![CQMH ABDUL HAMID
4 GRENADIERS (NO 2639985)
At 0800 hours on 10 September 1965 Pakistan forces launched an
attack with a regiment of Patton tanks on a vital area ahead of village
Cheema on the Bhikkiwind road in the Khem Karam Sector. Intense
artillery shelling preceded the attack. The enemy tanks penetrated the
forward position by 0900 hours. Realising the grave situation, CQMH
Abdul Hamid who was commander of a RCL gun detachment moved
out to a flanking position with his gun mounted on a jeep, under
intense enemy shelling and tank fire. Taking an advantageous position,
he knocked out the leading enemy tank and then swiftly changing his
position, he sent another tank up in flames. By this time the enemy
tanks in the area spotted him and brought his jeep under concentrated
machine-gun and high explosive fire. Undeterred, Company Quarter
Master Havildar Abdul Hamid kept on firing on yet another enemy tank
with his recoilless gun. While doing so, he was mortally wounded by an
enemy high explosive shell.
Havildar Abdul Hamid’s brave action inspired his comrades to put up a
gallant fight and to beat back the heavy tank assault by the enemy. His
complete disregard for his personal safety during the operation and his
sustained acts of bravery in the face of constant enemy fire were a
shining example not only to his unit but also to the whole division and
were in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.[2]
[edit]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1965indopakwar-250724164129-9e7d9b07/85/1965-INDO-PAK-WAR-which-Pak-will-never-forget-ppt-43-320.jpg)
1965 INDO PAK WAR which Pak will never forget.ppt
- 1. Capture of Haji Pir Pass Capture of Haji Pir Pass INDO-PAK WAR (1965) INDO-PAK WAR (1965)
- 2. PREVIEW PREVIEW PHASE I PHASE I : EVENTS LEADING TO THE : EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISES CRISES PHASE II PHASE II : BATTLE OF CHHAMB : BATTLE OF CHHAMB AND ITS CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND ITS CRITICAL ANALYSIS PHASE III PHASE III : INDIAN COUNTER : INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE OFFENSIVE
- 3. PHASE I PHASE I EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISIS EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISIS
- 4. Studied from AMU, in India, and at the British Royal Military College, at Sandhurst, he was commissioned as an offr in the Indian Army(1928). Ayub Khan Ayub Khan Lal Bahadur Shastri Lal Bahadur Shastri PERSONALITIES PERSONALITIES
- 5. Gen JN Chaudhuri Gen JN Chaudhuri COAS, 19 Nov COAS, 19 Nov 1962 - 07 June 66 1962 - 07 June 66 Armd Corps, Armd Corps, 16 CAV and 7 LC 16 CAV and 7 LC
- 6. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT INDIA-CHINA CONFLICT OF 1962- INDIA-CHINA CONFLICT OF 1962- LOW LOW MORALE. POSSIBILITY OF TWO FRONT MORALE. POSSIBILITY OF TWO FRONT CONFLICT CONFLICT SINO-PAK RELATIONS SINO-PAK RELATIONS HAZRATBAL SHRINE INCIDENT HAZRATBAL SHRINE INCIDENT (26 DEC 1963) (26 DEC 1963) DEATH OF NEHRU IN 1964 DEATH OF NEHRU IN 1964 AND TRANSFER OF AND TRANSFER OF POWER TO SHASTRI POWER TO SHASTRI CANAL DEFENCE IN PAKISTAN CANAL DEFENCE IN PAKISTAN - - MARALA - RAVI LINK MARALA - RAVI LINK CANAL CANAL (MRL) (MRL) CONNECTS CHENAB AND RAVI CONNECTS CHENAB AND RAVI - - BAMBANWALA - RAVI – BEDIAN BAMBANWALA - RAVI – BEDIAN (BRB) (BRB) / / ICHHOGIL CANAL/ AYUB LINE ICHHOGIL CANAL/ AYUB LINE CONNECTS RAVI AND SUTLEJ CONNECTS RAVI AND SUTLEJ - ANTI TK OBSTACLE : 90 TO 140 FT WIDE - ANTI TK OBSTACLE : 90 TO 140 FT WIDE AND 18 FT DEEP WITH CONCRETE PILL AND 18 FT DEEP WITH CONCRETE PILL
