Advances in Water Science Methodologies 1st Edition U Aswathanarayana
Advances in Water Science Methodologies 1st Edition U Aswathanarayana
Advances in Water Science Methodologies 1st Edition U Aswathanarayana
Advances in Water Science Methodologies 1st Edition U Aswathanarayana
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Advances in WaterScience Methodologies 1st Edition U
Aswathanarayana Digital Instant Download
Author(s): UAswathanarayana
ISBN(s): 9780415375337, 0415375339
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 8.87 MB
Year: 2005
Language: english
1807 the numberswere 120,000 for the first month, and then
135,000. In 1814 they were 140,000 for seven, and 90,000 for six
months. The vote was by the month of twenty-eight days and
thirteen to the year.
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars the use of the
carronade in the navy was considerably extended. This piece,
invented by General Melville, and first cast in the Carron foundry in
Scotland, was introduced into the navy in 1779. It was a short piece
with a large bore, and a powder chamber, light, easily handled and
destructive to timber when fired at short range. The shot was large
in proportion to the size of the piece, and because of its destructive
effect on wood it was to have been named the “Smasher.” At first
the carronades were only placed where there was no room for long
guns. But its effect at close quarters proved so tempting that in
some cases the long guns were replaced by carronades. In 1782 the
Rainbow, 44, was so rearmed. The change made in the weight of her
broadside added—or seemed to add—immensely to her strength.
Her forty-four long guns gave a broadside weight of 318 lbs. The
forty-eight carronades she received in lieu of long guns, gave her a
broadside of 1238 lbs. The Rainbow made an easy capture of a
beautiful French frigate, the Hébé. But then she was able to come
close to the French ship before opening fire. When this advantage
could not be secured the carronade was of no value, for it had only a
short range. Its weakness was fully demonstrated in the action
between the Phœbe and the American frigate Essex. The American
ship was armed with carronades on her gun deck. The Phœbe was to
windward, and her captain, Hillyar, who knew the inferiority of his
opponent’s armament, kept his distance, and battered the American
into ruin. As the carronade was never counted officially in the
armament of a ship, its introduction led to confusion, and some
dishonesty in estimating the strength of our ships and our enemies.
We counted all the pieces of ordnance of our opponent but only our
own “guns.” The carronade was adopted by foreign navies after
1783. During the wars which began in 1793 the navy had the benefit
of a much improved system of signalling. The old system was one by
28.
which particular combinationsof flags, or the place of flags in the
rigging, conveyed a certain order. The new or numerary system was
elaborated by Lord Howe in combination with Kempenfelt, and was
largely developed by Sir Home Popham.
It will be seen from this list that the navy attained to its maximum of
numbers of ship’s officers and men in the years following Trafalgar.
The increase was most marked after 1808, the year of the beginning
of the war in Spain, and the largest numbers were reached from
1810 to 1814. There is a very general agreement among the best
authority that the augmented size of the fleet was not accompanied
by a growth in real power. It is maintained that, on the contrary, the
efficiency of the fleet fell off. Its gunnery was neglected for mere
“polish,” and the crews deteriorated in quality. Many explanations of
the decline have been given. The disappearance of French fleets
from the sea is said to have rendered our officers somewhat careless
of their gunnery. The unwillingness of the Admiralty to authorise
expenditure of powder in practice has been rendered responsible for
the decline of skill. The hardships of life in the navy aggravated by
the brutality of some officers are held to have deterred men from
entering the service, and to have made them eager to desert when
they were in it. The large proportion of foreigners employed is given
as another cause of the loss of efficiency. There are elements of
truth in all this criticism and apology. When seven hundred vessels
more or less were in commission, only a small minority had an
opportunity to see service. Some officers of known zeal and capacity
passed years without once being under fire. If the heart of a captain
was intent on seamanship and smartness he might be tempted, by
the small chance of meeting a foe, to neglect the gun drill of his
crew. If he feared to be blamed by the Admiralty for expending too
much powder, he would not venture to avail himself of the device
employed by some of his colleagues, who obtained practice for their
men by pretending to see suspicious strangers, and who did not
hesitate to make fictitious entries in their logs. After the loss of
several English vessels, captured in rapid succession by the
Americans in the war of 1812, the decline of our gunnery became a
29.
commonplace. So didthe cruelty of certain captains of “crack” ships,
who sacrificed everything, including humanity, to “overpolish.” We
hear of crews driven to mutinous explosions by officers who would
send their men aloft ten or twelve times to finish off some mere
detail of the set or stowing of sails. Such men enforced attention to
their pedantry and foppery by the lash. Mere declamation can be
neglected, but we cannot reject the testimony of Codrington given in
the very midst of the American war, in a private letter written from
the station, and supported by examples. “I have heard,” he said,
“many shocking stories of cruelty and misconduct witnessed by the
relators, officers now in this ship.” If there is any truth in the
statement that the number of floggings inflicted in English ships
diminished by a half when the Admiralty ordered quarterly returns of
punishments to be made, it is manifest that there must have been a
gross abuse of the power to flog. It is certain that we employed
many foreigners, and one of the English vessels lost in the war of
1812, the Epervier, had foreigners in her crew.
