for its impact on the spatial economy. (Appendix
3.1 shows location of case studies in Jakarta and West Java.)
Toll road development in Indonesia began in 1978 with the
operation of the Jagorawi (Jakarta–Bogor–Ciawi) toll road. At the
time, PT Jasa Marga was the only toll road operator in Indonesia.
The government embarked for private sector participation in 1987
with the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) scheme. However, until 2006
only about 606 km of toll roads were in operation, of which 464 km
was being managed by PT Jasa Marga, and the remaining 142 km by
a private enterprise. This achievement is quite low when considered
in the context of Indonesia’s geographic spread and the achievement
of countries such as China and Malaysia.

In response to the low progress of toll road development, the
government has focused on improving the PPP legal and institutional
framework. This section sheds light on the decision-making process
of infrastructure projects within the PPP scheme.
The first study on a toll-way system for Indonesia was done in
1974, right after the completion of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area
Transportation Study (JMATS) conducted by a German consultant
(Arge Becker-Intertraffic) under the framework of the Technical
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and
Federal Republic of Germany. The Directorate General of Highways
(the Bina Marga) then commissioned the same consultant to
investigate the technical, economic, and financial feasibility of the
Jakarta-West Java Tollway system. The work started in November
1974 and was finished in October 1976. The Jakarta-West Java
Tollway system comprised the Jakarta Intra Urban System of
tollways, the Jakarta Ring Road, and three regional highways in the
major transportation and development corridors leading east, west,
and south from the capital city (Ministry of Public Works, 1978).
Based on the study, the government then decided to construct
three regional highways surrounding Jakarta: the Jakarta-Bogor-
Ciawi highway, the Jakarta–Tangerang highway, and the Jakarta–
Cikampek highway. Construction of the first two was financed by the
Overseas Cooperation Fund, Japan (OECF), and the third highway
was financed by the World Bank.
The first case study is the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road
project, which was then extended to the Cawang–Tanjung Priok–
Pluit toll road. This is the first renowned PPP project for toll road
development in Indonesia. The road was built and operated by a
private company, PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP). The
company was owned and directed by Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, a
daughter of former president Soeharto. (She is no longer a
shareholder of the company now.) The company got the contract from
the government in 1987, and construction began in 1988.
The second case study examines the Cikampek–Purwakarta–
Padalarang (Cipularang) toll road. The road has been designed to
anticipate potential high traffic from Jakarta to Bandung and vice
versa. It will connect two existing toll roads in Jakarta (the Jakarta–
Cikampek toll road) and a toll road in Bandung (the Padalarang–
Cileunyi toll road).
The third case study evaluates the JORR. Sixty-seven km long,
the JORR was conceived in 1976 as part of the West Java Tollway
System and was envisaged to play an important role in

Chapter 356
complementing the three regional highway systems (Jagorawi,
Jakarta-Cikampek, and Jakarta–Tangerang), to ease traffic
congestion in the center of the capital, and to create a better links to
the Tanjung Priok Harbour and the Soekarno Hatta Airport.
The fourth case study describes the Triple-Decker Project
situated in Jakarta. It is a three-level transportation system
consisting of an arterial road on the ground level, an elevated light
rail transit track on the second level, and a toll road on the top level
linking Cinere, South Jakarta, with downtown Kota, West Jakarta.
The project was proposed and initiated by a private company, PT
Citra Lamtorogung Persada, in cooperation with PT Steady Safe.
One of the companies (PT Citra Lamtorogung Persada) is owned by
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, better known as Mbak Tutut, the eldest
daughter of President Soeharto.
3.6 Analysis and Discussion
The empirical events and the course of action taken by the actors in
the four cases lead to an analysis of the decision-making processes,
from which a number of conclusions can be drawn.
3.6.1 Analysis of the First Case
With closer attention to the streams of decisions taken by several
actors, a number of different rounds can be distinguished. Table 3.1
summarizes the rounds of decision making in case number one.
The Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road is part of Jakarta’s intra-
urban tollway. Initially, the road was built mainly to anticipate
incoming traffic flow as a result of the completion of the regional
highway between Jakarta and Cikampek. The government and donor
agency realized that after the completion of the Jakarta–Cikampek
freeway, the traffic volume for the metropolitan area of Jakarta was
potentially high and could cause serious distribution problems inside
Jakarta. The World Bank, which financed the Jakarta-Cikampek
freeway, requested that the Directorate General of Highways should
solve this problem.
The request by the World Bank was the starting point of the first
round in the decision-making. The round ran smoothly, and there
was no significant disagreement. It was completed when the
government of Indonesia, using OECF funds, requested the Japanese

