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![elaborate discussion that accounts for the integrity and coherence of policy
aims and measures; the scope and organisational structure of integration
policy; a variety of inclusion activities and combating discrimination and
marginalisation; integration-promoting education and information; protec-
tion of vulnerable groups; and participation of migrants in the formulation
and execution of integration policy.
The problem of integration in the context of so-called Europeanisation,
with which LesiÅskaās chapter concludes, is further investigated by
Theodora Kostakopoulou. She considers that aspect of migration policy
from the legal and institutional perspective and, in doing so, she pays spe-
cial attention to the evolution of the area of freedom, security and justice
in the European Communities. Her analysis draws on a critical review of
the development of policy goals and instruments in that area and she calls
for a readjustment of European migration law and policy. As Kostakopou-
lou argues:
[...] there is an urgent need to rethink the existing political frames
of migration and integration, and to devise a coherent framework of
migration governance that de-securitises migration, reflects interna-
tional and European legal commitments and takes sufficiently into
account the specificity of migration patterns in the āoldā, ānewā and
āfutureā migration countries.
Bearing in mind that āmobility is an integral part of the European integra-
tion projectā, a shift in paradigm is required ā āfrom perceiving and fram-
ing migration as a threat or nuisance to viewing it as a resourceā.
Notes
1 The CEEās economic and political polarisation (the emergence of migration attrac-
tion poles in the region) proved to be a precondition for that shift in the expected
out-migration of CEE populations. Other important underlying factors included: a
dramatic liberalisation of migration policies (especially the rules of entry) through-
out CEE, concomitant with the introduction of more rigorous admission rules in
Western countries; intra-regional differences in demography and imbalances in la-
bour markets in CEE; and ā last but not least ā the opening of ways for (until 1989,
largely repressed) movements of various ethnic groups that were territorially divided
or scattered by the redrawing of state borders in CEE during the Yalta Conference in
1945 (OkoĢlski 2004).
2 A vast literature exists on this subject. Among the most influential works one might
mention are: Bade (2003), Baines (1991), Castles and Miller (1993), Cohen (1987),
Eltis (1983, 2002), Hatton and Williamson (1994, 1998, 2008), King (1996),
Lucassen (1987), Potts (1990), Thomas (1954, 1958, 1972), Willcox (1929, 1931).
3 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (1993 after DecloıĢtres 1967) offer a slightly lower
figure (for 1800-1930) ā namely, 40 million ā but confine that estimate to the
INTRODUCTION 19](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-23-2048.jpg)
![Chesnais 1986: 299), between 1800 and 1930, the population whose moth-
er tongue was Russian increased by a factor of six; while in the case of
English, the growth was fivefold; Italian and Polish: three-and-a-half-fold;
Spanish: threefold; German: two-and-a-half-fold; and French: a bit more
than twofold. Chesnais (1992: 319) estimates that in the presently highly
developed countries, the growth of population size between the initial and
final years of the demographic transition (on average, one hundred years)
reached 300 per cent. It was mainly due to a systematic decrease of mortal-
ity and a consistently elevated natural increase. As alluded to in this vol-
umeās Introduction, a large part of that surplus population left for other
continents.8
This was due in some part to greatly improved means of trans-
portation and good opportunities elsewhere that lured immigrants (Hatton
& Williamson 2008; King 1996), but mainly because of a different and
very special reason. That reason is verbalised in Chesnaisā words (1992:
306):
[ā¦] emigration helped, at a time when the competition of young
adults on the job market was at its highest, to reduce the threat of
over-population [ā¦]. External migration [was] a manifestly strate-
gic variable in the process of a populationās adjustment to its
milieu.
As a matter of fact, Chesnais develops and substantiates empirically a hy-
pothesis which posits a close to twenty-year time lag between time series
of births (or natural increase) and emigration (Chesnais 1992: 171-175)
and, by the same token, a āsubstitution of mortality by migrationā.9
Russell
King (1996: 35), in reference to the safety valve theory, offers a similar
explanation:
As the death rate in Europe declined and the birth rate failed to
respond to keep population growth in check, emigration functioned
as a safety-valve to skim off a significant proportion of the surplus.
By many accounts, mass emigration from Europe, which started in the
early nineteenth century, can be considered a breakthrough in European
population history. In reference to that phenomenon, Timothy Hatton and
Jeffrey Williamson (2008) speak of the transition from a trickle to mass
migration.10
As a matter of fact, it is just one of the manifestations of a
broader concept ā the mobility transition, in terms of Wilbur Zelinskyās
(1971) well-known hypothesis. Its essence is that āphysical and social mo-
bilityā always substantially increases as society (ācommunityā in his own
words) experiences the process of modernisation. Moreover, āthe course of
the mobility transition closely parallels that of the demographic transitionā
(Zelinsky 1979: 171). One of the characteristics of early modernisation
26 MAREK OKĆLSKI](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-30-2048.jpg)
![(āthe early transitional societyā phase) is a āmajor outflow of emigrants to
available and attractive foreign destinationsā, concomitant with a ārapid de-
cline in mortality [and] a relatively rapid rate of natural increase, and thus
a major growth in size of populationā (Zelinsky 1979: 173).
By a striking contrast, after around 100 to 150 years from the onset of
mass intercontinental outflow of people, many countries of Europe wit-
nessed exacerbated inflow of immigrants, largely of non-European origin,
and at about the same time (if not a few decades earlier) European overseas
emigration began to fade. Conspicuously, this new tendency generally ap-
peared first in those countries where the mass emigration (and the demo-
graphic transition) was initiated at the earliest. In fact, labour markets in
some of those countries had attracted large numbers of foreigners several
decades before that time. At that time, however, the migrants originated as
a rule from other (less advanced in the process of industrialisation) coun-
tries of Europe and often they assumed the role of temporary workers in
their host countries.
The beginning of the 1970s saw some 10 million migrant workers in
Europe, many of them from Turkey, India, Pakistan, British, Dutch and
French colonies of the Caribbean, various African countries and the East
Indies. Between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, the foreign popula-
tion in Germany increased by around 3.5 million; in France and Britain by
more than 2.5 million; in Switzerland by nearly 800,000; in Belgium by
400,000; and in the Netherlands and Sweden by 300,000 (King 1986;
Castles & Miller 2003). Not only did foreign citizens become a part of the
resident populations in Europe in the decades to follow, but, moreover, the
number and geographical diversity of their origin greatly increased, as did
the number of European destination countries.
That profound change also finds a reflection in the hypothesis of the mo-
bility transition.11
In the late phase of the transition, as Zelinsky (1979:
173, 174) argues, āemigration is on the decline or may have ceased alto-
getherā and next, the phase of āadvanced societyā witnesses a āsignificant
net immigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from relatively
underdeveloped landsā. All that is due to āa slight to moderate rate of natu-
ral increase or none at allā, caused by the decline of fertility which finally
āoscillates rather unpredictably at low to moderate levelsā.
Levels of fertility in North-Western Europe after the mid-1960s (and lat-
er in other parts of the continent) turned out very low, in fact substantially
below the replacement level. This was hardly predicted by the demo-
graphic transition model. Such unexpected fall in fertility prompted Dirk
van de Kaa (1999)12
to extend and adjust the classical model of demo-
graphic transition by assuming that the natural increase of population can
be both positive and negative, and explicitly adding net migration as a
component of the population change that continuously interplays with nat-
ural increase. He incorporated in the model the idea developed by Hatton
TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 27](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-31-2048.jpg)
![and Williamson (1994), who suggested that, as natural increase (assuming
systematically positive values) first rises and later declines, emigration
goes through four phases ā initiation, growth, saturation and regression ā
and with further decline in natural increase (within its negative values), im-
migration comes to the fore. Referring to contemporary Europe, Van de
Kaa (1999: 29, 34) assumed that it
will face a lengthy period of below-replacement fertility and,
equally, a lengthy period of immigration [ā¦]. The region will
surely come to grips with reality and will start acting as an immi-
gration area. This will lead to a carefully controlled influx, possibly
during a couple of generations.
Therefore an important conclusion might be drawn here. During the time
of mass population movements, rates of migration are strongly linked (at
least in the statistical sense) to rates of natural increase.13
This is even
more so when it comes to long trends (Chesnais 1992).
Coming back to the nineteenth century, all European societies experi-
enced massive territorial mobility, including massive waves of emigration.
Compared to the types of migrations observed in earlier periods of
European history, the type of mobility that arose during the nineteenth cen-
tury displayed two important, distinct characteristics. First of all, it was by
and large intentional and usually included the aim of settlement. In addi-
tion, it was principally individualistic and economically oriented, as it was
undertaken by entrepreneurs (including farmers) and workers in search of
gainful employment.
It began, naturally, with capitalism and modernisation, and as a sustained
quasi-unidirectional process of complex social change. The Industrial
Revolution in England, an early component and factor of modernisation,
gave rise to an unprecedented and long-lasting decline in mortality and ac-
celerated population growth.14
Shortly, the population explosion became
an all-European phenomenon.
Increasing populations nourished industrial growth, both by enhancing
the demand for goods and by supplying the labour market with ever more
labour. Modernisation and the demographic transition became interwoven
and mutually interdependent (Dyson 2001).
Initially, surpluses of population and labour occurred mainly in back-
ward areas, which were barely influenced or penetrated by modern social
change and the related institutions or social relationships.
Thus, the flow of people moving to fulfil the unsatisfied labour demand
in modernising areas took a clear direction ā from the peripheries with
(mostly) subsistence (pre-capitalist) economies to metropolitan centres with
full-fledged markets and highly monetised (capitalist) economies. This phe-
nomenon, inter alia, contributed to the expansion of demand for goods and
28 MAREK OKĆLSKI](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-32-2048.jpg)
![continuous flow of immigrants was soon triggered and, after some time,
the WNE countries, one by one, turned into net immigration areas.
Many of the migrating workers originated from the Mediterranean coun-
tries. According to numerous accounts, between 1950 and 1970, anywhere
from 7 million to 10 million persons emigrated from Italy, Spain, Greece
and Portugal (circa 8 to 10 per cent of the mid-period population), of which
a half went to WNE (Layard, Blanchard, Dornbush & Krugman 1992).
Massimo Livi Bacci (1972: 17) estimates that in the period 1965-1970 āem-
igrant workers [from southern countries]18
make up about 50 per cent on
the average, of the potential increase of the labour forceā, of which 89 per
cent in the case of Italy, 85 per cent in the case of Portugal, 65 per cent in
the case of Greece and 46 per cent in the case of Spain.19
An outflow of
this huge magnitude was possible due to considerable underemployment or
ādisguisedā unemployment in those countries.20
In more underdeveloped
areas of the Mediterranean countries, the outflow comprised up to 85 to 90
per cent of the potential increase of the labour force (Danieli 1972).
Running parallel to this, from the late 1960s onwards, all four Mediterra-
nean countries experienced a rapid and consistent decline in fertility ā from
a maximum total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.4-3.1 to 1.4-1.7 around 1985
(United Nations 2007). The labour potential at the time was therefore
Table 1.2 (continued)
Stage/
sub-period
Region
Western and
Northern (WNE)
Southern
(Mediterranean)
Central and
Eastern (CEE)
4. Post-com-
munist migration
ā related to dis-
ruption of com-
munism and
orientation
towards
āFortress Europeā
(1989-2004)
Advanced segmentation of labour market
(secondary jobs for foreigners); massive
inflow of undocumented migrants and
asylum seekers; migrant smugglers
and traffickers; selective admission for
the highly skilled
Incomplete migration;
post-communist
adjustment migration;
economic polarisation
within CEE ! intra-
regional movements;
towards net immigration
(Czech Republic)
Prospective trends in the 10-15-year time span
5. Post-
enlargement
migration ā
integrated
European
migration space
(after 2004/2007)
Inflows due to population stagnation and ageing (main underlying
factors); further segmentation of labour markets; intra-EU competition
for the highly skilled; low level of intra-EU mobility (some but shallow
potential in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states; towards
completion of labour market draining of redundant labour in CEE)
Source: Own elaboration
TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 33](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-37-2048.jpg)
![are such seminal works as Zelinsky (1971), Piore (1979), Chesnais (1986) and
Massey (1999).
3 One of the key notions used in this chapter and to some extent throughout the en-
tire volume is āmodernisationā. I realise how ambiguous, if controversial, this term
might sound nowadays. My preferred meaning of modernisation is rather simple
and refers to a dichotomous typology of European societies, often applied to the his-
tory of the recent few hundred years, which distinguishes between āpre-modernā (tra-
ditional) type and āmodernā type. In accordance with this, each European society
evolves from the former to the latter; between the pre-modern and modern type
there is a specific transition, an all-embracing structural social change, called moder-
nisation. While the outcome of modernisation seems clear ā it is a structurally and
strikingly different society ā the criteria of that difference are numerous and by no
means mutually exclusive. They depend on the cognitive perspective represented by
those who are or were involved in the study of that process. The perspectives
adopted by such scholars as Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand ToĢnnies, Max Weber, Emile
Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Henry Maine, Robert Redfield and Krishan Kumar evi-
dently differed, but probably none of them would have found it difficult to point out
fundamental differences of structural character between a pre-modern and a modern
society, and even less to indicate the time and place on Earth where the change
called āmodernisationā came about. Needless to add, in this volume we distance our-
selves from āmodernisationā in Walt Rostowās sense.
4 Apart from periods of war or conquests and colonisations, international migrants in-
clude mostly relatively small numbers of merchants, mercenaries or missionaries.
David Coleman (2006: 37) argues that ālabour movement does not become generally
international until a much later date, particularly during the Industrial Revolution
[ā¦]ā.
5 It was estimated at some 39.5 million in AD 14 and at 39.2 million circa the year
1000 (Clark 1977: 64).
6 Jean-Marie Poursinās (1976: 21) estimate for circa 1400 is 45 million. Biraben
(2006: 13), however, puts the number of Europeans around that year much higher,
at some 52 million.
7 All estimates exclude the population living on the territory of the former USSR.
Here, similarly, its size did not change between Anno Domini and 1400, while in
the period 1400-1800 it grew by a little less than 300 per cent (Biraben 2006).
8 According to Poursin (1976: 23), between 1650 and 1950, the population of
European origin became larger by over 800 million and reached 940 million, 300
million of whom lived outside of Europe.
9 According to Chesnais (1992: 165): āMigration is at its highest during the period
when, following the decline in mortality, the curve of natural increase approaches its
apex; and the size of the wave of departures is closely connected with the level of
natural increase and hence with patterns of demographic transition. The traits of
migration are inseparable from the profiles of transition, and vice versa.ā
10 In an earlier work (Hatton & Williamson 1994), the authors spoke of the āemigra-
tion cycleā, which extends from a growing emigration rate to receding emigration.
11 A very similar perspective is represented by the concept of the āmigration curveā, i.e.
a historical process in which populations make the transition from net emigration
to net immigration (Ackerman 1976 quoted after Massey 1999).
12 Earlier Van de Kaa (together with Ron Lesthaeghe) developed a concept of the sec-
ond demographic transition, a phenomenon typical of North-Western Europe, where
it developed since the mid-1960s. He distinguished the two transitions in the follow-
ing way: āWhile mortality decline provided the āengineā for the first transition, ferti-
lity decline is the āengineā of the second. In both instances international migration
TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 41](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-45-2048.jpg)
![plays a significant role in the balancing equation, but while it provided a safety valve
of sorts in the first, it is a carefully guarded inlet in the secondā (van de Kaa 2004:
8).
