Gr macro monitor july 2017

Fiscal policy relaxation in a depressed economy
Can there be a “Free Lunch” for Greece?
Dr. Platon Monokroussos
Group Chief Economist
Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
July, 2017

 This study leans on the literature on regime-dependent fiscal multipliers and the existence of hysteresis effects to
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a further relaxation of the agreed fiscal targets for Greece could not only
benefit the country’s growth outlook, but might also lead to improved (rather than worsened) fiscal dynamics in the
medium- and long-run.
 This, rather counter-intuitive, argument is based on the assumption that fiscal multipliers are higher (and more
persistent) than usual when the economy features a massive output gap as a result of a severe recession and also that a
cyclical boost in output caused by an expansionary fiscal policy move may have a permanent positive effect on future
potential output.
 Although quite diverse views continue to exist among professional economists and policy makers as regards the
quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy, a more recent strand of the relevant literature appears to support the
regime-dependence of fiscal multipliers i.e., higher effects on output due to discretionary policy shocks in periods of deep
economic contractions than in normal economic times or expansions.
 As regards hysteresis, i.e. the notion that in a depressed economy featuring ample cyclical unemployment and excess
capacity, an expansionary fiscal policy shock could prove self-financing, i.e. instigate both an improvement in the future
potential output and a decline in the debt to GDP ratio in the medium- and long-term (and vice versa for the case of a
contractionary fiscal policy shock), the literature has proposed a host of mechanisms to substantiate the existence of
such effects.
 In the case of a fiscal policy-induced cyclical downturn in an economy already featuring a sizeable negative output gap,
such effects may include, inter alia, reduced labor force attachment on the part of the long-term unemployed, scarring
effects on young workers who have trouble beginning their careers, lower physical and human capital investments,
reduced R&D expenditure, and changes in managerial attitudes.
 In Greece, an unprecedented in size (and heavily front-loaded) fiscal consolidation programme has been implemented
since 2010 to engineer an internal devaluation and correct the earlier acute macroeconomic imbalances. This facilitated a
huge improvement in the country’s fiscal accounts, but it has broadly failed so far to stabilize public debt dynamics. And
this, despite the aforementioned fiscal adjustment as well as any beneficial effects stemming from the PSI operation and
the broadly concessional interest rates currently paid on official-sector loans.
 Indeed, over the period 2010-2016, the general government primary fiscal balance has improved by c. 14ppts-of-GDP
(and by 19.2ppts-of-GDP in cyclically adjusted terms), while the gross public debt to GDP ratio has increased by
52.3ppts. Furthermore, real GDP losses amounted to c. 25ppts, while real potential output was at the end of 2016 lower
by 13.7ppts relative to its end-2009 level (AMECO data).
Summary of views & key findings

 In view of the aforementioned, the study provides a quantitative assessment of a number of scenarios for the evolution of
Greece’s GDP and other important variables such as the general government fiscal balance and the gross public debt
ratio under a hypothetical permanent relaxation of the agreed target for the primary surplus, to 2.2%-of-GDP from 2018
onwards.
 Assuming a range of (plausible) values for the short-term (impact) fiscal multiplier and for some other key parameters
used in the exercise (e.g. multiplier persistence and hysteresis coefficients), the study demonstrates that, under certain
conditions, the said fiscal policy intervention (relaxation of the primary surplus target) could lead to both higher GDP
levels and a lower debt to GDP ratio in the medium- and long-term relative to the current, no-policy-change baseline.
 It is important to note that in the self-financing fiscal relaxation scenarios presented in the study, the assumed values for
the above mentioned parameters broadly fall in the acceptable range of values for crisis episodes used in some recent
empirical studies conducted by the European Commission.
 Furthermore, the assumed values for the short-term multipliers are broadly in line with the multipliers for crisis-hit
economies reported in some recent empirical studies, including the ones published earlier by Eurobank Economic
Research (to our knowledge, the most comprehensive empirical studies for regime-dependent fiscal multipliers in Greece
published thus far).
 Although the empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers and the existence or not of hysteresis effects remain highly
debatable topics in leading academic and policy cycles, we believe that the present study constitutes a valuable addition
to the relevant debate.
 From a policy standpoint, we see value in revisiting/re-evaluating the agreed short-, medium- and long-run fiscal policy
path in Greece, with a view to minimizing the negative macroeconomic effects implied by the (still-demanding) targets for
the general government primary surplus.
Summary of views & key findings (continued)

Part I
Fiscal policy relaxation in a depressed economy
Can there be a “Free Lunch” for Greece?