- 8. RANN OF KUTCH RANN OF KUTCH
- 10. RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT -09 -09TH TH APR : APR : PAK 51 INF BDE PAK 51 INF BDE ATTACKED THREE ATTACKED THREE MILES SOUTH WEST OF KANJARKOT MILES SOUTH WEST OF KANJARKOT -24 -24TH TH APR: APR: PAK 8 INF DIV PAK 8 INF DIV AGAINST IND BDE AGAINST IND BDE ATTACK ON KANJARKOT, SARDAR POST AND ATTACK ON KANJARKOT, SARDAR POST AND VIGKOT WITH TKS AND ARTY VIGKOT WITH TKS AND ARTY -30TH JUN: AGREEMENT -30TH JUN: AGREEMENT - PAK CONCLUDED IND ARMY TO BE - PAK CONCLUDED IND ARMY TO BE ILL-EQUIPPED, WITH LOW MORALE AND ILL-EQUIPPED, WITH LOW MORALE AND CHANCE OF WN INTERVENTION CHANCE OF WN INTERVENTION CONVOY DISTURBANCE BY PAK CONVOY DISTURBANCE BY PAK, CAPTURE , CAPTURE TWO PAK POSTS ON 16 TWO PAK POSTS ON 16TH TH MAY, RETURNED BACK MAY, RETURNED BACK ON UN ASSURANCE ON UN ASSURANCE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
- 11. PAK INFLITRATORS IN KASHMIR: PAK INFLITRATORS IN KASHMIR: GIBRALTOR GIBRALTOR FORCE FORCE HIGHLY TRAINED GUERILLA FORCE OF 30,000 HIGHLY TRAINED GUERILLA FORCE OF 30,000 MEN INFILT BY PAK DURING 05 AUG-10 AUG MEN INFILT BY PAK DURING 05 AUG-10 AUG FOR PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE, UNDERMINE THE FOR PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE, UNDERMINE THE LOCAL GOVT AND MAKE THE ENVIRONMENT LOCAL GOVT AND MAKE THE ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE FOR LAND OFFENSIVE CONDUCIVE FOR LAND OFFENSIVE NO OF TASK FORCES RAISED, EACH NO OF TASK FORCES RAISED, EACH COMPRISING 3-6 COY’S : EACH COY COMPRISING 3-6 COY’S : EACH COY CONSISTED OF 35-40 POK SOLDIERS, 3-4 OR CONSISTED OF 35-40 POK SOLDIERS, 3-4 OR FROM SPL SERVICE GP AND ABOUT 66 FROM SPL SERVICE GP AND ABOUT 66 MUJAHIDS. COY COMMANDED BY REGULAR MUJAHIDS. COY COMMANDED BY REGULAR PAK OR POK ARMY OFFRS PAK OR POK ARMY OFFRS INFIL FORCES EQP WITH PAK ARMS, AMN, INFIL FORCES EQP WITH PAK ARMS, AMN, EQPT AND CLOTHING/RATIONS EQPT AND CLOTHING/RATIONS
- 12. INFILTRATION BY GIBRALTER FORCE INFILTRATION BY GIBRALTER FORCE
- 13. GIBRALTOR FORCE GIBRALTOR FORCE CONSISTED OF FOLLOWING CONSISTED OF FOLLOWING TASK FORCES TASK FORCES TARIQ FORCE- TARIQ FORCE- AREA KARGIL AREA KARGIL QASIM FORCE- QASIM FORCE- AREA GURES AREA GURES KHALID FORCE- KHALID FORCE- TITHWAL SEC TITHWAL SEC JACOB FORCE – MINIMANG AREA JACOB FORCE – MINIMANG AREA SALAHUDDIN FORCE- SALAHUDDIN FORCE- AREA URI AREA URI GULMARG-SRI AND MANDI GULMARG-SRI AND MANDI NUSRAT FORCE- NUSRAT FORCE- AREA RAJAURI- AREA RAJAURI- MENDHAR MENDHAR GHAZNAVI FORCE GHAZNAVI FORCE IN AREA DARHAL- IN AREA DARHAL- THANAMANDI-BUDIL THANAMANDI-BUDIL BABUR FORCE BABUR FORCE IN AREA NAUSHERA- IN AREA NAUSHERA- CHHAMB CHHAMB MURTAZA FORCE MURTAZA FORCE – KEL AREA – KEL AREA
