Effective Security Lifecycle
in DevOps
Pawel Krawczyk
Intro
● In application security since 90’s
– Worked for Motorola, Aon, Goldman-Sachs, HSBC
– OWASP, open-source https://github.com/kravietz
– Created https://webcookies.org/
● Contact me at pawel.krawczyk@hush.com
Three Riders of the Apocalypse
● Custom code exploits
● Framework and library exploits
● Infrastructure that allows all that
Self-defending web applications
4
• Modern web application frameworks have powerful security features
− Template escaping and sanitization by design
− Database abstraction
− Session management
− Authentication
− Web security features
• Advantages
− They come for free
− They’re standard
− They’re thoroughly tested for QA and security audited
− Usually more robust than home-brewed ones
Self-defending web applications
5
• Modern web application frameworks have powerful security features
− Template escaping and sanitization by design → prevent XSS
− Database abstraction → prevent SQLi
− Session management → prevent session fixation, CSRF
− Authentication → prevent admin/admin1
− Web security features → protect client-side
• Advantages
− They come for free
− They’re standard
− They’re thoroughly tested for QA and security audited
− Usually more robust than home-brewed ones
Primary „do not repeat at home” areas
6
• Input validation, sanitization and escaping
• Cryptography
• Authentication, authorization
• A lot of libraries on GitHub
− Most are of poor quality!
− Many users != quality code
− Be very careful when using samples from StackOverflow!
Effective DevSecOps
Effective DevSecOps
9
SAP Java
Freemarker Templates Auto-Escaping
Freemarker Templates Auto-Escaping
13
Toxic dependencies
Libraries and Dependencies
14
What really makes your application?
1. The code you wrote
●
“our code”, “custom code”
2. Platform API and standard libraries
●
Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js
3. 3rd party libraries
●
Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
Libraries and Dependencies
15
What really makes your application?
1. The code you wrote
●
“our code”, “custom code”
2. Platform API and standard libraries
●
Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js
3. 3rd party libraries
●
Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
Libraries and Dependencies
16
What really makes your application?
1. The code you wrote
●
“our code”, “custom code”
2. Platform API and standard libraries
●
Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js
3. 3rd party libraries
●
Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
Libraries and Dependencies
17
What really makes your application?
1. The code you wrote
●
“our code”, “custom code”
2. Platform API and standard libraries
●
Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js
3. 3rd party libraries
●
Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
Vulnerabilities in client-side libraries
18
Dependency watchers
OWASP Dependency Check (Java)
20
OWASP Dependency Check
21
npm audit (previously: Node Security Platform)
22
Safety (Python)
23
Retire.js (JavaScript)
24
Snyk.io (JavaScript)
25
Keeping up to date
● Abandon the “n-1” nonsense
● Always upgrade libraries with security patches
– Even if they are not exploitable right now
● Prefer to install any bugfix updates
– If you hold, you only accumulate tech debt
– Twice the work when a security update comes
Custom code scanners
Security Scanners
28
• Huge market with very inconsistent quality and maturity
− Good salesmen with nearly useless products
− Mature products with too many bells-and-whistles
− Ancient scanning engines poorly handling modern code
− Expensive, but price unrelated to quality
• Key segments
− SAST („static application security testing”)
− DAST („dynamic”)
− IAST („interacive”)
− RASP (“run-time application self-protection”)
• Security scanner buyer’s guide
− Always evaluate scanner for specific project
What various scanners see?
29
API #1 API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
30
API #1 API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
31
API #1 API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
DAST – dynamic scanning
“curl on steroids”
HTTP crawler & scanner
+ sees whole app
- requires working app
- noisy
- false positives
SAST
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
32
API #1
API #2
Java
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
SAST
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
33
API #1
API #2
Java
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
SAST – source code
“grep on steroids”
+ no binary required
+ all exec paths
- very noisy
- false positives
- very expensive
SAST
DAST
IAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
34
API #1 API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
SAST
DAST
IAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
35
API #1 API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAMLIAST – run-time scan
“strace on steroids”
+ low false positives
+ high precision
- limited to one service
- expensive
SAST
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
36
API #1
API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
RASP
IAST
SAST
DAST
Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST
37
API #1
API #2
Nginx
Load balancer
SAML
RASP
IAST
RASP – run-time protection
“AppArmor for Java”
+ high precision
+ better than WAF
Scanners parade
DefenseCode ThunderScan (SAST)
40
FindSecurityBugs (SAST)
41
SpotBugs (SAST)
42
Formerly FindBugs and FindSecBugs
SpotBugs (SAST)
Contrast Security (IAST)
OWASP ZAP (DAST)
45
Bandit (SAST)
Security scanner buyer’s guide
46
• Programming language support
− Language version and syntax supported
• Supports JavaScript, but what about ES6?
− Framework support
• Nobody writes web apps in pure Java or Python
• Frameworks provide key HTTP, templating, SQL abstraction
• Scanner must know framework entry and exit points
• Scanner supports JavaScript, but does it know about Node.js?
• Understands Java, but what about JAX, Jackson, DropWizard?
• Play Framework is part Java, part Scala, compiles to Java bytecode
Rule updates
● How frequently updated?
– Vulnerability detection rules are the heart of each scanner
– Not much joy from ASP.NET 2.0 rules
● Compiled binaries required?
– Advantage of SAST is source-code only scanning
– Compiled improve precision but limits deployment to developer environment
48
Integration with build pipeline
● Inline scan vs dedicated scan server
● Headless (command line only) run vs GUI
● How much resources taken by the scanner?
● Some scanners require resource-intensive servers
● Integration with continuous integration tools (Jenkins plugins, API)
● Effectiveness of web crawling (DAST only, AngularJS apps)
Result analysis
● Precision of results
● Thousands of false positives render scanner useless
● Does it find actual vulnerabilities? (false sense of security)
● Can you rate and comment findings?
● Can you whitelist false positives or accepted risk?
● Can you report false positives to vendor?
● Does it integrate into IDE?
● Plugins for IntelliJ, Eclipse, Visual Studio?
 Systems unpatched for years
− “for security reasons we don’t install any security patches”
− “we’re not target”
 No OS-level hardening
− “for security reasons we keep all SUID binaries”
 Flat huge LANs
− “it’s been like this since 80’s”
 No host-level firewalls
− “our perimeter has three expensive firewalls”
 No intrusion detection
− “why would anyone run a SSH scan against us for weeks?”
Infrastructure horror
Blacklisting
OSSEC/Wazuh Intrusion Detection
Effective DevSecOps
 apt install unattended-upgrades
 InSpec https://www.inspec.io/
 Lynis https://cisofy.com/lynis/
 SSH and OS hardening roles
− https://dev-sec.io/
− Ansible, Chef, Puppet
Operating system hardening
Questions
● pawel.krawczyk@hush.com
● Signal: +44 7879 180015
● Telegram, XMPP, SSB etc