Source: AMECO (European Commission)
An unprecedented (and front-loaded) fiscal adjustment that inescapably
exacerbated the huge contraction of domestic output

Structural Balance of General Government Excluding
Interest (% Potential GDP) in 2016
Source: AMECO (European Commission)
Greece currently features the highest structural fiscal balance in the EA

Source: EC Compliance Report - The Third Adjustment Programme for Greece, Second Review (Jun. 2017), Eurobank Economic Research
Gross public debt & gross financing needs (*)
(% of GDP)
European Commission’s baseline DSA scenario for Greece
EC baseline scenario
Key assumptions
(*) The depicted evolution of the public debt & GFN ratios may
deviate somewhat from what is projected in the Commission’s
DSA due to differences in some underlying assumptions
Nominal GDP growth
between 4.3% and 4.0% in 2018-
2030; 3.2% afterwards
General government primary
suplus (% GDP)
3.5% in 2018-2022; 3.0% in 2023;
2.5% in 2024; 2.2% afterwards
Privatization revenue
(full, projection horizon)
€17bn
Set aside for bank recap needs
(EUR bn)
none
Market refinancing rates (%)
5.10% in 2019; 5.50% 2021; slowly
converging thereafter towards 4.3%
by 2060
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
17%
19%
21%
23%
25%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
2017
2019
2021
2023
2025
2027
2029
2031
2033
2035
2037
2039
2041
2043
2045
2047
2049
2051
2053
2055
2057
2059
Debt (left axis) GFN (right axis)

Source: Eurobank Economic Research
How a fiscal policy intervention may affect the evolution of the debt ratio
Let us assume that a discretionary fiscal policy shock is implemented by the domestic authorities in the current
period e.g. the fiscal authority introduces measures aiming to improve (increase) the primary general government
balance by one unit.
The aforementioned intervention influences the debt to GDP ratio in the current period (and, maybe, in future periods if the
ensuing fiscal drag shows a certain degree of persistence) via the following three (3) channels:
― 1st numerator effect: fiscal intervention causes a one-to-one increase in the primary fiscal balance;
― 2nd numerator effect: the aforementioned effect is partially offset (and, in certain instances, more than outweighed) by the
impact of automatic stabilizers e.g. lower tax revenues/higher unemployment benefits due to the ensuing economic
contraction (fiscal drag);
― denominator effect: fiscal intervention causes a decline in economic activity and thus, it reduces the denominator of the
debt-to-GDP.
The first of the above mentioned effects tends to reduce the debt to GDP ratio, while the latter two tend to increase it.
 In periods when 1st numerator effect < 2nd numerator effect + denominator effect, the fiscal consolidation is self-
defeating.
 In periods when the above relationship holds for a fiscal relaxation, the said policy intervention is self-financing.
 In the case of Greece, the public debt to GDP ratio increased by c. 69.5ppts-of-GDP between 2008 and 2016, despite the
PSI exercise and the sharp improvement in the primary fiscal balance (by 9.3ppts-of-GDP) over that period.
 Clearly, the aforementioned analysis suggests that the fiscal consolidation programmes implemented in Greece over the
last several years have so far failed to stabilize the country’s public debt dynamics.

