Colonial intrusion and the Somali Resistance

1
Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, (1996): The Collapse of The Somali State: The Impact
of the Colonial Legacy, Haan Associates, London (pp. 25-55)
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Chapter II
COLONIAL INTRUSION AND THE SOMALI RESISTANCE
European exploration opened the door to colonialism. Among the first European
explorers who reached the Somaliland coast were the Englishman William Christopher
who reached the Geledi Sultanate in 1843 and Captain Charles J. Cruttenden who
penetrated the interior land in the north-east.0
During the same period the French
Commodore Charles Guillain explored the southern coast, Richard F. Burton reached
Zeyla (Zeila) and Berbera in the 1850s, John Speke, a protégé of Burton, started out
from Las Qorey (Las Khorai), in the north-eastern part of Somaliland, and reached up
to Nugaal in central Somaliland. The Frenchman Georges Révoil penetrated the
Dharoor Valley (Daror), Count Porro, unfortunately, was killed in Western Somaliland
in 1885, and F.L. James, more fortunate than Count Porro, reached Western Somaliland
in the same period.0
However, it was the German explorer, Carl von der Decken, who
travelled most extensively in the interior of Somaliland, from 1859 until his death in
Bardheere (Bardera) in 1865.0
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 created a geopolitical situation which
increased the competition for control of the coast along the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean among the European colonial powers.0
This colonial competition had a
devastating effect on the centuries-old independence of the Somalis. The ambition to
control the coast as well the interior was not only that of the British, other colonial
powers namely France, Italy Germany, and Abyssinia (former name of present
Ethiopia) had the same objectives.
Partition in the Making
Britain settled in Aden in 1839 using it as a supply station for the route to the Far
East. She took interest in the Somali coast because of its provision of fresh meat and
vegetables for her Aden garrison.
In the early 1860s, the Khedive Ismail of Egypt, in the name of the Pasha of Turkey
and the Sublime Porte, began to establish his sovereignty over the ports of the Red Sea
by appointing an Egyptian governor for the whole coast from Suez to Cape Guardafui.
In 1875 the Egyptians took possession of Zeyla, marched inland and occupied Harar
where they set up an administration which was to last ten years.0
The Khedive claimed dominion over the whole Somali coast and dispatched a naval
expedition to the mouth of the Jubba river to link the southern Sudan and the Great
Lakes with East Africa. Egyptian troops were landed at Kismaayo but they were
withdrawn following a protest from Britain, on behalf of the Sultan of Zanzibar, who
also claimed this part of the coast.0
Britain's objection to the Turkish and Egyptian
claim was settled with an agreement signed in September 1877 recognising Egyptian
jurisdiction over the Somaliland coast.0
Following the successful uprising in the Sudan by the Mahdist Movement in 1885,
Egypt had to withdraw its forces from the Somaliland coast and the route to Harar, to
reinforce its control in the Sudan.
To stop its European rivals from filling the gap left by the Egyptian withdrawal, the
British government signed treaties with the Somali clans living along the Red Sea. This
was to become British Somaliland.
In 1886, Britain and Germany, who were both competing for `spheres of influence'
in East Africa, agreed to recognise the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over parts
of the East African coast to a depth of ten miles, including certain ports as far as

2
Warsheikh.0
The vagueness of the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement gave Germany a
chance to secure possession of the great lakes, for not only was the country north of the
River Tana left free to German enterprise, so was the country to the north-west of the
British sphere. The matter was settled in 1890 when Germany, in consideration for
Britain's secession of Heligoland, withdrew her protectorate over the adjoining coast up
to Kismaayo (Kismayu), and surrendered her claims to territories north of the Tana.0
Thus a vast area, reaching to the western watershed of the Nile,0
fell into the British
sphere of influence, an influence then exerted by the Imperial British East Africa
Company. This company was formed primarily as a trading venture, but by Royal
Charter in 1888, it was charged with the administration of this area. Following
Germany's withdrawal, therefore, the Company, by agreement with the Sultan of
Zanzibar, assumed responsibility, in 1891, for the administration of Jubbaland.0
What began, then, as a trading venture in Jubbaland ended in a colonial
administration, and the Company was vested with political and administrative functions
that were beyond its capacity.0
In 1895 A.H. Hardinge of the British Foreign Office
visited the 'Province' and proclaimed the establishment of British colonial rule.
From this period Britain created another area out of the Jubbaland, a territory which
was later to be known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD).
Until the nineteenth century Abyssinians were limited to the central highlands of
Ethiopia. A few years before the accession to power of Menelik II (King of Shoa) as
Emperor in 1889, they started to expand their power beyond the Amhara Highlands.0
Menelik took advantage of the rivalry between European powers. Under a treaty of
alliance between Italy and Shoa, Italy in September 1890 secured Christian Abyssinia's
accession to the Brussels General Act of 1890 which intended to protect `the aboriginal
populations of Africa'. However, in Menelik's case his accession to the Brussels
General Act merely legalized the import of firearms, and thus enabled him to realise his
imperial plans.0
Harar had been built, for the greater part, in the sixteenth century, and had soon
become the richest town in East Africa, an independent city state, and a centre of
commerce and of Islamic learning.0
It was the greatest prize that Menelik could win, for
not only was Harar and the neighbouring highland rich and fertile, it was a mountain
stronghold that protected the Somali lowlands from Abyssinian penetration and vice
versa.
In 1886 Menelik sent an army against Harar under Ras Waldo Gabriel but it was
defeated by Emir Abdullahi. Then in February 1887, Menelik himself with an army of
30,000 met the Hararis (or Adaris, as the Harar people are also known) at Ghalauko and
speedily routed them in a battle.0
From taking control of the city state of Harar, in 1887,
Menelik's marauding troops next target was to be the Somalis0
in what was developing
as the Western Somaliland.
The need for a refuelling station on the Red Sea to strengthen their naval
communication with their Indo-China and Madagascar dominions, led France to gain
access to Obok, on the extreme north-west edge of Somaliland territory, establishing a
formal French colony and protectorate in 1885, which was to become known as French
Somaliland.
Following an agreement between France and Britain in 1888, the two countries
recognized each other's claims to a `Protectorate' on the west and east side respectively
of the Zeyla to Harar caravan route. This was bound to conflict with Italy's
interpretation of the Treaty of Uccialli with Abyssinia. By this treaty Italy acquired, in
her view, a protectorate over the whole of Abyssinia. Britain acceded to this view but
France contested, and Menelik, for the time being, ignored it.0
Menelik's interpretation of the Uccialli Treaty resulted in antagonising Italy, and his
relations with France became more cordial. By a concession in 1894 and again in 1896
he permitted the French to construct a railway connecting Abyssinia with Djibouti.0
On
March 1896, tension between Abyssinia and Italy culminated in a confrontation

