fairer_finance_how-can-housing-wealth-bridge-the-later-life-funding-gap.pdf

How can housing wealth
bridge the later life funding
gap?
In partnership with the Equity Release Council
May 2025

How can housing wealth bridge the later life funding gap
© Fairer Finance | fairerfinance.com 2
Contents
Executive summary..................................................................................................... 3
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 8
2. The challenge of maintaining living standards in later life ................................ 9
2.01 Later life living standards will not be maintained through pensions alone ...............9
2.02 People are living longer into later life...................................................................9
2.03 Individuals in later life face economic risks.........................................................10
2.04 On average, people hold more housing wealth than pension wealth.....................11
2.05 Housing wealth will be key to maintaining later life living standards.....................12
2.06 Later life starts when people begin to decumulate their assets ............................20
3. The opportunity: enabling individuals to access their housing wealth............ 25
3.01 The economic model ........................................................................................25
3.02 The benefits of accessing housing wealth to households .....................................30
3.03 The aggregate economic benefits of individuals accessing housing wealth............34
4. Overcoming barriers to consumers making the most of their housing wealth 38
4.01 Demand side barriers to making the most of housing wealth through downsizing
or later life lending...........................................................................................38
4.02 Supply side barriers to making the most of housing wealth through downsizing or
later life lending...............................................................................................48
4.03 Summary of recommendations..........................................................................55
5. Technical appendix........................................................................................... 57

Executive summary
The UK is on the verge of a later life crisis.
As life expectancy increases, pension
provision weakens, and the cost of care
rises – the number of people reaching
retirement without adequate provision to
maintain their standard of living is set to
increase year on year.
But wrapped up within this growing risk,
there is a significant opportunity.
With over three quarters of people in
retirement owning property, many have
housing wealth which can partially or
completely bridge the financial gap.1
As things stand, there are a number of
social, regulatory, and economic barriers
which block the path to housing wealth
becoming part of mainstream later life
planning.
This report looks to bring fresh clarity to
this pressing issue. Through new economic
modelling, we have estimated the shortfall
that different households may face in
meeting later life living standards.
In an ideal world, people will be able to
access housing wealth through downsizing,
if they wish. However, the current lack of
1
Office for National Statistics (2025), ‘Property
wealth: wealth in Great Britain’.
suitable housing stock means that many
people do not view downsizing as a viable
option. Therefore, we have focussed our
economic modelling on people accessing
housing wealth through later life lending.
Where pensions and savings can’t deliver
the desired living standard, we demonstrate
the impact of people using later life lending
to bridge the gap.
Our analysis shows that 51% of
households aged 60+ in 2040 could
benefit from accessing their housing
wealth in retirement through later life
lending, unlocking £23bn each year (in
2025 prices).
This will not only support millions of
consumers to live better lives in
retirement, but could also contribute
£21bn of gross value added to our
economy in 2040 (in 2025 prices).
There are a great many uncertainties
surrounding the overall potential economic
impact of households making greater use of
housing wealth in later life. However, it is

clear that the scale of potential spending is
significant at a macroeconomic level.
If we are to realise the potential of this
opportunity, policymakers need to act now.
Barriers to accessing housing
wealth
There are currently two key ways that
individuals can access their housing wealth:
downsizing (selling their property and
moving to a cheaper one), or later life
lending.
These are not mutually exclusive and some
households may end up using both.
Each have barriers which policymakers
should focus on removing.
For those who wish to downsize, there are
three key blockers. Firstly, a lack of suitable
retirement housing means that many
people are unable to find desirable options
in their local area. The political will to
increase housing supply in the UK has often
focused on first time buyers, rather than
building suitable and desirable retirement
properties to support downsizing – allowing
existing family homes to be freed up for
younger buyers.
Secondly, the costs of downsizing remains
high – exacerbated by stamp duty.
The third key blocker is also an obstacle to
later life lending – a lack of knowledge
2
Nikhil Rathi (2025), ‘On the right track: Connecting
consumers, products and growth’.
amongst consumers, and a social stigma.
Using housing wealth to fund later life is not
currently part of the retirement
conversation and many do not see it as a
mainstream option.
When consumers interact with MoneyHelper
or Pension Wise as they approach
retirement, there is a lack of actionable
advice around housing wealth. In the case
of later life lending, there is often a shame
associated with it, and it is seen as a last
resort.
The other key barrier to later life lending is
the regulatory environment – which has
created advice silos, and stymied innovation
in this market as a result. Mainstream
mortgage lenders do not talk about later life
lending options to borrowers as they are
entering later life, just as many equity
release advisers do not talk to consumers
about mainstream mortgages. Wealth
advisers tend not to be qualified to advise
on later life lending, and do not always
include housing wealth as part of core
retirement planning.
As the chief executive of the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA), Nikhil Rathi, said
in a speech in March 2025 ‘Pensions,
savings, mortgages, housing wealth – each
[sit] on their own line, with their own
ticketing system, timetable, and rules’.2

There is a need and opportunity to realign
regulation and government advice to
support more people to access housing
wealth in later life.
Our analysis shows that 51% of
households aged 60+ in 2040 could
benefit from accessing their housing
wealth over the course of their later
life. In that year, 18% of households
aged 60+ might access their housing
wealth. Of those that do access
housing wealth, the median total
amount taken over their lifetime is
estimated to be £140,000 (in 2025
prices).
Defining later life
To help frame the conversation, we have
introduced a new definition of later life.
Later life begins when a person begins to
draw down on the assets they have
accumulated for retirement. This may not
be when they retire. It may be a time when
they switch to part time or lower paid work
– and begin drawing on their private
pensions. Or it may be when they choose to
downsize or use later life lending to top up
their retirement savings.
The final stages of accumulation – where
consumers are still working, saving and
paying down debt – are a crucial time when
they need to be supported to consider how
they can maximise use of the assets they
have in retirement. This period – typically
from age 50 up until state retirement age –
is a crucial moment for both state and
private financial advice services to engage
with customers to prepare them to make
the best decisions for their retirement.
Supporting consumers to
unlock housing wealth in later
life
In the final section of the report, we make
five recommendations to government and
regulators.
With the FCA set to launch a review of its
mortgage and later life lending markets in
June 2025 – as the Government continues
to formulate its long-term growth strategy –
there is a unique opportunity to make
progress on this vital issue.
1. Government should facilitate a
substantial increase in the supply
of suitable and desirable
retirement properties, located in
the communities where people in
later life wish to live. This should also
include a better framework for
consumer protection, including looking
at innovative tenure models that
promote the use of housing wealth to
improve affordability and health
outcomes.
2. Government should lower the
financial cost of downsizing by
reducing stamp duty for people in
later life. By facilitating more

downsizing and freeing up family
homes, the government can recoup
some of the lost tax revenues through
an increase in upsizing stimulated by
greater supply of larger housing stock.
3. Government and regulators should
normalise the use of housing
wealth to maintain living standards
in later life. MoneyHelper and Pension
Wise should embed housing wealth as a
central part of later life advice and
guidance. Government and public
agencies should invest in public
information campaigns to break down
the stigma and normalise the use of
housing wealth in retirement.
4. Government and regulators should
develop a personalised service for
people, which brings their pension
and housing wealth into a single
view. Once pension dashboards are
completed, the government should look
to build in housing wealth to give
consumers a clear view of their financial
position and options as they enter later
life.
5. The FCA should reform the
regulation around later life advice,
to break down silos and ensure all
consumers are supported to
maximise the use of all their assets
as they approach retirement. Spec-
ifically, the FCA should:
a. Ensure that equity release advisers
are obliged to consider all forms of
later life lending.
b. Ensure that advice on mainstream
mortgages to people from the age of
50 onwards explicitly considers
retirement planning, including later
life lending options. This may be
through referring people to
retirement dashboards, midlife
MOTs, or other professional advisers
which bring together all sources of
retirement wealth.
c. Build more explicit consideration of
housing wealth into the FCA
rulebook, such that financial
advisers assess the role that housing
wealth may play for customers in
funding their retirement.
d. Allow for targeted support to assist
consumers in considering their use
of housing wealth as they plan for
retirement (whilst ensuring that
equity release remains an advised
sale).

e. Use the levers of the Consumer Duty
to ensure the UK has a vibrant and
competitive later life lending market,
which offers fair value to consumers
and creates the conditions for
product innovation. In advice
markets, the FCA should use the
Consumer Duty to eliminate product
bias – and ensure that consumers
are supported to achieve the best
outcomes for their needs, regardless
of which part of the advice market
they are engaging with.

1. Introduction
This report sets out to answer the following
question.
How can government policy ensure that
people maximise the use of their assets
in later life, so that more people can live
a good quality of life, meet any care
needs, and have something to give to
their loved ones if they want to?
This is undoubtedly a large question, and it
is beyond the reach of a single study to
comprehensively address all the intricacies
involved. Rather, this is a contribution to
the evidence base on how households’
asset mix is set to change over the next few
decades, and a consideration as to what
policy interventions need to be taken today
to support the best outcomes for
tomorrow’s retirees.
Our approach is based on economic
modelling and interviews with over 20
organisations, including a broad range of
independent experts, trade bodies, product
manufacturers and distributors,
qualifications bodies, and different types of
specialist advisers. We have spoken to
3
For more information about the Equity Release
Council, see:
https://www.equityreleasecouncil.com/about/.
organisations across a range of relevant
sectors, including pensions, financial advice,
standard residential mortgages, equity
release, and long-term care.
This report was paid for by the Equity
Release Council. Fairer Finance agreed the
research outline with the Equity Release
Council but retained full editorial control
over the output. The aim of the report was
not to present equity release as the
principal solution for future generations of
retirees. Downsizing is an equally important
and usually cheaper alternative – but one
which is currently unattractive due to a lack
of suitable housing stock. Downsizing and
later life lending are not always mutually
exclusive. The report looks neutrally at all
ways to support more customers in
accessing their housing wealth.
The views in this report are the views of
Fairer Finance and do not necessarily reflect
the Equity Release Council’s views.
The Equity Release Council is the
representative trade body for the equity
release sector.3

2. The challenge of maintaining
living standards in later life
2.01 Later life living standards will not be maintained
through pensions alone
Younger cohorts in the UK will be less likely to meet their income needs in retirement through
their pension pots alone. This is partly a result of the move from defined benefit (DB) pensions
to defined contribution (DC) pensions. Many people with DC pensions are (on average) not
saving sufficiently into their pension.
According to Scottish Widows, 38% of future retirees are on track for a retirement income
below the Pension and Lifetime Saving Association’s (PLSA) ‘minimum standard’.4
Of those
retirees who have a pension income above the ‘minimum standard’, many will not have a
pension income sufficient to meet their desired expenditure.
Gender inequality is relevant to pension wealth, with women having smaller pensions than men
on average. The gender pension gap is estimated to be around 35%.5
The rising cost of housing in the UK increases the required level of income for renters in
retirement. Further, the rising cost of housing will increase the number of people who will rent
in retirement, or who haven’t paid off a mortgage in retirement.6
According to the Office of
National Statistics (ONS), the proportion of people in the UK who do not own a property has
risen from 29% in 2006-08, to 35% in 2020-22.7
2.02 People are living longer into later life
We live in an ageing society.8
This has broad implications across housing, healthcare, personal
finances, and macroeconomics. As life expectancy increases, so does the expected length of
4
Scottish Widows (2024), ‘Retirement Report 2024’.
5
Specifically, based on 2018-20 data, the gap between male and female uncrystallised non-zero median pension
wealth around normal minimum pension age is 35%. Department for Work and Pensions (2023), ‘The Gender
Pensions Gap in Private Pensions’.
6
Office for National Statistics (2020), ‘Living longer: changes in housing tenure over time’.
7
Office for National Statistics (2025), ‘Property wealth: wealth in Great Britain’.
8
Office for National Statistics (2023). Profile of the older population living in England and Wales in 2021 and
changes since 2011.

retirement. This means that the value of assets that is required to fund a certain level of living
standards is rising.
Life expectancies have steadily increased over the last 40 years.9
The demographic makeup of
the UK is projected to shift over the next decade. The population older than the state pension
age is projected to rise from 11.3 million to 13.7 million by the year 2032.10
The projected shift
in overall distribution of UK population demographics can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The projected age distribution of the UK population
Source: Fairer Finance, Office for National Statistics (2025), 'National population projections'.
2.03 Individuals in later life face economic risks
There are two primary economic risks affecting later life living standards – the risk of living
longer and the risk of poor health or disability. These risks affect later life living standards –
both at the average, and the distribution (i.e. the number of older people with very low living
standards).
The risk of living longer
Life expectancy is uncertain, and individuals face a risk of ‘running out’ of income if they live
longer than their wealth can support. Longevity risk is not the simple linear relationship that
individuals might expect. For example, the average 70-year-old woman has a life expectancy of
88 years, whereas the average 80-year-old woman has a life expectancy of 90 years.11
9
Office for National Statistics (2024). Life expectancy for local areas of Great Britain
10
Office for National Statistics (2025), 'National population projections'
11
Office for National Statistics (2025), ‘Life expectancy calculator’.

