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The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries

This document summarizes a study examining the characteristics and effects of political influence on firms in developing countries. The study finds that politically influential firms receive economic benefits like lower taxes and easier access to credit. However, these firms also provide benefits to politicians through maintaining higher employment levels and paying more taxes. While influential firms earn higher profits, they are less productive than non-influential firms and are less likely to invest or innovate due to restrictions on firing workers and unpredictable taxes imposed on them. Overall, the study suggests that political influence undermines firm performance and can prolong economic underdevelopment.

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The Costs of Political In‡uence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries1 Raj M. Desai2 Georgetown University Anders Olofsgård3 Georgetown University May 2011 1 We are grateful for comments from Torbjörn Becker, Lael Brainard, Marc Busch, Tore Ellingsen, Garance Genicot, Sanford Gordon, James Habyarimana, Homi Kharas, Chloé Le Coq, Johannes Linn, Rod Ludema, Lars Persson, Dennis Quinn, Vijaya Ramachandran, George Shambaugh, Anna Sjögren, David Strömberg, and two anonymous reviewers. Previous drafts were presented at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Research Institute for Industrial Studies, the Delhi School of Economics, Stockholm University, the Stockholm School of Economics, the Brookings Institution, and the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2 Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government, Georgetown Uni- versity; the Brookings Institution. Email: desair@georgetown.edu 3 Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Economics, Georgetown Uni- versity; Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Email: afo2@georgetown.edu
Abstract Arrangements by which politically connected …rms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or e¤ects of in‡uence in business- government relationships. We present a simple model in which in‡uence requires …rms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political in‡uence improves the business environment for selected …rms, but restricts their ability to …re workers. Under these conditions, if political in‡uence primarily lowers …xed costs over variable costs, then favored …rms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will su¤er, even if they earn higher pro…ts than non-in‡uential …rms. We rely on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 …rms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We …nd that in‡uential …rms bene…t from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these …rms also provide politically valuable bene…ts to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these …rms are worse-performing than their non-in‡uential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
Arrangements by which …rms with close ties to incumbent political authorities receive fa- vors that have economic value are a pervasive feature of business-government relationships in countries around the world. Despite the prevalence of these arrangements, however, relatively little is known about the precise form …rm-level political in‡uence takes, or its consequences. What characterizes the bargain between in‡uential …rms and governments? How do in‡uen- tial …rms compensate governments, if at all, for any bene…ts they receive? Recent …rm-level analyses have examined various determinants of political in‡uence, and how these connec- tions a¤ect market valuation. Others have detailed the channels through which the bene…ts accrue. Still other, …nally, have explained how “systems”of in‡uence come into being, and why they survive. Much less is known, however, of how these political connections a¤ect decisions within …rms or of the strings that may come attached to political in‡uence. We investigate both the characteristics that de…ne political in‡uence among …rms in developing countries as well as the e¤ects of that in‡uence on company behavior and per- formance. We argue that political in‡uence improves the business environment for selected …rms through industrial or quasi-industrial policies, but restricts their ability to …re workers. In‡uential …rms thus relinquish a portion of their control rights— particularly over employ- ment decisions— in order to provide bene…ts of political value to public o¢ cials. If in‡uence lowers …xed operating costs for privileged …rms, they may earn higher pro…ts than non- in‡uential …rms but they will be less likely to invest or innovate, and their productivity will su¤er. Firm-level political in‡uence, therefore, can undermine the performance of politically- powerful …rms. We draw on …rm-level surveys in approximately 40 developing countries, consisting of over 8,000 enterprises. We …nd that politically in‡uential …rms do indeed face a more favor- able business environment than their non-in‡uential counterparts across several dimensions. 1
However, in‡uential …rms also tend to carry bloated payrolls and report more (hide less?) of their sales to tax authorities, suggesting two mechanisms by which they o¤er political compensation: employment levels and tax revenues. In‡uential …rms are also less likely to open new product lines or production facilities, or to close obsolete ones; they also report lower real growth in sales, shorter investment horizons, and lower productivity levels than non-in‡uential …rms. These results are robust to adjustments for a number of biases in the survey data. Taken together, our results imply that …rm-speci…c industrial policy will be more prone to cronyism than policies that do not target individual …rms. Our results can also explain why crony capitalism persists in countries despite its adverse e¤ects on long- term economic performance. Finally, our …ndings o¤er some con…rmation for the view that politically-devised restrictions that block access to technologies and preserve rents for elites are at the heart of prolonged economic under-development. Political In‡uence in Business-State Relations Three sets of questions must be addressed in order to assess the characteristics and e¤ects of …rm-level political in‡uence: (i) what bene…ts do in‡uential …rms receive? (ii) what bene…ts do politicians receive?; and (iii) what are the economic consequences of political in‡uence? For the …rst question, arrangements by which political authorities grant favors to in‡uential economic agents that allow these agents to earn above-market returns has been documented in case studies and some cross-national analyses. On the other hand, little empirical investigation has been conducted regarding the last two questions. 2
Bene…ts to Firms The speci…c nature of relationships of in‡uence varies from country to country. Studies of US campaign …nance, political action committees, and the revolving door between lobbying …rms and congressional sta¤ o¢ ces, have typically identi…ed the ties that politically-in‡uential US …rms can forge with speci…c political …gures (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Ang and Boyer 2000, Krozner and Stratmann 1998). In developing nations, political in‡uence is usually obtained through a combination of kinship ties, political alliances, ethnic solidarity, or …nancial dealings between owners and political elites. One e¤ect of these connections is that share values are often linked to individual politicians. Share prices for …rms connected to the ruling Suharto family in Indonesia fell when rumors circulated that Suharto was experiencing health problems (Fisman 2001). During the Asian …nancial crisis, the closure of o¤shore currency markets bene…tted …rms with political connections to Malaysian prime minister Mahathir (Johnson and Mitton 2003). Brazilian …rms that provided contributions to federal deputies experienced rising share values at election time (Claessen, Feijen, and Laeven 2006). Favors granted to in‡uential …rms have large economic value. In Pakistan, politically connected …rms borrow more and have higher default rates than other …rms (Khwaja and Mian 2005). These di¤erences in access to credit are all driven by lending practices from government banks, and bene…ts increase with the strength of the political connections. Cross- national evidence also shows that …rms whose controlling shareholders or top managers are members of legislatures or national governments enjoy easier access to debt …nancing, lower taxation, and greater market shares, and that in‡uential …rms also consider the judicial system and tax regulations to be less constraining (Faccio 2006, Chong and Gradstein 2007). Conversely, …rms excluded from these privileges may be forced to rely on graft in order to compete with more in‡uential …rms. 3
In‡uence as Mutual Exchange A common perspective is that politically-powerful …rms manipulate policies and shape leg- islation in order to give themselves long-term material bene…ts (e.g. Hellman et al. 2003, Slinko et al. 2005). But these "state-capture" models convey the mistaken impression that governments are unwitting victims of this behavior rather than willing participants in a rela- tionship that is mutually bene…cial to politicians and …rms alike. Substantial evidence from around the world suggests, however, that political in‡uence is better characterized as an “elite exchange”between …rms and politicians, whereby economic rewards are transferred to …rms that provide politicians with politically-valuable services in return. In the 1990s in‡uential Russian businesses, for example, were more likely to be subject to price controls and more frequent inspections— both being bene…cial to politicians (Frye 2003). In countries such as Mexico and Thailand, companies that acquired concessions during the privatization of state telecoms companies were able to …x prices, restrict the supply of connections, or engage in predatory pricing against would-be competitors while anti-trust authorities looked the other way (Winter 2007; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). In all cases, speci…c political parties or public o¢ cials bene…ted directly as a result of elevating these …rms to positions of political in‡uence.1 One channel by which powerful …rms can reward politicians is through employment. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that in‡uential …rms receiving public subsidies will, in re- turn, cede some control rights over employment decisions to politicians (who bene…t from low unemployment rates). Robinson and Verdier (2002) also emphasize the advantage of control over employment decisions, suggesting that politicians can generate support through selec- 1 More generally, Choi and Thum (2007) argue that the provision of rent streams from …rms to governments is a fundamental part of the in‡uence “bargain” allowing …rms to invest in stabilizing the political regime because, in case of a changeover, the …rm will lose politically granted bene…ts. For this reason, crony capitalism is sometimes considered a second-best solution to the government’s commitment problem, since politicians share in the above-market returns that economic actors receive over time (Haber 2006). 4
tive job o¤ers that are contingent on government survival. As long as these jobs pay better than the market rate, potential supporters have a joint stake in keeping incumbents in o¢ ce. Politicians facing unemployment can also design and implement a range of “hidden”(implicit, o¤-budget) subsidies or other forms of preferential treatment to keep up employment levels in private …rms in order to avoid signaling economic mismanagement (Desai and Olofsgård 2006). Bertrand, et al. (2004), …nd that politically connected business leaders in France generate "re-election favors" to incumbent politicians by creating more jobs, particularly in more electorally contested areas and around election years.2 Although less investigated, a second channel of politically-valuable bene…ts is the revenue stream from …rms to the state. Examining the tax compliance of …rms in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, Gehlbach (2006) …nds that the ability of …rms to hide revenues from tax authorities accounts for di¤erences in …rm-level satisfaction with state-provided goods and services, and in particular, that larger …rms are less likely to hide tax revenues and tend to be happier with public goods. In formerly state-socialist economies, the abil- ity of …rms to provide revenues is often associated with privileges. In Russia, for example, …nancial companies that …nanced the de…cit were, in turn, given shares in natural resource companies under the loans-for-shares program in the mid 1990s (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). Alternatively, leaders in Latin America have often targeted tax hikes at politically-powerful businesses, especially during election cycles (Weyland 2002). These examples raise the pos- sibility that in‡uential …rms may be more taxable making them, at once, the recipients of tax breaks as well as targets of more stringent monitoring by tax authorities— a possibility 2 The elite exchange may be more plausible in the context of low- and middle-income countries, where in‡uence-seeking can be dependent on informal ties and cronyism. Alternative perspectives of business- government relations in richer countries focus on objectives other than in‡uence buying. Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003), e.g., argue that political contributions by US corporations are a form of political participation. Gordon and Hafer (2005) consider lobbying expenditures a signal of corporations’ intent to resist regulatory oversight. We note, however, that others do identify quid-pro-quo arrangements between political contributors and governments in richer countries (e.g., Menozzi, Gutiérrez Urtiaga, and Vannoni 2010; Bonneau and Cann 2009). 5
suggested by the observation that cronyistic ties between corporations and governments can actually reduce monitoring costs (Kang 2003).3 In the next section we provide a simple formal illustration of the e¤ect of political in‡u- ence on …rm investment incentives, and by extension, productivity, when political in‡uence requires …rms to cede control rights in return for preferential treatment. Note that the …rm- level e¤ects of ceding control rights over hiring and …ring are not the same as that of providing direct transfers to politicians. Contributions to incumbents’electoral campaigns, for exam- ple, constitute a direct transfer but do not a¤ect investment or production decisions since marginal costs or marginal revenues remain una¤ected. By contrast, if politicians impose restrictions on …ring (to limit local unemployment) or impose ad hoc taxes (to access rev- enues that can then be showered on potential voters), …rm performance on the margin will be a¤ected.4 The Investment Decision A continuum of …rms of size one uses capital (k) and labor(l) in a Leontie¤ production tech- nology, yielding quantity Q = minfk; lg. Some selected …rms are protected from competition through monopoly rights, regulatory forbearance, or bureaucratic predation against competi- tors, and/or are subsidized via budgetary transfers, tax breaks, access to cheap credit, etc. 3 It is important to emphasize that, although political connectedness is often considered a form of corruption, there are two important di¤erences. First, unlike "administrative" corruption, in‡uence does not necessarily involve bribe-taking by public o¢ cials. In fact, in‡uential enterprises or individuals may actually be shielded from predatory public o¢ cials. Second, unlike corruption, in‡uence can be perfectly legal— obtained through political …nancing or lobbying, through favoritism on the part of regulators, through industrial policies, laws or statutes granting special favors, or simply through selective enforcement of existing rules. We focus exclusively on …rm-level e¤ects. Arguments have been made, however, that selective protection and subsidy can harm aggregate welfare, e.g., by distorting competition and leading to production of goods of inferior quality, or by increasing costs to state budgets. 4 Or, political appointees in management positions may be less skilled, driving down productivity both in the aggregate and at the margin. 6
The e¢ cient per-unit labor and capital costs to …rm i are, respectively wi + I , and r I , where I is an indicator function taking on the value 1 if the …rm is a recipient of privileges that have economic value (protection and subsidies), 0 otherwise. We will refer to these as in‡uential …rms and non-in‡uential …rms, respectively. E¢ cient per-unit labor costs depend on wages wi and worker e¤ort; parameterizes the negative e¤ect on worker e¤ort due to the absence of competition.5 Additionally, represents the capital cost reduction due to subsidization. In addition to capital and labor, …rms face administrative barriers including onerous and costly start-up procedures, bribe taxes, as well as the cost-equivalent of delays in being granted licenses and permits, harassment by police or inspectors, and other methods po- tentially used by public o¢ cials to extract rents. These costs often constitute a signi…cant burden on …rms operating in the formal sector in lower- and middle-income countries. We argue that political in‡uence can shield …rms from this form of rent extraction. We therefore normalize this cost at c = 0 for in‡uential …rms, c > 0 for non-in‡uential …rms. Firms are price takers, but bene…t from higher prices when protected from competition. We denote the price as p ( ) = 1+I , where represents the bene…t from protection. Demand for …rms’products is uncertain. With probability that demand is high, …rms sell Q at price p ( ); with probability (1 ) that demand is low, …rms sell Q at price p ( ), and Q >Q. Firms (i) make an investment decision (i.e., whether to augment their capital stock), and 5 X-e¢ ciency losses due to weak competitive pressures (Leibenstein 1966) typically form the analytical core of microeconomic models that examine how economic agents’e¤orts are in‡uenced by competitors. Where principals compare the outcome of agents’ e¤orts across competing …rms, compensation contracts can be designed with stronger incentives, and agents will thus expend greater e¤ort (Vickers 1995). But without competition, the ability to use such yardsticks is severely limited. 7
(ii) set employment levels. Finally nature draws demand conditions. The initial employment decision, therefore, is made under uncertainty regarding Q. We assume that …rms bene…t- ting from industrial policies have partially ceded control rights over employment decisions, and are prevented from shedding labor. Consequently, non-in‡uential …rms can …re workers without cost once Q is realized, whereas in‡uential …rms cannot. It follows from the Leon- tie¤ production function that once Q is realized, the pro…t-maximizing employment level is min fk; Qg. In‡uential …rms, unable to follow this rule, will have to retain the number of workers decided under uncertainty. Firms begin with capital and employment at level k, the optimal level under low-demand conditions. Each …rm decides whether to increase its capital stock to k as well as the number of additional workers to hire. It follows from the production technology that prior to the realization of Q, l = k for all k.6 We can now compare expected utility with and without investment. The representative …rm’s expected pro…t if it does not invest can be written as: p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) k (1 I) c: The same …rm’s expected pro…t, if it invests, will be p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) k (1 I) c + (1 ) p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) l (1 I) c : It follows that the …rm will choose to invest if and only if p ( ) k k (r I ) k k + (wi + I ) l k + k lj : (1) 6 Strictly speaking, when k = k in‡uential …rms will only employ extra employees such that l = k if the bene…t of being able to meet the extra demand in good times exceeds the risk of ending up with bloated payrolls in bad times. However, if this condition is not satis…ed, then the …rm will have no incentive to invest in the higher capital stock at the outset, so it will always be true that l = k. 8
Rearranging terms we can rewrite the investment condition (1) as a wage threshold wi ~w ( p ( ) (r I )) ~l I ; (2) where ~l is de…ned by ~l l k + k l k k ; i.e., the cost of ceding control rights over employment decisions. It follows from the restric- tions against …ring that ~l = 1 for an in‡uential …rm (l = k), whereas ~l = for a non-in‡uential …rm (l = k). Firms with a labor unit cost below the wage threshold in (2) will invest, the others will not. An increase in the wage threshold, therefore, increases the likelihood that a randomly-selected …rm will invest. If subsidized credits were provided to …rms without cost, then the threshold would increase by a factor of , suggesting that …rms bene…ting from industrial policies should be more likely to invest. On the other hand, if these …rms are required to cede control over employment decisions, they will be faced with excessive em- ployment (and wage expenditures) in the event of low demand (~l), reducing their likelihood of investing. Additionally, protection from competition has two contrasting e¤ects: a price e¤ect and an e¢ ciency e¤ect. On the one hand protection means that the …rm can charge higher prices, making new investments more attractive (the price e¤ect is captured by ). On the other hand, the absence of competition increases the wage needed to obtain an e¤ective unit of labor input ( ), suggesting that in‡uential …rms may be less likely to make new investments because of lower labor e¤ort. Finally, expected labor productivity (Q=l) will be lower in in‡uential …rms, who will retain excess employees if they invest when demand proves low. In the section that follows, we test the validity of several assumptions from this framework: that in‡uential …rms face a lower cost of doing business (c), have access to cheaper credit 9
