Competing World-Visions? China’s and the EU’s Africa-Policies

Europe in a Non-European World:
- The External Relations of the EU in a Changing World Order

Competing World-Visions? China’s and the EU’s Africa-Policies

Table of Content

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3

2. Normative power: The EU’s Africa-Policy ........................................................................ 4

3. Business instead of aid: China’s Africa-policy’ ................................................................. 6

4. Case Study: Angola ........................................................................................................ 8

5. The ‘China effect’: Cooperation instead of conditionality ............................................. 11

6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 13

References ....................................................................................................................... 15

2

Introduction
“The battle for influence in the world between the West and China is not Africa’s
problem. Our continent is in a hurry to build infrastructure, ensure affordable energy
and educate our people…China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted
than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European
investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations.”
(Abdoulaye Wade (President of Senegal) in Carbone, 2011, p. 203)

While African countries have been widely neglected by western states after the end of the
Cold War, they have become a new priority for Western actors, as well as for emerging
powers. Most importantly, China established itself as an important political and economic
player on the African continent. The flow of goods between China and Africa has quintupled
since 2000 and China is becoming Africa’s most important trading-partner. During the last
two decades more than 800 Chinese companies have invested a total of US$ 1.2 billion on
the continent1 and Chinese companies have managed to secure orders for African
infrastructure projects worth more than US$ 30 billion. In 2006, China imported 30% of its oil
from Africa, most of it from Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria. Moreover, it is estimated that not
only China benefits from this dynamic cooperation but also Africa: According to the German
Development Institute, economic growth in Africa has risen by one to two percentage points
“thanks to support from China” (DIE, 2006, p. 1).
China's motivation for increased activity on the African continent is clear: China aims
at securing natural resources, especially oil, and gaining access to Africa’s markets.
Furthermore, China tries to establish itself as a global political power. At the same time, the
Chinese model of “authoritarian capitalism” provides African leaders with an alternative
policy to the traditional Western aid and development cooperation. As a result, the success
of China’s approach is more and more seen as a challenge to the influence of Western states
and their foreign policies towards Africa.
As European politicians realized that China’s successful strategy potentially
undermines their traditional influence in Africa, they started to question their normative
policy-approach towards Africa. While Europe conducts a policy that is based on ethical and

1
c.f. DIE Breifing Paper, 2006

3

normative considerations, such as good governance, democracy, human rights and the
promotion of sustainable economic development, China promotes a no-strings-attached,
business-like approach. In contrast to the EU, China presents itself rather as an investor who
wants to do business rather than donor who wants to provide aid.
This paper will shed light on the differences between China’s and the EU’s Africa
policies. It argues that China’s engagement has contributed to the fact that Africa has again
become a priority of the European political agenda.
The following two parts of this paper will provide an overview over the diverging
policies of China and the EU towards Africa. In order to better illustrate the different
approaches, the fourth chapter will provide a case study on Chinese and European projects
in Angola. The fifth section will analyze in how far China's influence has an effect on the
policies of the EU and whether China challenges the Europe's' normative power.

2. Normative power: The EU’s Africa Policy

Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical…It is perhaps a paradox to
note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions
of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.
(Rosecrance, in Manners, 2002, p. 238)

Generally, the European policy approach is based on core norms, such as peace, liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law, as well as ‘minor’ norms, which are
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (Storey,
2007¸ Manners, 2002, p. 243). These norms and values form the foundations of European
politics both on community level and on international level when it comes to cooperation
with third states. As a consequence, adherence to these norms is a condition for aid and
cooperation between the EU and African states. According to Manners (2002), the EU is a
normative power as it places the above-mentioned universal norms and principles at the
center of its relations with Member States and non-members.
Manners conception stresses that Europe has the ability to influence and to set
global opinions and norms through interaction with other governments (Storey, 2007). In
Manner’s words, the EU acts “to change norms in the international system and is also
4

committed to do so, in order to extend its norms into the international system” (Manners,
2002, p. 252). The latter motivation is described by the concept of transference. Discussing
the relationship between the EU and Africa, this normative idea plays a central role, as it
defines the terms by which Europe and Africa cooperate.