On average, older people underestimate how much longer they will live for. If individuals had a
more accurate understanding of their longevity risk, they might make different decisions.12
The risk of poor health or disability
Individuals may require healthcare or social care in later life (‘care’). The risk of requiring care
increases with age, and can be met through care in the home, or through moving to a
residential care home. Care is often costly, with the cost depending on the nature of support
provided. In England in 2023, the average annual cost of a residential care home without
nursing care was £49,348, or £65,884 with nursing care.13
Government schemes to contribute
to care costs vary between the UK nations (and even within England, the application of the
schemes can vary by local authority). These schemes are currently means-tested, limited, and
do not apply in all circumstances.
The risks of higher inflation and lower investment returns
Individuals face the risk that higher inflation erodes their savings at a faster rate than they
expect. This also applies to non-inflation linked income, such as level annuities. Inflation is
notoriously hard to predict, due to the role of external shocks. For example, domestic energy
prices almost doubled in 2022, driving economy-wide inflation.14
Individuals also face the risk that their investments are more volatile in the short-run than
expected, or generate a lower long-run return than expected. Different asset classes have
different levels of volatility and return. For example, house prices typically have lower volatility
than equities.
2.04 On average, people hold more housing wealth than
pension wealth
In the face of insufficient pension wealth, the full range of assets will be required in order to
maintain later life living standards. The most significant type of wealth held by UK households
is net housing wealth (e.g. the value of the home).
12
For example, Canada Life (2023), ‘New retirement gap looms as people underestimate life expectancy’.
13
LaingBuisson (2024), ‘Care of Older People UK Market Report 34th edition 2024’, as cited by PayingForCare.org
(2024), ‘How much does it cost?’.
14 Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (2024), ‘Quarterly Energy Prices’.

Across all households in the UK, housing wealth constituted 40% of total wealth (2020-22).15
Pension wealth constituted 35%, meaning that more wealth is tied up in property than in
pension pots.16
Housing wealth is unequally distributed across the population. For example, housing wealth
constituted over half (51%) of total wealth in London but under a third (30%) in the North East
of England.17
We also see housing wealth increasing for those in older cohorts. Those aged 65+ own more
valuable housing than those aged 65+ did a few years ago. This is partly due to rising house
prices. This is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Housing wealth of those aged 65
Source: Fairer Finance, Office for National Statistics (2025), ‘Property wealth: wealth in Great Britain’.
2.05 Housing wealth will be key to maintaining later life
living standards
Some consumers can be fairly categorised as ‘cash poor, property rich’. These consumers own
some (or all) of the valuable asset in which they live. They can access their property wealth
through downsizing, or through secured borrowing against their home, or both.
15 Office for National Statistics (2025), ‘Household total wealth in Great Britain: April 2020 to March 2022’.
The remainder is made up of financial wealth at 14% (e.g. savings) and physical wealth at 10% (e.g. vehicles). The
numbers may not sum due to rounding.

Consumers can downsize and then use later life lending, as long as their new home meets the
lending criteria of the mortgage provider. Alternatively, some later life lending products allow
the consumer to downsize without penalty (as long as their new home meets the lending
criteria).
Many consumers make trade-offs between their living standards and their
ability to give an inheritance
Individuals face nuanced trade-offs about how they use their assets. For example, many
individuals hold preferences for leaving an inheritance or gifting money to others at different
points in time. In one study, 67% of people surveyed expected to leave money to their loved
ones, with 29% expecting to leave over £200,000.18
These preferences may change over time
as the customer ages. The home is often seen as the primary vehicle for leaving an inheritance,
partly driven by the design of inheritance tax (IHT).
We explain more of the behavioural barriers to effective decision-making over later life lending
and downsizing in section 4.
Downsizing could be a long-term solution for many consumers
Individuals can increase their ability to meet consumption needs by selling their home and
moving to a cheaper home. These homes are typically smaller or in a location where the
housing is cheaper. The individual’s new home could be specialised retirement living, more
suitable to their needs. Downsizing brings societal benefits by increasing ‘bedroom utilisation’.
Previous studies have found that around one third of consumers over 55 have considered
downsizing their home.19
However, many of these people do not downsize their home. There is
a significant disconnect between intentions to downsize and following through.20
Downsizing can be both emotionally and financially costly
Downsizing is seen as emotionally costly by many individuals, who wish to stay living in their
current home and in their current location and community. Downsizing also comes with
financial transaction costs (stamp duty, conveyancing fees, etc.) and non-financial transaction
costs (the hassle of moving).
18
Demos (2023), 'The Inheritance Tax Puzzle'
19
International Longevity Centre (2016). 'Generation Stuck'
20
Park, A., & Ziegler, F. (2016) 'A Home for Life? A Critical Perspective on Housing Choice for "Downsizers" in the
UK'

Financially, the value of the original home must be sufficient to mitigate fees, taxes such as
stamp duty, and any annual charges on the new property before equity is released.21
One study
found that in 2024-15 the average amount of equity released by downsizing was only £13,800
(before costs).22
Downsizing also requires effort, draining consumers mentally as they leave what may have
been the primary family home and deal with the stress of moving.23
There is a lack of suitable housing stock to downsize into
Even for those who are willing or able to pay these costs, there is a lack of suitable, cost-
effective housing stock for them to move into.24
Many consumers have specific physical needs
or want to remain close to family and existing social networks, reducing the capacity to
downsize. The lack of supply of retirement homes is well documented, and we would expect
this shortage of supply to increase the prices of these homes. For example, the 2022 Mayhew
Review found that only around 7,000 retirement homes are built each year, and recommended
that this be increased to 50,000 new retirement homes a year.25
While not right for everyone in later life, downsizing is an integral piece of the later life financial
puzzle. It must be part of any discussion surrounding later life financial and housing provision.
The flexibility it allows later life consumers to live independently in a property which suits their
needs whilst realising capital is a key part of any solution.
As it stands, this would require a shift in consumer behaviour and housing policy. Building more
suitable properties would alleviate some of these issues, as consumers can downsize knowing
their new property will meet their needs. Building more suitable properties, though, has a
lengthy lead in time. Alternative solutions, in the short to medium term, must be considered to
bridge this gap. This would allow for all later life options to be catered for across the breadth of
individual consumers’ wants and needs.
Later life lending could be a long-term solution for many consumers
Those who cannot or do not wish to downsize can access their property wealth through later
life lending.
21
Centre for Financial Innovation (2020). 'Too little, too late? Housing for an aging population'
22
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2018), ‘The use of housing wealth at older ages’.
23
International Longevity Centre UK (2016). Generation Stuck
24
Centre for Financial Innovation (2020). 'Too little, too late? Housing for an aging population'
25
Mayhew, L. (2022), ‘The Mayhew Review – Future-proofing retirement living: Easing the care and housing crises’.

For individuals who own their own home, secured credit against the home is typically a lower
cost of borrowing than unsecured lending. Depending on the value of the home, and the
proportion of the home that is owned by the consumer, a mortgage can release significant
sums of money. In this way, a mortgage can be used to meet significant consumption needs.
Consumers currently face a degree of choice over whether to purchase a mortgage that will be
repaid within their lifetime, as described below. Different products will be suitable for different
consumers.
• Residential mortgages (or remortgages) must be repaid within their lifetime. This means
that the customer must pass an affordability assessment for repaying the total sum
borrowed plus interest. An affordability assessment is the way in which the lender assures
itself that the borrower is likely to be able to afford to make the repayments. This is an
important consumer protection as, is the repayments are not made, the home can be
repossessed by the lender. Some providers of residential mortgages have raised or removed
their maximum ages in recent years, meaning that more consumers in later life have
residential mortgages.
• Term interest only (TIO) mortgages provide a way for the consumer to repay the interest
on their mortgage during the mortgage term, with the principal repayable at the end of the
term. This means that the customer must pass an affordability assessment for repaying the
interest. These products are designed for people who will be able to repay their mortgage at
the end of the term. However, some consumers with a TIO mortgage in later life may
instead choose to move to a retirement interest only mortgage or a lifetime mortgage
instead.
• Retirement interest only (RIO) mortgages provide a way for the consumer to repay the
interest on their mortgage, but not the principal. This means that the customer must pass
an affordability assessment for repaying the interest. Currently, RIO mortgages are not
commonly sold in the UK.
• Lifetime mortgages provide a way for consumers aged 55+ to access the value of their
home without being required to repay any of the borrowing until they pass away, sell their
home, or go into residential care. As there are no mandatory repayments, the home cannot
be repossessed.

• Since 2022, members of the Equity Release Council have been required to offer new
customers the opportunity to make penalty-free partial repayments. 26
• For a number of years after the purchase of the lifetime mortgage, larger partial
repayments or full repayments are typically subject to an early repayment charge.
• If customers do not cover the interest with voluntary repayments then the interest due on
the loan compounds over time (which can grow to be more than the initial value of the
loan). Rates are typically fixed for the life of the loan.
• Some lifetime mortgages allow consumers to borrow an initial sum, with the potential to
access more (e.g. through an agreed drawdown facility which would not require
reassessing the value of the home).
• Members of the Equity Release Council are required to allow for the customer to
downsize their home without incurring an early repayment charge as long as the new
home meets their lending criteria. In addition, should the homeowner move into care
either in the residential home or with a relative, they will not be charged an early
repayment charge if they have a medical certificate.
• Members of the Equity Release Council are also required to offer a no negative equity
guarantee (‘NNEG’), meaning that the customer’s estate cannot end up owing more than
the value of their home.
Of all new mortgage products sold to those aged over 55, 33% are lifetime mortgages.27
The
volumes of new lifetime mortgages fell significantly towards the end of 2022 as interest rates
rose.28
Later life lending products could meet a more diverse set of consumer
needs
Several types of innovative lifetime mortgage products are provided in other countries. These
products might meet the more diverse and varied financial needs of some consumers. For
example:
26
Currently all UK providers are members of the Equity Release Council.
27
Where the main borrower is over the age of 55, in Q3 2024, there were 17,706 residential mortgages (including
house purchase, remortgage, RIO), compared to 5,830 lifetime mortgages. See: UK Finance (2024), ‘Later Life
Lending Update - Q3 2024’.
28
Equity Release Council (2024), ‘Q3 2024 lending data full report’.

• Automated or semi-automated income lifetime mortgages. With some exceptions,
lifetime mortgages with drawdown facilities tend to be relatively manual, with the consumer
needing to make discrete drawdown transactions. Lifetime mortgages with pre-determined
drawdown patterns (e.g. a set amount that increases with inflation each year) might provide
additional utility to some consumers.
• Lifetime mortgages which are more flexible and do not have early repayment
charges. In Australia, there are products which allow for more flexibility over the amount of
equity accessed and repaid. The absence of an early repayment charge gives customers
more flexibility. These Australian products may have a lower loan-to-value ratio than in the
UK, and a variable interest rate.29
We are aware of one provider in the UK which has a
lifetime mortgage without an early repayment charge.30
In general, we might expect the
absence of an early repayment charge to be associated with higher interest rates on the
mortgage.
• Annuities directly funded by lifetime mortgages. A lump sum lifetime mortgage could
be used to fund an annuity product. Currently, consumers would need to undertake two
transactions rather than one transaction (first the lifetime mortgage, then the annuity
purchase). This could be a lower hassle (and potentially a lower cost) journey if undertaken
through one transaction.
• Short-term equity release. Some consumers may benefit from being able to ‘bridge the
gap’ between their current situation and a future point in time when their finances improve.
For example, when they receive inheritance or are able to liquidate a different asset. Certain
Canadian reverse mortgage products have a fixed interest rate for a limited term (e.g. 6
years), after which the early repayment charge is reduced or removed.31
• Home equity line of credit (HELOC). In Canada and the USA, HELOC products provide
secured credit (with lower interest rates than unsecured credit), against the security of the
consumer’s home. These products help meet short-term needs at lower cost but can result
in the consumer losing their home if they do not keep up with repayments. HELOC products
are not designed to bridge long-term gaps between desired living standards and pension
income.32
29
For example, see https://householdcapital.com.au/.
30
See: https://www.more2life.co.uk/product/maxi-zero.
31
For example, see: https://www.equitablebank.ca/reverse-mortgage/comparison-rates.
32
For example, see: https://www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/mortgages/home-equity-line-
credit.html.