( ), face fewer competitors ( ), and that in‡uential …rms will carry excess labor (~l). We also test e¤ects of …rm-level in‡uence on productivity and investment, which are decreasing in net costs of in‡uence. Note that the cost of doing business is assumed to be …xed and does not vary with k, and therefore only a¤ects …rm pro…ts and has no impact on relative incentives to invest. More generally there are likely both …xed and variable cost components in the regulatory and tax environments for businesses–components which cannot easily be identi…ed ex ante. We can, however, determine which component dominates by examining the …rms performance; an adverse e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on performance would indicate that the …xed component dominates the costs of doing business. Data and Methodology We rely on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (World Bank 2002, formerly the Produc- tivity and Investment Climate Surveys), which, since its inception in 2000 has collected data from approximately 75,000 manufacturing and service …rms in over 100 developing countries. These data, although expansive in their cross-country coverage, do not contain the type of information that would allow us to measure actual political connections, namely, detailed information on owners or o¢ cers that could be used to assess their political identities. In- stead, the Enterprise Surveys contain several perception-based questions about the political in‡uence of …rms in shaping national policies a¤ecting their businesses. Moreover, questions on political in‡uence were dropped from the core questionnaire after 2005. The subset of this total sample of …rms who have coded responses for questions of political in‡uence, there- fore, is far smaller— but still leaves us with over 8,000 …rms surveyed in approximately 40 developing countries between 2000 and 2005. 10
Addressing Biases in Firm Responses The use of qualitative or subjective indicators in surveys is subject to measurement error, which introduces three potential biases in the Enterprise Survey data: (i) non-comparability bias, (ii) systemic bias; and (iii) representativeness bias. First, di¤erences across respon- dents’interpretations of the questions can produce problems of comparability particularly when respondents are asked to use ordinal response categories. Di¤erent respondents may interpret concepts such as “in‡uence”in di¤erent ways based on unobservable characteristics (“culture,”socialization, etc.). Ordinal scales may mean di¤erent things to di¤erent respon- dents based on idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism. Sometimes referred to in educational testing as “di¤erential item functioning”(DIF), the problem is particularly acute in measurements of political e¢ cacy, where the actual level of e¢ cacy may di¤er from the reported level due to individual-speci…c proclivities (King and Wand 2007). Firm-level perceptions of in‡uence would similarly be a¤ected by DIF where identical …rms may have unequal probabilities of answering questions about their own political in‡uence in the same way. Explicit “anchoring vignettes”or other hypothetical questions to establish baselines that could normally correct survey responses for inter-…rm incomparability, however, are not in- cluded in the Enterprise Surveys core questionnaire. Instead, to measure in‡uence we use …rm responses to a question related to four categories of businesses: How much in‡uence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your busi- ness? a: your …rm; b: other domestic …rms; c: dominant …rms or conglomerates in key sectors of the economy; d: individuals or …rms with close personal ties to political leaders. Each answer ranges from 0 (no impact) to 4 (decisive in‡uence). The distributions of responses to this question are shown in …gure 1. Note that the modal response is "none" for 11
all questions, and in particular, some 68% of …rms believe themselves to have no in‡uence. Moreover, it is not the case that …rms that rank their own in‡uence lowly tend to rank the in‡uence of other …rms highly. Figure 2 breaks down rankings of the other …rms’in‡uence by self-rankings of in‡uence. For most categories of self-rankings, the most common response (the dark bars in the graph) is to rank themselves and others as having identical levels of in‡uence–those who think they have no in‡uence also believe that other types of …rms have no in‡uence, those who think they are moderately in‡uential also think others are moderately in‡uential, and so on. We see, then that most …rms think that no one has any political in‡uence, and that in‡uence self-ratings are associated with ratings of others. To correct for the strong possibility that DIF is present, we take the sum of the di¤erences between the self-assessment A and the assessments of other groups, i.e., a (b+c+d 3 ), which yields a measure of the perceived in‡uence “gap”between the responding …rm and other types of …rms.7 Our measure of in‡uence ranges from -4 to +4. Figure 3 shows the distrubution of the transformed in‡uence score, which is now more normal than that shown in …gure 1.8 Table 1a shows pairwise correlations among all components of the transformed in‡uence score. We see that most components are positively, and signi…cantly correlated. We also see that the standard deviation is greater than the mean for self-in‡uence responses; the opposite is the case for in‡uence assessments of other types of …rms. As with survey “anchors," then, assessments of others are subject to less inter-…rm variation than self-assessments, and thus we use responses to questions about other groups to subtract o¤ the DIF from the self-assessment response. Table 1b shows pairwise correlations 7 We di¤erence …rms’self perceptions with their average perceptions regarding three other groups (other …rms, other conglomerates, and other politically-connected …rms) rather than simply “other domestic …rms”to reduce the e¤ect of biased perceptions towards any particular category of …rms. Di¤erencing self perceptions solely with perceptions of other …rms has no e¤ect on our results. 8 The normal distribution is even more pronounced when we remove the approximately 1500 observations for which all types of …rms are rated as having no in‡uence. Eliminating these observations from subsequent regressions has no e¤ects on the results thus we include them in our core sample. 12
between the transformed in‡uence score and several more objective …rm-level characteristics, including age, whether the …rm is an exporter, whether the majority shareholder is domestic, whether the …rm is state-owned, and the size of the …rm. The relationships generally conform to expectations of the nature of political in‡uence: older …rms, state-owned …rms, foreign companies, and …rms with more employees are in‡uential relative to other types of …rms–in line with …ndings using more objective measures of political connectedness (e.g., Faccio 2006, Bertrand et al., 2004). Second, that rankings of self and others’in‡uence tend to move together suggests that responses may be a¤ected by systemic bias. Previous analyses of business environment con- straints using the Enterprise Surveys have shown that interpretation of responses is com- plicated by the fact that some managers simply tend to view the world through the same subjective lens, and some …rms simply have a higher propensity to complain regardless of the actual constraints their businesses may face (Carlin, Sha¤er, and Seabright 2006). The use of country, time, and industry dummy variables can mitigate some of this perception bias, since the variation being examined is within-country, within-survey years, and within-industry, respectively. Consequently, all of our estimations include these …xed e¤ects. But the inclusion of a variable among regressors that proxies the systemic bias more directly would better correct for bias in perception-based outcomes. We use two approaches to accomplish this. First, we regress responses by managers to a question of the severity of macroeconomic instability on the annual change in the consumer price index (CPI) in the country during the survey year–a proxy for actual macroeconomic instability–plus time and country dummies. The residual from this estimation may be interpreted as the extent to which within-country, within-industry perceptions of macroeconomic instability are not in‡uenced by price instability. We reason that the inclusion of this residual among the regressors in our 13
main estimations can control for …rm-speci…c systemic bias to the extent that perceptions should re‡ect actual conditions. Previous research utilizing similar approaches–relying on actual country-speci…c tax or regulation indicators–has found that subjective responses in the Enterprise Surveys actually do re‡ect within-country, within-sector objective circumstances measured from within the survey or from outside sources (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido 2009). Second, we also include responses by managers to questions about the degree to which their …rms’activity is constrained by crime. Evidence suggests that, although there is signi…cant variation across countries and sectors, …rms within the same country and the same industry are likely to be similarly a¤ected by crime (see, e.g., Amin 2009, Krskoska and Robeck 2006). The distribution of responses to these questions, in equations including country and industry …xed e¤ects, should therefore closely proxy the distribution of the propensity to complain within our sample. The range for each question is 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). Third, …rms may refuse to answer certain questions, or they may simply lie, creating a representativeness bias. Despite e¤orts to minimize non-response during data collection, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys are characterized by high levels of missing responses. Given that some questions–in particular, those concerning relationships with political authorities– may be highly sensitive, non-response as well as false-response rates can vary across questions. Moreover, non-responses are correlated with certain …rm or country characteristics (Jensen, Li, and Rahman 2010). The Enterprise Surveys do not include any set of screening questions that could be used to identify …rm "reticence." Our imperfect solution, therefore, is simply to use logistic regression models controlling for baseline information (described below) to estimate the probability of response for each dependent variable; the reciprocals of these probabilities are used as weights in our subsequent analysis. 14
Speci…cation and Methods Our basic speci…cations take the following form: Ri = f ( !!i; i; xxi) (3) where R is the hypothesized outcome for …rm i speci…ed in the preceding section (…rm i faces better business environment; …rm i provides politically valuable bene…ts; …rm i invest less), ! is our measure of the relative in‡uence of …rm i, is the …rm-speci…c systemic bias of …rm i as described above, x is a vector of …rm-speci…c control variables, and !, , and x are vectors of coe¢ cients. The …rm-speci…c characteristics we include are: the age of the …rm (in years), the size of the …rm (number of permanent employees, log scale, lagged one year), a legal-status e¤ect (identifying whether the …rm is publicly listed, privately held, a cooperative, partnership, or sole proprietorship), a location e¤ect (identifying whether the …rm is located in the capital city, in a city with more than 1 million, 250,000 to 1 million, 50,000 to 250,000, or less than 50,000 in resident population), dummy variables identifying whether the …rm is an exporter, whether the …rm is majority-owned by a domestic company or individual (vs. a foreign entity), and whether the …rm is a state-owned enterprise. In addition, we include the following sets of dummies in all speci…cations: industry dummies (ISIC 2-digit), survey-year dummies, and country dummies. Summary statistics for all variables used in our analysis are in table 2.9 Given that intra-group correlation of errors in survey data can be present even in the presence of …xed e¤ects, we allow errors in (3) to be correlated across …rms in a given country-industry, i.e., standard errors are clustered by country-industries in all speci…cations. Our basic speci…cations are estimated using OLS or logit regressions depending on whether the outcome of interest is continuous or binary, respectively. 9 We also included a dummy specifying whether the …rms have ever been state-owned, given that newly privatized …rms may maintain close political connections while struggling with legacies of state ownership (bloated payrolls and ine¢ cient business practices). The inclusion of this dummy is without consequence for our results. 15
Estimates of …rm-level political in‡uence may, additionally, be a¤ected by selection bias due to the non-random character of “in‡uential” vs. “non-in‡uential” …rms, whereby the distribution of covariates !, , and x, may be very di¤erent for …rms depending on their level of political in‡uence. In the absence of randomization, a common approach is to use match- ing methods to ensure that di¤erent categories of observations (in‡uential vs. non-in‡uential …rms) are as similar as possible in terms of relevant covariates–a method analogous to sever- ing the links between explanatory covariates and likelihood of “treatment”in observational data.10 We therefore correct for observable di¤erences between in‡uential/non-in‡uential …rms by pre-processing our data with matching methods, then re-running our parametric analyses on the matched sub-sample of the data as recommended by Ho, et al. (2007), and similar to the parametric bias-adjustment for matching by Abadie and Imbens (2006). We compute coe¢ cients on all independent variables after matching rather than reporting the simple di¤erence in means without controlling for potential confounding variables. The pur- pose of matching here, of course, is to ensure that in‡uential …rms are as close as possible to non-in‡uential …rms in terms of relevant covariates. We rely on propensity score matching based on the following model: Pr (Influencei = 1) = ^ i + ^ xxi + ^ lLobbyi ; (4) where Influence = 1 [Influence = 0] occurs when a …rm is [is not] able to in‡uence national policies a¤ecting its business. We designate …rms as in‡uential if their transformed in‡uence score as calculated above is greater than zero.11 is the standard normal distribution function, is the …rm-speci…c bias, and x is a vector of …rm-speci…c indicators–age of the …rm, number of permanent workers, dummies specifying whether the …rm is an exporter, 10 This approach does not control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which can only be corrected through the inclusion of all relevant confounding factors in the selection model. 11 We experimented with di¤erent cuto¤s, including 0, >-1, etc., with no major di¤erence in the result. Note that, at a cuto¤ of >0, approximately 10% of observations are coded as in‡uential; at 0 it is 30%. 16
domestically-owned, or state-owned, as well as legal-, location-, sector-, year-, and country dummies. To this we add an additional dummy: whether, in the past two years, the …rm has sought to lobby the government or otherwise in‡uence the content of laws or regulations a¤ecting the …rm’s business. We generate a propensity score derived from a logit regression of (4).12 All regressions are run on both unmatched and matched subsamples. Endogeneity Although a solution to the selection problem, matching does not correct for potential endo- geneity. We recognize that the costs that …rms face or the bene…ts they obtain may boost their in‡uence as well as the other way around. For example, it is possible that …rms with bloated payrolls are more likely to have the ear of politicians, or that …rms that are able to reduce the costs of navigating regulatory barriers are also better at bringing pressure to bear on lawmakers. Alternatively, …rms paying high bribes may turn to in‡uence activities to be shielded from rapacious o¢ cials, or poorly-performing …rms may engage in in‡uence-peddling to compensate for losses. Finding valid, …rm-speci…c instruments that meet the usual criteria (especially excludabil- ity/orthogonality to the outcome of interest) poses a serious challenge. We follow a common approach taken by, among others, Fisman and Svensson (2007), and use grouped averages as instruments to address potential endogeneity. We generate average levels of in‡uence for each country-industry, and use these to instrument …rm-level in‡uence. An individual …rm’s in‡uence level will depend not only on characteristics of that particular …rm, but also on char- acteristics speci…c to the country and industrial sector in which it operates. At the country 12 We use local linear regression to construct matched outcomes, with biweight (quartic) kernels and default bandwidths of 0.06 and using the common-support condition. Local linear matching–a generalized version of kernel matching–constructs a match for each in‡uential …rm using smoothed local regression over multiple …rms in the comparison group, and demonstrates greater robustness to di¤erent data densities than alternative pair-matching estimators (see Heckman, Ishimura, and Todd 1997). In our data, local linear matching also improves the balance between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms better than alternative estimators. 17
level, the rewards and risks of engaging in elite exchange will depend on the transparency and accountability of the political system, as well as on the distribution of rents in the economy. At the industry level, in‡uence may vary across sectors because of di¤erences in the extent of government regulation, wage- or price-setting (or other existing price distortions), the avail- ability of subsidies, and other forms of state intervention in the sector. Certain sectors may be strategically more important than others, while some industries may be more dependent on public procurement, and so on. We can posit that this variation across countries and sectors is not driven by factors speci…c to the …rm itself, but rather, by factors determined by these country-industry characteristics. It follows that variation in …rm-speci…c in‡uence explained by the country-industry average level of in‡uence should be uncorrelated with unobservable …rm-speci…c factors that are causing endogeneity bias.13 Results Is Life Easier for In‡uential Firms? We …rst examine whether the assumption that in‡uential …rms face lower costs of doing busi- ness (c) is empirically justi…ed. Table 3 examines three costs typically imposed on businesses in developing countries: bribes, non-payment, and theft (exact wordings of questions used for these and other selected variables can be found in the appendix). Columns (1) to (5) examine bribes as a percentage of sales.14 We begin with a benchmark regression that is uncorrected for various biases in column (1), then include our CPI-based and crime-based proxies for sys- temic bias. The inclusion of these terms does not a¤ect the basic result: in‡uential …rms pay 13 To make the uncorrelated errors condition more robust, country-industry average in‡uence is taken from the self-in‡uence indicator, rather than the transformed in‡uence gap score. For a review of the use of group averages as instrumental variables, see Angrist and Krueger (2001). 14 The Enterprise Survey asks how much "a typical …rm like yours" pays in bribes, rather than how much "your …rm" pays, in order to minimize under-reporting. 18
less in bribes than non-in‡uential …rms. Similarly, when weighting for non-response bias and clustering errors by country-industry in column (4), and when re-running the estimation on the matched sub-sample in column (5), results do not change.15 Taking account of systemic bias, non-response weights, and clustering, we examine the e¤ect of in‡uence on government contracts as a percentage of procurement contract value, non-payment of receivables, and losses from crime and theft. As a general robustness check, here and throughout, we run estimations on unmatched and matched samples. As with overall bribes, in‡uential …rms also pay fewer bribes for government contracts.16 With less consistency, we also …nd that older …rms, state-owned companies, and foreign companies are better protected from bribe collectors. We also include workers (our measure of …rm size) in quadratic form, and …nd that …rms with more employees pay more in bribes for government contracts but the e¤ect is diminishing. We include, but do not report, legal status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies. 17 These results argue against the view that bribes are an instrument of in‡uence-peddling by private sector elites. Rather, our …ndings suggest that bribe taxes are used by the public 15 Given the potential sensitivity of the matched results to speci…cation changes in the propensity score- generating (logit) model for equation (4), we tested the stability of our results as follows: we re-ran the logit speci…cation 12 separate times, each time dropping one covariate or set of dummy variables, then re-estimated our main regression (5) in table 3. The results are essentially identical, with little di¤erence in magnitude, signs, or signi…cance of the covariates in the main results. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of variance (std. deviation absolute value of the mean 100%) for the in‡uence beta across these 12 speci…cations is less than 0.02%. 16 Using our basic estimation for the matched sub-sample of …rms, we further computed the probabilities that in‡uential vs. non-in‡uential …rms are forced to pay bribes to various types of inspectors and o¢ cials (these results are not reported here). With statistical con…dence (p < 0.01), we …nd that the likelihood that non-in‡uential …rms will have to pay bribes to building inspectors, health inspectors, and environmental inspectors is, respectively 27%, 29%, and 24% greater than for in‡uential …rms. With lower con…dence (p < 0.1), non-in‡uential …rms were also found to be 17% and 24% more likely to have to bribe tax collectors and local police, respectively. Notably, no signi…cant di¤erence in bribe propensity between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms is found for labor inspectors— perhaps a re‡ection that, if labor regulations might a¤ect non-in‡uential …rms more adversely while labor costs are a problem for in‡uential …rms, the bribe tax paid to labor inspectors may be equivalent. 17 From a simple stochastic simulation of columns (4) and (6), setting all variables at their sample means, an average …rm pays 1.8% of sales in bribes, and 2.5% of the value of a government contract in bribes. But for the most in‡uential …rms, the amounts drop to 1% and 0.7%, respectively. Meanwhile …rms that score below the bottom quintile in in‡uence pay 2% of sales and 3% of contract value in bribes to public o¢ cials. It is possible that in‡uential …rms pay less bribes because they have less extensive dealings with public o¢ cials than non-in‡uential …rms. We …nd no evidence for this disparity. We estimated the percentage of "senior management’s time spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations" based on the benchmark speci…cation in table 3, and …nd that in‡uence has no statistically signi…cant e¤ect. 19