13 Brinley Thomas (1954) suggested that it is much more than a statistical relationship.
He argued that, contrary to widespread opinion, the volume and fluctuations of
European immigration to the United States depended not only on the demand for
labour in this country, but above all on demographic changes in the countries of ori-
gin. Thomas found that all four main upsurges of emigration from Europe until the
outbreak of World War I followed, with a 25-year time lag, a peak in natural
increase.
14 King (1996: 45) cites interesting observations made by Friedrich Engels, who was
one of the first to recognise the important role of population growth in the develop-
ment of English industry.
15 The opposite view is represented by Anthony Fielding (1993). According to him, un-
til recently mass migration in Europe was determined by the medium-term econom-
ic fluctuations (the business cycle). After the mid-1970s, however, Western Europe
underwent fundamental change in the production system ā from Fordist to post-
Fordist, which substantially affected migration: āthe most important feature of mass
migration under post-Fordist forms of production organization is its absence!ā
(Fielding 1993: 14). Mass migration gives way to āsmall-scale and more individualis-
tic formsā of inter-regional and international mobility.
16 It is not rare that in the initial stage of changes fertility rises, which is due to,
among other things, the deep mortality decline itself (better chances of potential
mothersā survival).
17 For the discussion of the ācrowding-out effectā, see Kaczmarczyk and OkoĢlski
(2008).
18 Including also the former Yugoslavia and Turkey.
19 Taking into account migration of seasonal and temporary workers, however, would
significantly increase that estimate. Thus, according to Livi Bacci (1972: 18), āwe can
by all means say that [ā¦] the number of emigrant workers has been greater than the
natural increase of the labour forceā.
20 Excess supply of manpower in the agricultural sector, especially the unemployed or
underemployed peasants searching for a job in foreign countries, was believed to be
the main source of emigration potential in the Mediterranean countries (Livi Bacci
1972).
21 Interestingly, a study carried out in the 1960s by the UN Economic Commission for
Europe (UN ECE 1968), devoted to the determinants of labour supply in Europe un-
til 1980 ā which inter alia evaluated labour market situation in CEE ā found strong
but latent migration pressures in the then socialist countries, which at that time
were contained by the existing legislation and administrative order. Referring to that
study, Luisa Danieli (1972) pointed to Poland and Romania as CEE countries having
a vast surplus of manpower (from one fifth to one half of the active population) and
to Czechoslovakia and Hungary as countries with probably insufficient labour
supply.
22 Polish LFS provides quarterly estimates of the stock of temporary migrants (i.e.
those who at the time of survey are registered as āpermanentā residents of Poland).
In general, the survey is limited to households where at least one member is present
in his or her domicile at the time of survey and, if that condition is met, to the
household members fifteen years old or more. Thus, the migrant count based on
LFS might be seriously underestimated.
42 MAREK OKĆLSKI](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25970559-250519192423-70d83671/75/European-Immigrations-Trends-Structures-And-Policy-Implications-Marek-Oklski-Editor-46-2048.jpg)
![23 Short-term migrants are defined as those whose uninterrupted stay outside of
Poland does not exceed twelve months at the time of survey; otherwise, the migrants
are considered to be long-term.
24 Massey (1999: 40), referring to Michael Pioreās theory of immigration driven by the
mechanisms of segmented labour market, notes that the main factor of immigra-
tion, āthe imbalance between the structural demand for entry-level workers and the
limited domestic supply of such workers [ā¦] in developed countriesā, stems from
two major root causes. One of them is a combination of āfundamental socio-demo-
graphic trendsā, such as very low natural increase of the working-age population, the
depletion of labour reserves in rural communities and the rise of female labour-force
participation together with the transformation of womenās jobs into a source of pri-
mary income support. Another main root cause is āthe built-in demand for inexpen-
sive and flexible labourā in modern industrial societies, which results from āfunda-
mental characteristics of advanced industrial societies and their economiesā, such as:
āstructural inflationā, āsocial constraints on motivation embedded within occupational
hierarchiesā and āthe inherent duality of labour and capitalā, producing a segmented
labour market structure (Massey 1999: 37-39).
25 See chapter 2 in this volume.
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European Immigrations Trends Structures And Policy Implications Marek Oklski Editor
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- 6. IMISCOE International Migration, Integrationand Social Cohesion in Europe The IMISCOE Research Network unites researchers from, at present, 28 institutes specialising in studies of international migration, integration and social cohesion in Europe. What began in 2004 as a Network of Excellence sponsored by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission has become, as of April 2009, an independent self-funding endeavour. From the start, IMISCOE has promoted integrated, multidisciplinary and globally comparative research led by scholars from various branches of the economic and social sciences, the humanities and law. The Network furthers existing studies and pioneers new scholarship on migration and migrant integration. Encouraging innovative lines of inquiry key to European policymaking and governance is also a priority. The IMISCOE-Amsterdam University Press Series makes the Networkās findings and results available to researchers, policymakers and practitioners, the media and other interested stakeholders. High-quality manuscripts authored by Network members and cooperating partners are evaluated by external peer reviews and the IMISCOE Editorial Committee. The Committee comprises the following members: Tiziana Caponio, Department of Political Studies, University of Turin / Forum for International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI), Turin, Italy Michael Collyer, Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR), University of Sussex, United Kingdom Rosita Fibbi, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), University of NeuchĆ¢tel / Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland Agata GĆ³rny, Centre of Migration Research (CMR) / Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland Albert Kraler, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Vienna, Austria Jorge Malheiros, Centre of Geographical Studies (CEG), University of Lisbon, Portugal Marco Martiniello, National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS), Brussels / Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM), University of LiĆØge, Belgium Marlou Schrover, Institute for History, Leiden University, The Netherlands Patrick Simon, National Demographic Institute (INED), Paris, France Miri Song, School of Social Policy and Sociology, University of Kent, United Kingdom IMISCOE Policy Briefs and more information on the network can be found at www.imiscoe.org.
- 7. European Immigrations Trends, Structuresand Policy Implications edited by Marek OkĆ³lski IMISCOE Research
- 8. Cover design: StudioJan de Boer BNO, Amsterdam Layout: The DocWorkers, Almere ISBN 978 90 8964 457 2 e-ISBN 978 90 4851 727 5 (pdf) e-ISBN 978 90 4851 728 2 (e-Pub) NUR 741 / 763 Ā© Marek OkĆ³lski / Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
- 9. Table of Contents Introduction7 Marek OkĆ³lski 1 Transition from emigration to immigration Is it the destiny of modern European countries? 23 Marek OkĆ³lski 2 Early starters and latecomers Comparing countries of immigration and immigration regimes in Europe 45 JoaquĆn Arango 3 āOldā immigration countries in Europe The concept and empirical examples 65 Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger 4 Migration transitions in an era of liquid migration Reflections on Fassmann and Reeger 91 Godfried Engbersen 5 Immigrants, markets and policies in Southern Europe The making of an immigration model? 107 JoĆ£o Peixoto, JoaquĆn Arango, Corrado Bonifazi, Claudia Finotelli, Catarina Sabino, Salvatore Strozza and Anna Triandafyllidou 6 The Southern European āmodel of immigrationā A sceptical view 149 Martin Baldwin-Edwards 7 Framing the Iberian model of labour migration Employment exploitation, de facto deregulation and formal compensation 159 Jorge Malheiros
- 10. 8 Patterns ofimmigration in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland A comparative perspective 179 DuÅ”an Drbohlav 9 An uncertain future of immigration in Europe Insights from expert-based stochastic forecasts for selected countries 211 Arkadiusz WiÅniowski, Jakub Bijak, Marek Kupiszewski and Dorota Kupiszewska 10 Comments on āAn uncertain future of immigration in Europeā by WiÅniowski et al. 233 Leo van Wissen 11 Migration policy matters A comparative analysis of policy recommendations 239 Magdalena LesiÅska 12 The evolving area of freedom, security and justice Taking stock and thinking ahead 259 Dora Kostakopoulou Europe, a continent of immigrants A conclusion 269 Marek OkĆ³lski Contributors 275 6 EUROPEAN IMMIGRATIONS
- 11. Introduction Marek OkĆ³lski Not longago, Europe was symbolically reunited ā at least, such might be the perception of the first eastward enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004. The accession of eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU gave rise to further dismantling of those barriers between East and West that had been erected in the Cold War era. What followed was a softening of divisions across European societies and an intensification of mutual contacts and flows of knowledge and ideas. Many varied social phenomena in the East were expected to converge with those in other parts of the continent. Migration patterns, regimes and policies ranked among those phenomena. At the beginning of 1989, when the Poles ā and slightly later, citizens of other CEE countries ā were granted unlimited freedom of international travel, a considerable part of western public opinion and western states re- acted with anxiety, if not phobia. It was feared that freedom of movement ā a basic human right that for decades prior to 1989 the West had unstint- ingly supported ā could result in excessive flows of people from CEE to the West. The East-West exodus did not happen, however. This was because the former communist countries of Europe, still aptly perceived in the late 1980s as politically and economically similar, set different goals for them- selves and chose various strategies for transition to democracy and market economy, thus undergoing massive change. An important outcome of that change was a growing capacity to contain within the region itself the vast migration potential that had accumulated over the period of communist repression. This is why in the early 1990s, tens of thousands of Bulgarians, Romanians, Ukrainians and other CEE nationals opted for migration to other former communist countries, notably to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, instead of following in the footsteps of their fellow countrymen who (in much smaller numbers than expected) headed for the West.1 In comparison with Western Europe, the Czech Republic and some other economically booming CEE countries were both geographically and culturally closer for the migrants and thus involved less risk for the pio- neers of international mobility of people from Ukraine, Romania or other source countries.
- 12. Over the 1990sthe inflow of foreigners to CEE countries continued. Its forms became more mature; the earlier dominant form ā the movement of petty traders and irregular workers engaged in various odd jobs ā gave way to the flow of predominantly regular contract workers or small-scale entre- preneurs. By attracting considerable numbers of migrants from faraway countries, such as China (in Hungary and the Czech Republic) or Vietnam (in the Czech Republic and Poland), the national and ethnic composition of incoming foreigners became more diverse. At this time, communities of settled migrants began to appear, especially in large cities. It appeared that those CEE countries in the forefront of political and eco- nomic transition were undergoing changes similar to those experienced a few decades earlier by four Southern European countries ā namely, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. These southern countries, along with the proc- ess of economic integration with Western Europe, rather rapidly changed their migration statuses. Having been important source countries for guest worker migration to many western economies in the 1950s and 1960s, while suffering from excess labour supply, they shifted to become new major European destinations for immigrant workers. Since almost all Western European countries had also undergone such a transition, albeit at least a quarter of a century earlier, it seemed rather nat- ural to predict that once Eastern Europe became economically integrated with the rest of the continent, the migration patterns in that region would change accordingly. Or, at least, to profoundly consider such a hypothesis. * Indeed, large scope of geographical coverage, long duration, high volume of migratory movements and a shift in migration balance from negative to positive on the European soil seem to be an unprecedented social phenom- enon of modernity.2 The beginning of mass emigration from Europe is usu- ally dated to the early nineteenth century. Jean-Claude Chesnais (1986) ar- gues that over a whole century, in the period 1815-1914, more than 60 million inhabitants of Europe (one fifth of its 1850 population) abandoned the continent of origin and, according to Russell King (1996), approxi- mately 50 million Europeans moved to other continents between 1850 and 1914.3 In roughly the same period (1861-1920), the United Sates, alone, saw the arrival of 30 million immigrants, 27 or 28 million of whom were probably of European origin (Miller & Castles 1993 after Borjas 1990).4 In addition, many millions of European people migrated to other countries within the continent. For instance, between 1876 and 1920, from a total of fifteen million Italian immigrants, nearly seven million went to other European countries, notably to France, Switzerland and Germany. Similarly, a considerable proportion of Irish migrants moved to England and Scotland, whereas Germany was a destination of a large number of 8 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 13. Poles (Castles &Miller 1993). In a sharp contrast, until the late 1940s in- tercontinental migration to Europe did not match the emigration figures. It predominantly included returning emigrants whose proportion relative to the out-migrants was usually well below 50 per cent (King 1996). In relative terms, (overseas) emigration per 1,000 resident population was very high in almost all European countries. In certain decades of the 1850-1910 period, it exceeded five per 1,000 on a yearly basis. In coun- tries such as England, Scotland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain and Portugal, it accounted for a large part of their natural increase (Baines 1991; Hatton & Williamson 2008). The recent picture is strikingly different. Europe has become a continent of net immigration. From 1960 to 2010, the overall positive migration bal- ance was around 32.9 million, that is approximately one fourth of the total 128.3 million increase in the European resident population in that period (UN 2009). According to the United Nations estimate, between 1960 and 2005, the number of international migrants in three of four major parts of the continent (northern, southern and western) rose from 10.3 million to 39.3 million or, in relative terms, from 2.8 per cent to 9.0 per cent of the total population (UN 2006).5 A growing importance of immigration to Europe can be best illustrated by the following observation: the first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rate of net migration close to (plus) 3.5 per 1,000 population in the group of 27 member countries of the European Union, whereas the respec- tive rate of natural increase was below one per 1,000 (Eurostat 2009). Corrado Bonifazi (2008) attempted to establish the time when Europe at- tained its status of net immigration. In the 1950s, the migration balance was still strongly negative (-4.8 million over the decade). In the 1960s, the net loss continued, but at a substantially lower level (-600,000). In the next decade, the balance became positive (+3 million). Thus, the 1970s wit- nessed a breakthrough. Since that time the gap between immigration and emigration in favour of the former has been systematically growing. Bonifazi, however, also stressed distinctive differences in migration trends between major groups of countries and individual countries themselves. Western Europe turned to a net immigration regime in the 1950s, where- as Northern and Southern Europe only did so in the 1970s.6 In turn, if the Russian Federation was excluded, Eastern Europe remained a net emigra- tion region until the end of the century, if not beyond that date.7 On the other hand, Belgium, France, Switzerland and Germany became a net im- migration area as soon as in the 1950s,8 while Italy only did so in the 1990s. In 1950, many countries of Europe which nowadays are perceived as immigration areas, hardly hosted foreign residents; in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, their share in the total population was below 1 per cent (in some of them ā below 0.3 per cent). After a half-century or so, the proportion of INTRODUCTION 9