Regardless of the specific type of lifetime mortgage, lifetime mortgages are currently an
advised sale in the UK. This means that consumers must seek advice from a qualified equity
release adviser.
Later life lending is distributed through a fragmented and complex
customer journey
Consumers seeking regulated advice face a complex landscape, which is likely to be opaque.
This is shown in Figure 3. All three types of adviser must be FCA-authorised to operate.
Figure 3: Silos in advice
Source: Fairer Finance.
• ‘Standard residential’ mortgages are distributed through mortgage brokers.33
These brokers are qualified to advise on the full range of residential mortgages and TIO
mortgages. However, they cannot advise on equity release unless they have an additional
qualification (which many do not hold). This means that many consumers in later life
seeking residential mortgage advice may not receive advice on all types of available
mortgages for them (e.g. lifetime mortgages).
• Lifetime mortgages are distributed through equity release advisers. Compared to
residential mortgage brokers, these advisers have an additional certification on equity
release products. In practice, these advisers may or may not also advise on standard
residential mortgages (although they are required by the FCA to assist the consumer in
33
Consumers can also purchase standard residential mortgages without receiving advice (i.e. on an execution only
basis).

understanding the alternatives to equity release mortgages). This means that some
consumers seeking equity release advice may not receive advice on all types of available
mortgages for them.
• Financial advisers advise on pensions and financial wealth management. Some
financial advisers do not also advise on accessing housing wealth or lifetime mortgages. This
means that consumers seeking financial advice on managing their wealth are not always
receiving advice on managing their property wealth.
Some brokers advise on all types of mortgages, and some advisers have referral arrangements
with other types of advisers.
However, we understand that the silos in advice are likely to lead to consumer detriment, as (in
practice) they reduce the likelihood that consumers receive the most suitable advice. The
current market design is likely to lead to some degree of path dependency, whereby the course
of action recommended to the customer is affected by the type of adviser the customer first
contacted.
The silos could also mean that consumers may have to go through several advice journeys,
increasing the friction in the journey.
Consumers are not having the right conversations at the right time about
later life finances
Given that the provision of advice is fragmented and complex for people, we might expect
consumers to be having broader conversations about their various sources of wealth and
options for funding their living standards in later life. However, information and about later life
finances is often presented in silos.
For example, someone who is highly engaged with their pension might not be prompted to
consider whether their housing wealth could also meet their needs in retirement. This ‘engaged
pensions’ customer might read all the information provided by their pension providers, they
might access information through Pension Wise, and read more about their options on
MoneyHelper. These trusted sources of information are typically focused on pension wealth.

2.06 Later life starts when people begin to decumulate
their assets
Later life is a period of change and important financial touchpoints
Individuals’ career and home lives typically change dramatically during later life, necessitating
careful financial planning to adapt to meet any new challenges or opportunities. For the
purposes of this report, we define later life as starting when people begin to decumulate their
assets.
Our definition of later life focuses on the economic journey that people experience, and it is
important to recognise that the economic journey is largely driven by non-economic factors. As
people age, social and health factors drive changes in personal finances and financial decisions.
Viewing consumer behaviour through this lens gives policymakers and financial institutions a
conceptualisation of ‘later life’ as a series of touchpoints that all adult consumers go through.
The challenges and opportunities for reflection that each stage presents can inform how best to
frame consumers’ thinking about their financial assets as they reach these touchpoints.
Individuals only enter later life once. It is hard for people to learn from and then rectify any
mistakes or missed opportunities. Many of the financial decisions in later life are one-shot,
rather than repeated. We do not want people to later regret their decisions in the run-up to, or
after, retirement.
The economic risks faced by individuals in later life vary over time
As the individual ages, the nature of the risks change. This means that we must understand the
overarching economic journey as experienced by people in later life.
Defining later life is not about constraining individual choices – indeed, in this report, we argue
in favour of giving people more choice. Rather, a common understanding of later life will help
the policy debate focus on key challenges and opportunities – enabling more people to reach
their varied financial objectives.
Later life starts when decumulation begins
Some people begin to decumulate their assets when they start to withdraw from their pension,
for example through accessing the tax-free cash at age 57. Alternatively, they may not take the
tax-free cash in their 50s and begin to decumulate their pension later. Other people begin to

decumulate when they downsize their home to release some of their housing wealth. Typically,
people begin to decumulate between age 57 and 67.
We now explore three key life stages, which are also shown in Figure 4.
• Prior to later life, the final stage of accumulation.
• Later life flexible decumulation.
• Later life needs-based decumulation.
Adults go through distinct stages of development, with each stage presenting consumers with
unique challenges and opportunities.34 35
Our analysis is based on psychological, social, and
financial research on adult development. Whilst many of these steps are common to adults in
each age bracket, they will not be universal. They may be experienced in different sequences,
at different times, or not at all.
Figure 4: The journey into and through later life
Prior to later life, people are in their final stage of accumulation
As of 2022, there were 13.3 million people aged between 50 and 64.36
By the year 2032, there
are predicted to be 12.8 million.37
Many people in this age range will be in their final stage of
accumulation, and some will have begun their decumulation.
This phase is socially and financially critical for outcomes in later life.38
Cognitive abilities start
to plateau, and physical health may start to decline. The healthy life expectancy of an adult in
34
Lachman, M. E., Teshale, S., & Agrigoroaei, S. (2015). Midlife as a pivotal period in the life course: Balancing
growth and decline at the crossroads of youth and old age. International journal of behavioral development, 39(1),
20–31.
35
Halloran, E.C. (2024). Adult development and associated health risks. Journal of patient-centered research and
reviews, 11 1, 63-67.
36
Office for National Statistics (2024). 'Estimates of the population for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland'
37
Office for National Statistics (2025). 'National population projections'
38
Lachman, M. E., Teshale, S., & Agrigoroaei, S. (2015), ‘Midlife as a pivotal period in the life course: Balancing
growth and decline at the crossroads of youth and old age’, International Journal of Behavioral Development, 39(1),
20–31.

England is 61.9 for women and 61.5 for men.39
Whilst not a guarantee of the onset of ill health,
this might mean that health considerations may have a larger influence on financial decision-
making.
Consumers in this stage tend to experience reducing earnings, as can be seen in Figure 5. For
those with children, childcare responsibilities may lessen.40
There are important financial
considerations to be made after pension freedom at age 57.
Figure 5: Median gross weekly pay by age (£).
Source: Fairer Finance, Office for National Statistics (2024), ‘Employee earnings in the UK’.
Later life starts with flexible decumulation
As of 2022, there were 9.3 million adults aged between 65-79 years old in the UK.41
By the year
2032, this is predicted to rise to 10.8 million.42
Typically people will have begun to decumulate
by the age of 67, with some having started in their 50s.
This stage marks the beginning of later life and is characterised by changing consumption
profiles for adults in this age bracket.43
Spending on international travel and other desire-based
expenditure increases, whilst spending on motor travel and in-house food decreases. This
profile change is influenced by the socio-economic background of the individual consumer with
39
ONS (2024), ‘Healthy life expectancy in England and Wales: between 2011 to 2013 and 2021 to 2023’.
40
growth and decline at the crossroads of youth and old age’, International Journal of Behavioral Development, 39(1),
20–31.
41
Northern Ireland'
42
Office for National Statistics (2025). 'National population projections'
43
R, Crawford and H, Karjalainen and D, Sturrock. (2022). How does spending change through retirement?. London:
The IFS.

total expenditure decreasing in general. Household total wealth tends to be at its peak during
this period, as can be seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Median household total wealth (£) by household head age
Source: Fairer Finance, Office for National Statistics (2025), 'Household total wealth in Great Britain April 2020 to
March 2022'
Physically and cognitively, this tends to be a period of decline for adults in this stage.44
The
average age for losing a spouse falls within this age bracket bringing about important financial
implications for wealth management.45
With decisions to be made about retirement and the desired pension outcome for consumers,
this period is important as a touchstone for assessing the consumer’s needs and wants. It
might also be a key time to assess gifting money to future generations.
Later life evolves into needs-based decumulation
As of 2022, there were 3.4 million adults aged 80 or over in the UK.46
By the year 2032, this is
predicted to rise to 4.6 million.47
Economic consumption patterns tend to change over the course of later life.48
Household
spending on discretionary categories tends to decline as people move into their late 70s and
44
growth and decline at the crossroads of youth and old age’, International journal of behavioral development, 39(1),
20–31.
45
Age UK (2019), ‘You are not alone. Advice and support following bereavement’.
46
Northern Ireland'.
47
Office for National Statistics (2025). 'National population projections'.
48
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2022), 'How does spending change through retirement?'.

80s. These changes affect consumers’ desire and ability to utilise their wealth in discretionary
spending, examples of these trends can be seen in Figure 7.49
Figure 7: Average weekly household expenditure on recreation and culture by age
Note: quintiles refer to gross income distribution
Source: Fairer Finance, Office for National Statistics (2024), ‘Family spending workbook 2: expenditure by income’.
Whilst household spending tends to decrease in this age bracket, there are increased
expenditures on meeting care needs as physical and cognitive health declines.50
Some of this
provision can be met by residential care centres, but there is a preference for owner-occupiers
to remain in their own home.51
When asked whether they preferred to stay in the property that they currently lived in, 91% of
adults aged 65-74 said they either agreed or strongly agreed, rising to 95% for those aged
75+.52
There is a lack of existing housing stock which meets the wellbeing needs of this
population, limiting the capacity for downsizing to meet healthcare and financial needs.
Based on our understanding of later life, we have modelled the role that housing wealth could
play in maintain living standards in later life. This is described in section 3.
49
These changes in spending patterns are not consistent across sectors and wealth quintiles, which may be driven
by some consumers experiencing real income increase over the course of retirement. Going forward, we might
expect to see a more consistent decline in discretionary spending with age, as the gap between retirement income
and desired spending is likely to be larger for many people.
50
Age UK Age UK issues clarion call for a big shift towards joined up home and community based health and social
care services for older people.
51
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government The Older People's Housing Taskforce Report - GOV.UK.
52
Coco, J.F. & Lopes, P. (2019). Aging in Place, Housing Maintenance and Reverse Mortgages. The Review of
Economic Studies, Volume 87, Issue 4, July 2020, Pages 1799–1836.

3. The opportunity: enabling
individuals to access their housing
wealth
Housing wealth could clearly play a role in helping many households maintain their living
standards in later life. In section 3 we quantify this through economic modelling.
• We describe the economic model in section 3.01.
• We outline the results of the model at a household level in section 3.02.
• We provide the aggregate results of the model in section 3.03.
3.01 The economic model
In order to examine how individuals might better meet their spending needs during later life –
as detailed in Section 2 – we have developed an economic model. This model explores how
housing wealth could, in principle, contribute to meet any gaps in available finances for
different households.53
We have modelled the way in which housing wealth can be used to increase living standards in
later life. However, this is not a forecast. Rather, we estimate the size of the opportunity if
policymakers, regulators, and industry can overcome the barriers that stand in the way of
people accessing the value of their home through lifetime mortgages.
The model looks forward to 2040. The model estimates the difference between desired
spending and household income in 2040, for the population aged 60 and above. Where the
desired spending is greater than the household income, we model the potential impact of
people accessing the value of their home through a lifetime mortgage.
We have not modelled the way in which people make the trade-off between their standard of
living and their ability to give an inheritance. Some people are likely to choose to accept a
lower quality of life, to preserve some (or all) of the value of their home as inheritance.
53
Full details of the economic model can be found in the appendix.

We have made reasonable and conservative assumptions. Our assumptions are based on
historic data and logical inferences. Where there is judgement required, we have erred on the
side of increasing income after retirement and reducing spending needs after retirement. This
means that our estimate of the opportunity for later life lending to increase living standards is
conservative.
Desired expenditure in later life is based on living standards, repaying
mortgages, and care costs
We assume that the desired expenditure for each household is based on the PLSA living
standards.54
This can lead to households targeting a level of income in retirement which
appears unrealistic, given their pre-retirement income. Therefore, to be conservative, we limit
the desired expenditure relative to gross pre-retirement income.55
In addition, some households face the cost of repaying their residential mortgage after the age
of 60. Further, some households face a cost shock associated with requiring long-term care.
This is shown in Figure 8.
It is possible that some households have greater desired expenditure than we have modelled.
For example, to pay for substantial discretionary purchases that go above and beyond the PLSA
standards.
54
High-income households target PLSA ‘comfortable’, and low- and mid-income households target PLSA ‘moderate’.
55
Mid- and high-income households target no more than 70% of gross pre-retirement income, while low-income
households target no more than 80% of gross pre-retirement income.