When the EU exchanges goods and trades with African countries or when it provides aid or
technical assistance, community norms and standards are basic conditions for cooperation.
As provided by the Cotonou Agreement2, the ACP3 countries are asked to promote human
rights, processes of democratization, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance
in exchange for aid and cooperation with the EU. As Lirong (2011) argues, this agreement
“can be understood as a 20-year socialization program” (p. 9) because it uses aid as an

2
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm
3
The group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states

5

economic incentive to uphold common norms and values, which corresponds with Manners
conception of normative power.
Based on Manners concept of normative power it can be argued that the relationship
between the EU and African states can be described as asymmetric or even paternalistic:
One the one side, there is the powerful EU which consists of highly developed and
industrialized states. On the other side there are the weaker African partners who have to
accept the rules set by the EU, if they want to benefit from aid and cooperation. The
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP countries, for
instance, have been criticized for being impressed upon African regions (Langan, 2011). With
the rise of China, however, African states have the chance to opt for an alternative partner
who offers cooperation, which comes almost without any conditions. The characteristics of
the Chinese model will be described in the following chapter.

3. Business instead of aid: China’s Africa-policy’

Africa, along with other ex-European colonies, has maintained close economic ties
with Europe. This relationship has been guided by two main assumptions. One is that
the arrangement would help to bring about development in the continent and the
other is that Africa has limited to no options in its choice of economic strategy.
Experience has shown, however, that the relationship has failed to bring about
development and current developments are opening up options for Africa to forge
new relationships. (Baregu, 2008, p. 99)

As a result of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 and the following crisis of China’s relations
with the West, African states became a high status on China’s foreign policy agenda. In the
subsequent years, the Chinese government rewarded those African countries that supported
China during this period with attractive development projects. In contrast to the asymmetric
Western approach towards Africa, China uses the rhetoric of ‘South-South’-cooperation. As
Kopiński et al. (2011) argue, “China’s leaders have avoided the calls for democracy and good
governance that the West ostensibly demands” (p. 129). Thus, China presents itself as an
equal partner, who wants to cooperate on eye-level for mutual advantage. By presenting
itself as the largest developing country in the world, it has been able to project an “identity
of being a post-colonial actor, closer to the needs of developing countries” (Carbone, 2011,
6

p. 207). According to Alden (2007), many African leaders view China, its system of
‘authoritarian capitalism’ and the fact that it successfully fought poverty at home without
following the prescriptions of the West as a success story and a role model. Indeed, China
has pursued a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of it partners and follows a
no-strings-attached approach of cooperation. This means a rejection of any type of
conditionality4 (ibid.). Consequently, China maintains good relations with all kinds of
governments regardless of their domestic or international standing (e.g. Angola, Zimbabwe
and Sudan).
According to Asche & Schüller (2008), China’s current global strategy can be summarized
as follows: First, China wants to promote its own (economic) development and its internal
stability. Second, China aims at improving its access to the international stage and to
international markets through a complex diplomatic strategy, which uses both foreign-policy
and development-policy strategies. With regard to Africa, the Chinese approach comprises a
public diplomacy strategy that focuses on the construction of public facilities (hospitals or
sports stadiums) and the fight against diseases such as malaria and HIV. The aim of this
strategy is to improve the public perception of China in Africa.
Furthermore, China creates economic incentives for African countries to export
commodities to China and heavily invests in transport infrastructure in order to facilitate
access to raw materials. In order to achieve cooperation China grants very low or interest-
free loans, or provides other development assistance inputs to African governments without
political conditions (Asche & Schüller, 2008, p. 16). An important feature of the Chinese
policy is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which provides an institutional
framework for relations with African countries. Since 2000, there have been three meetings
in which China succeeded in bringing all African states around one table. While the
government functions as a door-opener to the African continent, it is important to consider
that China’s engagement in Africa is more and more based on private businesses (Asche &
Schüller, 2008, p. 11). These companies operate on a profit-oriented basis without
development-policy concerns. This underlines the business-approach of the Chinese Policy.