- 14. TASK • To estb infiltration bases for op at all pts within the state of J&K with the sp of anti Indian elements. • To fan out from bases as and when possible in order to commit act of sabotage and violence, to terrorize peaceful and loyal citizens and to provide sp to pro Pakistan elements • To atk civil and military personnel and govt institutions in different parts of the Jammu and Kashmir state so as to disperse Indian Army and Police forces as much as possible. • To create tension and unrest in J&K and instigate lawless activities with a view to paralysing the adm and projecting a picture of internal revolt in the state • To facilitate the induction of increased no of armed forces from pakistan
- 15. OTHER OBJECTIVES • Destruction of bridges and disruption of lines of comn • Raid on amn dumps and supply dumps • Raid on Indian fmns and unit HQs • Ambushing of convoys and patrols • Finally merge with local population and await further orders
- 16. WHY GIBRALTOR FAILED? • Political atmosphere in J&K was misjudged by Pakistan • Minimal support from the local population • No kashmiri leader were taken into confidence by Pak …. To maint secrecy of Ops • Morale of Mujahids and Razakars • Pak overestimated the capacity of their guerillas and under estimated the capacity of Indian security forces • Poor Adm • Launching of Ops was poorly planned
- 17. RAIDERS TO INF IN SMALL GPS IN RAIDERS TO INF IN SMALL GPS IN KASHMIR FROM ALL DIR AND KASHMIR FROM ALL DIR AND CONCENTRATE IN VALLEY BY 7 AUG 1965 CONCENTRATE IN VALLEY BY 7 AUG 1965 5 5TH TH AUG RPTD BY MOHAMMAD DIN AND AUG RPTD BY MOHAMMAD DIN AND WAZIR AHMAD WAZIR AHMAD COUNTER INF OPS BY INDIA : COUNTER INF OPS BY INDIA : CROSS CFL CROSS CFL ON 15 AUG: ON 15 AUG: - CAPTURE OF - CAPTURE OF HAJIPIR PASS HAJIPIR PASS - CAPTURE OF - CAPTURE OF KRISHNAGANGA BULGE KRISHNAGANGA BULGE • OP GRANDSLAM OP GRANDSLAM :01 SEP- FULL FLEDGED :01 SEP- FULL FLEDGED ATTACK BY PAK ARMY ON CHHAMB ATTACK BY PAK ARMY ON CHHAMB • INDIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE INDIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE : ATTACK : ATTACK ON LAHORE AND SIALKOT ON 6 ON LAHORE AND SIALKOT ON 6TH TH / 7 / 7TH TH OF OF SEP SEP • ENDED AT 0300 HRS ON 23 SEP WITH ENDED AT 0300 HRS ON 23 SEP WITH TASHKENT DECLARATION TASHKENT DECLARATION
- 18. OPS LAUNCHED • OP KABADI • EX ARROW HEAD • OP DESERT HAWK I, II, III • OP BAKSHI • OP ABLAZE
- 19. PHASE II PHASE II BATTLE OF CHHAMB AND ITS BATTLE OF CHHAMB AND ITS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS
- 21. PAK ATT ON CHHAMB-JAURIAN PAK ATT ON CHHAMB-JAURIAN OP ‘GRAND SLAM’ OP ‘GRAND SLAM’ SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC: SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC: • THIS WAS OPEN AND PLAIN COUNTRY AND THE THIS WAS OPEN AND PLAIN COUNTRY AND THE ONLY TANKABLE AREAALONG THE CFL ONLY TANKABLE AREAALONG THE CFL • AKHNOOR WAS A STRATEGIC POINT ON AKHNOOR WAS A STRATEGIC POINT ON JAMMU-RAJOURI-POONCH LINE OF JAMMU-RAJOURI-POONCH LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS • PAK HAD A SHORT LINE OF COMMUNICATION PAK HAD A SHORT LINE OF COMMUNICATION FOR LOG FOR LOG • THIS SEC ALLOWED THE NEAREST AND MOST THIS SEC ALLOWED THE NEAREST AND MOST DIRECT APPROACH ACROSS THE CFL TO THE DIRECT APPROACH ACROSS THE CFL TO THE ONLY BRIDGE OVER RIVER CHENAB AT ONLY BRIDGE OVER RIVER CHENAB AT AKHNNOOR. AKHNNOOR.
