The money laundering cycle
Valuation of financial instruments
BDO supports the Chamber of Hong
Kong Listed Companies (CHKLC)
director training series 2014
BDO global network development at
a glance
New Companies Ordinance (Chapter
622)
Recent amendment to listing rules
relating to connected transactions
Albert Au awarded the BBS
BDO Asia Pacific Regional Conference
2014
Fanny Hsiang was appointed as a
member of the small and medium-
sized entities implementation group
BDO new appointments
Recent BDO publications
BDO Annual Statement
APERCU
August 2014
www.bdo.COM.HK
Contents
01
04
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
The Money LaunderingCycle
T
he Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) is an inter-government anti money laundering (AML)
body comprising 34 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations.The primary
objective of the FATF is to combat money laundering activities through the establishment of
international AML standards and frameworks.
Money launderers are creative, sophisticated and well-networked.They design, evolve and comingle
new money laundering techniques in thousands of different forms frequently. Studying and
researching these new methods and developing new AML procedures are definitely one of the most
difficult tasks of FATF.
Typically, a complete money laundering cycle has three stages. Although money laundering methods
emerge in different forms, they are always based on these three stages.
Nevertheless, “Know Your Enemies” is the underlying principle.
Placement stage
Crime is big business which generates large amounts of cash.
After evading the police, the next question money launderers ask is how to hide away the load of illicit
cash.This kicks off the first stage of the money laundering cycle – placement – which is about injecting
cash into the financial system in the least suspicious manner.
The traditional placement method is direct cash deposit into financial institutions (eg banks and
securities firms). In order to get around the algorithm of AML transaction monitoring systems, money
launderers usually break down the cash deposits into small amounts, so that they can go under the
detection thresholds of AML systems, such as the US$10,000 rule which requires banks to file AML
reports of cash transactions over US$10,000 to the authorities under the US Bank Secrecy Act.
This technique is simple, but immature. It takes a rather long period of time to process all the small-
amount transactions. In addition, the illicit money is scattered among different bank accounts held by
different dummies whose number has limit. In the long run, evolving algorithms of AML systems are
able to recognise such deposit patterns.
2 APERCU - August 2014
“Comingling with clean funds” may be a
more effective placement method. Money
launderers can place illicit cash into financial
systems by assimilating it into their legitimate
cash businesses, such as pubs, restaurants and
retail stores, and by such means comingle the
illicit money with clean funds earned from the
business.
Operationally, these comingled funds can be
injected as sales proceeds during peak business
seasons which “apparently” justify the increase
of sales and related cash deposits. Strategically,
money launderers operate different money-
washing businesses, close them down on a
rotational basis and re-establish them in another
form in order to remove unexplainable patterns
and trails.
In the course of this, the books of these
businesses are closed and audited in the normal
way and, on that basis, taxes are paid as a small
cost of washing money.This could be one of the
reasons why the suspicious transaction reporting
duty under AML law in many jurisdictions is
now extending beyond financial sectors to
professional regimes, such as lawyers and
accountants.
Layering stage
Once illicit funds enters the financial system in
the placement stage, money launderers then
create a large number of financial transactions
in order to disassociate the funds from its illicit
sources.This is the second stage – layering –
which is usually featured by:
1.	 Moving funds around the globe in order to
stop local authorities from tracing trails at
their borders;
2.	 Engaging in financial instruments trading
which hides the unusual trading patterns in
transaction pools of extremely high volume;
3.	 Using different dummies in each transaction
to conceal the original illicit sources.
Figure 1 demonstrates a simple web of
transactions and it can go on and on until money
launderers are comfortable about the level of
disassociation from the original illicit sources.
Step 1:
•	 A listed company director engaged in insider dealing wires his funds from the US to HK. (Let’s say)
Step 2:
•	 The proceeds are used to buy some stocks in HK.
•	 The shares are transferred to Dummy X which pays some stamp duty to legitimise the trade.
Step 3:
•	 Dummy X sells the shares.
•	 A loan arrangement is entered into with Dummy Y which justifies the related fund transfer in another country.
Step 4:
•	 Dummy Y transfers the funds back to Country A as capital injection of a company held by Dummy Z on behalf of the listed company director.
•	 “Dizzy enough? Let’s loop again.” said Money Launderers.
Step 4
Step 3
Step 1
Step 2
Country B
Country C
Country A
Figure 1
In layering stages, it is difficult to distinguish
a normal transaction from one conducted by
money launderers unless the whole chain of
transactions is presented. In fact, this is the
whole purpose of layering.
Integration stage
After trails are substantially removed in the
layering stage, money launderers need to
reunite with the washed money and return it to
themselves as if it is from legitimate sources.
This is the ultimate objective and final stage of
the money laundering cycle – integration.
Traditionally, integration is achieved through
dealing in high-value items, such as properties
and antiques whose subsequent sales would
return legitimate proceeds. In less developed
areas, such transactions can even be facilitated
by corrupt professionals, eg accountants and
lawyers as perfect “witnesses” endorsing the
legitimacy of the fund source.This kind of
integration technique is usually applied locally.