Figure 8: Stylised approach to modelling desired expenditure
Note: Illustrative only (not to scale). There is significant variation between households and over time. The relevant
PLSA living standard is determined by whether the household is low, mid, or high income. Similarly, the relevant
maximum proportion of gross pre-retirement income is determined by whether the household is low, mid, or high
income.
Housing wealth is accessed through later life lending once other sources of
income are exhausted
We assume that households first access their pension income before accessing their savings to
fund their desired spending. If the combination of these is insufficient or exhausted, we assume
the household accesses the value of their home to fund their desired spending. This is shown in
Figure 9.
The combination of benefits (which is mostly the state pension), private pension, savings, and
housing wealth may be insufficient to meet the desired spending.56
In these cases, the unmet
spending needs signal that the household will enjoy a lower living standard.
56
We have based state benefits income on the current level of state benefits received by pensioners, according to
the ONS. We adjust this for inflation. We recognise that the level of state benefits to pensioners could increase over
time in real terms, e.g. due to increasing national insurance contributions. Alternatively, it is possible that the level of
state benefits is reduced in order to reduce the total cost of these state benefits.

Figure 9: Stylised approach to modelling sources of income
Note: Illustrative only (not to scale). There is significant variation between households and over time. Many
households do not need to access housing wealth to reach their desired expenditure at a given age. Even with
housing wealth, some households cannot reach their desired expenditure at a given age (resulting in a lower
standard of living).
The potential role of housing wealth varies by the levels of household
income and housing wealth
We model nine financial personas. These personas represent 75% of the population aged 60 and
above.57
The personas vary in their income and housing wealth and are outlined in Table 1.
57
In other words, we assume that 25% of the population aged 60 and above will have no use for later life lending.
While renting has been rising, increasing home ownership is likely to remain a public policy objective. Ultimately, it is
difficult to predict the exact proportion of people in later life who will have housing wealth in 2040, and so we have
based our modelling on the current situation. Further, to be conservative, we assume those aged under 60 have no
use for later life lending.

Table 1: Financial personas – property wealth for a couple aged 50 in 2025
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
£148,644
Persona 4
£233,583
Persona 7
£353,914
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
£218,011
Persona 5
£342,588
Persona 8
£519,073
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
£237,830
Persona 6
£373,733
Persona 9
£566,252
Note: The property wealth was calibrated from ONS datasets on property wealth. Some degree of estimation is
required, in terms of the assumed correlation between property wealth and income. The 2025 figures are then
uprated for inflation in the model.
For each of the nine personas, we model a series of demographic factors, external shocks, and
different choices. These are as follows:
• Whether the household is a couple or a single, and the age at which the first person in a
couple dies.
• Whether the first person in the household experiences a cost shock associated with requiring
long-term care and the age at which this occurs.
• The age at which the household stops working.
• Whether the household has an outstanding residential mortgage.58
• The type of pension income that the household has access to, or chooses.
• The level of realised investment returns.
We have considered a large number of different combinations of these factors, to form a
representative view across the population. As a consequence, in total, we model 9,720 different
scenarios.
58
It is also possible that – for some households – repaying unsecured lending or car finance increases their desired
spending. However, to be conservative, our modelling does not increase desired expenditure for these factors (and
focusses on repaying mortgages).

3.02 The benefits of accessing housing wealth to
households
We model the use of later life lending to thousands of households experiencing different
circumstances and making different choices. While we cannot show all of these scenarios here,
we show several examples below to illustrate key findings of the model.
Many households do not need to
access their housing wealth
We find that many households do not
require later life lending. Their pension
income and savings are sufficient to meet
their desired spending.
An example of this is shown in Figure 10. In
this scenario, the household has an
outstanding mortgage and uses savings to
bridge the gap between earnings and the
desired spending at ages 60-66. At 67, the
household receives the state pension and
its private pension, and can fully meet its
desired spending. At 86 there is a cost
shock associated with requiring care which
is fully met by savings. At 89, the spending
needs reduce as the first person in the
couple dies, and the combination of state
pension and private pension is again
enough to meet the spending needs of the
surviving partner.
Figure 10 shows the second person in the
household surviving to the age of 100. This
is for the purposes of illustration. Our model
assumes that people pass away in line with
longevity statistics.
Figure 10: In some scenarios, housing wealth is not required to maintain living standards
Note: 2025 prices. Persona 7 (high housing wealth, low income). Couple retires at 67 with an outstanding mortgage.
There is a cost shock associated with requiring care at age 86, with the first person in the couple passing away at
89. Couple has a DB pension. Market returns of 4.50%. Second person in the couple dies in line with longevity
statistics (but shown here to live to 100 for the purposes of illustration).

Some households have access to
sufficient housing wealth to
maintain their living standards
We find that many households do require
housing wealth to maintain their living
standards. For some of these households,
the housing wealth is sufficient to bridge
the gap between pension income and the
desired standard of living.
this scenario, the household has an
outstanding mortgage and uses savings to
bridge the gap between earnings and the
desired spending at ages 60-66. At 67, the
household receives the state pension and
its private pension. However, pension
income is not sufficient to meet the desired
spending, and the household also runs out
of savings at 67. Therefore, at 67 the
household starts to access the value of its
housing.
At 86 there is a cost shock associated with
requiring care. These care costs are fully
met by equity release. At 84 the spending
needs reduce as the first person in the
couple dies, and the combination of state
pension and private pension meet the
spending needs of the surviving partner. No
more housing wealth is required from 84
onwards.
Figure 11: In some scenarios, housing wealth is sufficient to bridge the gap between pension
income and the desired standard of living
Note: 2025 prices. Persona 7 (high housing wealth, low income). Couple retires at 67 with an outstanding mortgage.
There is a cost shock associated with requiring care at age 80, with the first person in the couple passing away at
83. Couple has an annuity. Market returns of 4.50%. Second person in the couple dies in line with longevity statistics
(but shown here to live to 100 for the purposes of illustration).

Some households access housing
wealth to maintain their living
standards before they receive the
state pension
We find that there is a particular challenge
to living standards for those households
that stop working at 60. They may stop
working out of choice, or because of
external reasons such as poor health. For
households with limited savings, later life
lending provides a bridge to maintain living
standards before the state pension is
received at 67.
this scenario, the household retires at 60
with limited savings. At 60-66, the
household accesses some of its housing
wealth to maintain living standards. From
67 onwards, no equity release is required to
maintain living standards.
Figure 12 shows the person surviving to the
age of 100. This is for the purposes of
illustration. Our model assumes that people
pass away in line with longevity statistics.
Figure 12: In some scenarios, housing wealth maintains the standard of living until the
household receives the state pension
Note: 2025 prices. Persona 2 (low housing wealth, mid income). Single retires at 60 without an outstanding
mortgage. There is no cost associated with requiring care. Half the single’s pension is DB, and half is an annuity.
Market returns of 4.50%. The single dies in line with longevity statistics (but shown here to live to 100 for the
purposes of illustration).

Some households access housing
wealth to maintain their living
standards until their housing
wealth runs out
We find that some households do not have
sufficient housing wealth to sustain their
living standards for longer than a short
period of time. The household releases as
much equity as it can, until it can release no
more. At this point, the living standards fall
as the household has no other untapped
source of wealth.
this scenario, the household accesses its
housing wealth from 67 to 83. Even though
the household is drawing down a relatively
high proportion of its drawdown pot each
year, it still requires some equity release to
maintain living standards. The drawdown
pot is exhausted at 82. However, the
household runs out of accessible housing
wealth at 83. This means that, from 83
onwards, there is unmet spending needs
and therefore a lower standard of living.

Figure 13: In some scenarios, housing wealth maintains the standard of living until it is
exhausted, and the standard of living drops
Note: 2025 prices. Persona 4 (mid housing wealth, low income). Couple retires at 67 with an outstanding mortgage.
There is no cost shock associated with requiring care. The first person in the couple passes away at 86. Couple
withdraws 8% of initial drawdown pot size. Market returns of 4.50%. Second person in the couple dies in line with
longevity statistics (but shown here to live to 100 for the purposes of illustration).
3.03 The aggregate economic benefits of individuals
accessing housing wealth
The 9,720 different household scenarios have been designed to represent the range of
outcomes we might expect for 75% of the whole population aged 60 and above. These
outcomes can be aggregated – using suitable weightings based on available statistics – to
provide UK-wide totals.
Based on this aggregation, our modelling suggests that the median age at which households
start to access their housing wealth to maintain living standards is 69. The use of housing
wealth peaks in the 70s.
On average, those accessing their housing wealth before the state pension age access larger
amounts of equity than those accessing their housing wealth after the state pension age. In
other words, those accessing the housing wealth 60-66 tend to face a greater challenge to their
living standards.
The average size of the housing wealth accessed falls at 71. This is because we assume that
households repay their residential mortgage by 70 at the latest.

While much of the use of housing wealth is driven by costs associated with care, these are
averaged out by age and we do not see specific peaks of equity release usage in the 80s or
90s. In other words, while some households face care costs at 79, some face care costs at 80,
81, etc.
Figure 14: The value of housing wealth accessed, and the proportion of households accessing
housing wealth by age
Note: 2025 prices.
We estimate that £23bn of housing wealth could be accessed each year, to
reach higher living standards
The modelling suggests that the UK population of people aged 60 and above would access
approximately £23bn of housing wealth each year, in 2025 prices. This figure is based on the
modelled population in 2040 (adjusted for inflation) and considers only meeting the spending
needs defined in the model. Therefore, this figure does not consider the use of housing wealth
to meet other needs, such as giving inheritance at a time of the consumer’s choosing.
The housing wealth of those aged 60+ is modelled to be approximately £4,300 billion in 2040,
so the annual withdrawal would be approximately 0.5% of total housing wealth.
Without this spending, these households would have a lower standard of living. For some
households, this might also mean that they claim more means-tested benefits.

We estimate that 51% of households might access housing wealth to
reach their desired living standards during later life
Based on the modelling, we estimate that by the age of 90,59
some 51% of households would
have accessed housing wealth to meet spending needs at some point since the age of 60. Our
modelling for the year 2040 suggests that approximately 18% of households aged 60+ might
access their housing wealth in that year. Modelled households often access relatively small
amounts of housing wealth over a number of years, to meet spending needs.60
We find that the financial ‘personas’ with lower income are more likely to access housing wealth
than richer personas, with some 83% of modelled ‘persona 1’ households accessing housing
wealth to meet spending needs.
The modelling assumes people only access housing wealth when required, and the average
amount in any given year is estimated to be £9,000, in 2025 prices. Of those that do access
housing wealth, the median total amount taken over their lifetime is £140,000, from this
modelling.
Modelled as later life lending, including interest accumulation, the model suggests that by age
80 (assuming all households live to be at least 80), some 15% of all households will have later
life lending worth at least 50% of their housing wealth, suggesting that they may have
exhausted the accessible property wealth.
59
In the modelling, nearly everyone who accesses housing wealth has done so for the first time before age 90.
60
We model households accessing housing wealth as and when they need to, without bringing in frictions such as
transaction costs.

Table 2: The proportion of each financial persona that accesses housing wealth
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
83%
Persona 4
72%
Persona 7
60%
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
77%
Persona 5
68%
Persona 8
56%
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
74%
Persona 6
66%
Persona 9
55%
Note: The table does not show the 25% of the population aged 60 and above which is assumed not to access any
housing wealth, which is why the figures average to 68%, rather than 51% of all households.
The gross value added (GVA) of this spending is worth £21bn to the UK
economy
Based on the aggregate spending of £23bn enabled by individuals accessing their housing
wealth, we estimate that the GVA contribution of this spending. We base this estimate on
typical spending patterns of those aged 60 and over. The direct GVA would be some £12bn,
with an additional indirect GVA contribution of £9bn.61
The sum GVA impact of £21bn would
represent approximately 0.7% of total UK GDP in 2040.62
Of course, there are a great many uncertainties surrounding the overall potential economic
impact of households making greater use of housing wealth in later life. For example, how the
greater use of housing wealth might affect spending of future generations. However, it is clear
that the scale of potential spending is significant at a macroeconomic level.
Given the potential role for housing wealth to maintain living standards for people in later life,
we explore how to overcome the barriers to consumers making the most of their housing
wealth. This can be found in section 4, below.
61
We calculate the GVA for the total amount of spending enabled by equity release using the ONS input-output
tables for 2021 (the latest available year) as well as the ONS estimates of spending patterns up to 2023.
62
We have assumed an average UK real GDP growth rate of 1.2% per annum, in line with recent consensus
forecasts. We have not attempted to estimate further ‘induced’ GDP impacts due to the considerable uncertainties
surrounding how overall spending and employment patterns could evolve.

