Damage Assessment: EU-Russia relations in crisis

Special Report
Damage Assessment:
EU-Russia relations in crisis
June 2017
Edited by:
Łukasz Kulesa
Ivan Timofeev
Joseph Dobbs

Special Report: EU-Russia Damage Assessment
Łukasz Kulesa, Ivan Timofeev Joseph Dobbs(eds.)
June 2017
This views expressed in each chapter of this report are those of the author or
authors alone. This report does not necessarily represent the view of the ELN,
RIAC or any of their members. The essays were written between January
and March 2017.

Table of Contents
About the Authors - Page 4
Introduction - Page 6
Łukasz Kulesa, Ivan Timofeev Joseph Dobbs
The polarisation of regional politics: The impact of the EU-Russia confrontation
on countries in the common neighbourhood - Page 9
David Cadier Samuel Charap
The Impact of EU-Russia tensions on the economy of the EU - Page 17
Erica Moret Maria Shagina
Three years of tension: Russia-EU economic cooperation challenged - Page 25
Sergey Afontsev
The impact of EU-Russia tensions on the politics of the EU and its Member
States: Insecurity and Resolve - Page 31
Joseph Dobbs
The impact of EU-Russia tensions on Russian politics - Page 39
Pavel Kanevskiy
2014: a watershed for the image of Russia among the citizens of EU Member
States - Page 47
Hanna Smith
The impact of tensions between the EU and Russia at the people-to-people
level - Page 55
Natalia Evtikhevich
Conclusions - Page 65

4 Damage Assessment: EU-Russia relations in crisis
About the Authors
Sergei Afontsev is a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Department Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO); Head of the Chair of the World Economy, Moscow
Lomonossov State University; Professor, MGIMO University. He holds a PhD in
economics.
David Cadier is an Associate at LSE IDEAS and a TAPIR Visiting Fellow at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs. He has previously worked at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
and as a Teaching Fellow at the London School of Economics. He holds a PhD from
Sciences-Po in Paris.
Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation in Washington,
DC. From November 2012 until April 2017, Charap was the Senior Fellow for Russia
and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Priorto joining the IISS,
he served at the U.S. Department of State as Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary
for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning
Staff, covering Russia and Eurasia. From 2009-2011, Charap was Director for Russia
and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress. He holds a DPhil (PhD) from the
University of Oxford.
Joseph Dobbs is a Research Fellow at the European Leadership Network in London.
Dobbs is also co-chair of the Economic Working Group of the Younger Generation
Leaders Network (YGLN). He joined the ELN in 2014 following postgraduate study at
the University of Oxford. He has previously worked for the European External Action
Service and in domestic politics in the United Kingdom.
Natalia Evtikhevich is a program manager at the Russian International Affairs
Council (RIAC) responsible for projects on Russia’s relations with the EU, United
States, and Latin America as well as projects on Euro-Atlantic security. She has a
PhD in international relations from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences.
Pavel Kanevskiy is an associate professor of political science and vice dean at
the Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) Faculty of Sociology. He is an
EASI Hurford Next Generation Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, focusing on EU-
Russia relations. He holds a PhD in political science from Moscow State University.

About the Authors 5
Kanevskiy is a member of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic
Security (YGLN).
Łukasz KulesaisResearchDirectorattheEuropeanLeadershipNetwork.Previously,
he worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and between 2010–2012 as Deputy
Director of the Strategic Analyses Department at the National Security Bureau, a
body providing aid and support to the President of the Republic of Poland in executing
security and defence tasks.
Erica Moret is Senior Researcher at the Programme for the Study of International
Governance (PSIG) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva, and author of various publications on sanctions, including on
Russia, Iran, Syria, North Korea and Cuba as well as on EU foreign and security
policy. She coordinates and chairs the Geneva International Sanctions Network and
has participated in EU and UN taskforces on the same subject. She holds a DPhil
(PhD) from the University of Oxford.
Maria Shagina is a Researcher at the Geneva International Sanctions Network
(GISN). Maria received a joint PhD degree in Political Science from the University
of Lucerne and the University of Zurich (NCCR Democracy). Her PhD dissertation
focused on the Europeanisation of party politics in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
and international aid assistance to political parties. Funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation, Maria spent 9 months as a PhD visiting fellow at the Centre for
Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, University of Birmingham. In 2012, she
was a recipient of the Swiss Government Excellence Scholarship for her research
stay at the Institute of Political Science (University of Bern).
Hanna Smith is a researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute at the University of Helsinki
and editor-in-chief of Aleksanteri Insight. She is an expert on Russian foreign policy
as well as Russian domestic policy trends that impact upon Russia’s foreign relations.
In 2001-02 she was a visiting researcher at the University of Birmingham, and in
2006 at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ivan Timofeev has been a Director of Programs at the Russian International
Affairs Council (RIAC) since 2011. Timofeev also leads the “Contemporary State”
programme at the Valdai Discussion Club. Before joining RIAC, Ivan was the Head
of the Analytical Monitoring Center at MGIMO-University (2009-2011) – a research
and educational branch of the Russian MFA. Ivan was awarded a doctoral degree in
Political Science at MGIMO-University in 2006.

Introduction
The spring and summer of 2014 brought profound change in the character of the
relationship between the European Union and Russia. The sequence of decisions
which alteredthe pre-2014 status quo weretaken inthe context ofthe fast-developing
crisis in and around Ukraine, and were meant to affect the policy calculus of the
“other side”. Yet the choices made in 2014 set EU-Russia relations on a new course,
one that is much more difficult to navigate than anyone could have anticipated.
Contrary to what many predicted, hoped or feared, EU solidarity over Russian
sanctions has not collapsed, and Russia has not changed its policy on Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine. What started as a series of tactical responses has since then been
consolidated in the EU and Russia’s strategic documents and deeply impacted the
views of both sides towards the other.
Important questions still remain: will tensions pass and will we see resumption of
work on building a cooperative EU-Russia relationship? Or will the 2014-17 period
be remembered rather for the emergence of a new model of bilateral relations,
significantly different in character and intensity?
To help answer these questions, this special report brings together contributions
from a group of distinguished Western and Russian experts.1
The authors focus
on specific aspects of the new reality of EU-Russia relations, as it has emerged
during the last three years of ongoing tensions and bitter confrontation. As editors,
we have identified three areas in which the changes seem most profound: the
economy, the politics and “the people” (the attitude of the publics towards each
other, people-to-people contacts, etc). For each of these areas, Russian experts
present and assess developments inside their own country, while Western authors
describe the situation at the EU level and in selected European Union countries. We
hope that such ‘pairings’ provide readers with thought-provoking material and will
allow readers to not only compare how the same developments are seen on both
sides of the new divide, but also to contrast different approaches taken by individual
experts to the same topic.
To frame the picture, this collection includes an essay devoted to the impact of
the 2014-17 tensions in EU-Russia relations on the countries in the shared
1 The essays writtten in this collection were completed in the first three months of 2017 and
do not necessarily take into account events thereafter.

Introduction7
neighbourhood area, including Ukraine. We should also note that, as the focus of the
volume is on EU-Russia relations, analysis of the military aspect of the Russia-West
confrontation, including changes of national military postures and developments in
NATO-Russia relations, is absent from this collection.
Chapter one, written by David Cadier and Samuel Charap, opens our collection
by explaining the impact of EU-Russia tensions on countries in the common
neighbourhood. Cadier and Charap argue that tensions have consolidated the rigidity
and lack of nuance in both sides’ approaches. They also argue that countries in the
region have prioritised the maintenance of power through playing both sides against
each other above much needed reform.
In chapters two and three authors address the economic situation between the EU
and Russia. For the EU, Erica Moret and Maria Shagina outline the unprecedented
unity of the EU on sanctions towards Russia and demonstrate that their economic
impact, and that of Russian countermeasures, have been largely manageable. Sergey
Afontsev, offering a Russian perspective, argues that for Russia sanctions and
countermeasures have had an economic impact but have neither been the primary
economic concern for Moscow nor enough to force a change the in Kremlin’s policy.
Chapters four and five address the political implications of EU-Russia tensions.
The political implication for the EU, argues Joseph Dobbs has been a challenge to
the bloc’s unity, values and relevance, he writes that the response of the EU and
its Member States means that President Putin has probably ‘lost’ Europe. From
a Russian perspective, Pavel Kanevskiy argues that Russia’s European vector has
been challenged and that tensions have begun to be institutionalised, but no other
path is viable for Moscow.
Chapters six and seven consider the impact on people-to-people relations between
the EU and Russia. Hanna Smith writes that, in the EU, trust of Russia has suffered
a blow unlike anything seen since the Cold War, although negative perceptions of
Russia are focused primarily at the state rather than the people. Natalia Evtikhevich
outlines in detail how the downturn in relations has impacted people-to-people
relations from a Russian perspective, arguing that while many areas have retained
good levels of cooperation, public opinion has turned significantly against the EU.
ThevolumehasbeenpreparedasajointinitiativeoftheEuropeanLeadershipNetwork
(ELN) and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), two organisations which
have cooperated before on a number of projects aimed at analysing and offering
recommendations on the state of relations between Russia, the EU and NATO.
The views presented by individual authors do not necessarily reflect the positions

of either of the organizations or its members. We acknowledge that a variety of
opinions and divisive views exist about the causes of the current crisis in EU-Russia
relations, especially about the responsibility for developments in Ukraine. The aim
of this volume is not to focus on this particular crisis, assign blame or to agree on
its interpretation, but rather to evaluate the consequences of the processes set
in motion in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 (or, as many would claim, much
earlier) for the future of Russia and the EU.
This special report, coming some three years since EU-Russia relations began to
decline significantly, is offered as a resource for readers to evaluate the implications
of the crisis in relations. Importantly, we hope that readers can learn from the side-
by-side analyses of authors from both sides of the growing divide. Moreover, we
hope that our choice of topics shows both the severe and less severe implications.
Readers may, for example, be surprised to learn that the economic impact of
sanctions is not as severe as some may think, while others may be concerned to
learn just how estranged the EU and Russia are becoming politically and socially.
The damage done is serious, and regardless of who is to blame for it both sides have
an interest in improving relations. We hope this report can help in this endeavour.

David Cadier Samuel Charap 9
The Polarisation of Regional Politics: The impact of
the EU-Russia confrontation on countries the common
neighbourhood
David Cadier Samuel Charap
The roots and principal manifestations of the current crisis in EU-Russia relations
have to do, above all, with contestation in the common neighbourhood. The geo-
economic competition between the two actors took a new turn in the early 2010s,
as Brussels and Moscow launched rival trade integration platforms for countries
in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and, for Russia, Central Asia (the Eastern
Partnership or EaP, and the Eurasian Economic Union or EEU, respectively). More
than simply securing trade positions or gaining new markets, the objective for the
EU and Russia was to attempt to shape these countries’ economic, administrative
and political structures to favour their own commercial and security interests.
This approach to region-building competition put strains on those countries in the
region which are, for the most part, ill-governed, internally divided, and structurally
dependent on both the EU and Russia.
The events in Ukraine cast a dramatic light on this contest and, at the same time,
escalated it radically. Tensions around the signing of an Association Agreement
(AA) between Brussels and Kyiv were the initial spark for the protests that led to the
Maidan Revolution. It is important to note, however, that the AA episode was just
the spark; it was the weakness of Ukraine’s state that transformed a small protest
movement into a revolution. Specifically, it was the unjust, corrupt and oligarchic
nature of the Yanukovych government which was the main cause of popular support
for the Maidan. By the same token, it was not the AA but the fall of Yanukovych that
prompted Russia to intervene militarily in Crimea and support armed groups in the
east with the intention of blocking Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. In other words,
while the geo-economic competition was an important trigger, it was Ukraine’s
domestic political situation coupled with Moscow’s determination to prevent it from
decisively moving towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, together with the Maidan
Revolution’s ousting of Yanukovych which were more central to transforming the
situation into a diplomatic crisis and the on-going armed conflict.
The Ukraine crisis seems to have reinforced the tendency to approach the region
through a binary geopolitical lens, which is detrimental to political and economic
reform. Both Russia and the EU tend to paint black and white pictures of the region.
Not only does the reality on the ground not correspond with these pictures, but the
actors’ respective policies do not have the potential to transform the region along
those lines. Worse, this binarization of regional politics exacerbates internal divides

in the countries of the common neighbourhood and allows elites to instrumentalise
competition among external actors to their benefit.
Structural impact on regional politics: not a clash between two blocs
The EU and Russia, byadoptingtheirincompatible geo-economic offers and divergent
geopolitical orientations, present the countries of the common neighbourhood with
a dilemma.2
Neither, however, has the means to fully deliver on what they promise.
The EU’s bureaucratic logic runs aground on geopolitical realities, while Russia’s
geopolitical fixation undermines the credibility of its economic initiatives.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is an internally driven, bureaucratic, and
non-strategic construct.3
Its overarching aim is to stabilize the EU’s periphery by
exporting the EU’s internal model, ratherthan risk seeing the periphery destabilize the
EU. It was conceived more as an alternative to membership than as a steppingstone
to it. The EaP, launched in 2009, mainly regionalised the ENP’s instruments. Yet, in
spite of its modest policy framework and largely defensive rationale, the EaP has
often been accompanied by disproportionately ambitious rhetoric of two different
sorts: a transformational one from representatives of the EU institutions and a
geopolitical one from some member states’ officials.
The EU has been hoping to reproduce the transformative power it once wielded over
Central Europe with the enlargement process but without offering membership.
To be accepted by all member states, the EaP had to be limited to an incremental
and highly procedural program of approximation with EU norms and standards. It
is important to underscore here the difference between the AA and membership; if
the EU truly wanted to ‘expand’, it would offer Ukraine and the other EaP countries
a membership perspective.
2 There is, for instance, an incompatibility between the Russia-led EEU and the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) offered by the EU on the issue of tariffs. As a
customs union, the EEU requires its members to have common tariffs towards all external actors
(including the EU) while the point of signing a DCFTA is precisely to establish privileged bilateral
tariffs with the EU. Had both actors’ regional offers remained at the level of free trade agreements
(eg DCFTA and CIS free trade agreement), countries of the common neighbourhood could have
engaged in both – Serbia currently has free-trade agreements with both the EU and Russia.
3 David Cadier, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU–Russia Competition in the
Shared Neighbourhood and the Ukraine Crisis ”, Global Policy, Vol. 5, Issue s1, October 2014

This harsh reality can be contrasted with the narrative claiming that the EaP is
an instrument in a geopolitical battle as a means to contain Russia’s influence.4
Although representatives of EU institutions have never used this rhetoric, the
behaviour of EU leaders at certain junctures suggested that they also engaged in
geopolitical thinking; for instance, they relaxed previously set conditions for Ukraine
to sign the Association Agreement in order to incentivize Yanukovych. In addition,
some advocates of the EaP portrayed it as a means to push Russia’s influence away
from their own borders and thus reinforce their own security.5
Framing EU policy in these terms does not correspond with the reality of the EU’s
actual capabilities and sends the wrong signal to countries of the neighbourhood
about European determination to “prevail” over Russia. The EU’s transformative
power is real but diffuse and, therefore, difficult to use instrumentally.6
Through the
EaP, the EU offers economic benefits but cannot pretend to be able to protect the
countries of the neighbourhood from Russian influence. The call from a prominent
Ukrainian expert in April 2013 for the EU to, “stop with the unnecessary rhetoric
about competition over Ukraine with Russia”, “pause the enlargement debate” and
“deliver a clear message to Ukraine”, remains valid.7
4 For instance, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, whose country was holding the EU Council
Presidency at the time, characterized the AA with Ukraine as a “geopolitical process”. Judy Dempsey,
‘The Kremlin Tries Charm to Counter the EU’, The New York Times, 5 August 2013. Most recently,
in mainstream Western media, the same Agreement was described as a “a bulwark against Russian
aggression” and the visa-free regime as a way “to help [countries of the post-soviet space] as they
try to move away from Moscow’s orbit”. ‘Dutch threaten to sink EU-Ukraine trade and security deal’,
The Financial Times, 8 December 2016; ‘EU unblocks visa-free travel for Ukraine, Georgia’, Reuters,
8 December 2016.
5 ‘Never again do we want to have a common border with Russia,’ the Polish president
Bronisaw Komorowski reportedly said to Chancellor Merkel in October 2013 when the tensions
around the Association Agreement were mounting. Christiane Hoffmann et al., ‘Summit of Failure:
How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine, Part 2: Four Thousand Deaths and an Eastern Ukraine
Gripped by War’, Spiegel Online, 24 November 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
war-in-ukraine-a-result-of-misunderstandings-between-europe-and-russia-a-1004706-2.html.
6 Academic field research show that policy change induced by the EU is uncontrolled, sector-
specific and independent of the degree of interdependence with the EU. See for instance: Tanja
Börzel and Julia Langbein (eds), Convergence without Accession? Explaining Policy Change in the
EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, London: Routledge, 2014.
7 Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, ‘Why does Ukraine matter to the EU?’, Carnegie Europe, 16 April
2013.