- 22. SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC • FOR INDIA, BRINGING UP OF HEAVY FOR INDIA, BRINGING UP OF HEAVY ARMOUR FROM JAMMU WOULD BE A ARMOUR FROM JAMMU WOULD BE A PROBLEM AS AKHNOOR BRIDGE WAS CL18- PROBLEM AS AKHNOOR BRIDGE WAS CL18- LOG HANDICAP LOG HANDICAP • ACC TO CFLAGREEMENT OF 1949, INDIA ACC TO CFLAGREEMENT OF 1949, INDIA COULD ONLY KEEPA STIPULATED NO OF COULD ONLY KEEPA STIPULATED NO OF TPS IN THIS AREA. REINFORCEMENT FROM TPS IN THIS AREA. REINFORCEMENT FROM JAMMU WOULD HAVE THINNED THE DEF JAMMU WOULD HAVE THINNED THE DEF AT JAMMU AT JAMMU • THE AREA WAS SUITABLE FOR DEP OF HVY THE AREA WAS SUITABLE FOR DEP OF HVY ARTY ARTY • PAK COULD CONC ITS ASSAULT FORCE IN PAK COULD CONC ITS ASSAULT FORCE IN OWN TERRITROY WITHOUT VIOLATION OF OWN TERRITROY WITHOUT VIOLATION OF CFLAGREEMENT CFLAGREEMENT
- 23. SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC • PAK HAD EASY AND QUICK ACCESS TO PAK HAD EASY AND QUICK ACCESS TO THIS SEC FROM SIALKOT AND KHARIYAN THIS SEC FROM SIALKOT AND KHARIYAN • TAC ADV FOR PAK WAS THAT RIVER TAC ADV FOR PAK WAS THAT RIVER CHENAB PROTECTED THE EASTERN CHENAB PROTECTED THE EASTERN FLANK OF THEIR OFF, WHILE THE WN FLANK OF THEIR OFF, WHILE THE WN FLANK WAS PROTECTED BY ROUGH MTN FLANK WAS PROTECTED BY ROUGH MTN TERRAIN TERRAIN • BEING OPEN COUNTRY ON PAK SIDE IT BEING OPEN COUNTRY ON PAK SIDE IT ALLOWED PAK ARMOUR COMPLETE ALLOWED PAK ARMOUR COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE IN ITS FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE IN ITS APPROACH TO OUR DEFENCES. APPROACH TO OUR DEFENCES.
- 24. ORBAT PAK FORCES ORBAT PAK FORCES 12 PAK 12 PAK INF DIV INF DIV (MAJ GEN AKHTAR (MAJ GEN AKHTAR MALIK) MALIK) (I) 102 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS (I) 102 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS (II) 10 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS (II) 10 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS (III) 4 AK BDE WITH 3 BNS (III) 4 AK BDE WITH 3 BNS 02 COYS OF 12 FRONTIER FORCE 02 COYS OF 12 FRONTIER FORCE O2 O2 ARMD REGTS ARMD REGTS SP OF SP OF CORPS ARTY CORPS ARTY AND OWN AND OWN DIV DIV ARTY ARTY
- 25. ORBAT ORBAT INDIAN INDIAN FORCES FORCES 191 191 INF BDE INF BDE (BRIG MAN MOHAN SINGH) (BRIG MAN MOHAN SINGH) (I) (I) 15 KUMAON 15 KUMAON (II) (II) 3 MAHAR 3 MAHAR (III) (III) 6 SIKH LI 6 SIKH LI (IV) (IV) 3 J & K MILITIA 3 J & K MILITIA (V) (V) 6/5 GR 6/5 GR (VI) (VI) 3 PUNJAB ARMD POLICE (PAP) 3 PUNJAB ARMD POLICE (PAP) C SQN EX 20 LANCERS C SQN EX 20 LANCERS 14 14 FD REGT FD REGT 39 39 MED REGT MED REGT
- 26. COMPARISON OF FORCES COMPARISON OF FORCES PAKISTAN PAKISTAN • 7 ½ INF BNS 7 ½ INF BNS 6 INF BNS 6 INF BNS • 2 ARMD REGTS 1 ARMD SQN 2 ARMD REGTS 1 ARMD SQN (PATTON ) (AMX TANKS) (PATTON ) (AMX TANKS) • CORPS ARTY TROOP OF CORPS ARTY TROOP OF MED GUNS MED GUNS PAK HAD 6:1 SUPERIOTY IN ARMOUR PAK HAD 6:1 SUPERIOTY IN ARMOUR INDIAN INDIAN
- 27. PAKISTAN’S AIMS PAKISTAN’S AIMS (A) (A) TO STALL INDIAN OFF ACROSS CFL TO STALL INDIAN OFF ACROSS CFL (B) (B) TO CAPTURE AKHNOOR AND THE TO CAPTURE AKHNOOR AND THE BRIDGE ACROSS RIVER CHENAB BRIDGE ACROSS RIVER CHENAB (C) (C) TO COMPEL INDIA TO REINFORCE ITS TO COMPEL INDIA TO REINFORCE ITS TPS IN CHAMB-JAURIAN SEC, TPS IN CHAMB-JAURIAN SEC, THEREBY THINNING OUT DEF IN THEREBY THINNING OUT DEF IN JAMMU JAMMU (D) (D) TO STRIKE A SECOND BLOW FROM TO STRIKE A SECOND BLOW FROM SIALKOT SIDE TO CAPTURE JAMMU SIALKOT SIDE TO CAPTURE JAMMU (E) (E) TO HAVE TERRITORIAL GAINS TO HAVE TERRITORIAL GAINS
