Exploiting NoSQL Like Never Before
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The document discusses the security vulnerabilities associated with various NoSQL databases such as MongoDB, CouchDB, Redis, and Cassandra, emphasizing the need for developers to address security issues like weak authentication and lack of default security measures. It also covers various attack vectors, exploitation techniques, and the necessity of automated frameworks for testing these vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the document touches on the NoSQL exploitation framework, which provides tools and support for security testing across multiple NoSQL databases.
Exploiting NoSQL Like Never Before
- 1. Exploiting NoSQL Like Never Before HITB AMS 2014
- 2. About Me • Independent Security Researcher • Member @ OpenSecurity • Currently Pursuing My Bachelors Degree (Amal Jyothi College of Engineering) • Spoken @ a couple of Conferences • Sleep @ Morning, Researches and Codes @ Night • And I Live in India (Kerala)
- 3. India is Awesome Kerala is Super Awesome
- 4. Tea Gardens
- 5. Boat Rides
- 6. Boat Racing
- 7. Agenda • More Emphasis Given on the Server-Client and Server Management Consoles • Pentesting Scenarios are given more importance. • We will not deal with Memory Related Bugs or issues. • Demos
- 9. 2 Words “Super COOL”
- 10. Key Takeovers Schema less “ACID” (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability) Not using the relational model Built for the 21st century web estates Running well on clusters Open-source Support
- 11. Mainly 4 types Wide Column Store / Column Families Hbase Cassandra Document Store MongoDB CouchDB Key Value / Tuple Store Riak Redis Graph Databases Neo4J DEX
- 13. NoSQL Security
- 14. Why Developers Need to Worry ?
- 15. Low on Security Emphasizes on “Trusted Environment” Weak Authentication Mechanisms or No security by Default. Man in the Middle Widely Open Source and API’s Widely Exposed. API for PHP widely abused.
- 16. You Will Love this Part
- 18. No Proper Validation in API Calls Developers Use them to Develop various Applications PHP is easy to abuse for Mongo ,Couch, Cassandra.
- 19. MongoDB
- 20. Mongo Trivia Written in: C++ Main point: Retains some friendly properties of SQL. (Query, index) Protocol: Custom, binary (BSON) Mongod is the "Mongo Daemon” running on Port 27017 by Default Web Interface Runs on 28017 Mongo is the Client Mongod Uses MongoDB Wire Protocol (TCP/IP Socket) Data is Represented using JSON format
- 22. Mongo Client Mongo Client Mongo Server Mongo Client
- 23. Attackers Perspective Mongo Client Mongo Client Mongo Server Mongo Client Sniffing,Enumeration,JS Injection,DOS
- 25. Issues JavaScript Attacks mostly used against MongoDB Vulnerabilities Keep Popping Up • Run command RCE Mongo Shell Functions Purely Based on JavaScript Possible Chances to Overwrite Functions Resource Exhaustion Regex Matching ,plenty of JavaScript operations could be used
- 26. Some Useful Mongo Commands Create DB • use dbname Create Collection • db.createCollection(“collection_name”) Insert Data • db.collection_name.insert({user_id:”25”,age:10}) Delete Data • db.collection_name.remove({user_id:”25”}) Drop • db.dropDatabase() • db.collection_name.drop() Version • db.version() Stats • db.hostInfo ()
- 27. Useful Commands for us db.killOp(opid) db.listCommands() db.loadServerScripts() db.logout() db.repairDatabase()
- 28. db.runCommand(cmdObj) db.serverStatus() db.shutdownServer() db.stats() db.version() The list doesn’t end here more API calls @ Mongo References.
- 29. Mapping SQL Logical Commands to MongoDB • and mapped to && • or to || • ‘=‘ to ‘==‘
- 31. Post Exploitation Phase • Allows the attacker to write JavaScript functions and save them • Can use for further attacks when needed. • db.system.js.save( { _id : “hitb2014ams" , value : function (x, y){ return x + y; } } ); • db.loadServerScripts()
- 33. Reference to DB in Mongo • Mongo Functions get to refer the db object and its main functions • An attacker who finds an Injection point could abuse this. • Found in Versions 2.2 or less • Mongo Patched for versions above. Does JS Injection end here?