4. Overcoming barriers to consumers
making the most of their housing
wealth
As described in section 3, economic modelling finds that approximately half of households could
use property wealth to help them meet spending needs during later life. Income and savings
can be insufficient to meet spending needs for a range of reasons, including early retirement,
exhausting DC pension pots and care-related cost shocks, and property wealth could help to
cover funding gaps. However, for property wealth to be used in this way, if households choose
to do so, a number of existing barriers would need to be addressed.
In section 4 we cover:
• Demand side barriers to making the most of housing wealth through downsizing or later life
lending, and our recommendations for overcoming key barriers (section 4.01).
• Supply side barriers to making the most of housing wealth through downsizing or later life
lending, and our recommendations for overcoming key barriers (section 4.02).
• A summary of our five recommendations (section 4.03).
4.01 Demand side barriers to making the most of
housing wealth through downsizing or later life
lending
Encouraging and enabling consumers to engage with their later life financial options cannot
happen in a vacuum. There must be a clear understanding of the barriers consumers face in
engaging with later life financial decisions. We analyse demand side barriers through the ‘Four
A’s’ framework, shown in Figure 15.
Consumers need to have the right conversations at the right time. Consumers must engage
with their later life finances at important touchpoints as they go through working life, as they
approach retirement, and as they navigate retirement.
These conversations must guide consumers towards accessible and trusted sources of
information, informing consumers about their options. For consumers to make good decisions
about their later life finances, they must access this information.

Consumers must then assess the nature of the trade-offs they face. For consumers to be
making well-informed decisions, they need to understand the benefits, risks and costs of
different options. Consumers must be able to compare different courses of action regarding
their pensions, investments, savings, and housing wealth. Consumers must understand the
likely impact of these decisions on their ability to give an inheritance and the timing of this
inheritance, and their ability to receive state benefits.
Having made their choices, consumers must then be able to act on their decisions.
Figure 15: The Four A’s framework
Source: Fairer Finance based on FCA and CMA (2018), ‘Helping people get a better deal: Learning lessons about
consumer facing remedies’, and Fletcher, A. (2018), ‘Disclosure and Other Tools for Enhancing Consumer
Engagement and Competition’, Centre for Competition mortgage working paper 18-13.
In the following we focus on the major demand side barriers at each of these four stages. Each
consumer will have their own unique decisions to make, and financial situation to consider.
These barriers serve as a jumping-off point for discussion about how we can best support
consumers in making the best decisions about their later life finances.
We make our recommendations throughout. Any policy changes must be consumer focused.
When considering how to enable the full range of consumers to use their assets in later life to
maintain their living standards, there is no one-size-fits-all remedy. As demonstrated in section
3, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in demographics, wealth, health, desired financial
outcomes, and preferences over inheritance. Our recommendations provide a way to better
meet the diverse range of consumer needs in later life.
Many consumers do not engage with their later life finances, or engage too
late
Some consumers do not consider their housing wealth as part of their thinking
about later life finances

Consumers often mentally divide their financial assets and expected costs into ‘buckets’ to
make sense of their finances. This is called mental accounting, and it enables consumers to
rationalise and simplify financial decisions, such as budgeting.63
Whilst mental accounting can be useful in short-term planning and financial decisions, it might
encourage consumers to mentally silo their assets. Good decisions about later life finances
require consumers to think about their assets in the round, rather than in isolation. Some
consumers may mentally account for pension savings as separate from property wealth. This
prevents them from accessing information surrounding downsizing or later life lending if it is
seen as a separate consideration from pension income.
As shown in section 3, many households would benefit from thinking about their housing
wealth as a way of maintaining their living standards in later life.
Consumers are unaware of their later life lending options
Pension auto-enrolment has been a great success in encouraging consumers to begin to save
for their later life. Whilst an effective tool, it can lead to short-term thinking, driving consumer
inertia and disengagement from later life financial planning.64
This can lead to poor later life
outcomes for consumers, as they delay engaging with financial planning until too late.
One study found that 36% of those aged 45-64 could downsize their home, so this service
should not just focus on those in retirement – but also on those who are in the stage of final
accumulation for later life.65
For example, in section 3, we find that many consumers could benefit from accessing their
housing wealth before they receive the state pension. Accessing housing wealth is therefore
potentially beneficial for some households in their 60s. We also find that some households
would benefit from accessing their housing wealth to maintain living standards in the face of
costs associated with care. Accessing housing wealth can take time, and it is important to make
carefully considered decisions, so it is important that people do not leave it too late to start the
process.
Even for those consumers who do engage with their later life finances, there is a lack of
awareness of their later life lending options. This is an industry acknowledged barrier, with key
stakeholders suggesting that the lack of consumer awareness is a failing of the industry itself.66
63
Silva, E.M., de Lacerda Moreira, R., & Bartolon, P.M. (2023), ‘Mental Accounting and decision making: a systematic
literature review’.
64
Foster, L. (2015), ‘Young People and Attitudes towards Pension Planning’.
65
Barclays (2024), ‘Barclays policy report estimates ‘Right-sizing’ could free up 3.8m UK homes’.
66
FTAdviser (2025), ‘Mortgage advisers failing over-50s on later life lending’.

The lack of awareness drives low intentions among consumers to use their property wealth as a
means of supporting themselves in later life.67
If consumers don’t know that there are viable
options available to them, then discussion on downstream change is redundant. The potential
economic value of later life lending in maintaining later life living standards cannot be realised if
consumers remain unaware of the market in the first place.
Free impartial guidance services do not consistently surface housing wealth as part
of the conversation about later life finances
Government-backed services, such as MoneyHelper and Pension Wise, are invaluable resources
for consumers. They offer free impartial guidance across a variety of products and services.
Consumers can feel safe in the knowledge they are receiving unbiased information about their
options.
Later life lending, by its nature, straddles numerous markets and sectors. In some ways it is
akin to a traditional mortgage product, in others, it can be considered as a retirement option.
Information about later life lending options, such as equity release, can only be found in the
‘Home’ guidance section on the MoneyHelper website.68
This places it alongside information for
first-time buyers and those with traditional mortgages.
The MoneyHelper ‘Money Midlife MOT’ tool is one attempt to encourage people to engage with
their finances.69
The output of the tool is a report with different categories including ‘Your
home’ and ‘Retirement planning’. In the ‘Your home’ section, it suggests that the user should
consider where they will live in retirement. However, there is no mention of housing wealth in
the ‘Retirement planning’ section, potentially reinforcing the silos between different types of
wealth. The report points the user to other sources of information on topics that might be
relevant to the user, based on their answers to the questions. The report does not go as far as
drawing out specific financial insights that are tailored to the user.
This siloing from pension and later life finance options makes it difficult and unintuitive for
consumers to access this information. It may feed into consumers’ mental accounting,
encouraging them to view property wealth as entirely separate from their later life finances.
67
The Lang Cat (2022), ‘House Rules’.
68
See: https://www.moneyhelper.org.uk/en/homes/buying-a-home.
69
See: https://www.moneyhelper.org.uk/en/everyday-money/midlife-mot. Other organisations have also developed
‘midlife MOTs’, for example: https://www.aviva.co.uk/retirement/tools/mid-life-mot-app/.

Recommendation
Government and regulators should develop a personalised service for people, which brings
their pension and housing wealth into a single view. Once pension dashboards are
completed, the government should look to build in housing wealth to give consumers a
clear view of their financial position and options as they enter later life.
Financial journeys throughout adult life do not consistently surface housing wealth
as part of the conversation about later life finances
Many people purchase a standard residential mortgage, and an increasing number of those
mortgages have a term that goes beyond their intended retirement age.70
Where these
mortgages are advised, these conversations provide an opportunity to help people consider
their later life finances. As shown in section 3, the need to make repayments on these
mortgages after the age of 60 is one of the drivers of lower living standards – which can be
addressed through accessing housing wealth.
Most people now have DC pensions. Many people do not engage with their pension
accumulation. As shown in section 3, relatively low pension pots is a key driver of lower living
standards in later life. However, to the extent that people do engage with their pension, they
could be prompted to consider how their pension and housing wealth are part of the same
financial picture.
There are significant emotional barriers to considering the home as an ‘asset’
Among those who are aware of their options to downsize or take later life lending, there remain
significant emotional and psychological barriers to their engagement.
The focus on housing is typically as an accumulating asset, and people may feel that it is less
socially acceptable to use the value of their home in the decumulation journey.71 72
70
See, for example, Steve Webb’s 2024 FOI request.
71
Overton, L., Fox O’Mahony. L., and M. Gibson (2018), ‘The emotional dimension of trading on home in later life:
Experiences of shame, guilt and pride’, in S. Bahun and B. Petric (eds.) ‘Thinking Home: Interdisciplinary Dialogues’,
London: Bloomsbury.
72
Overton, L. and Fox O'Mahony, L. (2016), ‘Understanding Attitudes to Paying for Care amongst Equity Release
Consumers: citizenship, solidarity and the ‘hardworking homeowner’, Journal of Social Policy, pp. 49-67.

One reason why homeownership might be so emotive for consumers is that it is associated with
not only status but improved health and well-being outcomes and self-perceptions.73
This effect
carries over to mental health, with home ownership being associated with a decreased rate of
mental health issues.74
The benefit to individual health and wellbeing is not solely due to home
ownership itself, but is tied to the benefits of local areas such as ready access to social and
health services.
Later life borrowing in particular is often associated with stigma or shame.75
One survey found
that women are more likely than men to feel ‘judged’ for needing to use equity release.76
Taking on debt is also looked at unfavourably cross-culturally, as social norms around living
within your means and financial stability influence consumer attitudes.77
Consumers’ worries about taking on debt are compounded by a lack of trust and
misconceptions about the industry itself. 78
Trust in financial institutions underpins consumers'
financial decisions, encouraging them to engage with their financial options.79
Without it,
consumers are unlikely to begin the journey towards later life lending.
Trust in the later life lending sector is improving.80
However, consumer engagement with later
life lending is still be influenced by historic mis-selling cases and worst-case scenario stories in
the press about the industry's practices.81
Addressing these concerns, and accounting for emotional aspects of accessing home wealth are
an important factor in enabling asset maximisation.
That being said, there are some signs that younger cohorts of homeowners view their housing
wealth differently to older cohorts. A survey in 2023 found that 85% of those aged 25-34
73
Munford, L. A., Fichera, E., & Sutton, M. (2020), ‘Is owning your home good for your health? Evidence from
exogenous variations in subsidies in England’, Economics and human biology, 39, 100903.
74
Rahman, S., & Steeb, D. R. (2024), ‘Unlocking the door to mental wellness: exploring the impact of
homeownership on mental health issues’, BMC public health, 24(1), 3479.
75
For example, Fox O'Mahony, L. and L. Overton (2015), ‘Asset-based Welfare, Equity Release and the Meaning of
the Owned Home’, Housing Studies, 30(3).
76
Standard Life Home Finance (2023), ‘UK over 45s less concerned about equity release, but women are more
cautious than men’.
77
Martinez-Marquina, A, & Shi, M. (2022), ‘The Opportunity Cost of Debt Aversion’, American Economic Review, 114,
1140-1172.
78
Sharma et al. (2022). ‘The UK equity release market: Views from the regulatory authorities, product providers and
advisors’.
79
Xu, X. (2020). ‘Trust and financial inclusion: A cross-country study’.
80
Sharma et al. (2022), ‘The UK equity release market: Views from the regulatory authorities, product providers and
advisors’.
81
FT Adviser (2017), ‘Scale of equity release mis-advice scandal revealed’.

would be interested in accessing their housing wealth in future – compared to 30% of those
aged 75+.82
Recommendation
Government and regulators should normalise the use of housing wealth to maintain living
standards in later life. MoneyHelper and Pension Wise should embed housing wealth as a
central part of later life advice and guidance. Government and public agencies should invest
in public information campaigns to break down the stigma and normalise the use of housing
wealth in retirement.
Many consumers do not access information about later life finances that
surfaces housing wealth as part of the picture
Consumers often receive advice which does not cover the whole picture of later life
finances
For the reasons covered in section 2.05, silos in advice are likely to lead to consumer detriment,
as (in practice) the silos reduce the likelihood that consumers receive the most suitable advice.
The current market design is likely to lead to some degree of path dependency, whereby the
course of action recommended to the customer is affected by the type of adviser the customer
first contacted.
Gender inequality is also relevant to considerations about advice. In general, women are less
likely to receive financial advice than men.83
This ’gender advice gap’ has also been found
among people considering equity release, with women less likely to have ever spoken to an
independent financial adviser before.84
Our recommendations for improving the distribution of equity release mortgages are covered in
the discussion of the supply side of the market, in section 4.02.
82
Equity Release Council (2024), ‘No brick left unturned: three in five UK homeowners look to property wealth to
prop up retirement dream’.
83
Intelliflo (2025), ‘The who, what, where of advice: intelliflo’s 2025 Advice Map of the UK’.
84
Standard Life Home Finance (2022), ‘Standard Life Home Finance Reveals the Equity Release Gender Divide’.