- 29. BATTLE OF CHHAMB BATTLE OF CHHAMB • Pak off started 0345 hrs on 1 Pak off started 0345 hrs on 1st st Sep. Sep. • Intense Arty bombardment along CFL for 3 Intense Arty bombardment along CFL for 3 hrs immediately after which made Armour hrs immediately after which made Armour thrust and captured area upto Mandiala. thrust and captured area upto Mandiala. • Cdr asked for Air strike but delayed Cdr asked for Air strike but delayed •At 2030 hrs HQ 15 Corps ordered GOC 10 Inf At 2030 hrs HQ 15 Corps ordered GOC 10 Inf Div to assume immediate Op Comd & and 191 Div to assume immediate Op Comd & and 191 Inf Bde to withdraw. By 0300hrs Chhamb in Inf Bde to withdraw. By 0300hrs Chhamb in Pak hands Pak hands •2nd Sep at 1100hrs Gen Yahya Khan took 2nd Sep at 1100hrs Gen Yahya Khan took charge of Ops charge of Ops
- 30. • 191 withdrew 1 191 withdrew 1st st /2 /2nd nd ni to Akhnur ni to Akhnur • 41 Mtn Bde to occupy Jaurian with one 41 Mtn Bde to occupy Jaurian with one Sqn of Armour and one Fd Regt of Arty. Sqn of Armour and one Fd Regt of Arty. • 2 2nd nd morning one Inf Bn moved for protection morning one Inf Bn moved for protection of Akhnur Bridge of Akhnur Bridge • 2 2nd nd Sep Pak did not press their successful Sep Pak did not press their successful thrust losing advantage and allowing for thrust losing advantage and allowing for Indian rft. Indian rft. • 3 3rd rd Sep attack on Jaurian but 41 Inf Bde held Sep attack on Jaurian but 41 Inf Bde held grd. By ni of 4 grd. By ni of 4th th very little fight left in them. very little fight left in them. Pulled to Akhnoor Pulled to Akhnoor BATTLE OF CHHAMB (Contd) BATTLE OF CHHAMB (Contd)
- 31. CRITICALANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT CRITICALANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT 1. 1. WELL DEFINED WELL DEFINED SELECTION AND MAINT OF AIM SELECTION AND MAINT OF AIM 2. 2. FAILURE IN MAINTAINENCE OFAIM FAILURE IN MAINTAINENCE OFAIM BY PAK BY PAK 3. 3. FAILURE IN FAILURE IN APPRECIATION OF ATTACK APPRECIATION OF ATTACK BY IND BY IND 4. 4. FAILURE IN FAILURE IN PREPARATION OF IND DEF PREPARATION OF IND DEF -Concrete def not constructed -Concrete def not constructed -Enough amn not stocked for def battle -Enough amn not stocked for def battle -Mines not positioned in time so could not be laid -Mines not positioned in time so could not be laid -Tank str not boosted up in time -Tank str not boosted up in time -Troops dply only N and W of Tawi -Troops dply only N and W of Tawi - S portion of E Tawi unprotected - S portion of E Tawi unprotected - Bridge not str - Bridge not str - Meagre tk force West of Tawi - Meagre tk force West of Tawi
- 32. CRITICALANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT CRITICALANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT 5. IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT AIR SUPPORT not available to 191 Inf not available to 191 Inf Bde , knocking out own tanks and engage own troops Bde , knocking out own tanks and engage own troops and amn dumps. Need to define bomb line and amn dumps. Need to define bomb line 6. 6. LACK OF LACK OF INF-TANK COOPERATION INF-TANK COOPERATION 7. 7. POOR COMMU SYSTEM POOR COMMU SYSTEM : 3 Mahar remained out of : 3 Mahar remained out of touch with the Bde throughout the war. Wireless touch with the Bde throughout the war. Wireless communication should be foolproof communication should be foolproof 8. 8. HQ 10 HQ 10 INF DIV WAS INF DIV WAS NEWLY RAISED NEWLY RAISED and not fit to and not fit to take Ops role take Ops role 9. 9. Effective PAK Effective PAK INT INT 10. 10. ROLE OF TANKS ROLE OF TANKS