consultant (Pacific Consultants International) to conduct a review of
the feasibility study of the Jakarta Intra Urban Tollway, including
the preliminary design and detailed engineering services. The
Jakarta Intra urban Tollway network then consisted of three links
and additional one link of the Jakarta Harbour road that would
connect the three regional highways. The feasibility study of the
Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road was completed in 1983.
Aiming to find alternative ways of financing infrastructure, the
government decided to invite private partnership. The tender
offering of the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road triggered the second
round of the decision-making process, mainly to explore private
participation. The round ended with the government declaring the
CMNP consortium as the contractors. Following the decision, in 1987
a new feasibility study was conducted with a new, elevated toll road
idea.
The third round started when a decision had to be made after the
new toll road project Tanjung Priok–Pluit/ Jembatan Tiga was
completed. The toll road was also operated by CMNP. Both projects
are part of the intra urban tollway system. The other part of the
project in the Intra Urban Tollway system (Cawang–Tomang–Pluit
toll road) was executed by the state-owned company toll road
operator PT Jasa Marga. A new proposal to increase the concession
period of CMNP and revenue-sharing of the toll road collection
between the CMNP and Jasa Marga was then submitted.
Table 3.1 Rounds of Decision Making (first case study)
Main empirical events Interpretations based on
the rounds model
A request by the World Bank to
the government to anticipate
transport problems in Jakarta. A
feasibility study of the Jakarta
Intra Urban Tollway then
conducted, including the
preliminary design and detailed
engineering services (1983)
The first round:
exploring an action to
anticipate future problems and
the need for transport
infrastructure
Government offers partnership to
private company. Finally, the
CMNP consortium wins the
contract (1986/1987).
The second round:
making goals to develop and to
apply the idea of a private
provision in infrastructure

Chapter 358
Main empirical events Interpretations based on
the rounds model
New construction of harbor toll
road Tanjung Priok–Jembatan
Tiga by PT CMNP as an extension
of Cawang–Tanjung–Priuk toll
road to Jembatan Tiga (1993)
The third round:
new agreement on concession
and revenue-sharing is
proposed after the new toll
road is constructed
Government announces it will
evaluate and renegotiate toll road
management and concession for
Cawang-Priok-Pluit (2000).
Finally, a new revenue-sharing
agreement was reached (2002).
The fourth round:
economic crisis followed by
political reform creates huge
pressure on the government to
evaluate toll road management
for projects touched by
corruption
Adapted from Teisman (2000)
The third round was wrapped up when the government decided to
combine the toll road projects into one package and distribute the
combined revenues from toll collection in the network to PT Jasa
Marga and PT CMNP. However, the allocation was unfair as PT
CMNP received 75 percent while PT Jasa Marga received only 25
percent.
Provoked by anti-corruption and anti-Soeharto issues, in 2000, a
fourth round emerged. The government announced that it was
evaluating and renegotiating toll road management and concessions
for the Cawang–Tanjung Priok–Pluit toll road, which was followed by
the establishment of a team to renegotiate an unfair MOU on
revenue sharing between PT Jasa Marga and PT CMNP. Finally, in
2002, a new deal on revenue sharing was announced: 55 percent for
CMNP and 45 percent for Jasa Marga.
Table 3.2 depicts the group of actors that can be distinguished
during each round of the decision-making process. In the first round,
the study identified the World Bank, the Directorate General of
Highways, and the government of Japan. In this round, all the actors
shared the same perception about the problem even though they
participated in different ways, since the resources they brought to
the table were different.
In the second round, three actors were identified: the Directorate
General of Highways, a private company, and a state-owned
company, Jasa Marga. In this round, the government conducted a