Russia, too, seems to continue to nurture illusions about its ability to score a lasting
geopolitical win in the common neighbourhood and to integrate it economically. Yet,
contrary to the opinions of both its champions and its critics, the EEU is neither a
new version of the EU nor of the USSR. It is a modern, ambitious trade integration
platform but one that faces significant imbalances and has obvious shortcomings in
its implementation. Most importantly, by attempting to turn the EEU into a foreign
policy instrument, Moscow has been undermining its own creation. Armenia was
pressured into joining but has been an unenthusiastic member, while Kyrgyzstan was
allowed to join in spite of its weak economy and porous border with China. Russia’s
attempt to politicize the EEU triggered the resistance of Belarus and Kazakhstan:
they rejected, for instance, its demand to impose common trade sanctions on the
West and Ukraine. More crucially, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine increased Belarus’
sensitivity about its political sovereignty, and thus decreased its disposition towards
economic integration.8
The objective of preventing countries of the neighbourhood from adhering more
closely to the EU seems to have been a central driver of Russian policy. While Russia
was content with Azerbaijan’s decision to stay out of both of the AA and the EEU,
Moscow did use economic coercion to deter Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia from
signing AAs. By resorting to coercive means in this endeavour (including the use
of military force as well as economic measures), Russia not only alienated those
countries’ elites and jeopardized the prospect of seeing them join its own regional
framework but also greatly exacerbated the zero-sum character of regional politics.
Neitherthe EU norRussia will be ableto constitute cohesive, unitaryand impermeable
blocs at their borders. The region simply does not fit their binary categorisations.
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have signed free-trade agreements with the EU
while Belarus and Armenia are members of Russia’s EEU. Yet, this does not mean
that their governments definitively fall under the ‘sphere of influence’ of one or the
other power. Countries of the entre-deux have diverse and complex linkages with
both external actors. Structural dependencies, internal political divides, separatism
and the potential benefits of playing the EU and Russia against one another mean
that they cannot or will not totally and definitively swing in one direction or the other.
8 As witnessed by the current tensions between the two countries, which led to the re-
establishing of the border controls that the EEU had suppressed. See: ‘Belarus’s Lukashenko slams
Russia over border controls’, Financial Times, 3 February 2017.

Belarus sees in its EEU membership both a means to extract subsidies from Moscow
and an opportunity to turn itself into a hub for trade with the West.9
Armenia is
cautiously negotiating with Brussels a separate framework agreement and, quite
interestingly, its EEU membership has not prevented it from undertaking greater
convergence with EU norms.10
Kyiv, despite the antagonism generated by the
annexation of Crimea and the war in the east, will need to find a modus vivendi
with Moscow to re-establish commercial and energy relations, as their rupture
has dramatically worsened Ukraine’s economic woes. In Georgia, the current
government has adopted a much less confrontational position towards Russia than
its predecessor. Moldova has recently elected a President who has vowed to scrap
the AA with the EU, but he came to power in an election that was much less about
geopolitical association than it was about corruption.11
Throughout the region, data shows that there has been little correlation between
foreign policy orientation, quality of governance and democratic reforms.12
Approaching the common neighbourhood though a binary geopolitical lens has led to
suboptimal policies that provide incentives for regional elites to instrumentalise this
rivalry.
Domestic Impact: how the EU-Russia competition undermines reform13
States of the region all suffer, to varying degrees, from a similar set of post-Soviet
pathologies: dysfunctional institutions of modern governance; partially reformed
economies that lack functioning markets; weak or absent rule of law; ‘patronal’
politics based on personal connections and dependence rather than ideology or
coherent programmes14
; pervasive corruption and a close link between political
9 Balázs Jarábik and Anaïs Marin, ‘Belarus’, in David Cadier (ed.) The Geopolitics of Eurasian
Economic Integration, LSE IDEAS Special Report 19, London School of Economics, June 2014.
10 Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The
Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation,” Journal of European Integration 37, no. 4 (June 7,
2015): 491–507.
11 Dan Peleschuk, ‘Blame Corruption and Misrule, Not Geopolitical Rivalry, for Moldova’s
Problems’, World Politics Review, 8 November 2016.
12 Florence Gaub and Nicu Popescu, ‘The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey’, Chaillot
Paper 136, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 17 December 2015, pp. 41-61.
13 This section is draws on Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine
Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2017), chapter
4.
14 See Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

power and control of major financial and industrial assets. Many factors contribute
to the endurance of these pathologies. The contest between Russia and the West,
while by no means the only one, did feed regional dysfunction in important ways.
Principally, it has helped sustain, in many of these countries, what Joel Hellman
termed a ‘partial reform equilibrium’, that is, a situation in which economic gains
are concentrated among a small group of “winners” who use their power to “block
further advances in reform that would correct the very distortions on which their
initial gains were based”. 15
Russian and Western willingness to subsidise political loyalty has fed the partial
reform equilibrium. For fear of “losing” its neighbour to Western influence, Russia
pours money into Belarus through waivers of oil-export tariffs and below-market
gas prices; it was willing to do the same for Ukraine under Yanukovych. The West,
for its part, despite its stated policy of linking assistance to meaningful reform, has
supported new IMF programmes for Ukraine ten times since independence; all
previous ones had been suspended because Kyiv did not implement the required
reforms. The IMF, within 18 months of signing the current one, had to amend its by-
laws, at Western governments’ insistence, to be able to continue dispensing funds.
Similarly, corruption-ridden Moldova would surely have gone bankrupt more than
once without its EU lifeline.16
These financial infusions, spurred on by the regional
contest, gave governing elites the “no-strings-attached” cash necessary to put off
implementing structural reforms.
Geopolitically binary policies also exacerbated pre-existing political and ethnic divides
in several of the EaP states. In Ukraine, although Russia’s intervention changed the
dynamic somewhat, important regional schisms remain.17
In Moldova, the EU-Russia
contestation has fuelled separatism among the Gagauz, a self-governing Turkic
minority that organized a (disputed) plebiscite in favour of joining the EEU. 18
The
Transnistrian authorities have expressed the same desire, while Russian officials,
15 Joel Hellman, ‘Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions’,
World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2, 1998. p. 233
16 See: Andrew Higgins, ‘Moldova, Hunting for Missing Millions, Finds Only Ash’, New York
Times, 4 June 2015,
17 See polling in Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, ‘The Ukrainian People on the Current Crisis’,
Public Consultation Program at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of
Maryland Report, March 2015,. http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/ukrainian-people-current-
crisis
18 See ‘TsIK Gagauzii obnarodoval okonchatel’nye itogi referenduma o budushchei sud’be
avtonomii’, TASS, 5 February 2014, http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/940951.

who often use the breakaway province as leverage, have implicitly threatened
Moldova that signing the AA could jeopardize any future reunification.19
In Georgia, there have been similar differences in opinion between the separatist
regions and the rest of the country. 20
Even before the 2008 war, these rifts
bedevilled activities to reconcile grievances stemming from the conflicts of the early
1990s. Today, Russia’s determination to prevent Tbilisi from restoring control over
the breakaway regions prevents any such activities from even getting off the ground.
The tussle between the outside powers has also warped party politics and supplanted
democratic discourse with demagoguery. In Moldova and Ukraine, parties and
leaders have declared themselves pro-European to capitalise on popular desire
for good government, which many of their citizens associate with the EU. When
in power, however, many have proven to be as corrupt and incompetent as their
so-called pro-Russian opponents. More generally, elites of the region have often
sought to take advantage of the EU-Russia contest to divert attention away from
reforms. When geopolitical and geo-economic conflict is at the top of the agenda,
other problems fall by the wayside.
When the contest is particularly intense, Western policymakers seem ready to
deliberately downplay human rights and democracy-related problems for fear of
pushing countries into Russia’s embrace. Since the Ukraine crisis, the states of the
region have had more leverage with the West in this regard. The EU has accelerated
its offer to these countries, even though “their compliance with the rules and norms
promoted by the West [has] not meaningfully changed or [has] in some cases even
decreased”.21
Belarus was a case in point. In February 2016, the EU rolled back
sanctions on President Lukashenko and his coterie, as well as on several state-
controlled firms. EU officials have admitted that, in doing so, they ignored Minsk’s
non-compliance with Brussels’ stated requirements regarding human rights, by
reason that Belarus had become a ‘battleground of powers’.22
19 ‘Rogozin Warns Moldova on Relations’, The Moscow Times, 4 September 2013. https://
themoscowtimes.com/articles/rogozin-warns-moldova-on-relations-27369
20 Compare for instance: International Republican Institute, ‘Public Opinion Survey Residents
of Georgia, March–April 2016’; and Toal and O’Loughlin, ‘How People in South Ossetia, Abkhazia
and Transnistria Feel about Annexation by Russia’.http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/
georgia_2016.pdf.
21 Nelli Babayan, ‘The In-Betweeners: The Eastern Partnership Countries and the Russia–
West Conflict’, 2015–16 Paper Series, Transatlantic Academy, April 2016, p. 1, http://www.gmfus.
org/file/8150/download.
22 EU officials cited in Ibid., p. 13.

Geopolitical thinking weakens the EU’s ability to push the region’s governments to
reform, while Russia, with its own severe political and economic reform challenges
at home and its prioritization of geopolitics in its dealings with these states, cannot
be counted on to support or encourage reforms in its neighbourhood. Soft-pedalling
criticism of rulers who pledge fealty also feeds a widespread belief that public
censure regarding human rights, democracy or reform is merely an instrument to
punish disloyalty. Inconsistencies in the airing of such critiques across countries or,
over time, in particular countries, undercuts those officials who do speak out about
abuses or push their interlocutors to reform. It is easier for the latter to brush off
such concerns if they receive mixed messages or can point to double standards.
By treating the EaP countries as spoils to be won, the EU also gives all the region’s
leaders a trump card against almost any expression of disapproval: the threat of
turning towards Moscow. In the case of Ukraine post-2014, where such a threat
is no longer credible, on the logic that Ukraine cannot be allowed to fail, Western
states have been reluctant to withhold public statements of support and financial
assistance. The elite in Kyiv knows it and, in the words of a European diplomat,
tends to “abuse that knowledge”.23
Conclusion
While the regional contest between the EU and Russia is doing damage to the
neighbouring countries themselves, neither the EU nor Russia can hope to prevail
over the other. . Rather than leading to a genuine reconsideration, the Ukraine crisis
has consolidated the rigidity and lack of nuance of their approaches. If we are to
move past the current deadlock, it is high time for protagonists on both sides to
stop seeing their policies for what they are not, and start seeing the region in all its
complexity.
23 Quoted in Joshua Yaffa, ‘Reforming Ukraine after the Revolution’, New Yorker, 5 September
2016, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/reforming-ukraine-after-maidan.

Erica Moret Maria Shagina 17
The impact of EU-Russia tensions on the economy of the
EU
Erica Moret Maria Shagina
Since March 2014, the EU has shown unprecedented unanimity in the imposition and
maintenance of its sanctions vis-à-vis Moscow’s involvement in the crisis in eastern
Ukraine, and its role in the annexation of Crimea, deemed illegal under international
law. This united approach has been maintained despite divergent national interests
and commercial relations with Russia and notwithstanding Russia’s high integration
with the global economy and ability to retaliate with countersanctions. The measures,
imposed with the stated aims of ceasing hostilities, negotiating and implementing
a peace agreement and upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity, have included
restrictions on individuals (including asset freezes and visa bans) and sectoral
sanctions (including finance, energy and defence).24
Costs
Before sanctions were imposed, Russia ranked as the EU’s third largest trade
partner, providing a third of its energy needs.25
In turn, the EU was Russia’s main
trading partner, supplying, for example, just under a tenth of Russian agricultural
imports.26
In 2014, exports from the EU to Russia declined by 12.1% and from Russia
to the EU by 13.5%, alongside a decline in the total trade value from EUR 326 billion
to EUR 285 billion.27
It is challenging, if not almost impossible, to pinpoint direct impacts of sanctions on
the economies of the target or the sender, because of the difficulty of establishing
causality. Sanctions do not operate in a vacuum; other political and economic
24 Moret, Erica, Biersteker, Thomas, Giumelli, Francesco, Portela, Clara, Veber, Maruša,
Bastiat-Jarosz, Dawid and Bobocea, Cristian (2016). The new deterrent? International sanctions
against Russia over the Ukraine crisis: Impacts, costs and further action. Programme for the
Study of International Governance, Graduate Institute, Geneva. 12 October. Retrieved from: http://
graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/The%20
New%20Deterrent%20International%20Sanctions%20Against%20Russia%20Over%20the%20
Ukraine%20Crisis%20-%20Impacts,%20Costs%20and%20Further%20Action.pdf
25 Ibid.
26 See data on EU Agri-Food exports in http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban/
pdf/exports-data-by-ms_en.pdf.
27 Ibid.

drivers can be equally, if not more, important.28
Although some parts of the EU
have been impacted more than others, the overall EU economy appears to have
resisted the negative impacts of reduced commercial ties with Russia since 2014.29
This is probably due to EU subsidies being paid to the worst affected sectors, trade
redirection to new markets, and increased purchasing power linked to lower global
oil prices.30
The European Commission estimated costs to the EU at EUR 40 billion
(or -0.3% of the EU’s GDP) in 2014, and EUR 50 billion (-0.4% of EU GDP) in 2015.31
A number of potentially lucrative European deals were put on hold or cancelled due
to the sanctions. However, new markets were found, for many products; for example,
France cancelled the sale of two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia but later sold
them to Egypt.32
There have also been claims by Moscow that European products
have been re-packaged and exported to Russia via Belarus, Kazakhstan and the
Balkans, leading, among other measures, to a temporary ban of food imports from
Belarus from November 2014.33
Some European financial institutions have faced the
risk of the possible default of Russian banks or companies in receipt of European
loans; France is the most exposed, followed by Italy, Germany and the UK.34
Research by Moret et al. shows that Western Europe has lost the least in terms of a
decline in trade with Russia since, but not necessarily in relation to, the imposition of
sanctions, with Finland, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe enduring the greatest
costs.35
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia and Finland shared the most significant
weight of exports to Russia between 2013-2015, whereas countries such as Ireland,
28 See World Bank (2015) “Russia Economic Report” No 33. April. Retrieved from: https://
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/russia/rer33-eng.pdf.; Austrian
Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) (2015). “Disrupted Trade Relations between the EU and
Russia: The Potential Economic Consequences for the EU and Switzerland”. Retrieved from http://
www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20150703_OTS0085/disrupted-trade-relations-between-the-
eu-and-russia-the-potential-economic-consequences-for-the-eu-and-switzerland; Gros, Daniel and
Mustilli, Federica (2015). “The Economic Impact of Sanctions Against Russia: Much Ado About Very
Little.” Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary. 23 October.
29 Ibid.
30 Christie, Edward Hunter (2016). “The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions
against Russia.” The RUSI Journal. 161:3:52-64, June/ July 2016.
31 Ibid.
32 Szczepański, Marcin (2015). “Economic Impact on the EU of Sanctions over Ukraine
Conflict.” European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2015
33 Moret et al., The new deterrent?
34 Ibid.
35 Moret et al., The new deterrent?