sector to extort payments from weak or vulnerable enterprises. This is consistent with a bargaining framework for bribe-paying in which political connectedness can increase …rms’ relative bargaining power in dealing with public o¢ cials (Svensson 2003). High-level connec- tions shield …rms from predatory behavior by rank-and-…le administrators, indicating that the prevalence of corruption and cronyism in an economy are, for non-in‡uential …rms, rein- forcing.18 We turn to instrumental variables regressions in table 4. As indicated above, we cannot discount the possibility that …rms which are targets of bribe-taking o¢ cials may choose to seek political in‡uence as compensation. Speci…cally, it is possible that some …rms that are paying high bribe taxes will devote greater resources to developing political contacts and relationships, while others do not. Both types of …rms would su¤er from high bribe payments, but not as a result of political in‡uence. As this potential endogeneity applies to most of our dependent variables, we explore whether the e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on bribes changes when we instrument for in‡uence using the approach described in the previous section. Table 4 presents these results. We replicate our basic regression (table 3, columns 3-4) by estimating the e¤ect of in- ‡uence on bribes by instrumental variables (IV) regression. Table 4 reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) results for a just-identi…ed model using country-industry averages of in‡uence as instruments for …rm-level in‡uence. We identify the e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on bribes by the exclusion restriction that country-industry average in‡uence does not appear in the second- 18 Political connections usually protect …rms, but in some notable cases they do not. Columns (8) to (9) estimate the percent of sales that are left unpaid. Firms were asked to report the percent of sales to private customers that involve overdue payments. Firms in developing nations— particularly in the former Soviet- bloc countries— typically su¤er from signi…cant unpaid bills from customers, and have often responded by non-payments of their own to creditors, suppliers, tax collectors, and even workers. We …nd that politically in‡uential …rms are less likely to be trapped in these cycles of non-payment. In columns (10) to (11) we examine the e¤ect of political in‡uence on losses from theft, robbery, arson, or vandalism. Losses from theft are una¤ected by …rm in‡uence, size, or state-ownership (other e¤ects are unstable) suggesting that …rms of all stripes are similarly a¤ected by crime, and that the use of a crime-based proxy for systemic bias is valid. For in‡uential …rms, governments have less control over criminals than they have over bribe collectors and non-paying customers. 20
stage regression. In the …rst stage we see that the impact of country-industry averages has a strong, independent e¤ect on …rm-level in‡uence. Tests for under-identi…cation (the Ander- son canonical correlation test) reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identi…ed. Tests for instrument strength (Cragg-Donald F statistic) are above critical values required to reject inconsistency of the IV estimator. In columns (3) and (4) we use a cluster-robust IV estimator with non-response weights. First-stage results are similar to those of the simple IV estimator: the instrument is correlated with …rm in‡uence, and is both valid and above critical values for instrument strength. Second-stage results in columns (2) and (4) show that instrumented …rm in‡uence has a negative impact on bribes, although this is only signi…cant in the cluster-robust estimation. Control variables have signs similar to results in table 3. We also test for the endogeneity of in‡uence in second-stage results. We use the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Wu- Hausman test implemented by Baum, et al. (2003), for which the null hypothesis is that the OLS estimator of the same equation (treating the suspect regressor as exogenous) yields consistent estimates, and a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressor’s e¤ect on the estimates requires an IV estimator. These tests show that we cannot reject the null of exogeneity. In sum, the use of country-industry in‡uence averages, though a valid instrument, ultimately suggests limited endogeneity bias in our OLS results. Unfortunately, the lack of other valid instruments in the Enterprise Surveys limits our ability to conduct more elaborate explorations of the robustness of our basic claims to potential endogeneity biases. 19 19 As a general test of the robustness of our results to possible endogeneity, we instrument …rm in‡uence with country-industry, grouped averages, and re-estimate all regressions that follow using the cluster-robust 2SLS estimator, with non-response weights. These results are not reported but are available from the authors. Statistical tests, in all cases, reject under-identi…cation, and reject the inconsistency of the IV estimator given the most stringent criteria (only when replicating results from table 8 below can we reject inconsistency at a slightly less stringent level). With one exception, the coe¢ cients on in‡uence retain their previous signs. In all but one case, however, in‡uence loses statistical signi…cance; this loss of precision is no surprise given the use of an aggregate (as opposed to …rm-speci…c) instrument. In only one instance, …nally, is exogeneity rejected with more than 95% con…dence, but in this estimation, the sign for …rm in‡uence remains the same as in the OLS estimation. 21
In table 5 we turn to …rms’business constraints. In the …rst several equations, our de- pendent variables are averages of responses to questions about the severity of …ve categories of constraints: infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, and transportation), taxation (both rates and the administration of), regulations (including customs, licensing, and per- mits), and …nance (cost and access). In each case we code these variables 1 if the obstacle was considered “major”or “severe,”0 otherwise. To these four indicators we add a sixth, based on …rm responses to a question of how customers would respond were the …rm to raise prices of their main product or service by 10%, a proxy for the absence of competitors ( ). We code this outcome 1 if …rms state that there would be no change in customer behavior, 0 other- wise.20 The results of these logit regressions are summarized in equations (1) to (10) in table 5. For simplicity we only report the coe¢ cient on in‡uence across estimations. All outcomes, however, were estimated using the full speci…cation in (3), incorporating bias, non-response weights, and clusters, on both unmatched and matched samples. We also report pseudo R2 from the full estimations. As with crime, poor infrastructure does not discriminate between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms. But all other constraints are decidedly more severe for non-in‡uential …rms, which are …ve to eight times more likely to consider tax, regulatory, and …nancial constraints to be major or severe obstacles than in‡uential …rms. These results also con…rm the absence of competition for in‡uential …rms, for whom price hikes are less likely to a¤ect customer behavior. As mentioned previously, the allocation of credit to privileged …rms on “soft” terms is considered a mainstay of crony capitalism. In equations (11) to (18) we investigate whether in‡uential …rms have easier access to credit ( ). Again, we report only the coe¢ cients and standard errors for the in‡uence variable. Here we examine four proxy outcomes: (i) 20 Firms were given four choices of responses: A: customers would continue to buy at the same quantities; B: customers would continue to buy but at slightly lower quantities; C: customers would continue to buy but at much lower quantities; and D: customers would stop buying. 22
whether collateral was required for the most recent loan (for …rms that obtained loans); (ii) the cost of the collateral (as a percentage of loan value); and the percentage of (iii) working capital and (iv) new investments …nanced by “informal sources”(money-lenders or other informal …nancial institutions). For the …rst outcome— the collateral requirement— we use logit regressions, while for all others we rely on OLS. Consistently and unsurprisingly, in‡uential …rms have easier access to credit. In‡uential …rms are less likely to be asked to collateralize loans by lenders. Among …rms that do provide collateral or a deposit for their …nancing, the more in‡uential …rms typically have to cover less of their loans than less in‡uential …rms. And in‡uential …rms are less entwined in the informal …nancial sector. Can In‡uential Firms Bene…t Politicians? In table 6 we examine evidence of the high-employment guarantees (~l) we have suggested as a source of political rents. Columns (1) and (2) present logit results for unmatched and matched samples, respectively, of estimating the e¤ect of political in‡uence on excess employment. Firms were asked, if they could change the number of full-time workers without restriction or punishment, whether they would shrink their payrolls. We code responses 1 or 0 depending on whether …rms reported they would lay o¤ workers. In columns (1) and (2), in addition to the variables included in the basic speci…cation, we also include …rms’ capacity utilization, on the assumption that use of installed productive capacity can a¤ect …rm managers’ preferences regarding optimal employment levels. We …nd that in‡uential …rms are more likely to maintain excess labor than non-in‡uential …rms. A second source of potential rents is tax payments, since public expenditures may be used to bolster public support. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is percentage of sales reported for tax purposes. Our results show that in‡uential …rms comply with tax reporting 23
rules to a greater extent than non-in‡uential …rms (both in absolute and per-employee terms). Note that we also con…rm one of Gehlbach’s …ndings, namely, that …rms with more employees hide less taxes. In‡uential …rms may have a harder time evading taxes— possibly because their connections put them under closer scrutiny— but are also more likely to be compensated by explicit exemptions. Does In‡uence A¤ect Investment and Innovation? Rewards in the form of lowered costs of business, monopoly rents, and other bene…ts are often justi…ed by developing country governments as a de facto form of targeted industrial policy, on the assumption that most politically-connected …rms use these bene…ts to invest and innovate, and that these in‡uential …rms, therefore, are also the most dynamic. However, our model suggests that the opposite could be true, more in‡uential …rms are less likely to invest and innovate if the costs of bloated payrolls and x-ine¢ ciency due to lack of competitive pressure dominate the bene…cial e¤ects. We examine this relationship in tables 7 and 8. Firms were asked a series of questions on their restructuring activities and innovation. Table 7 shows the results of estimations in which the dependent variables are a set of innova- tion/restructuring outcomes: whether, in the past three years, the …rm opened a new plant, introduced a new product line, closed an old plant, or closed an obsolete product line. While there are valid concerns regarding the comparability of “newness” or “obsolescence” across …rms in di¤erent countries and in di¤erent industries, the inclusion of industry and country dummies should correct for these di¤erences. In addition to these outcomes, we also exam- ined whether …rms engaged in R&D activities in the past year. As in table 5, we only report coe¢ cients and standard errors for the in‡uence variable, for logit estimations using both unmatched and matched samples. Once again, in‡uential …rms display a certain consistency: 24
they are less likely to open or close facilities, introduce or close out product lines, or engage in R&D. In table 8 we examine real growth in sales over the past three years (log scale), total investment, and the investment planning horizon in months (estimated with a Poisson event- count model). In‡uential …rms su¤er from lower real growth in sales over the three-year period. Columns (3) and (4) represent a log-form estimation of investment per worker. Political in‡uence lowers …rm-level investment (although the coe¢ cient is signi…cant only in the matched-sample regression). Finally, in‡uential …rms have a more myopic investment- planning horizon than non-in‡uential …rms. Political In‡uence and Productivity In columns (7) - (10) in table 7, …nally, we show results from basic productivity estimations. A Cobb-Douglas production function for …rm i in country c can be written as: log Yic = 0 + c + L log Lic + K log Kic + ic; (5) where Y is output, L and K are labor and capital inputs, and 0 and c are common and country-speci…c intercepts, respectively. The error term, ic, can be interpreted as within-country total-factor productivity (TFP), i.e., productivity after measured inputs have been accounted for. Using equation (5) we estimate …rm productivity in two ways. First we estimate an augmented production function where we regress output on L (workers) and K (capital inputs) in addition to the variables in our basic speci…cation (3), including in‡uence and other …rm-speci…c characteristics. We use sales rather than value-added for the dependent variable, given the unavailability of value-added data in the Enterprise Surveys. The augmented production function allows us to estimate the independent e¤ect of political in‡uence on …rm productivity. Secondly, we generate the residuals (TFP) from equation 25
(5) and regress the result using our basic speci…cation, allowing us to gauge the e¤ect of political in‡uence on …rm-level TFP. Incorporating these measures shrinks our sample size signi…cantly and therefore must be interpreted with caution, but we do see that the e¤ect of political in‡uence seems to support the notion that connected …rms su¤er from lower e¢ ciency. In the augmented production functions, political in‡uence is associated with less output (although the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient in the matched sample drops below the 10% level), and in‡uence is also associated with lower TFP. Firms that bene…t from preferential treatment are less productive than those that do not. Conclusion We have examined the content of …rm-state relationships characterized by special privileges granted to favored …rms— something that is prevalent across the developing world. Theoret- ical and empirical analyses of these relationships have generally focused exclusively on the bene…ts or costs to …rms (and to some extent to politicians), without assessing the impact on …rm-level decision making. We argue that economic privileges often come with a price, and use a simple framework to show how company performance varies between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms. We have characterized political in‡uence as a bargain between …rms and politicians whereby the former relinquish a portion of control rights in exchange for subsidies and pro- tection. We model how this bargain a¤ects …rm decisions, arguing that protection from competition, combined with the tendency to oversta¤ dampens incentives to invest, innovate, and lowers productivity. Data from more than 8,000 …rms in over 40 developing countries show that in‡uential …rms do have easier access to credits, face lower demand elasticity, en- joy regulatory forbearance, pay smaller bribes, and generally face fewer obstacles to doing 26
business than less-in‡uential …rms. In exchange, in‡uential …rms provide politicians with politically-valuable bene…ts in the form of higher employment and revenue. These constraints— the costs of political in‡uence— mean that in‡uential …rms are less likely to restructure operations, invest less in R&D, rely on shorter investment-planning horizons, and report lower real sales growth, investment rates, and productivity than less- in‡uential …rms. Despite their access to privileges of economic value, in‡uential …rms su¤er from sharp disincentives to innovation and long-term investment. We found these results to be robust to simple controls for systemic bias, non-response, intra-group correlation, and selection bias. We also relied on a useful, if imperfect, instrument for …rm in‡uence and found that …rm in‡uence is generally not subject to strong endogeneity bias, and that in the few cases where there appears to be bias, instrumenting for in‡uence does not alter our main results. Our …ndings, …nally, suggest some …rm-level answers to three separate but related ques- tions on the political-economy of development. First, when does industrial policy lead to adverse economic outcomes and when does it work? There are examples where industrial policy has played an important role in promoting development, just as there are examples where industrial policy has had the opposite e¤ect. The di¤erence may be attributable to the nature of the political institutions implementing these policies (Robinson 2009). Our …ndings highlight a particular channel: if industrial policy, by picking winners, also endows selected …rms with greater in‡uence in public a¤airs, it is likely that those …rms will also provide bene…ts to incumbent politicians. The underlying political motives for industrial policies are often opaque and the temptation to secure political favors (employment, rev- enue) in return for selective, targeted supports can be irresistible to political leaders, and 27
is ultimately harmful to the dynamism and e¢ ciency of bene…ciary …rms.21 We show that …rms bene…ting from distortionary industrial policies are often precisely those that are po- litically valuable, and that this bargain with the state reduces incentives for investment and innovation, and harms productivity. Non-distortionary interventions, by contrast, such as those that enhance infrastructure or support skill-acquisition by workers, would not directly bene…t speci…c …rms. We can speculate, consequently, that governments relying on these broader interventions might avoid cronyism in business-state relations since there would be little grounds for the direct exchange of favors between …rms and politicians.22 Second, why do some economies remain chronically under-developed? Several authors have argued that di¤erences in barriers to adopting technological innovations account for di¤ering rates of development (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Mokyr 1992). Others have suggested that that these barriers, far from being exogenously-determined, are deliberately fashioned through restrictive labor practices and restrictions on the import of productivity- enhancing equipment (Parente and Prescott 2002). Our results suggest an additional source of these barriers, namely, the bargains associated with …rm-level political in‡uence whereby incentives to invest in advanced equipment and technology (even if available domestically) are weakened, while at the same time, the costs of business are raised for non-in‡uential …rms. Finally, if these …rm-state in‡uence relationships are dependent on political incumbents, why do they persist even as political regimes change? For Haber (2006), these bargains are a solution to the government’s commitment problem: by sharing a stream of rents with a small group of elites, the bargain is made more credible to income holders and the cronyistic 21 Even some advocates of experimentation in industrial policy acknowledge that the risks of cronyism can be substantial (e.g. Mukand and Rodrik 2005). 22 Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), for example, have argued that these types of "soft" industrial policies, while they are more di¢ cult to implement than tari¤s, subsidies, tax breaks, etc., are less vulnerable to political manipulation. 28
arrangement more durable. For others, limited access to privileges among certain favored groups is a mechanism for maintaining order under conditions of fragile state capacity (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Our results suggest a slightly di¤erent logic: both …rms and politicians have a strong interest in ensuring that enterprises remain a permanent source of mutual rents. For politicians, control rights in critical sectors of the economy are highly desirable. Meanwhile …rms risk losing a series of privileges should politicians be replaced, and thus those that have privileges are encouraged to perpetuate their in‡uence-peddling activities regardless of who is in power. 29
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36 Figure 1: Distributions of influence perceptions Notes: Graph shows distribution of survey responses to: “How much influence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your business?”
37 Figure 2: Self influence of firms relative to perceived influence of other firms Notes: Graph shows how firms assess influence of three types of other firms (other domestic firms, dominant firms and conglomerates, and firms with personal ties to leaders) based on responding firm assessment of its own influence. Horizontal axis shows response categories for the firm’s own influence, histograms show fraction of firms rating the influence of all three other firm types as none (=0), minor (=1), moderate (=2), major (=3), decisive (=4). Dark bars show fraction of observations where firms’ own assessment is the same as their assessment of others, shaded and unshaded bars show fractions of observations where others are believed to have greater and lesser influence than the responding firm, respectively.
38 Figure 3: Transformed influence score Notes: Section of bar at influence = 0 with cross-hatching shows observations where all categories of firms (including the responding firm) were rated as having no influence. Density functions are plotted with biweight kernels and bandwidths of 1.0; solid line excludes all firms that responded “none” for all categories of firms.
39 Table 1a: Pairwise correlations of influence components (a) (b) (c) (d) Self influence Influence of other domestic firms Influence of dominant firms Influence of politically- connected firms Self influence (a) 0.541 (0.945) Influence of other domestic firms (b) 0.425 (0.000) 1.160 (1.106) Influence of dominant firms (c) 0.117 (0.000) 0.424 (0.000) 1.751 (1.326) Influence of politically-connected firms (d) 0.012 (0.171) 0.297 (0.000) 0.587 (0.000) 1.697 (1.421) Transformed influence [a — (b + c + d)/3] 0.569 (0.000) -0.270 (0.000) -0.640 (0.000) -0.680 (0.000) Table 1b: Correlations of transformed influence with other variables a — (b + c + d)/3 (1) (2) Age 0.072 (0.000) 0.086 (0.000) Exporter -0.020 (0.061) -0.039 (0.001) Domestic -0.032 (0.004) -0.035 (0.003) State-owned 0.114 (0.000) 0.117 (0.000) Workers (log L) 0.094 (0.000) 0.126 (0.000) N 8,452 7,349 Notes: Off-diagonal figures in table 1a and figures in table 2b are pairwise correlation coefficients, with significance levels in parentheses. Numbers along the diagonal (in italics) in table 1a are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Table 1a uses all available observations, while table 1b is restricted to the core sample used in all subsequent regressions. All firms that have responded a = b = c = d = 0 are omitted in column 2 of table 1b.