Some consumers find it difficult to assess their later life options
The trade-offs involved in later life lending products are complex
Well-informed decisions about later life lending products involve weighing up trade-offs. For
example, between enjoying a higher standard of living and the ability to give an inheritance.
These trade-offs are nuanced, as they depend on expectations around life expectancy, house
prices, and other long-term factors.
Consumer understanding of these trade-offs is affected by behavioural biases. These biases
arise from the way in which we make financial decisions in the face of complexity. Biases are
not necessarily unreasonable. However, biases can lead to people making financial decisions
that are not in their own best interests.
Consumers must be able to understand and assess loan-to-value statistics, interest rates, and
compounding effects in making their decisions. Consumers who lack knowledge or confidence
in understanding financial products can be unable to understand and access beneficial financial
products.85
In England, 24% of adults have very low numeracy levels, meaning they have
trouble with any form of numerical or graphical calculations.86
Without support, many
consumers approaching later life are likely to struggle to understand compound interest.
Later life lending trade-offs also involve a consideration of risk, which can also be hard to
assess. The ability to assess and tolerate financial risk is influenced by factors including age and
financial literacy, with low financial literacy associated with a lower willingness to take on risk.87
Well-informed decisions about later life lending products also involve serious consideration of
the whole range of available options. These options include downsizing, other types of
mortgage, and a different decumulation pattern for pensions. This is unlikely to be a swift
decision.
This combination of factors is why the advised nature of the sale is important. The equity
release adviser should be well-placed to help consumers make well-informed decisions that
they do not regret.
85
Hastings, J., & Mitchell, O. S. (2018), ‘How Financial Literacy and Impatience Shape Retirement Wealth and
Investment Behaviors’.
86
Gal, I. (2024), ’Adult education in mathematics and numeracy: a scoping review of recent research’.
87
Nolte, J., & Hanoch, Y. (2024), ‘Adult age differences in risk perception and risk taking’, Current opinion in
psychology, 55, 101746. Bayar, Y., Sezgin, H. F., Öztürk, Ö. F., & Şaşmaz, M. Ü. (2020), ‘Financial literacy and
financial risk tolerance of individual investors: Multinomial logistic regression approach’, Sage Open, 10(3).

Downsizing involves significant transaction costs, reducing the value of the housing
wealth that is accessed by consumers
One study estimated that – in 2014-15 – the median wealth released by downsizing was only
£14,000 (9% of the property value), with those aged 80+ releasing a median wealth of
£49,000 (25% of the property value).88
These sums were before any costs associated with
moving, such as stamp duty, legal fees, estate agent fees, and removal costs. These costs can
often be in the range of £5,000-£10,000.89
Even allowing for 10 years of house price inflation, the transaction costs associated with
downsizing are likely to consume a significant amount of the value. Both the Mayhew Review
and UK Finance have recommended changes to stamp duty to reduce the costs of
downsizing.90
Recommendation
Government should lower the financial cost of downsizing by reducing stamp duty for
people in later life. By facilitating more downsizing and freeing up family homes, the
government can recoup some of the lost tax revenues through an increase in upsizing
stimulated by greater supply of larger housing stock.
Some consumers in later life are reluctant to move away from their existing social
networks, meaning that downsizing properties must be well-located
Some consumers in later life rely on their social networks for support. Moreover, many in later
life are active contributors to their local community and may wish to remain part of their local
community. These consumers are unlikely to be willing to move away from their social
networks, in order to downsize.
This means that suitable downsize properties must be located nearby, in order for them to
consider downsizing. The supply of suitable downsize properties may be insufficient to meet
their needs (see section 0).
88
IFS (2018), ‘The use of housing wealth at older ages’.
89
The Lang Cat (2022). ‘House Rules’.
90
Mayhew, L. (2022), ‘The Mayhew Review – Future-proofing retirement living: Easing the care and housing crises’.
and UK Finance (2024), ‘Homes We Need’.

Later life lending involves transaction costs, reducing the value of the housing
wealth that is accessed by consumers
Transaction costs are not unique to later life lending. However, the transaction costs of later life
lending can be a sizeable proportion of smaller loans. The combination of adviser commission,
legal fees, and a product fee can be in the range of £2,500-£3,000.91
There are barriers which prevent consumers from taking action
The final barriers consumers face are those that prevent them from acting on their desire to
take out a later life lending product. These impact consumers after they have begun the
journey towards later life lending, engaged with and assessed their options, and decided it is a
viable option for them.
Downsizing can be difficult and time-consuming
The downsizing process is not simple for consumers. They must find a buyer for their home
and find a new home to buy. This process often takes months and can be subject to
frustrations such as chains falling through. Moving home is disruptive.
As a result, people in later life can require support to downsize, for example, from their family.
If this support is not forthcoming, then people may not downsize their home.
Consumers with families often face emotional and social challenges to later life
lending
Many consumers who are engaging with later life lending options are not doing so with only
themselves to consider. Those with children and grandchildren may feel that they need to
consider not only their own needs but those of their loved ones.92
Whilst many children and
family members of consumers may be accepting of using property value as an asset, there is a
significant number who strongly disapprove.93
The decision consumers must make is further complicated if their children live in the property
with them. In these cases, where the customer purchases an equity release mortgage,
dependents and family members may be required to sign waivers acknowledging that they do
not have a right to continue to live in the property after the death of the property owner.
91
The Lang Cat (2022). ‘House Rules’.
92
FCA (2022), ‘Equity release and alternative products’.
93
The Lang Cat (2022), ‘House Rules’.

These issues may delay or prevent consumers from engaging with later life lending options
entirely. They may feel unable emotionally or practically to include their family in their decision,
discouraging them from continuing with the purchase.
Later life lending involves several stages and different advisers
Taking out a later life lending product is not as simple as filling out a form. It is a relatively
high-friction process that can take some months to complete. Equity release also involves
receiving separate legal advice. While this friction and time delay may support well-informed
consumer decisions, it may also lead to some consumers dropping out the journey.94
4.02 Supply side barriers to making the most of housing
wealth through downsizing or later life lending
The supply of housing stock is not sufficient to meet the needs of people in
later life
There is insufficient supply of housing stock
As has been well-documented by the Mayhew Review and others, there is insufficient housing
targeted at meeting the needs of people looking to downsize in later life. Low supply inevitably
leads to higher prices, which means that the value released by downsizing is limited.
Housing targeted at later life is not homogeneous, as people in later life have a variety of needs
and expectations. For example:
• Smaller housing with fewer rooms and less outside space to maintain.
• Accessible housing with, for example, step-free access to the property, and around the
property.
• Retirement communities which provide a social network as well as differing levels of
support.
The geographic distribution of this housing is key, as people are less likely to downsize if it
means leaving their social network.
There is currently insufficient consumer protection for those living in retirement
properties
94
Sharma et al. (2022), ‘The UK equity release market: Views from the regulatory authorities, product providers and
advisors’.

The specialist housing market in the UK is small by international comparison and suffers from
reputational issues. For example, recent media reports have focused on the poor resale
performance of retirement housing, with high service charges mentioned as a contributing
factor.95
This can lead to ‘accidental’ asset decumulation, as the lower resale value is not
expected. This goes some way to explaining why equity release providers are unlikely to lend
against retirement properties, cutting off a route for older people to access any of their housing
wealth which tied up in retirement housing.96
In recent years, a new generation of ‘integrated retirement communities’ have started bringing
models more commonly found overseas. For example, in New Zealand, properties are offered
for lower upfront prices and with lower ongoing costs – in return for a ‘deferred management
fee’.97
This is a form of ‘intentional’ asset decumulation, with older people using a proportion of
their housing wealth to make retirement housing more affordable. This model has contributed
to 14% of the over 75s in New Zealand living in a retirement village, over double the proportion
of older homeowners in the UK living in retirement housing.98
While growing in popularity in the UK, this ‘intentional’ asset decumulation model – typically
found in housing-with-care retirement communities – is held back by a lack of sector specific
regulation, creating uncertainty for providers of housing with care communities.99
Moving to housing-with-care schemes has other benefits, with Homes England estimating the
financial savings to the NHS at £1,840 per resident per year.100
By comparison, the financial
savings to the NHS of traditional retirement housing was estimated at £8 per resident per year.
These benefits to the public purse have led to attempts to grow the specialist housing market
in the UK in recent years, with the independent Taskforce on Older People’s Housing
recommending increasing consumer protection, addressing the issue of poor resale values, and
putting a working group in place to study the feasibility of new tenure models akin to those
found overseas.101
95
The Times (2025), ‘Families lose ‘life savings’ on developer’s retirement flats’.
96
See: https://www.equityreleasecouncil.com/what-is-equity-release/faq/why-are-some-types-of-property-not-
acceptable-to-equity-release-providers/.
97
Gunn, M. (2025), ‘New Zealand senior living favours lease-like model’.
98
Collyns, J. (2025), ‘How the New Zealand retirement village model might work for the UK’. Older People’s Housing
Taskforce (2024), ‘Final report of the Older People’s Housing Taskforce, for the Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government and Department of Health and Social Care’
99
Countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have dedicated acts of parliament to regulate
these markets, such as the Retirement Villages Act 2003 in New Zealand.
100
Homes England (2024), ‘Measuring Social Value – Paper 4: Measuring the Wellbeing and Fiscal Impacts of
Housing for Older People’.
101
Older People’s Housing Taskforce (2024), ‘Final report of the Older People’s Housing Taskforce, for the Ministry of
Housing, Communities and Local Government and Department of Health and Social Care’

Efforts to grow the downsizer and specialist housing market in the UK are therefore likely to
involve addressing issues around the ‘accidental’ asset decumulation of retirement housing. As
recommended by the Taskforce, this could also involve further regulation (which would be
welcomed by trade bodies working in the sector).102
Ultimately, this should encourage more people in later life to access their housing wealth by
downsizing into retirement properties. Further, innovative tenure models might open up new
ways for people living in retirement properties to also access some of their housing wealth
through later life lending.
Recommendation
Government should facilitate a substantial increase in the supply of suitable and desirable
retirement properties, located in the communities where people in later life wish to live.
This should also include a better framework for consumer protection, including looking at
innovative tenure models that promote the use of housing wealth to improve affordability
and health outcomes.
The manufacturing of later life lending products: limited competition
between different types of business model is restricting product innovation
The major funders of equity release mortgages in the UK tend to be insurers, which are
matching the timing of their assets (i.e. equity release) against that of their liabilities (e.g.
annuities). This business model is subject to prudential regulation. Moving to more dynamic or
flexible lifetime mortgage products might require alternative funding models.
While there is competition between insurers to provide equity release mortgages, the
similarities between their business models contribute to there being less variation in the design
of these products than we might ordinarily expect in a competitive market.
In particular, consumers may benefit from a wider range of equity release products such as:
• Automated or semi-automated income lifetime mortgages.
• Lifetime mortgages which are more flexible and do not have early repayment charges.
102
The Associated Retirement Community Operators (2025), ‘ARCO statement on today's story in The Times’.

• Annuities directly funded by lifetime mortgages.
• Short-term equity release.
• Home equity line of credit (HELOC).
The later life market is innovating, introducing more products that include drawdown
facilities.103
As noted in section 2.05, there are some examples of more innovative products in
the market. However, without a diversification of funding models, the amount of innovation in
product design may be limited. Other forms of funding are prevalent in other countries, such as
the USA or Australia.104
Product innovation and consumer demand are linked. Providers will only invest in building new
propositions if they expect there to be consumer demand for those products. Removing the
demand-side barriers to later life lending and reforming the distribution of later life lending will
unlock greater demand, and stimulate more product innovation.
The distribution of later life lending: silos are restricting the provision of
customer-centric advice
The fragmentation of advice provision is driven by regulation
The silos between standard residential mortgages, equity release mortgages, and financial
advice are embedded in the FCA Handbook. All these types of advisers must be authorised by
the FCA.
• Standard residential mortgages and equity release mortgages are regulated under the
Mortgages and Home Finance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (MCOB).
• MCOB contains additional rules for equity release mortgages (MCOB 8 and MCOB 9). In
practice, this separation within MCOB means that mortgage brokers can advise on the sale
of standard residential mortgages to people in later life – including retirement interest only
mortgages – without any consideration for whether lifetime mortgages would be more
suitable for the customer.
• Financial advice is regulated under the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS). Financial
advisers must obtain information about the customer’s property ownership (if any). While
financial advisers can then explicitly consider the customer’s housing wealth as part of their
advice, there is no regulatory requirement to do so. There is also no regulatory requirement
103
About Consulting (2023), ‘Later Life Lending: Great Expectations’.
104
Hutchison et al. (2024) ‘Equity Release Mortgages in the UK: Regional Characteristics of Demand and Supply’.