More Related Content

PDF
AppSec in an Agile World
PDF
SecDevOps
PPTX
OWASP AppSec EU - SecDevOps, a view from the trenches - Abhay Bhargav
PDF
Devops security-An Insight into Secure-SDLC
PDF
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
PPTX
Making Security Agile
PDF
A Secure DevOps Journey
PPTX
Web Application Security: Beyond PEN Testing
AppSec in an Agile World
SecDevOps
OWASP AppSec EU - SecDevOps, a view from the trenches - Abhay Bhargav
Devops security-An Insight into Secure-SDLC
Are Agile And Secure Development Mutually Exclusive?
Making Security Agile
A Secure DevOps Journey
Web Application Security: Beyond PEN Testing

What's hot (20)

PPTX
Continuous and Visible Security Testing with BDD-Security
PPTX
Simplify Dev with Complicated Security Tools
PDF
DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019
PPTX
Static Analysis Security Testing for Dummies... and You
PDF
Proactive Security AppSec Case Study
PPTX
Agile and Secure SDLC
PDF
SecDevOps - The Operationalisation of Security
PPSX
PDF
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
PPT
Code Quality - Security
PPTX
What Good is this Tool? A Guide to Choosing the Right Application Security Te...
PPTX
Implementing an Application Security Pipeline in Jenkins
PPTX
Secure Software Development Life Cycle
PPTX
Integrating security into Continuous Delivery
PPTX
24may 1200 valday eric anklesaria 'secure sdlc – core banking'
PPTX
Agile and Secure Development
PDF
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
PPTX
we45 SecDevOps Presentation - ISACA Chennai
PDF
Shift Left Security
PPTX
Static Application Security Testing Strategies for Automation and Continuous ...
Continuous and Visible Security Testing with BDD-Security
Simplify Dev with Complicated Security Tools
DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019
Static Analysis Security Testing for Dummies... and You
Proactive Security AppSec Case Study
Agile and Secure SDLC
SecDevOps - The Operationalisation of Security
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
Code Quality - Security
What Good is this Tool? A Guide to Choosing the Right Application Security Te...
Implementing an Application Security Pipeline in Jenkins
Secure Software Development Life Cycle
Integrating security into Continuous Delivery
24may 1200 valday eric anklesaria 'secure sdlc – core banking'
Agile and Secure Development
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
we45 SecDevOps Presentation - ISACA Chennai
Shift Left Security
Static Application Security Testing Strategies for Automation and Continuous ...
Ad