40 Table 2: Summary statistics Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Influence 8,452 -1.02 1.24 -4 4 Age of firm (years) 8,452 19.55 17.72 3 206 Exporter* 8,452 0.20 0.40 0 1 Domestically-owned firm* 8,452 0.86 0.35 0 1 State-owned firm* 8,452 0.07 0.25 0 1 Permanent workers (log, t — 1) 8,452 3.44 1.65 0 9.21 Firm-specific systematic bias (CPI-based) 8,452 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.12 Firm-specific systematic bias (crime-based) 8,452 1.35 1.35 0 4 Lobbied government* 6,919 0.23 0.42 0 1 Country-industry average influence 8,452 0.49 0.36 0 4 Capacity utilization (% of total capacity) 8,060 76.48 20.29 3 120 Total bribes (% sales) 6,220 1.83 3.80 0 50 Bribes for govt. contracts (% of value) 6,580 4.00 8.43 0 100 Overdue receivables (% of sales) 3,020 15.46 22.11 0 100 Losses due to crime (% sales) 7,828 0.95 3.80 0 95 Infrastructure* 8,375 0.09 0.28 0 1 Taxation* 8,452 0.43 0.49 0 1 Regulation* 7,702 0.18 0.39 0 1 Finance* 8,064 0.38 0.48 0 1 Monopoly pricing* 7,818 0.17 0.37 0 1 Collateral requirement* 3,284 0.77 0.42 0 1 Cost of collateral (% of loan value) 2,389 136.25 85.81 1 1000 Informal finance (% of working capital) 8,305 1.44 8.39 0 100 Informal finance (% of new investments) 6,078 0.99 7.44 0 100 Excess labor* 6,647 0.56 0.50 0 1 Tax compliance (% of sales reported) 7,539 77.45 27.81 0 100 Opened new plant or facility (past 3 years)* 7,952 0.15 0.35 0 1 Opened new product line (past 3 years)* 7,958 0.46 0.50 0 1 Closed old plant or facility (past 3 years)* 7,946 0.10 0.30 0 1 Closed obsolete product line (past 3 years)* 7,952 0.26 0.44 0 1 Conducted R&D activities (past year)* 2,475 0.48 0.50 0 1 Output (US$, log) 3,110 7.15 2.64 4.83 18.98 Capital inputs (US$, log) 2,579 5.07 4.09 -9.38 18.24 TFP (US$, log) 2,557 0.01 0.82 -4.21 5.54 Real sales growth (US$, log, 3-year) 2,577 0.24 0.58 -5.99 7.15 Investment (US$, log) 1,650 2.67 2.99 0 18.45 Investment horizon (months) 2,672 9.27 11.03 1 120 Notes: All summary statistics taken from full (unmatched) sample; * denotes dichotomous variable.
41 Table 3: Firm influence and the costs of doing business Total bribe payments (% of sales) Bribes for procurement (% of contract value) Unpaid receivables (% of sales) Losses from crime (% of sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) Influence -0.184*** (0.039) -0.184*** (0.039) -0.158*** (0.040) -0.152*** (0.057) -0.152*** (0.057) -0.340*** (0.091) -0.387*** (0.086) -0.697** (0.325) -1.003* (0.584) -0.039 (0.037) -0.045 (0.048) Age -0.006* (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.018 (0.024) -0.001 (0.036) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) Exporter -0.042 (0.128) -0.043 (0.128) -0.020 (0.130) -0.080 (0.152) -0.080 (0.152) -0.007 (0.225) 0.063 (0.204) -2.920* (1.565) -4.532** (2.204) 0.050 (0.134) 0.081 (0.163) Domestic 0.327** (0.134) 0.327** (0.134) 0.301** (0.136) 0.310** (0.122) 0.313** (0.122) 0.193 (0.257) 0.099 (0.254) 2.044 (1.662) 1.710 (2.221) 0.203* (0.118) 0.185 (0.128) State-owned -0.643*** (0.243) -0.641*** (0.243) -0.596** (0.246) -0.607*** (0.222) -0.613*** (0.223) -0.637 (0.389) -0.649* (0.391) 1.483 (3.894) 3.157 (3.705) 0.125 (0.194) 0.160 (0.200) Workers (log L) 0.062 (0.107) 0.062 (0.107) 0.055 (0.108) 0.045 (0.116) 0.046 (0.117) 0.746*** (0.243) 0.515** (0.216) 2.237 (1.838) 2.415 (2.058) -0.050 (0.113) -0.055 (0.119) Workers2 -0.021 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) -0.020 (0.013) -0.018 (0.015) -0.019 (0.015) -0.116*** (0.029) -0.071*** (0.025) -0.271 (0.204) -0.330 (0.238) 0.000 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013) Bias (CPI) -8.553 (27.190) Bias (crime) 0.318*** (0.042) 0.326*** (0.055) 0.326*** (0.055) 0.536*** (0.094) 0.336*** (0.071) 0.561** (0.262) 0.786 (0.515) 0.323*** (0.046) 0.401*** (0.058) Non-response weighting No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Matched sub-sample No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes N 6,531 6,531 6,362 6,046 6,033 6,699 5,699 3,052 1,618 7,952 6,424 k 388 388 413 412 83 77 416 415 Adjusted R2 0.113 0.112 0.121 0.133 0.133 0.227 0.105 0.250 0.218 0.035 0.036 RMSE 3.594 3.594 3.597 3.696 3.700 7.452 5.797 19.979 23.461 3.813 4.137 Notes: Results from OLS regressions, with legal-status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in parentheses in columns 1 — 3; robust standard errors clustered by k country-industry clusters are in parentheses in columns 4 — 11. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
42 Table 4: Robustness: instrumental variables regressions 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage Firm influence (1) Bribes (2) Firm influence (3) Bribes (4) Influence -0.313 (0.235) -0.469** (0.233) Age 0.003*** (0.001) -0.006* (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) Exporter -0.034 (0.040) -0.024 (0.129) -0.020 (0.045) -0.082 (0.153) Domestic -0.046 (0.042) 0.291** (0.136) -0.055 (0.049) 0.289** (0.125) State-owned 0.137* (0.076) -0.570** (0.248) 0.131 (0.089) -0.556** (0.220) Workers (log L) -0.026 (0.034) 0.050 (0.108) -0.012 (0.033) 0.038 (0.117) Workers2 0.009** (0.004) -0.018 (0.014) 0.007* (0.004) -0.015 (0.015) Bias -0.112*** (0.013) 0.301*** (0.049) -0.107*** (0.014) 0.292*** (0.054) Country-industry average influence 0.806*** (0.059) 0.797*** (0.057) N 6,362 6,362 6,046 6,046 k 388 388 R2 0.162 0.130 0.161 0.136 RMSE 1.113 3.579 1.122 3.691 Likelihood ratio 184.627 (0.000) 67.089 (0.000) Cragg-Donald F 187.784 164.561 Endogeneity test 0.450 (0.502) 2.059 (0.151) Notes: Dependent variable is total bribe payments as a percent of sales. Results are from IV regressions, with legal-status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in parentheses in columns 1 and 2; cluster-robust standard errors for k country-industry clusters are in parentheses in columns 3 and 4. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are centered R2 . Likelihood-ratio is Anderson canonical correlation statistic for simple IV, Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified). Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or Cragg- Donald F) is 16.38 for maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the bias (inconsistency) of OLS, i.e., the most stringent criterion. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
43 Table 5: Political influence and business constraints Eq. Dep. Var. Coeff. S.E. N k R2 Matched sub-sample (1) (2) Infrastructure 0.005 -0.012 0.043 0.052 8,251 6,713 383 382 0.160 0.199 No Yes (3) (4) Taxes -0.227*** -0.247*** 0.026 0.029 8,452 6,918 420 419 0.209 0.130 No Yes (5) (6) Regulations -0.227*** -0.265*** 0.030 0.039 7,623 6,428 400 399 0.178 0.160 No Yes (7) (8) Finance -0.145*** -0.152*** 0.024 0.029 8,163 6,651 420 419 0.215 0.140 No Yes (9) (10) Monopoly 0.128*** 0.145*** 0.027 0.030 7,955 6,441 411 407 0.094 0.078 No Yes (11) (12) Collateral -0.125*** -0.124*** 0.040 0.048 3,324 2,792 360 359 0.134 0.142 No Yes (13) (14) Collateral (% of loan) -3.472** -3.325** 1.435 1.617 2,343 1,998 321 320 0.186 0.206 No Yes (15) (16) Informal finance (% of working capital) -0.179** -0.136* 0.081 0.076 8,438 6,901 419 418 0.016 0.011 No Yes (17) (18) Informal finance (% of investment) -0.160 -0.197* 0.098 0.108 6,173 4,900 408 407 0.002 0.001 No Yes Notes: Coefficients for “influence” and robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are reported. All regressions include, in addition to influence, the following variables: age of firm, exporter dummy, domestic dummy, workers (linear and quadratic), firm-specific bias, legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Equations (1) — (12) show results from logit regressions, (15) — (18) are by OLS. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 for logit regressions, adjusted R2 for OLS. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
44 Table 6: Political influence, excess labor, and tax compliance Excess labor Tax compliance (% of sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) Influence 0.090*** (0.023) 0.091*** (0.028) 0.510** (0.218) 0.565* (0.288) Age -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.049*** (0.018) 0.034* (0.019) Exporter 0.081 (0.084) 0.090 (0.088) 0.438 (0.883) -0.760 (0.915) Domestic 0.172* (0.102) 0.111 (0.100) -3.353*** (0.800) -3.052*** (0.863) State-owned 0.171 (0.178) 0.138 (0.177) 3.551** (1.609) 3.997** (1.644) Workers (log L) 0.215*** (0.083) 0.145* (0.084) 2.137*** (0.796) 2.609*** (0.829) Workers2 -0.033*** (0.011) -0.022* (0.012) -0.042 (0.090) -0.121 (0.094) Bias 0.092*** (0.024) 0.095*** (0.032) -1.023*** (0.224) -0.795*** (0.250) Capacity utilization -0.003** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) Matched sub-sample No Yes No Yes N 6,398 5,054 7,661 6,239 k 400 399 417 416 R2 0.111 0.092 0.268 0.273 Log likelihood/RMSE -4,906.254 -3,984.916 23.835 23.914 Notes: All regressions include legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are in parentheses. Equations (1) and (2) show results from logit regressions, (2) and (3) are by OLS. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 for logit regressions, adjusted R2 for OLS. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
45 Table 7: Political influence and firm innovation Coeff. S.E. N k R2 Matched sub-sample (1) (2) Started new production line -0.059** -0.091*** 0.023 0.026 7,843 6,306 408 407 0.124 0.110 No Yes (3) (4) Opened new plant -0.142*** -0.189*** 0.032 0.040 7,838 6,301 408 407 0.114 0.139 No Yes (5) (6) Closed obsolete production line -0.087*** -0.159*** 0.029 0.031 7,838 6,301 408 407 0.119 0.131 No Yes (7) (8) Closed old plant -0.088*** -0.085** 0.031 0.038 7,832 6,295 408 407 0.086 0.101 No Yes (9) (10) Engaged in R&D activities -0.083** -0.148*** 0.041 0.053 2,256 783 48 40 0.078 0.164 No Yes Notes: Coefficients for “influence” and robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are reported using logit estimation. All regressions include, in addition to influence, the following variables: age of firm, exporter dummy, domestic dummy, workers (linear and quadratic), firm-specific bias, legal- status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 . *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
46 Table 8: Political influence, productivity, and investment Real sales growth (log) Investment (log) Investment horizon (months) Output (log) Total factor productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Influence -0.015* (0.009) -0.033** (0.016) -0.053 (0.041) -0.129** (0.064) -0.054*** (0.005) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.028*** (0.009) -0.026 (0.016) -0.028*** (0.009) -0.035* (0.017) Workers (Log L) 0.038 (0.054) 0.003 (0.068) 0.260 (0.249) 0.256 (0.248) 0.129*** (0.021) 0.151*** (0.024) 0.385*** (0.042) 0.301*** (0.048) -0.829*** (0.130) -1.012*** (0.150) Workers2 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.007) 0.071*** (0.025) 0.066** (0.029) 0.004* (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.092*** (0.013) 0.096*** (0.015) Capital inputs (Log K) 0.370*** (0.027) 0.280*** (0.061) Age -0.004*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.011** (0.005) -0.014* (0.008) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) -0.006* (0.003) Exporter -0.035 (0.034) -0.065 (0.055) 0.047 (0.291) -0.228 (0.424) 0.074*** (0.017) 0.071*** (0.025) 0.182*** (0.055) 0.031 (0.095) 0.128** (0.049) -0.023 (0.076) Domestic -0.015 (0.056) 0.003 (0.066) -0.546* (0.285) -0.573 (0.368) -0.125*** (0.020) -0.047* (0.025) -0.213** (0.095) -0.184* (0.098) -0.098 (0.105) -0.002 (0.110) State-owned -0.052 (0.111) -0.118 (0.121) -0.149 (0.363) -0.040 (0.386) -0.235*** (0.084) -0.275*** (0.089) -1.529*** (0.518) -1.469*** (0.517) -1.629*** (0.510) -1.685*** (0.490) Bias 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.007) Matched sub-subsample No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes N 2,592 1,183 1,662 881 2,699 1,328 2,580 1,134 2,580 1,134 k 87 80 66 58 72 66 72 66 Adjusted R2 0.053 0.056 0.325 0.273 0.871 0.901 0.149 0.233 RMSE 0.570 0.636 2.444 2.881 0.782 0.838 0.758 0.819 Notes: Notes: All regressions include legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Equations (1) — (8) are from OLS, equations (9) and (10) from Poisson event-count regression. Robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are in parentheses. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
47 Appendix: Coding of selected variables Variable coding  Wording of source question Age  (survey year – Q1)     Q1. In what year did your firm begin operations in this country?    Exporter  (coded 1 if Q2.ii > Q2.i or Q2.iii)  Q2. What percent of your establishment’s sales are:  i) sold domestically  ii) exported directly  iii) exported indirectly (through a distributor)    Domestic  (coded 1 if Q3.i selected)    State‐owned  (coded 1 if Q3.ii selected)     Q3. Which of the following best describes the largest shareholder or owner in  your firm? (Multiple answers allowed)  i) Domestic company  ii) Government or government agency  iii) [other response categories omitted]    Lobbied government  (coded 1 if Q4 = yes)  Q4. Think about national laws and regulations enacted in the last two years  that  have  a  substantial  impact  on  your  business.  Did  your  firm  seek  to  lobby  government  or  otherwise  influence  the  content  of  laws  or  regulations affecting it? (yes/no)    Bribes    Q5. We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or  informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to  customs,  taxes,  licenses,  regulations,  services,  etc.  On  average,  what  percent of annual sales value would such expenses cost a typical firm like  yours?    Bribes for government contracts  Q6. When establishments in your industry do business with the government,  how much of the contract value is typically expected in gifts or informal  payments to secure the contract?    Overdue receivables  Q7. What  percent  of  your  sales  to  private  customers  involve  overdue  payments?    Losses due to crime  Q8. Please estimate the losses (as a percent of total sales) of theft, robbery,  vandalism or arson against your establishment in the last year?    Infrastructure  (coded 1 if Q9.i + Q9.ii + Q9.iii ≥ 9)    Taxation  (coded 1 if Q9.iv + Q9.v ≥ 6)    Regulation  (coded 1 if Q9.vi + Q9.vii  ≥ 6)    Finance  (coded 1 if Q9.viii + Q9.ix ≥ 6)    CPI‐based systemic bias  (residual from regression of Q 9.x  on inflation)    Crime‐based systemic bias (Q9.xi)    Q9. Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation  and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its  severity as an obstacle on a four‐point scale where: 0 = No obstacle; 1 =  Minor  obstacle;  2  =  Moderate  obstacle;  3  =  Major  obstacle;  4  =  Very  severe obstacle  i) Telecommunications   ii) Electricity  iii) Transportation  iv) Tax rates   v) Tax administration  vi) Customs and trade regulations  vii) Business licensing and operating permits  viii) Access to financing (e.g. collateral)  ix) Cost of financing (e.g. interest rates)  x) Macroeconomic instability  xi) Crime, theft, and disorder    Monopoly  (coded 1 if Q10.i selected)  Q10.Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If you were to raise  your prices of your main product line or main line of services 10% above 
48 their current level in the domestic market (after allowing for any inflation)  which of the following would best describe the result assuming that your  competitors maintained their current prices?  i) Our customers would continue to buy from us in the same  quantities as now   ii) Our  customers  would  continue  to  buy  from  us,  but  at  slightly lower quantities   iii) Our customers would continue to buy from us, but at much  lower quantities  iv) Our customers would stop buying from us    Collateral  (coded 1 if Q11 = yes)  Q11.For the most recent loan or overdraft, did the financing require collateral  or a deposit? (yes/no)    Excess labor  (coded 1 if Q12 <100%)  Q12.If you could change the number of regular full‐time workers you currently  employ without any restrictions (i.e. without seeking permission, making  severance  payments  etc.),  what  would  be  your  optimal  level  of  employment  as a  percent  of  your  existing  workforce?  (E.g.  90%  implies  you  would  reduce  your  workforce  by  10%,  110%  means  you  want  to  expand by 10%)    Tax compliance  Q13.Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with  taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate  the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?    New plant  (coded 1 if Q14.i = yes)    New product  (coded 1 if Q14.ii = yes)    Closed plant  (coded 1 if Q14.iii = yes)    Closed product  (coded 1 if Q14.iv = yes)    Q14.Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives in the last  three years? (yes/no)  i) Opened a new plant  ii) Developed a major new product line  iii) Closed at least one existing plant or outlet  iv) Discontinued at least one product (not production line)  Conducted R&D activities  (coded 1 if Q15 > 0)  Q15.How  much  did  your  establishment  spend  on  design  or  R&D  last  year?  (Spending includes wages and salaries of R&D personnel, such as scientists  and engineers; materials, education costs, and subcontracting costs.)  Source: World Bank (2002).

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The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries

  • 1.