3
between the two armies at Adowa where the Italians were overwhelmed and
outmanoeuvred, resulting in a complete victory for Menelik.
A Peace Treaty was signed in the autumn of 1896 in which Italy renounced the
Treaty of Uccialli and recognised the full sovereignty and independence of Abyssinia.0
The Italian defeat at Adowa was a `decisive event in the history of the Horn of
Africa because it appears to have forced the three European powers to a recognition of
Menelik's independence which made it desirable for them to secure from Menelik
recognition of their colonial boundaries, without much thought to Menelik's own
colonial ambitions'.0
Italy, delayed by its internal problems, entered late to 'the African feast as a poor
relation'.0
They created a colony in the Benaadir (Benadir) in the south, which was
under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar.0
Italy was concerned about the interest
shown by the British and Germans in the north-east part of Somaliland where there
were two antagonistic sultanates: the Majeerteen Sultanate of Boqor Osman and the
Hobyo (Obbia) Sultanate of Sultan Yusuf Ali Kenadid.0
These Sultanates of Majeerteen
and Hobyo had developed diverse and very effective political organization with
measures of centralized authority over relatively large territories.
To avert the influence of its colonial antagonists, Italy concluded a treaty of
protectorate with the Sultanate of Hobyo on 8 February 1889 and, after long resistance,
with Boqor Osman on 7 April of the same year.0
This new deal prompted Germany to
object to the treaties, claiming that she had priority over Italy in the area. The case was
taken to Berlin, and after having considered Article 34 of the General Act of the Berlin
Conference of 1884, the court ruled in favour of Italy.0
The partition of Somaliland was already developing during this period. So, too, was
an organised form of Somali resistance. The fate of the Somalis would be decided by
the outcome of this resistance.
THE FIRST ITALIAN COLONIZATION OF BENAADIR
The first Italian interest in the Somali peninsula and East Africa dates back to 1885,
when captain Antonio Cecchi was sent on a mission to explore an outlet for Italian
emigration along the coast of south Somaliland. Behind this initial interest was the then
Italian Foreign Minister, Pasquale Mancini, whose ambition and plans envisaged
extending Italian possession beyond Eritrea, which Italy had taken in February 1885.
On 12 August 1892 Italy received in lease the Benaadir coast from the Sultan of
Zanzibar, adding to its successful conclusion in 1888 and 1889 protectorate agreements
with the north-eastern sultanates of Majeerteen and Hobyo.
Instead of adopting a system of crown colony like in Eritrea, Italy preferred to form
a system of indirect rule where the "institution of salaried chiefs in each clan were the
point of contact between the government and its colonial subjects".0
The running of the colony, therefore, was given to the Filonardi Company (Societá
Filonardi). It was given the right to exploit and the responsibility to oversee security.
By adapting the policy of capitalising on other people's possession it was natural
that Italy should meet with some resistance. Ironically, neither the Italian government
nor Filonardi had forseen such circumstances.
The Resistance of the Biyamaal and Wa'daan
Everything seemed quiet for Vincenzo Filonardi, the administrator of the Societá
Filonardi, when he disembarked at Marka in October 1893 to take possession of the
colony. But during this visit, Lieutenant Maurizio Talamone, the captain of one of the
ships, was stabbed to death.0
The incident was the first sign of opposition to Italian intrusion in the southern part
of Somaliland. Centred mainly around Marka, the resistance, led by the Biyamaal clan,
penetrated further to the north near Muqdisho and into the interior reaching the area of

4
the Wa'daan clan who also formed a resistance against the intruders. The Biyamaal
clan, which is the largest and most powerful of the Dir clan-family in the southern
Somaliland, live in the area behind the coast from Marka to Jamaame, beside the river
Shabeelle.0
While the Biyamaal resistance front stretched along the Shabeelle River
south from Marka, the Wa'daan clans fought in the area south from the powerful Geledi
sultanate in Afgooye, on the Shabeelle river.
Following the Talamone stabbing incident, many Marka elders were arrested and
deported to Eritrea, and the town and its surroundings were bombarded. In a counter-
attack, the Biyamaal and Wa'daan began to siege the town, and blocked
communications with the interior.0
Blockading Marka meant ruin for the population of
the town and that of the people who lived in its suburbs, as the port city depended on
trading with the hinterland. The people of Marka could not survive without the
agricultural commodities of the Shabeelle River area and the pastoral products of the
interior. To meet the town's food requirement, the Filonardi Company had to supply the
population by ship.
The conflict caught the Filonardi Company by surprise, and to meet the conditions it
was necessary to increase its military prowess. What they believed would have been an
effortless acquisition was turning into a sour and complicated operation.
The crisis prompted Filonardi to ask his government for financial and military help.
However, the Italian government was reluctant to increase its involvement and
responsibility over its colony.
Following this humiliation, it was no surprise when Filonardi announced his
resignation on 3 December.0
In spite of this, he continued to function for his
government up to the expiration of the contract, by which time the Italian government
had signed a new contract with Console Antonio Cecchi, who created the Societá
Anonima Commerciale Italiana del Benadir, known as the Societá del Benadir, on 15
April 1896.0
As Marka had now become the rebel city, the Italian authorities avoided sending
commissioners there. Giacomo Trevis, the Resident in Baraawa (Brava) at that time,
was to oversee Marka.
In early November 1895, Marka was again subjected to repressive action, when the
Somalis killed recruits to the Italian administration. In reaction, the Biyamaal besieged
Marka and again cut its communications with the interior. The deepening conflict
resulted in the killing of Trevis.0
Italy's plan to create a territory of settlement for Italian
emigration in southern Somaliland was failing to be viable.
Italy's Futile Attempts
The Biyamaal resistance and their sieges of Marka, and the Italian authority's
retribution, continued unabated for many years. It was heightened when, in November
1896, while on a pleasure trip, Console Antonio Cecchi, the Societá del Benadir
administrator and also the de facto governor of Southern Somaliland, and his
lieutenants, were ambushed at Lafoole, a small village a few kilometres from Afgooye,
south of Muqdisho, by Wa'daan and Biyamaal fighters, who killed 14 of them,
including Cecchi. In reprisal the Italian authority burned all villages of the Wa'daan
clans and arrested and deported Marka elders, including those of the Biyamaal clan.
The Biyamaal and Wa'daan fighters again began their siege of Marka and this time
tightened their grip over the port city. After futile attempts by the Italians to break the
blockade, they finally bent to the demands of the fighters by releasing the Marka elders.
In spite of the fact that they thwarted the colonialists' attempts to take their land, the
Biyamaal and Wa'daan resistance were not properly organised. Nevertheless, they
confronted the sophisticated army of a colonial power with their indigenous defensive
tools and will. In spite of the Somalis' high casualities and loss, they had prevented the
intruders from reaching west of the river Shabeelle for all these years.

5
Reform of Biyamaal and Wa'daan Resistance
In the first decade Biyamaal and Wa'daan resistance was directed against colonial
exploitation of their land. Then, between the end of 1906 and the early part of 1907 that
of the Biyamaal assumed a form of organized resistance. Under the leadership of
Ma'alim Mursal Abdi Yusuf0
and Sheekh Abikar Gafle, the resistance was transformed
from just a clannic resistance to one based on Islamic principles. Sheikh Abikar and
Ma'alim Mursal crusaded widely against the intruders. The aim was to widen the
struggle against all the intruders and infidel.0
The change reflected a clear influence of
the nationalistic Daraawiish movement which was opposing British and Abyssinian
intrusion in the Somali peninsula (see below). For the first time, their military tactics
were changing as a result of modern weapons and perhaps of Daraawiish military
advisers.
On 5 March 1905 Italy signed a peace agreement and protection treaty with the
Daraawiish at Ilig, in the north-eastern part of Somaliland. The Ilig Treaty recognised
Sayid Mahamed as the ruler of the Nugaal Valley (Appendix III). By assigning the
Nugaal Valley to the Daraawiish state, Italy hoped to eliminate the threat of the
Daraawiish moving into their dominion in Benaadir. Italy was concerned about its
colony in Benaadir and believed that the object of the Daraawiish struggle to be
southern Somaliland, where they could find abundance of water.
As Italy's attempt to contain the Daraawiish influence in the north was failing, the
Biyamaal resistance, inspired by religious fervour, was receiving new momentum. To
counter the new threat Italy decided to reinforce its troops and use all means to suppress
the resistance.
In early February 1907 Lieutenant Pesenti, a young Italian officer new to the colony,
and his troops ventured to interrupt a local meeting and arrest the local leaders in
Moyaale, east of the river Shabeelle. In a counter-attack Biyamaal fighters destroyed
Italian position at Dhanaane. In reaction, the Italian troops razed all villages in a nearly
hundred-kilometre range, killed people and seized animals.0
The Dhanaane clash was a turning point in Italian involvement in the Benaadir area,
as it accelerated the arrival of the new governor, Tommaso Carletti, who arrived in
Muqdisho in May 1907.
On the one hand, Italy was now intent on reinforcing its forces in southern
Somaliland and bulldozing the resistance, on the other, Governor Carletti was
instructed to start 'pacifying' the people in order to enable him to penetrate the interior,
an area which Italy had not hitherto entered.0
Despite fierce resistance, from July 1908 Italian colonial authority began to thrust its
way to the west of the river Shabeelle. Under the command of Major Antonio Di
Giorgio, Italian forces, reinforced with an Eritrean contingent, started to overwhelm the
rebels with utmost savagery, burning any village suspected of nurturing opposition.
THE DARAAWIISH RESISTANCE
Somali resistance to foreign interference in their lives dated back to at least the years
between 1528 and 1535 when, under the command of Imam Ahmed (Ahmed Ibn
Ibrahim al-Ghazi), known as Ahmed 'Gurey' (the left-handed), the Somali devastated,
and for a time successfully pushed back the Abyssinian Empire. It was only with the
help of the Portuguese0
that the Abyssinians defeated the Somali forces.
The resistance to colonial interference which Sayid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan
inspired and led at the close of the nineteenth century and for the succeeding two
decades was nationalistic in essence, and in a tradition not seen in the Somali peninsula
since Ahmed Gurey's war against Abyssinia in the sixteenth century.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Islam was reawakening in Eastern Africa, as a
result of a revival of Islam in the Muslim world.0
This tendency might have been
triggered by the Euro-Christian colonisation of Muslim lands in Africa and Asia,