4
except the ‘One China’ policy

7

Beside its economic and commercial objectives, China’s engagement in Africa aims at
substantiating its one-China policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, which has been very successful in the
recent years5. Furthermore, China has intensified its efforts to recruit South-South partners
in Africa for a community of interests in global issues, for instance the UN reform, World
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and reform and global governance processes (Asche
& Schüller, 2008, p. 14; Carbone, 2011, p.207)

4. Case Study: Angola

Having outlined the general differences between China’s and the EU’s policy-approaches,
this chapter will focus on the situation in Angola as a concrete example. Angola is one of the
largest African oil-producers in Africa and has significant unexploited oil-reserves. Being a
former Portuguese colony, the country traditionally has close contacts to Portugal, but also
to France and the United States, which have been Angola’s largest oil importers.
In addition to the economic relations with some Member States, the European
Commission (EC) uses development assistance, provided for within the framework of the
Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Joint EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, as a major
tool for bilateral relations. According to Hackenesch (2011), the EC is among the largest
traditional donors, providing € 214 million aid to Angola in the 10th European Development
Fund (EDF) for the period from 2008 to 2013. According to the EU-Angola Country Strategy
Paper (CSP), the key-areas of cooperation are governance, democracy, human rights and
support to economic and institutional reforms6. As Hackenesch (2011) points out, the EC
seeks to support good governance mainly through assistance and political dialogue and uses
positive conditionality by providing financial incentives. Additionally, in 2008 the EU sent an
election observer mission for the parliamentary elections.
Taking into account previous cooperation programs between Angola and the EU, the
results are rather mixed: projected launched within the 2002-2007 National Indicative
Program (NIP), have been heavily delayed or were not fully implemented or were even

5
Only four African countries now recognize Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé, Príncipe)
6
http://eeas.europa.eu/angola/index_en.htm

8

completely canceled. Thus, Hackenesch (2011) argues that cooperation between Angola and
the EU was characterized by substantial difficulties and did not reach several of its core
objectives because “the Angolan government was not willing to engage in dialogue on
governance issues” (p. 18). Generally, it can be said that the EC has “considerable difficulties
in establishing itself as a partner with the Angolan leadership” and entering an effective
dialogue on governance reforms (ibid., p. 22).
Regarding the relations between China and Angola, the picture looks quite different.
At the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002, the ruling elite in the country sought to
diversify its economic relations, which opened the door for the expansion of Chinese–
Angolan cooperation. According to Alves (2010), „relations have been marked by an
astoundingly rapid intensification of political and economic exchanges“ (p. 5), which is also
underlined by frequent state visits and continuously expanding trade flows between the two
countries. In 2006, Angola became China’s major trading partner, which is mainly due to the
large amount of oil imported by China. Indeed, China's thirst for oil can be considered as the
driving force of the relationship between the two countries. Since 2004, the Chinese state-
owned oil-company Sinopec has invested at least $3.6 billion in Angola (ibid., p. 9).
China’s co-operation with Angola is based on so-called concessional- or soft-loans,
that are granted by its major state-owned Chinese banks (Exim Bank7; CDB8) and other
sources, for instance the China International Fund (CIF). These loans are usually more
generous than standard commercial loans because financial risks are backed-up with oil-
exports. Furthermore, they are tied to the participation of contractors from China, who are
preferred over the local competition, when it comes to the realization of huge
infrastructure-projects, for instance the construction of oil-pipelines. However, cooperation
goes beyond oil: Since 2005 the government-run Exim bank provided $4.5 billion out of
which $2 billion were invested in projects aiming at improving energy and water supply,
education and health. Especially these investments have „certainly enhanced China’s
political capital, maximizing goodwill among the Angolan government and the general

7
Export-Import-Bank of China
8
China Development Bank

9

population vis-à-vis China“ (ibid, p. 15). Moreover, China pursues prestigious infrastructure
projects, such as the rehabilitation of three railway lines.