- 14. foreign residents inthose countries multiplied by a factor five to ten (Bonifazi 2008). * Those simple empirical facts, besides the authorsā intuition, became the in- spiration for a research project from which this volume emanated.9 The emergence of ever-new immigration countries in Europe in recent decades makes the question of a common European migration pattern perti- nent and indeed topical. Cultural proximity and common cultural heritage, comprehensive political, economic and historical links between societies and regions, similar contemporary socio-economic and demographic chal- lenges and convergence of institutions and policies (partly through acces- sion to the EU) can offer a provisional justification. On the other hand, the succession of European countries in assuming the status of immigration area resembles the phenomenon of gradual entrance by those countries of the mass migration era over several decades in the nineteenth century. From a cross-country and inter-regional perspective, mass emigration from Europe in the period from the 1820s until the out- break of World War I (and in some cases until the early 1950s) was by no means a uniform process, either in terms of its overall volume or time dis- tribution. Similarly, in the period of intensified immigration, after World War II, European countries and their regions significantly differed with re- spect to the size and persistence of inflows over time. What particularly mattered in the later period from the European viewpoint were also the dif- ferences in forms of flows, the conditions of migrantsā stay and employ- ment and thus immigrantsā propensity or ability to settle and integrate in the host society. Those differences notwithstanding, a general tendency appears clear and indeed unquestionable: until the mid-twentieth century, a great majority of European regions and Europe as a whole were primarily a sending area, whereas, since the second half of that century, they have gradually become a net receiving area.10 * This volume is dedicated to a broadly conceived European migration pat- tern, to a unique coincidence and interplay of mass migration and the for- mation of modern Europe. Taking such a long and general view, the analy- ses in the ensuing chapters, however, focus on relatively recent (or future) phenomena transpiring in the group of countries that belong to the EU. An underlying assumption is that a typical feature for modernising European countries is the change of a migration balance from net emigra- tion to net immigration. In addition, two basic hypotheses explicitly mark the conceptual framework. 10 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 15. ā Patterns ofimmigration in ānewā destination countries (latecomers) re- call historical patterns observed in āoldā destination countries (early starters).11 ā Each individual country ā in the process of transformation from net em- igration to net immigration ā displays a number of important distinctive characteristics that are dependent on geographic location, previous mi- gration links and routes, as well as the historical time of the transforma- tion and international migratory context at the time. Through systematising and examining the available body of knowledge about mass migration in Europe, the analyses in this volume seek to recon- struct immigration patterns in individual countries and groups of countries and identify major similarities and differences across those patterns. They also aim to link specific migration patterns with their root causes, historical contexts and structural factors. In particular, an attempt is made to evaluate the impact of migration policies on the course of immigration. Last but not least, the volume includes an exercise on the projection of immigration trends in the āforeseeableā future that exploits the knowledge about past migration and innovative analytical tools. These aims are to be achieved by in-depth analyses of causes, character- istics and effects of past and current migration flows to EU countries, espe- cially those located in the southern and eastern rims of the European Community. A special importance is to be given to comparing and assess- ing the political background of immigration in the countries of destination, including its institutional and administrative setup. The countries included in the analysis represent three parts of Europe that obviously differ according to geographic location and the time when net positive immigration status was (or will be) reached. The countries where the change in migration balance was accomplished before or during the third quarter of the twentieth century are named āoldā immigration countries. Those where such change occurred in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century are named ānewā immigration countries; and the remain- der (the change to be completed some time in the twenty-first century) are named āfutureā immigration countries. The respective breakdown of those countries is presented in Table 1. The main concept underlying the framework and the method of analysis is that of country migration status. Migration status, perceived in terms of migration balance and inflows/outflows volume, became a crucial category in the analysis of migration transition ā the process of a former emigration country acquiring the attributes of a new immigration country. In turn, those concepts and categories were framed by a more general conception of the migration cycle. āMigration cycleā is an analytically useful, but by no means innovatory idea. For instance, as early as 1954, Brinley Thomas examined long swings INTRODUCTION 11
- 16. in trans-Atlantic migration(and urban development) in the period 1870- 1910 within the concept of āmigration cycleā,12 while Castles and Miller (1993) suggested a cycle-like four-stage āmodelā of migration as a tool for systematising and identifying the time-dependent internal dynamics of im- migration.13 Similarly, and also in 1993, Anthony Fielding argued that mass migration to, from and within Europe changes āin tune with the stages of the business cycleā (Fielding 1993: 10). He distinguished four stages of the cycle, each being distinctly different with respect to basic mi- gration characteristics. As economic activity fluctuates in a regular pattern, from an expansion (up to a peak) to a recession (down to a trough), and from a recession to an expansion, mass migration behaves in the way that is presented in Table 2. Moreover, the āmigration cycleā underlies such concepts as āmobility transitionā (Zelinsky 1971), āmigratory transitionā (Chesnais 1986) and ātransition from trickle to floodā (Hatton & Williamson 2008), and has been exploited in many empirical studies. Some of those applications are referred to in chapter 1 of this volume. It might be mentioned here, Table 1 Breakdown of countries with respect to their migration status Part of Europe Time Early 4th quarter of the twentieth century Late West Austria, France South Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain East Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland Source: Own elaboration Table 2 Stages of a migration cycle dependent on the business cycle Stage 1 (expansion) Stage 2 (peak) Stage 3 (recession) Stage 4 (trough) Immigration starts low and rises rapidly; emigration starts high and falls rapidly; net immigration replaces net emigration. Immigration peaks high; emigration bottoms out low; high net immigration Immigration starts high and falls rapidly; emigration starts low and rises rapidly; net emigration replaces net immigration. Immigration bottoms out low; emigration peaks high; high net emigration Source: Fielding (1993: 11) 12 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 17. however, that nouniversal or unequivocal sense and meaning is attributed in the literature to the concept of migration cycle. The authors of the present volume apply āmigration cycleā in a flexible manner, in its narrower or wider meaning, according to analytical needs, aspect of migration or time-horizon of analysis. For instance, one of those applications followed the pioneering effort of Felice Dassetto (1990), who himself understood the cycle as a combination of cross-generation proc- esses making migrants from poor countries enter and settle in a rich coun- try. In this volume, it is exploited in the analysis of European countries passing to ever-greater āmaturityā with respect to immigration (see chapter 2 by JoaquĆn Arango in this volume). Another example was the application of the āmigration cycleā to the systematisation of stages in the change in country migration status, where the fundamental and constitutive process of the cycle comes to be the migration transition (see chapter 1 by Marek OkĆ³lski and chapter 3 by Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger in this vol- ume). The principal difference between the approaches adopted by the au- thors is that some of them (mainly chapter 1 and, to a lesser degree, also chapter 3 plus some others) take a very long view and reach as far back as to the origins of mass emigration, while others (mainly chapter 2) focus on relatively recent developments in European migration history, namely, the stage when European countries were experiencing sizeable and sustained flows of immigrants. The reason of this distinction seems obvious and it is purely functional. The former enables us to capture and compare the change in migration patterns in virtually all countries of Europe; the latter serves as an in-depth analysis of similarities and diversity in the establish- ment and maturing of the area and pertains exclusively to the present (āoldā and ānewā) net immigration countries. * This volume is organised as follows. The first two chapters focus on the re- cent history of European migration and the conceptual underpinnings of the analyses presented later in the volume. The next part (chapters 3 through 8) consists of three syntheses that test the concept of a regional immigration pattern in each of the three groups of countries and inquire into similarities and differences in migrant flows, immigrant integration and migration policies in those groups. It becomes clear that a synthetic perspective is more appropriate and manageable for countries with rela- tively long histories and rich experiences of immigration, as opposed to countries where immigration is a rather new phenomenon. In the synthesis depicting immigration in āoldā immigration countries (chapter 3), the authors take a rather long and general view and offer styl- ised facts about migration. A corresponding chapter 5, related to ānewā im- migration countries, while also attempting to draw a general picture, pays INTRODUCTION 13
- 18. more attention todetails and specificities of time, country and context of immigration. In contrast to these two, chapter 8, devoted to āfutureā immi- gration countries ā adhering to the cross-country comparative approach ā mainly describes trends and patterns in individual countries; the author here is rather cautious in pointing to common regional characteristics of the analysed processes. The first two of those syntheses are accompanied by chapters 4, 6 and 7 presenting either different perspectives on the virtue of a āregionalā model of immigration or discussion of some of the key find- ings of those syntheses. The inclusion in the volume of these three critical chapters seems to have enriched the body of arguments in the debate on a āEuropean pattern of immigrationā. The next part of the volume (chapters 9 and 10) deals with migration forecasts. First, past attempts at migration forecasting, focusing mainly on inadequate data and techniques, are critically assessed and, in turn, an innovative approach to improving those forecasts is developed. Such a view is challenged and, to some extent, balanced in a brief rejoinder that follows. The final part of the volume (chapters 11 and 12) concentrates on lessons that can be learned from a comparative analysis of migration poli- cies carried out in the individual countries and the groups of countries, as well as from recent trends in the management of migration in the context of European integration. In its conclusion, this part identifies the major challenges faced by the EU in the area of migration and immigrant integra- tion policy. The volume closes with a brief account of major conclusions and an appraisal of the degree to which the authorsā objectives have been accomplished. Here the hypothesis of European migration pattern is crit- ically reassessed. Turning to a more detailed look at the chapters, the first, by OkĆ³lski, deals with the premises of migration status change in European countries. It is based on the hypothesis that, in the long run, migration results primar- ily from the degree of disequilibrium between population and other resour- ces, which at times manifests itself in various degrees of overpopulation or underpopulation. He points to the circumstances under which countries of Northern and Western Europe transformed from sending masses of their population overseas to receiving large numbers of people from all around the world and, consequently, from net emigration to net immigration. He also suggests that a similar shift in the migration pattern and balance, albeit after a certain time lag, occurred in a number of Southern European coun- tries. This leads him to elaborate some considerations about the present mi- gration status of Central and East European countries and basic prerequi- sites for their change of migration status in the near future. OkĆ³lski concludes that such a change in any country requires, above all, the out- flow of excess population and, secondly, embarking on the path of sus- tained modern economic growth. When this is coupled with the completion of the demographic transition (natural increase close to zero and advanced 14 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 19. ageing of thepopulation), emigration starts to decline. On the other hand, economic competition and the search for cheap labour by employers in- duce segmentation of the labour market and increase demand for foreign workers. In effect, in the course of time the inflow of people becomes larg- er than the outflow. In the following chapter, Arango seeks an answer to the question: Do different migration realities and experiences among European countries stem from historical factors (e.g. the moment when the migration pattern or regime started to change) or from structural socio-economic differences? In order to do so, he develops an analytical framework that serves as a ba- sis for identification of distinct groups of immigration countries and a tool for the analysis of intra-group similarities and inter-group differences. This framework refers to the notion of a migration cycle conceived as a multi- stage process through which immigrants become better adapted to and (ul- timately) integrated in the receiving society, and the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants increasingly resemble those of the native pop- ulation. It also implies the following four criteria of grouping and analysis of the immigration countries: age (stage of the migration cycle), generation (historical context of initial and formative phases of the cycle), historical precedence and socio-economic regime. In the next step, Arango applies that framework to examine the distinctiveness of the immigration patterns and characteristics of immigrant populations in the three groups of European countries. He concludes that the set of analysed countries presents great complexity and variation with respect to migration. This not- withstanding, the three different migration regimes in Europe seem to be a reality, where four Southern countries represent the highest degree of inter- nal homogeneity and three CEE countries represent the lowest. In the volumeās first chapter devoted to a specific group of European countries, Fassmann and Reeger describe in a detailed manner the migra- tion patterns observed in āoldā immigration countries. In doing so, they ex- tensively use the concept of a migration cycle composed of three distinct stages: initial (pre-transformation), intermediate (transition) and adaptation (post-transformation). They also consider four characteristics of each stage: historical time, quantities (flows, stocks, pace of growth, fluctuations), pub- lic perception and legal measures. In their analysis, they include Germany and the UK in addition to Austria and France, and contrast those countries with Spain (as an example of a ānewā immigration country). Accounting for the differences between the countries at any given time, Fassmann and Reeger come to a straightforward final conclusion: with regard to immigra- tion, European countries are developing in the same direction and in a sim- ilar way. Godfried Engbersenās chapter widens the scope of analysis that deals with āoldā immigration countries. The author argues that the long-run ap- proach adopted by Fassmann and Reeger, which he calls āpath-dependentā, INTRODUCTION 15
- 20. fails to recognisethe importance of contemporary (or current) migration flows to Western countries, whose nature seems significantly different from the bulk of flows observed in the past. The essence of that new mobility, exemplified by the case of flows of people from CEE to the Netherlands, is a fluid (liquid) form of labour migration. In an institutional context entirely different from that of the old guest worker system of the 1960s and 1970s, the migration pattern in āoldā countries now seems to be deviat- ing from the path depicted by the concept of a migration cycle. New mi- grations are, among others, characterised by a regular status of migrantsā employment, temporary stay, individualised life strategies, multiplicity and multidirectionality of movements and loosely defined aspirations and op- tions of migrants. All of this makes rather pertinent the question put for- ward by Engbersen: Are we witnessing a shift from the adaptation stage (ac- cording to Fassmann and Reeger, the final in the migration cycle) to a new initial stage? The three succeeding chapters deal with the specificity of the so-called Southern (or Mediterranean) model of immigration, pertaining to ānewā countries of immigration. In the opening chapter, JoĆ£o Peixoto and six co- authors skilfully synthesise the immense research and new findings pertain- ing to four countries ā Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Arango, Bonifazi, Finotelli, Peixoto, Sabino, Strozza & Triandafyllidou 2009). They refer to earlier comparative analyses of immigration experiences in Southern European countries with the intention of testing their validity and updating them. In their analysis, Peixoto et al. focus on the phenomenon of irregular migration, the mechanisms of migrant workersā insertion in the labour market and migration policy responses. Special attention is paid to regularisation policies, executed ā typical for Southern countries ā ex post, as well as to their effectiveness and social costs. Through cross-country analysis, the authors scrupulously examine various aspects of migration- related experiences, tracking signs of both regional homogeneity and diver- sity. Despite the differences with regard to timing, quantity and types of migrant flows or to policy tools, ultimately, they seem to be convinced that a āSouthern modelā does exist. They stress, however, that the model is dynamic because with time it acquires ever-new dimensions and meanings and includes new social frameworks and new policy instruments. In turn, Martin Baldwin-Edwards presents a sceptical view about the utility and validity of a āSouthern modelā, identified in earlier years by the author himself and several others, especially when it comes to analyses of ongoing migration processes in the respective countries. Further, he adds a number of factors that ā according to him ā could enrich the analysis by Peixoto et al.; these include the role of local governance in policy directed at integration of immigrants, the role of NGOs and civil society in provid- ing social support and acceptance of immigrants and the dependence of mi- gration policy on political ideology and the operation of political parties. 16 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 21. In conclusion, Baldwin-Edwardssuggests that a āSouthern modelā might be too simple and too broad to adequately grasp all complexities and expe- riences acquired to date by the Mediterranean countries. The last in the series of three chapters devoted to Southern European countries limits itself to Portugal and Spain, to what is called the āIberian model of labour migrationā. Author Jorge Malheiros takes an in-depth look at a major feature of that model: the low degree of regulation of migration flows āin a society characterised by practices marked by familiarism, infor- mality and patrimony-based traditionsā. He finds a close match between economic interests and migration policies that bring about a specific pat- tern of foreign worker recruitment, insertion and, ultimately, integration in the labour market. He argues that in this respect, Portugal and Spain, which are similar, differ significantly from Italy and radically from Greece. The next chapter is devoted to immigration trends and patterns in three CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In this chapter, DuÅ”an Drbohlav draws extensively from a comprehensive cross-country analysis pertaining to the three countries (Grabowska-LusiÅska, Drbohlav & Hars 2011). He points out that the three āfutureā immigration countries, although expected to be experiencing similar migration-related processes, are in fact strongly differentiated. Migration flows to the Czech Republic are rather strong, emigration is low and the migration balance is clearly positive; Hungary has little immigration and hardly any emigration, result- ing in a tiny surplus of immigrants; and in Poland emigration by far ex- ceeds immigration, leading to a negative migration balance. On the other hand, Poland has a strong inflow of circular or short-term migrants (a good proportion of those migrants fit the concept of liquid migration, introduced in chapter 4) whereas in the Czech Republic and Hungary, long-term immi- gration is the predominant type. Drbohlav concludes that all three countries are undergoing migration transition, an intermediary stage between being an emigration country and being an immigration country, but find them- selves in different phases of the transition. Poland is in its incipient phase, whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic, especially, are considerably fur- ther on in that process. Those differences notwithstanding, all three are at the moment too āyoungā as immigration countries to justify a meaningful search for a āregional modelā of immigration or to draw a parallel between those countries and the rest of Europe. The following two chapters deal with the issue of immigration in the fu- ture, or, strictly speaking, with the limits to migration forecasting. Arkadiusz WiÅniowski and his three co-authors argue that the relevant fore- casts yield inevitably uncertain results if only for three reasons: the inabil- ity to adequately define migration, difficulty in its precise measurement and imperfections in knowledge about the nature of the processes involved. A considerable part of these weaknesses is attributed by them to the deter- ministic character of population forecasts, in general, and migration, in INTRODUCTION 17
