A Method of Improving Energy Efficiency Through Geofencing and False Data Blocking In Context-Aware Architecture for Probabilistic Voting-Based Filtering Scheme of WSNs

International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.13, No.3, May 2021
DOI: 10.5121/ijcnc.2021.13306 97
A METHOD OF IMPROVING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY THROUGH GEOFENCING AND FALSE
DATA BLOCKING IN CONTEXT-AWARE
ARCHITECTURE FOR PROBABILISTIC VOTING-
BASED FILTERING SCHEME OF WSNS
Su Man Nam1
and Youn Kyoung Seo2
1
DUDU Information Technologies, Republic of Korea
2
Incheon Jae Neung University, Republic of Korea
ABSTRACT
In wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes have the disadvantage of being vulnerable to several attacks due
to the use of wireless communication and constrained energy. Adversaries exploit vulnerable
characteristics of these nodes to capture them and generate false positive and false negative attacks. These
attacks result in false alarms in a base station and information loss in intermediate nodes. A context-aware
architecture for a probabilistic voting-based filtering scheme (CAA-PVFS) identifies compromised nodes
that cause the damage. Although this method immediately detects the compromised nodes using its CAA, its
additional network use consumes unnecessary energy. In this paper, our proposed method configures
geofencing for the compromised nodes and blocks the nodes using false data injection. The proposed
method reduces the unnecessary energy of the additional network while maintaining security strength.
Experimental results indicate that the proposed method offers energy savings of up to 17% while
maintaining the security strength against the two attacks as compared to the existing method.
KEYWORDS
Wireless Sensor Network, Context-aware Architecture, Probabilistic Voting-based Filtering, False Positive
Attack, False Negative Attack, Network Security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the subject of extensive research efforts in various fields
such as environmental and habitat monitoring, and surveillance and tracking for military
applications [1-5]. A WSN is composed of numerous sensor nodes and a base station in a sensor
field. A sensor node uses a data collection module, a data process, and control module, a
communication module, and a battery module to operate without interference [2, 4, 6-9]. The
base station receives the data from the sensor node and provides information [8, 10, 11].
Although the sensor network operates in a large-scale environment without infrastructure, the
sensor nodes are highly vulnerable to capture and compromise because of their constrained
battery energy and operation resources [5, 10, 12-16].
In a WSN, adversaries can complete full control over it by reading its memory and influencing its
program through fabricated messages [5, 10]. An adversary can capture a small number of nodes
to attempt a false positive attack (FPA) [5, 10, 12, 17-19] and a false negative attack (FNA) [10,
17-19]. Figure 1 shows the false positive attack generated in a compromised node (node1) and

98
the false negative attack produced in the other node (node2). The compromised node (node1)
injects false reports about non-existent event to drain the energy of intermediate nodes and
generate false alarm in the base station. The other node (node2) inserts false message
authentication codes (MACs) [10, 12, 20]into a legitimate report to drop it and to lose
information.
A context-aware architecture for a probabilistic voting-based filtering scheme (CAA-PVFS) [10,
20] uses a different approach from existing several methods [5, 12, 17-19] to detect both these
attacks. When false data occurs on a compromised node, the existing methods filter the data with
high probability using their specific techniques in intermediate verification nodes. The CAA-
PVFS, on the other hand, integrates its CAA and an existing method’s filtering techniques to
effectively identify a compromised node and improves security strength. In the CAA-PVFS, a
sensor field includes a communication architecture (Comm-Arch) [10, 14] to collect all context
information and to forward the collected information to its CAA. The CAA analyzes the collected
information based on its knowledge base to detect the compromised node. Although the CAA-
PVFS identifies the compromised node against the two attacks, the CAA-PVFS continues to
transmit the false data of the node via the Comm-Arch after identifying it. Thus, this method
affects the network lifetime through unnecessary energy consumption.
Figure 1. False positive and false negative attacks.
In this paper, we propose a method that configures geofencing after identifying compromised
nodes by our CAA and blocks false data of the identified compromised nodes in the Comm-
Arch’s collection nodes. In our proposed method, the geofencing technology allows a false report
to be removed in the compromised node’s next node and the geofencing location to be appended
in a legitimate report when the report passes through compromised area. The legitimate report is
verified in the CAA and the base station. In addition, the data blocking technology prevents false
data through the collection nodes of the Comm-Arch using their blacklist. Experimental results
indicate that the proposed method improves energy efficiency while maintaining the security
strength of the sensor network.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
 Compromised nodes’ geofencing,
 False data blocking, and
 Improved energy efficiency of the entire network.

