Containers at risk a review of 21,000 cloud environments

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CONTAINERS AT-RISK
A Review of 21,000 Cloud Environments

I. Executive Summary
II. Introduction
III. The Eroding Perimeter
IV. Open Management Interfaces and APIs
V. Kubernetes Specifics
VI. Recommendations for Container Security Best Practices
VII. FAQ
© Lacework 2018. All Rights Reserved.
Overview

Securing your workloads in public clouds requires a different approach than
that used for traditional data centers. The need to operate security at cloud
speed, respond to continuous change, adapt at scale, and operate with a new
operating model all require a dramatic shift in the type of security solution
required by today’s operation. In a world where APIs drive the infrastructure
and create ephemeral workloads, organizations can develop control over their
cloud security posture through real-time visibility, anomaly detection, and deep
understanding of the behaviors of users, resources, and connections.
The reality of the risks of operating workloads in the cloud is highlighted in this
research conducted by Lacework. In early June 2018, Lacework discovered
more than 21,000 container orchestration and API management systems on the
Internet, and these results highlight the potential for attack points caused by
poorly configured resources, lack of credentials, and the use of non-secure
protocols.
This report describes the risks and threats that can be created by deploying
workloads in public cloud without the proper security guardrails, security
services, and the systematic use of security best practices.
Note: there is an FAQ at the bottom of the report.
Summary of findings (downloadable infographic)
© Lacework 2018. All Rights Reserved. 1
I. Executive Summary

Over the last few years we have seen a dramatic rise in the use of containers
and container orchestration systems for the coordination and management of
cloud services. Among other things, containers allow for rapid deployment,
ephemeral workloads, and autoscaling of applications at scale. For
organizations that work in an agile way and deploy services continuously, it’s an
enormously popular piece of their infrastructure. Popular types of containers
include: Kubernetes, Docker Swarm, OpenShift, and Mesosphere.
There are typically two critical pieces to managing these systems. First is a web
UI and associated APIs. Secondly, an administrator dashboard and API are
popular because they allow users to essentially run all aspects of a container
cluster from a single interface. Access to the dashboard gives you top level
access to all aspects of administration for the cluster it is assigned to manage.
That includes managing applications, containers, starting workloads, adding and
modifying applications, and setting key security controls.
Here are some examples of these systems dashboards:
II. Introduction
Kubernetes Management UI

Marathon / Mesos
Red Hat OpenShift

Portainer
Swarmpit.io

Prior to public clouds, enterprises used to have something called a perimeter,
which operated much like something you would see on a Game of Thrones set. At
the risk of oversimplifying things, enterprises had their own castle to protect
enterprise assets and all things that wanted to come inside the castle had to
cross the drawbridge. Furthermore, IT and security owned the moat, in case
evildoers attempted to gain access without passing through the bridge.
Basically, winter was always imminent, but the moat did the trick.
Now imagine if someone had the keys to your datacenter: access to all servers,
privileged accounts, and administrator passwords on all servers. Then, consider
what would happen if they had all this but could operate their attack all from
the Internet, hiding behind proxy servers, VPN concentrators, and
compromised routers, essentially masking who they are and where they are
coming from. Basically, your data, your customer’s data, and the foundation on
which you’ve built your organization would be in major trouble.
III. The Eroding Perimeter
Swagger
Let’s be clear. We are BIG BELIEVERS in all things public cloud,
but we need to raise the bar, and raise it quick.

In the past there have been reports that revealed that some companies
accidentally left their computing resources open to the world with no username
and password and, in turn, were taken over by hackers with a motive of
deploying machines and code to perform cryptomining from the abused
infrastructure. This can certainly be costly, but a greater risk is that an outsider
gains the highest level of privileges to your cluster.
Research conducted by Lacework discovered more than 22,000 publicly
accessible management nodes connected to the Internet. These nodes are
essentially openings to these organization’s cloud environments to anyone with
basic skills at searching the web. Although the vast majority of these
management interfaces have credentials set up, there is little reason why they
should be world-accessible and are far more vulnerable than they should be.
Additionally, just by being open, you are potentially disclosing information that
can give attackers sensitive information on their targets. Within most
discovered systems, the company name could be derived from certificates and
hostnames even without access. These organizations, and the others who will
replicate their mistakes, are opening themselves up to brute force password
and dictionary attacks.
In order to identify these nodes, a combination of web crawling, Shodan, SSL
data mining, and some internal tools were used - all this data being available
from publicly-accessible sources.
Research Overview
Note: Lacework will not release any company information or
details on specifics around discovered hosts. Additionally, no
access was attempted to any of the nodes that were open.

22,672 OPEN ADMIN DASHBOARDS DISCOVERED ON INTERNET
95% HOSTED INSIDE OF AMAZON WEB SERVICES (AWS)
55% HOSTED IN AN AWS REGION WITH THE US (US-EAST MOST POPULAR)
> 300 OPEN ADMIN DASHBOARDS OPEN WITH NO CREDENTIALS
High Level Findings
Platforms Discovered
We discovered the following applications during our research:
●   Kubernetes
● Mesos Marathon
●   Swagger API UI
●   Red Hat Openshift
●   Docker Swarm:
             ○ Portainer
             ○ Swarmpit

During the research we noticed an alarming number of systems with no
authentication whatsoever. Some were clearly in the midst of being setup, but
some were in full production. In cases where full access was available, one can
perform operations like add and deploy their own applications, delete
infrastructure, change credentials, and potentially exfiltrate data.
Some example screenshots of management dashboards:
IV. Open Management Interfaces and APIs
Open Mesos Marathon Screenshot