    The Costs ofPolitical In‡uence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries1 Raj M. Desai2 Georgetown University Anders Olofsgård3 Georgetown University May 2011 1 We are grateful for comments from Torbjörn Becker, Lael Brainard, Marc Busch, Tore Ellingsen, Garance Genicot, Sanford Gordon, James Habyarimana, Homi Kharas, Chloé Le Coq, Johannes Linn, Rod Ludema, Lars Persson, Dennis Quinn, Vijaya Ramachandran, George Shambaugh, Anna Sjögren, David Strömberg, and two anonymous reviewers. Previous drafts were presented at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Research Institute for Industrial Studies, the Delhi School of Economics, Stockholm University, the Stockholm School of Economics, the Brookings Institution, and the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2 Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government, Georgetown Uni- versity; the Brookings Institution. Email: [email protected] 3 Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Economics, Georgetown Uni- versity; Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Email: [email protected]
  • 2.
    Abstract Arrangements by whichpolitically connected …rms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or e¤ects of in‡uence in business- government relationships. We present a simple model in which in‡uence requires …rms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political in‡uence improves the business environment for selected …rms, but restricts their ability to …re workers. Under these conditions, if political in‡uence primarily lowers …xed costs over variable costs, then favored …rms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will su¤er, even if they earn higher pro…ts than non-in‡uential …rms. We rely on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 …rms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We …nd that in‡uential …rms bene…t from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these …rms also provide politically valuable bene…ts to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these …rms are worse-performing than their non-in‡uential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
  • 3.
    Arrangements by which…rms with close ties to incumbent political authorities receive fa- vors that have economic value are a pervasive feature of business-government relationships in countries around the world. Despite the prevalence of these arrangements, however, relatively little is known about the precise form …rm-level political in‡uence takes, or its consequences. What characterizes the bargain between in‡uential …rms and governments? How do in‡uen- tial …rms compensate governments, if at all, for any bene…ts they receive? Recent …rm-level analyses have examined various determinants of political in‡uence, and how these connec- tions a¤ect market valuation. Others have detailed the channels through which the bene…ts accrue. Still other, …nally, have explained how “systems”of in‡uence come into being, and why they survive. Much less is known, however, of how these political connections a¤ect decisions within …rms or of the strings that may come attached to political in‡uence. We investigate both the characteristics that de…ne political in‡uence among …rms in developing countries as well as the e¤ects of that in‡uence on company behavior and per- formance. We argue that political in‡uence improves the business environment for selected …rms through industrial or quasi-industrial policies, but restricts their ability to …re workers. In‡uential …rms thus relinquish a portion of their control rights— particularly over employ- ment decisions— in order to provide bene…ts of political value to public o¢ cials. If in‡uence lowers …xed operating costs for privileged …rms, they may earn higher pro…ts than non- in‡uential …rms but they will be less likely to invest or innovate, and their productivity will su¤er. Firm-level political in‡uence, therefore, can undermine the performance of politically- powerful …rms. We draw on …rm-level surveys in approximately 40 developing countries, consisting of over 8,000 enterprises. We …nd that politically in‡uential …rms do indeed face a more favor- able business environment than their non-in‡uential counterparts across several dimensions. 1
  • 4.
    However, in‡uential …rmsalso tend to carry bloated payrolls and report more (hide less?) of their sales to tax authorities, suggesting two mechanisms by which they o¤er political compensation: employment levels and tax revenues. In‡uential …rms are also less likely to open new product lines or production facilities, or to close obsolete ones; they also report lower real growth in sales, shorter investment horizons, and lower productivity levels than non-in‡uential …rms. These results are robust to adjustments for a number of biases in the survey data. Taken together, our results imply that …rm-speci…c industrial policy will be more prone to cronyism than policies that do not target individual …rms. Our results can also explain why crony capitalism persists in countries despite its adverse e¤ects on long- term economic performance. Finally, our …ndings o¤er some con…rmation for the view that politically-devised restrictions that block access to technologies and preserve rents for elites are at the heart of prolonged economic under-development. Political In‡uence in Business-State Relations Three sets of questions must be addressed in order to assess the characteristics and e¤ects of …rm-level political in‡uence: (i) what bene…ts do in‡uential …rms receive? (ii) what bene…ts do politicians receive?; and (iii) what are the economic consequences of political in‡uence? For the …rst question, arrangements by which political authorities grant favors to in‡uential economic agents that allow these agents to earn above-market returns has been documented in case studies and some cross-national analyses. On the other hand, little empirical investigation has been conducted regarding the last two questions. 2
  • 5.
    Bene…ts to Firms Thespeci…c nature of relationships of in‡uence varies from country to country. Studies of US campaign …nance, political action committees, and the revolving door between lobbying …rms and congressional sta¤ o¢ ces, have typically identi…ed the ties that politically-in‡uential US …rms can forge with speci…c political …gures (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Ang and Boyer 2000, Krozner and Stratmann 1998). In developing nations, political in‡uence is usually obtained through a combination of kinship ties, political alliances, ethnic solidarity, or …nancial dealings between owners and political elites. One e¤ect of these connections is that share values are often linked to individual politicians. Share prices for …rms connected to the ruling Suharto family in Indonesia fell when rumors circulated that Suharto was experiencing health problems (Fisman 2001). During the Asian …nancial crisis, the closure of o¤shore currency markets bene…tted …rms with political connections to Malaysian prime minister Mahathir (Johnson and Mitton 2003). Brazilian …rms that provided contributions to federal deputies experienced rising share values at election time (Claessen, Feijen, and Laeven 2006). Favors granted to in‡uential …rms have large economic value. In Pakistan, politically connected …rms borrow more and have higher default rates than other …rms (Khwaja and Mian 2005). These di¤erences in access to credit are all driven by lending practices from government banks, and bene…ts increase with the strength of the political connections. Cross- national evidence also shows that …rms whose controlling shareholders or top managers are members of legislatures or national governments enjoy easier access to debt …nancing, lower taxation, and greater market shares, and that in‡uential …rms also consider the judicial system and tax regulations to be less constraining (Faccio 2006, Chong and Gradstein 2007). Conversely, …rms excluded from these privileges may be forced to rely on graft in order to compete with more in‡uential …rms. 3
  • 6.
    In‡uence as MutualExchange A common perspective is that politically-powerful …rms manipulate policies and shape leg- islation in order to give themselves long-term material bene…ts (e.g. Hellman et al. 2003, Slinko et al. 2005). But these "state-capture" models convey the mistaken impression that governments are unwitting victims of this behavior rather than willing participants in a rela- tionship that is mutually bene…cial to politicians and …rms alike. Substantial evidence from around the world suggests, however, that political in‡uence is better characterized as an “elite exchange”between …rms and politicians, whereby economic rewards are transferred to …rms that provide politicians with politically-valuable services in return. In the 1990s in‡uential Russian businesses, for example, were more likely to be subject to price controls and more frequent inspections— both being bene…cial to politicians (Frye 2003). In countries such as Mexico and Thailand, companies that acquired concessions during the privatization of state telecoms companies were able to …x prices, restrict the supply of connections, or engage in predatory pricing against would-be competitors while anti-trust authorities looked the other way (Winter 2007; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). In all cases, speci…c political parties or public o¢ cials bene…ted directly as a result of elevating these …rms to positions of political in‡uence.1 One channel by which powerful …rms can reward politicians is through employment. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that in‡uential …rms receiving public subsidies will, in re- turn, cede some control rights over employment decisions to politicians (who bene…t from low unemployment rates). Robinson and Verdier (2002) also emphasize the advantage of control over employment decisions, suggesting that politicians can generate support through selec- 1 More generally, Choi and Thum (2007) argue that the provision of rent streams from …rms to governments is a fundamental part of the in‡uence “bargain” allowing …rms to invest in stabilizing the political regime because, in case of a changeover, the …rm will lose politically granted bene…ts. For this reason, crony capitalism is sometimes considered a second-best solution to the government’s commitment problem, since politicians share in the above-market returns that economic actors receive over time (Haber 2006). 4
  • 7.
    tive job o¤ersthat are contingent on government survival. As long as these jobs pay better than the market rate, potential supporters have a joint stake in keeping incumbents in o¢ ce. Politicians facing unemployment can also design and implement a range of “hidden”(implicit, o¤-budget) subsidies or other forms of preferential treatment to keep up employment levels in private …rms in order to avoid signaling economic mismanagement (Desai and Olofsgård 2006). Bertrand, et al. (2004), …nd that politically connected business leaders in France generate "re-election favors" to incumbent politicians by creating more jobs, particularly in more electorally contested areas and around election years.2 Although less investigated, a second channel of politically-valuable bene…ts is the revenue stream from …rms to the state. Examining the tax compliance of …rms in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, Gehlbach (2006) …nds that the ability of …rms to hide revenues from tax authorities accounts for di¤erences in …rm-level satisfaction with state-provided goods and services, and in particular, that larger …rms are less likely to hide tax revenues and tend to be happier with public goods. In formerly state-socialist economies, the abil- ity of …rms to provide revenues is often associated with privileges. In Russia, for example, …nancial companies that …nanced the de…cit were, in turn, given shares in natural resource companies under the loans-for-shares program in the mid 1990s (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). Alternatively, leaders in Latin America have often targeted tax hikes at politically-powerful businesses, especially during election cycles (Weyland 2002). These examples raise the pos- sibility that in‡uential …rms may be more taxable making them, at once, the recipients of tax breaks as well as targets of more stringent monitoring by tax authorities— a possibility 2 The elite exchange may be more plausible in the context of low- and middle-income countries, where in‡uence-seeking can be dependent on informal ties and cronyism. Alternative perspectives of business- government relations in richer countries focus on objectives other than in‡uence buying. Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003), e.g., argue that political contributions by US corporations are a form of political participation. Gordon and Hafer (2005) consider lobbying expenditures a signal of corporations’ intent to resist regulatory oversight. We note, however, that others do identify quid-pro-quo arrangements between political contributors and governments in richer countries (e.g., Menozzi, Gutiérrez Urtiaga, and Vannoni 2010; Bonneau and Cann 2009). 5
  • 8.
    suggested by theobservation that cronyistic ties between corporations and governments can actually reduce monitoring costs (Kang 2003).3 In the next section we provide a simple formal illustration of the e¤ect of political in‡u- ence on …rm investment incentives, and by extension, productivity, when political in‡uence requires …rms to cede control rights in return for preferential treatment. Note that the …rm- level e¤ects of ceding control rights over hiring and …ring are not the same as that of providing direct transfers to politicians. Contributions to incumbents’electoral campaigns, for exam- ple, constitute a direct transfer but do not a¤ect investment or production decisions since marginal costs or marginal revenues remain una¤ected. By contrast, if politicians impose restrictions on …ring (to limit local unemployment) or impose ad hoc taxes (to access rev- enues that can then be showered on potential voters), …rm performance on the margin will be a¤ected.4 The Investment Decision A continuum of …rms of size one uses capital (k) and labor(l) in a Leontie¤ production tech- nology, yielding quantity Q = minfk; lg. Some selected …rms are protected from competition through monopoly rights, regulatory forbearance, or bureaucratic predation against competi- tors, and/or are subsidized via budgetary transfers, tax breaks, access to cheap credit, etc. 3 It is important to emphasize that, although political connectedness is often considered a form of corruption, there are two important di¤erences. First, unlike "administrative" corruption, in‡uence does not necessarily involve bribe-taking by public o¢ cials. In fact, in‡uential enterprises or individuals may actually be shielded from predatory public o¢ cials. Second, unlike corruption, in‡uence can be perfectly legal— obtained through political …nancing or lobbying, through favoritism on the part of regulators, through industrial policies, laws or statutes granting special favors, or simply through selective enforcement of existing rules. We focus exclusively on …rm-level e¤ects. Arguments have been made, however, that selective protection and subsidy can harm aggregate welfare, e.g., by distorting competition and leading to production of goods of inferior quality, or by increasing costs to state budgets. 4 Or, political appointees in management positions may be less skilled, driving down productivity both in the aggregate and at the margin. 6
  • 9.
    The e¢ cientper-unit labor and capital costs to …rm i are, respectively wi + I , and r I , where I is an indicator function taking on the value 1 if the …rm is a recipient of privileges that have economic value (protection and subsidies), 0 otherwise. We will refer to these as in‡uential …rms and non-in‡uential …rms, respectively. E¢ cient per-unit labor costs depend on wages wi and worker e¤ort; parameterizes the negative e¤ect on worker e¤ort due to the absence of competition.5 Additionally, represents the capital cost reduction due to subsidization. In addition to capital and labor, …rms face administrative barriers including onerous and costly start-up procedures, bribe taxes, as well as the cost-equivalent of delays in being granted licenses and permits, harassment by police or inspectors, and other methods po- tentially used by public o¢ cials to extract rents. These costs often constitute a signi…cant burden on …rms operating in the formal sector in lower- and middle-income countries. We argue that political in‡uence can shield …rms from this form of rent extraction. We therefore normalize this cost at c = 0 for in‡uential …rms, c > 0 for non-in‡uential …rms. Firms are price takers, but bene…t from higher prices when protected from competition. We denote the price as p ( ) = 1+I , where represents the bene…t from protection. Demand for …rms’products is uncertain. With probability that demand is high, …rms sell Q at price p ( ); with probability (1 ) that demand is low, …rms sell Q at price p ( ), and Q >Q. Firms (i) make an investment decision (i.e., whether to augment their capital stock), and 5 X-e¢ ciency losses due to weak competitive pressures (Leibenstein 1966) typically form the analytical core of microeconomic models that examine how economic agents’e¤orts are in‡uenced by competitors. Where principals compare the outcome of agents’ e¤orts across competing …rms, compensation contracts can be designed with stronger incentives, and agents will thus expend greater e¤ort (Vickers 1995). But without competition, the ability to use such yardsticks is severely limited. 7
  • 10.
    (ii) set employmentlevels. Finally nature draws demand conditions. The initial employment decision, therefore, is made under uncertainty regarding Q. We assume that …rms bene…t- ting from industrial policies have partially ceded control rights over employment decisions, and are prevented from shedding labor. Consequently, non-in‡uential …rms can …re workers without cost once Q is realized, whereas in‡uential …rms cannot. It follows from the Leon- tie¤ production function that once Q is realized, the pro…t-maximizing employment level is min fk; Qg. In‡uential …rms, unable to follow this rule, will have to retain the number of workers decided under uncertainty. Firms begin with capital and employment at level k, the optimal level under low-demand conditions. Each …rm decides whether to increase its capital stock to k as well as the number of additional workers to hire. It follows from the production technology that prior to the realization of Q, l = k for all k.6 We can now compare expected utility with and without investment. The representative …rm’s expected pro…t if it does not invest can be written as: p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) k (1 I) c: The same …rm’s expected pro…t, if it invests, will be p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) k (1 I) c + (1 ) p ( ) k (r I ) k (wi + I ) l (1 I) c : It follows that the …rm will choose to invest if and only if p ( ) k k (r I ) k k + (wi + I ) l k + k lj : (1) 6 Strictly speaking, when k = k in‡uential …rms will only employ extra employees such that l = k if the bene…t of being able to meet the extra demand in good times exceeds the risk of ending up with bloated payrolls in bad times. However, if this condition is not satis…ed, then the …rm will have no incentive to invest in the higher capital stock at the outset, so it will always be true that l = k. 8
  • 11.
    Rearranging terms wecan rewrite the investment condition (1) as a wage threshold wi ~w ( p ( ) (r I )) ~l I ; (2) where ~l is de…ned by ~l l k + k l k k ; i.e., the cost of ceding control rights over employment decisions. It follows from the restric- tions against …ring that ~l = 1 for an in‡uential …rm (l = k), whereas ~l = for a non-in‡uential …rm (l = k). Firms with a labor unit cost below the wage threshold in (2) will invest, the others will not. An increase in the wage threshold, therefore, increases the likelihood that a randomly-selected …rm will invest. If subsidized credits were provided to …rms without cost, then the threshold would increase by a factor of , suggesting that …rms bene…ting from industrial policies should be more likely to invest. On the other hand, if these …rms are required to cede control over employment decisions, they will be faced with excessive em- ployment (and wage expenditures) in the event of low demand (~l), reducing their likelihood of investing. Additionally, protection from competition has two contrasting e¤ects: a price e¤ect and an e¢ ciency e¤ect. On the one hand protection means that the …rm can charge higher prices, making new investments more attractive (the price e¤ect is captured by ). On the other hand, the absence of competition increases the wage needed to obtain an e¤ective unit of labor input ( ), suggesting that in‡uential …rms may be less likely to make new investments because of lower labor e¤ort. Finally, expected labor productivity (Q=l) will be lower in in‡uential …rms, who will retain excess employees if they invest when demand proves low. In the section that follows, we test the validity of several assumptions from this framework: that in‡uential …rms face a lower cost of doing business (c), have access to cheaper credit 9
  • 12.
    ( ), facefewer competitors ( ), and that in‡uential …rms will carry excess labor (~l). We also test e¤ects of …rm-level in‡uence on productivity and investment, which are decreasing in net costs of in‡uence. Note that the cost of doing business is assumed to be …xed and does not vary with k, and therefore only a¤ects …rm pro…ts and has no impact on relative incentives to invest. More generally there are likely both …xed and variable cost components in the regulatory and tax environments for businesses–components which cannot easily be identi…ed ex ante. We can, however, determine which component dominates by examining the …rms performance; an adverse e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on performance would indicate that the …xed component dominates the costs of doing business. Data and Methodology We rely on the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (World Bank 2002, formerly the Produc- tivity and Investment Climate Surveys), which, since its inception in 2000 has collected data from approximately 75,000 manufacturing and service …rms in over 100 developing countries. These data, although expansive in their cross-country coverage, do not contain the type of information that would allow us to measure actual political connections, namely, detailed information on owners or o¢ cers that could be used to assess their political identities. In- stead, the Enterprise Surveys contain several perception-based questions about the political in‡uence of …rms in shaping national policies a¤ecting their businesses. Moreover, questions on political in‡uence were dropped from the core questionnaire after 2005. The subset of this total sample of …rms who have coded responses for questions of political in‡uence, there- fore, is far smaller— but still leaves us with over 8,000 …rms surveyed in approximately 40 developing countries between 2000 and 2005. 10
  • 13.