- 22. particular. In orderto alleviate at least some of the weakness of migration forecasting, they suggest using a stochastic approach and, in particular, Bayesian statistics. This leads them to apply the concept of migration fore- casting in a flexible manner, complementing official immigration data with expert data derived from a series of Delphi surveys. In turn, with help of autoregressive models and vector autoregressive models, WiÅniowski et al. present numerical results from that approach for a number of immigration countries representing various parts of Europe. Summing up, they seem to be confident that migration is mostly an unpredictable phenomenon and claim that āprecise forecasting of the exact values of immigration flows is virtually impossibleā. Although the application of stochastic models to the forecasting of migration flows enables researchers to quantify and account for a degree of uncertainty, the lesson for policymakers is clear: any migra- tion forecast must be viewed with great caution and all the more caution for longer time horizons. Leo van Wissen, in the second chapter in this section, applauds the ap- proach adopted by WiÅniowski et al., which he describes as innovative and elegant. However, he disagrees with their main message, namely that mi- gration is hardly predictable. To support his view, Van Wissen discusses in a rather technical way a handful of factors that ā in favourable circumstan- ces ā might make the results less uncertain. Thus, room for improvement can be found in the following: a better translation of expert ideas into dis- tributions of the parameters of the forecasting model; more careful assump- tions about the interdependency of model parameters; a lengthening of the time series for explanatory variables included in the model; a more accu- rate (āoptimalā) mathematical formulation of the model; and more inter- nally consistent data on migration extracted from official statistics. The two chapters preceding the final conclusions might be viewed as being practically oriented. They present policy recommendations that stem from analyses of most recent migration phenomena observed in Europe and attempt to refer those recommendations to the mainstream debate about a common European migration policy. First, Magdalena LesiÅska lists the premises required by āidealā or āmatureā migration policy. Through this lens, she examines the process of learning by countries in earlier phases of the migration transition from countries in more advanced phases. In this context, she identifies and analyses the lessons to be learned, first, from the current āoldā immigration countries and then from the ānewā im- migration countries. LesiÅska also attempts to address the main questions she considers āthe pillars of migration policyā. She answers the question āhow should labour migration be managed?ā by promoting the search for more flexible and effective rules and recruitment schemes. āHow should irregular immigration be coped with?ā is met with a proposal for controls, regularisation and addressing root causes. Finally, she asks about the modes of solving āthe eternal problem of integrationā and offers a very 18 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 23. elaborate discussion thataccounts for the integrity and coherence of policy aims and measures; the scope and organisational structure of integration policy; a variety of inclusion activities and combating discrimination and marginalisation; integration-promoting education and information; protec- tion of vulnerable groups; and participation of migrants in the formulation and execution of integration policy. The problem of integration in the context of so-called Europeanisation, with which LesiÅskaās chapter concludes, is further investigated by Theodora Kostakopoulou. She considers that aspect of migration policy from the legal and institutional perspective and, in doing so, she pays spe- cial attention to the evolution of the area of freedom, security and justice in the European Communities. Her analysis draws on a critical review of the development of policy goals and instruments in that area and she calls for a readjustment of European migration law and policy. As Kostakopou- lou argues: [...] there is an urgent need to rethink the existing political frames of migration and integration, and to devise a coherent framework of migration governance that de-securitises migration, reflects interna- tional and European legal commitments and takes sufficiently into account the specificity of migration patterns in the āoldā, ānewā and āfutureā migration countries. Bearing in mind that āmobility is an integral part of the European integra- tion projectā, a shift in paradigm is required ā āfrom perceiving and fram- ing migration as a threat or nuisance to viewing it as a resourceā. Notes 1 The CEEās economic and political polarisation (the emergence of migration attrac- tion poles in the region) proved to be a precondition for that shift in the expected out-migration of CEE populations. Other important underlying factors included: a dramatic liberalisation of migration policies (especially the rules of entry) through- out CEE, concomitant with the introduction of more rigorous admission rules in Western countries; intra-regional differences in demography and imbalances in la- bour markets in CEE; and ā last but not least ā the opening of ways for (until 1989, largely repressed) movements of various ethnic groups that were territorially divided or scattered by the redrawing of state borders in CEE during the Yalta Conference in 1945 (OkoĢlski 2004). 2 A vast literature exists on this subject. Among the most influential works one might mention are: Bade (2003), Baines (1991), Castles and Miller (1993), Cohen (1987), Eltis (1983, 2002), Hatton and Williamson (1994, 1998, 2008), King (1996), Lucassen (1987), Potts (1990), Thomas (1954, 1958, 1972), Willcox (1929, 1931). 3 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (1993 after DecloıĢtres 1967) offer a slightly lower figure (for 1800-1930) ā namely, 40 million ā but confine that estimate to the INTRODUCTION 19
- 24. overseas migration, thusexcluding a huge migration of Russian population to Siberia and Central Asia since the 1890s (around 13 million according to McKeown 2004). Klaus Baade (2003) offers a variety of reliable estimates of European overseas emigration in a period of around 100 years between the beginnings of the nine- teenth and the early twentieth centuries that range between 37 million and 63 million. 4 According to another account (Eltis 1983), in the period 1820-1880 13.7 million im- migrants in the US arrived from Europe (in the period 1760-1820 the number was only 800,000). 5 In Eastern Europe, the increase also seemed very steep ā from 6.8 million to 24.8 million (2.2 per cent to 7.5 per cent of the total population). These figures, however, to a large degree constitute an artefact. The initially large number of immigrants stemmed from the definition of international migrant adopted by the United Nations and based on the country of birth criterion. In turn, the period 1960-2005ās growth owed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing reclassification of persons who over that period moved within the boundaries of that country (and, of course, until around 1990 were considered internal migrants). From the time of the Soviet Unionās disintegration they became international migrants. Those reserva- tions are much less meaningful in the case of other parts of Europe (see Bonifazi 2008). 6 Precisely for that reason, the entities that compose Western Europe merit the name of āold immigration countriesā, while those of Southern Europe are often called ānew immigration countriesā. 7 The picture for Russia (and the whole former USSR, in fact) is blurred and cannot be compared with other parts of Europe due to reasons explained in note 5. 8 France presents a clear exception here. It was a country of net immigration already in some decades of the late nineteenth century and in the 1920s (King 1993). 9 IDEA ā an acronym for the project known as Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as New Immigration Destinations in the European Union ā was con- ceived in early 2006 and carried out from 2007 to 2009. It benefited from financial support granted by the European Commission within the 6th Framework Programme (Priority SSP-5A, Area 8.1 B.2.5, Project no. 44446). IDEA was coordi- nated by the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) at the University of Warsaw and conducted by a consortium of eleven research institutions including, alongside the coordinator (in alphabetical order): the Central European Forum for Migration and Population Research (IOM Warsaw); the Centre for International Migration and Refugee Studies (Institute of Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest); the Centre of Research in Economic Sociology and Organisation (Lisbon); the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development (Charles University, Prague); the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Athens); the Institute for Urban and Regional Studies (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna); the Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies (National Research Council, Rome); the Institute of Political Science (Paris University X, Nanterre); the Mediterranean Laboratory of Sociology (National Centre of Scientific Research, Aix-en-Provence); Ortega y Gasset University Institute for Research (Madrid). Full documentation and all research out- comes of the project are available at www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl. 10 Distinct exceptions to this tendency, however, could be observed even at the time of this writing. In particular, Poland and Romania from among the EU members and Ukraine from among non-EU countries ranked among important migrant-sending areas. 20 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 25. 11 Strikingly, TimothyHatton and Jeffrey Williamson (2008) speak about āoldā and ānewā emigrants from Europe during the period of mass overseas migration in refer- ence to emigrants from Western and Northern Europe in the first instance and from Eastern and Southern Europe in the second. King (1996) referring to Michael Piore (1979) distinguishes between āoldā and ānewā immigration to the US (originating from North-Western and South-Eastern Europe, respectively). 12 In reference to Thomasā concept, Hatton and Williamson (1994) explicitly spoke of the āemigration cycleā. 13 To be sure, in subsequent editions of the book, the concept of a four-stage model has been somehow diluted and presented in a very vague form. References Arango, J., C. Bonifazi, C. Finotelli, J. Peixoto, C. Sabino, S. Strozza & A. Triandafyllidou (2009), āThe making of an immigration model: Inflows, impacts and policies in Southern Europeā, IDEA Working Papers 9, www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP_9_Southern_ countries_synthesis.pdf. Baade K.J. (2003), Migration in European history. Oxford: John Wiley/Blackwell. Baines, D. (1991), Emigration from Europe 1815-1930. London: Macmillan. Bonifazi, C. (2008), āEvolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europeā, in C. Bonifazi, M. OkĆ³lski, J. Schoorl & P. Simon (eds.), International migration in Europe. New trends and new methods of analysis, 107-128. IMISCOE Research Series. Amster- dam: Amsterdam University Press. Castles, S. & M.J. Miller (1993), The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. Houndmills: Macmillan. Chesnais, J.-C. (1986), La transition dĆ©mographique: Etapes, formes, implications Ć©cono- miques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Cohen, R. (1987), The New Helots: Migrants in the international division of labour. Aldershot: Avebury. Dassetto, F. (1990), āPour une thĆ©orie des cycles migratoiresā, in A. Bastenier & F. Dassetto (eds.), Immigration et nouveaux pluralisms: Une confrontation de sociĆ©tĆ©s, 11-40. Brussels: De Boeck-Wesmael. Eltis, D. (ed.) (2002), Coerced and free migration: Global perspectives. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Eltis, D. (1983), āFree and coerced transatlantic migrations: Some comparisonsā, American Historical Review 88: 251-280. Eurostat (2009), āPopulation and social conditionsā. Data in focus 31: 1-11. Fielding, A. (1993), āMass migration and economic restructuringā, in R. King (ed.), Mass mi- grations in Europe: The legacy and the future, 7-17. London: Belhaven Press. Grabowska-LusiÅska, I., D. Drbohlav & A. HarÅ” (eds.), Immigration puzzles: Comparative analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland before and after joining the EU. SaarbrĆ¼cken: Lambert Academic Publishing. Hatton, T.J. & J.G. Williamson (2008), Global migration and the world economy: Two centu- ries of policy and performance. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hatton, T.J. & J.G. Williamson (1998), The age of mass migration: Causes and economic im- pact. New York: Oxford University Press. Hatton, T.J. & J.G. Williamson (eds.) (1994), Migration and the international labour market, 1850-1939. London: Routledge. King, R. (1996), āMigration in a world historical perspectiveā, in J. van den Broeck (ed.), The economics of labour migration, 7-75. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. INTRODUCTION 21
- 26. King, R. (1993),āEuropean international migration 1945-90: A statistical and geographical overviewā, in R. King (ed.), Mass migration in Europe: The legacy and the future, 19-39. London: Belhaven Press. Lucassen, J. (1987), Migrant labour in Europe 1600-1900. London: Croom Helm. McKeown, A. (2004), āGlobal migration 1846-1940ā, Journal of World History 15: 155-189. OkĆ³lski, M. (2004), āThe effects of political and economic transition on international migra- tion in Central and Eastern Europeā, in D.S. Massey & J.E. Taylor (eds.), International migration: Prospects and policies in a global market, 35-58. New York: Oxford University Press. Piore, M.J. (1979), Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Potts, L. (1990), The world labour market: A history of migration. London: Zed Books. Thomas, B. (1972), Migration and urban development: A reappraisal of British and American long cycles. London: Methuen. Thomas, B. (ed.) (1958), The economics of international migration. London: Macmillan. Thomas, B. (1954), Migration and economic growth: A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. UN (2009), World population prospects: The 2008 revision. New York: United Nations. UN (2006), Trends in total migrant stock: The 2005 revision. New York: United Nations. Willcox, W.F. (ed.) (1931), āInternational migrationsā, Vol. II, NBER Occasional Paper 18. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. Willcox, W.F. (ed.) (1929), āInternational migrationsā, Vol. I, NBER Occasional Paper 14. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. Zelinsky, W. (1971), āThe hypothesis of the mobility transitionā, Geographical Review 61: 219-249. 22 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 27. 1 Transition fromemigration to immigration Is it the destiny of modern European countries? Marek OkĆ³lski 1.1 Purpose of this chapter This book makes extensive use of two basic concepts: migration transition and the migration cycle. Expounded within its framework, the central premise of those concepts is such that, over time and under specific cir- cumstances, individual European countries transform their migration status from one of emigration to one of immigration. This change in migration status has been termed the āmigration transitionā. As explained in the Introduction of this volume, the āmigration cycleā in its more general sense involves three distinct, consecutive phases: the first occurs when a country is overwhelmed by the outflow of its inhabitants, while the proportion of foreign nationals in the total population continues to be marginal; the second begins when the migration transition takes place; and the third begins when immigration systematically predominates over emigration and foreigners constitute a considerable proportion of the population. The central part of the cycle, the migration transition, also involves distinct parts (i.e. stages), which can be distinguished according to a given countryās degree of maturity in terms of its immigration pattern or regime (see chapter 2 in this volume). A sequence of the stages ā from immature to mature immigration country ā makes up the āmigration cycleā (or rather āimmigration cycleā) in a narrower sense.1 The main hypothesis underlying the analyses included in the present vol- ume was that each European country finds itself in a specific stage of the immigration cycle. Consequently, countries included in the project were divided into three groups: the most advanced (āoldā), the moderately ad- vanced (ānewā) and the least advanced (āfutureā). As will be shown in part 3 of this chapter, of all countries analysed in depth in the present volume, Austria belongs to the first group (āoldā); Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to the second group (ānewā); and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the third group (āfutureā). Similarly, Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafylli- dou (2007) describe five types of European countries made distinct by their