Yet it is doubtful whether these explanations of the decline of our
discipline and skill are satisfactory. No vessel lost to the Americans
was so scandalously lost as the Ambuscade, taken by the French
Bayonnaise in 1798. She was outmanœuvred by a smaller ship, and
carried by boarding. In the American war the Phœbe, which took the
Essex in the South Seas, and the Shannon, which took the
Chesapeake, were nowise inferior to their opponents in gunnery. Nor
were we always beaten in that war by gunnery or by American
seamen. The Decatur, which took the Dominica by boarding, was
commanded by a French privateer, Captain Diron, and manned by a
French crew. The discipline of the navy was as severe for the marine
as for other men. Yet there never was any difficulty in recruiting for
the marines. If our navy sank below the level of 1805, the reason
must be sought in its size. One hundred and forty-five thousand men
was an immense number to take from the population of Great Britain
when it was less than half what it is to-day. And they had to be
found just when increased numbers of soldiers were needed, when
our merchant shipping had doubled, and when there was a great
30.
development of manufacturingindustry and of agriculture. If we had
been forced to rely on our own population we could not have found
the men. We succeeded because multitudes of foreign seamen were
driven to seek service in England by the ruin of commerce in their
native countries. Even with their help the Admiralty was unable to
supply crews of good quality to all the ships. If the Epervier was
largely manned by negroes and foreigners, she had many feeble,
undersized Englishmen who were taken because no better could be
obtained. The physical strength of the men was a consideration of
the first importance in the warships of the old navy. All the work at
the guns had to be done by downright pulling and hauling. The
proportion of one man to every 500 pounds of metal was just
sufficient to work the gun, and could not be maintained when the
crew was short-handed, or when it was necessary to fight both
broadsides. The effort required to run out a 32-pounder, which
weighed 55 cwt. 2 lb. on the weather broadside when the ship was
leaning over, was severe even for a full crew of twelve men. The
demand for good men had far outrun the supply. The existence of
the United States added materially to our difficulties, for it supplied
our sailors with an English-speaking country to which they could
escape. During the later stages of the war the navy was compelled
to form its crews with ever-increasing difficulty. It found marines
who, when they enlisted, had a security for permanent employment
and a pension. The sailors did not form a permanent corps and were
sent adrift when their ship was paid off. The regular bred seamen
preferred the good wages and freedom of the merchant service, or
emigrated to America. The miscellaneous landsmen, who formed a
large part of our crews, were obtained by bounties and the press.
The press did indeed take time-expired apprentices from the
merchant ships at sea, and they constituted a valuable part of our
crews. On land it was of little value. During 1811, 1812, and 1813,
29,405 men were impressed, 27,300 of them deserted, and as 3000
trustworthy men were employed in the gangs which seized them,
the navy was in fact the loser to the amount of 1000 men. The naval
rendezvous, placed in “the vilest sort of public house, with a
something that had once been a Union Jack suspended from a pole,
31.
but from filthand dirt wearing the appearance of a black flag,” was
not only a scandal, but a useless expense. Pressgang midshipman
was a byword for a ruffian. The practice of incorporating criminals
and vagabonds in the navy, which was as old as the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, was continued throughout the great war. Captain Anselm
Griffiths, whose description of a naval rendezvous has been quoted
above, is emphatic about the criminal element in the navy. “What,”
he says, “was the mass of discontent and impatience generated by a
forced association with the refuse of our jails, convicts, vagabonds,
thieves not brought to justice from lenity, smugglers, White Boys,
suspected Irish during the rebellion, all who from loss of character
could not procure employment, the idle and the worthless,—all was
fish that came to the net.”
Such accounts of the crews of the navy as this might be quoted in
numbers. We are tempted to wonder how the work was done with
such men, and whether there can be any foundation for the praise
given to the seamanship and gunnery of the navy. But Captain
Griffiths, and other authorities who support him, spoke of the bad
elements. With them were others of a very different order—the
marines and the pressed men of good character. The great length of
the war allowed time for the formation of a class of men who were
trained wholly in the navy and were attached to it by habit and
affection. When Broke commissioned the Shannon, he left England
with a crew composed of drafts from the guardships of very mixed
quality, and of a majority of boys provided by the Patriotic Society
and the workhouses. If the Shannon had met a well-appointed
American frigate within three months she would have fared no better
than the Epervier or the Java. But she was six years in commission
before her famous action. Broke had time to weed out the bad
characters. The boys grew to manhood under his wise training. The
same process was going on in other ships. If we could have limited
the establishment of the navy to 80,000 or even 100,000 men, every
ship might have been as well manned as the Shannon. It is even
possible that the weaknesses of the navy were made to appear
greater than they really were by the fact that the Admiralty, which
32.
naturally looked firstto fleets Napoleon was building in European
ports, kept its best men for the European stations, and compelled
captains, whose ships were commissioned for distant seas, to put up
with the worst. The increase in the staff of officers from over two to
over five thousand, brought with it the necessity for not being too
exacting as to their quality. Something must be allowed for the
jobbery of the time. There were men in the navy who owed their
positions to no merit of their own, but to the fact that some one of
influence had spoken for them. We must, again, allow for the fact
that there was as yet no uniform standard of discipline. The captains
had wide discretion, and the bad ones were unchecked.