PPP investment procedure. Participation was regulated by central
government regulation. With common interests and a superior
informal resource held by a private company (CMNP), the round
went smoothly and finally CMNP was elected as the operator of the
toll road. In the third round, CMNP dominated the decision-making
process due to the informal power the consortium held. However,
during the fourth round, the decision made in the third round had to
be revised.
Table 3.2 Actor Analysis (first case study)
Round Main actors Participation
1 The World Bank Requested the government to solve
a potential problem of congestion in
regard to the opening of new inter-
regional highways
Directorate
General of
Highways
Made the transport infrastructure
planning and policy
Government of
Japan (OECF)
Financed the feasibility study
2 Directorate
General of
Highways
Sought private involvement in
transport infrastructure
development
Private company
(CMNP)
Participated in the process of
private operator selection for the toll
road
Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that time,
Jasa Marga managed the agreement
with CMNP
3 CMNP Built and operated the new toll road
connected to the previous toll road
Jasa Marga Cooperated with CMNP ideas of
new toll road revenue-sharing
Ministry of
Finance &
Ministry of Public
Works
Issued the legal framework for the
revenue-sharing agreement
4 Coordinating
Ministry of
Economic Affairs
Issued the legal framework for
review of the toll road agreement
link to suspected corruption
Jasa Marga Negotiated revenue-sharing

Chapter 360
agreement
CMNP Negotiated revenue-sharing
agreement
Ministry of
Finance and
Ministry of Public
Works
Withdrew the previous legal
framework for the revenue-sharing
agreement
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004)
Policy games are complex not only because there are many players
making unpredictable strategic choices, but also because they are
often simultaneously involved in more than one arena (Van-Gils &
Klijn, 2007). The researcher identified four arenas in the first case:
the planning arena, the PPP arena, the toll road management arena,
and the political arena. Summaries of arena analysis are presented
in Table 3.3 The fourth round, which deals with the review and
renegotiation of revenue-sharing, takes place in two arenas: the toll
road management arena and the political arena. The decision of the
revenue-sharing review was made within the context of political
reform, which then affected the decision made in the toll road
management arena.
There were different interactions among the actors in each arena.
The Directorate General of Highways had frequent interactions with
almost all arenas, while the donor agencies had less frequent
interactions compared to other actors. With this kind of contact
pattern, the Directorate General of Highways became the central
actor in the network.
Table 3.3 Arena Analysis (first case study)
Arena Round Key actors Activities
Planning
Arena
1 Responsible
government
department;
donor agency
Preparing a policy to
ease the projected
problem in the
transport system
PPP Arena 2 Government
department;
SOEs; private
company
Exploring private
partnership for
transport
infrastructure
investment

Toll Road
Management
Arena
3 SOEs in toll road
operation; a
private company;
Ministry of Public
Works; Ministry
of Finance
Creating new
concession for toll
road operation
4 SOEs in toll road
operation; a
private company;
the responsible
government
department
Renegotiating and
revising the former
agreement
Political
Arena
4 House of
Representatives;
the responsible
government
department
Renegotiating and
revising the former
agreement
3.6.2 Analysis of the Second Case Study
The same process that was followed for the first case study was
adopted, beginning with identifying the rounds of decision making.
Four rounds of decision making were identified, as summarized in
Table 3.4. The first round started when the government decided to
conduct a study on the Jakarta West Java tollway system. The study
was completed in 1976. The government then decided to conduct a
further feasibility study of the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road in 1984.
The second round dealt with an initiative for private partnership.
Initially, in 1986, the project was offered internationally and tried to
attract foreign investors. In the end, in 1994, PT Citra Ganesha
Marga Nusantara emerged the winner in the bidding process and
held the right of concession, to build and operate the Cikampek-
Padalarang toll road network. The consortium members consisted of
Trafalgar House from England with 40 percent of the shares, and PT
Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada and PT Jasa Marga each had 30
percent. Land clearance was done by the government from 1990 to
1992.

