CSP Internal Threats
Hussein Mahgoob
Ahmed Ali El-Kosairy
Introduction
➢CERN (1) defines an insider threat as such:
A malicious insider threat ==
➢Organization
➢+
➢(current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner)
➢+
➢(Authorized access to an Organization's system )
Impact Area
Introduction

➢Example
 Edward Snowden (2)
 PRISM (2007)
 Right or Wrong ?!!
➢Something such as Watergate scandal(3)
Objective

➢How to protect your self from internal threats from Cloud
Service provider (CSP) perspective

➢How to protect your self from Internal threats (CSP) from user
perspective
Objective

●As a Client we are looking for privacy (please check previous
Presentation <Ahmed Nour >)

●As a CSP we are looking for defense in Depth.
➢What is DID ?
-Multilayer and technology of Security
Related Approaches

●Encryption
●Privilege and Authentication
●Security Policy
Our Approach

Using Combination of Security Intelligence systems
such as :
Data Loss Prevention

●Host level
●Network Level
●Formatted Based
●For CSP
Encryption
●For CSP and Client
●Try to use Multi layer of Encryption such as SFS for Linux and
EFS for Windows with any 3rd party(4).
DRM
●For CSP and Client.
●Data Right Management (DRM) based on PKI.
●Examples:
●Snap Chat
●Related News (5):
●Facebook Tried To Buy Snap chat For $3B.
●Snap chat may have rejected a $4 billion offer from
Google.
●Microsoft DRM.
●Apple Fair Play.
Apple Fair Play
Can We Trust CA,DRM,Security Algorithms!!
User Access Authentication
●For CSP and Client.
●Use Multi-factor authentication :
➢Something you know.
➢Something you have.
➢Something you are.

➢Two-man rule 0r Two-person integrity (TPI)
➢Examples : Nuke Bomb
And
●Security Architecture – Segmentation.
●Risk Management – Assessments (CSP perspective ).
➢Check on vacations.
➢Controls.
➢Mitigate Risk.
●Third Party Audits.
●Policy Enforcement.
Again Can We Trust CA,DRM,Security Algorithms !!!
Sony BMG DRM
• 2000 Napster Issue Shawn Fanning
• Music Companies “We will revenge”
• Sony BMG copy protection
• When inserted into a computer:
➢ the CDs installed one of two pieces of software
➢ which provided a form of digital rights management (DRM) by modifying the
operating system.
➢ Both programs could not be easily uninstalled.
➢ And they unintentionally created vulnerabilities that were exploited by
unrelated malware (6).

• rootkit scandal 2007 :)
ANSSI_CA

➢ANSSI:
Rogue digital certificates that had been issued by French
certificate authority ANSSI, who closely work with the
French Defense agency(7).
Cloud Service Provider (Csp) internal threats
RSA 4096-bit Crypto Analysis

(8)

Send Encrypted mails to you (He already know Plain text
and cipher text )
➢listen to frequency of your CPU by Microphone
➢Use low- and high-pass filters
➢Called acoustic signal Attack
➢ RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis(9)
Conclusion

We Need to apply DID on Client Level and Provider
Level
Conclusion
●Using Combination of Security Intelligence systems
such as :
➢DLP
➢Encryption (Multi layer of Encryption)
➢DRM
➢User Access
➢Security Architecture - Segmentation
➢Risk Management - Assessments
➢Third Party Audits
➢Policy Enforcement
➢And (FDM), etc. …......
But Remember everything came
with a price
References
(1)Cloud Security, The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013 Alliance ,
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top_threats/The_Notorious_Nine_Cloud_Computing_Top_Threats_in_2013.pdf
(2)Edward Snowden a 'hero' for NSA disclosures, Wikipedia founder says | World news. The Guardian (2013-11-25).,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/edward-snowden-nsa-wikipedia-founder,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden
(3)Watergate scandal,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal
(4)Rajesh Kumar Pal, Indranil Sengupta, Enhancing File Data Security in Linux Operating System, Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security,
2009. CICS '09. IEEE Symposium on, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4925089&queryText
%3DEnhancing+File+Data+Security+in+Linux+Operating+System+by+Integrating+Secure+File+System
(5)forbes, maybe snapchat is crazy to turn down 3b but was facebook nuts to offer it
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2013/11/14/maybe-snapchat-is-crazy-to-turn-down-3b-but-was-facebook-nuts-to-offer-it/
(6)Halderman, J. Alex, and Felten, Edward. "Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode" , Center for Information Technology Policy, Department of
Computer Science, Princeton University, 2006-02-14.,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/sonydrm-ext.pdf,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal
(7)The hacker news, fake google ssl certificates made in,
http://thehackernews.com/2013/12/fake-google-ssl-certificates-made-in.html
(8)Extremetech, researchers crack the worlds toughest encryption by listening to the tiny sounds made by your computers cpu,
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/173108-researchers-crack-the-worlds-toughest-encryption-by-listening-to-the-tiny-sounds-made-by-yourcomputers-cpu
(9)RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysisdt@infootnoteThe authors thank Lev Pachmanov for programming and
experiment support during the course of this research.dt@infootnote - acoustic-20131218.pdf,
http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/

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Cloud Service Provider (Csp) internal threats