Whatever evils the overgrowth of the navy brought with it, the
increase was unavoidable. In the years following Trafalgar, the
English Navy was in something not unlike the position of the French
armies in Spain after 1809. They were far more numerous than the
army of Wellington in Portugal. Yet they were frequently unable to
collect a force to oppose him, because they were compelled to
spread themselves over the whole of Spain. We have recently
learned how rapidly an army, which is powerful on a field of battle,
can be frittered into small detachments when it has to guard long
lines of communication, and to occupy a wide expanse of territory.
The English Government was, from the year 1793, under a
peremptory obligation to guard trade routes extending from Canton
to the St. Lawrence. The task did not become lighter after Trafalgar.
Napoleon adopted a definite policy. He began to build line of
battleships on a great scale. As his power spread he increased their
numbers till he had upwards of one hundred and fifty in ports
extending from Venice to Hamburg. They were rarely sent to sea.
Many of them, built hastily of green timber, began to rot so soon as
they were launched. But it was impossible to neglect them.
Squadrons must be employed to watch them. The bulk of our navy
was necessarily employed in that work. While our squadrons were
watching hostile ports, our commerce was subject to a double form
of attack. Light squadrons and single ships sailed from French ports
on commerce destroying cruises. Privateers sailed not only from
33.
French ports, butfrom colonial harbours, Martinique and
Guadaloupe, Bourbon and Mauritius, and the Dutch islands of Java
and Sumatra. These attacks had to be guarded against by blockade,
by convoy, by patrol, and by the conquest of the ports from which
the privateers sailed.
The history of blockade cannot be told. It is a long monotonous roll
of sailings from one point to another and back again, of periodical
returns to port to refit or for provisions, of ships driven away by
gales from the land, or forced to work to sea that they might not be
driven on a lee shore. The daily fulfilment of a routine, isolation from
family life and all society other than that of messmates, exposure to
cold, to heat, to wet, make up the lot of the officers and men of a
blockading fleet. And this was the work on which the majority of the
navy was employed. The brief intervals spent in a home port when
food and water had to be renewed, were hardly less painful than the
time spent on the cruising-ground, for the rule that neither officer
nor man might sleep on shore rendered the promise of more leave,
given in 1797, almost nugatory. Indeed an increase of pay was the
most solid advantage the seamen gained in that year. In 1808, when
the need for more men became very urgent the pay of the sailor
was raised to £1, 12s. for the lunar month. The secluded unnatural
life of the blockading squadrons was terrible for all ranks. Some of
the consequences it produced cannot be named. Not a few of the
men went mad under the strain, multitudes were hardened in heart
and distorted in character.
The blockades did the work assigned them. When, in 1809,
Napoleon endeavoured to send a strong squadron, drawn partly
from the Brest fleet and partly from ships at Rochefort, to the West
Indies, his plan was ruined by the Channel fleet. The bulk of his
force did get away from Brest, but only to be sighted by the British
forces and driven into the Basque roads. There they were attacked
by fireships under the immediate command of Lord Cochrane
(Dundonald) and the superior direction of Lord Gambier. The
operation was not so completely successful as it might have been.
Cochrane was so dissatisfied by the interference of his commander-
34.
in-chief that heforced the Admiralty to bring Gambier to a court
martial. Even so, the attack ruined the French squadron, and the
reinforcements never reached the French islands. Here we see the
normal working of the blockade, which left the French fleet no
chance of getting to sea, except by the help of good fortune in
evading the watch of the British ships.
No great French fleet ventured to sea, and only once did a
considerable French squadron incur the risk of trusting itself far from
port among the English forces. Napoleon would not hazard the great
fleet he was building up till he had vanquished all enemies on the
Continent, and could make a final attack with all the forces of
Europe. But though the main purpose was achieved the duty
became continually more severe till after the Russian campaign,
when the destruction of the Grand Army compelled the Emperor to
take the crews of his ships and make regiments of them. As his
power spread up to 1812, more and ever more ports had to be
watched, and it became constantly less possible to block them all
effectually. The vast works he carried out at Cherbourg made the
harbour capable of holding line-of-battle ships and imposed more
blockading duty on the navy. After the fall of Prussia in 1807 he
brought the coast of the Baltic under his control, and more ships
were needed to counteract his plans. The coast-line to be watched
was so long that though the English Government strained its
resources to the utmost, though the navy was increased by
desperate measures, it was impossible to prevent cruisers and small
squadrons from escaping to sea. In 1812 when 621 vessels were in
commission, and the establishment of the navy was 145,000 men,
Admiral Allemand sailed from Rochefort. He eluded the blockading
squadron. He almost succeeded in cutting off the Pompée, 74, which
was compelled to start eighty tons of water to lighten herself for
flight. He cruised in the Atlantic for the destruction of commerce,
and, though he had little fortune in meeting English trading vessels,
he got safe back to Brest. Allemand’s raid shows that the new fleet
Napoleon was forming was not so incapable of keeping the sea as it
has often been supposed to have been. An action fought in this
35.