APERCU - August 2014 3
Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is one of
the most complex and increasingly important
method of bringing together the illicit funds and
legitimising it through the use of international
trade, according to a study of the FATF in 2006.
It is estimated that hundreds of billions of dollars
are laundered throughTBML globally.
The key element of a basicTBML model is
misrepresentation of trade prices.
Over-invoicing
Make falsified international trade of “apparently”
high-valued products and over-bill the amount;
hence claim the proceeds in the seller’s country
to be legally earned profit.
Under-invoicing
Make falsified international trade of “actually”
high-valued items and under-bill the amount;
hence transfer the profit to the buyers’ country
in which the items will be resold at a high margin
as legally earned profit.
Graph 2 depicts the basic operation ofTBML
where the key notes are:
1.	 The illicit funds originate and are maintained
in Country C;
2.	 Buyer in Country A enters into international
trade with seller in Country B in the normal
course of business. Shipment is instructed
and made to affiliate in Country C;
3.	 Buyer in Country A enters into another trade
contract with affiliate in Country C and
re-invoices the goods at an inflated price
of $1,000.The funds are legitimised and
channelled to Country A through letters of
credit.
This case demonstrates thatTBML (buyer in
Country A and affiliate in Country C) can be
processed through paper work only and requires
no costs of operation.
Some red flags ofTBML are:
1.	 Significant deficiencies between the
description of the traded items on the bill of
lading and the invoice;
2.	 Significant deficiencies between the
description of the traded items on the bill
of lading (invoice) and the actually shipped
goods;
3.	 Significant deficiencies between the reported
value of traded items and the fair market
price;
4.	 The volume of trade is inconsistent with
the scale of operation or size of capital of
exporters/importers;
5.	 Settlement by unrelated third parties.
It is difficult to tackleTBML because it requires
Independent
seller in
Conutry B
Affiliate in
Country C
Bank in
Country C
Step 3: Invoice the goods at $1,000
Step 6: Pay $1,000 for settlement through letter of credit
Step 5:
Issue letter of credit
Step 4:
Pledge
the dirty
funds after
layering
with bankStep 7:
Legitimise
the funds as
“apparently”
supported by
trade contract
and paid up by
letter of credit
Ship goods
Step 1: Invoiced
normally at $100
Step 2: Wires $100
for AP settlement
Buyer
in Country A
Enjoy life in
Country A
meaningful statistical analysis built on a strong
international trade database. Internationally,
many countries are starting to establish a
function generally called “TradeTransparency
Unit” for conducting ongoing comparison
analysis and exchanging trade data. Yet, it will
take a while to see the effectiveness of such
programmes.
For further enquiries about Anti-money
laundering standards and programmes, please
contact our Director and Head of Risk Advisory
Services, Mr Patrick Rozario on (852) 2218 3118
or patrickrozario@bdo.com.hk
Jason Wong
Risk Advisory Services
jasonwong@bdo.com.hk
Graph 2

6 Money Laundering Cycle (p1-3) by Jason

  • 1.
    The money launderingcycle Valuation of financial instruments BDO supports the Chamber of Hong Kong Listed Companies (CHKLC) director training series 2014 BDO global network development at a glance New Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622) Recent amendment to listing rules relating to connected transactions Albert Au awarded the BBS BDO Asia Pacific Regional Conference 2014 Fanny Hsiang was appointed as a member of the small and medium- sized entities implementation group BDO new appointments Recent BDO publications BDO Annual Statement APERCU August 2014 www.bdo.COM.HK Contents 01 04 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 The Money LaunderingCycle T he Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) is an inter-government anti money laundering (AML) body comprising 34 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations.The primary objective of the FATF is to combat money laundering activities through the establishment of international AML standards and frameworks. Money launderers are creative, sophisticated and well-networked.They design, evolve and comingle new money laundering techniques in thousands of different forms frequently. Studying and researching these new methods and developing new AML procedures are definitely one of the most difficult tasks of FATF. Typically, a complete money laundering cycle has three stages. Although money laundering methods emerge in different forms, they are always based on these three stages. Nevertheless, “Know Your Enemies” is the underlying principle. Placement stage Crime is big business which generates large amounts of cash. After evading the police, the next question money launderers ask is how to hide away the load of illicit cash.This kicks off the first stage of the money laundering cycle – placement – which is about injecting cash into the financial system in the least suspicious manner. The traditional placement method is direct cash deposit into financial institutions (eg banks and securities firms). In order to get around the algorithm of AML transaction monitoring systems, money launderers usually break down the cash deposits into small amounts, so that they can go under the detection thresholds of AML systems, such as the US$10,000 rule which requires banks to file AML reports of cash transactions over US$10,000 to the authorities under the US Bank Secrecy Act. This technique is simple, but immature. It takes a rather long period of time to process all the small- amount transactions. In addition, the illicit money is scattered among different bank accounts held by different dummies whose number has limit. In the long run, evolving algorithms of AML systems are able to recognise such deposit patterns.
  • 2.