Chapter 362
However, the consortium did not make any significant progress in
construction due to financial problems because of the Indonesian
financial crisis in late 1997. The third round mainly dealt with the
impact of the crisis. The government issued a presidential decree
(number 39/97) in 1997 and decided to postpone major infrastructure
projects (one of them the Cipularang toll road project). Later, in 2001,
the Ministry of Settlements and Regional Infrastructure (now the
Ministry of Public Works) withdrew the toll road concession from PT
Citra Ganesha Marga Nusantara. Following that, PT Jasa Marga
requested the right of concession of the Cipularang toll road project
from the government. The government then agreed to give the
Cipularang toll road concession to Jasa Marga.
Table 3.4 Rounds of Decision Making (second case study)
Main empirical events Interpretations based on the
rounds model
Study of the Jakarta-West Java
Tollway system (finished in
1976). Project feasibility study
(1984).
The first round
explored a trans-regional
highway transportation system
The toll road project was offered
to foreign investors (1986). The
consortium Citra Ganesha
Marga Nusantara wins the
contract (1994).
The second round
explored private provision
The government announced its
decision to delay the project
because of the economic crisis
(1997). The government then
canceled the concession from
CGMN (2001) and decided that
Jasa Marga (toll road SOEs)
should take over the project
(2002).
The third round
dealt with the financial crisis
President Megawati requested
that Jasa Marga continue
construction of stage II of the
Cipularang toll road (2004).
The fourth round—
Stage II of the Cipularang toll
road
Adapted from Teisman (2000)

Construction of the first stage of the Cipularang toll road began in
2002. The first stage involved construction of 18 km of road, which
was then officially opened for public use by President Megawati in
2004. During the ceremony, President Megawati requested that PT
Jasa Marga construct the second stage of the Cipularang toll road,
which was to be finished before April 2005, mainly because there was
an Asia–Africa conference in Bandung in 2005. According to Jasa
Marga’s previous plans, the second stage of the Cipularang toll road
was scheduled for completion in 2006, not in 2005. Construction of
the second stage of Cipularang (length 41 km) was technically more
difficult due to the geographical terrain, which was hilly and
required high bridges to be constructed. On April 24, 2005,
participants in the Asia–Africa Conference finally used the road to
travel from Jakarta to Bandung. The official opening ceremony was
launched by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in early June
2005, and the road opened to the public on April 26, 2005.
In the second case study, the actors are distinguishable in only
three main groups: the central government, the private sector, and
SOE for toll roads (Table 3.5). It was only to be expected that, in such
a scenario, the central government would take the lead in decision
making due to the social and political characteristics where the
hierarchy in the public administration system was applied.
Table 3.5 Actor Analysis (second case study)
1 Directorate General
of Highways
Transport infrastructure planning
and policy
2 Directorate General
of Highways
Sought private involvement in
development
Private investor Private operator of toll road
Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that
time, Jasa Marga managed the
agreement with private operator
3 Central
Government
Decision to delay the project and
revise the right to concession
Jasa Marga Interested in project development

Chapter 364
Private operator
(CGMN)
Loss of concession
4 Central
government
Full support during the second
stage of development
Jasa Marga Sped up the project completion
There were more actors involved in decision making during the
second round. This was mainly due to government support for private
participation in infrastructure investment. The pattern of
participation and the perception of actors during the second round
was similar to what was observed during the second round in the
first case study.
The decisions about the Cikampek–Padalarang toll road project
were made in more than one arena. The financial crisis also created a
new context policy that affected the decision-making process in the
PPP arena. Table 3.6 presents an arena analysis with the key actors’
involvement and their activities in the arena.
Readers can observe that in the interaction among the three
actors in the second case study there exists almost the same high
frequency of interaction. However, we should also note the
institutional context, such as the formal structure of relationship
between the Directorate General of Highways and Jasa Marga as an
SOE. In this case, a formal rule should play an important role in the
interaction process among actors. In reality, an informal rule is
formed during the mutual interaction (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
Table 3.6 Arena Analysis (second case study)
Planning
Arena
1 Responsible
government
department
Creating a master plan
of transportation
network and policy
PPP
Arena
2 Government
department; SOEs;
private company
Exploring private
partnership for
transport
infrastructure
investment