Source: Eurobank Economic Research, Bousard, J., Castro F. and Salto M. “Fiscal Multipliers and Public Debt Dynamics in Consolidation”
European Commission Economic Papers 460/July 2012
Greece: simulation exercise
Can a relaxation of the agreed medium-term fiscal target be self-financing?
In the following pages, we present the projected evolution of Greece’s gross public debt to GDP ratio under four (4)
hypothetical scenarios, denoted S1, S2, S3 & S4.
― All scenarios assume that the official target for the general government primary balance (as % of GDP) is adjusted to 2.2%,
from 2018 onwards (i.e., over the full projection horizon 2018-2060).
― For simplicity, the said intervention (in our case, fiscal relaxation vs. the assumed baseline) is hypothesized to be
exogenous, discretionary and of permanent nature i.e., not to be reversed by an offsetting policy move in the future.
― This compares with the following path for the primary balance to GDP ratio agreed at the Eurogroup of 15 June, 2017:
FY-2017: 1.75%; period 2018-2022: 3.5%; FY-2023: 3.0%; FY-2024: 2.5%; period 2025-2060: 2.2%.
― Crucially, the scenarios under examination incorporate different assumptions regarding: the first-year (impact) multiplier,
the degree of multiplier persistence and the long-run impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation (herein, a proxy for
the existence of “hysteresis” effects).
― Furthermore, the market interest rate for refinancing Greek debt is assumed to increase by 3bps per 1ppt deviation of the
debt-to-GDP ratio from the 60% threshold. This is in line with what is assumed in the EC’s latest (June 2017) baseline
DSA analysis for Greece.
― In all scenarios under examination, the reaction of automatic stabilizers to the change in output growth caused by the
hypothesized policy intervention (herein, a permanent reduction in the primary balance to GDP target from 3.5% to 2.2%
from 2018 onwards) is captured by a cyclical semi-elasticity of government balance to the output gap of 0.42. This is in
line with the European Commission services’ calculations, as presented in Boussard et al., (2012).
Key parameter values used in the simulation exercise
 Fiscal multipliers are assumed to follow the convex, autoregressive decay path presented in page 10 of this document.
 The first-year (impact) multiplier is assumed to take the following discrete value: 0.75 (low), 1.5 (intermediate), 2.0 (high)
and 2.5 (very high). These are in line with the values assumed in some recent papers published by the European
Commission services (see e.g. Bousard et al., 2012) as well the estimates found in a couple of relevant empirical studies
for Greece, see e.g. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos, 2012 & 2013 (see also technical appendix of this document).
 α (persistence parameter): 0.30 (low), 0.60 (intermediate), 0.80 (high) and 0.90 (very high).
 β (long-run impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation): 0.30 (high), 0.10 (intermediate), 0.0 (no long-term
impact).
 Parameters a and β are assumed to follow a normal distribution with the assumed values falling within the respective
ranges for crisis episodes reported in Boussard et al., (2012).

Source: Boussard et al. (2012); EC (2013), Eurobank Economic Research
Greece: simulation exercise
Assumed fiscal multipliers & key parameter values
scenario
acronym
Scenario
characteristics
m1
first-year (impact)
multiplier
α
persistence parameter
β
long-run impulse
response of GDP to fiscal
consolidation
fiscal target
adjusted to 2.2% of GDP
from 2018 onwards
S1
high impact multiplier
value/ high multiplier
persistence / positive long-
run GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
2.0 0.80 0.30 2.2%
S2
high impact multiplier
value/ high multiplier
relaxation
2.5 0.90 0.30 2.2%
S3
intermediate impact
multiplier value/
intermediate multiplier
relaxation
1.5 0.60 0.10 2.2%
S4
low impact multiplier
value/ low multiplier
persistence / no long-run
GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
0.75 0.30 0.00 2.2%