Similar to Effective DevSecOps (20)

PDF
stackconf 2024 | How to hack and defend (your) open source by Roman Zhukov.pdf
PDF
Статический анализ кода в контексте SSDL
PPTX
SAST_QSDL
PPTX
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
PDF
Analysis of-quality-of-pkgs-in-packagist-univ-20171024
PPTX
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls version 2
PPTX
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
PPTX
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
PPTX
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v32.pptx
PDF
we45 DEFCON Workshop - Building AppSec Automation with Python
PDF
How do JavaScript frameworks impact the security of applications?
PDF
A Big Data Lake Based on Spark for BBVA Bank-(Oscar Mendez, STRATIO)
PDF
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
PPTX
Meetup callback
PPTX
Modern Web-site Development Pipeline
PPTX
GPCE16: Automatic Non-functional Testing of Code Generators Families
PDF
Apache Drill (ver. 0.2)
PPTX
Asynchrone Echtzeitanwendungen für SharePoint mit SignalR und knockout.js
PDF
OWASP SF - Reviewing Modern JavaScript Applications
PPTX
Raising ux bar with offline first design
stackconf 2024 | How to hack and defend (your) open source by Roman Zhukov.pdf
Статический анализ кода в контексте SSDL
SAST_QSDL
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
Analysis of-quality-of-pkgs-in-packagist-univ-20171024
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls version 2
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v2.pptx
OWASP_Top_Ten_Proactive_Controls_v32.pptx
we45 DEFCON Workshop - Building AppSec Automation with Python
How do JavaScript frameworks impact the security of applications?
A Big Data Lake Based on Spark for BBVA Bank-(Oscar Mendez, STRATIO)
Security Goodness with Ruby on Rails
Meetup callback
Modern Web-site Development Pipeline
GPCE16: Automatic Non-functional Testing of Code Generators Families
Apache Drill (ver. 0.2)
Asynchrone Echtzeitanwendungen für SharePoint mit SignalR und knockout.js
OWASP SF - Reviewing Modern JavaScript Applications
Raising ux bar with offline first design
Ad

More from Pawel Krawczyk (20)

PPTX
Top DevOps Security Failures
PPTX
Authenticity and usability
ODP
Reading Geek Night 2019
PPTX
Unicode the hero or villain
ODP
Get rid of TLS certificates - using IPSec for large scale cloud protection
PPTX
Presentation from CyberGov.pl 2015
PDF
Łukasz Lenart "How secure your web framework is? Based on Apache Struts 2"
PDF
Leszek Miś "Czy twoj WAF to potrafi"
PPTX
Paweł Krawczyk - Ekonomia bezpieczeństwa
PPTX
Are electronic signature assumptions realistic
PPTX
Dlaczego przejmować się bezpieczeństwem aplikacji (pol)
PPTX
Filtrowanie sieci - Panoptykon
PPTX
Pragmatic view on Electronic Signature directive 1999 93
PPTX
Why care about application security
PPT
Source Code Scanners
PDF
Krawczyk Ekonomia Bezpieczenstwa 2
PDF
Audyt Wewnetrzny W Zakresie Bezpieczenstwa
ODP
Kryptografia i mechanizmy bezpieczenstwa
ODP
Zaufanie W Systemach Informatycznych
PPT
Real Life Information Security
Top DevOps Security Failures
Authenticity and usability
Reading Geek Night 2019
Unicode the hero or villain
Get rid of TLS certificates - using IPSec for large scale cloud protection
Presentation from CyberGov.pl 2015
Łukasz Lenart "How secure your web framework is? Based on Apache Struts 2"
Leszek Miś "Czy twoj WAF to potrafi"
Paweł Krawczyk - Ekonomia bezpieczeństwa
Are electronic signature assumptions realistic
Dlaczego przejmować się bezpieczeństwem aplikacji (pol)
Filtrowanie sieci - Panoptykon
Pragmatic view on Electronic Signature directive 1999 93
Why care about application security
Source Code Scanners
Krawczyk Ekonomia Bezpieczenstwa 2
Audyt Wewnetrzny W Zakresie Bezpieczenstwa
Kryptografia i mechanizmy bezpieczenstwa
Zaufanie W Systemach Informatycznych
Real Life Information Security