6
creating a widespread reaction culminating in a resurgence of a revivalist movement
against the Euro-Christian hegemony. The Mahdist revolt in the Sudan in 1880s and
that of the Darwiish (Dervish) movement led by Sayid Mahamed in Somalia during the
same period, are examples of this revivalist movement.0
The resistance led by Sayid Mahamed Abdulle was motivated by religious and
cultural principles. His objective was to establish his suzerainty `over the whole of the
Somali territory'.0
Islam served as the ideology of the Darwiish movement. A Darwiish is a Muslim
believer who takes vows of poverty to lead a life of austerity in the service of Allah and
of his community.
A Brief Background to Sayid Mahamed's Life
Sayid Mahamed was born in the Sa'madeeqa valley, a small watering place between
Wud-Wud and Buuhodle in 1856,0
during a spring season known as Gobaysane.0
Two influences left an impression on the life of the Sayid. The first influence was
Islamic study, the other the might of pastoralism.
At the age of seven he attended Qoranic school and at eleven he learned the 114
suras of the Qoran by heart. Afterwards he became a teacher. After two years of
teaching the Qoran, he began to question his faith, a crisis that took him in search of
more rigorous religious learning for ten years. He travelled to many Islamic seats of
learning, including Muqdisho (Mugadisho), Nairobi, Harar and Khartoum (Sudan),
where he sought out the most learned sheikhs in each place.
In his thirties he set off for Mecca to discharge his haj obligations.0
While in Mecca,
he met Sheikh Mohammed Salah (1853-1917), who changed the young Mahamed
Abdulle Hassan completely. The mystic Sheikh Mohammed Salah of Sudan was the
founder of the Salahiya order0
which was spreading in the Arabian peninsula and across
the Red Sea into East Africa.
Islam has always had an association with brotherhoods (dariqa, literally meaning
'the way'), which express a mystical view of the Muslim faith. In the nineteenth century
various religious organisations developed in Somalia to the extent that 'Somali
profession of the Islamic faith was synonymous with membership of a sufi brother-
hood'.0
The Sufi order grew out of the main Qadiriya order, founded by Sheikh Abdul-
Qadir Jilani in the twelfth century. However, in later centuries sufist sectarianism
evolved which could be categorised in three groups of Muslim fellowship: (i) the
resisters who believed in struggle, (ii) the moderates who usually went about their
pedagogical teaching but occasionally created rebellion, and (iii) the conservatives who
practised their mystic meditation without concern for their social environment, some-
times collaborating with the rulers of the country.0
In 1895, following his sojourn in Arabia, Sayid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan returned
to Somaliland with a mandate to be the Salahiya representative.0
On his arrival in
Berbera port, Sayid Mahamed refused to pay a tax to the customs. His arrival home
coincided with the introduction of a new tax system by the British Consul General,
Colonel James Haya Sadler.0
The Sayid objected to paying customs duties to a foreign
power since he was entering his own land. The story goes that, when the customs
officer decided to arrest him, a well-intended interpreter explained away the sheikh's
refusal to pay as insanity: "Sir, he mad mullah,"0
and thereby originated the label of
Mad Mullah which colonial literature later assigned to the Sayid.
Before the return of Sayid Mahamed in British Somaliland the influence of Andara-
wiya, which like the Salihiya is an offshoot of Ahmadiya,0
was limited. The Qadiriya
settlements were well established both here and on the Benaadir coast in the south. In
Berbera Sayid Mahamed established a base from which he campaigned and spread the
Salahiya order while at the same time condemning the Qadiriya's moral laxity0
in
accommodating colonialism.

7
Sayid Mahamed's attempt to proselytise and convert urban Somalis to the Salahiya
order, however, met with stiff resistance from the Berbera community. There was firm
opposition from the Qadiriya order which had established roots in the area. His conflict
with the town's religious men caused him to lose the sympathy of Berbera people.0
In
turn, Berbera culama (theologians) fought back to discredit him and his new order. To
further undermine him, they informed the administration of his intentions.0
The rift between the two dariiqas intensified when the British administration sided
with Qadiriya and closed down the Salahiya religious centre at the end of 1897. This
infuriated Sayid Mahamed, who later moved with his small group of followers to his
maternal home, among the Dhulbahante, in the south of British Somaliland.
The Beginning of the Daraawiish Struggle
After being forced to leave Berbera, Sayid Mahamed moved to Qorya-weyn in the
south of British Somaliland, where he began preaching Islam under the Salahiya
banner. In spite of failing to convince the urbanised Berbera residents, he found willing
listeners in the pastoral society uninfluenced by an urban lifestyle.
The Sayid started to settle clan disputes thus acquiring the reputation of peacemaker,
and began to be seen by the pastoralists as an awliyo (saint) who had been sent among
them.0
In the first period, the British administration welcomed his exercise of authority
and saw him as an ally.0
But his aims to mediate and unify clans were in order to gain
their support in the fight against the intruders, and it soon became evident that his
aspirations were to oppose colonial interests. An incident that happened around this
time, in 1899, proved a turning point in the relations between the Sayid and the British
authority. A British administration constable, an ilaalo, went to the Daraawiish
settlement and sold his gun to the Sayid.0
On his return to Berbera the constable report-
ed that his gun had been stolen by the Sayid. The case prompted the British
administration to send a letter to Sayid Mahamed ordering him to surrender the stolen
gun immediately, but instead, on 1 September 1899, Sayid Mahamed replied in a letter
challenging British rule in the country. This defiance brought the Sheikh to the attention
of Britain itself, and the episode soured British attitudes towards the Sayid and his
movement. The conflict between the Daraawiish movement and the colonial powers
which was to last for two decades had begun.
In August 1898, the Daraawiish occupied Burao', the centre of British Somaliland,
and by doing this, Sayid Mahamed established control over the watering places of the
local clans, namely the Habar Yonis and the Habar Tol je'le clans.0
He engaged in some
peace-making between Habar Yonis and Habar Tol je'le clans, and between the
Dhulbahante and Habar Tol je'le.0
A huge assembly was held in Burao' at which Sayid
Mahamed urged the congregation to initiate a jihad (holy war) against the Ethiopians,
British and Italians who had come to colonise the Somali territory.
Further differences began appearing during this period. Sultan Nuur Ahmed
Ammaan, sultan of the Habar Yonis clan, felt uneasy about the leadership of Sayid
Mahamed. Sultan Nuur could do little to end it alone, therefore, he sought British help.
With this knowledge the Sayid was able to undermine the sultan's leadership, and
persuaded the Habar Yonis clan to depose their leader0
and replace him with one who
was favourable to the Daraawiish cause. Sultan Nuur was deposed and replaced by
Sultan Madar who, however, was soon opposing Sayid Mahamed.0
Obtaining leader-
ship sympathetic to the Daraawiish cause within the Somali clans became one of the
principal policies of the Sayid.
Shortly afterwards, the Daraawiish raided a Qadiriya settlement at Sheikh, a small
town between Berbera and Burao', and massacred its inhabitants. Panic spread in
Berbera where an imminent Daraawiish attack was feared. Surprised by the new
development, the British authority started to take the Daraawiish activities seriously.
However, by the end of 1899, the British were occupied by the Boer War and could do