Malta, Portugal, the UK and Cyprus had limited trade links with the target.36
In
absolute terms, in 2015, compared to 2013, the largest decline in exports to Russia
was felt by the largest exporters: Germany (EUR 14 billion); Italy (EUR 3.6 billion)
and France (c. EUR 3 billion).37
Greece, like Sweden and Luxembourg, has increased
exports to Russia in some sectors since sanctions have been in place.38
EU member
states have suffered greater costs than the US, the other principal power imposing
sanctions against Russian targets.39
Similarly, the impact of sanctions on employment levels is difficult to prove.40
In
the EU, lobbying companies have often described the risk of job losses caused by
sanctions and countersanctions, but typically fail to compare the approximations to
the EU’s total employment figures.41
One study has estimated that the decrease in
exports and tourism expenditure (EUR 44 billion) could result in the loss of up to
2.2 million jobs (around 1% of total EU employment).42
An ING report from 2014
suggests that Russian countermeasures could put at risk up to 130,000 jobs in the
agricultural sector.43
Countermeasures
In 2014, Russia responded with retaliatory measures against the EU and its allies,
intended to continue until late 2017; these include a visa ban against EU officials
and an agricultural ban covering fruit, vegetables, dairy products, meat, agricultural
equipment and agricultural products. Russia also ordered the destruction of Western-
produced foodstuffs and flowers allegedly illegally smuggled into the country.44
As
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Giumelli, Francesco (forthcoming, 2017). “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive
Measures on EU Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Sanctions on Russia”, Journal of
Common Market Studies.
39 Moret, Erica, Giumelli, Francesco, Bastiat-Jarosz, Dawid (2017) “Sanctions on Russia:
Impacts and Economic Costs on the United States”. Programme for the Study of International
Governance, Graduate Institute, Geneva. March 2017. Retrieved from: http://graduateinstitute.ch/
files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/Russian-Sanctions-Report.pdf
40 Christie, “The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions against Russia”.
41 Ibid.
42 Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) (2015).
43 ING International Special, Retrieved from https://www.ingwb.com/media/1033340/
russian-sanctions-130000-european-jobs-at-stake_august-2014.pdf
44 Rainsford, Sarah (2015). “Russians shocked as banned Western food destroyed”, BBC
News, 7 August 2015. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33818186

another form of retaliation, Russia appears to have leveraged its supplies of gas to
European countries.45
In September 2014, Russian energy giant, Gazprom, reduced
its gas supplies to Poland and Slovakia,46
seemingly in relation to their governments’
support of EU sanctions.
Moscow describes its sanctions against the EU and others by the legal term
“countermeasures” by “a state directly affected by the wrongful act under the law
of responsibility”.47
Nevertheless, even if one assumes that the EU’s autonomous
sanctions against Russia are warranted under international law (another legal grey
area), the measures still cannot be justified as countermeasures on a legal basis.
The EU has contested Russian sanctions against the EU on this basis and criticised
Moscow’s failure to communicate the legal underpinnings of the measures.48
The
EU also claims that Russia’s countermeasures are not compatible with WTO rules.49
Opposition to sanctions within the EU and economic costs
Despite the EU’s 28 members attaining unanimity on the renewal of sanctions every
six months, some EU states have opposed the measures more informally, either
privately or in public, whereas others have strongly favoured their prolongation in
terms of the fulfilment of the Minsk Accords.
Support for the EU’s sanctions on Russia does not typically correlate with greater
relative economic costs in export losses to Russia during the time measures were in
place.50
For example, Greece, Cyprus and Italy, whose exports to Russia represent
a fraction of their total world trade, are among those suffering the lowest decline on
some levels. Yet, they are among the EU states most vocal in calling for the lifting
of sanctions, together with the likes of Hungary and Austria. On the other hand,
45 See Ghaleb, Alexander (2011). Natural gas as an instrument of Russian state power.
Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College (US); Goldman, Marshall (2008). Petrostate: Putin,
power, and the new Russia. Oxford University Press, 2008.
46 Rettman, Andrew (2014). “Russia reduces gas supplies, as EU imposes sanctions.” EU
Observer, 11 September. Retrieved from https://euobserver.com/foreign/125582.
47 Ibid.
48 Statement by the EAEU Spokesperson on Russian “stop list”, EAEU, Brussels (30 June
2015). Retrieved from: http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://
eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150530_01_en.htm.
49 Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Council conclusions on Ukraine, Brussels, 15 August
2014. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
foraff/144314.pdf.
50 Moret et al. The new deterrent?

Central and Eastern European member states that have suffered the most, and
share greater trade interconnectedness with Russia, including Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, are among the strongest supporters of sanctions. .51
The core of EU states most active in lobbying for the sanctions comprises Germany,
the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Romania.
Whereas those in closest geographical proximity to Russia are driven by geopolitical
considerations caused bynegative historical experiences with Russia,the motivations
of Germany and the UK appearto differ. The UK, together with Sweden and Denmark,
traditionally shares a tougher (and shared transatlantic) stance and low economic
dependence on Russia.52
In contrast, Germany´s “strategic relationship” with Russia
is marked by close economic cooperation and a heavy dependence on Russian gas
(at 43% of Germany´s total gas imports).53
The German government hardened its
stance only after the downing of the Malaysian MH17 flight,54
as did the Netherlands,
having lost 196 Dutch citizens in the crash.
Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia (and, earlier, Netherlands),55
have shown more lukewarm support, probably because of geographical distance
and considerable economic ties with Russia. Their reliance on Russia´s investment
in real estate and tourism could explain Spain and Portugal’s reluctant support for
the measures, for example. Despite France´s active participation in the diplomatic
arena on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the Normandy Format, she
has tended to follow Germany´s lead and faces internal divisions on how best to
tackle Russia.56
Central European countries, including Slovakia, Czech Republic,
and Bulgaria, are marked by greater internal pro- and anti-sanctions polarisation of
their domestic elites and their commercial relationships with Russia exert significant
51 Ibid.
52 “The Battle of Londongrad? How vulnerable is the City to sanctions on Russia?”, Open
Europe, 21 March 2014. Retrieved from http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/foreign-policy/uk-
russia-sanctions/
53 BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Natural gas. June 2016.
54 Adomeit, Hannes (2012). “German-Russian Relations. Balance Sheet since 2000 and
Perspectives until 2025”, Etude Prospective Stratégique.
55 Gressel, Gustav (2016). Keeping Up Appearances. How Europe Is Supporting Ukraine´s
Transformation. London: European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016; de Pedro, Nicolás
(2014). How should Europe respond to Russia? The Spanish view. Commentary. European Council
on Foreign Relations, 14 November 2014. Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_
how_should_europe_respond_to_russia_the_spanish_view354
56 Gressel, Keeping Up Appearances.

pressure on them to take a more conciliatory approach.57
Such countries as Ireland,
Luxemburg, Belgium and Malta have played a more passive role in the sanctions to
date, which could be explained by geographical distance, weak historical ties and
lower economic dependency on Russian energy resources.58
Economic Alternatives to Russia
Aiming to balance market pressure, stabilise pricing and find alternative customers
for affected products, the European Commission implemented a range of emergency
measures in response to Russia’s countersanctions. These included a grant for €500
million in September 2015,59
with a new €500 million aid package renewed in July
2016.60
Safety net measures for fruit and vegetable producers comprised market
withdrawals for free distribution to charitable organisations, and compensation for
reduced harvesting rates.61
The Commission introduced measures to allow the EU
to buy a certain quantity of dairy products and meat from the market. In addition,
the Commission approved additional funding to promote agricultural products, both
within and outside the EU. To create new market opportunities, bilateral and regional
trade negotiations were intensified, in particular with the US, China, Japan, South
Korea, Hong Kong, and Switzerland.62
Coupled with weakening demand for dairy imports from China, the oversupply
was met by a series of protests by French, Belgian and British farmers.63
On the
domestic level, the French government responded to the protests by approving
57 Kucharczyk, Jacek and Grigorij Mesežnikov (2015). Diverging Voices, Converging Policies:
The Visegrad States’ Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Warsaw: Heinrich-Böll Stiftung, 2015.
58 Gressel, Keeping Up Appearances.
59 Hunt, Nigel (2015). “EU to give 500 million euros to farmers hit by Russia sanctions.”
Reuters, 7 September. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-farming-
idUSKCN0R71OQ20150907.
60 Michalopoulos, Sarantis (2016). “EU throws fresh cash at struggling dairy farmers”.
EurActiv, 19 July. Retrieved from https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-
throws-fresh-cash-at-struggling-farmers/
61 Fruit and vegetables: Crisis prevention and management. Agriculture and development.
European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fruit-and-vegetables/crisis-
prevention#green-harvesting/
62 European Commission (2015). EU responses on the Russian import ban on the agricultural
products. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban_en/
63 Polet, Yvan (2015). “A Perfect Storm for EU Dairy Prices.” United States Department of
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 14 August 2015.

€600 million in state aid to maintain prices.64
Finland took an alternative approach,
exporting industrial butter and milk powder which were not on the Russian list
of countersanctions.65
In Poland, the Ministry of Economy launched a campaign
to promote Polish agricultural produce in India, Indonesia and the Balkans as well
as on the domestic market.66
Similarly, a decline in exports to Russia of Spanish
peaches and plums was, reportedly, alleviated through a deal with China.67
Belarus
and Kazakhstan, reportedly, became the main alternative routes for sanctioned
goods to be delivered to the Russian market.68
Responding to Russia´s actions in Ukraine, the European Energy Security Strategy
has also aimed to diversify supplier countries and routes, increase energy efficiency,
build missing infrastructure links and strengthen emergency and solidarity
mechanisms.69
The shock of costs incurred through lost trade with Russia appears
to have been absorbed: global EU exports increased to €1,791 trillion in 2015, from
€1,736 trillion in 2013, which suggests that losses in exports to Russia have only
partly impacted on the EU as a whole.70
Conclusion
The EU has demonstrated unprecedented unity on its stance towards imposing
sanctions on Russia, despite divergent levels of support among and within member
states. Opposition to the measures appears to be influenced by a panoply of
historical, cultural, geographical, and economic and security drivers.71
The economic
costs to the EU of its sanctions on Russia appear to be manageable, in part due to
EU subsidies, trade redirection and increased purchasing power. Loss of trade with
64 Polet, A Perfect Storm for EU Dairy Prices.
65 Ibid.
66 Kucharczyk and Mesežnikov, Diverging Voices, Converging Policies.
67 Torres, Diego (2016). “Spain gets Chinese relief to Russian trade woes.” Politico, 26 July
2016. Retrieved from http://www.politico.eu/article/spain-strikes-plum-deal-with-china-to-recover-
from-russian-embargo-fruit-peaches-food-ban/
68 Bourdillon, Yves (2014): “L´embargo russe contre l`Europe aisé à contourner.” Les
Echos.fr, 13 August 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.lesechos.fr/13/08/2014/lesechos.
fr/0203702602413_l-embargo-russe-contre-l-europe-aise-a-contourner.htm#
69 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy. Brussels, May 2014.
70 Moret et al. The new deterrent?
71 Lehmkuhl, Dirk Shagina, Maria (2016). “The Sanction Policy of the Enlarged European
Union. The Case of Russia.” Euxeinos 21/2016, University of St. Gallen.

Russia since the imposition of sanctions is most marked in the countries in Russia’s
immediate vicinity, which remain among the most supportive of ongoing measures.
Factors such as UK’s departure from the EU, the US presidential election of Donald
Trump, and 2017 leadership elections around Europe, most notably in France and
Germany, have introduced uncertainty over the future of the package of measures
aimed at Russia. The future trajectory of cumulative international sanctions on
Russia could have far-reaching implications for Russia-West relations, the EU’s
position in the world, and its ability to continue using such measures as a favoured
policy instrument in tackling a range of security and foreign policy challenges in the
years to come.