- 33. PHASE III PHASE III INDIAN INDIAN COUNTER COUNTER OFFENSIVE OFFENSIVE
- 34. INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE
- 35. INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE-6TH SEP 1965 • WN COMD RESPONSIBLE FOR OPS AGAINST WN COMD RESPONSIBLE FOR OPS AGAINST WN PAK IN LAHORE, SIALKOT AND KASUR WN PAK IN LAHORE, SIALKOT AND KASUR • LT GEN HARBAKSH SINGH GOC-IN-C, HAD 1 LT GEN HARBAKSH SINGH GOC-IN-C, HAD 1 AND 11 CORPS UNDER HIS COMD AND 11 CORPS UNDER HIS COMD • LAHORE OFF WAS LAHORE OFF WAS 3 PRONGED ATTACK BY 3 PRONGED ATTACK BY 11 CORPS: 11 CORPS: - FIRST ALONG GT ROAD AXIS, FROM FIRST ALONG GT ROAD AXIS, FROM, , WAGAH TO DOGRAI WAGAH TO DOGRAI (15 INF DIV) (15 INF DIV) - SECOND ALONG SECOND ALONG BHIKKIWIND-BARKI BHIKKIWIND-BARKI AXIS AXIS (7 INF DIV) (7 INF DIV) - THIRD ALONG THIRD ALONG KHEMKARAN-KASUR AXIS KHEMKARAN-KASUR AXIS (4 MTN DIV) (4 MTN DIV)
- 36. GEN HARBAKSH SINGH GEN HARBAKSH SINGH
- 41. Brigadier Niranjan Brigadier Niranjan Singh shows the false Singh shows the false outer wall of one of the outer wall of one of the pill boxes captured in pill boxes captured in the Battle of Dograi. the Battle of Dograi.
- 43. CQMH ABDUL HAMID 4 GRENADIERS (NO 2639985) At 0800 hours on 10 September 1965 Pakistan forces launched an attack with a regiment of Patton tanks on a vital area ahead of village Cheema on the Bhikkiwind road in the Khem Karam Sector. Intense artillery shelling preceded the attack. The enemy tanks penetrated the forward position by 0900 hours. Realising the grave situation, CQMH Abdul Hamid who was commander of a RCL gun detachment moved out to a flanking position with his gun mounted on a jeep, under intense enemy shelling and tank fire. Taking an advantageous position, he knocked out the leading enemy tank and then swiftly changing his position, he sent another tank up in flames. By this time the enemy tanks in the area spotted him and brought his jeep under concentrated machine-gun and high explosive fire. Undeterred, Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid kept on firing on yet another enemy tank with his recoilless gun. While doing so, he was mortally wounded by an enemy high explosive shell. Havildar Abdul Hamid’s brave action inspired his comrades to put up a gallant fight and to beat back the heavy tank assault by the enemy. His complete disregard for his personal safety during the operation and his sustained acts of bravery in the face of constant enemy fire were a shining example not only to his unit but also to the whole division and were in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.[2] [edit]
- 44. Major General Rajinder Major General Rajinder Singh Sparrow MVC, Singh Sparrow MVC, GOC 1st Armd Div, GOC 1st Armd Div, leans on a captured leans on a captured Pakistani Patton tank, Pakistani Patton tank, after the Battle of after the Battle of Assal Uttar Assal Uttar. It is here . It is here where Pakistan's 1st where Pakistan's 1st Armd Div, consisting Armd Div, consisting of American-supplied of American-supplied Patton tanks, suffered Patton tanks, suffered a humiliating defeat a humiliating defeat from the Indian Army. from the Indian Army.
