Ajit democratic decentralization

Ajit democratic decentralization

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  DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THEINDIAN DEVELOPMENT SECTOR: Implications on Choice of Local Institutions Ajit Chaudhuri E & H Foundation 25th October 2013
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  THE ARGUMENT -1 • Development programmes require local institutions to work through • Choice of local institution has implications for the work being done • Choosing democratic institutions has positive externalities – Enhances quality of democracy in society – This in turn leads to better development Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 2
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  THE ARGUMENT -2 • Democratic decentralization has led to existence of local institutions with – – Constitutional responsibility for development – People’s mandate • Development programmes that involve / strengthen / choose such institutions – – Help decentralization yield democratic dividends – Are in line with spirit of Part IX of Constitution • Those that by-pass such institutions and create / empower / choose parallel, non-representative institutions do not Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 3
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  THE PAPER • Theoretical,but attempts to examine the practical implications of the argument • Flow of presentation – Setting the context – Democratic implications of institutional choice – Policy options for donors and NGOs – Conclusions Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 4
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  THE CONTEXT -1 • Donor Organizations and Choices – Donor Organizations – Funding the state • Direct Support • Project Funding – Do It Yourself – Funding NGOs – the oft preferred option – Key Downsides • PRIs with a development mandate exist • Creating parallel institutions and diffusing power may be not be in the long term interests of democracy Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 5
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  THE CONTEXT -2 • Democratic decentralization – Transfer of political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities to locally elected bodies and the empowerment of communities to exert control over these bodies (World Bank, 2000) – In India, driven by 73rd and 74th Amendments • Setting up PRIs • Delegation of authority, responsibilities and financial resources to them Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 6
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  THE CONTEXT -3 • Why Democratic Decentralization – Brings political representatives closer to electorate – Policies more likely to represent actual needs and preferences of communities BUT – Coordination problems & chances of elite capture – Measuring impact of DD is problematic – neither governance nor decentralization are quantifiable • Indian experience with DD is (so far) mixed but slow and inexorable movement towards it Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 7
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  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE -1 • Choosing local institutions by – – Transferring power to them – Conducting joint activities – Soliciting inputs for programmes and policies • Choice is recognition, it confers legitimacy and power, it transforms institutional landscape – Privatization – to private sector – Participatory/empowerment approach – to NGOs, CBOs, customary authorities, etc. • Institutional choice effects more than efficiency and effectiveness of public service provision – it impacts process of democratic decentralization Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 8
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  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE -2 • Ribot, J.C; 2007; “Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization”; Development 50(1), 43-49 • Institutional Choice and Representation – For an institution to be democratic, it must be representative • Accountable to people – positive & negative sanctions • Equipped with power – people’s needs & aspirations can be transformed into policy, and policy into practise Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 9
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  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE -3 – By avoiding local governments • Deprive local authorities of powers being transferred to the local arena • Empower parallel authorities • Force local governments to compete for legitimacy – Means of power transfer shapes accountability – conditional or as a secure right • Institutional Choice and Citizenship – Concept of ‘belonging’ infers citizenship – the ability to be politically engaged and shape the fate of the polity – in democracy, this is residence based Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 10
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  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE -4 – In other institutions, belonging is different • Business, NGOs, User groups – shared interests • Customary or religious institutions – various forms of identity – language, ethnicity, religion, place of origin – Choosing interest or identity based institutions results in politics of recognition • Forces individuals to conform to group cultures • Sees cultural dissonance, experimentation and criticism as disloyalty • Overshadows intra-group divisions of gender, class, etc. • Loses sight of role of redistribution in redressing injustice • Undermines residency based forms of belonging, i.e. democracy, encourages separatism Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 11
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  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE -5 • Institutional Choice and the Public Domain – Public domain – a public political space where – • Citizens feel able and entitled to influence authorities • Maintains and re-enforces public belonging and identity • Enables the integrative collective action that constitutes democracy • Necessary for the production of citizenship – Important to retain substantial powers in the public domain for decentralization to produce democratic dividends – equity, efficiency and development – Distributing public powers to interest and identity based groups encloses the public domain Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 12
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  POLICY OPTIONS –DONORS • Social development activities through nonrepresentative institutions has implications on democracy BUT • Is it viable to work through PRIs? 3 typical arguments against – – – – PRIs are political (not development) institutions PRIs are corrupt, unskilled, inefficient For foreign donors, the law prevents funding PRIs The arguments are valid and require consideration • Bringing development into political space, electoral cycles, less administration cost, decentralized corruption vs. more corruption – Working through PRIs – recognizing primacy of mandate Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 13
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  POLICY OPTIONS -NGOS • Traditional space still intact, business of public service provision for money needs rethinking • Different types of local institutions – which scenario should NGOs contribute to? – Pluralism of competition and cooperation that thickens civil society and results in efficiency, better representation, and other positive externalities OR – Divisive, undermining legitimacy of elected local governments, providing conditions for elite capture • To strengthen democratic decentralization, NGOs can – – Use mechanisms outlined in Panchayati Raj – Enable PRI control over planning and implementation – Build capacity of PRIs Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 14
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  CONCLUSION • Paper – –Describes democratic decentralization in India – Theorizes on democratic implications of institutional choices of donor organizations – Advises on the need to think through whether to work within the spirit of Part IX of Constitution – Suggests that development space for PRIs will increase, and others need to evolve to be relevant – Requests that others join this socio-political movement and enable it to fulfill its potential Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 15