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
Addressing the challenges of harmonizing law and artificial intelligence tech...
PDF
Peak of Data & AI Encore: Scalable Design & Infrastructure
PDF
Intravenous drug administration application for pediatric patients via augmen...
PDF
TrustArc Webinar - Data Minimization in Practice_ Reducing Risk, Enhancing Co...
PPTX
Blending method and technology for hydrogen.pptx
PPTX
Presentation - Principles of Instructional Design.pptx
PDF
State of AI in Business 2025 - MIT NANDA
PDF
Advancements in abstractive text summarization: a deep learning approach
PDF
Revolutionizing recommendations a survey: a comprehensive exploration of mode...
PPTX
Strategic Picks — Prioritising the Right Agentic Use Cases [2/6]
PDF
EGCB_Solar_Project_Presentation_and Finalcial Analysis.pdf
PDF
Technical Debt in the AI Coding Era - By Antonio Bianco
PDF
Introduction to c language from lecture slides
PDF
GDG Cloud Southlake #45: Patrick Debois: The Impact of GenAI on Development a...
PDF
Altius execution marketplace concept.pdf
PDF
Slides World Game (s) Great Redesign Eco Economic Epochs.pdf
PDF
FASHION-DRIVEN TEXTILES AS A CRYSTAL OF A NEW STREAM FOR STAKEHOLDER CAPITALI...
PPTX
From Curiosity to ROI — Cost-Benefit Analysis of Agentic Automation [3/6]
PPTX
How to use fields_get method in Odoo 18
PDF
Fitaura: AI & Machine Learning Powered Fitness Tracker
Addressing the challenges of harmonizing law and artificial intelligence tech...
Peak of Data & AI Encore: Scalable Design & Infrastructure
Intravenous drug administration application for pediatric patients via augmen...
TrustArc Webinar - Data Minimization in Practice_ Reducing Risk, Enhancing Co...
Blending method and technology for hydrogen.pptx
Presentation - Principles of Instructional Design.pptx
State of AI in Business 2025 - MIT NANDA
Advancements in abstractive text summarization: a deep learning approach
Revolutionizing recommendations a survey: a comprehensive exploration of mode...
Strategic Picks — Prioritising the Right Agentic Use Cases [2/6]
EGCB_Solar_Project_Presentation_and Finalcial Analysis.pdf
Technical Debt in the AI Coding Era - By Antonio Bianco
Introduction to c language from lecture slides
GDG Cloud Southlake #45: Patrick Debois: The Impact of GenAI on Development a...
Altius execution marketplace concept.pdf
Slides World Game (s) Great Redesign Eco Economic Epochs.pdf
FASHION-DRIVEN TEXTILES AS A CRYSTAL OF A NEW STREAM FOR STAKEHOLDER CAPITALI...
From Curiosity to ROI — Cost-Benefit Analysis of Agentic Automation [3/6]
How to use fields_get method in Odoo 18
Fitaura: AI & Machine Learning Powered Fitness Tracker