Yet, there are several problems with regards to the Chinese policy: The terms of
agreements with the Angolan government are in many cases extremely advantageous for
China9, while local companies struggle with the cheap competition from China. Moreover,
analysts reported that the “Chinese way of doing business” led to increased corruption and
undermined local efforts to increase transparency and good governance. According to van de
Looy (2006), Chinese money has also been used for government propaganda in the 2006
elections (p. 19). Generally, China’s financial assistance is criticized by the West for being
nontransparent and lacking a consistent framework because the ‘business instead of aid’-
approach falls into a blurred area between official development assistance (ODA) and
commercial loans. Further, Wissenbach (2007) argues that China “has not yet defined a
comprehensive development policy” (p. 13). As a result, its policy is sometimes very
inefficient. Finally, Chinese companies tend to bring their own laborers to work in Africa
instead of hiring local workers, which has increasingly negative effects on the local economy
(van de Looy, 2006, p. 26; (Alves, 2010, p. 24)).
The ‘Angola model’ is a typical example of the pragmatic nature of China’s assistance
and is designed to benefit both parties involved, fitting well into the ‘win-win co-operation’
and ‘mutual benefit’ rhetoric. Indeed, analysts come to the conclusion that China’s
engagement “is presumably positive for Africa”, (Asche & Schüller, p. 11) and has enhanced
Africa’s international bargaining position vis-à-vis the West. At the same time it has certainly
reduced the leverage of the Commission to engage with the Angolan leadership. Moreover,
it has to be taken into account that Angola was rewarded with a considerable second
cooperation program, although conditions were not met by the Angolan side. As Hackenesch
(2011) argues, this might be a direct result of increased completion by China, as the EC tries
“to „buy‟ itself into a dialogue with the government in light of China’s strong presence in the
country” (ibid., p. 23).

9
70% of the construction projects are to be assigned to Chinese companies. Domestic contractors can be
awarded only 30% of the projects covered by the loan (van de Looy, 2006, p. 19)

10

5. The ‘China effect’: Cooperation instead of conditionality

The China factor is altering the basic parameters on which the West’s relations with
Africa are based. In the context of the ongoing discussion on a strategic partnership
with the People’s Republic of China, the European Union (EU) is actively seeking a
constructive-critical dialogue with the country. (DIE, 2006, p.1)

The previously outlined characteristics of Chinese and European policy-approaches towards
Africa show that European policy-makers emphasized normative political aspects, most
importantly human rights and democracy. The Chinese policy, however, strongly focuses on
unconditional economic cooperation. As the example of Angola indicates, the latter
approach can be considered as increasingly successful because it meets the demand of
African politicians. As President Mogae of Botswana pointed out, he prefers “the attitude of
the Chinese to that of the West” (Carbone, 2011, p. 207). Likewise, Ugandan President
Museveni, stated:
“The Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our
conditions, and they make other people’s business their business. Whereas the
Chinese just deal with you, you represent your country, they represent their own
interests, and you do business”(Carbone, 2011, p. 207).

The emergence of China as a ‘non-traditional’ donor in Africa has had impacts on the EU’s
Africa-policy. According to Carbone (2011), Europe felt it’s pre-eminence on the African
continent challenged by China. Even if the level of foreign trade between China and Africa is
still relatively low, if compared to Western industrialized countries, foreign trade between
China and Africa has been developing rapidly since the end of the 1990s. Growth-rates of
recent years are unprecedented and the value of foreign trade had grown tenfold by 2006,
which is much faster than trade with Western countries (Asche & Schüller, 2008, p. 18f.).
This exponential development is likely to continue.

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Africa’s trade-partners

Trade between China and Africa

Source: Asche & Schüller, 2008, p. 19
According to Wissenbach (2007), the Europeans recognized that China’s increasing influence
strategically and effectively undermines their regional and local policies. In the light of
China’s effective and unconditional aid programs, the EU’s conditional approach appeared
unattractive to many African states. Consequently, Ling (2010) argues that the ‘Beijing
Model’ in Africa undermines Europe’s ”virtual monopoly of economic relations with Africa”
(Ling, 2010, p. 5). Finally, it was the China-Africa Summit held in 2006 that rang an “alarm
bell for several European leaders” (Carbone, 2011, p. 209) and led the EU to reconsider its
Africa-policy.
During the last years the EU has reacted to the increased political and economic
competition. Only a few weeks after the Chinese-African Summit in 2006, the EU concluded
that Africa is “an area of Key strategic interest to both the EU and China” and that Africa
should become a prominent issue on the EU’s political agenda (Carbone, 2011, p. 209). In
2007, the EU started a new initiative by adopting a “Joint Africa-EU Strategy” (JAES) and held