99
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the existing method, discusses
the problem statements. We offer a detailed description of the proposed method in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present a performance evaluation of the proposed method. We draw conclusions
and future works at the end of this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the CAA-PVFS for detecting both false positive and false negative
attacks, introduce the problem statements.
2.1. CAA-PVFS
In [10], the CAA-PVFS detects the false positive and negative attacks in the sensor network
using its CAA. In the CAA-PVFS, the CAA is implemented in simulation models consistent with
the structure and components of the sensor network. The CAA collects sensing data of the sensor
network via Comm-Arch and detects abnormal behavior for identifying the compromised nodes
through its knowledge base.
Figure 2 shows the procedure of the CAA-PVFS. The CAA-PVFS’s sensor field consists of the
PVFS-based WSN and the Comm-Arch. The PVFS detects false positive and negative attacks
through a pre-defined threshold, which the number of fabricated MACs in a report. The sensor
network is distributed with general sensor nodes, which are cluster-heads and members. The
Comm-Arch’s collection nodes are deployed with the sensor node in the sensor field. The
collection node collects the sensing data from the cluster-heads and the members. It uses different
frequencies to transmit the data to the CAA without interference of the sensor network. The CAA
receives the collected data via the Comm-Arch and analyses the data.
Figure 2. CAA-PVFS’s procedure
CAA-PVFS consists of four stages:
 Initialization and key assignment: In the sensor network, sensor nodes (i.e., cluster-heads,
members) are organized into the sensor field with keys. Each cluster-head forms a cluster
with the members within one hop. The cluster-head chooses its verification nodes
through probabilistic calculations. In the Comm-Arch, the collection nodes are arranged
to gather data transmitted from the network.
 Report generation: As a real event occurs, an elected cluster-head forwards the event
data to its members. Each member generates MACs and transmits them to the cluster-
head. The cluster-head then generates a report including gathered MACs. In the Comm-
Arch, the collection nodes gather the event data and the MACs while transmitting them.

100
 En-route filtering: As a verification node receives a report, it checks its keys to
authenticate if the MAC is normal or false. If the number of authenticated fabricated
MACs reaches the threshold, the node removes the report against the false positive
attack; if the number of fabricated MACs is below the threshold, the report continues to
be forwarded against the false negative attack. In the Comm-Arch, the collection node
gathers reports transmitted among intermediate nodes.
 Data verification in CAA: The CAA effectively identifies the compromised node against
false positive and negative attacks after gathering the gathered data. The CAA provides a
final context-aware-based decision to the base station of the sensor network.
2.2. Problem Statement
The CAA-PVFS effectively identifies the compromised nodes and copes with the false positive
and negative attacks through the Comm-Arch using the CAA. In the Comm-Arch, collection
nodes gather event data, MACs, and reports from the sensor network and broadcast it to the CAA
via multiple hops. Although the CAA-PVFS detects both attacks efficiently, the method is
consistently transmitted with fabricated data from areas of compromised nodes. For example, we
assume that one source collection node is 10 hops away from CAA and transmits a 36-byte
report. In [10, 12, 14], an energy model of the sensor node consumes 16.25 μJ per byte to
transmit and 12.5 μJ per byte to receive. The collection node consumes 28.75 μJ when sending
and receiving 1 byte of the data. While the report arrives at the CAA, 10 intermediate nodes of a
source consume 10,350 μJ (=28.75 μJ×36 bytes×10 hops). When event data, MACs, and reports
are transmitted continuously in a compromised node, the Comm-Arch is greatly affected by high
energy consumption. Thus, it is necessary to apply a geofencing technology in the sensor network
and communication blocking in the Comm-Arch to reduce unnecessary energy consumption.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we introduce the proposed method which configures geofencing for the
compromised nodes and blocks the nodes’ false data to reduce the needless energy of the Comm-
Arch.
3.1. Overview
The proposed method configures geofencing of identified compromised nodes by the CAA and
blocks false data of the compromised node using each collection node’s blacklist.
Figure 3 shows an overview of our proposed method. In a cluster (Cluster 1), a compromised
node is identified through an injection of the false positive attack. The compromised node
reinjects another false report in the sensor network. When false data (i.e., event data, MACs, or
reports) is transmitted continuously in a compromised node, the networks (i.e., WSN, Comm-
Arch) are greatly affected by false data injection and high energy consumption without
geofencing and data blocking technologies. As shown in Figure 3, our proposed method
configures the geofencing in the sensor network and blocks false data by blacklist to reduce the
unnecessary energy consumption in the entire network.

