Historiography
Cuban Missiles Crisis
Based on research by Réachbha Fitzgerald,
Oxford University
Initial Responses
 Early commentators on
the crisis had an
American dominated
view.
 As documents have
become declassified the
Soviet and Cuban
perspective on the crisis
has opened up
Traditional Interpretations
 Many ‘traditional’ interpretations of the crisis come
from commentators and members of the U.S.
Administration at the time
 Largely based on personal recollection and reinforced
with available official documents (nearly always
American).
Traditional Interpretations
 Present the presence of missiles on Cuba as an intolerable
provocation:
 Kennedy had to respond to protect balance of power
 Kennedy had to convince USSR of American resolve
 Blockade is praised as optimal strategy
 Outcome of Crisis is a triumph for USA
Traditional Interpretations
Arthur Schlesinger
 ‘A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House’,
1965
 Special Assistant to JFK
 “American leadership…
dazzled the world.”
Traditional Interpretations
Robert Kennedy
 ‘Thirteen Days: A Memoir of
the Cuban Missile Crisis’,
1969
 US Attorney General 1961-
1964. Brother of John F.
Kennedy
Traditional Interpretations
 Soviet Accounts: only Khrushchev’s memoirs and letters
written to USA were available pre-glasnost.
 Other Soviet accounts from the 1960s and 1970s are
propagandistic
 Limited Soviet sources available.
 Khrushchev and USSR’s motives can often only be speculated
upon.
Revisionist Interpretations
 A common mistrust of JFK and an assertion he
brought the world closer to nuclear war
 More emphasis give to idea that the missiles were
placed on Cuba to defend Castro’s socialist regime
against an anticipated American invasion.
 Still had little access to Soviet or Cuban sources, so
tends to apportion blame to USA rather than explain
Soviet or Cuban motives
Revisionist Interpretations
T. G. Paterson
 ‘Bearing the burden: a critical look at JFK’s foreign
policy’ Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1974)
 “The President’s desire to score a victory.”
 “Kennedy gave Khrushchev no chance to withdraw
his mistake or to save face”
Post - Revisionist
Interpretations
 Use declassified documents
 Attempt to construct a holistic view
 Highlights the importance of CIA activity, from the
Bay of Pigs to Operation Mongoose
 Improves JFK’s reputation as a ‘dove’ and emphasises
later US (secret) agreement to remove missiles from
Turkey
Post - Revisionist Interpretations
John Lewis Gaddis
 ‘We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
History’ 1997
 “Two superpowers dominated the
post-1945 world; each often acted in
response to what the other had done.”
 Khrushchev as an impulsive believer in
supporting the Cuban revolution

Cuba historiography

  • 1.
    Historiography Cuban Missiles Crisis Basedon research by Réachbha Fitzgerald, Oxford University
  • 2.
    Initial Responses  Earlycommentators on the crisis had an American dominated view.  As documents have become declassified the Soviet and Cuban perspective on the crisis has opened up
  • 3.
    Traditional Interpretations  Many‘traditional’ interpretations of the crisis come from commentators and members of the U.S. Administration at the time  Largely based on personal recollection and reinforced with available official documents (nearly always American).
  • 4.
    Traditional Interpretations  Presentthe presence of missiles on Cuba as an intolerable provocation:  Kennedy had to respond to protect balance of power  Kennedy had to convince USSR of American resolve  Blockade is praised as optimal strategy  Outcome of Crisis is a triumph for USA
  • 5.
    Traditional Interpretations Arthur Schlesinger ‘A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House’, 1965  Special Assistant to JFK  “American leadership… dazzled the world.”
  • 6.
    Traditional Interpretations Robert Kennedy ‘Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 1969  US Attorney General 1961- 1964. Brother of John F. Kennedy
  • 7.
    Traditional Interpretations  SovietAccounts: only Khrushchev’s memoirs and letters written to USA were available pre-glasnost.  Other Soviet accounts from the 1960s and 1970s are propagandistic  Limited Soviet sources available.  Khrushchev and USSR’s motives can often only be speculated upon.
  • 8.
    Revisionist Interpretations  Acommon mistrust of JFK and an assertion he brought the world closer to nuclear war  More emphasis give to idea that the missiles were placed on Cuba to defend Castro’s socialist regime against an anticipated American invasion.  Still had little access to Soviet or Cuban sources, so tends to apportion blame to USA rather than explain Soviet or Cuban motives
  • 9.
    Revisionist Interpretations T. G.Paterson  ‘Bearing the burden: a critical look at JFK’s foreign policy’ Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1974)  “The President’s desire to score a victory.”  “Kennedy gave Khrushchev no chance to withdraw his mistake or to save face”
  • 10.
    Post - Revisionist Interpretations Use declassified documents  Attempt to construct a holistic view  Highlights the importance of CIA activity, from the Bay of Pigs to Operation Mongoose  Improves JFK’s reputation as a ‘dove’ and emphasises later US (secret) agreement to remove missiles from Turkey
  • 11.
    Post - RevisionistInterpretations John Lewis Gaddis  ‘We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History’ 1997  “Two superpowers dominated the post-1945 world; each often acted in response to what the other had done.”  Khrushchev as an impulsive believer in supporting the Cuban revolution