8
little to contain the spread of the Daraawiish movement, which was badly hindering
their trade with the interior of the territory under their administration.
The British administration in Berbera urged their government to take action. It did
not take long for London to consent to raise a local levy of troops who would attempt to
suppress the spread of the Daraawiish movement.
During the same period, Sayid Mahamed preached the Salahiya philosophy and the
practice of tawassul ─ the veneration of saints. He taught chanting and the praise of
Sheikh Mohammed Salah by singing "Shay Lillah Sheikh Mahamed Salah." He gave
the name Daraawiish to the adherents of his Salahiya dariqa (order) and introduced the
wearing of a white turban (duub cad) which was also customary sufi costume. Within a
short time many pastoral communities followed the Daraawiish. In 1898 the
Daraawiish followers numbered more than 5000 men and women with 200 rifles. In the
middle of April 1898, the Daraawiish moved their base to Dareema-addo, a watering
place north-west of Buuhodle.
From Movement to State
Within a short time the Daraawiish grew in men, power and wealth. Because of this
growth, it became necessary for Sayid Mahamed to institutionalise the movement by
creating four main governmental apparatuses.0
At the top there was the ministerial
Council (qusuusi) which presided over affairs of state; next came bodyguards (gaar-
haye) who were responsible for the security of senior members; third was the regular
army (Maara-weyn) which was organised into seven regiments: Sheekhyaale, Gola-
weyne, Taar-gooye, Indha-badan, Miinanle, Dharbash and Rag-xun, each with its
commandant (muqaddim), and varying between 1000 to 4000 men; and fourth and
finally was the civilian population (Reer-beede) consisting mainly of people from clans
who followed the Daraawiish movement.
By forming a standing army, the movement had to face pressing needs such as food
and other logistical requirements of the troops. In the first period they were supported
by voluntary charity (siyaaro) which Muslims are required to give to religious men.
However, as the needs of the army increased, the Daraawiish began to lobby for more
help for 'the state'. On the other hand, they spread rumours that anybody who did not
help the Daraawiish in the jihad struggle was not Muslim and must be killed and his
property confiscated.0
The Daraawiish structure could be considered to constitute a state, since the three
salient features of state are defined as territory, population living in that defined
territory, and a government which is sovereign to rule the country and the people.
Though fluid, all these characteristics can be identified in the Daraawiish.
Such a state was fashioned on the model of the Salahiya brotherhood, with strict
hierarchy and rigid centralisation by a religious order. The cohesive force of the
Daraawiish state polity was based on religious ideology, and was a radical departure
from the politics of clan alliance.
Some followed it with enthusiasm, some with caution, but soon many conflicts
began to develop. Garaad Ali Garaad Mahamud, Sultan of Bah-Ararsame Dhulbahante
clan, whose people lived in Nugaal, felt uneasy at the expanding power of the Sayid
among his matrilineal relatives of the Dhulbahante. Towards the end of 1899, Sayid
Mahamed sent a delegation to the Garaad to try and persuade him and his people to join
the Daraawiish state. He sent a further delegation to the Garaad inviting him to the
xarun (headquarters). With reluctance Garaad Ali accepted, and in the heated debate
which followed Garaad Ali emphasised his position in the following way,
I am the ruler of Nugaal and its people. Their management is mine and I expect
everybody to respect it.0

9
This inevitably led to a confrontation between two systems: the traditionalist against
the new. The Daraawiish practice was alien to pastoral society. Traditionally the clan is
the most important political unit of the Somalis and this clashed with the new system
introduced by the Sayid.
The resulting hostility prompted Sayid Mahamed to dispatch a group of Daraawiish
to assassinate the Garaad.
The killing of Garaad Ali stunned the Somali clans and destabilised the Daraawiish.0
This incident proved to be one of the most catastrophic miscalculations made by Sayid
Mahamed. Many of his followers left him. Only his maternal kin, Ali Geri, stood by
him. Having lost the support of the Nugaal people, Sayid Mahamed and his followers
were forced to flee to Western Somaliland, to his paternal kin.
The Battles Between The Daraawiish and The Colonialists
The Daraawiish had a military organisation that was expert in guerrilla warfare. By
drawing their enemies to ideal terrain, they used to strike at will. The British,
sometimes with their allies, sent one expedition after another. The first expedition left
Burao' on 22 May 1901, and consisted of 21 officers of the British and Indian armies
and a levy of 1500 Somalis. Between 1900 and 1904, four British expeditions were sent
against the Daraawiish. Well-known battles were Afbakayle, which took place on 3
June 1901, Fardhidin on 16 July 1901, Beerdhiga (Eeragoo) on 4 April 1901, Agaar-
weyne (Gumburo) on April 1903, Daratoole on 22 April 1903, Jidbaale on 10 January
1904 and Ruugga (Dulmadoobe) on 9 August 1913.0
During the first period, the Daraawiish won many battles because of their
experience of guerrilla warfare, their knowledge of the territory and adaptability to the
environment, their belief that they were fighting a jihad (holy war) and therefore a just
war, and their military organisation. However, after many successes over the intruders,
they changed their tactics of guerrilla warfare to conventional tactics. This change of
strategy proved fatal for them.
On 9 January 1904 on the plains of Jidbaale, a watering place north of Las Anod in
the east of British Somaliland, they sought head on confrontation with the British. In
the following battle, the Daraawiish lost between 7000 and 8000, dead or injured.0
The
defeat demoralised and disorganised the Daraawiish. With the British forces on their
heels, the fleeing Daraawiish headed to the Majeerteen Sultanate in the north-east. On
their way they sent a message to Boqor Osman, whose relationship with the Sayid was
marred by a failed political marriage when the latter had asked to marry a daughter of
Boqor Osman, Qaali.0
Meanwhile, the British asked the Italian Consulate in Aden to press Boqor Osman
not to give the Sayid sanctuary. Boqor Osman gave way to Italian and British pressure,
and declined to give refuge to the frustrated Daraawiish. This angered Sayid Mahamed
at a time when many of his followers were deserting. Consequently, fighting erupted
between the Daraawiish and the forces of Boqor Osman. The Daraawiish forces were
obliged to head for Ilig, a strategic place on the Indian Ocean, in the north-east of
Somaliland.
The Ilig Treaty
After four years of fighting, the British found that they could not annihilate the
Daraawiish as they had believed. Because of financial troubles and opposition at home,
in 1904 they had been compelled to change tactics and make peace with the Daraawiish
through the Italians - who had not been in military conflict with the Daraawiish. Haji
Abdille Shihiri, who was a Daraawiish confidant, became the mediator between the
Italians and the Daraawiish. Haji Abdille Shihiri met with Cavalier Giulio Pestalozza,
the Diplomatic Representative of the Italian Government at Aden, where he took a
letter for the Sayid.

