1
DNSSEC Made Easy
Arth Paulite
APNIC Infrastructure Services
2
2
What is DNSSEC
• Domain Name System Security Extension
• Protect integrity and authenticity of DNS data
• Uses digital signatures similar to e-mail
• DNSSEC signing
– DNS response is signed by authoritative DNS server
• DNSSEC validation
– DNS resolver verify signature using public key
3
3
DNSSEC Signing
• What is it?
– The process of digitally signing DNS records using cryptographic keys.
– Ensures that DNS data (A, MX, TXT records) hasn’t been tampered with.
• Who does it?
– Domain owners or their hosting providers
• How it works?
– Zone file is signed by their private key
– Copy of public key is published in parent zone
• Purpose
– To prove authenticity and Integrity of DNS data.
4
4
DNSSEC validation
• What is it?
– The process of verifying digital signatures during DNS resolution
• Who does it?
– DNS resolvers ( ISPs or public DNS services like 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 )
• How it works?
– Resolver checks the signature (RRSIG) on DNS records
– It follows the chain of trust from root zone down to domain
– If signature is valid and chain is intact, the data is accepted
• Purpose
– To protect users from getting forged DNS responses
5
5
DNSSEC key components
• Traditional or
– Zone Signing Key (ZSK)
• Used to sign individual DNS records
– Key Signing Key (KSK)
• Used to sign ZSK and KSK
• Delegation Signer (DS)
– Copy of public key (hash) published in parent zone
– Links child zone to parent zone for DNSSEC chain of trust
• Simple
– Combined Signing key (CSK)
• Single key used as KSK and ZSK
6
6
Where do I start
• Use DNSSEC validation everywhere
– Home, work and especially public network
• Test your connection - https://internet.nl
• Use public DNS like 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8
– Running your own DNS Resolver (Opensource)
• BIND - Internet Systems Consortium (ISC)
• Unbound - NLNet Labs
• Knot - CZ.NIC, Operator of .CZ ccTLD
• PowerDNS - Open-Xchange
7
7
PH DNSSEC validation rate
8
8
DNSSEC signing for domain owner
• Use hosting provider with DNSSEC support
– Amazon Route53, Quad9
– Cloudflare free account
• Sufficient basic web caching
• Free DNS hosting
• Automatic DNSSEC signing
• Running your own DNSSEC signer
– Bind
– Knot
– PowerDNS
9
9
Challenges in DNSSEC signing
• DNSSEC policy
– DNSSEC key specs
• algorithm, length
– Key timings
• Key expiry
• Safely retiring used keys
– Signature timings
• Signature validity
• Signature refresh
– Zone timings
– Key rollover
• Regular key replacement
• Generating DS record
• DS record registration to parent
• Operational overhead
– Additional tooling
– Monitoring
– Additional resource, expertise
10
10
Automated DNSSEC policy
Applying default policy
zone ”paulite.art" {
type primary;
file "db.paulite.art";
dnssec-policy default;
};
Bind-9.20 default DNSSEC policy
dnssec-policy "default" {
keys { lifetime unlimited algorithm ecdsa256; };
...
# Key timings
dnskey-ttl PT1H;
publish-safety PT1H;
retire-safety PT1H;
purge-keys P90D;
...
# Signature timings
signatures-refresh P5D;
signatures-validity P14D;
signatures-validity-dnskey P14D;
...
# Zone parameters
max-zone-ttl P1D;
zone-propagation-delay PT5M;
parent-ds-ttl P1D;
parent-propagation-delay PT1H;
};
11
11
Automated DS record registration
• RFC 7344 – Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
– Child Delegation Signer (CDS)
– Child DNSKEY (CDNSKEY)
– Describes how child zones can signal changes to their DS records in the
parent zone
• RFC 8078 – Managing DS Records via CDS/CDNSKEY
– Framework for registries to safely implement RFC7344
• Registry supporting automated DS record registration
– .ch - Switzerland ccTLD
– .cz - Czech Republic ccTLD
12
Manual DS registration
• Perform DNS query for CDS
% dig cds paulite.art
paulite.art. CDS 31498 13 2 ABA02B050B629888C281BA33B208A188AB1…
• Where:
➢ 31498 - key tag or key ID
➢ 13 - algorithm refers to ECDSAP256SHA256
➢ 2 - refers to hash algorithm RSA SHA256
➢ The last part is the 64 hex digit hash of public key
13
Manual DS record registration
godaddy.com DS registration
14
14
Monitoring – dnsviz.net
. ( root )
.art
paulite.art
Status
paulite.art DNSSEC status
15
15
Summary
• DNSSEC validation
– Can be easily achieve using public DNS
– Opensource resolvers perform validation by default
• DNSSEC signing
– Bind-9.20 “default” policy is a good starting point
• Uses recommended algorithm – ECDSAP256SHA256
• Default timings are within recommended range
• Uses CSK that does not expire
• Creates CDS record letting parent pickup DS if supported
• Built-in tool (RNDC) for key rollover
– References
• ISC knowledge base – https://kb.isc.org
• APNIC Academy - Hands-on DNS/DNSSEC lab exercise
16
16
Thank you!