3.6.3 Analysis of the Third Case Study
The first round of the decision-making process on the JORR project
revolved around conducting a study on the Jakarta West Java
tollway system. The study was completed in 1976. The second round
related to the PPP initiative and ended with the decision that the
JORR would be divided into seven sections (S, E1, E2, E3, N, W1,
W2), and that the project concessions would be awarded to PT Citra
Mataram Satnamarga Persada, PT Citra Bhakti Margatama
Persada, and PT Marga Nurindo Bhakti under a BOT scheme with
the state-owned toll operator PT Jasa Marga. Some of the private
companies are partly owned by former president Soeharto's daughter
Siti Hardijanti Rukmana.
Like the second case study (the Cipularang project), the third
round of JORR decision making was related to the problem of the
economic crisis in late 1997. Construction commenced in 1993, but
had to be abandoned when the crisis occurred. The Asset
Management Unit of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
(IBRA) then took over the companies’ bad debts as the three
companies could not repay their loans to the banks. In return, the
companies surrendered the toll road project to the agency. IBRA and
Jasa Marga then established a new company under the name PT
Jalantol Lingkar Luar Jakarta (JLJ) to take care of the toll road
project and take responsibility for settling its debts to IBRA. One of
the main duties of JLJ was to find a strategic partner or new investor
for the JORR project.
In 2001, IBRA announced that a consortium company, DRB-
HICOM from Malaysia, had been selected as the preferred bidder for
JORR. However, in the same year, Parliament requested that the
JORR project be retendered. The government agreed to retender
JORR using the right-to-match scheme, where DRB-HICOM
Malaysia was the preferred bidder. If other investors proposed a
lower price, DRB-HICOM had the right to make the same bid. If
DRB-HICOM was uninterested, then the winner who proposed the
lowest price would be the investor. When the project retender process
was finalized, there were four applicants: Torno Internationale Spa,
Gamula Berhad, the Jakarta Infrastructure consortium, and the
Malaysian consortium. However, all of them, including the preferred
bidder, were rejected due to their inability to fulfill requirements.
Later on, in 2002, legal opinion from the Attorney General, which
was sought on a request from BPPN, said that the Malaysian
consortium did not have a right anymore over the JORR project.

Chapter 366
Table 3.7 Rounds of Decision Making (third case study)
rounds model
Study of the Jakarta-West Java
Tollway system (finished in
1976).
The first round covered
planning transport infrastructure
system and development
JORR was divided into seven
sections and project concessions
awarded to CMSP, CBMP, and
MSB (1990s).
The second round dealt with
public–private partnership
Presidential decree to postpone
projects due to economic crisis
(1997). Finally, JORR
concession projects were
awarded to the state-owned toll
road operator Jasa Marga
(2002)
The third round dealt with the
financial crisis
Landowners rejected the
compensation on offer of land
acquisition (2004).
The fourth round tackled
land acquisition
The government, through the Committee on Financial Sector Policy
(KKSK), finally decided that the JORR project should be transferred
to the state-owned PT Jasa Marga. In addition, KKSK also gave Jasa
Marga a discount, whereby the company could pay BPPN 50 percent
of the total amount within six months, and could pay the rest by
issuing an obligation. Jasa Marga then resumed construction under
the JORR project. The third round ended when finally the
government awarded Jasa Marga the JORR toll road project.
The fourth round was initiated to tackle the problem of land
acquisition and clearing. A decision made by some landowners who
rejected the compensation offered by Jasa Marga triggered a long
battle during this round. It made little sense to go ahead and
complete the construction of the toll road because of the blockade
created by the landowners. Table 3.7 summarizes the rounds of
decision-making process in the third case study.

To analyze the actors’ participation and perceptions in the third
case study, let us concentrate on the third and fourth rounds. In the
first and second rounds, the actors, participation, and perception
were almost identical to those of the previous cases. In the third
round, actors who were not directly related to toll road investment
were involved in the decision-making process. Actors such as the
BPPN made a central decision by redistributing Indonesia’s rights of
toll road operator. A summary of the actor analysis is presented in
Table 3.8, while arena analysis is presented in Table 3.9.
Table 3.8 Actor Analysis (third case study)
1 Directorate General of
Highways
Transport infrastructure
planning and policy
2 Directorate General of
Highways
Seeking private involvement in
development
Private investor Private operator of toll road
3 Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that
time, Jasa Marga managed the
agreement with the private
operator
Central Government Decision to postpone the
project and revise the
concession right
Jasa Marga Interested in project
development
Indonesia Bank
Restructuring Agency
Redistributing the project to a
new investor
Private toll road
operator.
Interested in project
development
4 Central Government Drafting legal framework of
land acquisition such as
presidential decree.