Source: Boussard et al. (2012); EC (2013), Eurobank Economic Research
Technical highlights
In order to incorporate multiplier persistence &
hysteresis in our simulation exercise we follow
Boussard et al. (2012)1 and European Commission
(2013)2 and assume:
Fiscal multipliers follow the following convex,
autoregressive decay path:3
mt,i = (m1 – β)αi-t + β, with t=1,...,τ and i = t, t+1,…,T
where,
m1 is the impact (i.e., first year) multiplier;
mt,i is the fiscal multiplier applying at time i to the
fiscal consolidation/relaxation done in year t (i ≥ t);
a: persistence parameter (0 <α < 1);
β: hysteresis parameter, representing the long-run
impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation/
relaxation (no assumption on the sign of β)
Α negative value of β indicates that “hysteresis” effects
are present (see e.g. de Long and Summers, 2012);
such a situation may arise when e.g. a cyclical
downturn today (vs. the assumed baseline) casts a
shadow (has a negative impact) on future potential
output.
By the same logic, a positive value of β represents a
situation in which a cyclical upturn boosts future
potential output.
For β = 0, it is assumed that there are no hysteresis
effects.
Multiplier assumptions
Modelling multiplier persistence & hysteresis
Stylized paths of GDP impulse responses
used in the simulation
1. “Fiscal Multipliers and Public Debt dynamics in Consolidations”
2. “Effects of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2013 Stability and
Convergence Programmes on public debt dynamics in EU Member
States”
3. This decay function reproduces relatively well the shape of the impulse-
response function by typical DSGE models for most of the permanent fiscal
shocks (see Bussard et al., 2012).
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
t=7
t=8
t=9
t=10
t=11
t=12
t=13
t=14
t=15
t=16
t=17
t=18
t=19
t=20
m1=1.0; α=0.6; β=-0.2
m1=1.0; α=0.3; β=0
m1=1.0; α=0.6; β=0.2

Source: European Commission Compliance Report, The Third Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Second Review (Jun. 2017)
& Eurobank Economic Research
Simulation analysis - Scenarios S1, S2, S3, S4
Evolution of nominal GDP & gross public debt to GDP ratio
Green-shaded areas indicate a self-financing fiscal expansion
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 174.6 167.2 159.9 153.0 146.8 123.1 109.3 99.9 91.7
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 187.7 195.2 203.0 210.9 219.2 287.8 397.7 545.0 746.8
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 170.5 164.3 158.1 152.3 147.3 123.3 108.5 98.7 90.4
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 192.6 199.5 206.7 214.2 222.1 289.1 398.6 545.8 747.5
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 169.1 162.7 156.3 150.4 145.1 120.6 106.1 96.8 88.9
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 193.8 200.8 208.1 215.6 223.4 290.0 399.0 545.9 747.6
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 171.8 166.6 161.0 155.5 150.7 127.0 111.9 101.6 92.8
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 191.4 197.5 204.5 211.9 219.8 288.0 398.0 545.3 747.0
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 173.8 168.8 163.0 157.4 152.4 128.4 113.2 102.8 93.8
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 189.5 195.8 203.2 211.0 219.2 287.8 397.7 545.0 746.8
European Commission
baseline
(June 2017)
Scenario S1
high impact multiplier/high
multiplier persistence /
positive long-run GDP response
to fiscal relaxation
Scenario S2
high impact multiplier/high
Scenario S3
intermediate impact
multiplier/intermediate
Scenario S4
low impact multiplier/low
multiplier persistence / no long-
relaxation

Part II
Technical Appendix & related literature

Fiscal multipliers
Key definitions
The term fiscal multiplier refers to the ratio of a change in output (ΔΥ) to an exogenous change in the fiscal balance,
be it a change in government spending (ΔG) or a change in government revenue (ΔΤ) or a combination of the two.1
Depending on the time horizon considered, there are several relevant ratios that fit the term fiscal multiplier:
─ The impact multiplier, defined as the ratio of a contemporaneous change in output (at time t0) to an exogenous change in
the fiscal balance at time t0 i.e., ΔY(t0) / ΔG(to).
─ The multiplier at some future point in time (say, N period from now), defined as the ratio of a change in output at time
t0+N to an exogenous change in the fiscal balance at time t0 i.e., ΔY(t0 + N) / ΔG(to).
─ The cumulative multiplier, defined as the ratio of the cumulative change in output over an exogenous change in the fiscal
balance over a time horizon of N periods i.e., ΔY(t0 + i) / ΔG(to + i), with i = 0, 1,…,N.
─ The peak or maximum multiplier, defined as the ratio of the largest change in output over any time horizon N to an
exogenous change in the fiscal balance at time t0, i.e., max ΔY(t0 + N) / ΔG(to), for every N.
1. For a more extensive note on the relevant definitions and the determinants of fiscal multipliers see e.g. Spilimbergo et al. (2011), IMF Staff
Position Note (09/11).

