Catch Me If You Can: PowerShell Red vs Blue
Download as PPTX, PDF10 likes8,086 views
The document discusses the evolution of PowerShell from an offensive and defensive perspective, detailing various tools and phases in its development from its inception to recent advancements. It highlights the ongoing 'cat and mouse' game between offensive techniques and defensive measures in the use of PowerShell. Notably, the shift towards improved defensive strategies and the vulnerabilities associated with older versions of PowerShell are emphasized.
![• Will Schroeder (@harmj0y)
• http://blog.harmj0y.net | will [at]
harmj0y.net
• Red teamer and offensive engineer for
Specter Ops
• Co-founder:
• Veil-Framework | Empire/EmPyre | BloodHound
• Developer of:
• PowerView | PowerUp | current PowerSploit
developer
• Microsoft CDM/PowerShell MVP
• Veteran trainer
About_Author](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/powershellredvblue-170514213521/85/Catch-Me-If-You-Can-PowerShell-Red-vs-Blue-36-320.jpg)
More Related Content
Similar to Catch Me If You Can: PowerShell Red vs Blue (20)
Catch Me If You Can: PowerShell Red vs Blue
- 1. Catch Me If You Can PowerShell Red vs. Blue Will Schroeder, Specter Ops A Survey of PowerShell Security
- 2. Agenda • Setting the Stage: Offensive Philosophy • Infancy: from Monad to PowerSyringe • Primary School: PowerSploit • Adolescence: PEs, Mimikatz, Kansa, and more • Parental Guidance: PowerShell <3 the Blue Team • Teenage Rebellion: PowerShell Empire • Defense Grows Up: CimSweep, BloodHound, and more
- 3. Our Offensive Philosophy • “Assume breach” approach, focus on post- exploitation • “Fundamentally, if someone wants to get in, they’re getting in…accept that. What we tell clients is: Number one, you’re in fight, whether you thought you were or not. Number two, you almost certainly are penetrated.” - Michael Hayden, Former Director of NSA & CIA • “Living off the Land” • Focus on blending with normal host and network options • Led us to focus on built-in capabilities, most importantly PowerShell!
- 4. In the Beginning (2002)…
- 5. …Then There Was Light! (2009)
- 7. From the Tree of Knowledge (2011)…
- 9. Learning to Walk (2011) • Defenses: • Execution policy? Profiles? • Basic transcription (Version 2) • The True Offensive Start:
- 10. • PowerSyringe (2011) became PowerSploit (2012) • Injects shellcode into the current or arbitrary process • One of the most common components reused malware • Common post-exploitation features added logging, screen shot collection, etc.) • PowerShell Version 3 (Sept 2012) • Module logging introduced - first logging of PS commands Primary School
- 11. • Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection (2013) • Allows for the loading of arbitrary .EXEs/.DLLs into the current process or a foreign process • The big one… Invoke-Mimikatz (2013) • Dumps plaintext passwords from memory! (Amongst *many* other tasty things ) Adolescence
- 13. • PowerView (March 2014) • Network/Active Directory situational awareness tool • Fun features ruined by Microsoft - hunting (NetCease in Oct 2016) and remote enumeration (SAMRi10 - Dec 2016) • Kansa (March 2014) • Incident response framework • Uproot (Oct 2014) • WMI based IDS with PowerShell deployment • PowerShellArsenal (Nov 2014) • PowerShell reverse engineering toolkit Adolescence
- 14. • PSReflect (Sep 2014) is “a series of helper functions designed to make defining in-memory enums, structs, and Win32 functions extremely easy” • This project immensely simplifies the usage of Win32 API calls/associated structures versus manual reflection • Really was a big “missing link” from our perspective • It can be used offensively defensively (Get-InjectedThread) Adolescence
- 15. • SharpPick (Dec. 2014) • PowerShell without PowerShell.exe! • Bypassed weak AppLocker configs/command logging • UnmanagedPowerShell (Dec 2014) • Inject PowerShell scripts into any process! • Loads .NET 2.0 runtime (if available) to bypass logging • PowerForensics (Mar 2015) • Live disk forensics with PowerShell! Adolescence
- 17. Sidenote: Lee vs. Lee
- 18. Some Parental Guidance (2015)
- 20. Bypasses Will Always Exist!