101
Figure 3. Overview of the proposed method
3.2. Detailed Procedure
Our proposed method newly adds the following functions based on the phases (initialization and
key assignment, report generation, en-route filtering, and data verification) proposed in [10].
 Geofencing configuration: The proposed method configures the geofencing of the
compromised nodes identified from the CAA.
 Data blocking: This method blocks fabricated data using the blacklist of the collection
node in the configured geofencing.
Figure 4 shows an example of how the base station configures a geofencing in the sensor
network. After our CAA verifies the false data, it notices an identification (ID) of a compromised
node to the base station. The base station extracts a cluster location of the ID and storages the
location of the compromised area. The station forwards the location information to neighbors of
the compromised node. As shown in Figure 4, a cluster-head CH1 broadcasts this location
information after it receives the alert information. Cluster-heads CH2 and CH3 receive the
information and configure virtual perimeter in the sensor network. The base station also storages
geofencing information of the compromised cluster after configuring the perimeter. In the
Comm-Arch, when the cluster-heads forward the information, collection nodes receive it. After a
collection node of the compromised cluster saves the information, the collection node
immediately rejects fabricated data received from the compromised node.

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Figure 4. Geofencing configuration of the compromised cluster
Figure 5 demonstrates the geofencing of the compromised cluster in a sensor field. In the
geofencing area, a cluster-head CH1 is a compromised node. The compromised node generates a
false report about the non-existent event without the cooperation of its members. The CH1
broadcasts the false report to a CH4. The CH4 immediately drops the fabricated report after it
receives the report of the compromised node. As soon as a collection node of the geofencing
checks its blacklist, the collection node promptly also removes the report.
Figure 5. Geofencing’s fabricateddata blocking
Figure 6 demonstrates the forwarding of two reports. One report bypasses the geofencing, and the
other report is transmitted via the configured geofencing. This is a compromised member (MB1)
in the geofencing area. The compromised node is identified through our CAA. A cluster-head
CH2 generates a report and forwards it to a CH1. The CH1 broadcasts the report towards its
collection node and a CH4. The collection node forwards the report to the CAA because the CH1
is normal. After receiving the report via geofencing, the CH4 appends the geofencing location in
the report. The report with the appended location is finally verified in the base station and the
CAA. On the other hand, a CH2 detours the geofencing and forwards the legitimate report to a

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CH3. The CH3 transmits it to the CH4. The CH4 forwards the report to the next node without the
extra action.
Figure 6. Geofencing location appending when a legitimate report passes through the geofencing.
Thus, our proposed method configures geofencing for the compromised nodes in the sensor
network and blocks the nodes’ false data to reduce the unnecessary energy consumption of the
additional network.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
We performed a simulation experiment to evaluate the proposed method and compare it to the
CAA-PVFS. A sensor field, which is 1,000 × 1,000 ㎡ includes 100 cluster-heads and 900
members for the sensor network and 100 collection nodes for the Comm-Arch. All nodes were
randomly and uniformly distributed in 100 × 100 m clusters. Each cluster includes one cluster-
head, nine members, one collection node. These nodes are implemented through DEVS models.
We used Fan et al.’s energy model for the sensor network [12]. Each cluster-head and members
consumed 16.25 μJ per byte to transmit, 12.5 μJ per byte to receive, 15 μJ per byte to generate,
and 75 μJ per MAC to verify. We also used Nam et al.’s energy model for the Comm-Arch [10].
Each collection-head consumed 19 μJ and 0.006 μJ per byte to compress and encrypt [21, 22].
The size of a report and key were 36 bytes and 8 bytes, respectively. The number of MACs is five
to generate a report in a source cluster-head [17]. The base station was in the lower middle of the
sensor field. We randomly generated the false positive and negative attacks in two clusters.
Compromised nodes generate attacks according to a 10 percent false traffic ratio. In the
simulation experiment, we randomly made 300 events. There was no packet loss in the
experiment.
Figure 7 shows dropped attack count versus two types of the false positive attack and the false
negative attack. Both the existing and the proposed methods have the same number of successful
attacks from the compromised nodes because they can immediately detect them through their
CAA. That is, both methods immediately identified the compromised nodes through the CAA
after two attacks are generated. Therefore, the proposed method maintains the same security
strength compared to the existing method.