    Addressing Biases inFirm Responses The use of qualitative or subjective indicators in surveys is subject to measurement error, which introduces three potential biases in the Enterprise Survey data: (i) non-comparability bias, (ii) systemic bias; and (iii) representativeness bias. First, di¤erences across respon- dents’interpretations of the questions can produce problems of comparability particularly when respondents are asked to use ordinal response categories. Di¤erent respondents may interpret concepts such as “in‡uence”in di¤erent ways based on unobservable characteristics (“culture,”socialization, etc.). Ordinal scales may mean di¤erent things to di¤erent respon- dents based on idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism. Sometimes referred to in educational testing as “di¤erential item functioning”(DIF), the problem is particularly acute in measurements of political e¢ cacy, where the actual level of e¢ cacy may di¤er from the reported level due to individual-speci…c proclivities (King and Wand 2007). Firm-level perceptions of in‡uence would similarly be a¤ected by DIF where identical …rms may have unequal probabilities of answering questions about their own political in‡uence in the same way. Explicit “anchoring vignettes”or other hypothetical questions to establish baselines that could normally correct survey responses for inter-…rm incomparability, however, are not in- cluded in the Enterprise Surveys core questionnaire. Instead, to measure in‡uence we use …rm responses to a question related to four categories of businesses: How much in‡uence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your busi- ness? a: your …rm; b: other domestic …rms; c: dominant …rms or conglomerates in key sectors of the economy; d: individuals or …rms with close personal ties to political leaders. Each answer ranges from 0 (no impact) to 4 (decisive in‡uence). The distributions of responses to this question are shown in …gure 1. Note that the modal response is "none" for 11
  • 14.
    all questions, andin particular, some 68% of …rms believe themselves to have no in‡uence. Moreover, it is not the case that …rms that rank their own in‡uence lowly tend to rank the in‡uence of other …rms highly. Figure 2 breaks down rankings of the other …rms’in‡uence by self-rankings of in‡uence. For most categories of self-rankings, the most common response (the dark bars in the graph) is to rank themselves and others as having identical levels of in‡uence–those who think they have no in‡uence also believe that other types of …rms have no in‡uence, those who think they are moderately in‡uential also think others are moderately in‡uential, and so on. We see, then that most …rms think that no one has any political in‡uence, and that in‡uence self-ratings are associated with ratings of others. To correct for the strong possibility that DIF is present, we take the sum of the di¤erences between the self-assessment A and the assessments of other groups, i.e., a (b+c+d 3 ), which yields a measure of the perceived in‡uence “gap”between the responding …rm and other types of …rms.7 Our measure of in‡uence ranges from -4 to +4. Figure 3 shows the distrubution of the transformed in‡uence score, which is now more normal than that shown in …gure 1.8 Table 1a shows pairwise correlations among all components of the transformed in‡uence score. We see that most components are positively, and signi…cantly correlated. We also see that the standard deviation is greater than the mean for self-in‡uence responses; the opposite is the case for in‡uence assessments of other types of …rms. As with survey “anchors," then, assessments of others are subject to less inter-…rm variation than self-assessments, and thus we use responses to questions about other groups to subtract o¤ the DIF from the self-assessment response. Table 1b shows pairwise correlations 7 We di¤erence …rms’self perceptions with their average perceptions regarding three other groups (other …rms, other conglomerates, and other politically-connected …rms) rather than simply “other domestic …rms”to reduce the e¤ect of biased perceptions towards any particular category of …rms. Di¤erencing self perceptions solely with perceptions of other …rms has no e¤ect on our results. 8 The normal distribution is even more pronounced when we remove the approximately 1500 observations for which all types of …rms are rated as having no in‡uence. Eliminating these observations from subsequent regressions has no e¤ects on the results thus we include them in our core sample. 12
  • 15.
    between the transformedin‡uence score and several more objective …rm-level characteristics, including age, whether the …rm is an exporter, whether the majority shareholder is domestic, whether the …rm is state-owned, and the size of the …rm. The relationships generally conform to expectations of the nature of political in‡uence: older …rms, state-owned …rms, foreign companies, and …rms with more employees are in‡uential relative to other types of …rms–in line with …ndings using more objective measures of political connectedness (e.g., Faccio 2006, Bertrand et al., 2004). Second, that rankings of self and others’in‡uence tend to move together suggests that responses may be a¤ected by systemic bias. Previous analyses of business environment con- straints using the Enterprise Surveys have shown that interpretation of responses is com- plicated by the fact that some managers simply tend to view the world through the same subjective lens, and some …rms simply have a higher propensity to complain regardless of the actual constraints their businesses may face (Carlin, Sha¤er, and Seabright 2006). The use of country, time, and industry dummy variables can mitigate some of this perception bias, since the variation being examined is within-country, within-survey years, and within-industry, respectively. Consequently, all of our estimations include these …xed e¤ects. But the inclusion of a variable among regressors that proxies the systemic bias more directly would better correct for bias in perception-based outcomes. We use two approaches to accomplish this. First, we regress responses by managers to a question of the severity of macroeconomic instability on the annual change in the consumer price index (CPI) in the country during the survey year–a proxy for actual macroeconomic instability–plus time and country dummies. The residual from this estimation may be interpreted as the extent to which within-country, within-industry perceptions of macroeconomic instability are not in‡uenced by price instability. We reason that the inclusion of this residual among the regressors in our 13
  • 16.
    main estimations cancontrol for …rm-speci…c systemic bias to the extent that perceptions should re‡ect actual conditions. Previous research utilizing similar approaches–relying on actual country-speci…c tax or regulation indicators–has found that subjective responses in the Enterprise Surveys actually do re‡ect within-country, within-sector objective circumstances measured from within the survey or from outside sources (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido 2009). Second, we also include responses by managers to questions about the degree to which their …rms’activity is constrained by crime. Evidence suggests that, although there is signi…cant variation across countries and sectors, …rms within the same country and the same industry are likely to be similarly a¤ected by crime (see, e.g., Amin 2009, Krskoska and Robeck 2006). The distribution of responses to these questions, in equations including country and industry …xed e¤ects, should therefore closely proxy the distribution of the propensity to complain within our sample. The range for each question is 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). Third, …rms may refuse to answer certain questions, or they may simply lie, creating a representativeness bias. Despite e¤orts to minimize non-response during data collection, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys are characterized by high levels of missing responses. Given that some questions–in particular, those concerning relationships with political authorities– may be highly sensitive, non-response as well as false-response rates can vary across questions. Moreover, non-responses are correlated with certain …rm or country characteristics (Jensen, Li, and Rahman 2010). The Enterprise Surveys do not include any set of screening questions that could be used to identify …rm "reticence." Our imperfect solution, therefore, is simply to use logistic regression models controlling for baseline information (described below) to estimate the probability of response for each dependent variable; the reciprocals of these probabilities are used as weights in our subsequent analysis. 14
  • 17.
    Speci…cation and Methods Ourbasic speci…cations take the following form: Ri = f ( !!i; i; xxi) (3) where R is the hypothesized outcome for …rm i speci…ed in the preceding section (…rm i faces better business environment; …rm i provides politically valuable bene…ts; …rm i invest less), ! is our measure of the relative in‡uence of …rm i, is the …rm-speci…c systemic bias of …rm i as described above, x is a vector of …rm-speci…c control variables, and !, , and x are vectors of coe¢ cients. The …rm-speci…c characteristics we include are: the age of the …rm (in years), the size of the …rm (number of permanent employees, log scale, lagged one year), a legal-status e¤ect (identifying whether the …rm is publicly listed, privately held, a cooperative, partnership, or sole proprietorship), a location e¤ect (identifying whether the …rm is located in the capital city, in a city with more than 1 million, 250,000 to 1 million, 50,000 to 250,000, or less than 50,000 in resident population), dummy variables identifying whether the …rm is an exporter, whether the …rm is majority-owned by a domestic company or individual (vs. a foreign entity), and whether the …rm is a state-owned enterprise. In addition, we include the following sets of dummies in all speci…cations: industry dummies (ISIC 2-digit), survey-year dummies, and country dummies. Summary statistics for all variables used in our analysis are in table 2.9 Given that intra-group correlation of errors in survey data can be present even in the presence of …xed e¤ects, we allow errors in (3) to be correlated across …rms in a given country-industry, i.e., standard errors are clustered by country-industries in all speci…cations. Our basic speci…cations are estimated using OLS or logit regressions depending on whether the outcome of interest is continuous or binary, respectively. 9 We also included a dummy specifying whether the …rms have ever been state-owned, given that newly privatized …rms may maintain close political connections while struggling with legacies of state ownership (bloated payrolls and ine¢ cient business practices). The inclusion of this dummy is without consequence for our results. 15
  • 18.
    Estimates of …rm-levelpolitical in‡uence may, additionally, be a¤ected by selection bias due to the non-random character of “in‡uential” vs. “non-in‡uential” …rms, whereby the distribution of covariates !, , and x, may be very di¤erent for …rms depending on their level of political in‡uence. In the absence of randomization, a common approach is to use match- ing methods to ensure that di¤erent categories of observations (in‡uential vs. non-in‡uential …rms) are as similar as possible in terms of relevant covariates–a method analogous to sever- ing the links between explanatory covariates and likelihood of “treatment”in observational data.10 We therefore correct for observable di¤erences between in‡uential/non-in‡uential …rms by pre-processing our data with matching methods, then re-running our parametric analyses on the matched sub-sample of the data as recommended by Ho, et al. (2007), and similar to the parametric bias-adjustment for matching by Abadie and Imbens (2006). We compute coe¢ cients on all independent variables after matching rather than reporting the simple di¤erence in means without controlling for potential confounding variables. The pur- pose of matching here, of course, is to ensure that in‡uential …rms are as close as possible to non-in‡uential …rms in terms of relevant covariates. We rely on propensity score matching based on the following model: Pr (Influencei = 1) = ^ i + ^ xxi + ^ lLobbyi ; (4) where Influence = 1 [Influence = 0] occurs when a …rm is [is not] able to in‡uence national policies a¤ecting its business. We designate …rms as in‡uential if their transformed in‡uence score as calculated above is greater than zero.11 is the standard normal distribution function, is the …rm-speci…c bias, and x is a vector of …rm-speci…c indicators–age of the …rm, number of permanent workers, dummies specifying whether the …rm is an exporter, 10 This approach does not control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which can only be corrected through the inclusion of all relevant confounding factors in the selection model. 11 We experimented with di¤erent cuto¤s, including 0, >-1, etc., with no major di¤erence in the result. Note that, at a cuto¤ of >0, approximately 10% of observations are coded as in‡uential; at 0 it is 30%. 16
  • 19.
    domestically-owned, or state-owned,as well as legal-, location-, sector-, year-, and country dummies. To this we add an additional dummy: whether, in the past two years, the …rm has sought to lobby the government or otherwise in‡uence the content of laws or regulations a¤ecting the …rm’s business. We generate a propensity score derived from a logit regression of (4).12 All regressions are run on both unmatched and matched subsamples. Endogeneity Although a solution to the selection problem, matching does not correct for potential endo- geneity. We recognize that the costs that …rms face or the bene…ts they obtain may boost their in‡uence as well as the other way around. For example, it is possible that …rms with bloated payrolls are more likely to have the ear of politicians, or that …rms that are able to reduce the costs of navigating regulatory barriers are also better at bringing pressure to bear on lawmakers. Alternatively, …rms paying high bribes may turn to in‡uence activities to be shielded from rapacious o¢ cials, or poorly-performing …rms may engage in in‡uence-peddling to compensate for losses. Finding valid, …rm-speci…c instruments that meet the usual criteria (especially excludabil- ity/orthogonality to the outcome of interest) poses a serious challenge. We follow a common approach taken by, among others, Fisman and Svensson (2007), and use grouped averages as instruments to address potential endogeneity. We generate average levels of in‡uence for each country-industry, and use these to instrument …rm-level in‡uence. An individual …rm’s in‡uence level will depend not only on characteristics of that particular …rm, but also on char- acteristics speci…c to the country and industrial sector in which it operates. At the country 12 We use local linear regression to construct matched outcomes, with biweight (quartic) kernels and default bandwidths of 0.06 and using the common-support condition. Local linear matching–a generalized version of kernel matching–constructs a match for each in‡uential …rm using smoothed local regression over multiple …rms in the comparison group, and demonstrates greater robustness to di¤erent data densities than alternative pair-matching estimators (see Heckman, Ishimura, and Todd 1997). In our data, local linear matching also improves the balance between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms better than alternative estimators. 17
  • 20.
    level, the rewardsand risks of engaging in elite exchange will depend on the transparency and accountability of the political system, as well as on the distribution of rents in the economy. At the industry level, in‡uence may vary across sectors because of di¤erences in the extent of government regulation, wage- or price-setting (or other existing price distortions), the avail- ability of subsidies, and other forms of state intervention in the sector. Certain sectors may be strategically more important than others, while some industries may be more dependent on public procurement, and so on. We can posit that this variation across countries and sectors is not driven by factors speci…c to the …rm itself, but rather, by factors determined by these country-industry characteristics. It follows that variation in …rm-speci…c in‡uence explained by the country-industry average level of in‡uence should be uncorrelated with unobservable …rm-speci…c factors that are causing endogeneity bias.13 Results Is Life Easier for In‡uential Firms? We …rst examine whether the assumption that in‡uential …rms face lower costs of doing busi- ness (c) is empirically justi…ed. Table 3 examines three costs typically imposed on businesses in developing countries: bribes, non-payment, and theft (exact wordings of questions used for these and other selected variables can be found in the appendix). Columns (1) to (5) examine bribes as a percentage of sales.14 We begin with a benchmark regression that is uncorrected for various biases in column (1), then include our CPI-based and crime-based proxies for sys- temic bias. The inclusion of these terms does not a¤ect the basic result: in‡uential …rms pay 13 To make the uncorrelated errors condition more robust, country-industry average in‡uence is taken from the self-in‡uence indicator, rather than the transformed in‡uence gap score. For a review of the use of group averages as instrumental variables, see Angrist and Krueger (2001). 14 The Enterprise Survey asks how much "a typical …rm like yours" pays in bribes, rather than how much "your …rm" pays, in order to minimize under-reporting. 18
  • 21.
    less in bribesthan non-in‡uential …rms. Similarly, when weighting for non-response bias and clustering errors by country-industry in column (4), and when re-running the estimation on the matched sub-sample in column (5), results do not change.15 Taking account of systemic bias, non-response weights, and clustering, we examine the e¤ect of in‡uence on government contracts as a percentage of procurement contract value, non-payment of receivables, and losses from crime and theft. As a general robustness check, here and throughout, we run estimations on unmatched and matched samples. As with overall bribes, in‡uential …rms also pay fewer bribes for government contracts.16 With less consistency, we also …nd that older …rms, state-owned companies, and foreign companies are better protected from bribe collectors. We also include workers (our measure of …rm size) in quadratic form, and …nd that …rms with more employees pay more in bribes for government contracts but the e¤ect is diminishing. We include, but do not report, legal status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies. 17 These results argue against the view that bribes are an instrument of in‡uence-peddling by private sector elites. Rather, our …ndings suggest that bribe taxes are used by the public 15 Given the potential sensitivity of the matched results to speci…cation changes in the propensity score- generating (logit) model for equation (4), we tested the stability of our results as follows: we re-ran the logit speci…cation 12 separate times, each time dropping one covariate or set of dummy variables, then re-estimated our main regression (5) in table 3. The results are essentially identical, with little di¤erence in magnitude, signs, or signi…cance of the covariates in the main results. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of variance (std. deviation absolute value of the mean 100%) for the in‡uence beta across these 12 speci…cations is less than 0.02%. 16 Using our basic estimation for the matched sub-sample of …rms, we further computed the probabilities that in‡uential vs. non-in‡uential …rms are forced to pay bribes to various types of inspectors and o¢ cials (these results are not reported here). With statistical con…dence (p < 0.01), we …nd that the likelihood that non-in‡uential …rms will have to pay bribes to building inspectors, health inspectors, and environmental inspectors is, respectively 27%, 29%, and 24% greater than for in‡uential …rms. With lower con…dence (p < 0.1), non-in‡uential …rms were also found to be 17% and 24% more likely to have to bribe tax collectors and local police, respectively. Notably, no signi…cant di¤erence in bribe propensity between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms is found for labor inspectors— perhaps a re‡ection that, if labor regulations might a¤ect non-in‡uential …rms more adversely while labor costs are a problem for in‡uential …rms, the bribe tax paid to labor inspectors may be equivalent. 17 From a simple stochastic simulation of columns (4) and (6), setting all variables at their sample means, an average …rm pays 1.8% of sales in bribes, and 2.5% of the value of a government contract in bribes. But for the most in‡uential …rms, the amounts drop to 1% and 0.7%, respectively. Meanwhile …rms that score below the bottom quintile in in‡uence pay 2% of sales and 3% of contract value in bribes to public o¢ cials. It is possible that in‡uential …rms pay less bribes because they have less extensive dealings with public o¢ cials than non-in‡uential …rms. We …nd no evidence for this disparity. We estimated the percentage of "senior management’s time spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations" based on the benchmark speci…cation in table 3, and …nd that in‡uence has no statistically signi…cant e¤ect. 19
  • 22.