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DNSSEC Made Easy, presented at PHNOG 2025

  • 1. 1 DNSSEC Made Easy Arth Paulite APNIC Infrastructure Services
  • 2. 2 2 What is DNSSEC • Domain Name System Security Extension • Protect integrity and authenticity of DNS data • Uses digital signatures similar to e-mail • DNSSEC signing – DNS response is signed by authoritative DNS server • DNSSEC validation – DNS resolver verify signature using public key
  • 3. 3 3 DNSSEC Signing • What is it? – The process of digitally signing DNS records using cryptographic keys. – Ensures that DNS data (A, MX, TXT records) hasn’t been tampered with. • Who does it? – Domain owners or their hosting providers • How it works? – Zone file is signed by their private key – Copy of public key is published in parent zone • Purpose – To prove authenticity and Integrity of DNS data.
  • 4. 4 4 DNSSEC validation • What is it? – The process of verifying digital signatures during DNS resolution • Who does it? – DNS resolvers ( ISPs or public DNS services like 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 ) • How it works? – Resolver checks the signature (RRSIG) on DNS records – It follows the chain of trust from root zone down to domain – If signature is valid and chain is intact, the data is accepted • Purpose – To protect users from getting forged DNS responses
  • 5. 5 5 DNSSEC key components • Traditional or – Zone Signing Key (ZSK) • Used to sign individual DNS records – Key Signing Key (KSK) • Used to sign ZSK and KSK • Delegation Signer (DS) – Copy of public key (hash) published in parent zone – Links child zone to parent zone for DNSSEC chain of trust • Simple – Combined Signing key (CSK) • Single key used as KSK and ZSK
  • 6. 6 6 Where do I start • Use DNSSEC validation everywhere – Home, work and especially public network • Test your connection - https://internet.nl • Use public DNS like 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8 – Running your own DNS Resolver (Opensource) • BIND - Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) • Unbound - NLNet Labs • Knot - CZ.NIC, Operator of .CZ ccTLD • PowerDNS - Open-Xchange
  • 8. 8 8 DNSSEC signing for domain owner • Use hosting provider with DNSSEC support – Amazon Route53, Quad9 – Cloudflare free account • Sufficient basic web caching • Free DNS hosting • Automatic DNSSEC signing • Running your own DNSSEC signer – Bind – Knot – PowerDNS
  • 9. 9 9 Challenges in DNSSEC signing • DNSSEC policy – DNSSEC key specs • algorithm, length – Key timings • Key expiry • Safely retiring used keys – Signature timings • Signature validity • Signature refresh – Zone timings – Key rollover • Regular key replacement • Generating DS record • DS record registration to parent • Operational overhead – Additional tooling – Monitoring – Additional resource, expertise
  • 10. 10 10 Automated DNSSEC policy Applying default policy zone ”paulite.art" { type primary; file "db.paulite.art"; dnssec-policy default; }; Bind-9.20 default DNSSEC policy dnssec-policy "default" { keys { lifetime unlimited algorithm ecdsa256; }; ... # Key timings dnskey-ttl PT1H; publish-safety PT1H; retire-safety PT1H; purge-keys P90D; ... # Signature timings signatures-refresh P5D; signatures-validity P14D; signatures-validity-dnskey P14D; ... # Zone parameters max-zone-ttl P1D; zone-propagation-delay PT5M; parent-ds-ttl P1D; parent-propagation-delay PT1H; };
  • 11. 11 11 Automated DS record registration • RFC 7344 – Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance – Child Delegation Signer (CDS) – Child DNSKEY (CDNSKEY) – Describes how child zones can signal changes to their DS records in the parent zone • RFC 8078 – Managing DS Records via CDS/CDNSKEY – Framework for registries to safely implement RFC7344 • Registry supporting automated DS record registration – .ch - Switzerland ccTLD – .cz - Czech Republic ccTLD
  • 12. 12 Manual DS registration • Perform DNS query for CDS % dig cds paulite.art paulite.art. CDS 31498 13 2 ABA02B050B629888C281BA33B208A188AB1… • Where: ➢ 31498 - key tag or key ID ➢ 13 - algorithm refers to ECDSAP256SHA256 ➢ 2 - refers to hash algorithm RSA SHA256 ➢ The last part is the 64 hex digit hash of public key
  • 13. 13 Manual DS record registration godaddy.com DS registration
  • 14. 14 14 Monitoring – dnsviz.net . ( root ) .art paulite.art Status paulite.art DNSSEC status
  • 15. 15 15 Summary • DNSSEC validation – Can be easily achieve using public DNS – Opensource resolvers perform validation by default • DNSSEC signing – Bind-9.20 “default” policy is a good starting point • Uses recommended algorithm – ECDSAP256SHA256 • Default timings are within recommended range • Uses CSK that does not expire • Creates CDS record letting parent pickup DS if supported • Built-in tool (RNDC) for key rollover – References • ISC knowledge base – https://kb.isc.org • APNIC Academy - Hands-on DNS/DNSSEC lab exercise