Sergey Afontsev 25
Three Years of Tension: Russia-EU Economic Cooperation
Challenged
Sergey Afontsev
For Russia, economic cooperation with the European Union was the key trade and
investment priority in the first years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The undisputable benefits of cooperation in these areas for both parties drove
mutual efforts to bring Russia and the EU closer to each other, culminating in the
‘Partnership for Modernisation’ project launched in 2010.72
By the beginning of 2014,
the EU accounted for over half of total Russian exports and almost three-quarters
of inward direct investment. With harmonization of technical regulations a free trade
area ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ and even a visa-free regime between Russia and
the EU became widely considered as attainable, realistic mid-term goals. Much of
this changed abruptly with the development of Russia-EU political tensions as a
result of political developments in Ukraine.
Economic Sanctions and Counter-sanctions
The economic sanctions first imposed by the EU against Russia in March 2014
and Russia’s retaliatory measures in August of the same year are by far the most
important, but not the only, factors contributing to the formation of the ‘new normality’
in economic relations between Russia and the EU. After a brief period of ‘targeted’
sanctions between March and July 2014, directed against particular persons and
legal entities in Russia, whose actions could be interpreted as threatening Ukraine’s
territorial integrity and political stability, the EU has followed the US in adopting
sectoral sanctions, principally targeting Russian financial institutions and energy
companies. Restrictions on the transfer of technologies for oil exploration and
extraction as well as dual use technologies were also introduced. These restrictions,
together with even tighter sanctions imposed by the US and declining oil prices
from July 2014 created some pressure in the Russian economy. Financial sanctions
appeared to be especially painful. After attempts to find alternative sources of
external financing in Asia-Pacific generally failed, Russian business appeared to be
deprived of the credit resources it had heavily relied on between 2010 and 2013.
Besides their direct impact, sanctions created general uncertainty and distrust.
As a result, cooperation suffered even in fields that were not subject to direct
72 The EU and Russia agreed at the Rostov-on-Don Summit in 2010 to enhance their
relationship with the Partnership for Modernisation, an agreement that would increase bilateral
economic cooperation and cooperation on common regional and global challenges.

sectoral sanctions, with many European companies postponing their projects in
Russia or leaving the Russian market completely. In particular, the number of
German companies working in Russia declined by 763 (12.7%) in 2015–2016.
While large European companies often preferred to weather hard times in Russia,
and sometimes even argued that economic sanctions were a ‘protective shield’
against potential newcomers to the Russian market, their business opportunities
shrank substantially. Thus far, Brussels officials have been immune to any objection
against their sanctions policy from European businesses. As one of them put it in
conversation with business representatives arguing for lifting sanctions, ‘You have
creamed the Russian market for years working with the Kremlin regime, and now
you should pay for that’. They are still paying, with thousands of job losses for both
Russia and the EU.
Russia’s retaliatory sanctions have costs too. In August 2014 the importing of a wide
range of agricultural products and food products from countries that introduced
economic sanctions against Russia was banned. In 2013 the value of the banned
goods imported to Russia was 4.5 billion euros, meaning the loss of the Russian
market was painful for some European producers. However, Russia has had to pay
its own price for the food embargo. Most importantly, Russian consumers faced
remarkable price increases. In the few weeks after the embargo was introduced,
the price of meat and fish jumped as much 60% in some Russian regions. Great
hope was placed on import substitution policies but their impact on prices was
inconsistent. In particular, prices for meat and poultry rose by 4.3% year-on-year
in December 2015 and by 1.6% year-on-year in December 2016, while for dairy
products the respective growth rates were 11.5% and 9.5% and for fish and seafood
– 20.9% and 8.6% respectively. To make the situation worse, import substitution
was often associated with a deterioration in quality; the most notorious example of
this was identified after the import of EU cheese was banned, when official surveys
found that up to 80% of Russian made cheeses did not comply with quality standards.
Some embargoed goods still make it into the Russian market, having been smuggled
from, or re-labelled in, third countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Macedonia
and Montenegro. Russia’s attempts to fight these practices contributed to increased
tensions in relations with these countries and especially with Belarus, which was
considered the principal supplier of embargoed foodstuffs from the EU to Russia.
Effects on Russian trade and economy
The impact of all these developments, however, should not be overestimated. Firstly,
despite all their costs for the Russian economy, sanctions were not the dominant
factor responsible for its troubles. With oil prices declining from over $112 per barrel
in July 2014 to just $27 in January 2016, Russian exports, budget revenues, and

Sergey Afontsev 27
real income experienced much more serious pressure. In 2015, when Russian GDP
dropped by 2.8%, the contribution of economic sanctions to this decline was some
0.9–1.1 percentage points, i.e., from one-third to two-fifths of the actual decline in
GDP. In 2016, a resumption of growth in oil prices and a consequent rise in export
revenues and capital inflows to the Russian economy reduced the impact of financial
sanctions. From 2014 to 2016, the cumulative costs of sanctions, in terms of GDP
decline and GDP growth foregone, ranged from 2.4 to 2.8 percentage points, which
was low but by no means disastrous.
Secondly, in reality the decline of Russia-EU trade has not been much worse than
that of total Russian trade, given all the challenges Russia faced with lessening
demand for its traditional exports, particularly fossil fuels and metals, because of
declining global prices. The value of Russian trade with the EU dropped in 2013–
2016 by a factor of 2.1 from $417.7 bn to just $235.8 bn, while for total Russian
trade this factor was as high as 1.8. In fact, the commodity structure of Russian
trade with specific countries is a better predictor for trade dynamics than economic
sanctions. For example, Russian exports to the US declined by just 16.0% in 2013–
2016 (compared with a 54.0% drop in Russian exports to the EU during the same
period) because, simply, Russian exports to the US are much less dependent on
energy-price fluctuations. At the same time, one of the major losers in terms of
its exports to Russia was the Republic of Korea, one of the few OECD countries
which has not introduced any economic sanctions against Russia. Korean exports
to Russia dropped by 50.4% in 2013–2016, compared to a 49.7% decline in Russian
imports from the EU. Although the share of the EU in total Russian trade declined
from 49.6% in 2013 to 42.8% in 2016, it retained its position as the leading trading
partner of Russia. The EU’s closest rival, China, accounted for 14.1% of Russian
trade in 2016. Although this share was 3.6 percentage points higher than in 2013, it
will be some time before Russia’s ‘Pivot to the East’ produces more visible changes
in the structure of Russian trade.
The picture for investment is not much different. In October 2016, accumulated
foreign direct investment (FDI) by residents of the EU countries totalled $226.3bn,
compared with $343.6 bn in January 2014. Despite its remarkable decline by 34.1%,
partly attributable to the recalculation due to the depreciation of the rouble, FDI
from the EU still accounted for 70.7% of total FDI stock in the Russian economy. In
fact, its share was almost the same as its January 2014 pre-Ukrainian crisis level
of 72.9% and the EU was maintaining its position as the leading investor in the
Russian economy. The dynamics of portfolio investment from the EU were much
more volatile, although there are strong reasons to believe that European investors,
despite all the financial sanctions, contributed to impressive capital inflows in the
fourth quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017. Indeed, these inflows were

associated mostly with high interest rates in Russia (up to 6 percentage points)
rather than with longer-term investment interest in the Russian economy and their
impact on exchange rate dynamics can bring substantial risks in the medium-term.
Still, soaring demand for private and sovereign Russian bonds has made the burden
of financial sanctions much less pressing than it was in 2015 and the first half of
2016.
The future
The most important lesson learned during the three years of Russia-EU political
tensions is that economic sanctions did not succeed in changing either the policies
of the Russian government towards the Ukrainian crisis or the attitude of Russian
citizens towards these policies. According to the traditional ‘pain-gain’ logic of
economic sanctions, more ‘pain’ to the economy of the affected country leads to
higher political ‘gains’ in terms of altering that country’s behaviour. In the Russian
case, however, this logic has failed dramatically. Hopes that economic ‘pain’ caused
by sectoral sanctions would deprive the Russian government of economic resources,
thereby inviting popular protest followed by a sort of ‘coloured revolution’ in Russia,
appeared to be groundless.
On the one hand, despite heavy pressure on domestic and international reserves,
they are still substantial. Indeed, the resources of the Reserve Fund, a Russian
sovereign wealth fund, dropped to 1.1% of GDP in March 2017, compared with 4.0%
in January 2014. On the other hand, those of the Fund of Future Generations rose
from 4.1% to 4.8% of GDP during the same period. As for international reserves,
there was a 25.9% decline during 2014–2016, but they have started to grow again,
approaching $400 bn by March 2017.
Meanwhile the Russian political system has shown remarkable stability, with recent
‘anti-corruption’ protests proving unable to change the general status quo. This was
not so much a result of the Russian government’s effective control over domestic
political processes as it was of the experience of neighbouring countries, especially
Ukraine, which showed clearly what kind of consequences political destabilization is
likely to generate. According to the latest polls by the VCIOM Public Opinion Research
Center, 59% of Russians (the highest number ever) are ready to bear the costs
associated with political decisions taken in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, while
support for retaliatory measures introduced by the Russian government approaches
72%. In March 2017, only 17% of poll participants mentioned that economic sanctions
affected their own economic situation negatively, compared with 45% two years ago.
At the same time, however, the proposition that food embargoes are detrimental to
the Russian economy was agreed with by 25% of respondents compared to 9% in

Sergey Afontsev 29
2014. The idea that Russia should unilaterally lift countersanctions is increasingly
unpopular; in March 2017, it was rejected by 76% of poll participants, an increase
of 19 percentage points from 2015. All this suggests that most Russians accept the
costs of the ‘sanctions war’ as the legitimate price for their country’s foreign policy
but will be glad to see the war finished by the mutual, simultaneous abolition of
sanctions.
The question, however, remains as to whether such a scenario is feasible. As
demonstrated by the crisis which arose between Russia and Turkey in November
2015, after a Russian SU-24 jet was shot down, Russia can quickly end an
international crisis if it feels there is the same willingness from the other side. The
notorious ‘Russian propaganda’ so feared by the EU can operate effectively in this
kind of scenario. The rhetoric of state media can turn quickly from negative to
positive towards the EU just as it did towards Turkey. The problem here is that
the crisis in Russia–EU relations is much longer-lasting and the ability of the EU
decision makers, both in Brussels and in national capitals, to withstand ‘pro-sanction’
pressures from Washington is viewed by Russian leaders much more sceptically.
European political elites and media, on their part, are not likelyto change their position
and their rhetoric towards Russia as easily as Russia can towards them. The most
promising approach to stopping the lose-lose spiral of the ‘sanctions war’ seems to
be the start of a comprehensive Minsk–3 process, which would address the complex
economic and political consequences of the Ukrainian crisis. As was the situation
three years ago, what Russians and Europeans need is not ‘pain without gain’ but
serious dialogue, addressing both the prospects of resuming EU–Russia economic
cooperation and the legitimate interests of the citizens of Ukraine.

Joseph Dobbs 31
The impact of EU-Russia tensions on the politics of the
EU and its Member States: insecurity and resolve
Joseph Dobbs
On the eruption of pro-European protests in Kyiv on the 21st of November 2013,
few imagined how serious the consequences would be over the following three and
a half years. The European Union’s (EU) relationship with the Russian Federation
remains in crisis, and what in the first months could have been characterised as a
very fluid situation has gradually become entrenched and institutionalised by both
sides. The emerging ideological nature of the tensions, fraught with disinformation,
and arguably two proxy wars, point worryingly towards the dawn of a new Cold War.
The Euromaidan protests were neither the first nor the final event to push EU-
Russia relations into a dangerous decline. The Russian war against Georgia in
2008 awoke some to the realisation that Western hopes of Russian integration into
the liberal Euro-Atlantic order were no longer realistic. On-going Russian backed
war in Ukraine’s Donbas region, the illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014,
the shooting down of a Malaysian passenger jet over Ukraine in July 2014, the
role of Russia in the Syrian civil war and Russia’s alleged interference in Western
democratic processes have all further pushed relations between Russia and the EU
into the depressing state they are in today. As a result, Russia is firmly identified as
a threatening ‘other’ rather than a member of the European family.
The implications of this crisis are multifaceted and serious. First and foremost
people have lost their lives and homes, and Ukraine continues to suffer. For the
EU and its Member States, the political ramifications of the on-going crisis are
particularly important. Russia’s actions have hit at the nerve of several of the EU’s
key insecurities and at the heart of what some believe to be the existential struggle
between liberal democracies and illiberal forces.
At the EU-wide level, the Russia crisis has challenged the bloc’s unity, values and
relevance. The initial success of uniting the EU behind sanctions proved the severity
of situation as seen by the EU Member States, but disunity as to how to proceed
with regard to Russia and the Ukraine crisis has been a permanent headache in
Brussels.
At a national level within the EU, many Member States fear that Russian interference
has been fuelling the rise of radical and largely far-right and anti-EU parties that
have aligned themselves with President Putin and his government. This paper does

not have the space to address every EU Member State but will focus on some of the
most interesting and significant cases of national approaches to EU-Russia relations.
The EU Dimension: Unity, Values and Relevance
The imposition of sanctions against Russia is demonstrative of the scale of Moscow’s
transgressions in the eyes of the EU. First and foremost, the illegal changing of an
international border is perceived as a fundamental challenge to European and global
security, which made sanctions over Crimea and Sevastopol comprehensive and
probably long-lasting. Moscow’s role in destabilising eastern Ukraine through active
and passive support for the rebels prompted broader further sectoral and targeted
sanctions against Russia itself.73
While the EU has been careful to link its response to Russian actions to the defence
of Ukraine, it must also be considered as a defence of EU values and foreign policy.
A long-held belief amongst most EU leaders has been that European countries of
the shared neighbourhood can develop closer relations with the EU while remaining
partners of Russia, and that their choice should be respected. Moscow’s brutal
demonstration of its willingness to use force to prevent what it deems to be Russia’s
sphere of influence further integrating with European institutions and its violation
of basic principles of European security not only came as a shock, but also helped
rally the EU countries around the idea of sanctions against Russia and support for
Ukraine.
True, the EU has worked hard to maintain unity on sanctions against Russia. First
imposed in March 2014, they have since been expanded to include Crimea-specific
sanctions and a raft of sanctions now linked to implementation of the Minsk Protocol.
The key challenge for Brussels comes every six months when sanctions need to
be renewed by unanimity. Thus far no EU Member State has wanted to be the first
to break cover, but the regular renewal of sanctions against Russia masks some
disquiet about the longevity of this policy. From Southern Europe in Italy, Greece,
Cyprus and Central and Eastern Europe in Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia there
is a sizeable contingent of sanctions sceptics waiting for political cover to make a
move. Russia understands this, and has made efforts to lobby relevant capitals.74
The
election of a fellow sanctions sceptic in any major European capital or a unilateral
action by the Trump administration could provide the necessary cover, or at the very
least cause further anxiety in Brussels.
73 See the European Commission’s detailing of Russia focused sanctions - http://europa.eu/
newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en
74 Examples of which include Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Greece.

Joseph Dobbs 33
Beyond sanctions policy, there has been a wider EU debate as to how to respond
to Russian actions. The varying economic and security concerns of Member States
drive most countries’ policies at the EU level. For the Baltic States and Poland, for
example, understandably acutely aware of the proximity of Russian troops to their
borders, a stronger policy is demanded. A more significant implication of Russian
actions has however been the way in which this debate is in part connected to
broader questions concerning the link between socially regressive far-right anti-EU
politicians and Russia.
The crisis with Russia was also a litmus test of the EU’s relevance in regional and
global affairs, which has long been a priority forthe EU - with the bloc establishing the
European External Action Service (EEAS), a High Representative, and a President
of the European Council as part of the Treaty of Lisbon to help achieve this. This has
not, however, translated into a strong diplomatic role for the EU as the West deals
with Russia over its aggression towards Ukraine. NATO, the Normandy grouping of
countries75
and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
have all arguably had more prominent roles than the EU in handling this crisis,
despite the fact that it was an EU Association Agreement with Ukraine that sparked
Russian aggression.
Some of Moscow’s actions have, however, increased the relevance of the EU.
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare has forced many involved in European security
to further recognise the role of the EU’s political, social and economic power in
tackling Russian tactics in Ukraine and beyond. This is demonstrated by the EU’s
leading role in providing support for Ukraine’s economy, increased efforts by the EU
to develop its energy policy,76
or by the EU’s establishment of the East StratCom
Task Force in 2015 to tackle Russian disinformation.77
The Russian threat has also
reinvigorated calls for closer EU cooperation with NATO, with the latter having a
greater appreciation of the EU’s relevance in European security.
The crisis in relations with Russia, along with other failures in EU foreign policy
over the last decade, has pushed forward a new more pragmatic foreign policy with
potentially long-lasting implications for the EU and the region. While it would be
75 The Normandy group includes Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany.
76 Europe’s New Challenge: The Battle to Save Ukraine’s Economy, Joseph Dobbs and Ian
Kearns, May 2015, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/europes-new-challenge-the-battle-
to-save-ukraines-economy_2755.html
77 See EEAS East Stratcom - https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_
en/2116/%20Questions%20and%20Answers%20about%20the%20East%20StratCom%20
Task%20Force

wrong to say that the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, its latest foreign policy doctrine,
was solely a response to the Ukraine crisis, it is clear that Russian aggression was a
big influence. Perhaps the most notable change in the EU’s foreign policy has been
to quietly drop the European Neighbourhood Project (ENP) with a new emphasis
on tailored approaches to countries in the region, and a toning down of language on
democracy promotion.78
It is difficult to single out the implications of Russian actions for EU policy from other
developments that have shaken the bloc, including the vote by the United Kingdom to
leave the bloc and the election on Donald Trump as President of the United States in
2016. What all three of these issues have done however, including Russian actions,
is to reinvigorate a debate within the EU regarding strategic autonomy in the fields
of defence, security and foreign policy. From further work on a Security Union to
moves towards progress in European defence, the EU may finally be getting serious
about its security.
National Level: perspectives on the Russian challenge
At the national level in EU countries, Russia has become part of the political agenda
in a way it hasn’t been since the Cold War, with the Kremlin’s machinations becoming
electoral fodder across the EU. From allegations of Russian active measures in
elections in France and Germany to the use of President Putin as a bogeyman to
make the case for the EU in referenda in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
there is arguably not another foreign country that has played as prominent a role
in EU political discussions as Russia in recent years. Different countries have
been impacted to different degrees, with proximity to Russia geographically and
economically often playing a role. Coinciding with increasing Euroscepticism – a
Euroscepticism that Moscow has arguably fostered – politicians across the EU have
begun arguing that to be pro-EU is to be politically anti-Russia.
There are a number of countries, such as Poland and the Baltic States, for whom
a strong response to Russia is rooted in historical experience. For these countries,
critical of Russia before 2013, Russian aggression towards Ukraine proved a point
they had long been making; Russia is not to be trusted. Perhaps more interestingly
,however, and worryingly for Moscow, is that there are likely more countries firmly in
that camp in 2017 as a result of its actions than there were in 2013. Also concerning
for the Kremlin should be the somewhat pro-Russian governments that have thus
far been consistent in their vote to renew sanctions. Italy, for example, has been
78 For more see Sven Biscop http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
SPB75.pdf and Jan Techau http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63994