same year musthave been a warning to the English Government, if
any were needed, that it dare not fail to maintain its naval forces at
the highest attainable level of strength. On the 21st February the
Victorious, 74, Captain Talbot, which was watching the growing
Franco-Venetian squadron at Venice, fought an action with one of
the vessels belonging to it, the Rivoli, 74, Captain Barré. The
Victorious had been detached from the Toulon blockade, the Rivoli
was at sea for the first time, yet the action lasted for four hours, and
though the Rivoli was finally compelled to surrender, she inflicted a
loss of 27 killed and 99 wounded on the Victorious.
At the beginning of 1808, the year in which the great increase
began, the need for numbers had been even more effectually
taught. English troops were then engaged in somewhat fretful
operations on the coast of Calabria. The French had recovered Corfu
and held Venice. The calls on our fleet in the Mediterranean were
many. Collingwood was co-operating with the troops, in southern
Italy, leaving frigates to watch Toulon. The French Government
decided to reinforce its squadron at Toulon by bringing round six
ships—the Majestueux, 120, the Ajax, Jemmappes, Lion,
Magnanime, and Suffren, 74’s, from Rochefort. They were
commanded by the same Admiral Allemand who was throughout his
career very successful in avoiding the many squadrons sent against
him. Rochefort was blockaded by Sir Richard Strachan with seven
sail of the line. Sir Richard generally kept his squadron at anchor in
the Basque Roads, but at the close of November 1807 he was
compelled, by the lack of provisions, to go to the rendezvous he had
assigned to the victuallers which were coming to join him—a point
thirty miles or so south of Roche Bonne. A frigate and a brig were
left to keep watch. North-easterly gales forced Strachan to the
south. The victuallers did not keep touch punctually. The work of
transferring cargo at sea in rough weather was tedious. Allemand,
seeing that he had only a frigate and a brig before him, put to sea
on the 17th January and steered for the Mediterranean. He had a
good start, and as the wind turned to the west and rose to a storm
he got clear away with five of his ships. The Majestueux was injured
36.
in the galeand compelled to return to Toulon. Allemand passed the
Straits of Gibraltar and reached Toulon, unseen by any English
cruiser, on the 6th February. Strachan, who was fighting his way
back to his station against the north-easterly wind when he heard of
Allemand’s escape, followed him to the Mediterranean. But he was
embayed by the westerly gale. He did not pass the Straits till the
10th, and he joined Thornborough, Collingwood’s second in
command, at Palermo on the 21st. Ganteaume, who commanded at
Toulon, put to sea with Allemand’s ships on the 7th February, made
his way round to Corfu to revictual the garrison, drove off the
Standard, which he found there, discharged his mission, and was safe
back at Toulon by the 10th April. Collingwood, who concentrated his
ships and pursued him, failed to meet him. In the meantime, two
French frigates, the Pénélope and Thémis, which sailed from
Bordeaux on the 21st January, had cruised near Madeira, had
destroyed English property to the value of a quarter of a million, had
entered the Mediterranean, and had reached Toulon before the end
of March. Criticism after the event could show that if this or the
other officer had done something he did not do, Allemand,
Ganteaume, and the frigates would have been cut short somewhere.
But the palpable fact was that our forces had not prevented the
cruises of the Frenchmen. When Strachan followed Allemand he
necessarily left Rochefort free for the privateers to enter or leave.
With all our superiority over the French fleets we still could not have
too many men, too many ships, and an increase was not to be
avoided, be the evils it entailed what they might.
The blockading fleets composed the screen covering all the other
operations of our ships. They were not able to protect completely,
but without such protection as they did afford other duties could not
have been performed. The most exacting and most constant of
these was convoy. The whole British Navy was engaged in the
protection of trade, but the task was peculiarly imposed on the ships
which sailed with the fleets of merchant vessels. It had always been
counted one of the most pressing of an admiral’s duties to protect
“the trade.” Hood took a crowd of merchant crafts with him when he
37.
sailed to reinforceRodney in the West Indies in 1780. Rodney
brought the trade with him when he returned home in ill-health.