- 28. migration patterns: oldhost countries, recent host countries, countries in tra- nsition, small island countries and non-immigrant countries. Leaving aside āsmall islandsā (which include, according to Gropas and Triandafyllidou, Cyprus and Malta ā and I would add Iceland here), this typology, apart from the three groups distinguished by the authors of this book, accounts for non- immigration status, the status attributed to the Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia. This chapter specifically addresses the process a country undergoes to attain āimmigration countryā status. To begin with, we should be more spe- cific when using the notion of an āimmigration countryā (or āreceiving areaā). Does any type of inflow count, e.g. one comprising foreigners and/ or return migrants; settlers and/or circular migrants ā irrespective of its vol- ume, durability or form ā or should there be some additional requirements? It seems that immigration, in order to be studied as such (especially in the context of an immigration country) needs to attain a certain (high) critical mass and to be a relatively sustained phenomenon. Moreover, it seems conceivable that high-volume and sustained immigration goes hand in hand with net emigration. Assuming, then, that no country becomes an immigra- tion country out of the blue, but rather reaches that status after a process of transformation from net emigration to net immigration, it seems useful ā at least insofar as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are concerned ā to extend the concept of the migration cycle further, by adding an early stage (āprenatalā or āembryonicā) of the migration transition, where emigra- tion declines and the nuclei of immigrant settlements are being set up. For Central and Eastern European countries (and likely for other coun- tries, e.g. Finland, Iceland and Ireland, as well) the real analytical crux, around which respective hypotheses could be tested empirically, is whether these countries are changing their statuses from net emigration to net immi- gration and, if so, how? This sort of approach, however, requires taking a far-reaching retrospec- tive view. 1.2 Factors of European migration in historical perspective Whereas the present volume is about relatively recent migratory phenom- ena, in this chapter, I take a long view. This is because I argue that the change in the migration status of any European country (population/soci- ety/state) should be conceived of as embedded in a broader demographic context and analysed as a structurally determined phenomenon. Such an approach evidently requires a long-time perspective.2 Precisely speaking, in pre-modern contemporary societies migration plays an ancillary role in population reproduction. It becomes an important component of reproduction once mortality begins its systematic and secular 24 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 29. decline. With thefall in death rates and ensuing, albeit delayed, fertility decline, the rate of natural increase reaches much higher levels than ever before and gives rise to several-decades-long, uninterrupted and relatively fast population growth. Thus, potential for mass emigration accrues. When the decrease in fertility rate is complete and fertility becomes close to the generation-to-generation replacement level, there is no longer need nor potential for massive and systematic emigration. On the contrary, under low and stable mortality, the close-to-replacement fertility brings about a very long process of population ageing. This, in turn, creates room for im- migrant population. If, under such a reproduction regime, population is to increase and at the same time āresistā fast ageing, steady immigration has to be reality. By this, migration maintains or reinforces its vital role in pop- ulation reproduction, the role acquired at a certain point of the secular mor- tality decline. Therefore, the demographic transition, the process that encapsulates the above-depicted phenomena, can be considered a structural foundation of the said change in migration status of European countries. On the other hand, one might perceive the demographic transition as an intermediate stage of the modernisation-related3 population cycle, whose initial (pre-modern) and ultimate (modern) stages assume some form of en- during population stability and a more or less erratic but also enduring equilibrium between the population size and its man-made environment. A shift in the predominant form and reproductive function of external migra- tion, viewed from the perspective of any population that undergoes such a cycle, is, according to Jean-Claude Chesnais (1986), an integral part of the demographic transition and is called by him the migration transition. Pre-modern migration is dependent upon political or economic conjunc- ture and rarely assumes mass scale.4 Typically, short-term mobility of circu- latory character predominates in the movements of population. Underneath, births and deaths ā their high levels and short-term but rarely coherent varia- tions notwithstanding ā remain in a long-term balance. Colin Clark (1977) and Jean-NoĆ«l Biraben (1979) suggest that over one thousand years (the period between 14 AD and approximately 1000), Europeās population size did not change at all,5 though in between it dis- played numerous ups and downs. Around the year 1400, its level was still not much higher than fourteen centuries earlier (Poursin 1976).6 Since the fifteenth century, European population seemed evidently on the rise, and in the period 1400-1800 it grew (according to Carr-Saunders 1936) by a little more than 300 per cent (United Nations 1973: 21) or (according to a more up-to-date estimate) by some 180 per cent (Biraben 2006: 13).7 This, how- ever, was only a prelude to a really explosive increase. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, within the period of less than 100 years, European populations recorded unprecedented growth, usu- ally by more than factor two. According to Walter F. Willcox (after TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 25
- 30. Chesnais 1986: 299),between 1800 and 1930, the population whose moth- er tongue was Russian increased by a factor of six; while in the case of English, the growth was fivefold; Italian and Polish: three-and-a-half-fold; Spanish: threefold; German: two-and-a-half-fold; and French: a bit more than twofold. Chesnais (1992: 319) estimates that in the presently highly developed countries, the growth of population size between the initial and final years of the demographic transition (on average, one hundred years) reached 300 per cent. It was mainly due to a systematic decrease of mortal- ity and a consistently elevated natural increase. As alluded to in this vol- umeās Introduction, a large part of that surplus population left for other continents.8 This was due in some part to greatly improved means of trans- portation and good opportunities elsewhere that lured immigrants (Hatton & Williamson 2008; King 1996), but mainly because of a different and very special reason. That reason is verbalised in Chesnaisā words (1992: 306): [ā¦] emigration helped, at a time when the competition of young adults on the job market was at its highest, to reduce the threat of over-population [ā¦]. External migration [was] a manifestly strate- gic variable in the process of a populationās adjustment to its milieu. As a matter of fact, Chesnais develops and substantiates empirically a hy- pothesis which posits a close to twenty-year time lag between time series of births (or natural increase) and emigration (Chesnais 1992: 171-175) and, by the same token, a āsubstitution of mortality by migrationā.9 Russell King (1996: 35), in reference to the safety valve theory, offers a similar explanation: As the death rate in Europe declined and the birth rate failed to respond to keep population growth in check, emigration functioned as a safety-valve to skim off a significant proportion of the surplus. By many accounts, mass emigration from Europe, which started in the early nineteenth century, can be considered a breakthrough in European population history. In reference to that phenomenon, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson (2008) speak of the transition from a trickle to mass migration.10 As a matter of fact, it is just one of the manifestations of a broader concept ā the mobility transition, in terms of Wilbur Zelinskyās (1971) well-known hypothesis. Its essence is that āphysical and social mo- bilityā always substantially increases as society (ācommunityā in his own words) experiences the process of modernisation. Moreover, āthe course of the mobility transition closely parallels that of the demographic transitionā (Zelinsky 1979: 171). One of the characteristics of early modernisation 26 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 31. (āthe early transitionalsocietyā phase) is a āmajor outflow of emigrants to available and attractive foreign destinationsā, concomitant with a ārapid de- cline in mortality [and] a relatively rapid rate of natural increase, and thus a major growth in size of populationā (Zelinsky 1979: 173). By a striking contrast, after around 100 to 150 years from the onset of mass intercontinental outflow of people, many countries of Europe wit- nessed exacerbated inflow of immigrants, largely of non-European origin, and at about the same time (if not a few decades earlier) European overseas emigration began to fade. Conspicuously, this new tendency generally ap- peared first in those countries where the mass emigration (and the demo- graphic transition) was initiated at the earliest. In fact, labour markets in some of those countries had attracted large numbers of foreigners several decades before that time. At that time, however, the migrants originated as a rule from other (less advanced in the process of industrialisation) coun- tries of Europe and often they assumed the role of temporary workers in their host countries. The beginning of the 1970s saw some 10 million migrant workers in Europe, many of them from Turkey, India, Pakistan, British, Dutch and French colonies of the Caribbean, various African countries and the East Indies. Between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, the foreign popula- tion in Germany increased by around 3.5 million; in France and Britain by more than 2.5 million; in Switzerland by nearly 800,000; in Belgium by 400,000; and in the Netherlands and Sweden by 300,000 (King 1986; Castles & Miller 2003). Not only did foreign citizens become a part of the resident populations in Europe in the decades to follow, but, moreover, the number and geographical diversity of their origin greatly increased, as did the number of European destination countries. That profound change also finds a reflection in the hypothesis of the mo- bility transition.11 In the late phase of the transition, as Zelinsky (1979: 173, 174) argues, āemigration is on the decline or may have ceased alto- getherā and next, the phase of āadvanced societyā witnesses a āsignificant net immigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from relatively underdeveloped landsā. All that is due to āa slight to moderate rate of natu- ral increase or none at allā, caused by the decline of fertility which finally āoscillates rather unpredictably at low to moderate levelsā. Levels of fertility in North-Western Europe after the mid-1960s (and lat- er in other parts of the continent) turned out very low, in fact substantially below the replacement level. This was hardly predicted by the demo- graphic transition model. Such unexpected fall in fertility prompted Dirk van de Kaa (1999)12 to extend and adjust the classical model of demo- graphic transition by assuming that the natural increase of population can be both positive and negative, and explicitly adding net migration as a component of the population change that continuously interplays with nat- ural increase. He incorporated in the model the idea developed by Hatton TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 27
- 32. and Williamson (1994),who suggested that, as natural increase (assuming systematically positive values) first rises and later declines, emigration goes through four phases ā initiation, growth, saturation and regression ā and with further decline in natural increase (within its negative values), im- migration comes to the fore. Referring to contemporary Europe, Van de Kaa (1999: 29, 34) assumed that it will face a lengthy period of below-replacement fertility and, equally, a lengthy period of immigration [ā¦]. The region will surely come to grips with reality and will start acting as an immi- gration area. This will lead to a carefully controlled influx, possibly during a couple of generations. Therefore an important conclusion might be drawn here. During the time of mass population movements, rates of migration are strongly linked (at least in the statistical sense) to rates of natural increase.13 This is even more so when it comes to long trends (Chesnais 1992). Coming back to the nineteenth century, all European societies experi- enced massive territorial mobility, including massive waves of emigration. Compared to the types of migrations observed in earlier periods of European history, the type of mobility that arose during the nineteenth cen- tury displayed two important, distinct characteristics. First of all, it was by and large intentional and usually included the aim of settlement. In addi- tion, it was principally individualistic and economically oriented, as it was undertaken by entrepreneurs (including farmers) and workers in search of gainful employment. It began, naturally, with capitalism and modernisation, and as a sustained quasi-unidirectional process of complex social change. The Industrial Revolution in England, an early component and factor of modernisation, gave rise to an unprecedented and long-lasting decline in mortality and ac- celerated population growth.14 Shortly, the population explosion became an all-European phenomenon. Increasing populations nourished industrial growth, both by enhancing the demand for goods and by supplying the labour market with ever more labour. Modernisation and the demographic transition became interwoven and mutually interdependent (Dyson 2001). Initially, surpluses of population and labour occurred mainly in back- ward areas, which were barely influenced or penetrated by modern social change and the related institutions or social relationships. Thus, the flow of people moving to fulfil the unsatisfied labour demand in modernising areas took a clear direction ā from the peripheries with (mostly) subsistence (pre-capitalist) economies to metropolitan centres with full-fledged markets and highly monetised (capitalist) economies. This phe- nomenon, inter alia, contributed to the expansion of demand for goods and 28 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 33. stimulated production growth.It should be mentioned that those flows of labour assumed the two forms, internal and international migration, both complementary or substituting for each other, depending on contextual cir- cumstances, e.g. the phase of economic (business) cycle (Thomas 1954). Population growth in Europe in the nineteenth century turned out to be so dynamic that the flows of people from the peripheries to the core, i.e. typically from rural to urban areas ā both within particular countries and in the trans-European space ā did not substantially reduce the population sur- plus and the emerging demographic-economic imbalance. As a conse- quence, a large overseas emigration movement emerged and attained an unprecedented scale. While in the early 1800s the population of all conti- nents besides Europe consisted of less than 5 million European settlers or their ancestors, today the respective number has skyrocketed to between 550 million and 650 million (Grabowska-LusiÅska & OkĆ³lski 2009). With the phenomenon of modernisation and of colonisation by Europeans of countries overseas, the world has gradually been divided into a group of core (or centre) countries, where modern changes were either complete or highly advanced, and a group of peripheral countries, where these changes were only just pending. A long-term process that characterises this division is the movement of individual countries from the former group towards the latter. Depending on the course of both modernisation and demographic transi- tion, the demand for labour in the metropolitan centres occasionally exceeded the supply of migrant labour (originating predominantly in the peripheries), but sometimes the opposite happened. The former scenario favoured immigration, whereas the latter case favoured emigration. A gen- eral tendency, however, was that of net emigration in the early stages of economic and demographic change, and net immigration in the later stages. France, for instance, where the pace of demographic transition was rela- tively ālowā and social change was rather deep, experienced very little emi- gration and rather quickly became a net immigration country (Morokvasic- MĆ¼ller, Dinh, Potot & Salzbrunn 2008). That net immigration status is typical of advanced modernity ā which, in turn, coincides with the end of demographic transition periods ā is a result of the very nature of the latter phenomenon. The end of demographic transition means, among other things, very low fertility, close to zero popu- lation growth and fast population ageing. Under the circumstances of rapid economic growth, this unavoidably leads to labour shortages and to labourās āimportationā from outside (third countries). The shift from a relative abundance of labour to a deficit could be seri- ously affected (amplified or impeded) by several other factors. One of these catalysts is the date when modern changes begin, or, strictly speak- ing, the relative level of modernity of a given society vis-Ć -vis other soci- eties at the moment of the processās initiation. The later a society enters TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 29
- 34. modernisation, the moreit can borrow or copy from pioneers or predeces- sors, and the less consistent social changes in that society seem to be. Modernisation processes in Mediterranean and CEE societies serve as an illustration here. It might also be the case, however, that the latecomers en- counter more acute and prolonged imbalances between the unsatisfied de- mand for labour generated by the centre and the excessive supply of labour generated by the periphery. Another crucial factor that contributes to the increased diversity among various societies in the course of the migration status change involves inherent cultural differences between those societies. The societies that are culturally similar to each other are more likely to undergo a comparable course of transition from a net emigration to net immigration status than those more dissimilar. Finally, there is virtually a plethora of factors of more universal or more local reach that are believed to have facilitated or accelerated or modified the course and essence of the transition, such as transportation costs, wage level and rates, conjuncture (phase of the busi- ness/investment cycle), the Irish Famine, ethnic cleansing (e.g. persecution of Jews in the Russian Empire), structure of the world economy (āAtlantic economyā), public policy (e.g. government subsidies), the strength of kin- ship and social networks, etc. (e.g. Baines 1991; Chesnais 1986; Gliwic 1934; Hatton &Williamson 2008; King 1996; Thomas 1954, 1972). In a short term, under the influence of those factors, many cases were noted to be of significant deviation from the main trend or even distinct exceptions from that trend. In the long run, however, the impact of demographic phe- nomena, especially the change in the regime of (vital) population reproduc- tion, turns out to be essential.15 Neither modern social change nor demographic transition is a uniform and linear process, and each one heavily depends on, among other things, starting points and cultural particularities. For instance, latecomer countries usually experience very rapid declines in mortality and strong surges in natural increase (i.e. the increase in native-born population)16 relative to pioneer countries, but the persistence of traditional lifestyles and subsis- tence economies among the latecomers at the beginning of their transitions is comparatively larger, and makes their drift to modernity more arduous and slow. Under such circumstances, even if emigration attains a large size, the population surplus is sustained ā if not increased ā which hampers or undermines social change. In order to synchronise the two processes, i.e. demographic and social change, a bit of luck is necessary. In the case of the Mediterranean coun- tries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), āluckā meant a contemporaneous decline in fertility and increase in the outflow of surplus population, which responded to an unfulfilled demand for foreign labour in the pioneer coun- tries of Western and Northern Europe. This happened in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Mediterranean countries were already fairly advanced not 30 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 35. only in themodernisation of their institutions and socio-economic struc- tures, but also in imitating āWesternā patterns of culture. The outflow of redundant population then brought about a crowding-out effect and made room for the completion of modern changes.17 1.3 Diversity of migration trends across Europe Let me now take a more restricted view and focus on European migration in the post-World War II period. Looking at basic migration trends in that period, and especially at migration status transformation from net emigra- tion to net immigration, it becomes apparent that, although major charac- teristics of that change were preserved, it was by and large influenced by a new post-war political reality. To clarify this point, I rely on a division of the post-war period into five stages presented in Table 1.1. Table 1.1 Stages of post-World War II migration processes Stage/sub-period Key characteristics 1. 1945-1947 Post-war reconstruction; new partition of Europe; adjustment migration 2. 1948-1973 Political bipolarity; Cold War and the arms race; blooming western market economies vis-Ć -vis state-controlled and non-efficient economies of Southern Europe and CEE; western economic integration (European Economic Community); strong labour flow from the South to the West and suppressed labour mobility in the East 3. 1974-1988 Political dĆ©tente; major cracks in the political system in CEE (1980, Poland); globalisation challenges; economic restructuring and deeper integration (inclusion of the South); search for available low-cost labour; inflow of irregular migrants from CEE (including many āethnic Germansā leaving their CEE countries of origin and entering Germany as tourists) and non-European countries; failure of āsocialist modernisationā 4. 1989-2004 Breakdown of the Communist bloc; end of bipolarity; sudden increase in population displacements; regional conflicts and wars; new political entities; a complete project of European integration (including common immigration policy and management); economic transition in CEE 5. after 2004/2007 Restoration of European unity; strong competition on the part of non-European economies; human capital deficits; continuous demand for immigrants vis-Ć -vis intensified difficulties in migrant integration Source: Own elaboration TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 31