Joseph Dobbs 35
sceptical about a strong response to Russia, in part because of its stronger economic
ties, but has thus far chosen EU unity over Moscow: a position likely becoming more
firm as Russia increases its activity in Libya.
For the EU’s larger foreign policy actors, Germany, France and the United Kingdom
(despite Brexit, the UK is still active in EU foreign policy formulation and will remain
so until at least 2019), Russia’s actions have increased political scepticism towards
Moscow. ‘Russia has lost Germany’79
has been a common headline since the
outbreak of the crisis. While Berlin still plays its role as a key contact point for the
Russian government, Germany’s long held policy of engagement with Russia has
come under extreme pressure as a result of Russian action and a difficult personal
relationship between Chancellor Merkel and President Putin.80
The Russian threat,
coinciding with a weakening transatlantic relationship and Brexit, is contributing to a
realisation amongst German leaders about their growing role in Europe.
For France, there was an initial resistance to a strong policy on Russia due to
strong economic ties with Russia. This was evident with the the pending sale of two
French made Mistral amphibious assault ships to Russia. After initial hesitation, the
Elysée eventually backed down and sold the ships to Egypt instead. Since then the
French government has been largely supportive of EU policy and active in diplomatic
processes such as the Normandy format. As the 2017 presidential election began
to approach, however, it became clear that there was no consensus on Russia in
France. The right-wing candidate Francois Fillon suggested sanctions should be
lifted, while for centrist Emmanuel Macron Russia was a threat to the European
order. Most concerningly for the EU was far-right candidate Marine Le Pen who
visited Moscow in March 2017 as the guest of President Putin, received €9.4m in
loans from a Moscow bank, supports Russia’s claims over Crimea and argues for
Russia to be France’s strategic partner.81
Russian support for Le Pen has reinforced
the relatively recent and growing belief that to be pro-EU demands that one is
politically anti-Russian, both in France and across the EU.
79 For example, Stefan Meister’s “How Russia Lost Germany” - http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/
number/How-Russia-Lost-Germany-17365
80 For more on the history of ‘Ostpolitik’ and its development in the post-Cold War era see
Tuomas Forsberg’s January 2016 International Affairs article “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel,
Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/
ostpolitik-frostpolitik-merkel-putin-and-german-foreign-policy-towards-russia
81 French Presidential Election: Leading Candidates’ Positions on NATO, EU Defence, and
Russia, Alice Billon-Galland, April 2017, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/french-
presidential-election-leading-candidates-positions-on-nato-eu-defence-and-russia_4623.html

In the United Kingdom Russia featured in the 2016 referendum on EU membership,
and although this should not be overstated it is again demonstrative of the new
equating of pro-EU and anti-Russian positions. The spectre of an aggressive
Kremlin was evoked on a number of occasions by Remain campaigners, including
by then Foreign Secretary Philip Hammondm who argued that “the only country …
that would like us to leave the EU is Russia. That should probably tell us all we need
to know.”82
The counter argument for some on the Leave side was to blame the EU
for the Ukraine crisis. More broadly, London’s fraught relationship with Moscow is
better explained by the assassination of former Russian intelligence office Alexander
Litvinenko in London in 2006. But recent Russian actions have further strengthened
the UK’s position, with the heads of the UK’s domestic and international intelligence
services both making rare interventions to warn of the Russian threat.83
For Sweden and Finland, the impact of Russian aggression has primarily been
on their respective NATO membership debates and strengthening resilience and
defence potential. Both countries are already increasing their engagement with the
Alliance due to concerns regarding Moscow’s posture, particularly the threat Russia
poses to the Baltic Sea region. Despite threats from the Russian government of a
“military kind” of response should Sweden join NATO, all major opposition parties
now support membership. While Finland is less supportive, a 2016 government panel
argued that Finland and Sweden should stick together on NATO issues. If Stockholm
were to push for NATO membership without Helsinki, as it did with EU membership
in the 1990s, then it is unlikely the latter would not also join. With elections coming
in Sweden in 2018 and Finland in 2019, the issue of NATO membership is likely to
be a major debate.
Before the crisis the Netherlands had been a supporter of engagement with Russia
and one of Moscow’s strongest partners in the EU. This has changed since Russian
backed rebels shot down a Malaysian passenger aircraft over Ukraine with Russian
equipment killing, 193 Dutch nationals. Yet the public is divided, with a referendum
on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in April 2016 becoming a “referendum
82 “Only Russia wants Britain to leave the EU, says Philip Hammond”, The Guardian, March
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/02/all-alternatives-eu-brexit-come-price-
tag-philip-hammond
83 For example in November 2016 the Director of Mi5, Andrew Parker, gave the first newspaper
interview by a serving spy in the UK to warn of the Russian threat - https://www.theguardian.
com/uk-news/2016/oct/31/andrew-parker-increasingly-aggressive-russia-a-growing-threat-to-uk-
says-mi5-head

Joseph Dobbs 37
on Vladimir Putin” according to some. The failure of pro-EU campaigners in that
referendum has been attributed in part to a group of pro-Russian activists.84
The impact of Russian aggression on its once strong partners can be seen in a
March 2017 resolution of the European People’s Party (EPP), which includes Dutch
Prime Minister Rutte’s VVD party and other parties once supportive of closer ties
with Russia. The resolution begins:
“EU Member States are facing an unprecedented threat to their democratic societies.
Russian propaganda, disinformation campaigns and continuous support for anti-
European political forces are undermining the European project, transatlantic cooperation
and Western democracies in general: in terms of liberal values, political independence and
sovereignty.”85
Putin has lost Europe
Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the Kremlin’s active attempts to destabilise
Europe have exposed significant weaknesses in the EU. The EU’s response,
however, stemming from the realisation of the severity of the situation, indicates
strength going forward.
It is clear that the Ukraine crisis has been a strategic failure for both Russia and the
EU, as well as a disaster for the Ukraine and the region. Long-term, however, it is
likely that Russia will be the bigger loser should the EU and wider West successfully
weather the storm. It is not inconceivable that Russia’s actions could contribute to
an enlarged NATO, a more relevant EU with greater institutional links to NATO, and,
more damagingly, to an EU political landscape in which Russia is firmly viewed as a
threat to the EU and its values.
If Russia’s image as a threat to EU and its values becomes further entrenched, it is
difficult to imagine a future relationship that goes beyond a transactional coexistence.
Russia has lost Europe and while both sides will suffer as a result, it is Russia, with
its far greater reliance on the EU economically, that will feel it most.
84 “Fake News, Fake Ukrainians: How a Group of Russians Tilted a Dutch Vote”, New York
Times, February 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-fake-
news-dutch-vote.html?_r=0
85 See - http://www.epp.eu/papers/russian-disinformation-undermining-western-
democracy/

Perhaps the only note of optimism is that thus far it is President Putin’s Russia that
the EU is increasingly opposed to, not the Russia that is home to millions of fellow
Europeans. There is perhaps still hope for a better relationship, but until Russia is
governed by a leader that the EU does not believe is working to undermine it this
hope will probably remain elusive.

Pavel Kanevskiy 39
The impact of EU-Russia tensions on Russian politics
Pavel Kanevskiy
The latest crisis in relations between Russia andthe European Union can be attributed
to a number of political, economic, social, cultural, structural and behavioural reasons.
We are witnessing not just a deterioration of the EU-Russia relationship but also the
emergence of doubts inside Russia as to whether Russia’s move towards Europe in
the 1990s and early 2000s was the right choice. At the same time, Russia’s Western
partners are alarmed by its regional ambitions, which they consider as the biggest
risk to the post-communist continental order.
A break-up instead of a marriage
It is notble that the EU-Russia separation began when there was an undeniable,
rational basis for more rapprochement. From Russia’s side, the impetus for a stronger
relationship was fuelled by its centuries-old desire to become a more modernised
state, using its close relationship with Europe as a means to develop. From the
European Union side, there were expectations that Russia would, at some stage,
become more democratic, predictable, and peaceful, opening its market to European
businesses. There were views that this process was inevitable, even during the early
years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, as he continued the Europeanisation started by
his predecessors Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Until the middle 2000s, many
representatives of the Russian mainstream expert community were discussing what
needed to be done for Russia to become an EU associated country. In 2003, levels
of public support for full membership reached a peak of 73%.86
Nonetheless, despite the public optimism and the fact that trade and economic ties
were growing every year, there seemed to be no consensus, either in Moscow or
in Brussels, on how to build strategic cooperation for the long term. Expectations
were high when the Four Common Spaces (FCS)87
and the Partnership for
Modernisation (P4M)88
came up in 2003 and 2010 respectively as a core of the
positive interdependence agenda. They were considered the centrepiece of the
86 Rossiya I Yevrosoyuz. FOM. 11.09.2008. URL: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/fre_an/d083622
87 The EU and Russia agreed at the 2003 St Petersburg Summit to create four common
spaces in an enhanced strategic partnership. These common spaces were “economic”, “freedom,
security and justice”, “external security cooperation” “research, education and culture”.
88 The EU and Russia agreed at the Rostov-on-Don Summit in 2010 to enhance their
relationship with the Partnership for Modernisation, an agreement that would increase bilateral
economic cooperation and cooperation on common regional and global challenges.

Russian “European vector”, promising greater integration and a new reason for
reforms in Russia. Nonetheless, the biggest pitfalls of the FCS and the P4M were
hidden by their rhetoric. Although the Joint Commissions reported partial progress
in the dedicated areas of cooperation, it was evident that they did not give birth
to the necessary grand policies in Russia which would foster administrative and
judicial reforms, change the investment climate, help to fight corruption, advance
the structure of the economy and so on. Another problem was that, although the
FCS and the P4M were facilitated by the top levels of leadership, they were lacking
the broader set of agents and horizontal ties needed to advance more dialogue and
structural dependence.
The Russian leadership continued to see the country’s development solely through
the lens of economics and continued to count foremost on the energy market as
the primary source of growth. This was a one-dimensional approach with many
vulnerabilities and political risks. Competition for the post-Soviet space sowed the
seeds of doubt in Moscow on the EU’s true ambitions in the East, while European
Union countries started to question the efficacy of the energy dialogue and whether
it could provide a basis for a stable, predictable relationship. The fragility of positive
interdependence became evident with the rise of the security agenda and military
escalations in the post-Soviet space. Volumes of trade and rational economic
interests on both sides couldn’t hide the fact that there was no developed strategic
vision for their common future.
It became apparent in the interval between the EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg
in 2012 and the 2013 Vilnius summit that the level of misunderstanding and mistrust
had reached an unprecedented level among decision makers on both sides.
Coinciding with the continuing stagnation of the Russian economy, social-political
tensions and the fragmentation of Russian society, the overall mood in Moscow
towards European integration became disillusioned. The Ukraine crisis and the war
in Donbas were the final dividing factors.
At the same time there fears that Brussels, together with Washington, was planning
a series of coordinated regime changes in the post-Soviet space and that a colour
revolution in Russia would inevitably follow. These fears had been accumulating
gradually. It took some time before they started seriously influencing policies in
Russia. This process can be described as a return of more geopolitical thinking,
provoked by the growing ambitions of Russia and the EU towards post-Soviet
countries, which found themselves stuck between the European and the Eurasian
integration projects. The combination of this geopolitical thinking and a perception
of their relationship through the lenses of influence and regional competition led
both sides away from constructive dialogue. In the Concept of the Foreign Policy of