Determinants of fiscal multipliers
A bird’s eye view on the literature
Prior theoretical and empirical work on the response of main macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous fiscal shocks has
shown that the size and, in certain instances, the sign of the fiscal multiplier can be country-, estimation method-, and
economic conditions-specific. In general, it appears that quite diverse views continue to exist among economists and policy
makers as regards the quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy.
As noted in e.g. Berti et al. (2013)1, many factors influence the size of fiscal multipliers. They can be grouped as follows:
i) the composition of the fiscal intervention and its credibility, as well as the fiscal rules adopted by the government; ii) the
effects of monetary policy on interest rates and the perceived riskiness of the sovereign; iii) the access of households and
companies to finance; iv) other economic factors, like price and wage flexibility, the exchange rate regime in which the
country operates and external demand.
Based on the existing literature, Berti et al. (2013) note that in case of financial crises fiscal multipliers tend to be larger than
usual (see, for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011). In particular, fiscal multipliers tend to be higher when
monetary policy is constrained by the liquidity trap (Christiano et al., 2011), economic agents are financially constrained
(Galí et al., 2007), important nominal price and wage rigidities are in place (Woodford, 2011; Andrés et al., 2012), economies
are relatively closed (Corsetti and Müller, 2012, and Ilzetzki et al., 2012) and exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, as in the
Euro Area (see, among others, Ilzetzki et al. ,2012, Corsetti et al., 2012, and Erceg and Lindé, 2012). When this is the case,
fiscal consolidation possibly entails short-term increases in the public debt-to-GDP ratio of the consolidating countries, due
to its short-term negative impact on economic activity. The higher the initial debt ratio and the greater the budget elasticity
to the cycle, the more likely this is.
One should anyway also consider that, as underlined in the literature, another key driver behind the impact of fiscal
consolidation is given by financial markets' perception of the possibility for a certain country to default on its sovereign. In
this sense, multipliers applying to consolidation efforts would not be large in instances where fiscal policy action lowers the
probability of default perceived by financial markets (see, for instance, Ilzetzki et al., 2012, Corsetti et al., 2012, and
Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito, 2013).
1. Berti K., F. Castro and M. Salto (2013) “Effects of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2013 Stability and Convergence Programmes on public
debt dynamics in EU Member States”, European Commission, Economic Papers 504/September 2013.

Are fiscal multipliers regime-dependent?
Findings of a recent meta regression analysis
Compound cum. multipliers of fiscal impulses for different regimes (*)
“UPPER” for economic upturns (actual output > potential output)
“AVERAGE” (actual output in line with potential output)
“LOWER” for economic downturns (actual output < potential output)
(*) blue-bold bars: baseline specification; green-striped bars: specification with all
possible interactions
Gechert, S. and A. Rannenberg (2014) “Are Fiscal
Multipliers Regime-Dependent? A Meta Regression
Analysis” IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, WP
139/Sept. 2014.
The study analyzes whether estimated multiplier
effects are systematically higher if the economy suffers
a downturn.
For that purpose, a meta-regression analysis is
conducted based on a unique data set of 98 empirical
studies with more than 1800 observations on
multiplier effects.
Controlling for regime dependence of the multiplier, the
Study finds that multipliers significantly increase (by
about 0.6 to 0.8 units) during a downturn.
Moreover, spending multipliers significantly exceed tax
multipliers (by about 0.3 units) in normal times and
even more so during recessions.
Based on a broad array of empirical evidence, the
study concludes that in order to limit the adverse
consequences for growth, fiscal consolidation should
take place during the recovery and should be primarily
tax-based.
On the right side of this page, see relevant figure
presented in the aforementioned study