- 36. Having identified thesestages and sub-periods, I will highlight basic differ- ences in migration trends between three groups of countries: Western and Northern Europe (WNE), Southern Europe (Mediterranean) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). What is an essential component of this geographical breakdown is, among other things, the temporal distance between respective initiations of modern social change. For example, WNE countries preceded Mediterranean countries, and Mediterranean countries preceded CEE coun- tries. To further elucidate this point, subsequent sub-periods can be distin- guished by their predominant characteristics and be considered specific to a given sub-period flow of people. These can be termed, respectively: āpost- war adjustment migrationā, āmigration related to labour recruitmentā, āmi- gration related to a ānew globalisationāā, āpost-communist migrationā and āpost-enlargement migrationā. They are succinctly described in Table 1.2. Directly after the period of post-war adjustment migration, WNE coun- tries, facing serious labour deficits and the challenge of deep economic re- structuring, were prepared for a massive intake of foreign workers. A Table 1.2 Sub-stages of post-World War II migration processes Stage/ sub-period Region Western and Northern (WNE) Southern (Mediterranean) Central and Eastern (CEE) 1. Post-war adjustment migration Post-war return migration; politically and ethnically motivated displacements (1945-1947) (Germany) (Greece) (All countries) 2. Migration related to labour recruitment/ bilateral agreements (1948-1973) Labour shortages; foreign recruitment; towards net immigra- tion; Finland, Ireland (major exceptions); fears of brain drain in some WNE countries (Low-skilled) labour outflow; freeing labour markets of redundant workforce; high net emigration; networks and ethnic niches in WNE Ban on international movements;under- urbanisation; GDR, Hungary, Czecho- slovakia (political exceptions), Yugoslavia (economic exception) 3. Migration of the onset of ānew globalisationā (1974-1988) Cessation of rec- ruitment; labour market segmen- tation; inflow for family reunion; inflow of asylum seekers; irregular employment of foreigners Rapid decline in outflow; labour deficit leads to admission of for- eigners (large scale of irregular work); towards net immigration Movements con-tained within CEE region; resumption of ethnicity-motivated outflow; onset of in- complete migration 32 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 37. continuous flow ofimmigrants was soon triggered and, after some time, the WNE countries, one by one, turned into net immigration areas. Many of the migrating workers originated from the Mediterranean coun- tries. According to numerous accounts, between 1950 and 1970, anywhere from 7 million to 10 million persons emigrated from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (circa 8 to 10 per cent of the mid-period population), of which a half went to WNE (Layard, Blanchard, Dornbush & Krugman 1992). Massimo Livi Bacci (1972: 17) estimates that in the period 1965-1970 āem- igrant workers [from southern countries]18 make up about 50 per cent on the average, of the potential increase of the labour forceā, of which 89 per cent in the case of Italy, 85 per cent in the case of Portugal, 65 per cent in the case of Greece and 46 per cent in the case of Spain.19 An outflow of this huge magnitude was possible due to considerable underemployment or ādisguisedā unemployment in those countries.20 In more underdeveloped areas of the Mediterranean countries, the outflow comprised up to 85 to 90 per cent of the potential increase of the labour force (Danieli 1972). Running parallel to this, from the late 1960s onwards, all four Mediterra- nean countries experienced a rapid and consistent decline in fertility ā from a maximum total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.4-3.1 to 1.4-1.7 around 1985 (United Nations 2007). The labour potential at the time was therefore Table 1.2 (continued) Stage/ sub-period Region Western and Northern (WNE) Southern (Mediterranean) Central and Eastern (CEE) 4. Post-com- munist migration ā related to dis- ruption of com- munism and orientation towards āFortress Europeā (1989-2004) Advanced segmentation of labour market (secondary jobs for foreigners); massive inflow of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers; migrant smugglers and traffickers; selective admission for the highly skilled Incomplete migration; post-communist adjustment migration; economic polarisation within CEE ! intra- regional movements; towards net immigration (Czech Republic) Prospective trends in the 10-15-year time span 5. Post- enlargement migration ā integrated European migration space (after 2004/2007) Inflows due to population stagnation and ageing (main underlying factors); further segmentation of labour markets; intra-EU competition for the highly skilled; low level of intra-EU mobility (some but shallow potential in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states; towards completion of labour market draining of redundant labour in CEE) Source: Own elaboration TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 33
- 38. significantly reduced dueto emigration, and a continuously diminishing la- bour potential was stabilised largely due to below-replacement fertility. Those were the main demographic underpinnings for major social change and sustained modern economic development. Social change in Italy accelerated in the 1950s, in Spain in the 1960s, but in Greece and Portugal only in the 1980s. In each case, however, a breakthrough occurred when economies opened up and integration with more developed European countries became a structural process. As a result, after 1973, in the sub-period of migration related to the process of ānew globalisationā, the Mediterranean countries ā first Italy and later the three others ā were strongly affected by shortages of labour. The worker outflow was drastically reduced and, soon thereafter, the labour markets were opened to the inflow of foreigners. By the end of the 1980s, all four countries changed their migration statuses and came to be new net immigration areas. Contrary to WNE and Mediterranean Europe, the population movements in CEE over the period leading up to the late 1980s were strongly subordi- nated to political factors. In fact, after the abrupt interruption of massive post-war resettlements in 1948, both the outflows and the inflows were al- most completely reduced to exceptional cases. Not only did international migration come to a halt, but also any cross-border mobility was effec- tively stopped. Under the circumstances of high natural increase and slug- gish economic development, a large backlog of unrealised migration arose in many CEE countries, notably in Poland and Romania.21 Over time, however, and alongside a softening grip on human freedoms, a variety of forms of out-movement began emerging that became alterna- tives to āregularā emigration. These movements, heavily controlled by the authorities, reflected a specific pattern that ran concomitantly with an inter- nal political cycle. In particular, compared to periods characterised by a āhard gripā on international mobility, many more people were allowed to leave the country in times of political turmoil and during shifts in political leadership. Gradually, more and more CEE residents who managed to travel abroad became residents of foreign countries ā as immigrants or temporary workers, refugees, co-ethnics or undocumented migrants (e.g. āoverstaying touristsā). What greatly differentiated CEE countries from other important migra- tion source countries were, until at least 1989, their migrantsā concealed motives and forms of movement. While a great majority of migrants from CEE countries sought employment in foreign countries ā which undoubt- edly constituted the main motive of their migration ā they were compelled to declare other purposes both to the government of their country of origin and that of the host countries in order to be allowed to leave or enter and stay. This forced them into an unstable and disadvantageous, if not precari- ous, situation in the labour market and in social life in general. Even after 34 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 39. 1989, when departuresfrom CEE countries were newly permitted and resi- dents could easily enter many traditional destination countries, they could do so legally only as tourists ā which was seldom an actual motive for journeying abroad. Because of their somewhat irregular status, most migrants originating from CEE countries endured discriminatory practices of employers and were usually grossly underpaid. In order to cope with that reality, CEE mi- grants developed a peculiar pattern of mobility that enabled them to boost the real value of their foreign earnings. It was incomplete migration, a sort of circulation of individual household members, often repeated, and char- acterised by short-term employment abroad and a very high proportion of earnings being remitted or repatriated to the migrantās home country, where the cost of living was substantially lower. By spending most of the āforeign moneyā they earned abroad in their countries of origin, the migrantsā real wages became relatively high and enabled migrant households to survive, if not enjoy a decent lifestyle. At the same time, however, migrant house- holds remained anchored and indeed enmeshed in the peripheries of CEE countries, despite the significant mobility of some of their members. As a result, throughout the entire sub-period of post-communist migration, the outflows of people from CEE countries barely contributed to unburden- ing them of redundant people. Despite growing out-migration, labour sur- pluses were sustained. At the same time, however, at least one radical change occurred that was in line with what happened earlier in WNE countries and Mediterranean Europe: fertility decreased to levels far below replacement. While in 1985 the TFR was still as high as 2.3 in Poland, Romania and Slovakia (then a part of Czechoslovakia) and 2.1 in the Baltic States, in 2000 it reached a level of around 1.3 throughout the entire region (United Nations 2007). This marked the beginning of a rapidly shrinking demographic labour potential. Now it would seem opportune to question whether the accession of CEE countries to the European Union resulted in any significant changes in the migration trends of their populations. It will not be possible to attain reliable estimates of the post-enlargement outflow until the results of the forthcoming population censuses are re- leased. For now, we can venture only guesstimates at best. This is because no existing record adequately measures various types of flows and stocks of migrants. Typically, the size and composition of migrant stocks differ from country to country because the definition of an immigrant resident differs. Some countries do not distinguish, for example, between migrants who moved before their home countryās accession date and those who moved later. This is especially pertinent when the act of accession provided migrants with an opportunity to change their statuses from clandestine and undocumented to regular and documented. Migrant flows are thus not TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 35
- 40. broken down accordingto the length of migrantsā sojourns in the destina- tion countries, which could result in multiple counts and other deficiencies. These caveats aside, it can be said that the date of the first eastward EU enlargement, 1 May 2004, marked the beginning of a new quality in the outflow of people from CEE countries. It has become quite clear, after two and a half years, that the change in differentia specifica of migration af- fected many of its aspects: the volume of flows, which increased substan- tially, and their composition ā regional, social, economic and demographic. Forms of flows and the motives of migrants also became more diversified. A cautious World Bank (2006) estimate of the outflow from the EU-8 ac- cession countries to the three EU-15 countries, which, on 1 May 2004, did not introduce transitory precautions to protect their labour markets, sug- gested a very large scale of mobility. It found that, over the first twenty months, until 31 December 2004, Lithuania lost 3.3 per cent of its working- age population, Latvia 2.4 per cent, Slovakia 1.3 per cent, Poland 1.2 per cent and Estonia 1.1 per cent. That came as a surprise to many analysts, see- ing as during the pre-accession period little was known about the migration potential of such countries as Latvia or Slovakia and the populations of those countries were not regarded as highly prone to emigration. It could be safely assumed that, between 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007, at least 1 million persons, 80 to 90 per cent of whom were job- seekers, emigrated from Poland. This corresponds to slightly more than 4 per cent of the total working-age mid-period population (2.6 per cent of the entire population). Keeping in mind the estimates of the outflow during the 1980s (more than 1 million long-term emigrants), and between 1991 and 2003 (approximately 750,000), it can be argued that, over the last quarter of a century, around 2.5 million Poles emigrated ā which amounts to over 67 per cent of the natural population increase in that period and over 6.5 per cent of the total population (Grabowska-LusiÅska & OkĆ³lski 2009). Comparing the rate and volume of that outflow to the outflow recorded in Mediterranean Europe during labour recruitment-related migra- tion, we can conclude that Poland might not be far from completing the crowding-out process. Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) data leave no doubt that the acces- sion date constituted a breakthrough in outflow trends. Until the beginning of 2004, the stock of temporary migrants, who traditionally predominate in the outflow from Poland, was fairly stable at a level of around 200,000.22 This was especially true for the number of long-term migrants; the stock of short-term migrants slowly decreased over the 1990s and slowly increased from 2000 to 2003.23 In the middle of 2005, the migrant stock surpassed 300,000; by mid-2006 it reached 450,000; and, at the end of that year, 500,000 Poles were recorded (by account of LFS) as temporary migrants. A similar conclusion can be drawn on the basis of host countriesā sources. For instance, an accelerated inflow to Britain is documented by 36 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 41. the National InsuranceNumber statistics, where Poles, along with Slovaks and Lithuanians, became leading nationalities among those issued a new number. One year before the accession date, they were barely featured at all in those statistics, with an overall share of around 4 per cent of all for- eigners. Just one year later, Poland became a clear leader in the statistics, and in the year 2006/2007, of the top six nationalities, three were CEE countries, which accounted for an overall share of 39 per cent. The British International Passenger Survey data also confirm that the movements of the citizens of accession countries into the United Kingdom, Poles in par- ticular, increased rapidly after 1 May 2004. The same trend was observed in Sweden, where not only did the inflow from CEE accelerate, but, in ad- dition to migrant workers, it comprised proportionally more family mem- bers. The case of the inflow into Ireland presents another striking illustration of this phenomenon. Until the middle of 2004, Ireland hosted few immigrants from CEE countries, but in 2006 CEE, citizens became a clearly predominant group among the newly arrived (Grabowska-LusiÅska & OkĆ³lski 2009). The three countries that did not limit access to their labour markets were not the only ones to have experienced elevated inflows from CEE coun- tries. With the one distinct exception of Germany, a significant increase was also observed in other WNE countries. Taken together, a considerable outflow of people from the CEE countries during the post-enlargement sub-period, which coincided with a rapid de- cline in fertility and a soon-to-be reduced demographic labour potential, provided for a historic opportunity to unburden CEE countriesā labour mar- kets of superfluous people and, as a consequence, improve their efficiency. Since this went hand in hand with modern economic change ā which was a requisite for economic integration with the EU ā the CEE accession countries could soon experience a breakthrough in the transformation of their migration status from net emigration to net immigration. As was his- torically the case for the four Mediterranean countries, a bit of luck in bringing about that major change proved helpful, if not indispensable. This time, for the CEE countries, the bit of luck came from Britain: it material- ised in the visionary and strong-willed British polity and in the huge ca- pacity of the booming British economy to absorb incoming labour. The significance of the outflow of people from CEE countries in the post-accession period cannot be overestimated. The crowding-out of those countriesā labour markets was a major, structurally determined social phe- nomenon, a foundation for further modern social change and, ultimately, an impetus for convergence with the core objectives of the EU. TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 37
