The Geopolitics of Undersea Cable Resilience
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The document discusses the critical role of undersea cables in global internet connectivity, highlighting their extensive reach and the significant volume of traffic they handle. It focuses on Taiwan's reliance on undersea cables for internet access and the potential geopolitical risks and opportunities posed by shifts in cable systems, particularly concerning China and the South China Sea. The paper also recommends strategies for Taiwan to enhance its digital resilience, including developing its satellite capabilities and improving cable infrastructure.
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The Geopolitics of Undersea Cable Resilience
- 1. The Geo-eco-techno-politics of Undersea Cable Resilience INTPOL 263 Winter 2025 Charles Mok, Global Digital Policy Incubator, Cyber Policy Center January 11, 2025
- 2. Undersea cables in the spotlight 2
- 3. The importance of undersea cables 3 • >570 cable systems globally • Carry >99% of global Internet traffic • 1.4 million km = circling the Earth >100 times • Typical physical size: 1 inch in diameter, similar to your garden hose • The core optical fibers are made of pure silica, i.e. glass • Long-term, capital-intensive investments, and not owned by governments (at least, not directly) • From telecom consortiums to big tech • 70% of undersea cable cuts, though, are indeed considered “unintentional” • From accidental to “gray zone tactics”
- 4. Internet connectivity during conflicts 4
- 6. The case of Taiwan 6 • “Strengthening Taiwan’s Critical Digital Lifeline — An Analysis of Taiwan’s Undersea Cable Network Resilience” by Charles Mok and Kenny Huang • https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/gdpi/ publication/strengthening-taiwans- critical-digital-lifeline • Summary article: https:// www.techpolicy.press/the-most- critical-resilience-questions-of-them- all-taiwans-undersea-cables/
- 7. The importance of undersea cables to Taiwan and the world 7 • Taiwan is connected to the world via 15+ undersea cable systems, providing over 100 Tbps of Internet bandwidth to over 21 million users, at >90% Internet penetration, one of the highest in the world, supporting Taiwan’s business, education, research and public sectors, including its semiconductor industry that has a 68% global market share, etc.
- 8. Geopolitical realignment of undersea cable systems in East Asia 8 • Where do transpacific undersea cable systems between North America and East/Southeast Asia go? • China’s claim in South China Sea: • Impossible applications and “approval” delays • Decline of Hong Kong as a regional Internet hub • US ban since 2019 • Risks and opportunities for Taiwan, and other Asian countries?
- 9. Is satellite communications the answer for Taiwan? 9
- 10. Taiwan’s alternative satellite backup plan 10
- 11. Taiwan goes to the sky 11 • Taiwan wants its own satellite network — LEO (low earth orbit) and MEO (medium earth orbit). • Also working with Eutelsat OneWeb, and others.
- 12. Can satellites substitute for undersea cables? 12 • “The total carrying capacity of a submarine cable is in the terabits (1 trillion) per second, while a satellite typically offers only 1 gigabit (1billion) per second, a ratio of more than 1000 to 1. Satellites handle less than 5% - to an estimate of even even 0.5% - of global data transmission.” • Comparable latency — 30-60 milliseconds — with slight advantage for cables • Lack of diversity for satellite providers — Starlink and everybody else • The need for the presence of earth stations • Typically only sufficient for critical use (e.g. government, military) only
- 13. Some recommendations for Taiwan 13 1. Investigate the validity of a cable repair industry in Taiwan 2. Make smart investment in Taiwan’s satellite capabilities 3. Seek strategic cooperation on digital resilience with neighbors 4. Elevate digital resilience strategy to central policy level 5. Set up a multi-stakeholder expert group on digital resilience 6. Establish cybersecurity standard practice for the cable industry 7. Incentivize more investments in undersea cable infrastructure 8. Formulate a grey zone aggression mitigation strategy
- 14. Mitigating grey zone aggression 14
- 15. Economic development vs. national security? 15
- 16. 16 Charles Mok Research Scholar Global Digital Policy Incubator Cyber Policy Center, Stanford University [email protected] @charlesmok