How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers in Greece?
Findings of some recent empirical analyses
In two recent empirical studies on the macroeconomic effects of exogenous fiscal shocks in Greece, regime-
dependent fiscal multipliers are estimated for a range of key government revenue and expenditure categories; see
Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos, 20121 & 20132.
Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) employ a Multivariate Threshold Autoregressive Model (TVAR) to investigate the
time- and regime-dependent properties of Greece’s fiscal multiplies. Some of the most important findings of the
aforementioned study are summarized below:
― The response of real output to discretionary shocks in government current spending on goods and services and/or
government tax revenue depends on the regime in which the shock occurs as well as on the size and direction
(expansionary vs. contractionary) of the initial shock.
― In general, expansionary or contractionary shocks taking place in lower output regimes (economic downturns) appear to
have much larger effects on output - both on impact and on a cumulative basis - than shocks of similar sign and size
occurring in upper regimes (economic expansions).
― In lower regimes, the contractionary effects on output from a negative fiscal shock (spending cut or tax hike) rise with the
absolute size of the shock. The same applies for expansionary fiscal shocks (spending hikes or tax cuts). Similar effects
apply for fiscal shocks taking place in upper output regimes, though to a much lesser extent.
― Regarding the current fiscal adjustment programme in Greece, our empirical results appear to support the case for a more
gradual implementation profile of the agreed austerity package for 2013-2016. This is especially because, the
aforementioned programme is heavily front-loaded, relying mainly on steep cuts in government expenditure items that are
understood to have large fiscal multipliers e.g. wages and pensions.
― Given the overall size of Greece’s fiscal adjustment programme, our multiplier estimates suggest that Greek GDP will
decline by up to €1.89 cumulatively over a three-year period per €1 discretionary decrease in real government spending on
goods and services.
― Furthermore, our estimates argue in favor of higher public investment spending in the current depressionary environment
as a means of boosting short- and medium-term economic growth. In particular, our GIRF estimates imply among others
that for a 5% YoY positive discretionary shock in the public investment programme, real output rises by between €2.91
and €3.99 cumulatively over a 12 quarter period per €1 increase in real investment expenditure.
1. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2012) “Fiscal Multipliers in deep economic recessions and the case for a 2-year extension in Greece’s
austerity programme” Eurobank Economic Research, October 2012.
2. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) “Greek fiscal multipliers revisited: Government spending cuts vs. tax hikes and the role of public
investment expenditure” Eurobank Economic Research, March 2013.

How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers in Greece?
Findings of some recent empirical studies
Source: Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) “Greek fiscal multipliers revisited:
Government spending cuts vs. tax hikes and the role of public investment expenditure”
Eurobank Economic Research, March 2013.
Output response to government current expenditure shocks
(G: real government spending on goods and services; T: real government taxes
net of transfers & property income; Y real output )

On hysteresis and self-defeating/self-financing fiscal interventions
The specter of self-defeating consolidations was initially raised in Gros (2011)1, where a simple framework was utilized to
show that austerity could indeed increase the debt ratio in the short-run. In a similar vein, Delong and Summers (2012)2
suggest that in a depressed economy even a small amount of “hysteresis” - i.e., a small impact on potential output due to the
economic downturn – means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing. Although the
authors clarify that their argument “does not justify unsustainable fiscal policies, nor does it justify delaying the passage of
legislation to make unsustainable fiscal policies sustainable” it is clear that the notion of hysteresis takes particular
importance for fiscal consolidations undertaken during deep economic downturns, where multipliers are likely to be both
high and persistent i.e., their recessionary effects stretch well beyond the year when the fiscal adjustment is applied.
A number of mechanisms have been suggested in the literature to substantiate the notion of hysteresis. Some of these
include (see Delong and Summers, 2012):
― reduced labor force attachment on the part of the long-term unemployed;
― scarring effects on young workers who have trouble beginning their careers;
― reductions in government physical and human capital investments as social insurance expenditures make prior claims
on limited public financial resources;
― reduced investment both in research and development and in physical capital;
― reduced experimentation with business models and informational spillovers, and changes in managerial attitudes;
― other effects.
1. Gros, Daniel, 2012, "Can Austerity Be Self-defeating?" CEPS, Intereconomics : review of European economic policy.- Berlin : Springer, ISSN
1613-964X, ZDB-ID 2066476X. - Vol. 47.2012, 3, p. 175-184.
2. Delong, J. Bradford & Summers, Lawrence H., 2012, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy “ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2012, The Brookings Institution.