Chapter 368
Jasa Marga Persuading landowner and
approaching the central
government to create a legal
framework for land acquisition
for development
Landowner Demanding higher payment for
land acquisition
Table 3.9. Arena Analysis (third case study)
Planning
Arena
1 Responsible
government
department
Creating a master
plan of
transportation
network and policy
PPP Arena 2 Government
department, SOEs,
private company
Exploring private
partnership for
transport
infrastructure
investment
Banking and
Asset
Restructuring
Arena
3 Committee on
Financial Sector
Policy; Indonesia
Bank Restructuring
Agency; banking
sector; private
company
Managing assets
(such as toll road)
and transferring a
concession right
and obligation
Political
Arena
3 House of
Representatives; the
central government
Ensuring fair
treatment of the
toll road
investment for toll
road companies

3.6.4 Analysis of the Fourth Case
The rounds of decision making started with a proposal by a private
company, CMNP, to build a triple-decker project—a three-level
transportation system. The project’s aim was to resolve the chronic
problem of transportation in Jakarta and, in particular, to ease the
traffic congestion. The government also planned to construct a
subway between Kota and Blok M, also in South Jakarta. Informally,
President Soeharto agreed to the proposal of the elevated road
linking Blok M and Kota in 1991, and the project feasibility study
was completed in 1993.
Unlike the subway system, a three-level transportation triple-
decker project for the Jakarta transportation network was not
included in the spatial plan or the city’s master plan for 1985–2005.
This issue generated a second round of decision making related to
spatial planning and environment. In August 1997, the project was
then finally included in the revised 1997–2010 spatial plan, which
replaced the 1985–2005 spatial plan.
Both projects seemed to have an equal chance of being adopted.
According to the initial plan, the construction of the subway would
begin in 1997, while the groundbreaking of the triple-decker project
was also scheduled for mid-1997. The Mass Rapid Transit Subway
system was to be built by a consortium of Indonesian, Japanese, and
German companies called the Indonesian Japan European Group,
and President Soeharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was part of it.
Realizing that the construction of a mass rapid railway network
in Indonesia by private companies would be difficult at that time due
to a series of constraints (all of the country’s railway systems are
under the control of the state-owned railway company Perumka, now
PT KAI), PT Citra Lamtorogung Persada tried to cooperate with
Perumka to operate the light rapid transit system. PT Jasa Marga
was also to be part of the project for the toll road operation.
A legal issue came up before construction, viz. whether a
presidential decree (Keppres) was required to carry out the
construction. The company, however, secured permits or decision
letters from the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of
Transportation. But this did not satisfy the city government of
Jakarta, who asked for a presidential decree as a legal basis to give a
clear picture as to what role it should play.
Despite the heavy burden due to the financial crisis in late 1997,
the company was still looking for a possibility to continue the project.
A new governor, Sutiyoso, also supported continuation of the project.

Chapter 370
A new issue that came up in 1998 was an environmental impact
analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan—AMDAL). Since
the construction activity had already been given the go ahead, the
environmental impact analysis demand came quite late. Yet another
issue was public involvement in the project. Furthermore, the
developer was asked to place project implementation details in the
public domain.
Finally, in early 1999, the government decided to cancel the
triple-decker project permit. Thus the fourth round dealing with the
Asian financial crisis ended with the cancellation of permits for
construction and investment, the orders for which was released by
the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation.
Table 3.10 presents the rounds of decision making for the fourth case
study.
Table 3.10 Rounds of Decision Making (fourth case study)
rounds model
A proposal was submitted to the
government by a private party
for a triple-decker project.
(1991). Feasibility study (1993)
The first round:
proposal for triple-decker project
Project included in 1997–2010
revised Jakarta Metropolitan
spatial plan (1997). Pressure on
providing an environmental
impact analysis prior
construction (1998).
The second round:
spatial planning and
environment
The government decides to
cancel the project permit letter
(1999).
The third round:
impact of the financial crisis
The regional government of Jakarta played an important role in the
decision making. The proposed infrastructure had to be in line with
the spatial plan for Jakarta. Therefore, in the second round (see
Table 3.11), the decision by the regional government to revise the
spatial plan was central to the project.