10
Craving respite, the Sayid accepted negotiation with the Italians who proposed that
he rule the territory from Ayl and Garaad on the Indian Ocean to Nugaal in the interior.
The agreement included a condition to release Sultan Yusuf Ali Kenadid, Sultan of
Hobyo (Obbia), who had been deposed and imprisoned by the Italians after he refused
to let British forces disembark at Hobyo with the intention of attacking the Daraawiish
from the east while other British forces engaged with the Daraawiish at Cagaar-weyne
(Gumburo) on 17 April 1903. As a result of his refusal, Sultan Yusuf Ali was deported
to Assab in Eritrea in 1903.0
After heated negotiations an agreement was reached on 5 March 1905. Giulio
Pestalozza signed for Italy. At Berbera on the 24th
March 1905, a provisional
Agreement was signed by the British and by representatives of the Daraawiish,
declaring amongst other things, that the Agreement between Italy and the Daraawiish
was in accord with the views of the British government.0
The Ilig Treaty recognised Sayid Mahamed as leader of a mini state in the Nugaal
Valley, under the protection of Italy (Appendix III). It also accorded him religious
liberty and freedom of trade, except in arms and slaves.0
By assigning the Nugaal Valley as a Daraawiish state, Italy hoped to eliminate the
threat of the Daraawiish to influence and support revolt in their own domain of Bena-
adir.0
However, on receiving the news of the Daraawiish' status, the Biyamaal and
Wa'daan clans rebelled against Italian rule. Only after Italy bombarded Marka did the
Italians subdue the Biyamaal uprising.0
Master of Eloquence
Knowing that the colonialists could not be defeated by force alone, Sayid Mahamed
began to change strategy by beginning to use words as arms. Just as words, spoken or
written, have been the most powerful means of communication of mankind,0
he
consummately and skilfully used the medium of Somali verse. He repeatedly sought to
gain in verse what he could not succeeded in acquiring with arms. When he lost a
battle, he "dipped into his reservoir of rhymes to encourage his shattered army."0
He
designed his verse to enhance his cause, to encourage his followers or scorn and
discredit his enemies. However, by scorning his enemies, he sometimes preached the
pastoral ethos excessively like an "epigram that borders on the obscene."0
The period in Ilig was, by concensus, the period during which he composed his best
poems: dextrously using the Somali language which is well noted for its richness of
vocabulary;0
using the medium of poetry as high powered propaganda warfare, Sayid
Mahamed became a "literary master".0
As poetry is the principle medium of mass
communication, his mastery of the art won him the reputation of being the greatest
Somali poet, and earned him the description "master of eloquence"0
from one modern-
day admirer.
The Sayid appealed to a traditional code of ethics that he knew would
strike a responsive chord in the [hearts of those who heard them]. The
notion of unbending defiance in the face of calamitous circumstances
was a theme he often stressed in his poems... Yet these tactics,
designed to hold the ranks of the faithful together, concealed the real
shift in strategy that the Sayid was initiating in the light of grim
realities.0
Long years of adversity gave vitality to Sayid Mahamed's personality. He was
persisting in the face of overwhelming odds. In spite of his totalitarianism and storming
character, his tyranny was directed towards a noble end0
as his objective was to get rid
of colonial power.
The Reconstruction of the Daraawiish State

11
The peace agreement gave the Sayid a period of respite to recover his strength and
influence. He built up his forces and, in breach of the treaty, imported arms on an
unprecedented scale. He set up a well-coordinated strategy to sabotage the colonial
administration and to terrorise and destabilise clans that he saw as loyal to British and
Italian rule, those under the Majeerteen and the Hobyo Sultanates, and Ogaadeen clans,
by sending out roving bands of raiders (burcad)0
. He invaded Mudug to establish
contact with Bah-Geri on the upper Shabeelle and extended his attacks on the Hobyo
Sultanate.
Indiscriminate raiding, seizing and plundering of the property of fellow Muslims,
and breaking a solemn treaty - even though with infidels - were seen as dishonourable,
and alienated Sayid Mahamed from many from among his followers.
At the end of 1909 the Daraawiish moved first to Aday-dheero then two years later
to Dameero and later still to Taleh. At Taleh, the heart of the Nugaal valley, the
Daraawiish reunited and started to build impressive and strategic garrisons. Taleh was
ideally placed as it was at the centre between the western Hawd (Haud), the Red Sea in
the east, the Indian Ocean, the Majeerteen and Hobyo Sultanates to the south, and
British Somaliland to the north. It was abundant with water and pasture. There the
Daraawiish built four garrisons: Silsilad could take two thousand fighters and five
thousand animals; Falaad, was the headquarters for the Sayid and his advisers; Daawad
was for guests; and Eegi or Daar-Ilaalo was an outpost for the headquarters.0
Although the building of the fortress gave the Daraawiish the appearance of
supremacy in the area, it was also a complete contradiction of the guerrilla warfare
tactics that the Daraawiish had adopted in previous years, and would give the enemy a
fixed target to attack and a defined territory for battle.
However, after the failure of another peace attempt by the British with the
Daraawiish in November 1909, London ordered its colonial administration in the
British Somaliland to confine themselves to three coastal towns on the Red Sea:
Berbera, Zeyla' and Bullahar.0
This decision resulted in declining British prestige in the
country.
By 1913 the Daraawiish dominated the entire hinterland of the Somali peninsula. In
the new status quo, the Daraawiish became the only organised institution in the area,0
and as a result, the booming trade of the British-controlled coastal area with the
hinterland became completely at the mercy of the Daraawiish. This prompted the
British to revise their policy, and they formed a mobile force, the Camel Corps, to
police the immediate hinterlands. Under the command of the arrogant and tough
Colonel Richard Corfield, the Camel Corps soon began to patrol in the immediate
hinterland.
The Daraawiish's Diplomatic Victories
On the diplomatic front, Sayid Mahamed made an alliance with the new Ethiopian
Emperor, Lij Iyasu, who acceded to the throne in December 1913. Emperor Iyasu was
sympathetic to Islam and moved his court to Dire Dawa among his Muslim subjects.0
He aspired to create a Muslim empire in East Africa. To fulfil his dream, he proposed to
make an alliance with Sayid Mahamed. It is probable that he supplied financial aid and
arms to the Daraawiish, and sent a German arms technician, called Emil Kirsch, to
Taleh to help the Daraawiish state.
The fear of an alliance of Ethiopian Muslims and the Daraawiish alarmed the
European capitals as well as the Ethiopian orthodox church. Their concern was justified
as the announcement of Emperor Iyasu's conversion to Islam was made in April 1916.0
However, before he could consolidate his power, Emperor Iyasu was deposed on 27
September 1916.
On another diplomatic front, Sayid Mahamed made an alliance with the Ottoman
Empire.0
However, in 1917, the Italians apprehended Sheikh Ahmed Shirwa Mahamed