  • 1. CSP Internal Threats Hussein Mahgoob Ahmed Ali El-Kosairy
  • 2. Introduction ➢CERN (1) defines an insider threat as such: A malicious insider threat == ➢Organization ➢+ ➢(current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner) ➢+ ➢(Authorized access to an Organization's system )
  • 4. Introduction ➢Example  Edward Snowden (2)  PRISM (2007)  Right or Wrong ?!! ➢Something such as Watergate scandal(3)
  • 5. Objective ➢How to protect your self from internal threats from Cloud Service provider (CSP) perspective ➢How to protect your self from Internal threats (CSP) from user perspective
  • 6. Objective ●As a Client we are looking for privacy (please check previous Presentation <Ahmed Nour >) ●As a CSP we are looking for defense in Depth. ➢What is DID ? -Multilayer and technology of Security
  • 7. Related Approaches ●Encryption ●Privilege and Authentication ●Security Policy
  • 8. Our Approach Using Combination of Security Intelligence systems such as :
  • 9. Data Loss Prevention ●Host level ●Network Level ●Formatted Based ●For CSP
  • 10. Encryption ●For CSP and Client ●Try to use Multi layer of Encryption such as SFS for Linux and EFS for Windows with any 3rd party(4).
  • 11. DRM ●For CSP and Client. ●Data Right Management (DRM) based on PKI. ●Examples: ●Snap Chat ●Related News (5): ●Facebook Tried To Buy Snap chat For $3B. ●Snap chat may have rejected a $4 billion offer from Google. ●Microsoft DRM. ●Apple Fair Play.
  • 13. Can We Trust CA,DRM,Security Algorithms!!
  • 14. User Access Authentication ●For CSP and Client. ●Use Multi-factor authentication : ➢Something you know. ➢Something you have. ➢Something you are. ➢Two-man rule 0r Two-person integrity (TPI) ➢Examples : Nuke Bomb
  • 15. And ●Security Architecture – Segmentation. ●Risk Management – Assessments (CSP perspective ). ➢Check on vacations. ➢Controls. ➢Mitigate Risk. ●Third Party Audits. ●Policy Enforcement.
  • 16. Again Can We Trust CA,DRM,Security Algorithms !!!
  • 17. Sony BMG DRM • 2000 Napster Issue Shawn Fanning • Music Companies “We will revenge” • Sony BMG copy protection • When inserted into a computer: ➢ the CDs installed one of two pieces of software ➢ which provided a form of digital rights management (DRM) by modifying the operating system. ➢ Both programs could not be easily uninstalled. ➢ And they unintentionally created vulnerabilities that were exploited by unrelated malware (6). • rootkit scandal 2007 :)
  • 18. ANSSI_CA ➢ANSSI: Rogue digital certificates that had been issued by French certificate authority ANSSI, who closely work with the French Defense agency(7).
  • 20. RSA 4096-bit Crypto Analysis (8) Send Encrypted mails to you (He already know Plain text and cipher text ) ➢listen to frequency of your CPU by Microphone ➢Use low- and high-pass filters ➢Called acoustic signal Attack ➢ RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis(9)
  • 21. Conclusion We Need to apply DID on Client Level and Provider Level
  • 22. Conclusion ●Using Combination of Security Intelligence systems such as : ➢DLP ➢Encryption (Multi layer of Encryption) ➢DRM ➢User Access ➢Security Architecture - Segmentation ➢Risk Management - Assessments ➢Third Party Audits ➢Policy Enforcement ➢And (FDM), etc. …......
  • 23. But Remember everything came with a price
  • 24. References (1)Cloud Security, The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013 Alliance , https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top_threats/The_Notorious_Nine_Cloud_Computing_Top_Threats_in_2013.pdf (2)Edward Snowden a 'hero' for NSA disclosures, Wikipedia founder says | World news. The Guardian (2013-11-25)., http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/edward-snowden-nsa-wikipedia-founder, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden (3)Watergate scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal (4)Rajesh Kumar Pal, Indranil Sengupta, Enhancing File Data Security in Linux Operating System, Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security, 2009. CICS '09. IEEE Symposium on, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4925089&queryText %3DEnhancing+File+Data+Security+in+Linux+Operating+System+by+Integrating+Secure+File+System (5)forbes, maybe snapchat is crazy to turn down 3b but was facebook nuts to offer it http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2013/11/14/maybe-snapchat-is-crazy-to-turn-down-3b-but-was-facebook-nuts-to-offer-it/ (6)Halderman, J. Alex, and Felten, Edward. "Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode" , Center for Information Technology Policy, Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, 2006-02-14., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/sonydrm-ext.pdf, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootkit_scandal (7)The hacker news, fake google ssl certificates made in, http://thehackernews.com/2013/12/fake-google-ssl-certificates-made-in.html (8)Extremetech, researchers crack the worlds toughest encryption by listening to the tiny sounds made by your computers cpu, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/173108-researchers-crack-the-worlds-toughest-encryption-by-listening-to-the-tiny-sounds-made-by-yourcomputers-cpu (9)RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysisdt@infootnoteThe authors thank Lev Pachmanov for programming and experiment support during the course of this research.dt@infootnote - acoustic-20131218.pdf, http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/