    sector to extortpayments from weak or vulnerable enterprises. This is consistent with a bargaining framework for bribe-paying in which political connectedness can increase …rms’ relative bargaining power in dealing with public o¢ cials (Svensson 2003). High-level connec- tions shield …rms from predatory behavior by rank-and-…le administrators, indicating that the prevalence of corruption and cronyism in an economy are, for non-in‡uential …rms, rein- forcing.18 We turn to instrumental variables regressions in table 4. As indicated above, we cannot discount the possibility that …rms which are targets of bribe-taking o¢ cials may choose to seek political in‡uence as compensation. Speci…cally, it is possible that some …rms that are paying high bribe taxes will devote greater resources to developing political contacts and relationships, while others do not. Both types of …rms would su¤er from high bribe payments, but not as a result of political in‡uence. As this potential endogeneity applies to most of our dependent variables, we explore whether the e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on bribes changes when we instrument for in‡uence using the approach described in the previous section. Table 4 presents these results. We replicate our basic regression (table 3, columns 3-4) by estimating the e¤ect of in- ‡uence on bribes by instrumental variables (IV) regression. Table 4 reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) results for a just-identi…ed model using country-industry averages of in‡uence as instruments for …rm-level in‡uence. We identify the e¤ect of …rm in‡uence on bribes by the exclusion restriction that country-industry average in‡uence does not appear in the second- 18 Political connections usually protect …rms, but in some notable cases they do not. Columns (8) to (9) estimate the percent of sales that are left unpaid. Firms were asked to report the percent of sales to private customers that involve overdue payments. Firms in developing nations— particularly in the former Soviet- bloc countries— typically su¤er from signi…cant unpaid bills from customers, and have often responded by non-payments of their own to creditors, suppliers, tax collectors, and even workers. We …nd that politically in‡uential …rms are less likely to be trapped in these cycles of non-payment. In columns (10) to (11) we examine the e¤ect of political in‡uence on losses from theft, robbery, arson, or vandalism. Losses from theft are una¤ected by …rm in‡uence, size, or state-ownership (other e¤ects are unstable) suggesting that …rms of all stripes are similarly a¤ected by crime, and that the use of a crime-based proxy for systemic bias is valid. For in‡uential …rms, governments have less control over criminals than they have over bribe collectors and non-paying customers. 20
  • 23.
    stage regression. Inthe …rst stage we see that the impact of country-industry averages has a strong, independent e¤ect on …rm-level in‡uence. Tests for under-identi…cation (the Ander- son canonical correlation test) reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identi…ed. Tests for instrument strength (Cragg-Donald F statistic) are above critical values required to reject inconsistency of the IV estimator. In columns (3) and (4) we use a cluster-robust IV estimator with non-response weights. First-stage results are similar to those of the simple IV estimator: the instrument is correlated with …rm in‡uence, and is both valid and above critical values for instrument strength. Second-stage results in columns (2) and (4) show that instrumented …rm in‡uence has a negative impact on bribes, although this is only signi…cant in the cluster-robust estimation. Control variables have signs similar to results in table 3. We also test for the endogeneity of in‡uence in second-stage results. We use the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Wu- Hausman test implemented by Baum, et al. (2003), for which the null hypothesis is that the OLS estimator of the same equation (treating the suspect regressor as exogenous) yields consistent estimates, and a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressor’s e¤ect on the estimates requires an IV estimator. These tests show that we cannot reject the null of exogeneity. In sum, the use of country-industry in‡uence averages, though a valid instrument, ultimately suggests limited endogeneity bias in our OLS results. Unfortunately, the lack of other valid instruments in the Enterprise Surveys limits our ability to conduct more elaborate explorations of the robustness of our basic claims to potential endogeneity biases. 19 19 As a general test of the robustness of our results to possible endogeneity, we instrument …rm in‡uence with country-industry, grouped averages, and re-estimate all regressions that follow using the cluster-robust 2SLS estimator, with non-response weights. These results are not reported but are available from the authors. Statistical tests, in all cases, reject under-identi…cation, and reject the inconsistency of the IV estimator given the most stringent criteria (only when replicating results from table 8 below can we reject inconsistency at a slightly less stringent level). With one exception, the coe¢ cients on in‡uence retain their previous signs. In all but one case, however, in‡uence loses statistical signi…cance; this loss of precision is no surprise given the use of an aggregate (as opposed to …rm-speci…c) instrument. In only one instance, …nally, is exogeneity rejected with more than 95% con…dence, but in this estimation, the sign for …rm in‡uence remains the same as in the OLS estimation. 21
  • 24.
    In table 5we turn to …rms’business constraints. In the …rst several equations, our de- pendent variables are averages of responses to questions about the severity of …ve categories of constraints: infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, and transportation), taxation (both rates and the administration of), regulations (including customs, licensing, and per- mits), and …nance (cost and access). In each case we code these variables 1 if the obstacle was considered “major”or “severe,”0 otherwise. To these four indicators we add a sixth, based on …rm responses to a question of how customers would respond were the …rm to raise prices of their main product or service by 10%, a proxy for the absence of competitors ( ). We code this outcome 1 if …rms state that there would be no change in customer behavior, 0 other- wise.20 The results of these logit regressions are summarized in equations (1) to (10) in table 5. For simplicity we only report the coe¢ cient on in‡uence across estimations. All outcomes, however, were estimated using the full speci…cation in (3), incorporating bias, non-response weights, and clusters, on both unmatched and matched samples. We also report pseudo R2 from the full estimations. As with crime, poor infrastructure does not discriminate between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms. But all other constraints are decidedly more severe for non-in‡uential …rms, which are …ve to eight times more likely to consider tax, regulatory, and …nancial constraints to be major or severe obstacles than in‡uential …rms. These results also con…rm the absence of competition for in‡uential …rms, for whom price hikes are less likely to a¤ect customer behavior. As mentioned previously, the allocation of credit to privileged …rms on “soft” terms is considered a mainstay of crony capitalism. In equations (11) to (18) we investigate whether in‡uential …rms have easier access to credit ( ). Again, we report only the coe¢ cients and standard errors for the in‡uence variable. Here we examine four proxy outcomes: (i) 20 Firms were given four choices of responses: A: customers would continue to buy at the same quantities; B: customers would continue to buy but at slightly lower quantities; C: customers would continue to buy but at much lower quantities; and D: customers would stop buying. 22
  • 25.
    whether collateral wasrequired for the most recent loan (for …rms that obtained loans); (ii) the cost of the collateral (as a percentage of loan value); and the percentage of (iii) working capital and (iv) new investments …nanced by “informal sources”(money-lenders or other informal …nancial institutions). For the …rst outcome— the collateral requirement— we use logit regressions, while for all others we rely on OLS. Consistently and unsurprisingly, in‡uential …rms have easier access to credit. In‡uential …rms are less likely to be asked to collateralize loans by lenders. Among …rms that do provide collateral or a deposit for their …nancing, the more in‡uential …rms typically have to cover less of their loans than less in‡uential …rms. And in‡uential …rms are less entwined in the informal …nancial sector. Can In‡uential Firms Bene…t Politicians? In table 6 we examine evidence of the high-employment guarantees (~l) we have suggested as a source of political rents. Columns (1) and (2) present logit results for unmatched and matched samples, respectively, of estimating the e¤ect of political in‡uence on excess employment. Firms were asked, if they could change the number of full-time workers without restriction or punishment, whether they would shrink their payrolls. We code responses 1 or 0 depending on whether …rms reported they would lay o¤ workers. In columns (1) and (2), in addition to the variables included in the basic speci…cation, we also include …rms’ capacity utilization, on the assumption that use of installed productive capacity can a¤ect …rm managers’ preferences regarding optimal employment levels. We …nd that in‡uential …rms are more likely to maintain excess labor than non-in‡uential …rms. A second source of potential rents is tax payments, since public expenditures may be used to bolster public support. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is percentage of sales reported for tax purposes. Our results show that in‡uential …rms comply with tax reporting 23
  • 26.
    rules to agreater extent than non-in‡uential …rms (both in absolute and per-employee terms). Note that we also con…rm one of Gehlbach’s …ndings, namely, that …rms with more employees hide less taxes. In‡uential …rms may have a harder time evading taxes— possibly because their connections put them under closer scrutiny— but are also more likely to be compensated by explicit exemptions. Does In‡uence A¤ect Investment and Innovation? Rewards in the form of lowered costs of business, monopoly rents, and other bene…ts are often justi…ed by developing country governments as a de facto form of targeted industrial policy, on the assumption that most politically-connected …rms use these bene…ts to invest and innovate, and that these in‡uential …rms, therefore, are also the most dynamic. However, our model suggests that the opposite could be true, more in‡uential …rms are less likely to invest and innovate if the costs of bloated payrolls and x-ine¢ ciency due to lack of competitive pressure dominate the bene…cial e¤ects. We examine this relationship in tables 7 and 8. Firms were asked a series of questions on their restructuring activities and innovation. Table 7 shows the results of estimations in which the dependent variables are a set of innova- tion/restructuring outcomes: whether, in the past three years, the …rm opened a new plant, introduced a new product line, closed an old plant, or closed an obsolete product line. While there are valid concerns regarding the comparability of “newness” or “obsolescence” across …rms in di¤erent countries and in di¤erent industries, the inclusion of industry and country dummies should correct for these di¤erences. In addition to these outcomes, we also exam- ined whether …rms engaged in R&D activities in the past year. As in table 5, we only report coe¢ cients and standard errors for the in‡uence variable, for logit estimations using both unmatched and matched samples. Once again, in‡uential …rms display a certain consistency: 24
  • 27.
    they are lesslikely to open or close facilities, introduce or close out product lines, or engage in R&D. In table 8 we examine real growth in sales over the past three years (log scale), total investment, and the investment planning horizon in months (estimated with a Poisson event- count model). In‡uential …rms su¤er from lower real growth in sales over the three-year period. Columns (3) and (4) represent a log-form estimation of investment per worker. Political in‡uence lowers …rm-level investment (although the coe¢ cient is signi…cant only in the matched-sample regression). Finally, in‡uential …rms have a more myopic investment- planning horizon than non-in‡uential …rms. Political In‡uence and Productivity In columns (7) - (10) in table 7, …nally, we show results from basic productivity estimations. A Cobb-Douglas production function for …rm i in country c can be written as: log Yic = 0 + c + L log Lic + K log Kic + ic; (5) where Y is output, L and K are labor and capital inputs, and 0 and c are common and country-speci…c intercepts, respectively. The error term, ic, can be interpreted as within-country total-factor productivity (TFP), i.e., productivity after measured inputs have been accounted for. Using equation (5) we estimate …rm productivity in two ways. First we estimate an augmented production function where we regress output on L (workers) and K (capital inputs) in addition to the variables in our basic speci…cation (3), including in‡uence and other …rm-speci…c characteristics. We use sales rather than value-added for the dependent variable, given the unavailability of value-added data in the Enterprise Surveys. The augmented production function allows us to estimate the independent e¤ect of political in‡uence on …rm productivity. Secondly, we generate the residuals (TFP) from equation 25
  • 28.
    (5) and regressthe result using our basic speci…cation, allowing us to gauge the e¤ect of political in‡uence on …rm-level TFP. Incorporating these measures shrinks our sample size signi…cantly and therefore must be interpreted with caution, but we do see that the e¤ect of political in‡uence seems to support the notion that connected …rms su¤er from lower e¢ ciency. In the augmented production functions, political in‡uence is associated with less output (although the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient in the matched sample drops below the 10% level), and in‡uence is also associated with lower TFP. Firms that bene…t from preferential treatment are less productive than those that do not. Conclusion We have examined the content of …rm-state relationships characterized by special privileges granted to favored …rms— something that is prevalent across the developing world. Theoret- ical and empirical analyses of these relationships have generally focused exclusively on the bene…ts or costs to …rms (and to some extent to politicians), without assessing the impact on …rm-level decision making. We argue that economic privileges often come with a price, and use a simple framework to show how company performance varies between in‡uential and non-in‡uential …rms. We have characterized political in‡uence as a bargain between …rms and politicians whereby the former relinquish a portion of control rights in exchange for subsidies and pro- tection. We model how this bargain a¤ects …rm decisions, arguing that protection from competition, combined with the tendency to oversta¤ dampens incentives to invest, innovate, and lowers productivity. Data from more than 8,000 …rms in over 40 developing countries show that in‡uential …rms do have easier access to credits, face lower demand elasticity, en- joy regulatory forbearance, pay smaller bribes, and generally face fewer obstacles to doing 26
  • 29.
    business than less-in‡uential…rms. In exchange, in‡uential …rms provide politicians with politically-valuable bene…ts in the form of higher employment and revenue. These constraints— the costs of political in‡uence— mean that in‡uential …rms are less likely to restructure operations, invest less in R&D, rely on shorter investment-planning horizons, and report lower real sales growth, investment rates, and productivity than less- in‡uential …rms. Despite their access to privileges of economic value, in‡uential …rms su¤er from sharp disincentives to innovation and long-term investment. We found these results to be robust to simple controls for systemic bias, non-response, intra-group correlation, and selection bias. We also relied on a useful, if imperfect, instrument for …rm in‡uence and found that …rm in‡uence is generally not subject to strong endogeneity bias, and that in the few cases where there appears to be bias, instrumenting for in‡uence does not alter our main results. Our …ndings, …nally, suggest some …rm-level answers to three separate but related ques- tions on the political-economy of development. First, when does industrial policy lead to adverse economic outcomes and when does it work? There are examples where industrial policy has played an important role in promoting development, just as there are examples where industrial policy has had the opposite e¤ect. The di¤erence may be attributable to the nature of the political institutions implementing these policies (Robinson 2009). Our …ndings highlight a particular channel: if industrial policy, by picking winners, also endows selected …rms with greater in‡uence in public a¤airs, it is likely that those …rms will also provide bene…ts to incumbent politicians. The underlying political motives for industrial policies are often opaque and the temptation to secure political favors (employment, rev- enue) in return for selective, targeted supports can be irresistible to political leaders, and 27
  • 30.
    is ultimately harmfulto the dynamism and e¢ ciency of bene…ciary …rms.21 We show that …rms bene…ting from distortionary industrial policies are often precisely those that are po- litically valuable, and that this bargain with the state reduces incentives for investment and innovation, and harms productivity. Non-distortionary interventions, by contrast, such as those that enhance infrastructure or support skill-acquisition by workers, would not directly bene…t speci…c …rms. We can speculate, consequently, that governments relying on these broader interventions might avoid cronyism in business-state relations since there would be little grounds for the direct exchange of favors between …rms and politicians.22 Second, why do some economies remain chronically under-developed? Several authors have argued that di¤erences in barriers to adopting technological innovations account for di¤ering rates of development (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Mokyr 1992). Others have suggested that that these barriers, far from being exogenously-determined, are deliberately fashioned through restrictive labor practices and restrictions on the import of productivity- enhancing equipment (Parente and Prescott 2002). Our results suggest an additional source of these barriers, namely, the bargains associated with …rm-level political in‡uence whereby incentives to invest in advanced equipment and technology (even if available domestically) are weakened, while at the same time, the costs of business are raised for non-in‡uential …rms. Finally, if these …rm-state in‡uence relationships are dependent on political incumbents, why do they persist even as political regimes change? For Haber (2006), these bargains are a solution to the government’s commitment problem: by sharing a stream of rents with a small group of elites, the bargain is made more credible to income holders and the cronyistic 21 Even some advocates of experimentation in industrial policy acknowledge that the risks of cronyism can be substantial (e.g. Mukand and Rodrik 2005). 22 Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), for example, have argued that these types of "soft" industrial policies, while they are more di¢ cult to implement than tari¤s, subsidies, tax breaks, etc., are less vulnerable to political manipulation. 28
  • 31.
    arrangement more durable.For others, limited access to privileges among certain favored groups is a mechanism for maintaining order under conditions of fragile state capacity (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Our results suggest a slightly di¤erent logic: both …rms and politicians have a strong interest in ensuring that enterprises remain a permanent source of mutual rents. For politicians, control rights in critical sectors of the economy are highly desirable. Meanwhile …rms risk losing a series of privileges should politicians be replaced, and thus those that have privileges are encouraged to perpetuate their in‡uence-peddling activities regardless of who is in power. 29
  • 32.
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  • 38.
    36 Figure 1: Distributionsof influence perceptions Notes: Graph shows distribution of survey responses to: “How much influence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your business?”
  • 39.
    37 Figure 2: Selfinfluence of firms relative to perceived influence of other firms Notes: Graph shows how firms assess influence of three types of other firms (other domestic firms, dominant firms and conglomerates, and firms with personal ties to leaders) based on responding firm assessment of its own influence. Horizontal axis shows response categories for the firm’s own influence, histograms show fraction of firms rating the influence of all three other firm types as none (=0), minor (=1), moderate (=2), major (=3), decisive (=4). Dark bars show fraction of observations where firms’ own assessment is the same as their assessment of others, shaded and unshaded bars show fractions of observations where others are believed to have greater and lesser influence than the responding firm, respectively.
  • 40.
    38 Figure 3: Transformedinfluence score Notes: Section of bar at influence = 0 with cross-hatching shows observations where all categories of firms (including the responding firm) were rated as having no influence. Density functions are plotted with biweight kernels and bandwidths of 1.0; solid line excludes all firms that responded “none” for all categories of firms.
  • 41.
    39 Table 1a: Pairwisecorrelations of influence components (a) (b) (c) (d) Self influence Influence of other domestic firms Influence of dominant firms Influence of politically- connected firms Self influence (a) 0.541 (0.945) Influence of other domestic firms (b) 0.425 (0.000) 1.160 (1.106) Influence of dominant firms (c) 0.117 (0.000) 0.424 (0.000) 1.751 (1.326) Influence of politically-connected firms (d) 0.012 (0.171) 0.297 (0.000) 0.587 (0.000) 1.697 (1.421) Transformed influence [a — (b + c + d)/3] 0.569 (0.000) -0.270 (0.000) -0.640 (0.000) -0.680 (0.000) Table 1b: Correlations of transformed influence with other variables a — (b + c + d)/3 (1) (2) Age 0.072 (0.000) 0.086 (0.000) Exporter -0.020 (0.061) -0.039 (0.001) Domestic -0.032 (0.004) -0.035 (0.003) State-owned 0.114 (0.000) 0.117 (0.000) Workers (log L) 0.094 (0.000) 0.126 (0.000) N 8,452 7,349 Notes: Off-diagonal figures in table 1a and figures in table 2b are pairwise correlation coefficients, with significance levels in parentheses. Numbers along the diagonal (in italics) in table 1a are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Table 1a uses all available observations, while table 1b is restricted to the core sample used in all subsequent regressions. All firms that have responded a = b = c = d = 0 are omitted in column 2 of table 1b.
  • 42.