Table 3.11 Actor Analysis (fourth case study)
1 Private Company Proposing an unsolicited
project for the Jakarta area
Central government
(Ministry of
Transportation and
Ministry of Public Works)
Issuing construction permit
Perumka (stated-owned
train operator)
Agreeing to operate the train
in the triple-decker system
2 Regional government Revising the spatial plan
Private company Convincing the regional
government and
environmentalists
3 Private company Recalculating the company’s
financial burden and
exposure from the crisis
Central government
(Ministry of
Transportation and
Ministry of Public Works)
Canceling the consortium’s
construction permit
The decision making involved in the proposed project was mainly
located in two arenas: the planning arena and the regional policy
arena. Table 3.12 presents the arena analysis. In this case, the local
government participated significantly in the planning arena. The
local government also became a key actor in the regional policy
arena. Issues such as environmental impact assessment and spatial
planning were discussed here.

Chapter 372
Table 3.12 Arena Analysis (fourth case study)
Planning
Arena
1 Private company,
central government,
local government
Submitting the
proposal and
making a decision
Regional
Policy
Arena
2 Local government,
the Ministry and
Department,
environment
interests group
Spatial planning
and environmental
planning
3.6.5 Comparison of the Four Cases Studies
During the initial phase of the development of highways, the main
actors in policymaking were the central government (the Directorate
General of Highways) and the donor agency. Subsequently, as seen in
the first case study, a private company came into the arena, and the
donor agency exited the arena. The new policy of private involvement
in infrastructure automatically added a new actor to the
policymaking arena.
In addition, economic, social, and political environmental changes
brought in new actors. The emergence of politicians in parliament as
new actors can be seen clearly from the third case study; they played
significant roles in the decision-making process. Furthermore,
according to Blom-Hansen (1997), reform in municipal areas could
also create new actors in the national arena.
The lack of public consultation, as can be seen from the fourth
case study, shows that including actors who are concerned with the
issues is essentially important in opening up the policy networks to
an extensive set of actors who cannot be considered experts, but who
are stakeholders all the same (Montpetit, 2003).
With the increasing number of actors, powers also become more
distributed, and there was every likelihood that the central
government’s dominant role would be eroded. We can see from the
planning initiative that among the four cases studies, only in the
fourth one did the planning initiative come from the private sector.
Therefore, generally, we can conclude that the public actors (central
and city governments) continue to play a key role in the process,
especially in consultation.

In the fourth case study, even though the developer had already
received a permit letter from the Ministry of Public Works and the
Ministry of Transportation, construction could not be started since
the local network (city government of Jakarta and local council) could
not make a decision without a presidential decree. This suggests that
decisions in PPP projects have to be linked to various different
actors, arenas, and networks, which constitutes not only an
organizational problem in terms of management but also a domain
problem (Klijn & Teisman, 2003).
In this framework, a specific role can be identified for network
analysis. Network analyses are becoming an increasingly significant
aspect of the governmental praxis as planning and policy designs
move further and further from coercive centralized methods toward
the more flexible and complex public management strategies
characteristic of the current era of governance (Howlett, 2002).
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined the decision-making process of infrastructure
through PPPs. The conclusion drawn was that it has become more
complex. Based on a preliminary analysis of four case studies in
Indonesian PPP projects, the study found evidence that in recent
cases, in line with social and environmental changes, decision
making could be seen as a series of rounds where decisions are taken
in various arenas as a series of interactions among multiple actors
involved in the network.
One of the apparent implications is that network analyses are
also becoming increasingly significant for the planning and decision
making of infrastructure in the current era of governance. The
perspective of governance as network steering (Klijn & Koppenjan,
2000; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) recommends the participation of
stakeholders in policymaking because of the interdependency
between actors. Government and business, both control sources that
are necessary to spatial investments and other policy (Oosten &
Esselbrugge, 2004).
From this point of view, the design of policymaking for
infrastructural investment and PPPs particularly should be more
sensitive to the real characteristics of the decision-making process.