12

an EU-Africa Summit. Moreover, the launch of the “EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership” and
the “Governance Initiative” are seen as closely connected to China’s rise in Africa (Carbone,
2011, p. 210). The underlying theme of these reforms is a transformation of the relationship
between the EU and African states, which moved from the donor-recipient relationship to a
donor-partner countries relationship. This also meant that cooperation instead of
conditionality became more important (Lirong, 2011, p. 11). While norms and values, such as
human rights, democracy and rule of law are still central and guiding criteria of development
cooperation, the EU pointed out, that these points ‘should not be interpreted as conditions’
(ibid. p. 12).
As Berger and Wissenbach (2007) argue, the “EU has conceptually shifted away from
conditional aid towards the provision of political and financial incentives” (p. 10). Through
this new approach, the EU tries to find a way between unconditional support, as provided by
China and the patronizing approach model of Western development cooperation. Moreover,
Africa has effectively become an issue matter of relations between China and the EU. The EU
has sought to establish a trilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanism between the EU,
China and Africa. According to Lirong (2011) the motivation behind this plan was the
expectation that China would “gradually adapt its behavior and embrace European norms”
(p. 30). However, China and also African countries have reacted very reluctantly to this
proposal because such an initiative would lead to restriction rather than cooperation. Thus,
China continues to pursue a no-strings-attached policy and refuses to use foreign aid as a
means to interfere in recipient countries’ internal affairs (Carbone, 2011, p. 216).

6. Conclusion

As this paper has shown, the EU and China have their own policy-approaches towards Africa
based on an individual set of policy objectives: China tries to promote its own development
by gaining access to natural resources (e.g. oil) and new markets. It presents itself as an
equal business-partner, who wants to cooperate on eye-level and stresses mutual
advantages of cooperation with African countries. Thus, it pursues a no-strings-attached
model of cooperation, which includes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of it partners. The only condition China sets is support for the so-called One-China-policy.
13

In contrast, the EU’s policy towards Africa is based on the community’s normative
conception. As a normative power, the EU sets conditions for cooperation with African
countries, for example such as human rights, rule of law and good governance. As the case
study of the EU’s and China’s relations with Angola has shown, China has substantially
increased its economic and political activities in African countries. Only within a few years
Angola has become one of China’s major trading partners. This example indicates that China
has successfully established itself as alternative player on the continent. While African
leaders have criticized Europe for its patronizing policy, they have embraced cooperation
with China. And indeed, there is evidence that this win-win cooperation actually has positive
effects for Africa. At the same time, the EU realized the negative aspects of this
development, as the ‘Beijing Model’ in Africa undermines Europe’s traditionally important
role on the African continent. In fact, the example of Angola indicates that the availability of
an alternative economic and political partner challenges Europe’s normative power and
reduces the influence of the EU to engage with the Angolan leadership.
Furthermore, this paper has shown that China’s engagement in African countries has
had two side-effects: First, it contributed to the fact that Africa has again become a priority
of the European political agenda as the EU has reacted to the increased political and
economic competition. Secondly, Africa has also become an issue for EU-China relations.
However, the chances for a meaningful trilateral dialogue between China, the EU and Africa,
are rather low as China and also African states fear that such a mechanism would rather limit
their leverage. Finally, it remains to be seen how China’s engagement affects the
development of African states in the long run: In fact, the current African-Chinese
cooperation might involve negative externalities, such as corruption, environmental
pollution and unsustainable growth. If the awareness of these negative effects is becoming
more prominent, African leaders might reconsider relations with China and the EU.

14

References

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Alves, A. C. (2010). The Oil Factor in Sino–Angolan Relations at the Start of the 21st Century,
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Asche, H. & Schüller, M. (2007). China als neue Kolonialmacht in Afrika? Umstrittende
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Asche, H. & Schüller, M. (2008). China‘s Engagement in Africa – Opportunities and Risks for
Development, gtz

Baregu, M. (2008). Africa-China-EU Relations: A View from Africa, International Review,
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

Berger, B. & Wissenbach, U. (2007). EU-China Trilateral Development Cooperation –
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Carbone, M. (2011). The European Union and China‘s rise in Africa: Competing visions,
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DIE (2006). China’s Africa Policy: Opportunity and Challenge for European Development
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Ling, J. (2010). Aid to Africa: What can the EU and China Learn from Each Other? SAIIA China
in Africa Project Occasional Paper 56, South African Institute of International Affairs

Lirong, L. (2011). The EU and China‘s engagement in Africa: The Dilemma of Socialization,
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Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common
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Storey, A. (2006): Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24:3, 331-346

van de Looy, J, (2006), ‘Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership? ASC Working Paper
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