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Dr. Beth Lautner - VS FMD Strategy
The document outlines strategies and measures for safeguarding animal health against foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), including the biology of the FMD virus, serotype distribution, and recommendations for an antigen bank. It discusses the goals and challenges of FMD response, emphasizing detection, control, and continuity of business while providing insights into response capabilities and vaccination strategies. The document also details historical outbreak data and highlights the importance of preparedness and collaboration among North America’s veterinary services to manage FMD effectively.
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Dr. Beth Lautner - VS FMD Strategy
- 1. Safeguarding Animal Health NationalInstitute for Animal Agriculture April 1, 2014 Beth Lautner, DVM, MS Associate Deputy Administrator, Science, Technology and Analysis Services Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture Veterinary Services Foot-and-Mouth Disease Strategies
- 2. Safeguarding Animal Health Footand Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus Biology • Picornavirus family, Apthovirus genus • 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 • Multiple topotypes (substrains tied to geographical region) within each serotype
- 3. Safeguarding Animal Health PresumptiveFMD Prevalence
- 4. Safeguarding Animal Health4 FMD Serotype Distribution
- 5. Recommendations from WRLFMDstrains to be included in FMDV antigen bank HIGH PRIORITY O Manisa O PanAsia-2 O BFS or Campos A24 Cruzeiro Asia 1 Shamir A Iran-05 (or A TUR 06) A22 Iraq SAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent i.e. SAT 2 Eritrea) MEDIUM PRIORITY A Eritrea SAT 2 Zimbabwe SAT 1 South Africa A Malaysia 97 (or Thai equivalent such as A/NPT/TAI/86) AArgentina 2001 O Taiwan 97 (pig-adapted strain or Philippine equivalent) LOW PRIORITY A Iran ’96 A Iran ’99 A Iran 87 or A Saudi Arabia 23/86 (or equivalent) A15 Bangkok related strain A87 Argentina related strain C Noville SAT 2 Kenya SAT 1 Kenya SAT 3 Zimbabwe
- 6. Safeguarding Animal Health 6TYPES OF FMD OUTBREAKS
- 7. Safeguarding Animal Health APHISFMD Response Goals 7 The goals of an FMD response are to: (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non- infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.
- 9. FMD Response Strategies 9 FMDresponse strategies—strategies are not mutually exclusive: Stamping-out Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live Combination of options Vaccination to live without stamping-out
- 10. Safeguarding Animal Health Challengesto Stamping-Out Only Strategies Huge herds, highly concentrated Mobility of animals/products
- 11. Safeguarding Animal Health Depopulation& Disposal Challenges Captive bolting • Labor intensive • Slow Gunshot • Accessible • Expensive • Safety issues Rendering • Preferred • Capacity issues • Logistics issues Unlined Burial • Polluting • Long-term environmental impact
- 12. Safeguarding Animal Health Developa Balanced Response Strategy Control Outbreak Protect Environment Minimize Waste Limit Economic Losses Maintain Food Supply Sustain Commerce
- 13. Safeguarding Animal Health Continuityof Business Planning • Secure Milk Supply: for milk and milk movement in an FMD outbreak, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement. • Secure Pork Supply: for swine and pork products, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement.
- 14. Safeguarding Animal Health FMDResponse Capabilities NAHERCNational Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
- 15. Safeguarding Animal Health NationalVeterinary Stockpile (NVS)
- 16. Safeguarding Animal Health CurrentDeployable Capabilities • 24 Hour Push Packs of PPE and decon supplies • PPE individual kits • Antiviral medications • Vaccine • Poultry depopulation foaming units, CO2 carts • Mobile refrigeration/ vaccine storage & transport systems • Animal handling equipment • Response support services
- 17. 17 Iowa Outbreak: OneInfected County Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 14,933 66,515 3,893 404 Buffer Zone (blue) 143,866 1,860,968 20,107 2,525 Total 158,799 1,927,483 24,000 2,929 Total livestock affected: 2,110,282 Data: NASS, 2007
- 18. 18 Iowa Outbreak: ThreeInfected Counties Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 63,548 240,484 8,067 1,025 Buffer Zone (blue) 463,637 3,534,164 32,844 6,245 Total 527,185 3,774,648 40,911 7,270 Total livestock affected: 4,342,744 Data: NASS, 2007
- 19. 19 Iowa Outbreak: NineInfected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108 Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723 Total 2,109,061 12,991,178 152,669 26,831 Total livestock affected: 15,252,908
- 20. 20 Iowa Outbreak: NineInfected Counties and Vaccination Zone Data: NASS, 2007 Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108 Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723 Vaccination Zone (yellow) 1,873,283 6,225,637 101,501 19,698 Total 3,982,344 19,216,815 254,170 43,799 Total livestock affected: 23,453,329
- 21. 21 California Outbreak: OneInfected County Where Bovine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 1,071,956 71,210 1,159 Buffer Zone (blue) 1,141,028 181,818 2,362 Total 2,212,984 253,028 3,521 Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 2,466,012 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.