- 21. • Transcription (v2, improved in v5) • Ability to record the contents of a PowerShell session • Module Logging (v3) • Captures good execution details, but tons data • Deep Script Block Logging (v5) • Records code blocks as they’re executed • Default: logs suspicious looking scripts Logs on Logs
- 22. The Rebellious Teenager (Aug 2015)
- 23. Lee Fires Back (2015/2017)
- 25. • CimSweep (Jan 2016) • C-based defensive sweeping tool • BloodHound (April 2016) • Active Directory attack path analysis • A modified version of PowerView is used the data ingestion • WMI load events (~2016) • SELECT * FROM Win32_ModuleLoadTrace WHERE FileName "%System.Management .Automation%.dll%" • https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/7fe1df7ca2f a3d067def00c01af • Take memory dump each time a PS process closes Defense Grows Up
- 26. • Invoke-Obfuscation (Sep 2016) • Encyclopedia of PowerShell obfuscation methods Things Get Complicated… http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2016/10/1/invoke-obfuscation-v11-release-sunday-oct-9
- 28. • Device Guard (2016+) allows for the enforcement of constrained language • Strong application whitelisting/code integrity • Unsigned scripts run in Constrained Mode • No access to underlying .NET framework • WMImplant (late 2016) • WMI/PowerShell based toolkit that deploys functions even in constrained language Towards the Future…
- 29. https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PSKerne l-Primitives PowerShell <3 The Kernel?? (2016- 2017+)
- 30. • Get-InjectedThread (April 2017) • Enumerates all current running threads • For each thread: • Finds the base address of each thread • Checks if the initial memory page of thread is allocated • Checks if the if the initial memory not backed by an file on disk • If the thread page IS committed and NOT backed by a file, then it is likely • Catches nearly all stock malware injection approaches! Scary (for us attackers ;)
- 32. • Command line logging • Full transcription (if possible) • Install v5, and uninstall v2!! • Windows10: • Defender + AMSI • Deep script block logging • Device Guard and constrained language mode • Great resource: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat- research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html Tips for Securing a PowerShell Deployment
- 33. Summary • There‘s a huge variety of offensive and defensive projects and technologies available • PowerShell red and blue will continue to play cat and mouse • PowerShell Version 2 remains a big achilles heel • The tide has started to really shift towards blue/defense! • We‘re actually moving towards C# for
- 34. • Now: 15 min break • Grab a coffee • Stay here to enjoy next presentation • Change track and switch to another room • Ask me questions or meet me in a breakout session room afterwards Next Steps...
- 35. Questions?
- 36. • Will Schroeder (@harmj0y) • http://blog.harmj0y.net | will [at] harmj0y.net • Red teamer and offensive engineer for Specter Ops • Co-founder: • Veil-Framework | Empire/EmPyre | BloodHound • Developer of: • PowerView | PowerUp | current PowerSploit developer • Microsoft CDM/PowerShell MVP • Veteran trainer About_Author
- 37. • PowerSploit - Matt Graeber, Chris Campbell, Joe Bialek • Kansa - Dave Hull • Uproot - Jared Atkinson • PowerShellArsenal - Matt Graeber • PowerView/PowerUp - Will Schroeder • PSReflect - Matt Graeber • SharpPick - Justin Warner • UnmanagedPowerShell - Lee Christensen • PowerShell Empire - Will Schroeder, Justin Warner, many many others About_References
- 38. • CimSweep - Matt Graeber, Jared Atkinson, Lee Christensen • BloodHound - Andy Robbins, Rohan Vazarkar, Will Schroeder • Invoke-Obfuscation - Daniel Bohannon • WMIPlant - Chris Truncer • PSKernel-Primitives - Ruben Boonen • Get-InjectedThread - Jared Atkinson About_References
- 39. • https://github.com/trustedsec/social-engineer- toolkit/blob/master/src/powershell/powerdump.powershell • https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/dev/ • https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Net-Cease-Blocking-Net-1e8dcb5b • https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/SAMRi10-Hardening-Remote-48d94b5b • https://github.com/davehull/Kansa • https://github.com/Invoke-IR/Uproot • https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerShellArsenal • https://github.com/mattifestation/PSReflect • https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick • https://github.com/leechristensen/UnmanagedPowerShell • https://github.com/EmpireProject/PSInject • https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire • https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/CimSweep • https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound • https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation • https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/WMImplant • https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PSKernel-Primitives • https://gist.github.com/jaredcatkinson/23905d34537ce4b5b1818c3e6405c1d2 About_References
Editor's Notes
- #3: Will show the evolution of offense and the defensive projects and mitigations that have been implemented in response Will not cover ALL tools, just ones I think are “evolutionary” relevant Focus only on “legitimate”/open-source offensive capabilities -> won’t cover crimeware/etc.