- 34. Timing Based Checks • Application can be tested for time based attacks • Mongo Shell Supports most of JavaScript functions • function(){ return sleep(500);} would render the application response delayed by 5sec. • Module added to NoSQL framework while testing for JS Injection attacks
- 35. THIS Pointer Reference • Although mongo blocks reference to the db has ended • Attacker could use this pointer to return objects and dumping as always
- 37. What if THIS is Blocked? Version to Rescue • Version command by default binds to mongo instances defined functions • So if an admin blocks the “this” pointer • function(){return this} • Function(){return version} or function(){return version()) • Scenario useful when developer uses $where to evaluate js code. Blocked
- 39. Mongo With PHP PHP converts parameter with brackets to arrays. • Already addressed issue in previous researches Lets Look at Some New vectors • $exists • $type • $all
- 41. Resource Exhaustion Mongo on 32 bit environment is too easy for attackers (Max Size limit 2GB) Use command creates arbitrary schemas on the fly Attacker could run it continuously exhausting the disk space resource as well as memory. var i=1;while(1){use i=i+1;} • An empty database takes up 192Mb
- 42. CouchDB
- 47. Key Features Written in: Erlang CouchDB document is a JSON object Schema-Free Main point: DB consistency, ease of use Protocol: HTTP/REST Distributed database system Runs on Default Port : 5984,Binds to loopback interface by default Client uses REST API to communicate with the Backend Futon Web Interface
- 48. Attack Surface Admin Party = Game Over. Auth Cookie Sniffable Credentials Send over Unencrypted Channel XSPA attacks in Replication (limited to port web server ports) XSS,HTML Injection in Futon Interface DOS (Versions on 1.5 and below),File Enumeration attacks
- 49. Vulnerabilities XSS at the token interface HTML injection can be used by attackers to lure the victim to other sites. XSPA Attack can be used in the replication to check whether port is open or not Blind File Name Enumeration possible within the Replication
- 50. Addressing Auth Cookie Defaults to Expire within 10 min Attacker gaining access would want to use these 10 min Fruitfully NoSQL Framework kicks in with automation session grabbing and dumping necessary info.
- 51. PHP on Couch Driver Uses Curl Library to send the requests to the API Un validated PHP APPS could result in calling Arbitrary API Call Execution Download PHP on Couch: https://github.com/dready92/PHP-on-Couch/
- 55. Redis
- 58. Key Features • Key Value storage engine. • Contains Redis Server and Client • Driven By a Config File • Documentation is Laugh in a Park • Redis supports five data structures: • strings, hashes, lists, sets and ordered sets.
- 59. Attacks Discussed • Bruteforce Redis Passwords • Denial of Service on the FLY. • Command Killing • Config Rewrite • Arbitrary File Rewrite • Blind File Enumeration (usefull in pentests)
- 60. Redis Version • Redis Version 2.6 • No Support For Scripting. • Redis Introduced version 2.8 • Added Ability for LUA Scripts
- 61. Did We Just Say Scripting ?
- 62. Welcome to Redis LUA Script Engine and Basics • Redis uses LUA to manage scripts • LUA engine is properly sandboxed and offers enough security • Global variables protection • Scripts are Executed using eval (Available from Redis 2.6)
- 63. • Limited number of available of Available Libraries for Use • base lib. • table lib. • string lib. • math lib. • debug lib. • cjson lib. • cmsgpack lib.
- 64. Key Points • EVAL and EVALSHA are used to evaluate scripts using the Lua interpreter built into Redis. • SCRIPT KILL,LISTS,EXISTS • Important NB: When a script is running no other functions can be accessed or any operations can be performed
- 65. Sample Lua One Line DOS • redis-cli eval "$(cat test.lua)" 0 • test.lua
- 66. Commands Disabled By an Attacker • rename-command API Call Used • Sample Command • rename-command CONFIG l33tshit • rename-command CONFIG "“ • Disables the command completely
- 67. Arbitrary File Rewrite • CONFIG GET • Gives the Current set of Configuration • CONFIG SET • Sets the configuration of the default command • CONFIG SET dir /var/www
- 68. File Name Enumeration • Restricted Environment • Allows to use dofile (open file in lua scripting) • Although file doesn’t open gives the file or directory exists or not • eval "dofile('/var/www')" 0 • Directory Exists but cant open file • eval "dofile('/var/wwws')" 0 • No such directory exists
- 71. Cassandra
- 72. Key Takeaways • Written in: Java • Main point: Store huge datasets in "almost" SQL • Protocol: CQL3 & Thrift • CQL3 is very similar SQL, but with some limitations that come from the scalability (most notably: no JOINs, no aggregate functions.) • Runs on Port : 9160
- 73. Sad Facts ? • No OR • No UNION • No subrequests • Terms must be indexed • Primary key can only be queried for
- 74. Security Issues • Cassandra model › Keyspace (=database) › ColumnFamily > Data • CQL injection on Web Apps • Shell Commands can be useful to attacker(during privilege escalation). • SOURCE command • Reads the contents of the file • Database Enumeration and Dumping using NoSQL Exploitation Framework
- 76. H-Base
- 77. Key Points • Written in: Java • Main point: Billions of rows X millions of columns • Protocol: HTTP/REST (also Thrift) • Port:6379,8080(Rest API) • Emphasis on Trusted Environment
- 78. Security Issues • By Default offers No Security • Man in The Middle Attacks • REST API exposed • Database Scanning and Enumeration using NoSQL Exploitation Framework
- 79. NoSQL DB’s Never End!! More Research Needed • Ne04j,Memcache,Riak are under scanners(Some Discussed Vulnerabilities applies to those also) • Support for Neo4j,Memcache and Riak soon to be added • Memory Leaks and Overflows on the Rise • An excellent address to Ne04j security issue was written recently • Link:http://blog.scrt.ch/2014/05/09/neo4j-enter-the-graphdb/
- 80. Is Automation Needed? Do We have a framework ?