- 45. Manning the post, Manning the post, in this image, is in this image, is Gren Mohammed Gren Mohammed Shafi, who killed a Shafi, who killed a Pakistani Div Cdr, Pakistani Div Cdr, with a LMG burst, with a LMG burst, during the war. during the war.
- 46. VICTORY AT KHEM KARAN VICTORY AT KHEM KARAN
- 47. PAKISTAN 1 ARMD DIV DESTROYED PAKISTAN 1 ARMD DIV DESTROYED
- 48. Abandoned M-48 Patton tank at khem karan Abandoned M-48 Patton tank at khem karan
- 50. INDIAN I CORPS OPS INDIAN I CORPS OPS • IND 1 CORPS CONSISTED OF : IND 1 CORPS CONSISTED OF : 1 ARMD DIV 1 ARMD DIV-CAPTURE PHILLORAAND ADV -CAPTURE PHILLORAAND ADV TO MARLA-RAVI LINK. REDUCE PAGOWAL, TO MARLA-RAVI LINK. REDUCE PAGOWAL, CHAWINDA CHAWINDA ENROUTE ENROUTE 6 MTN DIV 6 MTN DIV – BRIDGE-HEAD IN AREA – BRIDGE-HEAD IN AREA MAHARAJKE-CHARWAAND FIRM BASE TO MAHARAJKE-CHARWAAND FIRM BASE TO 1 ARMD DIV 1 ARMD DIV 14 INF DIV 14 INF DIV – CAPTURE – CAPTURE ZAFARWAL ZAFARWAL 26 INF DIV 26 INF DIV – CONTAIN PAK FORCES IN AREA – CONTAIN PAK FORCES IN AREA SIALKOT SIALKOT • OP GIVEN CODE NAME OP GIVEN CODE NAME ‘NEPAL’ ‘NEPAL’
- 51. Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzonji Tarapore
- 52. Somewhere in the Somewhere in the Sialkot sector, the Div Sialkot sector, the Div Cdr (second from left) Cdr (second from left) and a Col (third from and a Col (third from left) dancing with the left) dancing with the soldiers (Gurkhas) soldiers (Gurkhas) from their unit. from their unit. Victory Dance Victory Dance
- 53. Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh examines a captured M4 Sherman tank in examines a captured M4 Sherman tank in the Chawinda sector. the Chawinda sector.
- 54. TERRITORIAL GAINS TERRITORIAL GAINS INDIA INDIA: : - 720 SQ MILES OF PAK TERRITORY 720 SQ MILES OF PAK TERRITORY (a) (a) HAJIPIR BULGE HAJIPIR BULGE (b) (b) STRIP OF LAND AROUND TITHWAL STRIP OF LAND AROUND TITHWAL (c) (c) STRIP OF LAND IN PUN BETWEEN BORDER STRIP OF LAND IN PUN BETWEEN BORDER AND ICHHOGIL CANAL AND ICHHOGIL CANAL PAK: PAK: - -220 SQ MILE OF IND TERRITORY 220 SQ MILE OF IND TERRITORY (a) (a) STRIP OF LAND IN CHHAMB-AKHNOOR STRIP OF LAND IN CHHAMB-AKHNOOR SECTOR SECTOR (b) (b) NARROW WEDGE AROUND KHEMKARAN IN NARROW WEDGE AROUND KHEMKARAN IN PB PB
- 55. INDIAN INDIAN (a) (a) 128 TKS INCL 128 TKS INCL SHERMAN AND SHERMAN AND AMX AMX (b) (b) 35 AIR CRAFTS 35 AIR CRAFTS (c) (c) 1250-2700 1250-2700 KILLED KILLED (d) (d) 8400 WOUNDED 8400 WOUNDED (e) (e) 1500- 1500- PRISONERS PRISONERS PAK PAK (a) (a)1/3 OF ITS ARMOUR& 1/3 OF ITS ARMOUR& UPTO 60% OF ITS UPTO 60% OF ITS PATTON FORCE PATTON FORCE ( (b) 7O AIR CRAFTS b) 7O AIR CRAFTS (c) EQUALLY HIGH CAS (c) EQUALLY HIGH CAS OF PER OF PER CASUALITIES CASUALITIES