- #4: Quote- Microsoft Office365 red teaming whitepaper Access to .NET/the API, can stay off of disk, can reassemble malicious binaries in memory, etc. Explain what led us to PowerShell
- #6: “The Version 2 problem” – explain why we care about it from the offensive perspective
- #7: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKlVONfD53w Talked some about execution policy Main contribution - PowerDump
- #11: Built by Matt Graeber Eventually repurposed into open source offensive toolsets like Metasploit
- #12: Both coded by Joe Bialek Mainly built so every binary didn’t have to be recoded into pure PowerShell https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
- #13: Invoke-Mimikatz that creates a golden ticket for the parent domain and then DCSyncs the krbtgt of the root
- #14: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1 https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Net-Cease-Blocking-Net-1e8dcb5b https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/SAMRi10-Hardening-Remote-48d94b5b https://github.com/davehull/Kansa - Incident response collection cmdlets (Dave Hull) https://github.com/Invoke-IR/Uproot - IDS via WMI Event Subscriptions https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerShellArsenal - Reverse engineering
- #15: https://github.com/mattifestation/PSReflect Why not use Add-Type? Explain… Swap over- show PowerView code before and after
- #16: Twitter thread about “can we run PowerShell without powershell.exe” PowerForensics – explain CreateFile() approach to avoid native APIs http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367#more-367 https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick/SharpPick https://github.com/leechristensen/UnmanagedPowerShell
- #17: https://github.com/EmpireProject/PSInject $Code = ' [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.Windows.Forms"); [System.Windows.Forms.MessageBox]::Show("This is PS code! Current proc: $(Get-Process -Id $PID)"); ' $Encoded = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($Code)) Start-Process notepad Invoke-PSInject -ProcName notepad -PoshCode $Encoded
- #18: Command Line Version Parameter – “-version 2” Hosting Applications Compiled using V2 Reference Assemblies – “the “Windows PowerShell” classic event log has event ID 400. This is the “Engine Lifecycle” event, and includes the Engine Version.”
- #19: Released a month before Empire was slated to be released – gave me an existential freakout! -Better transcription with Start-Transcript and automatic transcription options -Deep script block logging -AMSI
- #22: -Transcription allows for automatic recording of PowerShell sessions -Module logging records pipeline execution details as PowerShell executes, including variable initialization and command invocations. -Module logging will record portions of scripts, some de-obfuscated code, and some data formatted for output. -Script block logging records blocks of code as they are executed by the PowerShell engine, thereby capturing the full contents of code executed by an attacker, including scripts and commands. Including code AFTER it was de-obfuscated! These suspicious blocks are logged at the “warning” level in EID 4104, unless script block logging is explicitly disabled. This feature ensures that some forensic data is logged for known-suspicious activity, even if logging is not enabled https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell/blob/02b5f357a20e6dee9f8e60e3adb9025be3c94490/src/System.Management.Automation/engine/runtime/CompiledScriptBlock.cs#L1612-L1660
- #23: PowerShellEmpire – talked about last year https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire
- #24: 2015- “Measure-VariableObfuscation” which relies on PowerShellArsenal to create “Obfuscation Metrics” for scripts
- #26: And system.management.automation.ni.dll – why the wildcard https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/CimSweep https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/7fe1df7ca2f08cbfa3d067def00c01af
- #28: ipmo .\Invoke-Obfuscation.psd1 Invoke-Obfuscation SET SCRIPTBLOCK function Invoke-Stuff { Get-Process }; Invoke-Stuff token all 1 clip (Show you executing it in a powershell window) back back STRING 3 clip (Show you executing it in a powershell window) back encoding 6 clip (Show you executing it in a powershell window) back launcher rundll++ 0 clip (run in cmd.exe)
- #29: Matt Graeber will speak on this on day 3 (device guard) Device Guard force PS into constrained language mode - https://msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/reference/5.1/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/about/about_Language_Modes No reflection, add-type, limits New-Object(e.g. no creating arbitrary COM objects) https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/WMImplant
- #31: https://gist.github.com/jaredcatkinson/23905d34537ce4b5b1818c3e6405c1d2
- #33: After this, you should WANT attackers to use PowerShell! Try and block the attacker, but if he still gets in, we want to be able to detect and see what he did
- #36: 42:00