Chapter 374
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Chapter 378
Appendix 3.1 Location of case studies
Source: Indonesian Toll Road Authority (BPJT)
Retrieved on February 09, 2009 from http://www.bpjt.net

Appendix 3.2 Interview Guide
Two types of interview guides were used for this research: (1) An
interview guide for the macro policy perspective, intended for policy
makers to get information on the overall infrastructure policy
process, and (2) An interview guide for project-specific processes,
intended to get data and information on the project decision-making
process (specifically as case studies).
(1) Interview guide for general overview of the infrastructure
decision making process
Planning Process
 How is the planning of infrastructure done in your
institution? Who has the responsibility?
 Does the planning result in a written document?
Budgeting and Financing Process
 How is the process of budgeting and financing in relation to
infrastructure done?
 Who is involved in the process?
Infrastructure Data
 How is infrastructure data managed in your institution?
 What type of data is still missing and considered necessary?
Governance
 What obstacles and challenges occur in the planning,
budgeting and financing of infrastructure?
 Are you satisfied with the policy-making process for
infrastructure? Is there any recommendation you would make
to improve it?
(2) Interview guide for the decision-making process of selected
infrastructure projects (case studies)
Historical aspects
 Would you like to explain the history of the project (starting
from the idea and proposal of the project)?
Policy Formulation and Adoption

Chapter 380
 In your opinion (or that of your institution), do you (or your
institution) think the project is necessary? Would you like to
explain why?
 Was the project the only solution? Were there any alternatives
to be considered?
Planning Process
 If your institution was involved in the planning process, how
was the planning of the project done in your institution? Who
had the responsibility?
Budgeting and Financing Process
 How was the budgeting and financing of the project done?
Strands of Activities
 Starting from the idea/initiative for this project, what
problems and issues did you face?
 How did you (or your institution) respond to those issues and
problems?
 During the process, were any non-technical issues (such as
social, political etc.) raised?
Study, Data and Method
 Was any study done by your institution as a background to, or
to support the decision of the project? Who conducted the
study?
 Has any other study been done or directed by other
institutions? Does it reach similar results and conclusion?
Governance
 What institutions or players were involved in the decision-
making process of this project? What was the role of each of
the institutions?
 How did you (or your institution) manage the relationship
with the other players?

Appendix 3.3 List of Respondents
Bambang Susantono
Senior Adviser to the Minister, Coordinating Ministry for Economic
Affairs
Suyono Dikun
Deputy Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development,
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs
Ir. Dedy Krisnariawan Sunoto
Investment Division PT Jasa Marga (SOE of toll road operator)
Hisnu Pawenang
Board Chairman, Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT)
Lalu A. Damanhuri
Infrastructure Consultant, Committee on Policy for the Acceleration
of Infrastructure (KKPPI)
Ir. Rido Matari Ichwan, MCP
Head of Programming and Budgeting Division, Bureau of Planning
and International Cooperation, Ministry of Public Works
Pandu Gunadi A. ST. MUM
Head of Subdivision Programming and Budgeting II, Bureau of
Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Public Works
Sutono
Head of Data and Information, Directorate General of Highways,
Ministry of Public Works
Zulfikri
Planning Division, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of
Transportation
Lukas B. Sihombing
Assistant Manager, PT Citra Marga Nusphala Persada (Private toll
road company)
Dedy Gunawan, ST, MSc.

Chapter 382
Directorate of Urban Road and Toll Road, Ministry of Public Works
Ir. Rahman Arief Dienaputra, M.Eng
Chief of Section of Policy and Strategy, Directorate of Planning,
Hasan Basri
Regional Development Planning (Bappeda), Jakarta
Sayogo
Regional Parliament Jakarta, Head of Commision D for
infrastructure
Bambang Setiadi
Manager, PT CMNP
Trijono Junoasmono
William Wallace
Lead Economist, World Bank, Jakarta
M Akbar
Transportation office, Regional government city of Jakarta
Sylvia Ananda
Listiyaning Handayani
Takehiro Yasui
Representative
Operation & Portfolio
Representative Office in Jakarta
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
Fahmi Shahab
Executive Director
Indonesian Industrial Estate Association (HKI)

Director PT Jalan Tol Lingkar Luar Jakarta: contacted but unable to
meet
Marwan J.
Congress member: contacted but unable to meet

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