Howe was called upon to see a hundred trading ships well clear of
the Channel when he sailed in 1794. But after that year the main
fleets were relieved of the duty. They were left free to pursue the
enemy’s fleets, and the protection of the traders against privateers,
and single man-of-war cruisers was left to detachments. It was a
tedious and thankless duty. The rate of sailing of the merchant ships
was very slow. The need for vigilance was unceasing, and peculiarly
great, while just leaving or approaching the land, for it was then that
the prowling privateer was most active. As the trading fleet neared
its destination the skippers were tempted to push ahead to reach
their market first, and they frequently fell into the hands of the
hostile commerce destroyers. The naval officers, who were liable to
be accused of neglecting their duty by the owners of the captured
ships, had long complained of their inability to control the merchant
skippers. When the war was renewed in 1803 the Government took
measures to reduce the loss inflicted on our shipping to the lowest
attainable level, by compelling all vessels not specially exempted to
sail in convoy. It passed “An Act for the better Protection of the
Trade of the United Kingdom during the present Hostilities with
France” (anno 43d
Geo. iii. cap. 57). By this Act merchant ships were
required to sail in convoys, to obey the naval officer commanding,
and not to separate wilfully under a penalty of £1000, if the cargo
belonged to a private owner, and of £1500 if it was composed of
naval or military stores. If a vessel did leave the convoy, and was
captured, the owner forfeited all right to recover his insurances.
Vessels might be licensed to sail without convoy, and the vessels of
the East India Company, and of the Hudson’s Bay Company were
expressly exempted.
An event which occurred on the 14th and 15th February 1804 would
seem to indicate that the East India Company could well dispense
with convoy. The French admiral, Linois, the victor of Algeciras, had
been sent to the east with General Decaen. He obtained early news
of the outbreak of hostilities when at or near Pondicherry and went
38.
off at onceto Java in such a hurry, that he did not wait for an
English naval officer whom he had invited to breakfast. On his way
he captured a number of valuable English ships, and then he sailed
from Batavia to intercept the Company’s vessels on their way from
Canton to Europe. This very valuable trading fleet consisted of
sixteen vessels of the nominal burden of 1200 tons, but a real
tonnage of from 1300 to 1500. They were armed with from 30 to 36
guns, and carried crews of 60 white seamen, and 120 Lascars. Their
guns were as a rule of no great value, and in real force they were far
inferior not only to a frigate but to a heavy corvette. Linois had with
him the Marengo, 74, the Belle Poule, 40-gun frigate, the Semillante,
36, the Berceau, 22, and the Aventurier, 16. On the 14th February
he sighted the Company’s ships to the E.N.E. of Pulo Aor, an island
near the east side of the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula.
They were on their way to the Straits of Malacca—sixteen of them in
all—the Earl Camden, the ship of the Company’s commodore,
Nathaniel Dance; the Warley, Henry Wilson; Alfred, James
Farquharson; Royal George, John Fam Timmins; Coutts, Robert Torin;
Wexford, W. Stanley Clarke; Ganges, William Moffat; Exeter, Henry
Meriton; Earl of Abergavenny, John Wordsworth; Henry Addington, John
Kirkpatrick; Bombay Castle, Arch. Hamilton; Cumberland, W. Ward
Farrer; Hope, Jas. Prendergass; Dorsetshire, Rob. Hunter Brown;
Warren Hastings, Thomas Larkins; Ocean, J. Christ. Lochner. The size
of the 1200-ton ships, the fact that they were painted to represent
two tiers of guns, the craft of Commodore Dance, who hoisted the
man-of-war pennant on three of them, and the bold bearing they all
assumed, cowed Linois. He hesitated to attack till the Indiamen saw
his hesitation, bore down on him and drove him to flight. The
Company’s skippers richly deserved all the praise and rewards they
received. The knighthood given to Dance was handsomely earned.
Yet it would be a great mistake to conclude from the affair of Pulo
Aor that the Company’s ships could rely on their own strength. Linois
was singularly disappointing to his friends whenever he attempted to
attack, though he could fight manfully with his back to the wall.
Indiamen did on several occasions make gallant and successful
fights. On the other hand they were frequently taken by frigates and
39.
privateers. When SirE. Pellew came to take the command in the
East Indies in 1804 the shipping had been well-nigh ruined in the
Bay of Bengal by French and Dutch privateers. It was only by
submitting to accept convoy that the Company was able to revive its
trade.
There were, however, limits to what the navy could do to protect
trade by convoy. Vessels might be captured while on their way from
their port of departure to the rendezvous. Gales might scatter them
when collected. Fog and mist might afford cover to the assailant. By
far the most effectual of all ways of protecting trade was to capture
the ports from which the assailants sailed. Therefore from 1793 to
1811, when the Dutch island of Java was taken, the navy was
engaged in a series of colonial expeditions. They began with the
seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the two little islands belonging to
France on the south coast of Newfoundland, and of Pondicherry—
three ports always occupied at the beginning of a war, and restored
at the close. St. Pierre and Miquelon were taken in May, and
Pondicherry was occupied August of 1793. In the same year Tobago
was taken from the French, and Martinique was attacked without
success. The royalists of the island called the English forces in, but
Rochambeau, the general in command, held his ground. The
planters of the French half of San Domingo also appealed to England
for protection against their insurgent slaves. It was so freely given
that Jamaica was for a time left without a garrison. The spectacle of
a triumphant servile revolt was dreadful to all the slave owners of
the West Indies. The operations on the coast of this island were
disastrous to the troops. They dared not carry negroes with them
from our own islands lest they should be infected in the rebellious
spirit of the French slaves. No use could be made of the negroes of
San Domingo. Therefore the soldiers had to engage in work which is
fatal to the white man in the tropics. Whole battalions were swept
away by fevers. The part of the navy in this case and in most
colonial expeditions was to carry the troops, to land them, to supply
naval brigades. These services were necessarily unvarying in
character. The occupation of a Dutch island in the Moluccas differs
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only in thenames of the men and ships from the occupation of a
French island in the West Indies. In these cases, too, the navy
though an indispensable, was a subordinate, part of the forces
engaged. It carried the soldiers and it helped them, but the army
effected the conquest. Nothing could well be more idle than to
speculate as to which of the two, the sailor or the soldier, was the
more essential to the victory. The soldiers could not reach the place
to be taken unless they were carried in ships, and the sailors could
not occupy the land without the soldiers. To speak of these
conquests as the gift of the Sea Power is inaccurate if not absurd.