12
and found in his possession a document from the Turkish government giving assurance
of their support and recognising Sayid Mahamed as the Amir of Somaliland.0
The diplomatic achievements, the Ilig Treaty, the British withdrawal to the coast,
and the reconstruction of the Daraawiish state in the heart of the country helped to
enhance the prestige of Sayid Mahamed throughout Somaliland. But his success had
disadvantages as it made the Sayid over-confident which in turn caused him to evaluate
falsely the strategy of his enemies. He over estimated the help he could receive from
Emperor Iyasu, who had only a short time left in power, and from the Ottoman Empire
which was in decline.
The Annihilation of the Daraawiish State
During the great days of the Daraawiish state in the Nugaal Valley, qusuusi
(advisers) of the state recommended that farming should stop, and trading with the
coast should be halted to avert enemy spies from reporting about the Daraawiish.0
They
suggested moving the headquarters to a location where rival informants could not spy
on them. Sayid Mahamed accepted the advice without examining the possible conse-
quences. In mid-1918 the headquarters were transferred to Mirashi0
, a mountainous
place with difficult access for their enemies.0
However, that decision proved detrimen-
tal to the Daraawiish tactics as it interrupted communication with their other
settlements. During this period the Daraawiish knew little about their enemies'
preparations.0
While the Daraawiish were in this isolated situation, the British built up their fire
power which they reinforced with the aeroplane, a newly invented lethal weapon, with
which they started to attack all Daraawiish bases in Taleh and Mirashi simultaneously
on the 21 January 1920. This took the Daraawiish military leaders by surprise. Their
plans never included a strategy to protect their bases against such fantastic weapons. On
3 February 1920 the British captured Taleh, and the Daraawiish troops abandoned their
forts in the Nugaal Valley and other areas before fleeing to Western Somaliland. There
they regrouped when a natural disaster occurred. Smallpox broke out in the region and
decimated the men and livestock.
Meanwhile, the British Governor despatched a peace delegation to Sayid Mahamed
pressing him to surrender. In exchange he was to be allowed to establish his own
religious settlement in the west of British Somaliland. Nonetheless, Sayid Mahamed
categorically refused to surrender, and to prove to the British authority that the
Daraawiish was still capable of intimidating its subjects, raided Isaaq clansmen grazing
their livestock near the Ethiopian border. The attack outraged the Isaaq clans, and with
the help of the administration, a force of Isaaq men led by Haji Warsame Bullale,
known as Haji Warabe, staged a massive onslaught on the already feeble Daraawiish.
After this fatal blow Sayid Mahamed and some of his qusuusi members fled to
Imay, in the Arusi country in Ethiopia. After arriving in Imay, the Sayid and his
remaining companions started to build thirteen new garrisons but Sayid Mahamed did
not live long enough to realise the reconstruction of the Daraawiish state. He
succumbed to an attack of influenza on 21 December 1920 at the age of fifty-six.
With the fear of the Daraawiish eliminated, the Italian colonial power was set to
establish its rule over the rest of what would became the Italian Somaliland. Currently
controlling only Benaadir, Italy now set as its top priority the elimination of the north-
eastern sultanates.
THE NORTH-EASTERN SOMALILAND SULTANATES
The north-eastern sultanates of Majeerteen and Hobyo developed a very effective
political organization with diversified measures of centralized authority over relatively
large territories. Italy, Britain, Germany and France had been trying to solicit them into
their sphere of influence since the early days of their competion for the Somali

13
peninsula. In the closing decades of the 1880s Germany was the first colonial power to
have built a special relationship with the Majeerteen.
To the other colonial powers' surprise however, on 7 April 1889, it was Italy who
concluded a treaty of protection with the Majeerteen sultanate, having only a few
months before, in December 1888, signed a similar treaty with the Hobyo sultanate.0
The protectorate agreements were renewed by the Majeerteen on 7 April 1895 and on
11 April 1895 by the Hobyo.
The treaty terms clearly stipulated that Italy was not to interfere in the internal
affairs of the sultanates,0
and in order to promote the Italian Government and the
sultanates' interests, Italy agreed to send commissioners to both sultanates.
By accepting Italy's protection in December 1888, Sultan Yusuf Ali of Hobyo was
planning to use Italy's support in his dispute with the Sultan of Zanzibar over the border
region north of Warsheekh. He was also interested in using this support against Boqor
Osman of the Majeerteen Sultanate with whom he contested control over the Nugaal
Valley. As a countermove against Sultan Yusuf Ali, Boqor Osman Mahamud also
accepted Italy's protection. They had both signed the protectorate agreements for their
own expansionist objectives, and, by exploiting the conflicting interests among
competing powers, to avoid direct occupation of their territories by force.
However, the relationship between Hobyo and Italy was complicated when Sultan
Yusuf Ali refused the Italian proposal to sanction a British contingent of troops to
disembark at Hobyo to pursue their battle with the Daraawiish (see above) in April
1903. Because of this controversy, Sultan Yusuf Ali and his son Yusuf Ali were
eventually deposed by the Italians and deported to Assab in Eritrea0
Conflict of Interest
The sultanate of Majeerteen lay on the utmost tip of the Horn. To the north was the
Red Sea, in the east there was the Indian Ocean. To the south of Majeerteenia stretched
the Nugaal Valley. To the west British Somaliland.
To define their zone of influence, the Italian and British administrations signed the
Anglo-Italian Treaty of 5 May 1894 which defined the Majeerteen Sultanate as being
east of the 490
Meridian. The line fell to the east of Taleh and Baran. In 1906 Cavalier
Pestalozza and General Swaine signed an agreement recognising Baran as under the
Majeerteen sultanate.0
Among other things, the Anglo-Italian treaty stipulated that the
Italian government be responsible for any act committed by the Majeerteen against the
people under British protection.0
All these dealings were taking place behind the backs
of the peoples concerned.
In March 1901, Boqor Osman extended his border by capturing two small towns in
the Mudug region. The Mudug was an area regarded as Sultan Yusuf Ali's realm. As
both sultans were under Italian protection, the contention prompted Giulio Pestalozza,
the Italian Consul at Aden, to sail to Baargaal, the seat of the Majeerteen court, to press
Boqor Osman to retreat and respect the treaties. Boqor Osman refused to give in.0
The matter worried Italy and it reasoned that unless Boqor Osman was brought
under their directive they feared they could not control the sultanate. Misunderstanding
and distrust was in the making. The conflict of interest was leading to confrontation as
each side began accusing the other.
Whilst the situation was still in confusion, the Italian Minister in Cairo intercepted a
letter from Boqor Osman seeking Ottoman protection over what the latter termed the
"Independent Majeerteen Somali."0
Furthermore, Italy learned about the sultanate's
arms build-up. Before it was too late, Italy decided to breach the treaty and to bring
Boqor Osman to his knees. The Volta ship bombarded the coastal villages of Bareeda
and Bender Khassim (Boosaaso), crippling the sultanate's modest arms and ammunition
warehouses. Boqor Osman fled to the interior, while Italian troops captured the sea
towns of Alula, Bender Khassim, Bareeda and Muranyo. Boqor Osman had been taken

14
by surprise, and had attempted unsuccessfully to counter the Italians in too many
battlefields.
Things were further complicated by other developments in the region: the Italo-
British arrangements for confining the Daraawiish to the Nugaal area was growing
untenable. The British had failed to secure peace with the Daraawiish and were in
retreat.0
The good relationships which in the past Boqor Osman had had with Sayid
Mahamed ended after persistent Daraawiish scorched earth raids on Majeerteen
settlements. Initially Boqor Osman had repulsed invasions of his Sultanate by the
Daraawiish. But armed confrontation with the Italians had made him vulnerable to the
Daraawiish attacks. He turned to the Italians for an "honourable settlement".
Because of the Daraawiish threat to their Benaadir colony and the weakness of
control afforded by the existing treaty with the Majeerteen, the Italians opted to open a
dialogue with Boqor Osman. After long negotiations, in March 1910, they signed a
renewal of the treaty but with a more rigid and effective protectorate powers and in
their own interpretation.0
From Sovereign to Subject:
The Elimination of the North-Eastern Sultanates
The dawn of fascism in the early 1920s heralded a change of strategy for Italy as the
north-eastern sultanates were soon to be forced within the boundaries of La Grande
Somalia according to the plan of fascist Italy. With the arrival of Governor Cesare
Maria De Vecchi on 15 December 1923 things began to change for that part of
Somaliland. Italy had access to these parts under the successive protection treaties, but
not direct rule. The fascist government had direct rule only over the Benaadir territory.
Given the defeat of the Daraawiish movement in the early 1920s and the rise of
fascism in Europe, on 10 July 1925 Benito Mussolini gave the green light to De Vecchi
to start the takeover of the north-eastern sultanates.0
Everything was to be changed and
the treaties abrogated.
The real principles of colonialism meant possession and domination of the people,
and the protection of the country from other greedy powers. Italy's interpretation of the
treaties of protection with the north-eastern sultanates was comparable to her view of
the Treaty of Uccialli with Abyssinia, and meant absolute control of the whole territory.
Never mind that the subsequent tension between Abyssinia and Italy had culminated in
1896 in the battle of Adowa in which the Italians were overwhelmed and
outmanoeuvred. The Italians had not learned their lesson, they were committing the
same historical mistake.
Governor De Vecchi's first plan was to disarm the sultanates. But before the plan
could be carried out there should be sufficient Italian troops in both sultanates. To
make the enforcement of his plan more viable, he began to reconstitute the old Somali
police corps, the Corpo Zaptié, as a colonial force.
Preparations for the Invasion
In preparation for the plan of invasion of the sultanates, the Alula Commissioner, E.
Coronaro received orders in April 1924 to carry out a reconnaissance on the territories
targetted for invasion. In spite of the forty year Italian relationship with the sultanates,
Italy did not have adequate knowledge of the geography. During this time, the
Stefanini-Puccioni geological survey was scheduled to take place, so it was a good
opportunity for the expedition of Coronaro to join with this.0
Coronaro's survey concluded that the Majeerteen Sultanate depended on sea traffic,
therefore, if this were blocked any resistance which could be mounted came after the
invasion of the sultanate would be minimal.0
As the first stage of the invasion plan Governor De Vecchi ordered the two
Sultanates to disarm. The reaction of both sultanates was to object, as they felt the