for financial advisers to disclose whether they are considering the customer’s housing
wealth.105
The silos in the FCA Handbook are mirrored in the professional qualifications held by different
types of advisers.
• Standard residential mortgage brokers must hold a level three qualification about
mortgages. There is no mandatory continuous professional learning (CPD) to maintain the
qualification.106
• There is an additional qualification for those wishing to advise on equity release.107
There is
no mandatory CPD to maintain the qualification.
• Financial advisers must hold a level four qualification about financial advice, and undertake
CPD to maintain this qualification.108
If a financial adviser wishes to advise on the sale of an
equity release mortgage then they must also hold the mortgages level three qualification
and the additional equity release qualification.
FCA regulation of adviser remuneration also varies by sector.
• Mortgage brokers are remunerated through one-off fees paid directly by the customer
and/or commission paid by the lender. The one-off nature of the remuneration tends to lead
to a transactional relationship between the adviser and the customer.
• Financial advisers are remunerated through fees paid directly by the customer. These fees
can include an upfront fee and a fee for ongoing advice. In these cases, the advisers have a
less transactional, longer-term relationship with the customer.
105
106
107
108

Recommendation
The FCA should reform the regulation around later life advice, to break down silos and
ensure all consumers are supported to maximise the use of all their assets as they approach
retirement. Specifically, the FCA should:
• Ensure that equity release advisers are obliged to consider all forms of later life lending.
• Ensure that advice on mainstream mortgages to people from the age of 50 onwards
explicitly considers retirement planning, including later life lending options. This may be
through referring people to retirement dashboards, midlife MOTs, or other professional
advisers which bring together all sources of retirement wealth.
• Build more explicit consideration of housing wealth into the FCA rulebook, such that
financial advisers assess the role that housing wealth may play for customers in funding
their retirement.
• Allow for targeted support to assist consumers in considering their use of housing wealth
as they plan for retirement (whilst ensuring that equity release remains an advised sale).
It is unlikely to be practical for all standard residential mortgage brokers to become equity
release advisers or retirement planners. However, through retirement dashboards and
targeted support we would anticipate that there will be light touch ways to nudge
consumers to think about their retirement finances. Given a growing proportion of
consumers are likely to still be repaying a standard residential mortgage in their 50s and
60s, remortgaging is a valuable touchpoint at which consumers can be prompted to think
about their finances in later life.
There are barriers to standard residential mortgage brokers and financial advisers
starting to advise on equity release mortgages
One way of reducing the fragmentation of advice would be for more mortgage brokers and
financial advisers to start advising on equity release. There are several barriers to this,
including the following.
• Some standard residential mortgage brokers and financial advisers view equity
release advice as more regulatory risky. This is partly because of the historic equity

release mis-selling scandals dating back to the 1980s.109
It is also partly because of the way
that the FCA has historically been heard to talk about equity release mortgages, i.e. as a last
resort for customers rather than a useful way for some customers to access their housing
wealth. There is also a concern about long-term Financial Ombudsman Service cases, raised
by the family of the customer upon their death. According to Equity Release Council data,
the FOS upheld rate on equity release mortgages (23%) was slightly lower than that of
residential mortgages (29%) in 2024. Nevertheless, these regulatory risk concerns persist.
• The remuneration model for equity release mortgages is different to standard
residential mortgages and financial advice. Adviser remuneration should ensure that
there is an economic benefit for advisers and brokers to give high-quality advice which suits
consumers’ needs. However, the nature and level of commission may be a barrier to others
entering the market.
• Equity release mortgage sales typically generate a higher percentage commission than
standard residential mortgages.110
Whether this equates to a higher commission in £
terms depends on the size of the mortgage. There may be legitimate reasons for this, for
example if it takes an adviser longer to advise on an equity release mortgage than a
standard residential mortgage (it is beyond the scope of this study to assess whether this
is the case). Nevertheless, some standard residential mortgage brokers may be
concerned about apparent bias if they recommend the product which has a higher
commission.
• Many financial advisers typically focus on products which do not earn them a commission
from the product provider. Some financial advisers may be concerned about apparent
bias if they recommend a decumulation strategy that generates a commission payment.
• Advising on equity release mortgages might require investment in new
technology. Some standard residential mortgage brokers and financial advisers operate
back-office systems which do not currently include equity release to the same extent as
standard residential mortgages or other sources of wealth. For example, sourcing systems or
CRM systems. While there are innovators in the market, there remains a technology barrier
for some advisers.
109
A summary of the historic issues can be found in The Lang Cat (2022), ‘House Rules’.
110
Council of Mortgage Lenders (2017) ‘Later life borrowing New mindsets: old silos’.

Recommendation
The FCA should use the levers of the Consumer Duty to ensure the UK has a vibrant and
competitive later life lending market, which offers fair value to consumers and creates the
conditions for product innovation. In advice markets, the FCA should use the Consumer
Duty to eliminate product bias – and ensure that consumers are supported to achieve the
best outcomes for their needs, regardless of which part of the advice market they are
engaging with.
4.03 Summary of recommendations
Given the potential role for housing wealth to maintain living standards for people in later life,
we make five key recommendations, which are summarised as follows.
1. Government should facilitate a substantial increase in the supply of suitable and
desirable retirement properties, located in the communities where people in
later life wish to live. This should also include a better framework for consumer
protection, including looking at innovative tenure models that promote the use of housing
wealth to improve affordability and health outcomes.
2. Government should lower the financial cost of downsizing by reducing stamp
duty for people in later life. By facilitating more downsizing and freeing up family
homes, the government can recoup some of the lost tax revenues through an increase in
upsizing stimulated by greater supply of larger housing stock.
3. Government and regulators should normalise the use of housing wealth to
maintain living standards in later life. MoneyHelper and Pension Wise should embed
housing wealth as a central part of later life advice and guidance. Government and public
agencies should invest in public information campaigns to break down the stigma and
normalise the use of housing wealth in retirement.
4. Government and regulators should develop a personalised service for people,
which brings their pension and housing wealth into a single view. Once pension
dashboards are completed, the government should look to build in housing wealth to give
consumers a clear view of their financial position and options as they enter later life.

5. The FCA should reform the regulation around later life advice, to break down
silos and ensure all consumers are supported to maximise the use of all their
assets as they approach retirement. Specifically, the FCA should:
a. Ensure that equity release advisers are obliged to consider all forms of later life lending.
b. Ensure that advice on mainstream mortgages to people from the age of 50 onwards
explicitly considers retirement planning, including later life lending options. This may be
through referring people to retirement dashboards, midlife MOTs, or other professional
advisers which bring together all sources of retirement wealth.
c. Build more explicit consideration of housing wealth into the FCA rulebook, such that
financial advisers assess the role that housing wealth may play for customers in funding
their retirement.
d. Allow for targeted support to assist consumers in considering their use of housing
wealth as they plan for retirement (whilst ensuring that equity release remains an
advised sale).
e. Use the levers of the Consumer Duty to ensure the UK has a vibrant and competitive
later life lending market, which offers fair value to consumers and creates the conditions
for product innovation. In advice markets, the FCA should use the Consumer Duty to
eliminate product bias – and ensure that consumers are supported to achieve the best
outcomes for their needs, regardless of which part of the advice market they are
engaging with.
It is unlikely to be practical for all standard residential mortgage brokers to become equity
release advisers or retirement planners. However, through retirement dashboards and
targeted support we would anticipate that there will be light touch ways to nudge
consumers to think about their retirement finances. Given a growing proportion of
consumers are likely to still be repaying a standard residential mortgage in their 50s and
60s, remortgaging is a valuable touchpoint at which consumers can be prompted to think
about their finances in later life.

5. Technical appendix
Our modelling approach
Our high-level modelling approach is based
on reasonable and conservative
assumptions and is described below.
First, we calibrate the model by defining the
financial personas and scenarios that they
face.
Second, we model the economic outcomes
for every combination of persona and
scenario over the course of their lives. We
model this for two counterfactuals: where
consumers do not access their property
wealth to meet their spending needs; and
where consumers do access their property
wealth to meet their spending needs.
Third, we compare the results to see the
effect of consumers accessing property
wealth to meet their spending needs. We
aggregate the results for each household to
see economy-wide figures. Based on these
economy-wide figures, we also estimate the
Gross Value Added (GVA) of this spending.
The modelled cohort
We model the outcomes for the cohort of
people aged 50 years old in 2025. In 2040,
this cohort will be 65 years old.
Our aggregate economic numbers refer to
the year 2040. We assume that those aged
60 years old in 2040 will behave in the
same way as the modelled cohort when the
modelled cohort is 60 years old. Similarly,
we assume that those aged 61 years old in
2040 will behave in the same way as the
modelled cohort when the modelled cohort
is 61 years old (and so on).
Modelling at a household level
We model people as households, by which
we mean family units which are either
couples or singles, and their dependents.
We use life expectancy forecasts to
estimate the point at which couple
households become single households.

Calibrating the financial personas
We model nine financial personas. These personas are set according to their
property wealth and their income.
Table A1: Financial personas – property wealth for a couple aged 50 in 2025
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
£148,644
Persona 4
£233,583
Persona 7
£353,914
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
£218,011
Persona 5
£342,588
Persona 8
£519,073
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
£237,830
Persona 6
£373,733
Persona 9
£566,252
Table A2: Financial personas – property wealth for a single aged 50 in 2025
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
£113,252
Persona 4
£176,957
Persona 7
£268,116
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
£166,103
Persona 5
£259,537
Persona 8
£415,259
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
£181,204
Persona 6
£283,131
Persona 9
£453,009
Property wealth and income are to some extent correlated. Personas 1, 4, and 7 have a lower
level of property wealth than personas 2, 5, and 8, respectively. Similarly, personas 3, 6, and 9

have a higher level of property wealth than personas 2, 5, and 8, respectively. In this way,
persona 9 has the highest level of property wealth, while persona 1 has the lowest.
We model the outcomes for 75% of the population. We base the personas on the 25th
, 50th
,
and 75th
percentiles of the wealth and income distribution.
Setting the scenarios
For each persona, we model a number of different scenarios. These scenarios reflect several
exogenous factors or financial choices that they could make. The scenarios were chosen to
illustrate the range of possible financial outcomes, and do not represent every scenario that
could possibly occur.
We model every single possible combination of these scenarios for every persona, for multiple
life expectancy scenarios. This is a total of 9,720 combinations. In section 0 we explain how we
then aggregate these scenarios to show the population-wide outcomes.
The scenarios are as follows.
• Whether the household is a couple or a single at 60 years old.
• If the household is a couple, the age at which the first person dies. This age is a random
variable, following the distribution of life expectancy.
• Whether the first person in the household experiences a cost shock associated with long
term care. If they do experience a cost shock, then this age is set randomly – following the
distribution of life expectancy. It is difficult to calibrate this cost shock for 2040 given a
paucity of data on current care costs and uncertainty over the future level of state support
for funding care. Our approach reduces the cost of care once savings have been depleted, to
reflect the availability of means-tested government funding. Our approach should be
interpreted as a general cost shock. For example, if the household needs to pay for care in
their own home or pay for home improvements (i.e. adaptations to make their home more
accessible for someone with care needs).111
111
Taking a conservative approach, we modelled two scenarios for the cost shock associated with care. Both
scenarios are estimated based the household paying for the provision of different levels of care in their own home
for three years, assuming a relatively high level of local authority funding towards this cost (i.e. the local authority
pays 60-80% of the cost, once the household’s assets reach the level required for local authority support). We
understand that local authorities currently vary in terms of whether they allow households to ‘top-up’ the cost of care
in their own home using equity release. We have only considered the use of equity release to pay for care costs by
couples, then weighted this outcome to reflect the full population, reflecting current policies. Ultimately, our
estimates should be considered only as an indicative approach for future care costs.