104
Figure 7. Dropped attack count versus two types of the attacks.
Figure 8 illustrates the energy consumption of the sensor network and the Comm-Arch versus the
hop count. Overall, the proposed method consumes less energy in the entire hop counts as
compared to the existing method. The hop count means the number of hops away from the base
station. The proposed method consumed 18 percentage less energy between 1 and 5 hops
compare to the existing method. Therefore, the proposed method consumes less unnecessary
energy in these hops close to the base station.
Figure 8. Energy consumption versus hop count.
Figure 9 shows the energy consumption of the entire network of the existing and the proposed
methods. In the entire network (i.e., WSN, Comm-Arch), the proposed method consumed
4843.24 mJ and the existing method consumed 586.47 mJ. Thus, the proposed method saves
about 17 percentage of energy compared to the existing method.

105
Figure 9. Energy Consumption versus methods.
5. RELATED WORKS
Several en-route filtering methods have been proposed to deal with false positive and negative
attacks. In the PVFS [20], the first such technique, a CH and MBs in a cluster generate a report
with their MACs. These MACs are randomly selected for attaching the report in the CH.
Intermediate CHs of the source CH verify the report based on the correctness of the MACs.
When the verification result at an intermediate CH is normal, the report is transmitted to the next
CH. The PVFS is able to simultaneously detect both the false positive and the negative attacks
with 80-90 percent probability within 10 hops. Akram et al. [23] presented a fuzzy adaptive
selection of MACs in a report to improves the energy resource and the security level in the sensor
network. This method can detect these two attacks within a short hop from the source CH. Lim et
al. [24] proposed an automatic threshold reset scheme using a double fuzzy logic to achieve high
en-route filtering probability. Nam et al. [25] provides proper security parameters using discrete
event modeling and simulation in the PVFS-based sensor network.
Most of the existing en-route filtering methods for the two attacks focus on increasing false data
by determining the effectiveness of the parameters of the PVFS. For example, Akram et al.’s
method uses fuzzy logic to select the number of MACs of a report for improving the security
strength. On the other hand, our proposed method provides geofencing of compromised nodes
after detecting them through context awareness of the WSN rather than probability detection of
false data.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Wireless sensor networks have the disadvantage of being vulnerable to security due to the use of
wireless communication and resource constraints of sensor nodes. Adversaries exploit certain
limitations of these nodes to capture them. The compromised nodes result in unnecessary
resource consumption and transmission interruptions through false positive and false negative
attacks. In this paper, the proposed method configures geofencing for the compromised nodes in
a sensor network and uses the blacklist of the collection nodes in a Comm-Arch. As a result, our

106
proposed method saved 17 percentage energy while maintaining the security strength of the entire
network compared to the existing method. Our proposed method is unable to detect network layer
attacks such as wormhole, sinkhole, sybil, etc. In future work, various types of attacks will be
considered to increase the effectiveness of the proposed method. Recently proposed
countermeasures will be adapted in the CAA in order to further improve energy efficiency and
network security.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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AUTHORS
Su Man Nam received the B.S. degree in Computer Information from Hanseo University,
Korea, and M.S. and Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from
Sungkyunkwan University, Korea, in 2013 and 2017 respectively. Dr. Nam joined a
researcher in the Department of Biomedical Informatics, Ajou University, Suwon, Korea,
in 2018. He is currently a senior researcher in DuDu IT, Ltd., Seoul, Korea. He is
interested in digital twin, modeling and simulation, WSN, and IoT.
Youn Kyoung Seo received the B.S. and M.S. degree in Computer Engineering from
Kyungpook National University, Korea, in 2000 and 2002 respectively. She is currently in
Ph.D. degree in Computer Engineering at Inha University, Korea and is currently a
professor in Computer Information at Incheon Jae Neung University, Korea. She joined a
senior researcher at Biomedical Knowledge Engineering Laboratory at Seoul National
University, Korea, in 2009. She is interested in machine learning, deep learning and IoT.

A Method of Improving Energy Efficiency Through Geofencing and False Data Blocking In Context-Aware Architecture for Probabilistic Voting-Based Filtering Scheme of WSNs

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