The Sea Power of itself could never have taken the Cape, or
Mauritius. Many of them were not taken to be kept. The permanent
occupation of Martinique or Guadaloupe would have been offensive
to the West Indian interest, since their produce would have
competed with that of our own islands in the home market. These
islands were taken primarily because they were the headquarters of
the privateers who preyed on our commerce, and secondarily
because they were useful pledges to have in hand when peace was
to be arranged.
A list of these expeditions given without monotonous detail will show
by what steps England applied and completed her command of the
sea.
In January 1794 Sir John Jervis arrived at Jamaica with four sail of
the line, escorting 7000 troops under the command of Sir C. Grey.
They made an easy conquest of Martinique, which had a garrison of
only 700 men in March, and in April occupied St. Lucia and
Guadaloupe. In June, Victor Hugues, by birth a mean white of the
last-named island, and a Jacobin of the most brutal character, but of
energy and capacity, arrived from Europe with nine vessels, and
troops. He landed in Guadaloupe. An attack made on his ships at
Pointe à Pitre by Jervis was repulsed. He drove the British garrison
from pillar to post, and reconquered the island by December.
Reinforcements reached him in September. Others sailed from Brest
41.
in November, and,though attacked by English ships near Désirade,
reached Guadaloupe in January 1795. Hugues rapidly took or retook
Santa Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominica. Our naval forces
were not numerous enough to watch everywhere. Nor were our
troops, who were rapidly diminished by disease, able to occupy in
sufficient force.
In August of 1795 Rear-Admiral Keith Elphinstone (Lord Keith)
landed the troops which occupied the Cape. In July and August of
the year the ships on the East India station and troops from India
occupied the Dutch posts on the east side of Ceylon, in Molucca, and
Cochin.
In April 1796 Rear-Admiral Christian came to take the command in
the West Indies in succession to Jervis, bringing troops under the
command of Sir Ralph Abercromby. Santa Lucia was retaken at once,
St. Vincent and Grenada in June. In the East Indies the Dutch posts
at Colombo, Amboyna, Banda, etc., were occupied. In August a half-
manned Dutch squadron of three line-of-battle ships and four
frigates fell into the hands of Keith at Saldanha Bay.
In February 1797 Spain having declared war, Rear-Admiral Harvey
and Abercromby, with 5 sail of the line and troops, seized Trinidad.
The Spanish admiral, Ruiz de Apodaca, whose ships were half-
manned, burnt his squadron, and the small garrison could offer no
resistance. An attack on Porto Rico in April was beaten off.
In 1799 Surinam was occupied.
In September 1800 Curaçao was surrendered by the inhabitants,
who were terrorised by a mob of piratical adventurers calling
themselves republicans.
In 1801, on the formation of the Northern Coalition, the Danish and
Swedish islands in the West Indies, St. Martin, Saba, St. Thomas, St.
John, Santa Cruz, St. Bartholomew, were occupied. The Dutch
island, St. Eustatius, was occupied. In the East Indies, Ternate was
taken. Portugal having been driven by the threats of France and
Spain to exclude other trade, we took possession of Madeira.
42.
By the termsof the Peace of Amiens, England made a wholesale
restoration of her conquests. Trinidad, which was of value as a depôt
for the smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies in South America,
was retained. In the East we kept Ceylon. On the renewal of the war
the work of the previous years had to be done over again.
In 1803 the Dutch islands in the West Indies were reoccupied, and
the negroes of San Domingo were helped to destroy the remnants of
the French troops among them.
In 1804, at the close of the year, an unsuccessful attack was made
on Curaçao. Surinam was occupied in April and May.
In 1806 the Cape was reoccupied.
In 1807 Curaçao was taken at a rush by Captain Brisbane.
In 1808 Marigalante fell into our hands, but an attempt to seize St.
Martin ended in the death or capture of all the men landed.
In 1809 Senegal was taken for the express purpose of rooting out
the privateers who made it their headquarters. In the West Indies a
powerful expedition, carrying 10,000 troops under General Beckwith,
escorted by Admiral Cochrane, took Martinique. Cayenne was
occupied by a naval brigade, and our old enemy, Victor Hugues, the
Governor, became our prisoner.