Pavel Kanevskiy 41
the Russian Federation approved by the President in 2016, the EU, just like NATO, is
considered an actor of geopolitical expansion and that expansion is the main reason
for the worsening relations between the two sides. However, this same Concept
describes the EU as an important partner of Russia for the building of a common
economic and humanitarian space, which, together with harmonization of rules and
standards through deeper integration between the EU and the EEU, is described as
a strategic goal.
The politics of Europeanisation in Russia
EU-Russia relations have always been full of paradoxes and dualisms, which makes
it difficult to find any simple explanation of how Russia and Europe co-exist when
partnership and rivalry go hand in hand. Beyond strategic and rational economic
factors, Russia’s relations with Europe have long been determined by Russia’s self-
identification as part of the wider pan-European project. With enormous resources
andvastterritories, forcenturies Russia has been choosing between Europeanisation
and distinctiveness, and between different paradigms of state, economic and social
order.
The crisis in EU-Russia relations has again posed the question about Russia’s
historical choice and national idea. The Russian state has started a new quest to
define Russia’s role in the world and for ways to describe its uniqueness; this led to
the renewal and spread of big narratives such as global ‘superpower’, patriotism,
‘Russian world’ and Orthodox Christianity. These represent a mix from different
epochs which are meant to show that Russia is becoming strong again. This
became the new conservative consensus for all major political actors, including
mainstream parties, the government-orientated part of civil society and the state-
controlled media. They do not necessarily form a coherent ideology or encourage
more political activity. On the contrary, there is a continuing devaluation of the whole
mechanism of political representation, which has led to political apathy and low
voter turnout. However, these revived ideas explain the symbolical level of the new
order, constructed around the main indicator of regime legitimacy, and trust in a
president regarded as a truly unifying national figure.
At the end of 2016, according to the Levada Centre, a polling organisation, 63%
of Russians wanted to see Putin as a president after 2018, up from 58% in 2014
and 34% in 2012.89
That does not mean that Russians necessarily support their
government’s economic policies, are satisfied with healthcare or education reforms,
89 Doverie k prezidentu byvaet raznoe. Levada Centre. 17.11.2016. URL: http://www.levada.
ru/2016/11/17/doverie-k-prezidentu-byvaet-raznoe/

trust the parliament, regional and local authorities or that they do not notice systemic
problems such as corruption and excessive administrative pressure. What it does
show, however, is that Russians do agree on the new, nebulous formula of Russia,
which makes them feel part of a strong nation, even though this support does not
convert into coherent participation.
One explanation of the new symbolic order is that the last three years have seen
Russian foreign policy become the new basis for regime legitimization. With the
help of the media Crimea and Syria have been turned into symbols of Russia’s self-
affirmation. Another explanation is that these ideas never left the consciousness of
Russian society. Various pieces of sociological monitoring over two decades have
demonstrated that for many people democracy and liberalism became associated
with decay, which can be overcome only through order, security and the revival of
traditional values. Many comparisons can be drawn with what is happening in the
West, which is witnessing an unprecedented growth of conservative and illiberal
moods. Patriotism in Russia is also fuelled by anti-Russian rhetoric abroad.
European values and Russian interests
There has not been a complete denial of basic Western values amongst the Russian
leadership. Putin, in his speeches and interviews, re-iterates that Russia is a
democratic state and that the rule of law should be preserved and improved. He
holds meetings with human rights activists and talks about the necessity of building
closer ties between the state and civil society. This proves, once again, that Russian
values and ideology remain a labyrinth full of contradictions. The Russian ruling
elite tries to follow two paths at the same time, striving to find a balance between
constitutional, democratic principles and what it considers extensive neoliberalism
imposed by the West. At the same time, Russian elites support many basic neoliberal
ideas on the condition that they are implemented carefully in a Russian context.
Values are, however, especially in international relations, secondary to pragmatism
for the Russian state. That is why it is easier for Moscow to build bilateral contacts
with separate European countries, regardless of the ideology of their ruling parties,
than with Brussels. Russia finds it easierto find common ground with representatives
of national elites than with the more values-driven European institutions, which
explains why EU-Russia relations are reduced to narrow business and academic
discussions.
What is also visible is that Europe is not becoming less attractive to Russia: there
remain pragmatic interests in common between both sides. Moscow understands
that Europe is Russia’s strongest link to global markets. This does not answer
the question of whether pragmatic interests can lead to a consolidation of politics

Pavel Kanevskiy 43
and values, but it does show the only road Russia is prepared to follow in today’s
conditions. This pragmatic vision does not go unchallenged in Moscow, however,
with various groups advocating for isolation or a reorientation to the east. These
arguments are lacking in logic but they do gain traction in the media and with the
public.
There are, then, many reasons why Russia follows its current political path. It would
be an oversimplification to say that the post-Crimea crisis in relations has changed
things dramatically.
Firstly, social groups that can be labelled as liberally oriented, and which should
have become a basis for a strong middle class, are still a relative minority in Russia,
concentrated in big cities. Those who constitute the contemporary middle class
in Russia often come from the bureaucracy, state-controlled organisations or the
corporate sector. Opportunities for SMEs are shrinking. The level of inequality in
Russia is striking: people have limited chances to improve their economic condition
independently of the state by using their entrepreneurial skills.
Secondly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has never refuted the
vertical power structure other than for a short period in 1991-1993 when there was
a strong parliament. The constitution accepted in 1993 paved the way for a clear
imbalance in favour the executive branch and the dominance of the presidential
power. It is this imbalance which is primarily responsible for the formulation of
foreign policy, balanced only nominally by a weak parliament and fragmented civil
society. Russia’s split with the West is a continuation of Russia’s top-down approach
in which everything depends on the balance between the political centre and the
elite. This makes policy much more vulnerable to behavioural attitudes, because it is
facilitated by a very limited number of actors. Both in terms of its relations with the
EU and implementation of its domestic policies, Russia traditionally relies heavily on
the administrative hierarchy.
In the area of strategic economic development, Russia faces the same challenges as
it has done for decades. Russia still wants to be a country with a constantly growing,
diversified economy, less dependent on energy exports, technologically advanced
and competitive on a global scale and whose citizens enjoy a high quality of life. This
gives rise to the question of whether it is more likely to achieve these goals under
the government’s austere control or by giving more freedom to individual citizens
who could start building a ‘bottom-up’ model.
Current developments show that Russia’s own response to the ‘vulnerabilities’ of
the Western liberal model is more bureaucratic capitalism and regime conservation,

which may be effective in the short-term but is unlikely to help in the long-term. We
should not forget that the Soviet Union collapsed because it was structurally and
economically inefficient. Despite having great human potential, the Soviet model
never managed to transform itself into a competitive market. Today, Russia has all
the necessary normative and economic frameworks to break the vicious circle of
history and become the modernised, enlightened country it has always aspired to be.
In fact, since the early 1990s, Russia has already changed tremendously, becoming
much more open, globalised and market friendly. Meanwhile, many internal and
external barriers are still in place.
Russia did not implement many necessary reforms or find a consensus on how
to manage its integration into the global market. Some groups in Russian society
managed to integrate themselves into the global system, some did not. It is important
to recognize that selective integration was caused not only by domestic political
obstacles but also by the unwillingness of many actors inside the European Union
to truly engage Russia. This is something that should not be ignored when talking
about the failures of Russian-European rapprochement.
Towards the return to Russia’s European vector?
After its break-up with the EU, the question is whether Russia will be able to continue
achieving its strategic goals. Export-led growth has its limits and, considering that
the world has entered an age of lower oil prices and tightening competition in the
hydrocarbons market, it will be difficult for Russia to sustain its energy-dependent
industry without the inflow of European technology, capital and managerial skills.
Recent developments, including the evolution of the Eurasian Economic Union
and closer ties with China, do not make the picture clearer as they haven’t had a
significant impact on the Russian economy, state or society. If China is to become
Russia’s next major partner in the modernisation process, it is very likely that the
same barriers that have always existed with Western partners will come into play.
Russia will use the known ‘energy for technologies’ exchange model but it is likely
that uncertainty of investment rules, lack of guarantees and declining technological
potential will fail to attract Chinese capital, except for limited interest in oil and gas
industries. It is an understandable path to diversify Russia’s trade structure, but it
may prove impossible to substitute Asia for Europe.
For Russia, divorce from the European Union and the West means that the task of
modernisation is going get harder. However, one should avoid seeing Russia as a
static model. In fact, both Russia’s economy and society are highly dynamic, if not
volatile. Althoughthe currenttrend mayseem like a retreat from European integration,
Russia is still inseparable from the more general processes of globalisation, which

Pavel Kanevskiy 45
cannot simply be reversed. In this sense, history provides many lessons which
are waiting to be learned. For instance, for Peter the Great, the prime importance
of Europe was in terms of achieving such pragmatic goals as military-industrial
modernization, state building and economic development. However, it also brought
changes to the core of Russian society and its power structure. Peter’s reforms,
inspired by Europe, laid the foundation for the much better developed country he
left his successors. Another example is the historical struggle between republican
and monarchic ideas in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, when Russia stood
on the winning side of the monarchies. However, the long-term effect of this on
Russian policies gave birth to ideas of constitutionalism and led the way for the
liberal reforms of Alexander II.
The last quarter century has shown that consolidation and harmonisation with
European norms and values, although thorny, was an understandable path towards
more openness and democratisation in Russian society. That the process is
incomplete is due to miscalculations, mistakes, outdated stereotypes and prematurely
over-optimistic moods on the part of both the EU and Russia. This has served to
weaken Russian proponents of a European trajectory.
Russia continues to face the same problems that any other developing country does.
At the same time, Russia is a European country that should be considered as an
equal member of the European family by its citizens, its leadership and the West.
Russia needs to continue its search for societal consensus based on the ideals of
human development, economic prosperity, the rule of law, individual freedoms and
democracy. That consensus will be impossible to find without the re-establishment
of closer contacts and trust with its European partners on systemic, symbolical and
inter-personal levels. There are manymechanismsthat can help facilitate a new stage
of relations, from establishing deeper levels of human contacts and technological
cooperation to establishing clearer investment rules and greater exchange of
information on crucial issues. Any attempt to dig more trenches between Russia
and Europe and to rely on the use of geopolitical logic to justify Russia’s historical
uniqueness and isolation will never bring about regional stability or help Russia’s
strategic development goals.

Hanna Smith 47
2014: A watershed for the image of Russia among the
citizens of EU Member States
Hanna Smith
Image is an important factor in international relations. Facts matter, but perceptions
matter even more; when nothing positive can be found in reality, hope, expectations
and beliefs can still promote a positive image. In international relations, it is possible to
promote a number of perceptions: economic relations can be presented as improving,
even if this picture is contradicted by some statistics; security cooperation can be
based on untested ideas about common threats and interests and an atmosphere of
trust and friendly curiosity can be created through increased social interactions (for
example, travel, NGO cooperation and joint cultural activities).
Cracks in Russia’s image prior to 2014
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the
Russian Federation pursued the strategy of promoting positive perceptions about
its relationship with Europe and other Western countries. Many will remember
“Gorbymania” in the West. Suspicion towards the Soviet Union still prevailed in the
West, but the change in Gorbachev’s tone and policy line promoting the idea of
the “Common European Home”, interdependence, universal values and all-human
interests could not be ignored.90
The predominantly positive image of Russia in the
early 1990s was based on hopes and expectations of rapid democratisation and
liberalisation, as well as on the expectation that the foreign policy line of Gorbachev’s
New Thinking would continue even after the fall of the Soviet Union. Longstanding
admiration in the West for Russia’s cultural achievements provided a basis, at least
for many intellectuals, for hoping that Russia would now rediscover its place in
Europe. After 1991, the perception that Russians had overthrown communism and
were embracing democracy added to this existing goodwill.
However, keeping up an appearance just for the sake of it is not easy. The positive
image of Russia based on hope, potential and beliefs had started to suffer already
during the first half of the 1990s because of an ailing Russian economy, the First
Chechen War, Russian internal political infighting and reports of corruption and
crime. Western hopes were disappointed by the apparent turn towards a more
authoritarian mode of government after President Yeltsin’s 1993 confrontation with
90 Brown, Archie (1997), The Gorbachev Factor, Oxford University Press

Parliament, the process of privatisation and the way in which it was conducted,
and so on. The shift in hopes and expectations started to cast a shadow over future
potential. The change of image also had consequences forpolicy. Too rapid a Russian
integration into European structures was not viewed positively by EU countries,
while, at the same time, the transformation of former East European countries from
communism to market economies and towards democracy was rewarded with EU
and NATO integration. Russian initiatives to lift the OSCE to the core of a common
European security architecture received a lukewarm reception at best and NATO
enlargement was based, in part, on the image of Russia as a threat, rather than
on the idea of enlarging a security community seeking cooperation with Russia.
Russian membership in the Council of Europe is an exception but, even there, the
negotiation process was overshadowed by Russian internal events that reduced the
level of trust between Russia and EU member countries as well as between other
members of the Council of Europe. The Russian think-tank the Council of Foreign
and Defence Policy of the Russian Federation published a report in 1997 which
concluded that Russia’s image in the West was negative, characterised by such
stereotypes as “Russia is seen a military threat of a new type” and as a “criminal and
corrupt state”, with negative consequences for Russian business.91
There have been conflicting interpretations by Russia and the European Union
member states about why it is so difficult to change the negative image of Russia.
The Russian regime’s understanding of why Russia was seen in the early 2000s
by its European neighbours as “an alien country, strange, unfathomable, even at
times barbarous”92
was quite simplified. President Vladimir Putin provided his
diagnosis of the situation in 2004, stating, “Perceptions of Russia are often far from
the reality. There are also frequent planned campaigns to discredit this country,
apparently damaging both for the state and for the national business.”93
Partly as
a result of this analysis, in the past decade Russia has sought to actively promote
its image abroad by launching the English language TV news channel Russia Today
(RT), funding research at European universities, putting on a grandiose display
for global consumption at the Sochi Olympics and promoting Russian culture and
sporting achievement generally. However, these efforts often backfired among
91 Council on Foreign and Defence Policy of the Russian Federation (1997), ‘Imidzh Rossii
I rossiiskogo biznesa v zapadnykh sredstvakh massovoi informatsii’, http://www.svop.ru/files/
meetings/m033313383622111.pdf, accessed 19.02.2017
92 Lo, Bobo (2003), Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford:
Blackwell
93 Putin, V (2004), Address at the Plenary Session of the Russian Fedearion Ambassadors
and Permanent Representatives Meeting, 12 July, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/22545, accessed 19.02.2017

Hanna Smith 49
a public already suspicious of anything seen to emanate from the Russian state.
The overt politicisation and biased coverage of RT, the corruption associated with
the construction of the Olympic facilities at Sochi and an ever-growing tornado
of revelations and accusations of Russian cheating in sport, have outweighed, in
the minds of the European public, any admiration they might have had for Russian
achievements.
The expert community expressed a more nuanced view than did the official Russian
one as to why Russia lacked popularity in the West. Andrei Tsygankov explained in
the mid-2000s that one of the reasons for a negative image of Russia in Europe
and other Western countries was because Russia “no longer matters” and that the
problem was more a lack of visibility than the lack of a favourable image.94
From
the perspectives of other European countries, analysts did not agree that there
had been “planned campaigns” or that, in Europe, Russia mattered more than in
the United States. The prevailing EU perspective was that the negative image of
Russia was down to Russia itself: the way Russian society worked, how the different
political groups operated, how sometimes frequent infighting occurred even inside
the same political groups, how the Russian military was used in Chechnya and how
freedom of expression and political opposition were treated. The expansion of the
EU and NATO to include countries formerly part of the Soviet Union or of communist
Eastern Europe put an additional strain on Russia’s standing in those organisations.
Countries like the Baltic States and Poland were predisposed, for historical reasons,
to view Russia with suspicion and hostility.
Something that also has to be kept in mind when examining the perception of Russia
among EU member countries is that there are several competing images and not
everything is black and white. Different images exist not only among the different
countries, but also within them.95,96
The image of Russia depends, to a large extent,
on the historical memory and relations of each country. Thus it is not only the
history of the Cold War and its ideological divide which matter, but also the history of
Europe and Russian imperialism before the revolution of 1917. Valentina Feklyunina
has shown in her extensive study that there are also wide ranging differences within
each country among public opinion, the mass media, political and business or expert/
academic elites. She has shown that the predominantly negative image of Russia
was stronger among political elites and the mass media and to some extent among
the expert community and some business circles. Public opinion seemed to be less
94 Tsygankov 2005, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power’ Post-Soviet
Affairs, 21, 2, 132-158
95 Leonard, Mark and Popescu, Nicu (2007), A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, European
Council Foreign Relations, ECFR Paper 02, November.
96 David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie and Haukkala, Hiski (2013), National perspectives on Russia,
European Foreign Policy in Making, Routledge

negative and closer to neutral towards Russia.97
However, even public opinion polls,
such as the German Marshall Fund’s annual surveys ‘Transatlantic Trends’, when
looked at over the long term, became less favourable towards Russia during Putin’s
second term in office, turning more negative than positive.98
The watershed of 2014
The dynamics of Russia’s image among European countries before 2014 were
based, to a large extent, on historical memory and views on developments in Russian
internal politics. Interestingly, the war in Georgia in 2008 did not have as big an
effect on European views of Russia as did the two earlier Chechen wars or the 2003
arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The biggest watershed leading towards emergence
of a more negative image was the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in
the Donbas in 2014. The Marshall Fund’s survey for 2014 showed a 68% negative
opinion in 2014, compared to 62% in 2013 and 55% in 2012.
Similar findings emerge from the Pew Research Center’s 2015 poll relating to the
image of Russia As in the Marshall Fund’s survey, the image of Russia had sunk to
an all-time low. In all the big countries in Europe, the image of Russia became 10-
20 per cent less favourable compared with the previous poll (percentage negative
assessments of Russia: Poland 80%, Germany 70%, France 70%, Italy 69, Spain
66%, the United Kingdom 66%). Germany was the most striking example. In 2010
the image of Russia was more positive than negative, with over half of Germans
viewing Russia positively. In 2015 the figure for positive assessments dropped to
27%. It is important to bear in mind that opinion polls always have a margin of error.
Nevertheless, a shift on this scale demonstrates that a real change occurred as a
result of events in 2014.99
97 Feklyunina, Valentina (2009), National Images in International Relations: Putin’s Russia and
the West, PhD, Department of Politics, Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences, University of
Glasgow
98 German Marshall Fund’s annual surveys ‘Transatlantic Trends- key fundings’ (2014), with
the Compagnia di San Paolo and supported by the Barrow Cadbury Trust, the Fundacion BBVA
and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The survey covers ten EU member countries: France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. http://trends.gmfus.org/
files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf
99 Stokes, Bruce , Wike Richard and Poushter Jacob, (2016), Europeans Face the World
Divided Many question national influence and obligations to allies, but share desire for greater EU
role in global affairs, PewResearchCentre, June, 16, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Pew-Research-Center-EPW-Report-FINAL-June-13-2016.pdf Accessed
19.02.2017