- 42. 1.4 Transformation ofmigration status: An outline of the model Taking the long view, migration can be perceived as a response to a dis- equilibrium that arises between population size and growth and the stock and composition of resources that a given population uses or needs to sup- port itself (Coleman 2006). As pointed out in section 1.2 of this chapter, modernisation stimulates two processes that are of vital importance for mi- gration, namely: ā The shrinking of the subsistence sector of the economy, which has his- torically symbolised backwardness and, by diminishing, makes way for an expanding and highly monetised market sector. ā A specific change in population (called the demographic transition) whose major traits include a systematic and accelerated increase in the number of people that goes parallel with, on the one hand, a clustering of those people in the enclaves of backwardness or the peripheries of modernity, and, on the other hand, a growing shortage of people in emerging economic growth poles (centres). This sort of social change entails a mass migration from the periphery to the centre, whose direct cause is the relatively uneven distribution of the population. This is a multistage phenomenon, ranging from the strictly local through the global stage. It could be argued that population surpluses hamper or occasionally pre- clude the modernisation of peripheries. The outflow of redundant people constitutes one major impetus for the completion of the modernisation project ā though it is not capable of either initiating or substituting modern reforms. A rapidly onsetting period of modernity, due to an increasing (and usu- ally relatively high) natural population increase, is conducive to emigra- tion. Outflows generally originate in overpopulated rural areas (including tiny towns located in the middle of those areas), then expand to include de- veloping urban areas or colonised lands. A mature level of modernisation coincides with a declining (and usually relatively low, sometimes negative) natural population increase. Population ageing is also usually set in motion. What ensues is a structural deficit in a given population, manifested above all in a steady labour shortage. Needless to say, this is conducive to immigration.24 An additional factor determining the flow of people from country periph- eries to centres that is related to modernisation and relevant from an international perspective is the timing of the initiation of modern changes in particular countries (a āgeneration effectā).25 As a rule, pioneer countries in early stages of modernisation, apart from sending population surpluses generated by their peripheries to modernity poles (centres), export some of these surpluses to other countries ā typically to colonies overseas. 38 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 43. Latecomer countries, however,usually lack such opportunities. What even- tually facilitates migration for the latecomer countries is, quite paradoxi- cally, a difference in the timing of the transformation processā initiation be- tween them and the pioneer countries: the latter are converted sooner from countries of net emigration to net immigration. The erosion of traditional socio-economic structures and institutions within the latecomer countries goes hand in hand with an advanced level of modernity and often with la- bour shortages within the pioneer countries (Massey 1999). The subsistence (natural) sector in a modernising society can be thought of as something of a vestigial organ or other archaic remnant in the body of an advancing economy. No convergence mechanism exists to make it compatible with the market (capitalist) sector. In the long run, it can only perish or become parasitic for the latter. People functioning in subsistence sectors have little chance of changing their social and economic roles and positions unless they abandon their outdated lifestyles or occupations. In the vast majority of cases, however, abandonment means out-migration. There is something of a structural incompatibility between the subsis- tence and market economy. The virtues of the former include a āclosed- nessā or semi-isolation, a struggle for survival and continuity. The virtues of the latter include an openness and a tendency towards expansion. The mentality, work culture and skills of the people in one sector are useless in the other. The characteristics of cultural and human capital ā indefinitely reproduced and propagated in the subsistence sector ā do not fit the market sector. There is thus a kind of superfluity of population resources in the subsistence sector. In modern society, with welfare states as its prominent institution, the natural or subsistence sector gives rise to extra social costs. These costs are particularly acute under conditions of low mobility or when mobility (out- flow) is impeded by existing institutions. This is because the natural increase of people living in the subsistence sector is relatively high, which puts pressure on social benefits and leads to increasing related costs. The preservation of the subsistence sector under otherwise modern conditions thus impairs or impedes development. The scale of modernising reforms (e.g. investment in modern infrastructure and R&D) is severely limited by competition stemming from the necessary financing of extra social costs that result from the very existence of a subsistence sector. Modern and self-sustained development within a country is possible and particularly beneficial if three conditions are met at about the same time: ā Deep reforms leading to the expansion of the competitive market sector. ā A reduction in fertility, bringing about a low natural increase. ā High mobility (especially spatial mobility) of the population, which fa- cilitates internal transfers of demographic surpluses within the TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 39
- 44. subsistence sector andoutflows of the remaining redundant population to third countries. The subsistence sector then rapidly diminishes and sources of superfluous population begin to dry out. A modern, liberalised economy is strength- ened and consolidated when, among other things, strong international com- petition exists and no population pressure is exerted (close to zero natural increase) on it. The attempts of economic actors (firms) to lower labour costs (or at least to prevent their increase) are accompanied by and, in a way, confronted with a diminishing local workforce and a weakening pro- pensity of local workers to accept low-paying jobs. This tendency results from, and is reinforced by, the very nature of the institutions of the welfare state. The ensuing evolution of the labour market gives way to a specific structural form called a ādual labour marketā, which displays a characteristic segmentation pattern. The expansion of a labour market segment with lax regulatory standards and wage rigidities becomes a source of comparative advantage to certain firms linked to that segment. However, with an insuffi- cient supply of local labour, the inflow of migrant workers from peripheral economies is a fundamental prerequisite of such a sectorās expansion. Specific institutions and mechanisms exist to facilitate the inflow of workers responding to the volume and structure of modern economiesā de- mand for labour. Systematic immigration contributes to the emergence and growth of a āforeignersā sectorā within the labour market. Migrant workers in foreignersā sectors become over-represented relative to their share in the total labour force and, in some cases, even outnumber the local workers. In sum, the indispensable requisites for any country to transform its mi- gration status are, first, the outflow of redundant population (the crowding- out) and, secondly, embarking on the path of sustained modern develop- ment. Under these circumstances, emigration declines rapidly. In turn, the completion of the demographic transition (natural increase at close to zero and rapid ageing of the population, including the workforce) and the eco- nomic competition-led segmentation of the labour market bring about an inflow of foreign workers whose number, over time, becomes larger than that of outgoing local workers. A former emigration country thus becomes an immigration country. Notes 1 In this very meaning, āmigration cycleā is narrower from a historical time perspec- tive, but it goes more deeply as far as contextual matters are concerned. 2 I adhere here to an approach of studying historical structures evolving over a long time by means of problem-oriented and comprehensive analyses (lire lāhistoire Ć re- bours, according to Marc Bloch), as developed by French historians and known as longue durĆ©e (Braudel 1999). Akin to that approach in the area of migration study 40 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 45. are such seminalworks as Zelinsky (1971), Piore (1979), Chesnais (1986) and Massey (1999). 3 One of the key notions used in this chapter and to some extent throughout the en- tire volume is āmodernisationā. I realise how ambiguous, if controversial, this term might sound nowadays. My preferred meaning of modernisation is rather simple and refers to a dichotomous typology of European societies, often applied to the his- tory of the recent few hundred years, which distinguishes between āpre-modernā (tra- ditional) type and āmodernā type. In accordance with this, each European society evolves from the former to the latter; between the pre-modern and modern type there is a specific transition, an all-embracing structural social change, called moder- nisation. While the outcome of modernisation seems clear ā it is a structurally and strikingly different society ā the criteria of that difference are numerous and by no means mutually exclusive. They depend on the cognitive perspective represented by those who are or were involved in the study of that process. The perspectives adopted by such scholars as Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand ToĢnnies, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Henry Maine, Robert Redfield and Krishan Kumar evi- dently differed, but probably none of them would have found it difficult to point out fundamental differences of structural character between a pre-modern and a modern society, and even less to indicate the time and place on Earth where the change called āmodernisationā came about. Needless to add, in this volume we distance our- selves from āmodernisationā in Walt Rostowās sense. 4 Apart from periods of war or conquests and colonisations, international migrants in- clude mostly relatively small numbers of merchants, mercenaries or missionaries. David Coleman (2006: 37) argues that ālabour movement does not become generally international until a much later date, particularly during the Industrial Revolution [ā¦]ā. 5 It was estimated at some 39.5 million in AD 14 and at 39.2 million circa the year 1000 (Clark 1977: 64). 6 Jean-Marie Poursinās (1976: 21) estimate for circa 1400 is 45 million. Biraben (2006: 13), however, puts the number of Europeans around that year much higher, at some 52 million. 7 All estimates exclude the population living on the territory of the former USSR. Here, similarly, its size did not change between Anno Domini and 1400, while in the period 1400-1800 it grew by a little less than 300 per cent (Biraben 2006). 8 According to Poursin (1976: 23), between 1650 and 1950, the population of European origin became larger by over 800 million and reached 940 million, 300 million of whom lived outside of Europe. 9 According to Chesnais (1992: 165): āMigration is at its highest during the period when, following the decline in mortality, the curve of natural increase approaches its apex; and the size of the wave of departures is closely connected with the level of natural increase and hence with patterns of demographic transition. The traits of migration are inseparable from the profiles of transition, and vice versa.ā 10 In an earlier work (Hatton & Williamson 1994), the authors spoke of the āemigra- tion cycleā, which extends from a growing emigration rate to receding emigration. 11 A very similar perspective is represented by the concept of the āmigration curveā, i.e. a historical process in which populations make the transition from net emigration to net immigration (Ackerman 1976 quoted after Massey 1999). 12 Earlier Van de Kaa (together with Ron Lesthaeghe) developed a concept of the sec- ond demographic transition, a phenomenon typical of North-Western Europe, where it developed since the mid-1960s. He distinguished the two transitions in the follow- ing way: āWhile mortality decline provided the āengineā for the first transition, ferti- lity decline is the āengineā of the second. In both instances international migration TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 41
- 46. plays a significantrole in the balancing equation, but while it provided a safety valve of sorts in the first, it is a carefully guarded inlet in the secondā (van de Kaa 2004: 8). 13 Brinley Thomas (1954) suggested that it is much more than a statistical relationship. He argued that, contrary to widespread opinion, the volume and fluctuations of European immigration to the United States depended not only on the demand for labour in this country, but above all on demographic changes in the countries of ori- gin. Thomas found that all four main upsurges of emigration from Europe until the outbreak of World War I followed, with a 25-year time lag, a peak in natural increase. 14 King (1996: 45) cites interesting observations made by Friedrich Engels, who was one of the first to recognise the important role of population growth in the develop- ment of English industry. 15 The opposite view is represented by Anthony Fielding (1993). According to him, un- til recently mass migration in Europe was determined by the medium-term econom- ic fluctuations (the business cycle). After the mid-1970s, however, Western Europe underwent fundamental change in the production system ā from Fordist to post- Fordist, which substantially affected migration: āthe most important feature of mass migration under post-Fordist forms of production organization is its absence!ā (Fielding 1993: 14). Mass migration gives way to āsmall-scale and more individualis- tic formsā of inter-regional and international mobility. 16 It is not rare that in the initial stage of changes fertility rises, which is due to, among other things, the deep mortality decline itself (better chances of potential mothersā survival). 17 For the discussion of the ācrowding-out effectā, see Kaczmarczyk and OkoĢlski (2008). 18 Including also the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. 19 Taking into account migration of seasonal and temporary workers, however, would significantly increase that estimate. Thus, according to Livi Bacci (1972: 18), āwe can by all means say that [ā¦] the number of emigrant workers has been greater than the natural increase of the labour forceā. 20 Excess supply of manpower in the agricultural sector, especially the unemployed or underemployed peasants searching for a job in foreign countries, was believed to be the main source of emigration potential in the Mediterranean countries (Livi Bacci 1972). 21 Interestingly, a study carried out in the 1960s by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE 1968), devoted to the determinants of labour supply in Europe un- til 1980 ā which inter alia evaluated labour market situation in CEE ā found strong but latent migration pressures in the then socialist countries, which at that time were contained by the existing legislation and administrative order. Referring to that study, Luisa Danieli (1972) pointed to Poland and Romania as CEE countries having a vast surplus of manpower (from one fifth to one half of the active population) and to Czechoslovakia and Hungary as countries with probably insufficient labour supply. 22 Polish LFS provides quarterly estimates of the stock of temporary migrants (i.e. those who at the time of survey are registered as āpermanentā residents of Poland). In general, the survey is limited to households where at least one member is present in his or her domicile at the time of survey and, if that condition is met, to the household members fifteen years old or more. Thus, the migrant count based on LFS might be seriously underestimated. 42 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 47. 23 Short-term migrantsare defined as those whose uninterrupted stay outside of Poland does not exceed twelve months at the time of survey; otherwise, the migrants are considered to be long-term. 24 Massey (1999: 40), referring to Michael Pioreās theory of immigration driven by the mechanisms of segmented labour market, notes that the main factor of immigra- tion, āthe imbalance between the structural demand for entry-level workers and the limited domestic supply of such workers [ā¦] in developed countriesā, stems from two major root causes. One of them is a combination of āfundamental socio-demo- graphic trendsā, such as very low natural increase of the working-age population, the depletion of labour reserves in rural communities and the rise of female labour-force participation together with the transformation of womenās jobs into a source of pri- mary income support. Another main root cause is āthe built-in demand for inexpen- sive and flexible labourā in modern industrial societies, which results from āfunda- mental characteristics of advanced industrial societies and their economiesā, such as: āstructural inflationā, āsocial constraints on motivation embedded within occupational hierarchiesā and āthe inherent duality of labour and capitalā, producing a segmented labour market structure (Massey 1999: 37-39). 25 See chapter 2 in this volume. References Baines, D. (1991), Emigration from Europe 1815-1930. London: Macmillan. Biraben, J.-N. (2006), āThe history of the human population from the first beginnings to the recent dayā, in G. Caselli, J. Vallin & G. Wunsch (eds.), Demography: Analysis and Synthesis. A Treatise in Population Studies, 5-17. Burlington: Academic Press. Biraben, J.-N. (1979), āEssai sur lāĆ©volution du nombre des hommesā, Population 34 (1): 13- 26. Braudel, F. (1999), Historia i trwanie. Warsaw: Czytelnik. Castles, S. & M.J. Miller (1993), The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. Houndmills: Macmillan. Chesnais, J.-C. (1992), The demographic transition: Stages, patterns and economic implica- tions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chesnais, J.-C. (1986), La transition dĆ©mographique: Etapes, formes, implications Ć©cono- miques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Coleman, D. (2006), āMigration as a primary force in human population processesā, in G. Caselli, J. Vallin & G. Wunsch (eds.), Demography: Analysis and Synthesis. A Treatise in Population Studies, 19-40. Burlington: Academic Press. Clark, C. (1977), Population growth and land use. London: The Macmillan Press. Danieli, L. (1972), āThe demographic and social pattern of emigration in Europeā, in M. Livi Bacci (ed.), The demographic and social pattern of emigration from Southern European countries, 377-394. Florence: Universita di Firenze. Dyson, T. (2001), āA partial theory of world development: The neglected role of the demo- graphic transition in the shaping of modern societyā, International Journal of Population Geography 2 (7): 67-90. Fielding, A. (1993), āMass migration and economic restructuringā, in R. King (ed.), Mass mi- grations in Europe: The legacy and the future, 7-17. London: Belhaven Press. Gliwic, H. (1934), MaterjaÅ ludzki w gospodarce Åwiatowej. Warsaw: Trzaska, Evert i Michalski. Grabowska-LusiÅska, I. & M. OkĆ³lski (2009), Emigracja ostatnia? Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. TRANSITION FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION 43