- 82. Key Points A framework of one of its Kind Open Source, Written In Python • I am not a hardcode coder(Bugs are prone ) Over 1200 lines of code Documented API’s Code Download:nosqlproject.com
- 83. Key Features • Support for Mongo,Couch,Redis-Base and Cassandra • Support for: • NoSQL Run Web Applications • Tests for JavaScript Attacks • Mongo DB $ Attacks • Couch PHP Driver Attack Vectors • Multithreaded Mass IP List Scanner
- 84. And the List Continues • Database Cloning Feature • Brute force & Dictionary attacks • Post Exploitation Module Integrated • Shodan IP List Grabber • Sniffing DB credentials and cookies • Added More Payload List
- 85. Future Updates • Updated Cassandra and HBase attacks • Resource Exhaustion • Support for Riak,Memcache and Ne04j on its way. • More Stable (Bug Less )
- 87. Bugs or Contribute • Official Mailing List: [email protected] • Contribute By pulling from GITHUB.
- 89. Thank You
- 90. Grab Me On • Facebook : francis.alexander.33 • Twitter: @torque59 • Github: torque59 • LinkedIn:
Editor's Notes
- #3: Opensecurity a community of like minded people for security,organizes yearly conference’s on information and security.
- #11: Schema less means No schema required: Data can be inserted in a NoSQL database without first defining a rigid database schema. As a corollary, the format of the data being inserted can be changed at any time, without application disruption. This provides immense application flexibility, which ultimately delivers substantial business flexibility.
- #16: Low on Security Discuss various encryption issues
- #21: MongoDB wire Protocol is a simple socket-based, request-response style protocol. Clients communicate with the database server through a regular TCP/IP socket.
- #26: Since Mongo uses Javascript ,there has been lately a lot of abuse (it uses the V8 engine for version greater than 2.4 before used Spider Monkey) RCE for mongo 2.2 is already an metasploit module. Locked js environment but possibility to overwrite certain prototypes Resource exhaustion
- #28: db.killOp(opid) kills the current operation in the db db.listCommands() lists all the db commands db.loadServerScripts() loads all the scripts in db.system.js run a database command. if cmdObj is a string, turns it into { cmdObj : 1 }
- #32: Rather than writing several js functions needed Attacker can save harmful scripts and call eval to evaluate the scripts db.loadServerScripts() loads script from the system.js collectionn
- #34: Db is database object in mongo shell
- #38: $where evaluates a js code ,if it returns one then it then it returns true .
- #40: Write new vectors exists, checks for whether document $exists Matches documents that have the specified field. $type Selects documents if a field is of the specified type.if char then return all documents with char $all Matches arrays that contain all elements specified in the query.
- #49: XSPA attacks in Replication (limited to port web server ports) File enumeration
- #50: Ports that have web i
- #52: _all_dbs,_changes
- #53: _design api call is used to fetch the documents And the _queryAndTest is used to give the request directly via Curl
- #59: Documentation allows attackers to specifically target redis,
- #65: Used to list available scripts,kill available scripts
- #68: Consider a case scenario where we have an webapp running on apache server By rewriting the location to
- #75: Php app is broken somewhat (I had a demo for it )