- 22. 22 California Outbreak: FiveInfected Counties Where Bovine Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 3,029,931 183,321 5,675 Buffer Zone (blue) 1,188,938 236,568 7,061 Total 4,218,869 420,389 12,736 Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 4,639,258 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.
- 23. 23 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Approximately Three InfectedCounties Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 900,654 1,336,881 1,236 564 Buffer Zone (blue) 3,494,672 865 18,816 4,091 Total 4,395,326 1,337,746 20,052 4,655 Total livestock affected: 5,753,124 Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated.
- 24. 24 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Six Infected Counties Data:NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 1,516,259 1,337,157 4,569 1,633 Buffer Zone (blue) 7,549,474 146,615 39,783 12,268 Total 9,065,733 1,483,772 44,352 13,901 Total livestock affected: 10,593,857
- 25. 25 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Twelve Infected Counties Data:NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations Infected Zone (pink) 2,180,236 1,476,783 14,873 3,120 Buffer Zone (blue) 12,713,422 1,322,642 97,648 31,298 Total 14,893,658 2,799,425 112,521 34,418 Total livestock affected: 17,805,604
- 26. Safeguarding Animal Health TheComplexities of FMD Vaccine Planning • 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 • Multiple topotypes within each serotype • Topotypes within serotype ± cross-reactive • Most vaccine inactivated (killed) • Molecular vaccines in development (Genvec) • Two categories: • Emergency Vaccine - ≥ 6 PD50 • Commercial Vaccine - ≥ 3 PD50 • Emergency vaccine stored as concentrate • Commercial vaccine stored as finished product • Difficult to anticipate what to bank • Novel vaccine technology needed
- 27. Mission Statement The NAFMDVBfosters the preparedness for responding to an FMD outbreak in North America, maintaining expertise in FMD vaccines, vaccine deployment, vaccination and other FMD control measures. The NAFMDVB maintains the repository of vaccine antigen concentrates (VAC) for the production of emergency FMD vaccines.
- 28. Background Established: In 1982from a Memorandum of Understanding between United States, Canada, and Mexico to ensure the availability and readiness of vaccines when needed, to control an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in North America. • Based on emergency vaccinate to kill strategy • Annual contributions from Canada, Mexico and the United States proportional to the susceptible animal population of each country.
- 29. Two Governing Bodies TheCommission: Chief Veterinary Officer from each country The Technical Committee (TC): Comprised of one technical and one regulatory representative from each country. The TC advises the Commission on matters of a scientific and technical nature. The TC works in coordination with the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) to advise the Commission on policy and implementation of the NAFMDVB program by each member country. The EMWG is a subcommittee of the North American Animal Health committee (NAAHC) charged with coordinating, harmonizing, and expediting animal health emergency management in North America.
- 30. NAFMDVB Location USDA’sForeign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Under stringent safety and security controls 24/7.
- 31. Facilities Laboratory facility forantigen, sera and master seed testing. Storage facility Liquid nitrogen freezers for antigens and antigen samples Refrigerators for pilot vaccines Access to animal rooms with capacity to house 17 bovines of 400 pounds.
- 32. USDA-APHIS-VS/NAFMDVB/ US COMMODITY GROUP DELEGATIONVISIT LPA 20/02/2014 WELCOME / BIENVENUE / BIENVENIDOS
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