Hanna Smith 51
The Pew poll also made a distinction between the image of Russia as a country and
the image of President Putin’s regime.. The negative attitude towards the regime
was significantly higher than that towards the image of Russia. The strongest critics
of Putin’s regime, according to the poll, were Spain (92%), Poland (87%) and France
(85%) in that order.100
In the Marshall Foundation’s survey the countries appeared
in the same order, with the exception that Sweden (77%) held third place before
France. When it came to the image of Russia as distinct from the regime, Sweden
(78%) and Netherlands (73%) held the most unfavourable opinions in the EU.
Similar conclusions, although derived from a different starting point, are included in
an annual Finnish survey conducted by the Advisory Board for Defence Information
(ABDI). The ABDI survey mainly focuses on questions relating to security. Here, the
underlying factor is an understanding that state actions and policies influence the
feeling of security in neighbouring countries. In 2010 only 28 per cent saw Russian
policies as having a negative effect on Finnish security. In 2016 the number was 50
per cent.101
This is a very significant change, taking into account that Finnish long-
term policy towards Russia has always been constructive and accommodating. That
policy was feasible while the belief was that the Russian state was a responsible
actor, a belief that suffered a blow in 2014.
The difference between opinion on the Russian regime and President Putin, as
opposed to opinion on Russia and the Russians, is noteworthy. National opinion
polls back up the findings of the Marshall Foundation and Pew Research Centre. In
Germany, a survey carried out by TNS Emnid on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
and the Public Affairs Institute in Poland led the CEO of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
to conclude that, “Russia under Putin may have lost considerable support among
Germans, but this is not the case for Russians as such. Acceptance for Russians in
certain social roles, such as a colleague or a neighbour, has not suffered.”102
100 Stokes, Bruce, (2015), ‘Russia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World Russia’s
Image Trails U.S. across All Regions’, PewResearchCentre, August 5, http://www.pewglobal.
org/2015/08/05/russia-putin-held-in-low-regard-around-the-world/, accessed 19.02.2017
101 ABDI, Advisory Board for Defence Information, (2016), Suomalaisten mielipiteitä ulko –
ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta, maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta (Finnish opinions of foreign and
security policy, land defense and security), December 1, http://www.defmin.fi/files/3573/MTS_
mielipdietutkimsuraportti_joukuu_2016.pdf
102 BS, Bertelsmann Stiftung, (2016), Stress test for German-Russian relations, April 22,
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/our-projects/strengthening-and-connecting-europe/news/
stress-test-for-german-russian-relations/ , accessed 19.02.2017

These changing Finnish and German views on Russia are good indicators of how
significantly the war in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea have impacted
on Russia’s image in Europe. There have always been countries and societies
with more negative attitudes towards Russia, largely for historical reasons. Some
countries, such as Bulgaria, Greece and the Czech Republic, have historically had a
more positive image of Russia. Finland and Germany, however, have a mixed history
of both warring and cooperating with Russia. The historical factors, even though
they are present, have been pushed aside in favour of interest-based cooperation
and realities. It is true that German and Finnish opinions have been influenced by
internal Russian events, such as the two Chechen wars, Khodorkovsky’s arrest,
corruption scandals, and reports of crime, political infighting or the Pussy Riot case.
It is also true, however, that nothing, not even the 2008 war in Georgia, has changed
views towards the Russian state and regime as significantly as have the events of
2014. While more comprehensive research has yet to be done to explore closely
this shift in European attitudes, it reflects the stance taken by the main European
leaders. Whereas in 2008 there had been more understanding of Russia’s actions
which had been provoked, according to the official EU report on the Georgia war, by
Georgia making the first openly hostile act, there was no such talk in 2014. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s apparent decision that enough was enough with Russia
was in line with public attitudes.
The Pew Research Centre also conducted another survey, in summer 2016, which
looked more at perceptions of Russia as a threat and the type of policies the European
Union should adopt towards Russia. Considering the question of Russia as a threat
to the EU, 34% of respondents saw Russia as a major threat, 48% a minor threat
and 16% not a threat. More nuanced and highly divided views came through when
considering the EU’s Russia policy and when comparing Russia to China and the
US. The Survey found that supporters of the European rightwing parties all have
more confidence that Putin’s Russia will do the right thing regarding world affairs:
supporters of Alternative for Germany (49%), Front National in France (31%),
Northern League in Italy (46%), UK Independence Party (28%), Party for Freedom
in Netherlands (26%) and Sweden Democrats (21%). It is noteworthy that not even
all supporters of the right wing parties, including some whose leadership express
praise for Russia as a strong state, agree fully on Russia. Large numbers of those
supporting such parties answered “hard to say” to the question about confidence in
Putin’s Russia.103
103 Taylor, Kyle, (2017), Europeans favoring right-wing populist parties are more positive
on Putin , PewResearchCentre, January 24, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/24/
europeans-favoring-right-wing-populist-parties-are-more-positive-on-putin/, accessed 19.02.2017

Hanna Smith 53
Conclusion
The question of image has been explored by international academic and expert
communities for decades. Perceived threats and opportunities may provide
motivation for policies and perceptions of relative power and can determine, too, the
choice of policy tools. Cultural factors also influence assessments. In the 1990s and
2000s, the image of Russia among the general public in other European countries
was neither that of a threat, nor of a big opportunity, but fairly neutral, although, in
some cases, the tendency was to look down on Russia. Political elites, the business
community and experts were more divided on the question of how much of a threat
Russia was and how much an opportunity. Russian internal events mattered but
tended to reinforce existing images of Russia,, which varied among countries and
among different groups .
It seems that events in 2014 changed something rather fundamental in Russia’s
relations with different EU member countries. The trust that had existed between
Russia and most EU member states suffered a blow which had not been seen in
opinion polls since the fall of the Soviet Union or, indeed, since the Cold War. This
trust, based on perceptions, beliefs, hopes and expectations, will take a long time to
be restored. Some cause for optimism remains in the fact that the negativity from
the side of the EU member states is much more focused towards the state, the state
system and the current regime in Russia, than towards the population and Russia
as a nation.

Natalia Evtikhevich 55
The impact of tensions between the EU and Russia at the
people-to-people level
Natalia Evtikhevich
In discussions between experts from Russia and the EU there are often many
areas of common interest discussed. Such discussions often include cooperation
in science and technology, promoting regional and trans-border cooperation, and
people-to-people contacts. In other words, both sides focus on the less political
aspects of relations. However, in the last three years political tensions have had
some negative impact on Russia-EU relations in education, culture, academic study,
science and innovation, although not as bad an impact as first expected.
There is a tendency to politicise what should be non-political even when it serves
as a vital bridge for maintaining contacts, especially in times of deep political crisis.
This paper summarises the state of people-to-people relations between Russia and
the EU, and makes recommendations as to how to improve the situation.
Student exchange and academic ties
In 2014 some experts were sure that sanctions would have negative impact on
collaboration between EU and Russia in the field of education.104
According to information from the Erasmus+ office in Russia, however, sanctions
have not affected educational programmes. Cooperation between Russia and the
EU goes on and the volume of credit mobility105
has actually grown. In 2015, credit
mobility among students and teachers from Russia to the EU stood at 1916 people
per year and from the EU to Russia at 1238 people. In 2016, the numbers increased
to 2187 and 1572 respectively. For the German Academic Exchange Service
(DAAD), sanctions have not discouraged their activities in Russia. Indeed they plan
104 Sanctions against Russia hinder cooperation in higher education// Helsinki Times,
November 4, 2014 http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/12636-sanctions-
against-russia-hinder-cooperation-in-higher-education.html
105 Credit mobility can be defined as a limited period of study or traineeship abroad (in the
framework of on-going studies at a home institution) for the purpose of gaining credits. After the
mobility phase, students return to their home institution, where the credits are recognized and they
complete their studies. Erasmus + International credit mobility, https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/
file/838/download

on hosting an international summer school on “Russian Studies and EU-Russia
Relations” in 2017106
.
According to the head of the EU delegation to Russia, Vygaudas Usackas, “The
European Union plans to strengthen cooperation with Russia in the spheres of
science, culture, education and the arts”. In a 2016 interview, the EU envoy pointed
out that the bloc spends almost 28 million euros to allow 3,500 Russian students to
attend EU universities for periods ranging from three to nine months. According to
Usackas, these efforts are the best example that the European Union “has always
advocated respectful relations in these areas.”107
It is in Russia’s interest to preserve and develop student and academic exchange
with the EU, as the exchanges are a major part of the internationalisation programs
of Russian universities that has been in the limelight in recent years. Granted,
students from Asian countries have demonstrated a high level of interest in obtaining
education in Russia and there is now a trend in Russia of inviting scholars from Asia,
but such internationalisation programs should remain multipronged.
Science and innovation
The Russia-EU record in STI (Science and Technology Industries) cooperation is
relatively stable, although Russia-EU tensions and sanctions imposed by the US and
EU have influenced the rate of progress in this field of interaction.
Some new practical difficulties have emerged that had not existed before the crisis
in mutual relations. Russian scientists and researchers have complained that it has
become more difficult to publish articles in European journals. They have no access
to foreign grants and scientific supports. The Institute of the Chemical Physics
Problems of the Russian Academy of Science, in particular, received a number of
refusals.108
Some of the researchers link this to existing sanctions and an overall
crisis in Russia-EU relations.
106 DAAD Summer School 2017, http://beuc.petrsu.ru/daad2017.html
107 The European Union plans to strengthen cooperation with Russia in the sphere of science,
culture, education and the arts, Vygaudas Usackas, the head of the EU delegation to Russia, said
Wednesday. Sputnik, 20.04.2016 https://sputniknews.com/europe/201604201038346324-envoy-
cooperation-eu/
108 Российским ученым отказывают в публикациях и грантах за границей//Известия,
12.09.2014 http://izvestia.ru/news/576607

The regime of sanctions also creates uncertainties for international investors, who
are unwilling to invest in scientific RD projects. There are examples of international
companies stopping exports to Russia of scientific equipment crucial for conducting
some types of research.109
On the other hand, there are some positive examples. In spite of the political situation,
the “EU-Russia Year of Science 2014” was launched. The goal of the project was
to promote and encourage technological cooperation between Russia and the EU.
The Year of Science marked a new stage of cooperation and coincided with the
start of the new EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, Horizon
2020, and a new Russian Federal Targeted Programme, “Research Development
in Priority Areas of Development of the Russian Scientific Technological
Complex, 2014-2020”. Both programmes share the goal of increasing economic
competitiveness by supporting forward-looking exploratory science and innovative
market-oriented research. The EU-Russia Agreement on Science and Technology
Cooperation was renewed in February 2014 for another five-year term and serves
as a solid basis for cooperation.110
Russia-EU STI cooperation has been effective in megaprojects.111
Russia and the
EU actively collaborate on a number of research infrastructure initiatives, including
the EU X-ray Free-Electron Laser (XFEL) and the Facility for Antiproton and Ion
Research (FAIR), the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), and
the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN)112
.
109 Russian scientists squeezed by sanctions, Kremlin policies, Phys.org, January 20, 2015,
https://phys.org/news/2015-07-russian-scientists-sanctions-kremlin-policies.html Russian
sanctions hurt chemical industry, Chemistry World, November 13, 2014 https://www.chemistryworld.
com/news/russian-sanctions-hurt-chemical-industry-/7963.article
110 EU-Russia Year of Science. 12 months of excellence and cooperation in science, higher
education and innovation, http://www.bilat-rus.eu/_media/EU-Russia_YoS_2014_brochure_2nd_
edition_15_Mar_2015.pdf
111 Kanevskiy P. A new stage of Russian-European relations through the lens of science,
technology and innovation cooperation/2014-2015 Hurford next generation fellowship research
papers http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2016/08/01/888a5519/A%20
new%20stage%20of%20Russian%20European%20relations%20through%20the%20lens%20
of%20science%20technology%20and%20innovation%20cooperation%20Pavel%20Kanevskiy.pdf
112 The Russian Federation and the European Union, Delegation of the European Union to
Russia, 10.05.2016 (EU)https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/720/node/720_en