Can an expansionary fiscal policy in a depressed economy be self-financing?
“In a depressed economy, with short-term nominal interest rates at their zero lower bound [or with monetary policy being
constrained because of the institutional arrangements of the euro area - phase within brackets is our addition], ample cyclical
unemployment, and excess capacity, increased government purchases would be neither offset by the monetary authority
raising interest rates nor neutralized by supply-side bottlenecks. Then even a small amount of hysteresis—even a small
shadow cast on future potential output by the cyclical downturn—means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy
is likely to be self-financing. Even if it is not, it is highly likely to pass the sensible benefit-cost test of raising the present value
of future potential output. Thus, at the zero bound, where the central bank cannot or will not but in any event does not perform
its full role in stabilization policy, fiscal policy has the stabilization policy mission that others have convincingly argued it lacks
in normal times. Whereas many economists have assumed that the path of potential output is invariant to even a deep
and prolonged downturn, the available evidence raises a strong fear that hysteresis is indeed a factor. Although nothing in
our analysis calls into question the importance of sustainable fiscal policies, it strongly suggests the need for caution
regarding the pace of fiscal consolidation.”
Delong and Summers (2012)1

A reduced-form framework for assessing under what conditions fiscal
expansion is self-financing
In line with Delong and Summers (2012)1, let us assume:
A temporary increase in government spending by ΔG, measured in percentage-point -of-potential-GDP-years.
A reduction of the present period’s output gap, Υn (“n” for “now”) by an amount ΔΥn (also measured in percentage point-
years), due to the aforementioned policy intervention:
(1) ΔΥn = μ*ΔG , where μ is the short-term (impact) multiplier coefficient
Financing this expansion of government purchases requires increasing the national debt by an amount ΔD, also measured in
percentage-point-of-potential-GDP-years. Given μ as before and assuming a baseline marginal tax-and-transfer rate t, the
required increase in the national debt is then:
(2) ΔD = (1-μτ)*ΔG.
If now the economy’s long-run growth rate is g and the real government borrowing rate is r, this additional debt ΔD imposes
on the government an annual financing burden in percentage points of a year’s potential GDP of:
(3) (r-g)*ΔD = (r-g)*(1-μτ)*ΔG , if it is to maintain a stable long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.
Assume next that in future periods production is determined by supply and that there is no gap between real aggregate
demand and potential output. Then, in a typical future period, potential and actual output Yf (where “f ” stands for “future”)
will be reduced by a hysteresis parameter η times the depth by which the economy is depressed in the present:
(4) ΔYf = η*ΔΥn = η*μ*ΔG.
A fiscal expansion undertaken to prevent hysteresis thus creates a fiscal dividend; it raises future tax collections by an
amount:
(5) τ*ΔYf = τ*η*μ*ΔG.
Equations (3) and (5) together imply that if:
(6) (r-g)*(1-μτ) - η*μ*τ ≤ 0,
then at the margin, transitory expansionary fiscal policy is self-financing.
Rearranging equation 6, we can show that this net future fiscal dividend from the present-period fiscal expansion DG arises
as long as r satisfies:
(7) r ≤ g + η*μ*τ / (1-μτ)

Critical Values for the real effective interest rate on debt for a fiscal
expansion to be self-financing
Parameter values for base case
Parameter Interpretation Value range
μ Present-period government spending multiplier 0-2.5
r Real government borrowing rate & social rate of time discount, per year 0.025-?
g Trend growth rate of potential GDP, per year 0.0095-0.0125
τ Marginal tax-and-transfer rate 0.33-0.40
η Hysteresis: proportional reduction in potential output from a temporary downturn 0.0-0.2
Critical Values of the Real Treasury Rate for Fiscal Expansion to Be Self-Financing
Hysteresis η μ = 0 μ = 0.5 μ = 1.0 μ=1.5 μ=2.0 μ=2.5
0.000 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
0.025 1.00% 1.53% 2.35% 3.76% 6.83% 18.50%
0.050 1.00% 2.06% 3.69% 6.53% 12.67% 36.00%
0.100 1.00% 3.12% 6.38% 12.05% 24.33% 71.00%
0.200 1.00% 5.24% 11.77% 23.11% 47.67% 141.00%
Critical real Treasury interest rate for individual value of
multiplier μ (% per year)
In line with Delong and Summers (2012)1,

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Gr macro monitor july 2017

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Gr macro monitor july 2017