- 48. Gropas, R. &A. Triandafyllidou (eds.) (2007), European immigration: A sourcebook. Aldershot: Ashgate. Hatton, T.J. & J.G. Williamson (2008), Global migration and the world economy: Two centu- ries of policy and performance. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hatton, T.J. & J.G. Williamson (1994), āInternational migration 1850-1939: An economic sur- veyā, in T.J. Hatton & J.G. Williamson (eds.), Migration and international labour market: 1850-1939, 3-32. London: Routledge. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kaczmarczyk, P. & M. OkĆ³lski (2008), āDemographic and labour-market impacts of migration on Polandā, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3 (24): 599-624. King, R. (1996), āMigration in a world historical perspectiveā, in J. van den Broeck (ed.), The economics of labour migration, 7-75. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Layard, R., O. Blanchard, R. Dornbush & P. Krugman (1992), East-West migration: The alter- natives. Cambridge: MIT Press. Livi Bacci, M. (ed.) (1972), The demographic and social pattern of emigration from Southern European countries. Florence: Universita di Firenze. Massey, D.S. (1999), āWhy does immigration occur? A theoretical synthesisā, in C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz & J. DeWind (eds.), The handbook of international migration: The American experience, 34-52. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Morokvasic-Muller, M., B. Dinh, S. Potot & M. Salzbrunn (2008), āImmigrant France: Colonial heritage, labour (im)migration and settlementā, IDEA Working Papers 2, www. idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP2_France.pdf. OkĆ³lski, M. (2008), āEuropa en moviemento: La migracion desde y hacia Europa Central y del Esteā, Revista CIDOB dāAfers Internacionals 84: 11-32. OkĆ³lski, M. (2007), āEurope in movement: Migration from/to Central and Eastern Europeā, CMR Working Papers 22 (80). Piore, M.J. (1979), Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Poursin, J.-M. (1976), LudnoÅÄ Åwiata. Warsaw: PaÅstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [origi- nally published in 1971 as La population mondiale, Paris: Ćditions du Seuil]. Thomas, B. (1954), Migration and economic growth: A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Nations (2007), World population prospects: The 2006 revision. New York: United Nations. Van de Kaa, D. (2004), āIs the second demographic transition a useful research concept. Questions and answersā, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2: 4-10. Van de Kaa, D. (1999), āEurope and its population: The long viewā, in D. van de Kaa, H. Leridon, G. Gesano & M. OkĆ³lski (eds.), European populations: Unity in diversity, 1-50. Word Bank (2006), āLabour migration from the new EU member statesā, World Bank EU- 8 Quarterly Report September. Zelinsky, W. (1979), āThe demographic transition: Changing patterns of migrationā, in Population science in the service of mankind, 165-190. Vienna: Institute of Life/ International Union for Scientific Study of Population. Zelinsky, W. (1971), āThe hypothesis of the mobility transitionā, Geographical Review 61: 219-249. 44 MAREK OKĆLSKI
- 49. 2 Early startersand latecomers Comparing countries of immigration and immigration regimes in Europe JoaquĆn Arango āSeek simplicity and distrust itā (J. Davis) 2.1 Introduction In recent decades, Europe has become one of the major immigration- receiving regions in the world. No other region receives more immigrants in absolute terms, although not in relation to population size. Put in histori- cal perspective, this represents an epochal change, since Europeans tended to predominate in international migration flows until the 1960s. Taken as a whole, it can be said that Europeās migration transition ā i.e. its transfor- mation from a primarily sending region to a primarily receiving one ā took place in the two decades that followed the end of World War II, albeit a handful of countries had experienced it well before. This fact notwithstand- ing, the present configuration of Europe as an immigration-receiving re- gion is better understood as the outcome of a gradual accumulation of national migration transitions, some of which are still in process. Further national transitions can be expected in the coming years. In the specialised literature, Europe is often referred to as an internation- al migration system. Since the 1990s, the notion of migration systems has gained momentum. The idea of applying system analysis to the study of migration is no doubt an appealing concept, one that emphasises the bi- directionality that exists between groups of countries that exchange migra- tion flows alongside other exchanges. It was effectively applied by the geographer Akin Mabogunje in a seminal study of international migration flows in Western Africa (Mabogunje 1970) and later promoted by Mary Kritz, Lin Lean Lim and Hania Zlotnik at the beginning of the 1990s (Kritz, Lim & Zlotnik 1992). At present, however, it is still richer in unde- livered promises than in tangible results. It suffers from considerable ambi- guity, as its central premise is used with a diversity of meanings that are seldom made clear. In its most common application, it pertains to groups
- 50. of more orless contiguous or proximate receiving countries that have im- portant elements in common ā thereby excluding the countries where the bulk of immigrants originate, as the initial and more orthodox version of the notion would have it (Zlotnik 1992). In so doing, it does not go far be- yond what geographers used to term āmigration regionsā. Defined in this limited way, Europe is one of the four major systems in the contemporary world, together with North America, the Persian Gulf and the Asia Pacific region (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1998). Put in a global perspective and compared with the remain- ing three, Europe appears to be a relatively homogeneous entity. Yet, taken in itself, and looking inwards rather than outwards, there can be little doubt that, if anything characterises Europe, it is a high degree of diversity ā an unsurprising fact given the large number of countries that it comprises. Europe is synonymous with heterogeneity, and this applies to migration realities as well as to many other factors. A minor semantic clarification might be advisable before proceeding fur- ther. In recent years the age-old distinction between sending and receiving countries has been increasingly questioned. No doubt, strictly speaking, it can be said that all countries are sending, receiving and transit countries at the same time. The distinction justifiably often rests, however, on solid foundations and is analytically useful, as out-migration and immigration are phenomena that yield very different outcomes and impacts, and they re- sult in different realities, needs and policies. Doing away with these well- established concepts implies renouncing useful labels and putting countries that are markedly different in terms of migration in a single bag, which could serve to blur the analysis rather than to clarify it. Some countries are primarily immigration-receiving ones and others are, above all, sending ones, while some may be significantly sending and receiving at the same time. The decisive criterion for defining a country as immigration-receiving is not so much net migration in a given year ā in a receiving country it can be occasionally negative ā but rather the societal impact of receiving or hosting significant numbers of immigrants. And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for defining sending or transit countries. In other words, in this chapter a receiving country is one in which the most socially significant phenomenon in terms of international mobility is immigration. Understood in this way, the condition of immigration-receiving can be applied to a large number of countries in Europe. It is clearly the case of the fifteen that were members of the EU before the 2004 enlargement, as well as of Switzerland and Norway. It is also the case of some of the coun- tries that joined the EU in 2004, including some that are significantly send- ing and receiving at the same time.1 Comparing the countries that form the European migration system, con- servatively defined as comprising only its receiving end, can help improve the knowledge of national immigration experiences and their determinants 46 JOAQUĆN ARANGO
- 51. and provide abetter understanding of the latterās implications for policy. The heuristic potential of the comparative perspective has been sufficiently substantiated in the social sciences, and does not require further examina- tion here. Yet, the large number of countries involved in this case makes the comparison difficult, though not impossible. Comparing countries that have long hosted populations of immigrant background with others that started to receive significant numbers of immigrants a few years ago fur- ther compounds the analytical difficulties. No doubt, every country is par- ticular and different from all the others, also in matters of migration. Nevertheless, significant similarities among countries can be found as well. Indeed, identifying meaningful groups of receiving countries might be an effective way of reducing the high degree of complexity resulting from heterogeneity. If the aim is to seek significant patterns, it can be posited that the comparative exercise will be analytically richer if it is carried not only among a large number of individual countries, but also among a much smaller number of meaningful groups of countries. In turn, it can be sur- mised that these groups could be seen as representative of different types of immigration-receiving countries, as ideal types that may have analytical value and prove useful in the explanation of different migration realities. Identifying their core characteristics may have analytical value in itself, and could help explain policy outcomes. This chapter aims to identify and analyse factors that may help to signif- icantly group sets of immigration-receiving countries in Europe, factors that, in other words, bundle together a set of countries by relevant similar- ities and distinguish them from other sets of countries. Admittedly, doing so constantly incurs the risk of overgeneralisation ā difficult to avoid given the nature of the subject matter. Existing theories are of little or no use in this exercise. The analytical framework has to be developed inductively, going back and forth between models and reality and taking relevant no- tions from both. The identification of different types of immigration countries and their implications commands increasing attention in these times (King 2000; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2007). This exercise can be particularly relevant in the case of an EU that has now formally embarked on the construction of a common immigration and asylum policy. The existence of significant differences, in terms of migration realities and orientations among member states, can add to the staggering difficulties that this ambitious enterprise entails, as experience so far suggests. Ascertaining which differences are more relevant and how they affect national stances towards common policy could be one of the outcomes of this comparative exercise. Determining what recent destination countries can learn from the experiences of those that preceded them as receiving countries could be an additional outcome.2 This exercise should help to improve understanding of the core characteris- tics of each group or of each type of receiving country. In turn, these EARLY STARTERS AND LATECOMERS 47
- 52. characteristics could helpto understand different policy approaches and to identify priorities. They could also clarify their underlying determinants, including prevailing attitudes towards immigration that, in turn, may be affected by the impacts of immigration as they are perceived by different societies. 2.2 Analytical considerations and hypotheses This chapter departs from the basic proposition that, on the basis of both similarities and differences, meaningful groupings of immigration-receiving countries in Europe can be identified. To be significant, each group will comprise those countries that show greater similarities among them and greater differences with the remaining countries. The groups selected will be meaningful and relevant if similarities prevail over differences, and if differences with countries in other groups are generally larger than those among them. A set of hypotheses relative to the variables that are relevant to the grouping of countries will be put forth. Historical and socio-economic factors will be the foremost candidates for the explanation of similarities and differences. In theory, the hypotheses ought to be tested against the ex- isting wealth of empirical data. Yet, testing them against the empirical evi- dence available for a large number of countries is a Herculean task, one that goes well beyond the possibilities of this chapter. Instead, some gener- al, impressionistic remarks about their possible validity will be offered. The comparative exercise requires identification of the criteria upon which the grouping of countries rests. Are they chiefly structural factors, i.e. having to do with significant differences in socio-economic regimes and other societal characteristics? Are they mainly historical in nature, i.e. related to the length of the immigration-receiving experience and the impli- cations that derive from chronology or timing? In other words, are migra- tion experiences and realities among European regional groups of receiving countries significantly different because they are structurally different ā and because structural socio-economic differences are the result of different migration patterns ā or because some countries developed earlier as immi- gration-receiving countries, or both? Finally, are these groupings regional in character, i.e. do they roughly coincide with well-defined geographic regions? 2.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The āage effectā Immigration-receiving countries are bound to differ significantly depending on the stage of the migration cycle in which they find themselves, as mi- gration stages decisively affect the composition of the immigrant popula- tion and its changing relationship with the general population. In the 48 JOAQUĆN ARANGO
- 53. course of theirimmigration experience, receiving countries go through a migration cycle ā a notion inspired by the life cycle concept, borrowed by the social sciences from biology (Clausen 1986; Glick 1947). Certain socio- demographic structures and aggregate characteristics of the immigrant population correspond to each stage of the cycle, which, in turn, makes for different socio-economic impacts and contributes to different percep- tions from among the general population. Borrowing from the demo- graphic parlance, this can be referred to as an āage effectā. Immigration realities are very much affected by the stage of the migration cycle in which countries find themselves and they tend to evolve as countries ad- vance into later stages. The notion of a migration cycle was proposed by the Belgian sociologist Felice Dassetto as the set of processes through which immigrants from less developed countries enter and settle in more developed ones, in a time se- quence that affects ā and requires adaptation by ā the immigrants them- selves, the native population and the institutions of the receiving societies. Within the migration cycle, certain stages can be identified. Dassetto points out three: in the first stage, immigrants are, above all, socially marginalised foreign workers; the second stage is dominated by family reunion ā and therefore by the appearance of new actors ā as well as settlement and ac- culturation, and is often further accompanied by social tensions between the immigrant population and segments of the receiving society, connected with the schooling of immigrant children, the use of public services, partic- ularly health, and the establishment of immigrant families in the neighbour- hood; the third stage has to do with the long-term inclusion and integration processes of long-term residents (Dassetto 1990). Typically, young adults ā often single or unaccompanied by their fami- lies ā tend to prevail in the initial stages. Family reunion flows follow after a certain, often variable time. A second generation develops over time, and the number of elderly members increases. Gradually, the demographic composition of the immigrant population tends to resemble that of the gen- eral population. After several decades, it becomes multigenerational. Of course, different immigration societies go through the immigration cycle in different forms and at different speeds. The persistence or intensity of flows at later stages obviously makes an impact on the composition of the immigrant population. Yet, the realities of countries that have, historically, long experienced significant immigration, and which have a multigenerational immigrant population, tend to be very different from those of countries of recent im- migration, in which the first generation is still prevalent or of those in which the second generation is still in the making. Immigrant populations made up primarily of individuals greatly differ from those organised around families containing more than one generation and around commun- ities. Different socio-demographic profiles determine very different effects, EARLY STARTERS AND LATECOMERS 49
- 54. in terms oflabour force participation rates, consumption of public services and social benefits, patterns of housing and settlement, social visibility and the like. In turn, different impacts, real or perceived, may affect societal at- titudes towards immigration. The āage effectā also affects policies, usually entailing a greater concern for integration as time goes by. Taking the long view, it can be argued that the effect of age as a differ- entiating factor is transitory, and it will fade away after a few decades, once a receiving country reaches the mature stage. This consideration somewhat lessens its appeal. There is, however, another implication of the timing variable, more precisely of the birth date of a country as an immi- gration-receiving one, which is relevant in a different sense and for reasons that go beyond the different composition of the immigrant population. It can be referred to as the āgeneration effectā, to use demographic jargon once again, and paves the way for another hypothesis. 2.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The āgeneration effectā The timing factor has another implication that can be understood as a āgen- eration effectā. It stems from the influence exerted on the course and char- acteristics of the immigration experience by the historical context in which its initial and formative phases took place. Especially influential elements of this context are the types of immigration flows prevailing in that period and the socio-economic conditions that determine them, the dominant con- ceptions of migration, and the main characteristics of the international eco- nomic order and of socio-economic regimes. These influences may leave a long-lasting imprint on later stages of the immigration experience. These formative years may shape dominant social orientations towards immigra- tion that would have a long-lasting effect or produce facts or policies that further impact future developments. As a matter of fact, this last observation opens the door to a third hypoth- esis, also related to timing, and borrowed this time from economic history. It could be termed the hypothesis of the āinfluence of historical precedenceā. 2.2.3 Hypothesis 3: The influence of historical precedence Nearly half a century ago, the economic historian Alexander Gerschenk- ron, in his seminal analysis of historical patterns of industrialisation, pointed out that the experience of latecomers is bound to be markedly dif- ferent from that of early starters, if only because of the influence that the experience of the forerunners exerts on those that follow. Not only is the pace usually quicker ā there is often an advantage in catching up ā but the structures of production and industrial organisation are different, as is the intellectual climate which harbours the process (Gerschenkron 1962). Industrialisation and immigration are admittedly very different in nature, 50 JOAQUĆN ARANGO
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