The majority of the megaprojects are in the area of physics. As discussed at a
meeting on Russia-EU relations at the Russian International Affairs Council,113
there are several scientific centres in Russia which have developed wide contacts,
cooperation and successful joint project working with European centres, among
them the TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) and the National Research
Centre Kurchatov Institute. Russia and the EU cooperate on STI in the frameworks
of Horizon 2020 projects, though the cooperation is limited in comparison with the
previous framework programme.
One of the obstacles in the way of Russia-EU cooperation in STI is a lack of
information on the activities of Russia and Russian research centres in this area.
One initiative that has been launched by Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for
CIS issues, expat compatriots and international humanitarian cooperation) to work
out awareness-raising programs, and to try to facilitate contacts between Russian
and European scientists.
Visa liberalisation
Student, academic and scientific exchanges themselves are not enough to improve
the overall situation in Russia-EU relations and people-mobility in general. According
to a European Parliament report, in the first nine months of 2015, Russians made 11
million trips to EU countries, 27% less than during the corresponding period a year
earlier.114
The decline can be attributed to economic sanctions and the fact that a
devalued ruble made travelling abroad too expensive for many Russians. However,
as the statistics of 2015 and 2016 show, Russia is still the largest applicant for
Schengen visas,115
with over 3 million applications per year.
One way to increase people-to-people contacts would be for the EU to liberalise its
visa regime for Russian citizens. The dialogue between Russia and the EU on visa
liberalisation was launched in 2006 and made some progress, but was suspended
in 2014. The EU views a visa-free regime with Russia as a significant concession,
113 Negative trends in Russia-EU relations can be overcome, Russian International Affairs
Council, 24.03.2016, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=7445#top-content
114 The EU’s Russia policy. Five guiding principles, Briefing, October 2016 http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589857/EPRS_BRI(2016)589857_EN.pdf.
115 Schengen visa info, http://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-statistics-third-
country-2015 http://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-statistics-third-country-2016/

even if the EU could also benefit from it through deepening the ties in the fields of
education, academic study, science and innovation. Visa liberalisation is desirable,
but is unlikely to happen in the short term due to the current political situation.
Opinion polls
Following the Ukraine crisis and the imposition of sanctions against Russia, the
attitude of Russians toward the EU expressed in public opinion polls, has deteriorated.
In 2014, the proportion of those with a positive view of the EU dropped dramatically
and negative views shot upward. According to the Levada Center’s opinion poll,
published in October 2014, a majority of Russians (68%) expressed criticism
and resentment against Europe. Only 16% Russians had a favourable view of the
European Union.116
This poll also demonstrated a high increase in negative attitudes
toward the EU compared with the pre-crisis period. For instance, the percentage of
Russians who expressed strong negative sentiments toward Europe increased from
1% in January 2014 to 16% in September 2016.
According to another survey from the same period, conducted by the Independent
Research Agency, in April 2014 EU policy towards Russia was supported by just
11% of respondents. Most Russians viewed European policy as unacceptable and the
poll showed 45% of Russian respondents expressing a negative view of Europe.117
Finally, a survey funded by NORC at the University of Chicago and conducted in
November-December 2014, showed that Russian public opinion of the European
Union had declined sharply since 2012 and that nearly half of Russians had an
unfavourable view of the European Union (49%). The majority of Russians saw the
European Union as an adversary. However, a significant majority maintained that
Russia should try to cooperate with and improve relations with specific European
countries. Russian respondents are, however, divided when it comes to Western
European countries. More Russians express negative attitudes about the United
Kingdom (31% unfavourable vs. 18% favourable) and Germany (30% unfavourable
vs. 20% favourable).Opinion was almost evenly split on France (26% favourable vs.
23% unfavourable).118
116 Россияне против всех, Левада центр, 03.10.2014 http://www.levada.ru/2014/10/03/
rossiyane-protiv-vseh/
117 Independent Research Agency, http://www.bashkirova-partners.ru/news/results/
evropejskij-soyuz-v-zerkale-rossijskogo-obshhestvennogo-mneniya.html
118 Public Opinion in Russia: Russians’ Attitudes on Foreign Affairs and Social Issues, NORC
Center for Public Affairs Research http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/
public-opinion-in-russia-russians-attitudes-on-foreign-affairs-and-social-issues0401-6253.aspx.

Atthebeginningof2015,nearly71%ofrespondentsstilldemonstratedanunfavourable
attitude towards the EU.119
However, the Levada Center found that Russians were
beginning to have more flexible views about their European partners, or, at least,
the percentage of negative views had stopped rising.120
In early 2016, views of the
EU had actually improved somewhat. 28% of Russians voiced a favourable opinion
of the EU, whereas in 2014, as referred to above, just 16% expressed favourable
sentiments121
. However, negative attitudes remained predominant overall. In late
2016, 58% of respondents answered that they have, in general, bad’ and ‘very bad’
attitudes towards the EU.122
There has been similar concern about the possibility of a new Cold war. In particular,
recent polls showed 31% of Russians concerned about increasing tensions between
Russia and the West. Moreover, according to polls conducted in November 2014,
nearly 25% of respondents were convinced that Russia was actually at war with
Western powers.123
In 2015 another Russian sociological pollster, Public Opinion Fund, conducted a
survey about Russian-European relations. It demonstrated that 43% of Russians
polled believed that the EU did not want to cooperate with Russia, whereas 37%
held the opposite opinion.124
In their next opinion poll conducted in 2016, 73% of
respondents believed that Russia-EU relations had deteriorated. However, the
majority of Russians supported the view that Russia should aim to have good
relations and fruitful dialogue with Europe. The poll results suggested that Russians
also believed the state should make some effort to improve its relationship with the
EU.125
The Levada Centre conducted an opinion poll from 31 March to 3 April 2017 on the
issue of Russia’s perception of the world. The results of this survey showed that
in 2017 Russians’ views of the EU had improved. In March 2017, 35% of Russians
voiced a favourable opinion of the EU, while in May 2016, just 25% of participants
expressed the same sentiment. However, in 2017, a majority of Russians, some
119 Международныеотношения,Левадацентр,09.02.2015http://www.levada.ru/2015/02/09/
mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya/
120 Мониторинг отношения россиян к другим странам: сентябрь, Левада центр, 22.09.2015
http://www.levada.ru/2015/09/22/monitoring-otnosheniya-rossiyan-k-drugim-stranam-sentyabr/
121 Власть меняет курс в сторону Запада, Левада центр, 07.04.2016, http://www.levada.
ru/2016/04/07/vlast-menyaet-kurs-v-storonu-zapada/
122 Международныеотношения,Левадацентр,19.10.206,http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/19/
mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-3/
123 Пресс-выпуск2726,ВЦИОМ,01.12.2014,https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236uid=115071
124 Россия и Европа: вектор отношений, ФОМ, 05.08.2015, http://fom.ru/Mir/12265
125 Россия и Европа: характер отношений, ФОМ, 15.02.2016 http://fom.ru/Mir/12522

53%, still demonstrated an unfavourable attitude towards the EU, albeit this is less
of a majority than in May 2016.126
Expert level
Regrettably, the Ukraine and Russia-West crises also influence expert-level
dialogue. The key mission of this dialogue is to try and reach consensus and to
produce recommendations to respective governments on how to improve relations.
International encounters between pundits often descend into mutual accusation,
and propaganda is very frequently employed rather than agreed facts established
by research and deep, unbiased analysis. There is an urgent need to resume
constructive dialogue and a joint search for solutions to the challenges facing the
global community, or a new modus vivendi.
Although Russian and Western experts may differ on their interpretation of events
and codes of behaviour, they need to reach consensus on basic principles and
establish a common denominator in their approaches to dealing with the Russia-
West controversy.
Academics and analysts often complain that decision-makers pay scant attention to
their recommendations. What is needed to make research more systematic, covering
broader groups of problems, are more frequent, formal contacts between research
centres, institutes and think tanks in Russia and the EU, rather than informal links
between individual researchers. Recommendations arising from joint working
among such institutions would be more persuasive and influential in the long run.
Decision makers tend to respond to current events and rarely have time to act with
the relatively distant future in mind. For that reason, the focus of research must be
on how to offer a longer-term perspective to the decision makers
In the recent foreign policy documents, EU Global Strategy and the Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, both Russia and the EU supported
greater engagement of civil society and people-to-people contacts and called for
developments in this dimension.
One example of such institutional cooperation is a network of Russia-EU think-
tanks launched by the Russian International Affairs Council and the Delegation of
126 Россия и мир, Левада-центр, 10.04.2017, http://www.levada.ru/2017/04/10/rossiya-i-
mir-3/

the European Union in 2016.127
The objectives of the network are strengthening
the basis for longer-term engagement between the EU and Russia, promoting
professional exchange among experts from the EU and Russia, influencing decision-
making processes and making experts better aware of of opinion across the
region. The network will continue its work throughout 2017-2018 and, hopefully,
will make a difference in maintaining dialogue on the Track 2 level and working
out recommendations for decision-makers in Russia and the EU. The creation of
effective dialogue formats at all levels, starting from civil society and people-to-
people levels and, from those, to the highest political levels, would contribute to a
more transparent, and predictable relationship.
Conclusions and recommendations
Overall, limited results on the people-to-people level could be viewed as being a
mixed bag. In the period of crisis in Russia-EU relations, sanctions, distrust and
unpredictability, the people-to-people dimension has suffered less than have
political and security relations and cooperation in the economic field. Nevertheless,
the people-to-people dimension has been influenced by the overall atmosphere in
international relations and has been increasingly politicised, although supposed to be
non-political in nature. There have been some negative and disappointing examples:
for instance, the 2014 bilateral Russia-UK and UK-Russia Year of Culture lacked
any high level visits; the “New Wave” music festival, popular among Russians, was
relocated from Jurmala in Latvia to Sochi because of Latvia’s entry restrictions on
some participants.
In view of the various aspects described above, both sides should take the following
steps to overcome these unhealthy trends:
• End mutually hostile rhetoric at international expert-level forums and resume
dialogue in search of common solutions;
• Initiate and maintain cooperation between think tanks and scientific centres on
an institutional, formal level, rather than rely on informal links among selected
experts and scientists and increase the regularity and frequency of joint research
and projects;
• Initiate joint studies to analyse long-term perspectives for relations between
Russia and the West;
127 Евтихевич Н. Острые углы треугольника Россия-ЕС-США, Российский совет по
международным делам, 10.02.2017, http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=8687#top-content

• Focus on the education of the younger generation about and toward the idea of
building a common system of Euro-Atlantic security. A positive mentality can
be built by embedding tolerance of our diverse world and an understanding
of the possibility of achieving global stability by diplomacy, rather than by war,
aggression and ethnic conflict;
• Promote exchange programs for students and researchers, in order to counter
mutual mistrust and misunderstanding;
• Establish groups of young experts to analyse the current crisis and Russia-West
relations, investing thereby in the future of their relationship. One such group,
the Younger Generation Leadership Network (YGLN), instituted as a result of
cooperation among the Russian International Affairs Council, the Nuclear Threat
Initiative and the European Leadership Network, is engaged in joint preparation
of policy briefs which reflect the views of young experts and incorporate
recommendations for action;
• Use social media to create a positive image of Russia in the EU and of the EU
in Russia, highlighting not only negative information, but also positive news; and
• Ease visa regimes, or, at the very least, aim to do so in the longer term.
None of these steps is likely to lead to a dramatic change and rapid improvement in
EU-Russia relations, but they make more sense than simply hoping for some magic,
grand bargain to resolve all tensions. Russia and the EU share plenty of common
interests and the same geographic space; adopting the policies and the small, but
practical, steps suggested above would mark the beginning of efforts to improve the
current situation.

Conclusions65
Conclusions
Lukasz Kulesa, Ivan Timofeev and Joseph Dobbs
When Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative, visited Moscow for the first
time in April 2017, she and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
were able to list some positive examples of contacts and sectoral cooperation based
on a “pragmatic assessment of our respective interests”.128
But, Mogherini added,
it would be “quite surreal” to consider each other strategic partners while having
respective sanctions regimes in place. It would be similarly surreal to draw the same
conclusion from the thoughtful contributions assembled in this collection.
What began in 2013/2014 as a geopolitical dispute with an ideological aspect quickly
became an ideological dispute with a number of concerning geopolitical aspects.
Both sides are convinced that their approach is correct and will prevail in the end.
The situation three years later does not resemble a temporary crisis between two
strategic partners, but rather an emerging “new normal” between two opponents.
This new normal does, however, differ quite significantly from the old normal
that defined the Cold War. Globalisation and hyper-connectivity between people,
powered by new technologies, means that people-to-people contacts and economic
links are sustained at a level that would be difficult to imagine for most 20th
century
adversaries.
Both chapters on the economic impact of strained relations, as well as Natalia
Evtikhevich’s perspective on people-to-people relations, demonstrate that, for some
areas, the general deterioration in EU-Russia relations has been manageable. In
particular it would appear that sanctions have had no decisive economic impact
on either side, despite predictions. Both sides have successfully found ways to
circumvent sanctions or moved to alternative markets, which for the EU in particular
has arguably resulted in more efficiency for some sectors and some Member States.
For Russia it has been low oil prices that have been the primary downward pressure
on the economy, not EU or wider Western sanctions, although neither side’s
sanctions can be described as wide-ranging. The EU remains, despite sanctions
and broader political problems, Russia’s leading trade partner and principal foreign
investor in the Russian economy.
128 See - https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cameroon/24982/remarks-hrvp-mogherini-
joint-press-conference-foreign-minister-russian-federation-sergey_en

While relations between the EU and Russia have been sustained in some areas,
there are worrying and significant areas of decline that have characterised this new
normal. These developments have had and will continue to have a highly corrosive
effect on relations bilaterally and in the wider European space and, most importantly,
will complicate any attempts to improve the broader Russia-West relationship.
Firstly, at the political level, both Russia and the EU increasingly identify themselves
ideologically in opposition to the other. In Russia, as described by Pavel Kanevskiy,
the old ideas of Moscow’s distinct historical path and its devotion to ‘original’
conservative values have been molded into a new symbolic order, distinct from the
ideas embodied by the EU. From a European perspective Joseph Dobbs shows how
the leaders of the European Union and most of its member states are now openly
contrasting their own devotion to a set of ‘European values’ with Russia’s model of
illiberal democracy. Connection to the other side is increasingly viewed with political
suspicion: ‘Russian-friendly’ has become a negative epithet in the Western political
discourse the same way ‘pro-European’ is in Russia.
Secondly, with regard to public perception of the other, it seems that a fundamental
change took place in 2014. Chapters by Hanna Smith and Natalia Evtikhevich
document the dramatic surge in negative assessments of the other side and the
sharp drop in terms of trust. It is important to note that, on the EU side, these trends
are also visible in countries whose populations have been traditionally considered as
more positive towards Russia, including Germany. While the poll numbers appear to
have improved in recent months, the prevailing attitudes of European and Russian
publics towards each other are estrangement and mistrust.
Thirdly, Ukraine and other common neighbourhood countries continue to suffer
from the consequences of the crisis. Beyond the direct costs of fighting in Ukraine
and the economic consequences of the introduction of sanctions, Samuel Charap
and David Cadier draw attention in their chapter to the way in which the competition
between the Russian and EU clashing visions for the common neighbourhood
allows these countries’ leaderships and elites to play one party against the other,
with maintenance of power taking precedence over reducing the dysfunctionalities
of the states in question.
The consequences of the developments over the 2014-17 period, and especially
the three aspects described in this collection of essays, need to be fully grasped
and internalised, especially by decision-makers. The authors in this special report
have outlined many of the costs of the breakdown in EU-Russia relations, for both
sides, but policy-makers need to also be aware of the significant opportunity costs
associated with the current tensions. Both sides will look back on recent history and

Conclusions67
note with regret the many ways in which both sides could have worked together
on many pressing global issues.
Those charged with managing EU-Russia relations need also be aware that the
longer tensions continue the more institutionalised this crisis will become. The
contributors to this special report express their conviction that Russia and the EU
still form part of the same political space and their hope that relations can be
improved, this seems increasingly difficult to conceive in the present circumstances.

Point of Contact
Joseph Dobbs, Research Fellow, ELN
Email: josephd@europeanleadershipnetwork.org
Tel: +44 (0) 203 567 0818
Twitter: @joseph_dobbs
The European Leadership Network (ELN) works to advance the idea of a cooperative and cohesive
Europe and to develop collaborative European capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence and
security policy challenges of our time. It does this through its active network of former and emerging
European political, military, and diplomatic leaders, through its high-quality research, publications
and events, and through its institutional partnerships across Europe, North America, Latin America
and the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on arms control and political/military issues, including both
conventional and nuclear disarmament challenges inside Europe, and has a particular interest in
policy challenges arising in both the eastern and southern peripheries of the continent.
The ELN is a non-partisan, non-profit organisation based in London and registered in the United
Kingdom.

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