• The age at which the household stops working. To show the range of likely outcomes, this is
either 60 years old, or 67 years old.
• Whether the household has an outstanding residential mortgage at 55 years old. If there is
an outstanding mortgage at 55 years old, we assume that it is 30% loan to value (LTV), and
that it is fully repaid when the household is 70 years old.
• The type of pension income that the household has access to, or chooses. We model five
alternatives:
• a DB pension (increasing);
• a 50% DB and 50% DC pension (joint, level, no guarantee);
• a DC annuity (joint, level, no guarantee);
• a DC drawdown where the household withdraws 4.00% of the initial pot each year
(uprated for inflation); and
• a DC drawdown where the household withdraws 8.00% of the initial pot each year
(uprated for inflation).112
• The market returns (nominal) on the drawdown pot after fees are 2.50%, 4.50%, or 6.50%.
The age at which the single dies, or the age at which the second person in a couple dies is
taken into account when aggregating the impact across the population (see section 0).
Modelling spending needs over time
We start by applying the PLSA living standards. We assume that low-income and mid-income
households target the PLSA moderate level of spending, and that high-income households
target PLSA comfortable level of spending. We uprate the PLSA standards for inflation.
However, the PLSA standards are not realistic targets for some households. This is particularly
likely for households where the relevant PLSA standard is above their pre-retirement income.
We therefore apply a cap on the desired level of spending in the model. This is set to be 80%
of the pre-retirement income (which is then uprated for inflation) for lower income households
112
The 2022-23 distribution of drawdown withdrawals can be found here: https://www.fca.org.uk/data/retirement-
income-market-data-2022-23.

and 70% of income for medium and higher income households. This reflects the fact that
households can expect their spending to be lower in retirement.
Once a household has retired, we inflate the desired level of income by less than CPI. This
conservative assumption reflects the fact that – as people in the modelled cohort age – their
desired spending is expected to reduce in real terms.
As a conservative assumption, we assume that the desired living standards includes all of the
uses for later life lending which involve a material element of choice. For example, going on
holiday or on home improvements. We also assume that this includes giving money to their
loved ones before they die (i.e. passing on inheritance early). To the extent that people wish to
give more money earlier to their loved one, this could increase the use of later life lending.
In addition to the desired living standards, we include the cost of repaying a mortgage and a
cost shock associated with requiring long-term care.
Modelling financial resources over time
Pension income
Defined benefit pension income
Based on their final salary, we model the defined benefit income. For this calculation, we
estimate the number of years the person has been accumulating their DB pension, and multiply
this by 1/60. We then assume that DB income increases by CPI each year.
Defined contribution pension income
Based on ONS data covering pension wealth, we estimate the pension wealth for low-income,
mid-income, and high-income households at age 50. We model how this will increase over
time, based on market returns and additional pension contributions. This provides the pension
pot size for people at the age that they retire.
Some households choose to use their entire DC pot to purchase an annuity income at the point
of retirement. We assume they purchase a level annuity with no guarantee.
Some households choose to use their entire DC pot as a drawdown income. Some of these
households draw down 4% of their initial pot size each year (uprated for CPI), while others
draw down 8% of their initial pot size each year (uprated for CPI). This is held constant
(regardless of the spending needs).

Savings
Each persona has a given level of savings at age 50. We infer this based on ONS data on
financial wealth.
Table A3: Financial personas – financial wealth for a couple aged 50 in 2025
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
£112
Persona 4
£8,973
Persona 7
£39,930
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
£673
Persona 5
£14,133
Persona 8
£62,923
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
£1,682
Persona 6
£24,900
Persona 9
£95,899
Note: The distribution of financial wealth by persona is inferred based on ONS data on financial wealth. The 2025
figures are then uprated for inflation in the model.

Table A4: Financial personas – financial wealth for a single aged 50 in 2025
Property wealth:
low
Property wealth:
mid
Property wealth:
high
Pension
income: low
Persona 1
£56
Persona 4
£4,487
Persona 7
£19,965
Pension
income: mid
Persona 2
£336
Persona 5
£7,066
Persona 8
£31,462
Pension
income: high
Persona 3
£841
Persona 6
£12,450
Persona 9
£47,950
Note: The distribution of financial wealth by persona is inferred based on ONS data on financial wealth. The 2025
figures are then uprated for inflation in the model.
After the age of 50, we assume that those retiring at the age of 60 save 20% of their income
each year, while those retiring at 67 save 10% of their income each year. In this way, people
reach retirement with significantly more savings than they have at the age of 50.
Accessing property wealth
We assume that households in later life only access their property wealth once they have
exhausted their savings. This is because we have assumed that the interest rate on savings is
lower than the interest rate on a lifetime mortgage.
We do not assume that, if the household accesses their property wealth, they repay the
residential mortgage immediately. This is because we have assumed that the interest rate on
the lifetime mortgage is higher than the interest rate on the residential mortgage (i.e. it would
be relatively costly for the household to do this). We recognise that currently households would
likely take out the full amount to pay off the mortgage in one payment, but we maintain our
transaction cost-free approach as we wish to understand optimal use of assets.
Other assumptions
The model relies on a number of assumptions. These assumptions are not forecasts. Rather,
the assumptions are intended to provide reasonable and conservative estimate of the extent to
which consumers in later life may need to access their property wealth to meet their spending
needs.

As explained above, we have made reasonable and conservative assumptions. This means that
our assumptions are based on historic data and logical inferences. Where there is judgement
required, we have erred on the side of increasing income after retirement and reducing
spending needs after retirement. This means that our estimates of the need for later life
lending are conservative.
The tables below provide the assumptions, by category.
Table A5: Assumptions over inflation
Factor Assumption Notes
Consumer price index (CPI) 2.00% Based on the Bank of
England’s target.
Property price inflation 3.00% A conservative assumption,
at the lower end of historic
property price inflation. This
is also appropriate given the
dilapidation of properties
own by the same owner for
extended periods of time.
Wage growth for people
aged 50 and above
2.00% Based on no real wage
growth for this age group.
Growth in the state pension 2.00% Assumed to be the same as
CPI.
Table A6: Assumptions over later life lending
The maximum amount a
consumer can borrow under
a lifetime mortgage
50% loan to value (LTV) Reflecting the maximum LTV
often offered to customers.
The APR on a lifetime
mortgage
7.00% A conservative assumption,
based on ERC data on
lifetime mortgage APRs.

Table A7: Assumptions over residential mortgage
The LTV of a residential
mortgage at age 55
30% A conservative assumption,
broadly in line with historic
Wealth and Assets Survey
data.
The APR on a residential
mortgage of 30% loan to
value (LTV)
4.62% Based on Bank of England
data for APRs on residential
mortgages with loan to value
below 60%.
The annual repayment rate
on a residential mortgage,
from age 50 to age 70.
9.00% Based on repaying the
mortgage at the age of 70.
Table A8: Assumptions over saving
Savings accumulation at ages
50-59, if retiring at age 60
20% A conservative assumption
based on how people
nearing retirement may save
their income (in addition to
their pension contributions).
Savings accumulation at ages
50-66, if retiring at age 67
10% A conservative assumption
based on how people
nearing retirement may save
their income (in addition to
their pension contributions).
Returns on savings 3.00% A conservative assumption,
based on possible interest
rates available on liquid
savings (i.e. not
investments).

Table A9: Assumptions over working hours
Working hours when aged
60-64, as a proportion of
working hours when aged
50-59
94.59% Based on the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings, Office
for National Statistics.
Working hours when aged
65-66, as a proportion of
working hours when aged
50-59
59.46% Based on the Labour Force
Survey, Office for National
Statistics.
Table A10: Assumptions over pension
Age at which the state
pension applies
67 years old Based on the current state
pension age.
Years of DB accumulation if
retire at 60 years old
30 years Based on someone
accumulating a DB pension
for most of their working life.
Years of DB accumulation if
retire at 67 years old
37 years Based on someone
accumulating a DB pension
for most of their working life.
DB fraction of final salary,
per year of accumulation
1/60 Based on common market
practice.
DC contribution rate from
age 50 onwards (sum of
employer and employee
contributions)
8.00% A conservative assumption
based on the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings, Office
for National Statistics.
Defined contribution pension
pot size for low-income
personas
£13,495 Based on 25th
percentile of
ONS pension wealth data.
We have made an upward
adjustment to take account
of the fact that some people
with smaller DC pots also
have a DB pension, and

therefore these DC pots
should be excluded from this
figure.
pot size for mid-income
personas
£32,191 Based on median of ONS
pension wealth data.
pot size for high-income
personas
£94,844 Based on 75th
percentile of
ONS pension wealth data.
Annuity rate for couple at
age 60 (joint life, level, no
guarantee)
6.38% Based on current annuity
rates for the age 60, as
published by Hargreaves
Lansdown.
Annuity rate for couple at
age 67 (joint life, level, no
guarantee)
rates for the age 65 and 70,
as published by Hargreaves
Lansdown.
Annuity rate for single at age
60 (joint life, level, no
guarantee)
rates for the age 60, as
published by Hargreaves
Lansdown.
Annuity rate for single at age
67 (joint life, level, no
guarantee)
rates for the age 65 and 70,
as published by Hargreaves
Lansdown.
Table A11: Assumptions over retirement age
Low-income couple One retires at 60, and one at
67, or both retire at 67
Low-income couples are
likely to suffer a significant
drop in living standards if
both retire before the state
pension age. However,
health is still a driver of early
retirement. Therefore, we
assume that, if one person
retires at 60, the other
person keeps working until

they reach the state pension
age. This is a conservative
assumption.
Mid-income couple Both retire at 60, or both
retire at 67.
We assume that the couple
retires together. This
assumption is to show the
range of likely outcomes.
High-income couple Both retire at 60, or both
retire at 67.
We assume that the couple
retires together. This
assumption is to show the
range of likely outcomes.
Low-income single Retires at 60 or 67. This assumption is to show
the range of likely outcomes.
Mid-income single Retires at 60 or 67. This assumption is to show
High-income single Retires at 60 or 67. This assumption is to show
Table A12: Assumptions over relative income for couples
The income of a low-income
couple
2x low-income single A reasonable assumption
that low-income couples
constitute two low-income
singles.
The income of a mid-income
couple
2x mid-income single A reasonable assumption
mid- income couples
constitute two mid- income
singles.
The income of a high-income
couple
1x high income single plus 1x
mid-income single
A reasonable assumption
that high-income couples
constitute one high-income
single and one mid-income
single.

Table A13: Assumptions over spending needs
Factor Assumption
PLSA target expenditure for
those with low income
Moderate Based on the assumption
that low-income households
would target PLSA moderate
if achievable.
those with mid income
Moderate Based on the assumption
that mid-income households
would target PLSA moderate
if achievable.
those with high income
Comfortable Based on the assumption
that high-income households
would target PLSA
comfortable if achievable.
Maximum desired
expenditure as a proportion
of pre-retirement salary, for
low income
80% Based on the assumption
that households target lower
expenditure after retirement
(compared to before
retirement). We have seen
estimates of this target
ranging from 60%-80% of
pre-retirement income. Given
that this is a cap applied only
when the PLSA target is
relatively high, and that low
income households face fixed
costs, we use 80%.
Maximum desired
mid income
(compared to before
relatively high, we use 70%.
Maximum desired

high income
(compared to before
relatively high, and that high
income households face
variable costs, we use 70%.
Nominal increase in spending
needs over the course of
retirement (weighted
average across all spending
categories), as applied to the
desired level of expenditure
1.20% This conservative assumption
models that real spending
needs reduce with age (as it
is below CPI).

Table A14: Assumptions over costs associated with care
Care scenario: 3 years of
level costs associated with
care (2025 prices)
£350 per week Based on 14 hours a week of
care costing £25.00 per
hour.
Care scenario: 3 years of
increasing costs associated
with care (2025 prices)
£350 per week (year 1)
£700 per week (year 2)
£1,049 per week (year 3)
Based on 14 hours a week of
care costing £25.00 per
hour; and 28 hours a week
of care costing £25.00 per
hour. This is capped at the
cost of paying for residential
care. This is because, once
the cost reaches this level,
the household may move
towards residential care. This
figure is based on
LaingBuisson data for
residential care, published by
www.payingforcare.org
The threshold for savings
under which the state will
contribute to care costs (in
2025 prices)
£23,250 for a single
£46,500 for a couple
Based on current state
support thresholds.
The proportion of costs
associated with care paid by
the state, once the person is
eligible for means-tested
support
60% for high income
70% for mid income
80% for low income
In practice, this proportion
can vary depending on the
circumstances of the
household. This is a
conservative assumption, as
many households are likely
to pay significantly more
than 20-40% towards the
costs associated with care.
Aggregating the impact of later life lending across the
population
We aggregate the individual combinations on the basis of the following assumptions.
• 33% of households experience market returns of 2.50% after fees, with another 33%
experiencing 4.50%, and the final 33% experiencing 6.50%.

• 30% of households have an outstanding mortgage at age 60. This is higher than the current
proportion, whilst being lower than some have predicted based on current mortgage terms
for those in their 30s and 40s. Predictions based on current mortgage term may
overestimate the likelihood of having an outstanding residential mortgage in later life, as
some people are able and willing to repay their mortgage at a faster rate.
• 11.1% of households have a DB pension.
• 18.5% of households have 50% DB pension, and 50% DC annuity.
• 18.5% of households have a DC annuity.
• 25.9% of households have a DC drawdown and withdraw at 4% of the initial pot size.
• 25.9% of households have a DC drawdown and withdraw at 8% of the initial pot size.
• 29% of households experience a care-related cost shock at some point during their later life.
In the year 2040, a modelled 3% of the population 60+ are facing a cost shock, with 8% of
the population 85+ doing so.
• 80% of households retire at 67, with 20% retiring at 60. We assume that those with higher
income are relatively more likely to choose to retire at 60.
We have assumed an average UK real GDP growth rate of 1.2% per annum, in line with recent
consensus forecasts.

Contact us
Email: corporate@fairerfinance.com
Fairer Finance
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London EC2A 4NJ
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Fairer Finance Ltd is registered in England & Wales with number 10690640, and with registered address 24a, St.
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