In 1810 Cochrane and Beckwith took Guadaloupe. In the East,
Mauritius was taken, and Amboyna and the Moluccas fell into our
hands.
In 1811 the work was completed by the occupation of Java by a
large army from India.
These expeditions, which sailed to occupy islands from which attacks
could be made on our trade, were not the only tasks imposed on the
navy in the interest of commerce. As Napoleon fixed his yoke on
Europe, and endeavoured to compel all its peoples to join him in
excluding English trade, it became necessary to force an entry to
43.
new markets, andto find the means of getting access to the old. It
was in order to obtain fresh markets that the expeditions to the river
Plate were undertaken in 1806 and 1807. Few passages in history
are better fitted to show what is the rigid limit of the power of a
fleet than these adventures. The first was promoted by the admiral
on the Cape Station, Sir Home Popham. He saw that new markets
were becoming necessary, and he knew that the Spanish colonists
were discontented. From these sound premises he drew the
illegitimate deduction that the people of Buenos Ayres would
welcome English rule. He persuaded the authorities at the Cape to
despatch troops to Buenos Ayres. The navy carried them there, but
it could not save General Beresford and his men from being
compelled to capitulate when the townsmen rose on them. The
commercial classes in England forced the Government to continue
the enterprise begun by Sir Home. Monte Video was occupied, and
Buenos Ayres was again attacked in 1807. But our troops, ill-
commanded by General Whitelocke, were again forced to surrender.
England was on the verge of finding herself committed to a war of
conquest in South America, which would have employed her whole
disposable army, when the rising of Spain against Napoleon in 1808
gave her an honourable excuse for withdrawing from a
compromising adventure.
The eager disposition of the trading classes in England to follow the
lead given by Sir Home Popham, was immediately stimulated by
Napoleon’s Berlin decree of the 27th October 1806. It was the
beginning of a furious rivalry between himself and the British
Government, in which each endeavoured to prevent the other from
obtaining any benefit from neutral trade. The emperor strove to
exclude our commerce, and we to prevent any goods from reaching
Europe except through English ports. The neutral was ground
between the upper and the nether millstone. The navy was
employed in covering a vast contraband trade, which arose
inevitably from the natural desire of the inhabitants of Europe to
obtain goods they needed, and England’s equally natural desire to
sell. There was an element of hypocrisy on both sides, and in
44.
practice each undidmuch of its public policy by an underhand use of
a licensed trade. Napoleon undoubtedly employed this device to
obtain the very things he pretended to exclude. But he attempted to
confine the right to disregard his decrees to himself. Therefore the
smuggling trade could not be dispensed with, and it became one of
the duties of the navy to shepherd the smugglers. The great field of
this peculiar commerce was the Baltic. The Peace of Tilsit, between
France and Russia in July 1807, threatened England with a renewal
of the Northern Coalition. Her Government, whether informed of the
secret articles of the treaty directed against it, or acting, as it was
entitled to act, on the certainty that the Emperor of the French
would lay hands on any weapon he could reach to be used against
England, took prompt measures to diminish the danger. In
September it despatched a powerful combined expedition to occupy
Copenhagen and seize the Danish fleet. If this vigorous measure
requires any justification, one can be found in the paroxysm of rage
which it provoked in Napoleon.
The seizure of the Danish fleet entailed a war with Denmark, and
during the ensuing years the navy had to fight many sharp actions in
order to cover the merchant vessels on their way into and out of the
Baltic. When in that sea the trading vessels were frequently
compelled to cruise to and fro till they could co-operate with the
smugglers on shore, or till the Governments found a way of
admitting their goods out of sight of Napoleon’s agents. As Russia
was compelled to make believe to go to war with England, and was
very seriously engaged in depriving the Swedes of Finland, a brush
took place in August 1808. The English fleet co-operated with the
inefficient fleet of the Swedes, and escorted the 200 transports
carrying English troops, under Sir John Moore, to their assistance.
The Russian fleet would not be drawn into a battle, but one of their
liners, the Sewolod, 74, was cut off and taken. The Russian crew
showed solid courage, but their gunnery was not above the Spanish
level. The British fleets remained in the Baltic till the downfall of
Napoleon began. The service was trying, and the loss from
shipwreck was at times severe. But the work was mainly political,
45.
apart from theobligation to protect the traders from privateers
sailing from ports under French control. Among the political duties
discharged was one which demonstrated the scope of the navy’s
power. Napoleon had compelled the Spanish Government to supply
him with a body of troops for use in Germany—for he was as hard
put to it to find men for the vast armies his victories compelled him
to maintain, as the British Government was to keep up the
establishment of its navy. He had stationed the Spaniards in
Denmark, and they were there when their country rose against the
French in 1808. The British Government found means to inform the
Spanish general, Romana, of what had taken place. He concentrated
the greater part of his men, by forced marches in August, at Nyborg
in Fünen, and embarked them on board an English squadron
commanded by Sir R. Keats. They were sent on to Spain.