15
policy was in breach of the protectorate agreements. The pressure engendered by the
new development forced the two rival sultanates to settle their differences over Nugaal
possession, and form a united front against their common enemy.
The First Casualty: Hobyo
The Sultanate of Hobyo was different from that of Majeerteen in terms of its
geography and the pattern of the territory. It was founded by Yusuf Ali in the middle of
the nineteenth century in central Somaliland. The jurisdiction of Hobyo stretched from
El-Dheere through to Dusa-Mareeb in the south-west, from Galladi to Galkayo in the
west, from Jerriiban to Garaad in the north-east, and the Indian Ocean in the east.0
By 1st
October, De Vecchi's plan was to go into action. The operation to invade
Hobyo started in October 1925. Columns of the new Zaptié began to move towards the
sultanate. Hobyo, El-Buur, Galkayo, and the territory between were completely overrun
within a month. Hobyo was transformed from a sultanate into an administrative region.
Sultan Yusuf Ali surrendered. Nevertheless, soon suspicions were aroused as Trivulzio,
the Hobyo commissioner, reported movement of armed men towards the borders of the
sultanate before the takeover and after.
Before the Italians could concentrate on the Majeerteen, they were diverted by new
setbacks. On 9 November, the Italian fear was realised when a mutiny, led by one of the
military chiefs of Sultan Ali Yusuf, Omar Samatar, recaptured El-Buur. Soon the
rebellion expanded to the local population. The region went into revolt as El-Dheere
also came under the control of Omar Samatar. The Italian forces tried to recapture El-
Buur but they were repulsed. On 15 November the Italians retreated to Bud Bud and on
the way they were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties.
While a third attempt was in the last stages of preparation, the operation
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Splendorelli, was ambushed between Bud Bud and
Buula Barde. He and some of his staff were killed.0
As a consequence of the death of the commander of the operations and the effect of
two failed operations intended to overcome the El-Buur mutiny, the spirit of Italian
troops began to wane. The Governor took the situation seriously, and to prevent any
more failure he requested two battalions from Eritrea to reinforce his troops, and
assumed lead of the operations.0
Meanwhile, the rebellion was gaining sympathy across
the country, and as far afield as Western Somaliland.
The fascist government was surprised by the setback in Hobyo. The whole policy of
conquest was collapsing under its nose. The El-Buur episode drastically changed the
strategy of Italy as it revived memories of the Adowa fiasco when Italy had been
defeated by Abyssinia. Furthermore, in the Colonial Ministry in Rome, senior officials
distrusted the Governor's ability to deal with the matter. Rome instructed De Vecchi
that he was to receive the reinforcement from Eritrea, but that the commander of the
two battalions was to temporarily assume the military command of the operations and
De Vecchi was to stay in Muqdisho and confine himself to other colonial matters. In the
case of any military development, the military commander was to report directly to the
Chief of Staff in Rome.0
While the situation remained perplexed, De Vecchi moved the deposed sultan to
Muqdisho. Fascist Italy was poised to reconquer the sultanate by whatever means. To
manoeuvre the situation within Hobyo, they even contemplated the idea of reinstating
Ali Yusuf. However, the idea was dropped after they became pessimistic about the
results.
To undermine the resistance, however, and before the Eritrean reinforcement could
arrive, De Vecchi began to instill distrust among the local people by buying the loyalty
of some of them. In fact, these tactics had better results than had the military campaign,
and the resistance began gradually to wear down. Given the anarchy which would
follow,0
the new policy was a success.

16
On the military front, on 26 December 1925 Italian troops finally overran El-Buur,
and the forces of Omar Samatar were compelled to retreat to Western Somaliland.
The Second Casuality: The Fall of the Majeerteen Sultanate
By neutralising Hobyo, the fascists could concentrate on the Majeerteen. In early
October 1924, E. Coronaro, the new Alula commissioner, presented Boqor Osman with
an ultimatum to disarm and surrender.
Meanwhile, Italian troops began to pour into the sultanate in anticipation of this
operation. While landing at Haafuun and Alula, the sultanate's troops opened fire on
them. Fierce fighting ensued and to avoid escalating the conflict and to press the fascist
government to revoke their policy, Boqor Osman tried to open a dialogue. However, he
failed, and again fighting broke out between the two parties.
Following this disturbance, on 7 October the Governor instructed Coronaro to order
the Sultan to surrender; to intimidate the people he ordered the seizure of all merchant
boats in the Alula area. At Haafuun, Arimondi bombarded and destroyed all the boats
in the area.0
On 13 October Coronaro was to meet Boqor Osman at Baargaal to press for his
surrender. Under siege already, Boqor Osman was playing for time. However, on 23
October Boqor Osman sent an angry response to the Governor defying his order.
Following this a full scale attack was ordered in November. Baargaal was bombarded
and razed to the ground.0
This region was ethnically compact, and was out of range of
direct action by the fascist government of Muqdisho. The attempt of the colonisers to
suppress the region erupted into explosive confrontation.
The Italians were meeting fierce resistance on many fronts. In December 1925, led
by the charismatic leader Hersi Boqor, son of Boqor Osman, the sultanate forces drove
the Italians out of Hurdia and Haafuun, two strategic coastal towns on the Indian
Ocean. Another contingent attacked and destroyed an Italian communications centre at
Cape Guardafui, on the tip of the Horn. In retaliation Bernica and other warships were
called on to bombard all main coastal towns of the Majeerteen. After a violent
confrontation Italian forces captured Ayl (Eil), which until then had remained in the
hands of Hersi Boqor.0
In response to the unyielding situation, Italy called for reinforcements from their
other colonies, notably, Eritrea. With their arrival at the closing of 1926, the Italians
began to move into the interior where they had not been able to venture since their first
seizure of the coastal towns. Their attempt to capture Dharoor Valley was resisted, and
ended in failure.
De Vecchi had to reassess his plans as he was being humiliated on many fronts.
After one year of exerting full force he could not yet manage to gain a result over the
sultanate.
In spite of the fact that the Italian navy sealed the sultanate's main coastal entrance,
they could not succeed in stopping them from receiving arms and ammunition through
it. It was only early 1927 when they finally succeeded in shutting the northern coast of
the sultanate, thus cutting arms and ammunition supplies for the Majeerteen.
By this time, the balance had tilted to the Italian's side, and in January 1927 they
began to attack with a massive force, capturing Iskushuban, at the heart of the
Majeerteen. Hersi Boqor unsuccessfully attacked and challenged the Italians at
Iskushuban. To demoralise the resistance, ships were ordered to raze and bombard the
sultanate's coastal towns and villages.0
In the interior the Italian troops confiscated
livestock.
By the end of the 1927 the Italians had nearly taken control of the sultanate.
Defeated and humiliated, Hersi Boqor and his top staff were forced to retreat to
Ethiopia in order to rebuild the forces. However, they had an epidemic of cholera which
frustrated all attempts to recover his force.