Effective DevSecOps

  • 1. Effective Security Lifecycle in DevOps Pawel Krawczyk
  • 2. Intro ● In application security since 90’s – Worked for Motorola, Aon, Goldman-Sachs, HSBC – OWASP, open-source https://github.com/kravietz – Created https://webcookies.org/ ● Contact me at [email protected]
  • 3. Three Riders of the Apocalypse ● Custom code exploits ● Framework and library exploits ● Infrastructure that allows all that
  • 4. Self-defending web applications 4 • Modern web application frameworks have powerful security features − Template escaping and sanitization by design − Database abstraction − Session management − Authentication − Web security features • Advantages − They come for free − They’re standard − They’re thoroughly tested for QA and security audited − Usually more robust than home-brewed ones
  • 5. Self-defending web applications 5 • Modern web application frameworks have powerful security features − Template escaping and sanitization by design → prevent XSS − Database abstraction → prevent SQLi − Session management → prevent session fixation, CSRF − Authentication → prevent admin/admin1 − Web security features → protect client-side • Advantages − They come for free − They’re standard − They’re thoroughly tested for QA and security audited − Usually more robust than home-brewed ones
  • 6. Primary „do not repeat at home” areas 6 • Input validation, sanitization and escaping • Cryptography • Authentication, authorization • A lot of libraries on GitHub − Most are of poor quality! − Many users != quality code − Be very careful when using samples from StackOverflow!
  • 9. 9
  • 14. Libraries and Dependencies 14 What really makes your application? 1. The code you wrote ● “our code”, “custom code” 2. Platform API and standard libraries ● Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js 3. 3rd party libraries ● Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
  • 15. Libraries and Dependencies 15 What really makes your application? 1. The code you wrote ● “our code”, “custom code” 2. Platform API and standard libraries ● Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js 3. 3rd party libraries ● Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
  • 16. Libraries and Dependencies 16 What really makes your application? 1. The code you wrote ● “our code”, “custom code” 2. Platform API and standard libraries ● Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js 3. 3rd party libraries ● Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
  • 17. Libraries and Dependencies 17 What really makes your application? 1. The code you wrote ● “our code”, “custom code” 2. Platform API and standard libraries ● Django, ASP.NET, DropWizard, JAX-WS, Node.js 3. 3rd party libraries ● Include a dozen, you’ll get hundreds – chain reaction
  • 22. npm audit (previously: Node Security Platform) 22
  • 26. Keeping up to date ● Abandon the “n-1” nonsense ● Always upgrade libraries with security patches – Even if they are not exploitable right now ● Prefer to install any bugfix updates – If you hold, you only accumulate tech debt – Twice the work when a security update comes
  • 28. Security Scanners 28 • Huge market with very inconsistent quality and maturity − Good salesmen with nearly useless products − Mature products with too many bells-and-whistles − Ancient scanning engines poorly handling modern code − Expensive, but price unrelated to quality • Key segments − SAST („static application security testing”) − DAST („dynamic”) − IAST („interacive”) − RASP (“run-time application self-protection”) • Security scanner buyer’s guide − Always evaluate scanner for specific project
  • 29. What various scanners see? 29 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML
  • 30. DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 30 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML
  • 31. DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 31 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML DAST – dynamic scanning “curl on steroids” HTTP crawler & scanner + sees whole app - requires working app - noisy - false positives
  • 32. SAST DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 32 API #1 API #2 Java Nginx Load balancer SAML
  • 33. SAST DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 33 API #1 API #2 Java Nginx Load balancer SAML SAST – source code “grep on steroids” + no binary required + all exec paths - very noisy - false positives - very expensive
  • 34. SAST DAST IAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 34 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML
  • 35. SAST DAST IAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 35 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAMLIAST – run-time scan “strace on steroids” + low false positives + high precision - limited to one service - expensive
  • 36. SAST DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 36 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML RASP IAST
  • 37. SAST DAST Different scopes of SAST/DAST/IAST 37 API #1 API #2 Nginx Load balancer SAML RASP IAST RASP – run-time protection “AppArmor for Java” + high precision + better than WAF
  • 42. 42 Formerly FindBugs and FindSecBugs SpotBugs (SAST)
  • 46. Security scanner buyer’s guide 46 • Programming language support − Language version and syntax supported • Supports JavaScript, but what about ES6? − Framework support • Nobody writes web apps in pure Java or Python • Frameworks provide key HTTP, templating, SQL abstraction • Scanner must know framework entry and exit points • Scanner supports JavaScript, but does it know about Node.js? • Understands Java, but what about JAX, Jackson, DropWizard? • Play Framework is part Java, part Scala, compiles to Java bytecode
  • 47. Rule updates ● How frequently updated? – Vulnerability detection rules are the heart of each scanner – Not much joy from ASP.NET 2.0 rules ● Compiled binaries required? – Advantage of SAST is source-code only scanning – Compiled improve precision but limits deployment to developer environment
  • 48. 48 Integration with build pipeline ● Inline scan vs dedicated scan server ● Headless (command line only) run vs GUI ● How much resources taken by the scanner? ● Some scanners require resource-intensive servers ● Integration with continuous integration tools (Jenkins plugins, API) ● Effectiveness of web crawling (DAST only, AngularJS apps)
  • 49. Result analysis ● Precision of results ● Thousands of false positives render scanner useless ● Does it find actual vulnerabilities? (false sense of security) ● Can you rate and comment findings? ● Can you whitelist false positives or accepted risk? ● Can you report false positives to vendor? ● Does it integrate into IDE? ● Plugins for IntelliJ, Eclipse, Visual Studio?
  • 50.  Systems unpatched for years − “for security reasons we don’t install any security patches” − “we’re not target”  No OS-level hardening − “for security reasons we keep all SUID binaries”  Flat huge LANs − “it’s been like this since 80’s”  No host-level firewalls − “our perimeter has three expensive firewalls”  No intrusion detection − “why would anyone run a SSH scan against us for weeks?” Infrastructure horror
  • 54.  apt install unattended-upgrades  InSpec https://www.inspec.io/  Lynis https://cisofy.com/lynis/  SSH and OS hardening roles − https://dev-sec.io/ − Ansible, Chef, Puppet Operating system hardening
  • 55. Questions ● [email protected] ● Signal: +44 7879 180015 ● Telegram, XMPP, SSB etc