It cannot well be said that the power of the navy was shown in the
discharge of another piece of political duty it had been called upon
to perform at the other extremity of Europe from the Baltic. In 1806
Napoleon was instigating the Turks to attack Russia, who was still in
arms against him. The English Government desired to help the
enemy of our enemy, and Sir Thomas Duckworth was sent with a
squadron to coerce the Turks into keeping the peace. He forced the
passage of the Dardanelles in February 1807, and placed his
squadron opposite Constantinople. But he unfortunately allowed
himself to be played upon by the diplomacy of the Turks, and the
French ambassador, General Sebastiani. He delayed action till the
Turks had thrown up batteries which made the position of his
squadron dangerous, and he was compelled to retreat. On his return
his squadron was roughly handled by the Turkish batteries.
With the beginning of the war in the Peninsula the navy was
provided with a field on which it could perform, profitably and with a
definite aim, duties which it had too often been called upon to
discharge to no purpose. From the beginning of the war it had
escorted troops to be landed for conquest or co-operation with allies.
Many of these undertakings were of the most futile character. If it
took Abercromby to success in Egypt, it also took General Fraser to
46.
disaster. It carriedSir John Moore to the fiasco of the Swedish
expedition, and General Stuart to that barren victory at Maida in
Calabria, which was followed by re-embarkation, and served no
other purpose than to aggravate the sufferings of the very people
we came to help. After Sir Sidney Smith covered the escape of the
Portuguese royal family in November 1807 and escorted them to
Brazil, the work of our army was to be done on a great scale, nobly,
and with triumphant results in Spain and Portugal. It would be
pleasant to dwell on the incidents of the story; on the feats of the
Impérieuse, and the untiring activity of English cruisers which
intercepted the coast roads, and helped to keep the war alive all
along the coast of the Bay of Biscay. The navy helped to take coast
forts, or defend them. It embarked the Spanish irregular bands
when hard pressed, and disembarked them to begin again. It
contributed marines to hold the lines of Torres Vedras. It kept the
sea routes clear for the food and reinforcements sent to Wellington’s
army. But a service made up of scores of small actions cannot be
shown by a few examples, or told fully except at great length.
The same work was being done on a smaller scale on the coasts of
Sicily and Calabria, to guard the island against the attacks of the two
successive French rulers in Naples—the emperor’s brother Joseph,
and his brother-in-law Murat—and to keep resistance to them alive
on the mainland. When Napoleon had extorted Venice and Dalmatia
from Austria, English ships entered the Adriatic to carry on there the
work of blockade and harassment which others were doing
elsewhere. But in this sea the little war of skirmishes, single
combats, and affairs in boats, was varied by an action too
considerable and too significant to be allowed to pass among minor
operations.
On the 13th March 1811 a Franco-Venetian squadron of four heavy
frigates, two lighter frigates, and some small craft, commanded by
Captain Dubourdieu, attacked an English squadron of three frigates
and a 22-gun corvette, under Captain Hoste, near Lissa. The French
officer was to windward, and he attacked in two divisions, a weather
and a lee line, heading to cut through the English and surround the
47.
rear ships. IfHoste had been forced to remain passive with an
awkward fleet, Dubourdieu would no doubt have succeeded. But a
good breeze was blowing, and the English squadron was thoroughly
alert. Hoste closed his line till the bowsprit of one ship was over the
taffrail of the ship ahead of her, and he stood on. As he was moving
ahead the Franco-Venetians were compelled to advance on slanting
lines, and the lee ships masked part of the weather line. Hoste knew
that a sunk rock lay across his course. He stood on in hot action with
the leader of the Franco-Venetian weather line and of the lee line,
which came behind, till he could not safely go any further. He then
wore his line together. The leading Franco-Venetian ship, the
Favorite, ran on the rocks, and the others wore to escape her fate.
Their division into two lines became a cause of confusion. The single
unhampered English line cut them to pieces, and they were beaten
with the loss of three frigates. Dubourdieu would have done better if
he had formed his squadron in a single line, had engaged the four
English vessels to windward with four of his frigates, and had left the
two others to double on one end of Hoste’s line. Even so he would
probably have been beaten. When the English had turned, two
French vessels assailed the Amphion, Hoste’s frigate, which was now
the rear ship of his line. But the English officer shot from between
them, and crossed the bows of the vessel on his lee quarter.
Superior mobility and quality more than counterbalanced advantages
of number and position or ingenuity of plan of attack.
This is the lesson which Lissa teaches, and which had been taught
by every encounter in the war, great or small. But patent as it was,
England might have overlooked it but for a series of actions with a
new enemy which occurred at the close of the twenty-three years of
war. It is not my intention to depart from my rule of not describing
small ship actions or operations on lakes. Therefore I do not tell in
detail the events of the war of 1812 with the United States. The
single ship actions and encounters between flotillas on the American
lakes, of which it was composed, have been affectionately studied by
the patriotism of a great people. To us they are, but for one
consequence they had, only minor events in a long and varied
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