17
After two years of devastating war in which thousands of civilians died and the
entire economy of the sultanate was ruined, razing all coastal towns and villages, the
Italian colonial administration could boast that it had broken the Majeerteen resistance
and put an end to an era in Somaliland.
Boqor Osman fled to the British Somaliland, but was handed back to the Italians. In
November the formal act of surrender took place in Hurdia, and Boqor Osman
dramatically consigned his sword to Governor De Vecchi.0
Later Boqor Osman was
exiled to Muqdisho.
With the elimination of the north-eastern sultanates and the breaking of the Benaadir
resistance, from this period henceforth, Italian Somaliland was to become a reality.
The partition of Somaliland was already shaping during this period and the fate of
the Somalis was at the mercy of the colonial powers.

18
CHAPTER II
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966, pp.9-11.
. Ibid., pp.31-32.
. Ibid, p.11.
. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, op. cit., p.3.
. The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives, 1962, pp.19-20.
. Ibid., pp.19-20.
. Ibid., p.34
. Ibid., pp.1-5.
. Moyse-Barlett, H.; The History of the King's African Rifles, 1956, p.54.
. Ibid., pp.1-5.
. Ibid., p.7.
. Ibid., p.47.
. The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives, 1962,pp.34-35.
. J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 1952, pp.140-150.
. Ibid., p.53.
. Ibid., p.44.
. Ibid., pp.44-45.
. Ibid., p.45.
.A H M Jones et Elizabeth Monroe, A History of Abyssinia, 1937,pp136-7
. Said S. Samatar and David D. Laitan, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, op. cit., p.51.
. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, op. cit., pp.41-45.
. Ibid., p.27.
. Virginia Luling, The Social Structure of Southern Somali Tribes, 1971, p.213.
. Hassan Osman Ahmed, "La Cittá di Marka, I Biimaal e il Dominio sulla Costa Somala, pp.78-80.
. Gaadsan, another group of the Biyamaal clan grouping live in the Western Somaliland.
. Ibid., pp.80-81.
. Ibid., p.83.
. Ibid., p.85.
. Ibid., p.93. Few months before his death Giacomo Trevis became Marka Resident.
. Ma-alim literary means teacher of Islamic teachings.
. Ibid., p.137.
. Hassan Osman Ahmed, "La Cittá di Marka, I Biimaal e il Dominio sulla Costa Somala, p.138.
. Ibid., p.139.
. Isabel Burton, ed., First Footsteps in East Africa by Captain Sir Richard F. Burton, op. cit., p.10.
. Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, Divine Madness, 1992, pp.36-7.
. Ibid., pp.36-40
. Jardine, D., The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, 1923, p.159.
. Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-1921),
1976, p.4. Others believe that he was born in 1864.
. Traditionally, Somalis name seasons for events or their effect. Gobaysane was famous for its abundance.
. Haj is one of the five pillars of Islam. Every Muslim is required to do haj, in Mecca, at least once in his
lifetime.
. Salihiya is an offshoot of Ahmadiya order.
. I M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, 1980, p.63.
. Bradford G. Martin, "Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule", in Journal of African History,
10,3 (1969), pp.471-86.
op. cit., p. 8. About the mandate is in dispute. Others believe that the other hajis who accompanied him in
the haj recommended him to represent Salihiya in Somalia.

19
. Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism, op. cit., p.106.
op.cit., p.9. There is another version of how the Sayid acquired this epithet. It says when he left Mecca, he
passed the port of Aden. The Sheikh had a skirmish with an English officer. An interpreter named Ali Qaje
explained to the officer by saying, "Sir, pardon, he Mad Mullah".
. Ahmadiya was founded by Ahmad bin Idris Al-Faasi (1760-1837) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
. Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism, op. cit., p.106. The Qadiriya dariiqa was founded
by Sheikh 'Abdul-Qadir Jilani (d. AD 1166) and buried in Baghdad. It was divided into two groups:
Zayla'iya, named after its founder Sheikh Cabdiraxmaan Zaylici (Sheikh Abdul-Rahman Az-Zayli'i, d.
1883), in the north. Uwaysiya named after its founder Sheikh Uways Mahamed (Sheikh Uways Bin
Mahammad al-Baraawa) killed in 1909 by the Daraawiish forces in Biyooley in the south Somaliland.
. Ibid, p.107.
op. cit., p.12. Aw-Gaas Ahmed was the one who brought Sayid Mahamed to the attention of the
administration about Sayid Mahamed's by saying "This sheikh is planning something. If you do not arrest
him now, you will look for him very far." (Wadaadkaas waxbuu soo wadaa. Haddaan haatan la qabanna
meel fog baa laga dooni doonaa).
. Ibid, p.14.
. Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, 1932, p.86.
. I M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, op. cit., p. 68.
. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism. op. cit. ,p.52.
. I M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, op. cit., p. 69.
. Ibid., p.69.
. Sadia Muuse Ahmed, field note, interviewed on 25th
August 1993, London, England.
op.cit., p.126.
. Ibid., p.23.
. Ibid., p.25. This is what he said in Somali, "Nugaal iyo dadka deggan anaa Boqor u ah. Taladooda nin iiga
dambeeya maahee ninna uga dambayn maayo!".
. Ibid., p.26.
. See Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-
1921), op. cit., pp.41-102.
op. cit., p.63.
. Ibid., pp.117-18. On this occasion the Sayid said, "Talyan Koofiyad weynow, dabadeed aad kalaantoo.
Kidibkii aad shubtee, Keenadiid ma waddaa?" Translated in English, "O Italian with big hat, talk later. Did
you bring with you Keenadiid?"
. For more detail of the agreement see Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid
Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-1921), op. cit., p.134.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966, p.134.
. Ibid., pp.45-46.
. Mahamed D. Afrax, "The Mirror of Culture," in The Somali Challenge, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, 1994,
pp.233-249.
. Quoted in Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism, op. cit., p.181.
. Ibid., p.153.
. Cali Xirsi Cartan, note field, interviewed on 22 August 1993, London, England.
. B. W. Andrezejewski and I. M. Lewis, Somali Poetry, 1964, p.74.
. Spencer J. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 1952, p.34.
. I M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, op. cit., p.82. See Drake-Brockman and Ralph E., British
Somaliland, p.5-20. See D. Jardine, The Mad Mullah, 1923, pp.314-316.
Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid Mahamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-1921),
op. cit., p.20.
. Ibid., p.204.
. The order might have been from W. Churchill, the then Under-Secretary of State for Colonies who came
to visit Berbera. See Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle
Xasan, (1895-1921), op. cit., p.166.
. Siciid Mahamed Guure, field note, interviewed in March 1977, Iskushuban (Bari Region), Somalia.
. Ibid., p.78.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, op. cit., p.146.

20
. For the agreement see Francesco Caroselli, Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia, 1931, p.224. For more detail see
also Aw-Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraawiishta iyo Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan, (1895-
1921), op. cit., pp.242-246.
. I M Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, op. cit., p.78.
op. cit., p.260.
. Ibid., p.261-262.
. Ibid., p.262.
. Ibid., p.206.
. Cesare Maria De Vecchi, Orizzonti d'Impero, pp.56-7.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp.117-18.
. Ibid., pp.76-80.
. Ibid., p.91.
. Ibid. p.128.
. Ibid., p.129.
p.166.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp.141-2.
. Ibid., pp.152-153.
. Cesare Maria De Vecchi, Orizzonti d'Impero, 1935, p.76.
. Ibid., p.111.
. Ibid., pp.121-122.
. Ibid., p.153.
. Ibid., p.154.
. Ibid., p.148.
. Ibid., p.73.
. Ibid., p.126.
. Ibid., pp.130-1.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, p.55.
. Cesare Maria De Vecchi, Orizzonti d'Impero, pp.50-70.
. Robert L Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966, p.156.

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