    40 Table 2: Summarystatistics Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Influence 8,452 -1.02 1.24 -4 4 Age of firm (years) 8,452 19.55 17.72 3 206 Exporter* 8,452 0.20 0.40 0 1 Domestically-owned firm* 8,452 0.86 0.35 0 1 State-owned firm* 8,452 0.07 0.25 0 1 Permanent workers (log, t — 1) 8,452 3.44 1.65 0 9.21 Firm-specific systematic bias (CPI-based) 8,452 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.12 Firm-specific systematic bias (crime-based) 8,452 1.35 1.35 0 4 Lobbied government* 6,919 0.23 0.42 0 1 Country-industry average influence 8,452 0.49 0.36 0 4 Capacity utilization (% of total capacity) 8,060 76.48 20.29 3 120 Total bribes (% sales) 6,220 1.83 3.80 0 50 Bribes for govt. contracts (% of value) 6,580 4.00 8.43 0 100 Overdue receivables (% of sales) 3,020 15.46 22.11 0 100 Losses due to crime (% sales) 7,828 0.95 3.80 0 95 Infrastructure* 8,375 0.09 0.28 0 1 Taxation* 8,452 0.43 0.49 0 1 Regulation* 7,702 0.18 0.39 0 1 Finance* 8,064 0.38 0.48 0 1 Monopoly pricing* 7,818 0.17 0.37 0 1 Collateral requirement* 3,284 0.77 0.42 0 1 Cost of collateral (% of loan value) 2,389 136.25 85.81 1 1000 Informal finance (% of working capital) 8,305 1.44 8.39 0 100 Informal finance (% of new investments) 6,078 0.99 7.44 0 100 Excess labor* 6,647 0.56 0.50 0 1 Tax compliance (% of sales reported) 7,539 77.45 27.81 0 100 Opened new plant or facility (past 3 years)* 7,952 0.15 0.35 0 1 Opened new product line (past 3 years)* 7,958 0.46 0.50 0 1 Closed old plant or facility (past 3 years)* 7,946 0.10 0.30 0 1 Closed obsolete product line (past 3 years)* 7,952 0.26 0.44 0 1 Conducted R&D activities (past year)* 2,475 0.48 0.50 0 1 Output (US$, log) 3,110 7.15 2.64 4.83 18.98 Capital inputs (US$, log) 2,579 5.07 4.09 -9.38 18.24 TFP (US$, log) 2,557 0.01 0.82 -4.21 5.54 Real sales growth (US$, log, 3-year) 2,577 0.24 0.58 -5.99 7.15 Investment (US$, log) 1,650 2.67 2.99 0 18.45 Investment horizon (months) 2,672 9.27 11.03 1 120 Notes: All summary statistics taken from full (unmatched) sample; * denotes dichotomous variable.
  • 43.
    41 Table 3: Firminfluence and the costs of doing business Total bribe payments (% of sales) Bribes for procurement (% of contract value) Unpaid receivables (% of sales) Losses from crime (% of sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) Influence -0.184*** (0.039) -0.184*** (0.039) -0.158*** (0.040) -0.152*** (0.057) -0.152*** (0.057) -0.340*** (0.091) -0.387*** (0.086) -0.697** (0.325) -1.003* (0.584) -0.039 (0.037) -0.045 (0.048) Age -0.006* (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.018 (0.024) -0.001 (0.036) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) Exporter -0.042 (0.128) -0.043 (0.128) -0.020 (0.130) -0.080 (0.152) -0.080 (0.152) -0.007 (0.225) 0.063 (0.204) -2.920* (1.565) -4.532** (2.204) 0.050 (0.134) 0.081 (0.163) Domestic 0.327** (0.134) 0.327** (0.134) 0.301** (0.136) 0.310** (0.122) 0.313** (0.122) 0.193 (0.257) 0.099 (0.254) 2.044 (1.662) 1.710 (2.221) 0.203* (0.118) 0.185 (0.128) State-owned -0.643*** (0.243) -0.641*** (0.243) -0.596** (0.246) -0.607*** (0.222) -0.613*** (0.223) -0.637 (0.389) -0.649* (0.391) 1.483 (3.894) 3.157 (3.705) 0.125 (0.194) 0.160 (0.200) Workers (log L) 0.062 (0.107) 0.062 (0.107) 0.055 (0.108) 0.045 (0.116) 0.046 (0.117) 0.746*** (0.243) 0.515** (0.216) 2.237 (1.838) 2.415 (2.058) -0.050 (0.113) -0.055 (0.119) Workers2 -0.021 (0.013) -0.021 (0.013) -0.020 (0.013) -0.018 (0.015) -0.019 (0.015) -0.116*** (0.029) -0.071*** (0.025) -0.271 (0.204) -0.330 (0.238) 0.000 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013) Bias (CPI) -8.553 (27.190) Bias (crime) 0.318*** (0.042) 0.326*** (0.055) 0.326*** (0.055) 0.536*** (0.094) 0.336*** (0.071) 0.561** (0.262) 0.786 (0.515) 0.323*** (0.046) 0.401*** (0.058) Non-response weighting No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Matched sub-sample No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes N 6,531 6,531 6,362 6,046 6,033 6,699 5,699 3,052 1,618 7,952 6,424 k 388 388 413 412 83 77 416 415 Adjusted R2 0.113 0.112 0.121 0.133 0.133 0.227 0.105 0.250 0.218 0.035 0.036 RMSE 3.594 3.594 3.597 3.696 3.700 7.452 5.797 19.979 23.461 3.813 4.137 Notes: Results from OLS regressions, with legal-status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in parentheses in columns 1 — 3; robust standard errors clustered by k country-industry clusters are in parentheses in columns 4 — 11. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 44.
    42 Table 4: Robustness:instrumental variables regressions 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage Firm influence (1) Bribes (2) Firm influence (3) Bribes (4) Influence -0.313 (0.235) -0.469** (0.233) Age 0.003*** (0.001) -0.006* (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) Exporter -0.034 (0.040) -0.024 (0.129) -0.020 (0.045) -0.082 (0.153) Domestic -0.046 (0.042) 0.291** (0.136) -0.055 (0.049) 0.289** (0.125) State-owned 0.137* (0.076) -0.570** (0.248) 0.131 (0.089) -0.556** (0.220) Workers (log L) -0.026 (0.034) 0.050 (0.108) -0.012 (0.033) 0.038 (0.117) Workers2 0.009** (0.004) -0.018 (0.014) 0.007* (0.004) -0.015 (0.015) Bias -0.112*** (0.013) 0.301*** (0.049) -0.107*** (0.014) 0.292*** (0.054) Country-industry average influence 0.806*** (0.059) 0.797*** (0.057) N 6,362 6,362 6,046 6,046 k 388 388 R2 0.162 0.130 0.161 0.136 RMSE 1.113 3.579 1.122 3.691 Likelihood ratio 184.627 (0.000) 67.089 (0.000) Cragg-Donald F 187.784 164.561 Endogeneity test 0.450 (0.502) 2.059 (0.151) Notes: Dependent variable is total bribe payments as a percent of sales. Results are from IV regressions, with legal-status, location, industry, survey-year, and country dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in parentheses in columns 1 and 2; cluster-robust standard errors for k country-industry clusters are in parentheses in columns 3 and 4. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are centered R2 . Likelihood-ratio is Anderson canonical correlation statistic for simple IV, Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic for cluster-robust 2SLS (null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified). Stock-Yogo critical value (at 95% confidence) for weak-instrument test statistics (Kleibergen-Paap Wald or Cragg- Donald F) is 16.38 for maximum bias of IV estimator to be no more than 10% of the bias (inconsistency) of OLS, i.e., the most stringent criterion. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 45.
    43 Table 5: Politicalinfluence and business constraints Eq. Dep. Var. Coeff. S.E. N k R2 Matched sub-sample (1) (2) Infrastructure 0.005 -0.012 0.043 0.052 8,251 6,713 383 382 0.160 0.199 No Yes (3) (4) Taxes -0.227*** -0.247*** 0.026 0.029 8,452 6,918 420 419 0.209 0.130 No Yes (5) (6) Regulations -0.227*** -0.265*** 0.030 0.039 7,623 6,428 400 399 0.178 0.160 No Yes (7) (8) Finance -0.145*** -0.152*** 0.024 0.029 8,163 6,651 420 419 0.215 0.140 No Yes (9) (10) Monopoly 0.128*** 0.145*** 0.027 0.030 7,955 6,441 411 407 0.094 0.078 No Yes (11) (12) Collateral -0.125*** -0.124*** 0.040 0.048 3,324 2,792 360 359 0.134 0.142 No Yes (13) (14) Collateral (% of loan) -3.472** -3.325** 1.435 1.617 2,343 1,998 321 320 0.186 0.206 No Yes (15) (16) Informal finance (% of working capital) -0.179** -0.136* 0.081 0.076 8,438 6,901 419 418 0.016 0.011 No Yes (17) (18) Informal finance (% of investment) -0.160 -0.197* 0.098 0.108 6,173 4,900 408 407 0.002 0.001 No Yes Notes: Coefficients for “influence” and robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are reported. All regressions include, in addition to influence, the following variables: age of firm, exporter dummy, domestic dummy, workers (linear and quadratic), firm-specific bias, legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Equations (1) — (12) show results from logit regressions, (15) — (18) are by OLS. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 for logit regressions, adjusted R2 for OLS. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 46.
    44 Table 6: Politicalinfluence, excess labor, and tax compliance Excess labor Tax compliance (% of sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) Influence 0.090*** (0.023) 0.091*** (0.028) 0.510** (0.218) 0.565* (0.288) Age -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.049*** (0.018) 0.034* (0.019) Exporter 0.081 (0.084) 0.090 (0.088) 0.438 (0.883) -0.760 (0.915) Domestic 0.172* (0.102) 0.111 (0.100) -3.353*** (0.800) -3.052*** (0.863) State-owned 0.171 (0.178) 0.138 (0.177) 3.551** (1.609) 3.997** (1.644) Workers (log L) 0.215*** (0.083) 0.145* (0.084) 2.137*** (0.796) 2.609*** (0.829) Workers2 -0.033*** (0.011) -0.022* (0.012) -0.042 (0.090) -0.121 (0.094) Bias 0.092*** (0.024) 0.095*** (0.032) -1.023*** (0.224) -0.795*** (0.250) Capacity utilization -0.003** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) Matched sub-sample No Yes No Yes N 6,398 5,054 7,661 6,239 k 400 399 417 416 R2 0.111 0.092 0.268 0.273 Log likelihood/RMSE -4,906.254 -3,984.916 23.835 23.914 Notes: All regressions include legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are in parentheses. Equations (1) and (2) show results from logit regressions, (2) and (3) are by OLS. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 for logit regressions, adjusted R2 for OLS. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 47.
    45 Table 7: Politicalinfluence and firm innovation Coeff. S.E. N k R2 Matched sub-sample (1) (2) Started new production line -0.059** -0.091*** 0.023 0.026 7,843 6,306 408 407 0.124 0.110 No Yes (3) (4) Opened new plant -0.142*** -0.189*** 0.032 0.040 7,838 6,301 408 407 0.114 0.139 No Yes (5) (6) Closed obsolete production line -0.087*** -0.159*** 0.029 0.031 7,838 6,301 408 407 0.119 0.131 No Yes (7) (8) Closed old plant -0.088*** -0.085** 0.031 0.038 7,832 6,295 408 407 0.086 0.101 No Yes (9) (10) Engaged in R&D activities -0.083** -0.148*** 0.041 0.053 2,256 783 48 40 0.078 0.164 No Yes Notes: Coefficients for “influence” and robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are reported using logit estimation. All regressions include, in addition to influence, the following variables: age of firm, exporter dummy, domestic dummy, workers (linear and quadratic), firm-specific bias, legal- status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. R2 values reported are pseudo R2 . *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 48.
    46 Table 8: Politicalinfluence, productivity, and investment Real sales growth (log) Investment (log) Investment horizon (months) Output (log) Total factor productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Influence -0.015* (0.009) -0.033** (0.016) -0.053 (0.041) -0.129** (0.064) -0.054*** (0.005) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.028*** (0.009) -0.026 (0.016) -0.028*** (0.009) -0.035* (0.017) Workers (Log L) 0.038 (0.054) 0.003 (0.068) 0.260 (0.249) 0.256 (0.248) 0.129*** (0.021) 0.151*** (0.024) 0.385*** (0.042) 0.301*** (0.048) -0.829*** (0.130) -1.012*** (0.150) Workers2 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.007) 0.071*** (0.025) 0.066** (0.029) 0.004* (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.092*** (0.013) 0.096*** (0.015) Capital inputs (Log K) 0.370*** (0.027) 0.280*** (0.061) Age -0.004*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.011** (0.005) -0.014* (0.008) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) -0.006* (0.003) Exporter -0.035 (0.034) -0.065 (0.055) 0.047 (0.291) -0.228 (0.424) 0.074*** (0.017) 0.071*** (0.025) 0.182*** (0.055) 0.031 (0.095) 0.128** (0.049) -0.023 (0.076) Domestic -0.015 (0.056) 0.003 (0.066) -0.546* (0.285) -0.573 (0.368) -0.125*** (0.020) -0.047* (0.025) -0.213** (0.095) -0.184* (0.098) -0.098 (0.105) -0.002 (0.110) State-owned -0.052 (0.111) -0.118 (0.121) -0.149 (0.363) -0.040 (0.386) -0.235*** (0.084) -0.275*** (0.089) -1.529*** (0.518) -1.469*** (0.517) -1.629*** (0.510) -1.685*** (0.490) Bias 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.007) Matched sub-subsample No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes N 2,592 1,183 1,662 881 2,699 1,328 2,580 1,134 2,580 1,134 k 87 80 66 58 72 66 72 66 Adjusted R2 0.053 0.056 0.325 0.273 0.871 0.901 0.149 0.233 RMSE 0.570 0.636 2.444 2.881 0.782 0.838 0.758 0.819 Notes: Notes: All regressions include legal-status, location, industry, time, and country dummies. Equations (1) — (8) are from OLS, equations (9) and (10) from Poisson event-count regression. Robust standard errors clustered by k country-industries are in parentheses. All estimations are weighted for non-response bias. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
  • 49.
    47 Appendix: Coding ofselected variables Variable coding  Wording of source question Age  (survey year – Q1)     Q1. In what year did your firm begin operations in this country?    Exporter  (coded 1 if Q2.ii > Q2.i or Q2.iii)  Q2. What percent of your establishment’s sales are:  i) sold domestically  ii) exported directly  iii) exported indirectly (through a distributor)    Domestic  (coded 1 if Q3.i selected)    State‐owned  (coded 1 if Q3.ii selected)     Q3. Which of the following best describes the largest shareholder or owner in  your firm? (Multiple answers allowed)  i) Domestic company  ii) Government or government agency  iii) [other response categories omitted]    Lobbied government  (coded 1 if Q4 = yes)  Q4. Think about national laws and regulations enacted in the last two years  that  have  a  substantial  impact  on  your  business.  Did  your  firm  seek  to  lobby  government  or  otherwise  influence  the  content  of  laws  or  regulations affecting it? (yes/no)    Bribes    Q5. We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or  informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to  customs,  taxes,  licenses,  regulations,  services,  etc.  On  average,  what  percent of annual sales value would such expenses cost a typical firm like  yours?    Bribes for government contracts  Q6. When establishments in your industry do business with the government,  how much of the contract value is typically expected in gifts or informal  payments to secure the contract?    Overdue receivables  Q7. What  percent  of  your  sales  to  private  customers  involve  overdue  payments?    Losses due to crime  Q8. Please estimate the losses (as a percent of total sales) of theft, robbery,  vandalism or arson against your establishment in the last year?    Infrastructure  (coded 1 if Q9.i + Q9.ii + Q9.iii ≥ 9)    Taxation  (coded 1 if Q9.iv + Q9.v ≥ 6)    Regulation  (coded 1 if Q9.vi + Q9.vii  ≥ 6)    Finance  (coded 1 if Q9.viii + Q9.ix ≥ 6)    CPI‐based systemic bias  (residual from regression of Q 9.x  on inflation)    Crime‐based systemic bias (Q9.xi)    Q9. Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation  and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its  severity as an obstacle on a four‐point scale where: 0 = No obstacle; 1 =  Minor  obstacle;  2  =  Moderate  obstacle;  3  =  Major  obstacle;  4  =  Very  severe obstacle  i) Telecommunications   ii) Electricity  iii) Transportation  iv) Tax rates   v) Tax administration  vi) Customs and trade regulations  vii) Business licensing and operating permits  viii) Access to financing (e.g. collateral)  ix) Cost of financing (e.g. interest rates)  x) Macroeconomic instability  xi) Crime, theft, and disorder    Monopoly  (coded 1 if Q10.i selected)  Q10.Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If you were to raise  your prices of your main product line or main line of services 10% above 
  • 50.
    48 their current level in the domestic market (after allowing for any inflation)  which of the following would best describe the result assuming that your  competitors maintained their current prices?  i) Our customers would continue to buy from us in the same  quantities as now   ii) Our customers  would  continue  to  buy  from  us,  but  at  slightly lower quantities   iii) Our customers would continue to buy from us, but at much  lower quantities  iv) Our customers would stop buying from us    Collateral  (coded 1 if Q11 = yes)  Q11.For the most recent loan or overdraft, did the financing require collateral  or a deposit? (yes/no)    Excess labor  (coded 1 if Q12 <100%)  Q12.If you could change the number of regular full‐time workers you currently  employ without any restrictions (i.e. without seeking permission, making  severance  payments  etc.),  what  would  be  your  optimal  level  of  employment  as a  percent  of  your  existing  workforce?  (E.g.  90%  implies  you  would  reduce  your  workforce  by  10%,  110%  means  you  want  to  expand by 10%)    Tax compliance  Q13.Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with  taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate  the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?    New plant  (coded 1 if Q14.i = yes)    New product  (coded 1 if Q14.ii = yes)    Closed plant  (coded 1 if Q14.iii = yes)    Closed product  (coded 1 if Q14.iv = yes)    Q14.Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives in the last  three years? (yes/no)  i) Opened a new plant  ii) Developed a major new product line  iii) Closed at least one existing plant or outlet  iv) Discontinued at least one product (not production line)  Conducted R&D activities  (coded 1 if Q15 > 0)  Q15.How  much  did  your  establishment  spend  on  design  or  R&D  last  year?  (Spending includes wages and salaries of R&D personnel, such as scientists  and engineers; materials, education costs, and subcontracting costs.)  Source: World Bank (2002).