Open Swagger Screenshot
Open Kubernetes Screenshot

Kubernetes, or “K8s” as it’s often referred, is by far the most popular and
fastest growing orchestration and container management system. It's
incredibly powerful and provides a great deal of value to developers because it
is optimized to support deployment of large scale stable infrastructure.
Although there are several new security features that are helping to secure
Kubernetes such as default SSL and default authentication, we focused on
Kubernetes due to the popularity of the platform. The general issues found
were:
● Open dashboards that were in the midst of being setup,
● Open dashboards with no authentication,
● Open dashboards that possibly could be brute forced, and
● Information disclosure of the organizations that have deployed Kubernetes.
In cases where having the management UI open to the world is intentional - and
it's unclear what the use case would be - administrators and security operators
for these companies should be aware that their exposure is transparent and
that it poses a huge potential for risk of their data and cloud infrastructure.
V. Kubernetes Specifics

Open Kubernetes Admin Dashboard
Kubernetes Admin Dashboard Authentication

Screenshot Showing Non-Trusted Certificate
Screenshot Showing Information Disclosure

Locations of Servers (from Shodan)
Top Organizations (from Shodan)
Our researchers also discovered what appeared to be a popular container
health check service which is part of the Kubernetes branch named healthz.
Healthz is described as follows:
"The exec healthz server is a sidecar container meant to serve as a
liveness-exec-over-http bridge. It isolates pods from the
idiosyncrasies of container runtime exec implementations."

Web screenshot of open container running Healthz
During our research, 38 servers running healthz live on the Internet with no
authentication whatsoever were discovered. AWS and Alibaba were the most
popular cloud platforms supporting this activity.
While it's unclear whether you can perform full remote code execution (it looks
like it could be set up), by default you can monitor workloads and even stop
them from running via their UI.

During our research we learned that there are a lot of different ways to manage
your containers, and that they are all incredibly flexible and powerful. With
each one you essentially have the keys to the castle from deployment,
discovery, deletion, and manageability.
We suggest that if you are a security professional and you don’t know you are
running a container orchestration system, you should definitely find out ASAP.
From there you need to determine the acceptable level of outside visibility and
the policy determined for access.
Additional recommendations:
Regardless of network policy, use MFA for all access;
Apply strict controls to network access, especially for UI and API ports;
Use SSL for all servers and use valid certificates with proper expiration and
enforcement policies;
Investigate VPN (bastion), reverse proxy or direct connect connections to
sensitive servers;
Look into product and services such as Lacework in order to discover, detect,
prevent, and secure your container services.
Configure your Kubernetes pods to run read-only file systems;
Restrict privilege escalation in Kubernetes;
Build a pod security policy.
Kubernetes specific recommendations:
VI. Recommendations for Container Security Best
Practices

Q: What is the threat announced?
A: Containers that are not secured with proper configurations and settings can
pose major risks that can turn into threats. We believe there is little reason to
leave your administration interface open to the world without a bastion jump,
VPN, or proxy ACL. More importantly, you may be running a vulnerable version
of Kubernetes which could lead not just a brute force attack but potentially an
exploit-based and often there are more services than the management
applications running. Lastly, we discovered hundreds of UI’s open to the world
with no credentials needed and also sites not running SSL.
Q: Am I safe if my organization requires secure passwords on our servers?
A: If you use MFA then yes, you are certainly more safe than having a weak
password. However you are still leaving yourself potentially open to
exploitation and information disclosure. We did not verify or validate if
companies were using MFA on their sites. Also, we discovered hundreds of sites
still using HTTP vs HTTPS and sending credentials in insecure methods.
Q: Why are you reporting this research?
A: Because we believe that organizations should actively evaluate the
configuration of their container orchestration systems for risks that could
potentially lead to a breach. In the case where admin access is compromised,
there is significant damage that could be done. This includes remote code
execution, abuse of services, and data destruction.
Q: How do I know if my company is at risk?
A: We are not releasing a list of IP addresses; doing so would be unethical and
could put organizations at risk. You can check however whether you are using
an orchestration system by looking into your AWS Logs. In particular you
should focus on open ports and services running. You can also do a free risk
assessment with our service http://www.lacework.com/free-trial. We will share
information to trusted security researchers through typical secure channels.
VII. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q: Do you know what companies are using these services and have this risk?
A: In many cases the certificates of the server name and the names of domains
and URLs have information that could lead to the companies. That said, we are
not tracking nor releasing any company names.
Q: Did you brute force any accounts or passwords, execute code, or configure
anything during this research?
A: Absolutely not. Such activities would be contrary to our mission and not
pertinent to the type of research we conduct.
Q: What cloud / datacenters did you discover where the workloads were
hosted?
A: In alphabetical order:
A100 ROW GmbH
Amazon.com
Digital Ocean
Gtd Internet S.A.
Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd.
Hetzner Online GmbH
Iliad-Entreprises
Microsoft Azure
Nine Internet Solutions AG
ONLINE SAS
OVH Hosting
OVH SAS
Tencent cloud computing
University of California at Berkeley
WorldStream B.V.
17© Lacework 2018. All Rights Reserved.

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© 2018 Lacework, Inc. Lacework and Polygraph are registered trademarks of
Lacework. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their
respective companies. Lacework reserves the right to change, modify,
transfer, or otherwise revise this publication without notice.

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