Enabling effective hunt teaming and incident response
- 1. Enabling effective Hunt Teaming and Incident Response (with zero budget and limited time)
- 2. whoami Jeff McJunkin, Senior Technical Analyst Counter Hack Challenges Certifications: Yes* *CISSP, CCNA, GSEC, GCED, GPEN, GCFA, GCIH, GMOB, GXPN, GREM, GCIA, hopefully soon GSE
- 3. What do I do? ● Expert witness (digital forensics) ● TA (and soon, here ın Portland, teach!) for SANS ● Create challenges to help people learn offensive and defensive security ○ (SANS NetWars Tournament) ● Background in systems / network administration
- 5. Disclaimer on tools ● I will discuss specific tools ● I’m not paid to endorse these tools They’re just examples that I’ve found to work well (Well, usually)
- 6. What is hunt teaming? Step 1) Assume compromise (It turns out this is very realistic)
- 7. What is hunt teaming? Step 1) Assume compromise (It turns out this is very realistic) Step 2) Find your compromised hosts
- 8. What is hunt teaming? Step 1) Assume compromise (It turns out this is very realistic) Step 2) Find your compromised hosts Step 3) Find how they were compromised (forensication time!)
- 9. What is hunt teaming? Step 1) Assume compromise (It turns out this is very realistic) Step 2) Find your compromised hosts Step 3) Find how they were compromised (forensication time!) Step 4) Set up preventative and detective controls
- 10. What is incident response? Step 1) Notice an incident. Example incident sources include... ● Help desk notices malware on system ● Network team notices lots of outbound traffic from a usually-quiet machine ● Your university is featured on https://krebsonsecurity.com/ Step 2) Hair on fire, stop the bleeding!
- 11. What is incident response? Step 1) Notice an incident. Example incident sources include... ● Help desk notices malware on system ● Network team notices lots of outbound traffic from a usually-quiet machine ● Your university is featured on https://krebsonsecurity.com/ Step 2) Hair on fire, stop the bleeding Step 3) Learn, implement detective and preventative controls
- 12. Note the difference Hunt teaming is proactive. Incident response is reactive. Learning how you’re owned proactively is preferred, but we all encounter surprises.
- 13. What do we prepare for? ● Prevention, prevention, prevention ● Penetration testers? ● Things that make our bosses upset (Critical Nessus findings) ● Antivirus ● Patching ● Compliance ● Protecting The Perimeter
- 14. An aside on compliance... ● Compliance is probably a net positive ● HIPPA, PCI, CJIS, etc. ● But sometimes we can focus too much on compliance and miss focusing on security
- 15. What actually happens? Focus on DATA, not anecdotes. The Verizon Data Breach Report is perhaps the best source of actual compromise data we have in this industry.
- 17. What actually happens? - Target 2013 Breach 40 million credit cards stolen What weaknesses were used? ● Third-party network access ● No review of security logs ● Lack of segmentation
- 18. What actually happens? - Home Depot 2014 Breach 56 million credit cards stolen What software was used? Details are still forthcoming, but… ● Malware that scraped RAM for credit card information ● Same malware family as Target! ● Likely Domain Admin-level access by the attackers ● Current indications: Attackers targeted self-checkout lane computers
- 19. But those examples are too big, and not us! Good point. Here’s a smaller, local example: C&K Systems, Inc.
- 20. C&K Systems, Inc. ● Who are they? ○ Third-party payment vendor for Goodwill ● What happened? ○ No details yet ● Who else was affected? ○ Two other unnamed clients Notice a growing tendency for “watering hole” attacks
- 21. C&K Systems, Inc. How long until they noticed the breach?
- 22. C&K Systems, Inc. How long until they noticed the breach? 18 MONTHS.
- 24. Today’s attacks versus Yesterday’s defenses ● How do you detect memory-only malware? ○ Never touching the hard drive ● What logs are normal from your machines? ○ I.e., do you have a baseline to compare against? ● How often do you review these logs? ● What if the attacker has “gone native”? ○ Example: No “hacker tools”, just PowerShell and valid credentials
- 25. A useful thought exercise... Imagine if there were no anti-virus. Imagine if all your computers had unpatch-able known exploits. (Not too difficult, given XP and Server 2003’s end of life)
- 26. Where do we stand a chance? 1. Exploit 2. Installation (persistence) 3. Command and Control 4. Exfiltration (...maybe)
- 27. What’s the difference? Prepare, hunt, respond, learn
- 28. Prepare, hunt, respond, learn Get useful data ahead of time (program execution, centralized logging, persistence, evidence of pivoting)
- 29. Prepare, hunt, respond, learn Assume compromise. Act accordingly.
- 30. Prepare, hunt, respond, learn Find evil and exterminate it.
- 31. Prepare, hunt, respond, learn Red team is threat emulation, blue team should be able to describe red team’s actions
- 32. Mind the gap ● How do you track persistence? ● How about new program execution? ● How about data exfiltration? Full packet capture?
- 33. Persistence How many methods of persistence do you know of?
- 34. Persistence How many methods of persistence do you know of? I promise Sysinternals Autoruns knows more.
- 35. Centralized Persistence Tracking? 1. Scheduled Task via Group Policy (autorunsc.exe to plain text file on file server) 2. Diff most recent and second-most recent files. 3. Email upon difference.
- 37. Tracking program execution ● Ever heard of Carbon Black? ○ For many shops, Sysinternals Sysmon is equivalent. ○ For free.
- 38. Example event of program execution
- 39. Centralized logging? Step 1) Get your Windows Event Logs to one server (Event Log Forwarding). Step 2) Get your centralized Windows Event Logs into something easier to work with. (Splunk, ELK, SexiLog) Use NXLog Community, not Snare. Snare is now dead to me.
- 40. Data exfiltration ● How many spare desktops do you have? ● Install Security Onion on one, set up a SPAN port mirroring your outbound traffic Snort / Suricata / Bro are their own presentations NWACC 2014, by Jesse Martinich and Christina Kaiseramn!
- 41. Questions? I’ll be around for the rest of the day as well. Don’t want to ask here? Send me an email: [email protected] or [email protected]