    2 APERCU -August 2014 “Comingling with clean funds” may be a more effective placement method. Money launderers can place illicit cash into financial systems by assimilating it into their legitimate cash businesses, such as pubs, restaurants and retail stores, and by such means comingle the illicit money with clean funds earned from the business. Operationally, these comingled funds can be injected as sales proceeds during peak business seasons which “apparently” justify the increase of sales and related cash deposits. Strategically, money launderers operate different money- washing businesses, close them down on a rotational basis and re-establish them in another form in order to remove unexplainable patterns and trails. In the course of this, the books of these businesses are closed and audited in the normal way and, on that basis, taxes are paid as a small cost of washing money.This could be one of the reasons why the suspicious transaction reporting duty under AML law in many jurisdictions is now extending beyond financial sectors to professional regimes, such as lawyers and accountants. Layering stage Once illicit funds enters the financial system in the placement stage, money launderers then create a large number of financial transactions in order to disassociate the funds from its illicit sources.This is the second stage – layering – which is usually featured by: 1. Moving funds around the globe in order to stop local authorities from tracing trails at their borders; 2. Engaging in financial instruments trading which hides the unusual trading patterns in transaction pools of extremely high volume; 3. Using different dummies in each transaction to conceal the original illicit sources. Figure 1 demonstrates a simple web of transactions and it can go on and on until money launderers are comfortable about the level of disassociation from the original illicit sources. Step 1: • A listed company director engaged in insider dealing wires his funds from the US to HK. (Let’s say) Step 2: • The proceeds are used to buy some stocks in HK. • The shares are transferred to Dummy X which pays some stamp duty to legitimise the trade. Step 3: • Dummy X sells the shares. • A loan arrangement is entered into with Dummy Y which justifies the related fund transfer in another country. Step 4: • Dummy Y transfers the funds back to Country A as capital injection of a company held by Dummy Z on behalf of the listed company director. • “Dizzy enough? Let’s loop again.” said Money Launderers. Step 4 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Country B Country C Country A Figure 1 In layering stages, it is difficult to distinguish a normal transaction from one conducted by money launderers unless the whole chain of transactions is presented. In fact, this is the whole purpose of layering. Integration stage After trails are substantially removed in the layering stage, money launderers need to reunite with the washed money and return it to themselves as if it is from legitimate sources. This is the ultimate objective and final stage of the money laundering cycle – integration. Traditionally, integration is achieved through dealing in high-value items, such as properties and antiques whose subsequent sales would return legitimate proceeds. In less developed areas, such transactions can even be facilitated by corrupt professionals, eg accountants and lawyers as perfect “witnesses” endorsing the legitimacy of the fund source.This kind of integration technique is usually applied locally.
  • 3.
    APERCU - August2014 3 Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is one of the most complex and increasingly important method of bringing together the illicit funds and legitimising it through the use of international trade, according to a study of the FATF in 2006. It is estimated that hundreds of billions of dollars are laundered throughTBML globally. The key element of a basicTBML model is misrepresentation of trade prices. Over-invoicing Make falsified international trade of “apparently” high-valued products and over-bill the amount; hence claim the proceeds in the seller’s country to be legally earned profit. Under-invoicing Make falsified international trade of “actually” high-valued items and under-bill the amount; hence transfer the profit to the buyers’ country in which the items will be resold at a high margin as legally earned profit. Graph 2 depicts the basic operation ofTBML where the key notes are: 1. The illicit funds originate and are maintained in Country C; 2. Buyer in Country A enters into international trade with seller in Country B in the normal course of business. Shipment is instructed and made to affiliate in Country C; 3. Buyer in Country A enters into another trade contract with affiliate in Country C and re-invoices the goods at an inflated price of $1,000.The funds are legitimised and channelled to Country A through letters of credit. This case demonstrates thatTBML (buyer in Country A and affiliate in Country C) can be processed through paper work only and requires no costs of operation. Some red flags ofTBML are: 1. Significant deficiencies between the description of the traded items on the bill of lading and the invoice; 2. Significant deficiencies between the description of the traded items on the bill of lading (invoice) and the actually shipped goods; 3. Significant deficiencies between the reported value of traded items and the fair market price; 4. The volume of trade is inconsistent with the scale of operation or size of capital of exporters/importers; 5. Settlement by unrelated third parties. It is difficult to tackleTBML because it requires Independent seller in Conutry B Affiliate in Country C Bank in Country C Step 3: Invoice the goods at $1,000 Step 6: Pay $1,000 for settlement through letter of credit Step 5: Issue letter of credit Step 4: Pledge the dirty funds after layering with bankStep 7: Legitimise the funds as “apparently” supported by trade contract and paid up by letter of credit Ship goods Step 1: Invoiced normally at $100 Step 2: Wires $100 for AP settlement Buyer in Country A Enjoy life in Country A meaningful statistical analysis built on a strong international trade database. Internationally, many countries are starting to establish a function generally called “TradeTransparency Unit” for conducting ongoing comparison analysis and exchanging trade data. Yet, it will take a while to see the effectiveness of such programmes. For further enquiries about Anti-money laundering standards and programmes, please contact our Director and Head of Risk Advisory Services, Mr Patrick Rozario on (852) 2218 3118 or [email protected] Jason Wong Risk Advisory Services [email protected] Graph 2